

THE ETHICS OF REASON AND THE ETHICS

OF REASON

(Kantian and Nietzschean Ethics)

ACF2

8457 Ethics of Practical Reason by Kant

BA

Grundgesetze = a thesis of the metaphysics of ethics by Kant

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Metaphysics of ethics  
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What ought I to do, is a question that does not necessarily proceed from a discontentment with existing conditions. It has been asked by every human who, rising above the bestiality of acting upon sheer motivation, and therefore of necessity, has considered his capacity to act upon resolution, arrived at by an examination of concepts, and therefore, freely. Often, this question has not only implied dissatisfaction, but has arisen straight from that root. So often has this been the case, that any use of the concept "ought", has come to betray a position that things ought to be otherwise, that things ought to become different. It is not difficult, to recognize at once, how many of our known ethical systems are, on this basis, philosophies of desirability, based upon a desire that everything should be different. Depending of the depth of the insight of the ethical theorist into the reality of existence, the "is" of the world over against <sup>to</sup> "ought", as to whether that insight was limited to the phenomena or extended through to the thing-in-itself, these philosophies have invariably arrived at the welfare and happiness of men, or the denial and annihilation of life. Something seems to be wrong with these philosophies from the very start. Their "thus should it be" appears as a piece of human criticism and arrogance, the expression of a need which would fain have the whole world topsy-turvified as to accord with their desiderata, and therefore, condemnable as ludicrous, from the start. On the other hand, one could find a way out of this state of mind, by grasping its violence and stupidity and the damaging criticism of the whole that it involves, and setting on to ascertain, humbly and truthfully, what exist and how it exists.

(1) - idealistically-realistic philosophy

What ought I to do? is a question that does not necessarily proceed from a dissonance with existing conditions. It has been asked by every human who, rising above the passivity of seeing upon sheer motivation, and therefore of necessity, has considered his capacity to act upon resolution, arrived at by an examination of concepts, and therefore, freely. Often, this question has not only implied dissatisfaction, but has arisen straight from that root. So often has this been the case, that any use of the concept "ought" has come to betray a position that things ought to be otherwise, that things ought to become different. It is not difficult to recognize at once, how many of our known ethical systems are, on this basis, and therefore of desirability, based upon a desire that everything should be different. Depending on the depth of the insight of the ethical theories into the reality of existence, the "view" of the world over against "ought" as to whether that insight was limited to the phenomena or extended through to the thing-in-itself, these philosophies have invariably arrived at the welfare and happiness of man, or the denial and annihilation of life. Something seems to be wrong with these philosophies from the very start. Their "ought" should be put against as a piece of human error and errorance, the expression of a need which would have the whole world topy-curried as to accord with their desiderata, and therefore, controllable as individuals, from the start. On the other hand, one could find a way out of this state of mind, by grasping its violence and stupidity and the dragging evidence of the whole that it involves, and help to rectify, liberate and purify, what exists and how it exists.

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This is a more serious task, as compared with the phantasmagoric portrayal of things as they ought to be. But as such, the question is not yet ethical, for to be so, we understand it to imply some sort of resolve for the conducting of things to a something that is not yet, but which we want to be. Limited to the "is", no question is ethical while it can be anything else.

One alternative is left: Ethics must tell us what is definitely going to be, and to be ethical, is to will what is necessarily going to be. Oh, no! Ethics is not etiological science. It does not concern itself with the phenomenon; nor does it operate under the law of causation. It neither claims arrogantly to veer the ship of existence into a road that is not hers, nor lets happen what happens willy-nilly, however observed. Existence has a secret language she speaks. She surrenders her ulterior motives to that loyal soldier-son who, equipped with such plans, heads toward her end and makes her way easier, by annihilating at every moment, the thousand obstacles that impose exorbitant, often destructive detours. Ethics is neither realistically realistic, for it is not a science concerning itself with the study of the necessities becoming of reality, nor idealistically idealistic, a poetry concerning itself with the figuration of what one's imagination may fancy things; but an (1) concerning itself with ascertaining from reality what reality itself, in its hiddenmost recesses, wants to be.

This consideration commonly denominates all ethical systems, in view of their contents, and irrespective of their principles, lay a limited number of possible positions. We notice in history, however, that philosophers, in view of their principles, have differed widely while agreeing, in most cases, in respect of the conclusions and duties they deduced from those principles.

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The reason for their disagreement lies in the fact, just as every  
religion on earth, so far as it prescribes morality, does not leave  
the latter to rest on itself, but backs it by a body of dogmas.



it is sought in human nature, or in the external conditions of the world, or in anything else. The principles of ethics and the basis cannot be separated but must be kept separate.

The "is" is necessarily and closely connected with the "ought". From this connection is derived its significance to human actions as it becomes clearly understood, finally concluded, as the condition of the acting human subject. Whether this condition is an objectively real fact in the cosmos, or a subjective one in man's consciousness does not here make any difference. Without this connection, metaphysics is a sport and ethics is devoid of all foundations, and of contact with world, and a creation of pure fancy,--a pure stupidity.

As a matter of fact, ethics is not only connected with metaphysics, it depends upon it, and in the case of what is called above "idealistic ethics" it almost synthetically coincides therewith. Ethics therefore, can be built only deductively, synthetically, from metaphysics; and metaphysics can be arrived at analytically from any given system of ethics.

*Continued.*

A similar relation with metaphysics is shared by aesthetics (metaphysics of the beautiful) and it is only when all three, metaphysics of nature, metaphysics of morals and metaphysics of the beautiful, are put together, that a complete explanation of things becomes possible. The one implies both the others, just as the exhaustive comprehension of any single thing, it be an action, an object of art, or an object of nature, would necessarily postulate a similar comprehension of all else. "Do you think then," says Plato, "it is possible to understand at all adequately the nature of the soul, without understanding at the same time the nature of the whole, i.e. the totality of things?" (1)

It is natural then, with the foregoing considerations that all ethics should start by a clarification and demonstration of its first principles, although there is no necessity for its demonstrating its metaphysics. This task done, it can safely proceed to the exposition of its contents, the application of those first principles to the particular problems of human conduct. This paper will therefore treat the question of the basis of morality, as worked out by Kant, and therefrom conduct as synthetically to his ethics. To Nietzsche, however, the problem was not one that required systematic elaboration. He had no nerve for any systematic treatment; but, involved in the fury of destruction of prevalent European morality, he even assumed his first principles to be evident, and dived headlong in the wisdom of "application." We shall therefore proceed in his exposition analytically, from the contents to the first principles of his ethics.

(1) *Grundriss der Logik*, § 10, p. 10.

(1) *Phaedrus*, p. 270b.

"In a system of practical philosophy," says Kant, "we are not concerned with adducing reasons for that which takes place, but with formulating laws regarding that which ought to take place, even if it never does take place." (1) This is a jet-propelled take-off beyond the icy heights of the world, the rarer and "purer" atmosphere of philosophy. What is a law? How can a law exist for that which ought to take place, not to speak of that which never takes place?

The first essential characteristic of law as such, Kant tells us, is universality. A law as such, i.e. in the strictest sense of law, must hold for all cases at once and admit of no exceptions. Any exception will shatter it completely. There cannot be a law for me and another for you, but must inexorably remain one for all. Universality, therefore, is the form of law. For, whatever be its matter, a law must have the form of universality, or stop being a law.

A second essential characteristic of law as such is that it is not an entreaty, or an advise, but a command. Law, in itself, says Kant, can be an object of reverence and therewith a command. (2) The moral law always appears to us under human conditions, as a command or imperative, because in us reason has not full control over the inclinations. For the will of every finite rational being, law, is a law of duty. (3) Practical reason, as it were, generalizes our actions together with the inclination which is their motive.

- (1) ~~Grundlegung~~ Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Ethics. R. p. 54
- (2) Grundlegung p. R-20
- (3) ~~Kant~~ Critique of Practical Reason: p. 108

In this, the maxims of such actions are found to be, not only binding to the individual acting upon them, but, Kant would argue, for every rational subject as long as his object is the satisfaction of such inclinations. Yet, these maxims could be further worked upon, purified, i.e. abstracted from their particular references to attainment of particular results, while conserving their maxim-ity. But this maxim-ity, left over after complete purification from particulars would be nothing more than its validity for every rational agent as such. It would be merely a maxim of being rational, reasonable. A formal maxim is the maxim of following universal law as such. It is universal law.

This is a distinct petitio principii: How do we know that there are laws, at all, to which our conduct ought to be subject? That that ought to take place which never does take place? What is the legitimacy of this extraordinary assumption, Kant makes right in the preface, that purely moral laws exist; thus forcing upon us an ethics couched in the imperative terms of legislation? There is undoubtedly, a law for the human will, in so far as man belongs to nature; and this law is strictly provable and admits of no exception. It is the law of motivation, a form of the law of causation, the causation brought about by the medium of the understanding. It simply means that every action can take place in consequence of a sufficient motive. On the other hand, moral laws, apart from human institution, state ordinance or religious doctrine, cannot rightly be assumed as existing without proof. By taking such laws for granted, Kant is guilty of a petitio principii, which is all the bolder, for he at once adds that a moral law ought to imply "absolute necessity."

(1) *Grundgesetze der Metaphysik* p. 442

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(1) *Grundgesetze der Metaphysik* p. 442  
(2) *Grundgesetze der Metaphysik* p. 442  
(3) *Grundgesetze der Metaphysik* p. 442



Obligation derives its sense and meaning simply from its relation to threatened punishment or promised reward. Hence, Locke had said: "For since it would be utterly in vain to suppose a rule set to the free actions of man, without annexing to it some enforcement of good and evil to determine his will. We must, wherever we suppose a law, suppose also some reward or punishment annexed to that law." (1) Kant himself recognizes that in order to bring an untrained and unmanageable spirit into the path of virtue we must at first attract it by a view of its own advantage or alarm it by a fear of loss. (2) The will to a prospect of enjoyment may be safely joined with the moral motive, though by itself it is sufficient to determine action, as a counterpoise to the attractions of vice, it being borne in mind, that this should not be substituted to the motive of duty. (3) Consequently, what ought to be done, is, to use Kant's own terms, essentially and inevitably hypothetical, not categorical. Without these conditions, obligation loses its grounds, not to speak of the "absolute obligation" which is definitely a contradiction in adjecto.

The unthinkableness of the "absolute obligation" is proved by Kant himself, in the Critique of Practical Reason, where this obligation, said to be unconditional, nevertheless postulates more than one condition; a rewarder, a reward, and the immortality of the person to be rewarded. If we put ethics in an imperative form, making it a doctrine of duties and regard the moral worth of worthlessness of human conduct as the fulfilment or the violation of principles, we must remember that this view is undeniably derived from first, by their character of the particular agent, and theological morals, Jewish morals, and consequently, that it rests second, by their compatibility with the principles of morality.

- (1) Essay on Human Understanding: II, 33, 6.
- (2) K.p.v. p. 300, 271.
- (3) K.p.v. p. 217 and Rechtslehre, II, 216-16.

Obligation derives its force not merely from its relation to threatened punishment or promised reward. Hence, looks had said: "For since it would be utterly in vain to suppose a rule set to the free actions of man, without annexing to it some enforcement of good and evil to determine his will. We must, wherever we suppose as a law, suppose also some reward or punishment annexed to that law." (1) Kant himself recognises that in order to bring an untrained and unmanageable spirit into the path of virtue we must at first attract it by a view of its own advantage or alarm it by a fear of loss. (2) The will to a prospect of enjoyment may be easily joined with the moral motive, though by itself it is sufficient to determine action, as a counterpoise to the attraction of vice. It being borne in mind, that this should not be substituted to the motive of duty. (3) Consequently, what ought to be done, is, to use Kant's own terms, essentially and inevitably hypothetical, not categorical. Without these conditions, obligation loses its grounds, not to speak of the absolute obligation which is definitely contradictory in itself.

The unconditionality of the "absolute obligation" is proved by Kant himself, in the Critique of Practical Reason, where this obligation, said to be unconditional, nevertheless postulates more than one condition: a reward, a punishment, and the immortality of the person to be rewarded. If we put ethics in an imperative form, making it a doctrine of duties and regard the moral worth of worthlessness of human conduct as the fulfillment or the violation of duties, we must remember that this view is undeniably derived from theological morals, Jewish morals, and consequently, that it rests

(1) Essay on Human Understanding, II, 3, 3.  
(2) K.P.v. p. 300-231.  
(3) K.P.v. p. 314 and Introduction, II, 310-16.

inseparably on the assumption of man's dependence on another will, which gives him commands and announces rewards or punishments. No introduction of this view into philosophic morals can be made unsuspectingly.

This imperative form of ethics, Kant has borrowed from theological morals whose hypotheses lie at the root of his system. After him, the task of developing in turn a theology out of his morals, was easy enough. And so it was that a theology appeared depending simply on ethics. What ought to have been his first principle or hypotheses, namely, theology, he made the conclusion, and what ought to have been deduced as a conclusion, namely, the categorical imperative, he took as his hypothesis. After it has thus been turned upside down, nobody, for some time, recognized it as being what it really was, namely, the old well known system of theological morals.

According to Kant, a rational agent, so far as reason has full control over his passions, will necessarily seek his own happiness. Since man, as belonging to the sensible world, is a being with needs, reason has so far "an office which it cannot refuse", the office of serving the interests of sensibility and of seeking happiness in this world, and where possible, in the next. (1) To seek one's own happiness is not merely a maxim on which many men act: it is also an objective principle of practical reason, and is objectively necessary for a rational agent. However, particular principles of self-love, though objective, are still conditioned first, by their character and desires of the particular agent, and second, by their compatibility with the principles of morality.

only live as long as he will.  
K.P.v. p. 181

in the consideration of duties towards oneself, maxims should not be tested by their fitness to produce a systematic harmony of purposes among men if they were to become universal laws of value, but by reference to harmony of purpose, a harmony between the ends proposed by the maxim, when universalized as a law of nature, and "purposes of nature."

In the case of suicide, Kant holds that the determination of self-love is the furtherance of life, (1), that this is its purpose or function and not merely its effect. If I conceive myself as having created man and given him self-love with this end in view, can I will it to be a law of nature that this self-love should in certain circumstances aim at producing death? Kant's answer is "no!"

But doesn't Kant give this answer because he already assumes suicide to be wrong? Why should it not be a merciful dispensation of Providence that the same instinct which ordinarily leads to life might lead to death when life offered nothing but continuous pain? Wouldn't the principle of self-love itself, which Kant regards as rational principle of reason at the service of desire, be in contradiction with itself if it did not vary in its effects according as pleasure exceeded pain or vice versa? Unlike animals; man is not only a prey to bodily pain limited to the passing moment, but also to incomparably greater mental sufferings, which draw upon the future and the past; and nature, by way of compensation, has granted to man alone the privilege of being able to end his life at his own pleasure, before she herself sets a term to it; thus while animals necessarily live as long as they can, man need only live as long as he will.

[1] Grundlegung: p. 42-48

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In the consideration of duties towards oneself, maxims should not be tested by their fitness to produce a systematic harmony of purposes among men if they were to become universal laws of value, but by reference to harmony of purpose, a harmony between the ends proposed by the maxim, when universalized as a law of nature, and purposes of nature.

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Duties towards ourselves must, just as all others, be based either on right or on love. Duties towards ourselves based on right are impossible, because where the will assents, no injury is possible. For what I do is always what I will, what I do to myself, never any-thing but what I will, and therefore cannot be unjust. As regards duties towards ourselves based on love, ethics comes too late and finds its work already done. It is impossible to violate the duty of self-love, as it is assumed in any exigency, and used as standard to measure the worth of acts committed for the love of others. Kant himself says: "That which each man inevitably wills provided they are directed towards separating the moral motive of himself does not belong to the conception of duty." (1) What is generally left of duties towards ourselves is partly rules of worldly wisdom, partly hygienic prescriptions, neither of which belong to morals in the proper sense.

According to Kant, the task of philosophy is to distinguish from one another the a priori and empirical elements in our knowledge, and to consider what is our justification for accepting the a priori elements. As regards ethics, the task of the philosopher is, once the metaphysical problem is solved, to seek out, and if possible, to justify the supreme principle of morality. Pure ethics, must strictly be concerned with the supreme principles of morality alone. Moral principles, are to be distinguished from moral laws, like the ten commandments, which apply to men as men, (11), from moral rules, such as they statement that it may be my duty to oppose the foreign invader of my fatherland, and from still more applied, singular moral judgements. Singular and moral judgements cannot be a part of philosophy; moral rules as moral laws alike, must belong to applied

non-human rational beings such as angels whose immortality makes it ridiculous to say that they ought not to kill one another.

Kant is insistent on the need for pure ethics, and he time and again subjects to ridicule "popular" philosophies which mix up the apriori and the empirical, and grope their way by means of examples. In morals, human reason is easily set on the right path, since if we all have a duty to do, it must be possible for us to know what our duty is. (1) On his view, every human has, however, obscurely a pure philosophy of duty. (2) Examples in ethics may be allowed provided they are directed towards separating the moral motive from motives of self-interest <sup>and</sup> pleasure. (3) Kant repudiates the use of examples because they may give the impression that the concept of duty is a generalization from experience; as this in turn, may lead to a confusion of moral with non-moral motives, or to the view that duty is a mere phantom of the mind. For, we can have no certain examples of moral action: the validly asserted by any experience and thirdly, examples must be judged in the light of apriori principles and thus render any dispensation of such principles impossible.

Kant brilliantly separated the apriori from the aposteriori in human knowledge and thereafter, went on sundering the two from everywhere, ethics included. To his postulate of the existence of the moral law, he now adds another, namely, that this law is knowable apriori and is independent of all internal or external experiences. "For the apriori thought of a possible universal legislation which is merely problematical", he says, "is undconditionally

(1) Grundlegung, 391-8, 404-25. (2) K.V. 303.  
(3) M.D.S. Rechtslehre, II, 216-16.

beings towards ourselves must, just as all others, be based either on right or on love. Duties towards ourselves based on right are impossible, because where the will assents, no injury is possible. For what I do is always what I will, what I do to myself, never any-thing but what I will, and therefore cannot be unjust. As regards duties towards ourselves based on love, since some people find it work already done. It is impossible to violate the duty of self-love, as it is assumed in any expediency, and need no standard to measure the worth of acts committed for the love of others. Kant himself says: "That which each man inevitably wills of himself does not belong to the conception of duty." (1) What is generally left of duties towards ourselves is partly rules of worldly wisdom, partly hygienic prescriptions, neither of which belong to morals in the proper sense.

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(1) Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre, p. 40  
(ii) M.D.S. Tugendlehre, I, 418-19

commanded as a law without borrowing anything from experience or reason, from any external will... It is at least not impossible to conceive that law, which only applies to the subjective form of principles, yet serves as a principle of determination by means of the objective form of law in general. We may call the consciousness of this fundamental law a fact of reason, because we cannot reason it out from antecedent data of reason... but it forces itself on us as a synthetic a priori proposition which is not based on any intuition, either pure or empirical. (1)

From this definition, the implication immediately follows that such a law can only be formal, like everything else known a priori, and consequently has to do only with the form of actions, not with their essence. Kant is quite emphatic on this point: "It is useless to look for it, (the law), either subjectively in man's nature or objectively in the accidents of the external world.... Nothing whatever connected with it can be borrowed from knowledge relating to man, that is from anthropology." (2) One ought not to account to fall into the mistake of trying to derive one's principle of morality from the special constitution of human nature. <sup>3</sup> ... Everything derived from any natural disposition peculiar to man or from certain feelings and propensities, or indeed from any special trend attaching solely to human nature <sup>is</sup> not necessarily to be taken as the will of every rational being. (3) This shows, beyond all possibility of controversy, that Kant does not present the moral law as a fact of consciousness, capable of empirical proof. Instead of this, the

(1) Grundlegung, p. 142. (2) Grundlegung: preface (B) Grundlegung p. 52

non-human rational beings such as angels whose immortality makes it ridiculous to say that they ought not to kill one another. Kant is insistent on the need for pure ethics, and no time and again subjects to ridicule "popular" philosophies which mix up the a priori and the empirical, and grope their way by means of examples. In morals, human reason is really set on the right path, since it is not a duty to do, it must be possible for us to know what our duty is. (1) On his view, every human has, however, obviously a pure philosophy of duty. (2) Examples in ethics may be allowed provided they are directed towards separating the moral motive from motives of self-interest. (3) Kant repudiates the use of examples because they may give the impression that the concept of duty is a generalization from experience; as this in turn, may lead to a confusion of moral with non-moral motives, or to the view that duty is a mere phantom of the mind. For, we can have no certain examples of moral action; the validity asserted by any experience and, finally, examples must be judged in the light of a priori principles and thus render any dispensation of such principles impossible.

Kant brilliantly separates the a priori from the a posteriori in human knowledge and character, went on summing up the two forms everywhere, ethics included. To his postulate of the existence of the moral law, he now adds another, namely, that this law is known a priori and is independent of all interest or external experience. "For the a priori character of a possible universal legislation which is merely problematical," he says, "is unconditionally

(1) K.P.V. p. 142. (2) Grundlegung, p. 142. (3) Grundlegung, p. 142.

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moral law is based upon pure conceptions a priori, that is, conceptions,  
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in the air equally with ourselves." (2) Or, to say with the immortal  
Schiller: "where were theory rules, no more remains for invention."  
It is from these, or more correctly, from the mere form of their  
connection with judgements made, that a law is declared to proceed,  
which by so-called absolute necessity is supposed to be valid, and  
to be strong enough to lay bit and bridle on the surging throng of  
human desires. For this purpose, however, the law of ethics is  
the titanic might of egoism.

With this founding of ethics on the strictly a priori, entirely  
free from everything empirical, another idea is closely connected.  
The moral principle, thus established, is a synthetic proposition  
a priori, of merely formal contents, and hence, exclusively a matter  
of pure reason. It is to be regarded as valid not only for men,  
but for all possible rational beings. Indeed, it holds good for  
men only because these, per accidens, come under the category of  
rational beings. This is the reason for basing the moral principle  
on pure reason which, knowing nothing but itself, is not what it really  
is--an intellectual faculty of man--but a self-existent hypostatic  
essence.

- practice it has ever really been followed. (1) Schopenhauer:  
(1) Grundlegung p. 52. (2) Schopenhauer: The Basis of Morality, p. 44  
(1) Schopenhauer: The Basis of Morality, p. 44.

Just as intelligence in general is recognized to be an attribute of animal beings alone, and we are therefore never justified in thinking of it as existing outside and independent of animal nature; so is reason recognized as the exclusive attribute of the human race and we therefore have no right to suppose that reason exists externally to it and then proceeds to set up a genus called "Rational Being", differing from its single known species, "Man." Still less may we lay down laws for such imaginary rational beings in the abstract. To talk of rational beings external to man is like talking of heavy beings external to bodies. "One cannot help suspecting that Kant was thinking a little of the dear cherubim, or at any rate counted on their presence in the conviction of the reader." (1)

Kant has endeavored to separate pure a priori from empirical aposteriori knowledge. For this purpose, he assumed that just as we know a priori the laws of space, time and causality, so in like manner, we have the moral "plumbline" of our conduct given us prior to all experience, and revealed in a categorical imperative, an absolute "ought". Yet, Kant himself has given us to learn that space time and causality are nothing but the expression of the forms, that is, the functions of our intellect, wherewith alone, we are capable of grasping an objective world and wherein alone, such world can be mirrored; so that as we know it, the world is absolutely conditioned by these forms, and all experience must invariably and exactly coincide with them. While the moral law, is something that experience ignores or ridicules at every step and moment and as Kant himself says, is indeed doubtful whether in practice it has ever really been followed on any occasion. Is it not exactly the a priori of our knowledge of time, space and

(1) Schope Basis of Morality, p. 46.  
Kant.

Moral law is based upon pure concepts a priori, that is, concepts which are not derived from experience or external experience, and thus are a priori without exception. "Human consciousness as well as the whole external world, together with all the experience and all the facts they comprise, are swept from under our feet. We have nothing to stand on. And to add to this, we have nothing but a few entirely abstract, entirely unconnected concepts, floating in the air equally with ourselves." (2) Or to say with the immortal Bonifaz: "Where were theory rules, no more remains for invention." It is from these, or more correctly, from the mere form of their connection with judgments made, that a law is declared to proceed, which by so-called a priori necessity is supposed to be valid, and to be strong enough to lay its hand on the swinging thread of human desires, on the storm of passion, the agonies of advice and the frantic light of opinion.

With this founding of ethics on the strictly a priori, entirely free from everything empirical, another idea is closely connected. The moral principle, thus established, is a categorical proposition. A priori, categorical, formal, universal, and hence, exclusively a matter of pure reason. It is to be regarded as valid not only for man, but for all possible rational beings. Indeed, it holds good for man only because these, for a while, come under the category of rational beings. This is the reason for basing the moral principle on pure reason which, knowing no itself, is not what it really is--an intellectual faculty of man--but a self-existent hypothesis.

(1) Grundriss, p. 52. (2) Schope The Basis of Morality, p. 44.

causality, independent as this is of experience, that limits it strictly to phenomena, that is to the world as reflected in our consciousness, makes it invalid as regards the real nature of things, that is, as regards whatever exists independently of our capacity to grasp it. Now, if, in practical philosophy, moral law has as apriori origin in ourselves, must it not too, also, be only phenomenal and leave entirely untouched the essential nature of things? For it is precisely the moral principle in us that Kant represents as being in closest connection with the real essence of things, indeed, as directly in contact with it. (1) If an action is good, even if it is done for the sake of duty, we shall now expose his conception of duty. Although a good will is not necessarily one which acts for the sake of duty, yet, a will which acts for the sake of duty is good. For we should not forget the completely good and perfect will which never acts for the sake of duty as in every idea thereof, there is the thought of desires and inclinations to be overcome. A good will under human conditions is one which acts for the sake of duty. It is not good because it overcomes obstacles. It must be good apart from the obstacles it overcomes. If it were not so, our imperfect struggles toward goodness would eclipse even holiness itself. (2) Of actions which accord with duty, Kant recognizes three types: (A) Those done from immediate inclination; (B) Those done, not from immediate inclination, but from self-interest, and (C) those done neither from the one nor from the other, but for the sake of duty. (3) In order to be quite certain that we are judging the value of actions done for the sake of duty, Kant asks, us to remove the immediate inclination and assess the value of the action as it is in itself. Kant's doctrine is that the motive of duty must not only be present at the same time as inclination, but also, be the

(1) K.P.V. p. 175--228 (2) M.D.S. Tugendlehre-X, p. 397--244

(3) GR. 397-9, 16-19

(1) - Critique of Practical Reason, p. 156

of the action in its absence. Thus, for example, he asserts that when we have through grief lost the immediate inclination to live and desire nothing so much as death, there still remains the duty of preserving our life. And that in doing so, not from inclination, but ~~for~~ <sup>for</sup> duties sake, (never mind if such consideration could have ever stopped Cato or Cleopatra), the action has for the first time its genuine and unique moral worth. So far as an action is done merely from inclination---or even from such a motive as a rational desire for happiness, it has no moral worth. Actions done solely from inclination without any motive of duty, even if they should accord with duty, have no moral worth. Similarly, actions done solely for the sake of duty without any inclination have moral worth. "The purity of the moral principle can be strikingly shown only by removing from the motives of action everything that men may want as belonging to happiness." (1) Where an inclination exists as well as a will to do one's duty, there can be no moral worth in an action. Kant means that: (A) an action is good precisely in so far as it springs from a will to do one's duty; (B) Kant cannot confidently affirm an action to be good except in so far as we believe that the will to do one's duty could by itself have been sufficient to produce it without the support of any inclination; and (C) that such a belief is hazardous except in the absence of direct inclination to perform the action.

In determining one's duty, Kant starts with an action suggested to us by our inclinations. He then asks whether we can at the same time will an action of this kind as compatible with the universal moral law. Kant's doctrine is that the motive of duty must not only be present at the same time as inclination, but also, be the determining factor if our action is to be good.

(1) - Critique of Practical Reason, p. 156

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To return to our philosopher himself, we shall now expose his conception of duty. Although a good will is not necessarily one which acts for the sake of duty, yet, a will which acts for the sake of duty is good. For we should not forget the completely good and perfect will which never acts for the sake of duty as in every ideal thereof, there is the thought of a desire and inclination to overcome. A good will under human conditions is one which acts for the sake of duty. It is not good because it overcomes obstacles. It must be good apart from the obstacle it overcomes. If it were not so, our imperfect struggles toward goodness would eclipse even holiness itself. (2) Of actions which accord with duty, Kant recognizes three types: (A) Those done from immediate inclination; (B) Those done, not from immediate inclination, but from self-interest; and (C) Those done neither from the one nor from the other, but for the sake of duty. (3) In order to be quite certain that we are judging the value of actions done for the sake of duty, he asks, us to remove the immediate inclination and assess the value

(1) K.R.V. p. 175-228 (2) W.D.W. Tugendlehre, I, p. 327-328 (3) GR. 287-9, 10-19

in determining our duty, we must take no account of our inclinations nor of our happiness. We should not act with a view to gain even the feeling of moral self-approval, for in doing so, we shall lose the feeling, because it itself arises from the recognition that we have acted, not to obtain the duty, but for the sake of duty. An action done merely for the sake of this feeling, no matter how noble it is, is a self-centered action without moral worth. Even if we should blur over the motive of duty in the interests of love of goodness, Kant thinks we shall be laying ourselves open to all sorts of moral enthusiasm, to a "Schwärmerei" that will regard moral action as the meritorious manifestation of a "babbling heart". Our moral teaching should be manly, and not melting or sentimental or even grandiose. We are not "volunteers" but "conscripts" in the moral struggle, and our state of mind therein is at the best virtue and not holiness. (1)

An action, Kant asserts, has no genuine moral worth unless it be done simply as a matter of duty, and for duty's sake, without any liking for it being felt; and the character only begins to have value, if a man, who has no sympathy in his heart, and is cold and indifferent to others' sufferings, and who is "not by nature a lover of his kind", is nevertheless a doer of good actions, solely out of a pitiful sense of duty. (2) This assertion which is revolting to true moral sentiment; this apotheosis of lovelessness, this moral pedantry has been ridiculed by Schiller in his famous poem, The Philosopher:

(1) K.P.V. p.211, 150, 157, 280. (2) Grundlegung p.18

of the action is its essence. Thus, for example, he asserts that when we have through duty lost the immediate inclination to live and desire nothing so much as death, there still remains the duty of preserving our life. And that in doing so, not from inclination, but from duty, (never mind if such consideration could have been dropped out of the action) the action has for the first time its genuine and unique moral worth. So far as an action is done merely from inclination—overcome from such a motive as a rational desire for happiness, it has no moral worth. Actions done solely from inclination without any motive of duty, even if they should accord with duty, have no moral worth. Similarly, actions done solely for the sake of duty without any inclination have moral worth. The purity of the moral principle can be strikingly shown only by removing from the motives of action everything that man may want as belonging to happiness. (1) Where an inclination exists as well as a will to do one's duty, there can be no moral worth in an action. Kant means that (2) an action is good precisely in so far as it springs from a will to do one's duty; (3) Kant cannot consistently affirm an action to be good except in so far as we believe that the will to do one's duty could by itself have been sufficient to produce it without the support of any inclination; and (4) that such a belief is necessary except in the absence of direct inclination to perform the action.

In determining one's duty, Kant starts with an action suggested to us by our inclinations. He then asks whether we can do the same thing with an action of this kind as a compatible with the universal moral law. Kant's doctrine is that the motive of duty must not only be present at the same time as inclination, but also, be the determining factor if our action is to be good.

(1) - Critique of Practical Reason, p. 125

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There is a reason behind the demand for a sense of purpose, and it is not a demand for a sense of purpose in the abstract, but a demand for a sense of purpose in the concrete. It is a demand for a sense of purpose in the life of the individual, and it is a demand for a sense of purpose in the life of the community. It is a demand for a sense of purpose in the life of the nation, and it is a demand for a sense of purpose in the life of the world. It is a demand for a sense of purpose in the life of the universe, and it is a demand for a sense of purpose in the life of the God who created it.

persistently does the eye demand beauty. Inasmuch, then, as both these requirements, though made by two distinct judgements, address themselves to the same object, both must be granted satisfaction by one ~~is~~ <sup>and</sup> the same cause. The disposition of man which fits him best for fulfilling his mission as a moral being must also permit an expression that will be most advantageous to his beauty as a phenomenon. In other words, the aptitude of his moral activity ought to reveal itself by grace. (I)

Schiller is perfectly right! For the action which is prompted by respect for the moral law is good as far as it goes; and there are times when ~~an~~ <sup>such</sup> action is demanded. But it does not fulfil the conditions which Kant himself demanded of moral activity, namely, that it shall be self-determined. One kind of slavery is just as humiliating as another, and perfect freedom is found <sup>only</sup> when the act proceeds from the character of man in its entirety: from a character in which reason and sense, inclination and law are in perfect harmony. The ideal moral organization, Schiller would say as over against Kant, is that in which nature is so thoroughly disciplined that it executes with ease and precision those actions which, if it were not so disciplined, reason would, in its capacity, as intelligence, be obliged to demand; not duty,--but inclination to duty.

He may conceive of man repressing the demands of sense in order to live conformably to his reason; or subordinating the reasonable portion of his being to the sensuous and allowing him, self

(1) Schiller: Schriften, I, p. 92-3

(12) Schiller, Schriften I, S. 95-6 (13) *ib.* S. 97

self to be swept away, like other merely natural objects, by the force of physical necessity; or, finally, the inclinations may place themselves in harmony with law, and man is one with himself. (1) The beauty of conduct of which we are in search is not found in the first case, for where the sensuous nature offers an obstinate and vigorous resistance it must be met by a similar resistance on the part of spirit, but under this stern discipline, sensuousness will appear repressed, and the inner conflict will reveal, ~~itself~~, itself outwardly by constraint. A condition of pure morality then, cannot be favorable to beauty of action, which nature cannot produce except in so far as it is perfectly free; and we can never have grace of action so long as there are visible the traces of the conflict between moral freedom and the material conditions. Still less do we find beauty of action in the second case. ~~Whereas~~, under the rule of reason, the freedom of form was only restrained, here it is completely crushed by the brutal force of matter. Here the inner autonomy has vanished, and every external trace of this autonomy is entirely effaced. The grim realism with which Schiller describes the wretched witnesses of this physical and moral degradation,--- the dull, protruding eye, the relaxed lips and stupid mouth, the grasping voice and irregular breath,-- portrays how revolting man could become under such circumstances. "He does not only revolt the moral sense", Schiller says, "but the aesthetic sense also, which, not content with mere matter, but seeking true pleasure in form, will turn away from such a spectacle with disgust." (2)

Continued

(1). Schiller, Schriften X, p. 95-6 (2) ID. p. 97.

persistently does the eye demand beauty. Inasmuch, then, as both these requirements, though made by two distinct judgments, address themselves to the same object, both must be granted satisfaction by one and the same cause. The disposition of man is not his best for fulfilling his function as a moral being must also permit an expression that will be most advantageous to his beauty as a phenomenon. In other words, the splendor of his moral activity ought to reveal itself in his form. (1) Schiller is perfectly right. For the action which is prompted by respect for the moral law is good as far as it goes; and there are times when this action is demanded. It is at its best not until the conditions which demand it demand of man not only activity, namely, that it shall be self-determined, and kind of slavery is just as humiliating as another, and perfect freedom is found only when the not proceeds from the character of man in its entirety. From a character in which reason and sense, inclination and law are in perfect harmony. The ideal moral organization, Schiller would say as over against that, is that in which nature is so thoroughly disciplined that it recognizes with ease and precision those actions which, if it were not so disciplined, reason would, in its capacity, as intelligence, be obliged to demand; not duty,--but inclination to duty. It may conceive of man representing the demands of sense in order to live contentedly to his reason; or subordinating the sensuous portion of his being to the reason and allowing himself

(1) Schiller, X, p. 95-6

"Of these two relations", Schiller continues, "between the moral nature of man and his physical nature, the first makes one think of a monarchy where the strict surveillance of the ruler restrains every spontaneous moment; the second resembles an ochlocracy in which the citizen, in refusing obedience to his legitimate sovereign, finds he has liberty quite as little as the human features have beauty when the moral autonomy is suppressed---"

Now just as liberty is found between the extremes of legal oppression and anarchy, so also we shall find beauty between dignity, which bears witness to the domination exercised by mind, and voluptuousness, which reveals the domination of instinct." (1)

It is not until reason is so completely humanized that it will render due respect to nature, and nature is so completely rationalized that it will execute spontaneously the behests of reason, not till subjection, in short, gives place to perfect freedom, and man is at peace with himself, that the ideal of humanity has been fully realized. The conduct flowing from such a harmonious activity of all man's powers, Schiller calls "beautiful morality, die schöne Sittlichkeit", and the soul thus at once with itself "the beautiful soul, die schöne Seele."

"In the moral philosophy of Kant", he says, "the idea of duty is expounded with a harshness which is enough to frighten away the graces, and could easily tempt a not-too-feeble mind to seek for moral perfection in the somber paths of an ascetic and monkish life. (To matter how Kant himself has condemned such a conduct.)"

Continued

(1) Schiller: Schriften, X, p. 97

self to be swept away, like other mortal objects, by the force of physical necessity; or, finally, the inclination may place themselves in harmony with law, and man is one with himself. (1)

The beauty of conduct at which we are in action is not found in the first case, for where the human nature offers any obstacle and vigorous resistance it must be met by a similar resistance on the part of spirit, but under this stern discipline, consciousness will appear repressed, and the inner conflict will reveal itself outwardly by constraint. A condition of pure reasoning itself, cannot be favorable to beauty of action, which nature cannot produce except in so far as it is perfectly free; and we can never have grace of action so long as there are visible the traces of the conflict between moral freedom and the material conditions. Still less do we find beauty of action in the second case. Reason, under the rule of reason, the freedom of form is only restrained, but it is completely crushed by the physical force of matter. Here the inner autonomy has vanished, and every external trace of this autonomy is entirely effaced. The grim realism with which Schiller describes the weakened witness of this physical and moral degradation, the dull, protesting eye, the relaxed lips and stupid mouth, the grasping voice and irregular gait, -- portrays how revolting man could become under even element force. He does not only reveal the moral sense", Schiller says, "but the aesthetic sense also, which, not content with mere matter, but seeking true pleasure in form, will turn away from such a spectacle with disgust." (2)

(1) Schiller: Schriften, X, p. 96-8 (2) Id. p. 97.

the sufferings of other people, cannot, provided he has no  
 However much the great philosopher may have endeavored to guard  
 against this false interpretation, which must be repugnant more  
 than all else to so cheerful and independent a mind, he has  
 nevertheless given occasion for it, as it seems to me, by placing  
 in such strict and harsh opposition the two principles which act  
 upon the human will."

But what have the children of the house done, he asks, that  
 Kant should make provision only for the valets? It is true, as  
 Kant holds, that inclination is often an uncertain guide, and  
 so long as it is not the force of habit to resist it. The enemy who is  
 may prompt to the evil as well as to the good. But must we on that  
 account reject it altogether? "Because impure inclinations usurp  
 the name of virtue, is that a reason why the disinterested feelings  
 in the noblest heart should also be placed under suspicion? Because  
 the moral weakness would make the law lax enough to suit his whims  
 and caprices, there is no reason to give it a rigidity which would  
 turn the most spontaneous expression of moral freedom into slavery.  
 Under this imperative of the law, the pure will is under no less  
 restraint than the depraved; man is accused and humbled, and the  
 law which ought to be the most sublime witness of our grandeur  
 becomes the most crushing argument of our frailty. The law which  
 man has imposed upon himself comes, by this imperative form, to  
 have the aspect of a positive law imposed from without, an appearance  
 which is not entirely unjustified by the alleged radical tendency  
 in human nature to act in opposition to it." Or, to put it in  
 the sarcastic terms of Schopenhauer, "now I maintain without  
 hesitation that what opens the hand of the above described

(According to Kant) loveless door of good, who is indifferent to  
 (1) Schopenhauer: *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, p. 55. (2) Schopenhauer: *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, p. 55.

However much the Great Philosopher may have endeavored to guard against this false interpretation, which must be repugnant more than all else to an impartial and independent mind, he has nevertheless given occasion for it, as it seems to me, by placing in such strict and harsh opposition the two principles which are upon the human will.

But what have the children of the house done, he asks, that Kant should make provision only for the valet? It is true, as Kant holds, that inclination is often an uncertain guide, and may prompt to the evil as well as to the good. But what is that against rejecting it altogether? Because impure inclinations never the name of virtue, is that a reason why the disinterested feelings in the noblest heart should also be placed under suspicion? Because the moral law would make the law lax enough to suit his whims and caprices there is no reason to give it a rigidity which would turn the most spontaneous expression of moral freedom into slavery. Under this imperative of the law, the pure will is under no less restraint than the depraved; man is accused and punished, and the law which ought to be the most certain witness of our goodness becomes the most crushing argument of our frailty. The law which man has imposed upon himself comes, by this imperative form, to have the aspect of a positive law imposed from without, an appearance which is not entirely justified by the alleged radical tendency in human nature to set in opposition to it. Or, to put it in the sarcastic terms of Schopenhauer, "now I maintain without hesitation that what stands the head of the above described (According to Kant) loveless door of good, who is indifferent to

the sufferings of other people, cannot, provided he have no secondary motives, be anything else than a slavish *"Сидоровича"* (fear of gods), equally whether he calls his fetic *"Categorical Imperative"* or Fitzlipuzli. (1).

"It is only", Schiller says in a striking passage in "Anmut und Würde", "when man's moral attitude results from the united action of the two principles and thus becomes the expression of his entire humanity,---when it becomes his second nature, --- that it is secure; for as long as the spirit employs violence, so long must instinct use force to resist it. The enemy who is only overpowered and cast down can rise again, but the enemy who is reconciled is truly vanquished." (2).

While Kant had unbounded confidence in the power of reason and was jealous of its prerogatives, regarding feeling as an incompetent and dangerous guide to the will, we are rather inclined, with Schiller, to doubt the capacity of reason, considered in independence of the emotional nature, to furnish a sufficient motive for conduct, and have unlimited confidence, on the other hand, in the possibility of the education of feeling to the point where the will might surrender itself completely to its guidance, and have no occasion to fear for the consequences. It was the "children of the house" whom Kant had neglected for the valets, those exquisite souls that have been purged of fierce passions and conflicting interests, whose quick and sensitive instincts coarse and unbecomingly in conduct, and furnish shrink from the guidance through those complex moral situations whose fine points reason is unable to discern, and law too cumbersome to decide;

(1) Schopenhauer: Basis of Morality, p. 50 (2) Schiller. Schriften

the sufferings of other people, cannot, provided he have no  
secondary motives, be anything else than a slavish obedience  
(fear of God), equally whether he calls his fellow "categorical"  
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"children of the senses" whom Kant had restricted for the reason,  
those exquisite souls that have been purged of fierce passions  
and conflicting interests, whose duty and sensitive instincts  
arise from the will.

Guidance through these various moral situations whose line  
points reason's majestic discern, and law too cannot be decided;

(1) Schopenhauer, *Against the Will*, p. 50 (2) Schiller, *Schriften*  
Lp. 100

for whom, in short, duty has become a grateful task;  
"Glad hearts! Without reproach or blot;  
Who do thy work, and know it not."

In the choice between reason and incorrupted feeling, it is  
always the latter that receives our favor, as it did Schiller's.  
"Know'st thou", he warns the youth, who is about to distrust his  
heart and seek guidance of reason,  
"Know'st thou what bars thy way? how dear the bargain thou  
dost make  
Then but to buy uncertain good, sure good thou dost forsake;  
Feel'st thou sufficient strength to brave the deadliest  
human fray  
When Heart from Reason--Sense from Thought, shall rend  
themselves away?"

This will become clearer if we notice that in the same  
difficult the word 'achtung' (respect) is enforced where 'achtung'  
Fly, if thou can'st not trust thy heart to guide thee  
(obedience) is meant. Similarly, we read in Kant, "achtung" signifies  
on thy way--  
Oh! fly the charmed margin, ere the abyss engulf  
its prey,  
Round many a step that seeks the light the shades of  
midnight close;  
But in the glimmering twilight, see--how safely  
childhood goes!" (1)

(1). An einen jungen Freund als er sich der Weltweisheit  
widmete, Translated by Sir Bulwer Lytton.

Likening himself to Faust, who, by his exorcism compels  
 Mephistopheles who was in the form of a pebble to resume his true  
 form, Schopenhauer forced, by his analysis, the real meaning out  
 of Kant's language. "As it is only fair", he says, "always to put  
 the most favorable interpretation on an author's words, we will  
 suppose him, (Kant) to mean that an act true to duty is objectively  
 necessary, but subjectively accidental. Only is it so precisely  
 this way, that it is more easily said than thought; for where is  
 the object of this objective necessity, the consequence of which  
 for the most part, perhaps indeed always, fails to be realized  
 in objective reality? With every wish to be unbiassed, I cannot  
 but think that the expression--necessity of an action--is nothing  
 but an artificially concealed, very forced paraphrase of the word  
 "ought". This will become clearer if we notice that in the same  
 definition the word 'Achtung' (respect) is enforced where 'Gehorsam'  
 (obedience) is meant. Similarly, we read in Kant, "Achtung" signifies  
 simply the subordination of my will to a law. The direct determination  
 of the will by a law, and the consciousness that is so determined--  
 this is what is denoted by "Achtung". In what language? In  
 German, the proper term is Gehorsam. But the word Achtung, so  
 unsuitable as it is, cannot without a reason have been put in place  
 of the word Gehorsam. It must serve some purpose; and this is  
 obviously none other than to veil the derivation of the imperative  
 form, and of the conception of duty, from theological morals; just  
 as the expression "necessity of an action" which is such a forced  
 and awkward substitute for the word "shall", was only chosen because

for whom, in short, duty has become a gratuitous task;  
 "Glad hearted without reason or duty";  
 "No do thy work, and know it not."  
 in the choice between reason and interrupted feeling, it is  
 always the latter that receives our favor, as if the feeling were  
 "knowing" those, he warns the youth, who is about to distrust his  
 heart and seek guidance of reason.  
 "Know'st thou what duty says? how dear the bargain is!"  
 duty make  
 then but to pay uncertain good, some good thou dost forsake;  
 feel'st thou sufficient strength to brave the handiest  
 human troop  
 when heart from reason--dances from thought, shall read  
 themselves away?  
 Pity, if thou can'st not trust thy heart to guide thee  
 on thy way--  
 Oh! fly the charmed man, ere the eyes enail  
 its prey.  
 Round many a step that seeks the light the shadow of  
 midnight close;  
 but in the glimmering twilight, see--how safely  
 calmed goes!" (1)  
 (1) In einem jungen Freund als er sich der Weltweisheit  
 widmete, Translated by Sir Walter Pater.

"shall" is the exact language of the Decalogue. The above definition: 'Duty is the necessity of an action out of respect for the law', would therefore read in natural, undistinguished, plain language: "Duty signifies an action which ought to be done out of obedience to a law." This is the real des Pudels Kern! (1)

Kant ridiculed all empirical stimuli of the will, and began by removing everything, whether subjective or objective, on which a law determining the will's action could be empirically based. "It cannot be empirically determined whether any such Categorical Imperative exists anywhere---The possibility of the Categorical

Continued

rational beings. This, then, is the foundation <sup>and</sup> ~~the~~ foundation for his whole ethical system.  
 This is made perfectly clear in Remark I, of his Critique of Practical Reason, p. 145-146. Here, Kant, because he is so far as it works  
 out this principle or rather, this rationalization, resolved from Kant  
 the name of Practical Reason, and that of Categorical Imperative  
 to the law which results from his work. Consequently, Practical  
 Reason is not a special faculty, a sort of moral instinct, but as  
 Kant himself says, one and the same with theoretical reason in  
 fact. theoretical reason itself is as far as it works out the  
 categorical imperative.

The objection to which this Russian basis of morals is exposed lies in the fact that such an origin of the moral law is as in (1). Schopenhauer: Basis of Morality, p. 52. Inexplicable, measure of the description that man would of his own accord hit on the idea of looking about for, and inquiring after,

Liking himself to Kant, was, by his exoteric concepts  
 Hegelists who was in the form of a paradox to resume his true  
 form, temperament forced, by his analysis, the real meaning out  
 of Kant's language. "As it is only fair, he says, 'always to put  
 the most favorable interpretation on an author's words, we will  
 suppose him (Kant) to mean that an act true to duty is objectively  
 necessary, but subjectively accidental.' Only is it so precisely  
 this way, that it is more easily said than thought; for where is  
 the object of this objective necessity, the consciousness of which  
 for the most part, perhaps indeed always, fails to be realized  
 in objective reality? With every wish to be unbiassed, I cannot  
 but think that the expression--necessity of an action--is nothing  
 but an artificially conceived, very forced paraphrase of the word  
 "ought". This will become clearer if we notice that in the same  
 distinction the word "ought" (respect) is enforced where "dehors"  
 (obedience) is meant. Similarly, we read in Kant, "ought" signifies  
 simply the subordination of my will to a law. The direct determination  
 of the will by a law, and the consciousness that in so determined--  
 this is what is denoted by "ought". In that language in  
 German, the proper term is *dehors*. But the word *ought*, so  
 unsuitable as it is, cannot without a reason have been put in place  
 of the word *dehors*. It must serve some purpose; and this is  
 obviously some other than to veil the derivation of the imperative  
 form, and of the conception of duty, from theological sources; that  
 as the expression "necessity of an action" which in such a forced  
 and awkward substitute for the word "ought", was only chosen because

imperative must be investigated entirely on apriori grounds, because here we are not helped by any testimony of experience as to its reality." (1) The consequence is that he has nothing left for the substance of his law but simply its form. Now this can only be the abstract conception of lawfulness. But the conception of lawfulness is built up out of what is valid for all persons equally. Therefore the substance of the law consists of the conception of what is universally valid, and its contents are of course nothing else than its universal validity. Hence the formula will read as follows: Act only in accordance with that precept which you can also wish should be a general law for all rational beings. This, then, is the foundation Kant constructed for his principles of morals <sup>and</sup> therefore for his whole ethical system. This is made perfectly clear in Remark I, of his Critique of Practical Reason, p. 145-146. Here, reason, because and in so far as it works out this principle or rather, this ratiocination, receives from Kant the name of Practical Reason, and that of categorical imperative to the law which results from her work. Consequently, Practical Reason is not a special faculty, a sort of moral instinct, but as Kant himself says, one and the same with theoretical reason; is in fact, theoretical reason itself in so far as it works out the categorical imperative.

The objection to which this Kantian basis of morals is exposed lies in the fact that such an origin of the moral law in us is impossible, because of its assumption that man would of his own accord hit on the idea of looking about for, and inquiring after,

(1) Grundlegung, p. 44-5.

"shall" is the exact language of the Deontologist. The above definition: "Duty is the necessity of an action out of respect for the law", would therefore read in natural, undistorted, plain language: "Duty signifies an action which ought to be done out of obedience to a law". This is the real des Indes Kantianism. Kant ridiculed all empirical notion of the will, and began by removing everything, whether subjective or objective, on which a law determining the will's action could be empirically based. "It cannot be empirically ascertained whether any such categorical imperative exists anywhere--The possibility of the categorical imperative exists everywhere."

*Continued*

...the law which results from her work. Consequently, Practical Reason is not a special faculty, a sort of moral instinct, but as Kant himself says, one and the same with theoretical reason; is in fact, theoretical reason itself in so far as it works out the categorical imperative.

(1) Schopenhauer, Basis of Morality, p. 32.

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(1) Grundgesetze, p. 44-5.

a law to which his will should be subject and which should shape ...  
 his actions. This procedure, however, cannot possibly occur to him ...  
 of itself; at best it could only after another moral stimulus had ...  
 supplied the first impulse and motive thereto; and such a stimulus ...  
 would have to be positively operative, and real; and show itself to ...  
 be such, as well as spontaneously influence, indeed force its ...  
 presence upon, the mind. But anything of this sort would run ...  
 counter to Kant's assumption, which is to be regarded as itself ...  
 the origin of all moral conceptions. Consequently, as long as there ...  
 is no such antecedent motive, because, ex hypothesi, there exists no ...  
 other moral stimulus, this process of ratiocination, so long as egoism ...  
 alone, concludes Schopenhauer, "must remain as the plumb-line of ...  
 human conduct, as the guiding threads of the law of motivation;--- ...  
 the entirely empirical and egoistic motives of the moment, alone ...  
 and unchecked, must determine, in each separate case, the conduct ...  
 of a man; since of this assumption, there is no voice to arrest ...  
 him, neither does any reason whatever exist, why he should be ...  
 minded to inquire after and search for, a law which should limit ...  
 and govern his will. The moral stimulus, like every motive that ...  
 effects that will, must in all cases, make itself felt spontaneously, ...  
 and therefore, have a positive working, and consequently be real.

its entire want of reality, and hence of possible effect. Since ...  
 the structure of itself from rational and moral grounds, like ...  
 a sort of subtle and conscious technique but for now a ...  
 based on desire. It is therefore rather support and ...  
 nothing more.

(1) Schopenhauer: Works of Morality, p. 55

And because for men the only thing which has reality is the empirical, or else that which is supposed to have a possibly empirical existence, therefore it follows that the moral stimulus cannot but be empirical, and show itself as such of its own accord; and without waiting for us to begin our search, it must come and press itself upon us, and this with such force that it may, at least possibly, overcome the opposing egoistic motives in all their giant strength. "For ethics has," says Schopenhauer, "to do with actual human conduct, and not with the apriori building of card houses--a performance which yields results that no man would ever turn to in the stern stress and battle of life, and which, in face of the storm of our passions, would be about as serviceable as a syringe in a great fire." (1)

Kant considered it a special merit of this moral law that it is founded solely on abstract, pure apriori conceptions, consequently on pure reason; whereby its validity obtains, he says, not only for men, but for all rational beings as such. All the more must we regret that pure abstract conceptions apriori, without real contents, and without any kind of empirical basis can never move, at any rate, men; of the "dear cherubims", we are of course incapable of speaking. The second criticism of Kant's ethical basis, is precisely what he considers to be its second merit, namely, its lack of real substance, its entire want of reality, and hence of possible efficacy. Since the structure of itself from the beginning, floats in the air, like a web of the subtlest conceptions devoid of all contents, and is based on nothing, it can therefore neither support anything and moves nothing.

(1) Schopenhauer: Basis of Morality, p. 63

(1) E.P.V. p. 222 (2) ID. p. 23

And yet Kant loaded it with a burden of enormous weight, namely, the postulate of the freedom of will. In spite of his conviction that freedom in human action has absolutely no place; that theoretically not even its possibility is thinkable, "but we cannot perceive the possibility of the freedom of an efficient cause, especially in the world of sense; we are fortunate if only we can be sufficiently assured that there is no proof of its impossibility" (1), that if the character of a man, and all the motives which work on him were exactly known, his conduct could be calculated as certainly and as precisely as an eclipse of the moon, (2), he nevertheless makes an assumption of freedom, although only as a postulate, by his conclusion: "you can, because you ought." If we, however, once recognize that a thing is not and cannot be, what is the use of all the postulates in the world? We may cast away its basis, for the impossibility of a thing makes its non-existence a safe conclusion.

The law of causality is known to us a priori, and does not arise from experience, since experience itself, inasmuch as it presupposes intuitive perception is only possible through the same law. All the higher qualities of the intellect, all cleverness, sagacity, penetration, acumen, are directly proportioned to the exactness and fullness with which the workings of causality in all its relations are grasped; for all knowledge of the connection of things, in the widest sense of the word, is based on the comprehension of this law, and the clearness and accuracy with which it is understood is the measure of one man's superiority to another in inclination or momentary emotion, we cannot entirely absolve him

from the reproach of encouraging moral passivity." (1)  
(1) K.P.V. p. 223 (2) ID. p. 230 (K.P.V.)  
(2) Schopenhauer: "The World as Will and Idea," I, p. 72  
"A world of an action that it shall proceed from pure, rational

understanding, shrewdness, cunning. On the other hand, the epithet reasonable has at all times been applied to the man who does not allow himself to be guided by intuitive impressions only, but by thoughts and conceptions, and who therefore always sets to work logically after due reflection and forethought. Conduct of this sort is everywhere known as reasonable. Not that this by any means implies uprightness and love for one's fellows, or the urge to beauty. On the contrary, it is possible to act in the most reasonable way, that is, according to conclusions scientifically deduced, and weighed with the finest exactitude, and yet to follow the most iniquitous maxims. Reason has never, before Kant, been equated with virtue or the reasonable with the virtuous. The one depends on the kind of motivation, the other ~~depends~~ on the difference in fundamental principles. Reasonable and vicious may well go together; indeed, great, far-reaching crimes are only possible from their union. Similarly, unreasonable and noble-minded are often found associated, especially in acts of heroism. Furthermore the purpose to act rightly and nobly cannot always be carried out in accordance with abstract maxims; for in many cases, the exceedingly nice distinctions in the nature of the circumstances necessitate a choice of the right proceeding directly from the character. The application of mere abstract maxims sometimes gives false results because the maxims only half apply, and sometimes, cannot be carried out because they are foreign to the individual character as well as to his humane character. "Since then Kant makes it a condition of the moral abstract maxims, without any inclination or momentary emotion, we cannot entirely absolve him from the reproach of encouraging moral pedantry." (1)

(1) Schopenhauer: The world as Will and Idea, 1, p. 79  
\* worth of an action that it shall proceed from pure, rational

And yet Kant loaded it with a burden of enormous weight, namely, the postulate of the freedom of will. In spite of his conviction that freedom in human action has absolutely no place; that theoretically not even its possibility is thinkable, "but we cannot perceive the possibility of the freedom of an efficient cause, especially in the world of sense; we are fortunate if only we can be satisfactorily assured that there is no proof of its impossibility" (1). That if the character of a man, and all the motives which work in him were exactly known, his conduct could be calculated as certainly and as precisely as an eclipse of the moon. (2). He nevertheless makes an assumption of freedom, although only as a postulate, by his conclusion: "you can, because you ought." If we, however, once recognize that a thing cannot be, what is the use of all the postulates in the world? We may best say its basis, for the impossibility of a thing makes its non-existence a safe conclusion. The law of causality is known to us a priori, and does not arise from experience, since experience itself, inasmuch as it presupposes intuitive perception is only possible through the same law. All the higher faculties of the intellect, all clearness, sagacity, penetration, common sense, directly proportioned to the exactness and fairness with which the workings of causality in all its relations are grasped; for all knowledge of the connection of things, in the widest sense of the word, is based on the comprehension of this law, and the clearness and accuracy with which it is understood is the measure of one man's superiority to another in

(1) K.L.V. p. 222 (2) K.L.V. p. 223

understanding, awareness, conscience. On the other hand, the Spirit  
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(1) from the research of encyclopaedia moral pedagogy." (1)

(1) Schopenhauer: The World as Will and Idea, I, p. 79  
x work of an action that is shall proceed from pure, rational

therefore, the significance of Schiller's epigram. Thus Rousseau  
said in his *Emile*: "Mes sentiments naturels parlaient pour l'interet  
commun, ma raison rapportait tout à moi.... On a beau vouloir établir  
la vertu par la raison seule, quelle solide base peut-on lui donner?"  
And Aristotle: "virtues have their seat in parte irrationali <sup>animi</sup> and  
not in parte rationali." The maxims which the prudent and consistent,  
thoughtful and farseeing Machiavellian prince, is to follow, are not  
vicious because irrational. ~~as he is, the Machiavellian prince~~  
They We may trace the origins of this hypothesis of practical reason  
in so-called "rational psychology", according to which man is composed  
of two entirely heterogeneous substances the material body and the  
immaterial soul. Plato was first to formulate this dogma, and he  
endeavored to prove it as an objective truth. But it was Descartes  
who by working it out with exactness, perfectly developed and completed  
it. Spinoza demonstrated its fallacy, where he says in his *Ethics*,  
II, 7, "the thinking substance, and substance in extension are one  
and the selfsame substance, which is contained now under the latter  
attribute (that is, extension), now under the former (that is, the  
attribute of thinking), thus denying Descartes' twofold dualism. ~~and~~  
It was further refuted by Locke as he combated the theory of innate  
ideas and taught that it is not impossible that matter should think.  
Kant's doctrine of the autonomy <sup>of</sup> the will, arose from the  
attribution by Rational Psychology, of perception and volition, that  
is of working in concert <sup>and</sup> = close union with the various organs of the  
body, the lower will, to lower faculty of the soul; and of independent,  
pure activity, in concepts belonging exclusively to itself, the higher

the higher will, to a higher faculty of the soul. But this whole theory, is to be found as far back as Aristotle who, in De Anima, I.7. gave it a sufficiently clear statement, (402a.7.9.9.; 402b-2.10.11. 12; 403a-3.4.5. etc. etc.), while Plato, in the Phaedo, had already paved the way, with no uncertain hints, (65, 66, 94d). Kant was no doubt under the influence of this old-time doctrine.

Now that we have examined the basis of the ethics of reason, we shall turn to that which rests on it, its leading principle. They are both closely connected together, and the demand is really strange, on someone who is seeking an answer to his perturbing question what ought I to do, of his having first and foremost to search for one fit to regulate the conduct not only of the whole human race, but of the dear Cherubim as well. However, it is enough here to bear in mind that so far, we have not reached the moral law itself, but only an indication where it is to be looked for. The money, so to speak, is not yet paid down, but we hold a safe draft for it.

In the Grundlegung, Kant has given us five formulae, which together, constitute the categorical imperative of practical reason:

Formula I: "Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law."

Formula II: "Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature."

Formula III: "So act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means."

Formula IV: "So act that your will can regard itself at the same time as making universal law through its maxim."

(2) - Critique of Practical Reason, p. 130  
(3) - Grundlegung, p. 46

Formula V: "So act as if you were always through your maxims a law-making ~~making~~ member in a universal kingdom of ends."

The difference between formulae I and IV is so negligible that it can be safely ignored. Formulae II, III, and V, are subordinate to I and are merely intended to help us in its application and, according to Paton, to "bring the general and supreme principle of morality, formula I, nearer to intuition and so to feeling. (1) In the Critique of Practical Reason, it is formula IV that takes the pride of place. (2).

Then Kant speaks of "the Categorical Imperative" and asserts that there is only one, he has in mind the principle of all particular categorical imperatives; just as the hypothetical imperative, "if you will any end, you ought to will the means", is the principle of all hypothetical imperatives. Particular hypothetical imperatives are applications of the hypothe-<sup>tical</sup> imperative; and particular categorical imperatives, like, "thou shalt not kill," are applications of the categorical imperative. In Kant's language, they are *abgeleitet*, that is, derived, from it as from their principle. He holds that to conceive a categorical imperative is to know what it enjoins, but that to conceive a hypothetical imperative is not to know what is enjoined. (3)

To conceive the principle of all hypothetical imperatives--if you will any end, you ought to will the means--is to know what it enjoins. It is an analytic practical proposition. What we do not know is the particular hypothetical imperatives in which it is applied.

- (1) - The Categorical Imperative, p. 130
- (2) - Critique of Practical Reason, p. 141
- (3) - Grundlegung, p. 46

Formula V: "So act as if your duty always consisted in making a law."  
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(1) - The Categorical Imperative, p. 130  
 (2) - Critique of Practical Reason, p. 141  
 (3) - Grundgesetze, p. 44

To know these, we require to know something else--namely, what end  
 we seek and what are the means to it. If we have this knowledge, we  
 know all that is necessary to establish a particular hypothetical  
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As regards the principle of all categorical imperatives, to  
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 difference between the two lies in this,--that in the case of the  
 categorical imperative, knowledge of the end we seek and of the  
 means to this end does not determine how the imperative is to be  
 applied. The categorical imperative, asserts Kant, can and must,  
 unlike the hypothetical, be applied independently of our particular  
 desire for a particular end.

No matter how much Kant may say in this regard, the cashier  
 who is going to pay our bill, the only cashier who accepts our draft,  
 is a very unexpected one indeed; EGOTISM is his name. For it is said  
 that the precept which I can wish were the guide of all men's  
 conduct, is itself the real moral principle. That which I CAN WISH  
 is the hinge on which the given direction turns. But what can I  
 truly wish, and what not? Clearly in order to determine what I can  
 wish in the matter under discussion, I require yet another criterion;  
 for without such I could never find the key to the instruction which  
 comes to me like a sealed order. Where, then, is this criterion to  
 be discovered? Certainly nowhere else but in my egoism, which is  
 the nearest, ever-ready, original and living standard of all valuation.

itself; for even the love of which a man needs the love and  
 itself; for even the love of which a man needs the love and  
 (1) See all thought out, how excellent!--  
 (2) Grundgesetze p. 24  
 (3) Grundgesetze p. 49

to know these, we require to know something else--namely, what end we seek and what are the means to it. If we have this knowledge, we know all that is necessary to establish a particular hypothetical imperative.

As regards the principle of all categorical imperatives, to conceive this is to know what it enjoins, but it is not to know the particular categorical imperative in which it is applied. The difference between the two lies in this--that in the case of the categorical imperative, knowledge of the end we seek and of the means to this end does not determine how the imperative is to be applied. The categorical imperative, Kant says, is to be understood as applied independently of our particular desires for a particular end.

No matter how much Kant may say in this regard, the reader who is going to pay our bill, the only cashier who accepts our draft, is a very uneducated one indeed, WHOSE is his name. For it is said that the proverb which I can wish were the guide of all men's conduct, is itself the real moral principle. That which I can wish is the hinge on which the given direction turns. But what can I wish? and what not? Clearly in order to determine what I can wish in the matter under discussion, I require yet another criterion; for without such I could never find the key to the instruction which comes to me like a sealed order. There, then, is this criterion to be discovered? Certainly nowhere else but in my egoism, which is the nearest, every-day, original and living standard of all volitions.

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and which, at any rate is "older" than the moral principle. The direction for finding the real moral law, which is contained in the evolved from his own will, would desire himself of all sorts of the Kantian ethics, rests, as a matter of fact, on the tacit assumption help, which he desires. (1) Similarly, "if there were to regard that I can only wish for that which is most to my advantage. Now others' distress with total indifference, and you were to belong to because, in framing a precept to be generally followed, I cannot such an order of things, would you be here with the consciousness of regard myself as always active, but must contemplate myself as passive your will" Kant, further, says: "These lines of Verdi's (on the part, eventually and at times; therefore from this point of view, actors of pleasure and pain I continue with absolute certainty, my egoism decides for justice and lovingkindness; not from any wish "The only active force of man is pain which also precedes every to practice these virtues, but because it desires to experience them. pleasure." (2) These passages sufficiently show in what sense the "We are reminded of the miser, who, scorns Schopenhauer, "after listening to a sermon on beneficence, exclaims: But it is in the Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre, that "Wie gründlich ausgeführt, wie schön!-- this real nature of his ethical principle is most clearly stated. Fast möchte ich betteln gehn." (1)

Egoism is found in the Kantian text itself, at a decent distance, so as to prevent the fact at once leaping to light, that to help others, all people must be helping him here, after all, in spite of this grand apriori edifice, Egoism assistance. Thus this rule of selfishness contradicts itself. is sitting on the judge's seat, scales in hand. Thus, we read: Here, then, it is assumed, as explicitly as anything can be, that "That I could not wish for a general law to establish lying, because moral obligation rests solely and entirely on presupposed RECIPROCITY. people would no longer believe me, or else pay me back in the same consequence, it is utterly selfish, and only admits of being deter- coin." (2) "The universality of a law to the effect that every one proved by egoism, which, under the condition of reciprocity, none could promise what he likes, without any intention of keeping his how to make a compromise cleverly enough. The principle of always word, would make the promise itself, together with the object in acting in accordance with that precept which the law also wish were view, whatsoever that might be, impossible; for no one would believe universally established as law--this is the only condition under which it." (3) In connection with the maxim of hard-heartedness, we read a man's will can never be in antagonism to itself. the following: "A will, which should determine this, would contradict

itself; for cases can occur, in which a man needs the love and

(1) :- Grundlegung: p. 50

(2) :- Grundlegung: p. 67

(1) How well thought out, how excellent!--

(2) Grundlegung p. 24

I'd almost like to go a-begging!

(3) Grundlegung p. 49

(4) I'd almost like to go a-begging!

sympathy of others and in which he, by virtue of such a natural law, evolved from his own will, would deprive himself of all hope of the help, which he desires." (1) Similarly, "if every one were to regard others' distress with total indifference, and you were to belong to such an order of things; would you be here with the concurrence of your will?" Kant, further, says: "These lines of Verri's (On the nature of pleasure and pain) I confirm with absolute certainty: 'The only motive force of man is pain which also precedes every pleasure.'" (2) These passages sufficiently show in what sense the phrase, "to be able to wish," in Kant's formula is to be understood. But it is in the *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre*, that this real nature of his ethical principle is most clearly stated. In paragraph thirty we read: "For every one wishes to be helped. It however a man were to give utterance to his rule of unwillingness to help others, all people WOULD BE JUSTIFIED in refusing him assistance. Thus this rule of selfishness contradicts itself." Here, then, it is declared, as explicitly as anything can be, that moral obligation rests solely and entirely on presupposed RECIPROCITY. Consequently, it is utterly selfish, and only admits of being interpreted by egoism, which, under the condition of reciprocity, knows how to make a compromise cleverly enough. "The principle of always acting in accordance with that precept which you can also wish were universally established as law--this is the only condition under which a man's will can never be in antagonism with itself". (3)

(1):- Grundlegung: p. 50  
(3):- Grundlegung: p. 67

(1) (2) Quoted in Nietzsche's Will to Power: II, p. 168

and which, at any rate is "other" than the moral principle. The direction for finding the real law, which is contained in the Kantian ethics, rests, as a matter of fact, on the fact of reason. Now that I can only wish for that which is most to my advantage. Now because, in treating a person as a means, I cannot regard myself as always active, but must contemplate myself as passive part, eventually and at times; therefore from this point of view, my egoism decides for justice and lovingkindness; not from any wish to practice these virtues, but because it desires to experience them. "We are reminded of the alms, who, as Schopenhauer, after relating to a person of beneficence, exclaims: 'Wie glücklich magest du sein!'" (1) Egoism is found in the Kantian formula itself, as a defect, as we to prevent the fact of once leading to light, that have, after all, in spite of this grand ethical edifice, egoism is sitting on the judge's seat, ready in hand. Thus, we read: "That I could not wish for a general law to establish lying, because people would no longer believe me, or else pay me back in the same coin." (2) "The universality of a law to the effect that every one could promise that he liked, without any intention of keeping his word, would make the promise itself, together with the object in view, whatever that might be, impossible; for no one would believe it." (3) In connection with the maxim of hard-parallelism, we read the following: "A will, which should determine this, would contradict itself; for cases can occur, in which a man needs the love and

(1) How will thought out, how excellent! (2) Grundlegung p. 54 (3) Grundlegung p. 59

sympathy of others and in which he, by virtue of such a natural law, evolved from his own will, would deprive himself of all hope of the help, which he desires." (1) Similarly, "if every one were to regard others' distress with total indifference, and yet were to belong to such an order of things; would you be here with the concurrence of your will?" Kant, further, says: "those lines of Verri's (on the nature of pleasure and pain) I confirm with absolute certainty. 'The only motive force of man is pain which also preceded every pleasure.'" (2) These passages sufficiently show in what sense Kant, "to be able to wish," in Kant's formula is to be understood. But it is in the metaphysical anthropology der Vernunft, that this real nature of his ethical principle is most clearly stated. In paragraph thirty we read: "For every one wishes to be helped. If however a man were to give assistance to his rule of unwillingness to help others, all people would be unhappy in refusing him assistance. Thus this rule of selfishness contradicts itself." Here, then, it is declared, as explicitly as anything can be, that moral obligation rests solely and entirely on presupposed self-interest. Consequently, it is utterly selfish, and only advice of being interested by egoism, which, under the condition of reciprocity, knows how to make a compromise cleverly enough. "The principle of always acting in accordance with that precept which you can also wish were universally established as law--this is the only condition under which a man's will can never be in antagonism with itself." (3)

(A) - : p. 20  
(E) - : p. 27

It is then apparent that the meaning of "antagonism" is that if a man should auction the precept of injustice, he would subsequently, in the event of his playing a passive part, recall it, and so he would contradict himself.

The leading principle of the ethics of reason is then, not as maintained, a categorical, but a hypothetical imperative; because it tacitly presupposes the condition that the law to be established for what I do--inasmuch as I make it universal--shall also be a law for what is done to me; and because I, under this condition, as the eventually--non-active party, cannot possibly wish for injustice. But if I strike out this proviso, and, trusting to my surpassing strength, think of myself as always active, and never passive; then in choosing the precept which is to be universally valid, if there exists no other basis for ethics than reason, I can perfectly well, perfectly rationally and with perfect consistency, wish that injustice should be the general rule, and consequently order the world,

..... Upon the simple plan, [that they should take,  
[Who have the power, and they should keep,  
[who can.

Doesn't Kant resemble, in his self-mystification and search for the categorical imperative, the gentleman who at a ball has been flirting the whole evening with a masked beauty, in hopes of <sup>making</sup> a conquest; till at last, throwing off her disguise, she reveals herself--as his wife?

How to come to formula III: An END is the direct motive of an act of the will; a MEANS, the indirect. However, Kant says: "Man, <sup>is exactly like saying 'I am in myself, many in myself'</sup> indeed every rational being, exists as an end in himself." But "to <sup>'North or South in itself, and so on. At bottom, the end in itself'</sup>

It is then apparent that the meaning of "autonomous" is that it is a man should choose the process of his action, he would subsequently in the event of his playing a passive part, recall it, and so on. This would contradict himself.

The leading principle of the ethics of reason is that, not as a man should choose the process of his action, but a hypothetical imperative; because it is not a law for man to be a law for man, but a law for man to be a law for man. This is done to me; and because I, under this condition, as the eventually--non-active part, cannot possibly wish for injustice. But if I strike out this proviso, and, trusting to my overpowering strength, think of myself as always active, and never passive; then in choosing the process which is to be universally valid, if there exists no other basis for ethics than reason, I am perfectly well, perfectly rationally and with perfect consistency, with that injustice should be the general rule, and consequently order the world. Upon the simple plan, that they should take, who have the power, and they should keep, who can.

Doesn't Kant resemble, in his self-justification and search for the categorical imperative, the gentleman who as a bell has been lifting the whole evening with a masked beauty, in hopes of a conquest; till at last, throwing off her disguise, she reveals herself--as his wife. How to come to formula III: As III is the direct motive of an act of the will; a MAJOR, the indirect. However, Kant says: "Hence, every rational being, exists as an end in himself." But no

exist as an end in oneself" is an unthinkable expression, another contradiction in adjecto. For to be an end means to be an object of v<sup>o</sup>lition. Every end, that is, as we have just stated, can only exist in relation to a will whose direct motive it is. Only thus can the idea, "end" have any sense, which is lost as soon as such connection is broken. But this relation, which is essential to the thing, necessarily excludes every "in itself". "End in oneself" <sup>(x)</sup> is in the same case as the "absolute ought"; the same thought--the theological, lies at the root of each as its condition. For is the "absolute worth" or "human dignity", which is supposed to be attached to this alleged, though unthinkable, end-in-itself, at all better circumstanced. For every worth, is a valuation by comparison, and its bearing is necessarily twofold. First, it is relative since it exists for some one man, and secondly, it is comparative, as being compared with something else, and estimated accordingly. Derived from these two conditions, the conception "worth" loses all sense and meaning.

The formula itself, "so act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means," is a roundabout way of saying: "Do not consider yourself alone, but others also", which in turn is a paraphrase for: "Do not to another what you are unwilling should be done to yourself", and this contains nothing but the premises to the conclusion, Jesus Christ, in his unpoliticality and resignation, presented to the master Rabbi, the underground agitator, St. Paul,

<sup>(x)</sup> is exactly like saying 'friend in oneself'; 'enemy in oneself'; 'North or East in itself', and so on. At bottom, the 'end in itself'

exist as an end in itself" is an unambiguous expression, another  
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 the community, Jesus Christ, in his angelically and resignation,  
 presented to the world, the undogmatic epistle, St. Paul,

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 in itself

who organized therewith a world-wide political conflagration against  
 the Imperium Romanum, as we shall see later.

It remains for us to say something about the postulates of pure  
 practical reason. These postulates are not meant as theoretical dogmas,  
 but presuppositions which are practically necessary. They neither  
 enlarge our speculative knowledge, nor give any objective reality to  
 the ideas of speculative reason in general; nor yet, do they justify  
 it in the use of any conception. They are meant to give validity,  
 yes, worldly validity to these ideas of the practical reason, which  
 we have found, to be floating in pure air. These postulates  
 are immortality, freedom (as the causality of being who belongs to  
 the intelligible world), and the existence of God. The first rests  
 upon the practically necessary condition, that since the moral law  
 exists, existence should continue long enough to permit its complete  
 realization. The second arises from the necessary presupposition  
 of man's independence of the world of sense (never mind whether such  
 a thing is possible), and his capability of determining his will in  
 conformity with the law of an intelligible world, that is, the law  
 of freedom. The third depends upon the necessity of presupposing  
 a supreme, self-existent good, that is, the existence of God, as the  
 condition under which the highest good may be realized in such an  
 intelligible world. These postulates remind me of an Arabian old  
 wives' prescription which runs something like this: Take a bowl  
 that has no bottom; now if you will mix in it ten ounces of air,  
 eight of the spirit of our ancestor Adam, six of the breadth of  
 Eve, four of the shadow of the sun and two of the smoke of Abel's

who organized themselves in a political organization against the imperial power, as we shall see later.

It remains for us to say something about the postulates of practical reason. These postulates are not meant as theoretical dogmas, but as practical ones which are practically necessary. They neither enlarge our speculative knowledge, nor give any objective reality to the ideas of speculative reason in general, nor yet, as they justify it in the use of any conception. They are meant to give validity, not worldly validity to those ideas of the practical reason, which we have found to be floating in pure air. These postulates are immortality, freedom (as the causality of being who belongs to the intelligible world), and the existence of God. The first rests upon the practically necessary condition, that since the moral law exists, existence and its causality must be enough to permit its complete realization. The second arises from the necessary presupposition of man's independence of the world of sense (never mind whether such a thing is possible), and his capability of determining his will in conformity with the law of an intelligible world. That is, the law of freedom. The third depends upon the necessity of presupposing a supreme, self-existent good, that is, the existence of God, as the condition under which the highest good may be realized in accordance with the moral law. These postulates remind me of an Arabian tale which, I believe, was something like this: Take a bowl that has no bottom; now if you will mix in it ten pounds of air, eight of the spirit of our ancestor Adam, six of the breath of Eve, four of the shadow of the sun and two of the essence of Apollo's love, the bowl will be full.

being. This conception, speculative reason was able to think only sacrifice; and if you drink it without swallowing, and sleep transcendently; that is, it could not show it to be more than a without lying, and wake without sleeping, then you will be cured, transcendently ideal. Practical reason, on the other hand, by dealing with the help of God!

A supreme being, and in postulating him, according to his necessary law, is supposed to give meaning to this idea.

However, Kant argues that our reverence for the moral law, necessarily compels us to seek for the realization of the highest good. But, the question is still asked, by what, if not by this good and that hence, the reality of the highest good must be presupposed. Thus, by means of the postulates of practical reason, we are brought to further conceptions, themselves problems, which all that is to be done is to unite the conception of these postulates speculative no doubt set up as problems to be solved, but which it was itself unable to solve. The first conception is that of immortality.

This conception involved speculative reason in paralogisms; for it could find no trace of the permanence required for the conversion of the psychological conceptions of an ultimate subject into the consciousness of a substance; and practical reason, here supplies what is required by the postulate of a duration adequate enough for the complete realization of the moral law in the highest good. Another effect (mind you, effect! not ground) of this postulate, is that it leads us to the cosmological idea of an intelligible world and the consciousness of our existence in that world; in other words, it entreats us to believe in another world, intelligible which we cannot see. They are necessary conditions of the because found only in our imagination. This idea involved speculative reason in an antinomy, for the solution of which it had to fall back upon a problematic conception, the objective reality of which it could not prove. Practical reason, by means of the postulate of freedom, comes to the rescue and validates that idea.

of practical reason do not enlarge our theoretical knowledge, the Lastly, practical reason brings us to the conception of a supreme sphere of reason itself is in this sense enlarged, that by means

being. This conception, speculative reason was able to think only transcendently; that is, it could not show it to be more than a transcendental ideal. Practical reason, on the other hand, by needing a supreme being, and in postulating him, assigning to him a necessary job, is supposed to give meaning to this idea. But, the question is still asked, by what, if any, has this practical reason enlarged our knowledge. Practical reason cannot give us a theoretical knowledge of its postulates, nor of ourselves. All that it can do is to unite the conception of these postulates (the ounces) in the practical conception of the highest good, (the bowl) which is the supposed object of our will, (never mind if we there have always to act out of Achtung for the law, never for any object whatsoever), and to unite them entirely a priori through pure reason (mix them well and drink them without swallowing). This union is effected only through the medium of the moral law merely in relation to that which it commands with a view to the highest good. For to all ~~our~~ intents and purposes, intelligible freedom is unintelligible <sup>and remains</sup>. Kant argues that though the postulates of freedom, immortality and God, are not knowledge, they are at least thoughts the objects of which are not impossible. They are necessary conditions of the possibility of that which the moral law commands us to make our object. We can make no synthetic judgements in regard to them, nor can we determine theoretically how they are to be applied, and hence we cannot be said to have any knowledge of them. But while the ideas of practical reason do not enlarge our theoretical knowledge, the sphere of reason itself is in this sense enlarged, that by means

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determine theoretically how they are to be applied, and hence we  
cannot be said to have any knowledge of them. But while the ideas  
of practical reason do not enlarge our theoretical knowledge, the  
sphere of reason itself is in this sense enlarged, that by means

of practical postulates, we learn that there are objects corresponding  
to those ideas.  
However, the climax of practical reason comes when in its last  
attempt and as a last straw, it demands faith and confesses its need  
therefor. The shift from pure reason, to practical human action, yet  
postulates another huge assumption, Faith, in its whole process.  
For the influence upon the agent of the moral law, that is, the  
disposition which it produced in him to promote the highest good  
that can be practically realized by us, presupposes at the very  
least, that the highest good is possible. If it were not possible  
we should be trying to realize practically what could not be realized,  
and to give effect to an idea that was empty and without any object.  
Thus, the principle which determines a moral judgement is no doubt  
subjective in relation to us; but, inasmuch as it is also the means  
by which an object that is practically necessary may be promoted, it  
is also the foundation of all beliefs which possess moral certitude.  
That principle takes the form of a faith of pure practical reason.  
In other words, what is found by a whole elaborate set of assumptions,  
to be practically necessary, may and should demand a belief from us  
in its validity--and here Kantian ethics is as clear as ever as to its  
coincidence with theological morals.  
Considering the Kantian ethics of reason perspective, as a  
whole, some may feel impressed and taken away by the "Achtung"  
emotions stirring within them, and in their excitement get a peep  
into the Kantian supersensible world of pure and perfect rational  
beings and perhaps be terrified at their "animality", their

irrationality, at once, and be entranced at their certain citizenship in that kingdom and their intelligible entry therein, some day beyond, at another. Other mortals, however, may be indignant at these unhealthy excesses of the imagination. One may ask apropos of this, was it not rather strange to demand that an instrument should criticize its own value and effectiveness, a little ridiculous that this malignant servant, namely reason, should set itself master over and against its master, namely Life and Being, and prescribe imperatives irrespective of, if not directly opposed to the welfare of Life and Being? The right answer is, however, that most philosophers including Kant himself were building under the seductive influence of morality--that they arrived at certainty and truth only in appearance; but that in reality, their attention was directed towards "majestic moral edifices", to use Kant's own innocent mode of expression, who deems it his "less brilliant, but not underserving" task and work "to level the ground and prepare a solid foundation for the creation of those majestic moral edifices;" (1) and with Robespierre, "de fonder sur la terre l'empire de la sagesse, de la justice, et de la vertu." In order to make room for this moral imperium, Kant found himself compelled to add to it, with a priestly foresight, an independent world, a logical "beyond"--that was why he required his critique of pure reason. He would not have wanted it, if he had not deemed one thing to be more important than all others; to render this moral kingdom invulnerable by,--or even, invisible to, reason,--for he felt too strongly the vulnerability of a moral order of things in the face of reason. For, when confronted with nature and history, when confronted with the ingrained immorality of nature and history, Kant was a pessimist: he believed in morality despite

(1) - Critique of Pure Reason, II, 257

of practical postulates, we learn that there are objects corresponding to those ideas. However, the claim of practical reason when in its last attempt and as a last view, it demands faith and confesses its need therefore. The shift from pure reason, to practical reason action, yet postulates another huge assumption, faith, in its whole process. For the influence upon the agent of the moral law, that is, the disposition which it produces in him to promote the highest good, that can be practically realized by us, presupposes at the very least, that the highest good is possible. If it were not possible, we should be trying to realize practically what could not be realized, and to give effect to an idea that was empty and without any object. Thus, the principle which determines a moral judgment is no doubt subjective in relation to us; but, inasmuch as it is also the means by which an object that is practically necessary may be promoted, it is also the foundation of all beliefs which possess moral certitude. That principle takes the form of a faith of pure practical reason. In other words, what is found by a whole elaborate set of assumptions, to be practically necessary, may and should demand a belief from us in its validity--and here Kantian ethics is as clear as ever as to its coincidence with theological naturalism. Considering the Kantian ethics of reason perspectively, as a whole, some may feel impressed and taken away by the "adorning" emotions stirring within them, and in their excitement get a deep insight into the Kantian supersensible world of pure and perfect rational beings and perhaps be bewitched at their "animality", their

its being steadily contradicted by them, like Luther, who once urged it upon his friends with unspeakable audacity: "If we could conceive by reason alone how that God who shows so much wrath and malignity could be merciful and just, what use should we have for faith?" (1). In other words: I believe it BECAUSE it is absurd!!! Let anyone consider whether a man can be in possession of a desire to gain an insight into moral things when he feels himself comforted from the start by a belief in the inconceivableness of these things! One who still honestly believe in "illuminations" from above, in magic! Let us here remember the great Goethe, piercing through to Kant's most secret nature, as he wrote to Herder in 1793: "Kant, on the other hand, after he had tried throughout his life to keep his philosophical cloak unsoiled by foul prejudices, wantonly dirtied it in the end with the disreputable stain of the "radical evil" in human nature, in order that Christians too might be lured into kissing its hem."

Apart from the intrinsic? value of such assertions as "there is a categorical imperative in us", we may perhaps ask: That does such an assertion indicate about him who makes it? Some systems of morals are meant to justify their author in the eyes of other people; others are meant to frankly satisfy him; with other systems of morals, the author wants to crucify and humble himself; or take revenge; or glorify himself and gain superiority and distinction. By The Ethics of Reason, Kantian ethics gives us to understand that "what is estimable in me, is that I know how to obey--and with you it shall not be otherwise than with me!" In short, like all the others, the Ethics of Reason is another sign-language of the emotions. Assuming, exhypothesi, that the ethical significance of action springs

(1) - Quoted by Nietzsche in "Dawn of Day", preface.

irrationally, as once, and be embraced as their certain claim-ship in that kingdom and their intelligible duty therein. Some day beyond, at another. Other morals, however, may be indicated as these majestic excesses of the imagination. One may not suppose of him, who is not rather strange to demand that an instrument should realize its own value and effectiveness, a little ridiculous that this religious service, namely reason, should see itself master over and against its master, namely life and being, and prescribe imperatives irrespective of, it not directly opposed to the welfare of life and being. The right answer is, however, that most philosophers including Kant himself were building under the seductive influence of moralistic--that they arrived at certainty and truth only in appearance; but that in reality, their attention was directed towards "moralistic moral edifices", to use Kant's own innocent mode of expression, who seems to his "less brilliant", but not unimpressive task to level the ground and prepare a solid foundation for the erection of these majestic moral edifices; (1) and with his "moralistic moral edifices", he founders not in terms, but in essence, he is justice, so he is virtue, in order to make room for this moral imperialism, Kant found himself compelled to add to it, with a priestly foreign, an independent world, a logical "beyond"--that was why he regarded his critique of pure reason. He would not have wanted it, if he had not desired one thing to be more important than all others, to render this moralistic imperialism inevitable, or even, inevitable to reason,--for he felt too strongly the vulnerability of a moral order of things in the face of reason. For, when confronted with nature and history, when confronted with the ingrained immorality of nature and history, Kant was a pessimist: he believed in morally decisive

(1) - Critique of Pure Reason, II, 227

(V) - Quoted by Nietzsche in "Dawn of Day", therefore  
assuming, expounded, that the eternal significance of action springs  
from the eternal significance of the emotions.  
It shall not be operative then with me! In short, like all the  
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is a categorical imperative in me", we may perhaps ask: That does  
apart from the intrinsic value of such assertions as "there  
killing is bad".

from an imperative, an ought, in our consciousness, this imperative is far different from the synthetic a priori propositions, propounded in the Critique of Pure Reason. They may both satisfy the condition of apriority: but what is the legitimacy of the transition from apriority to "ought"? This question itself is not even raised, but passes over such a sacrilegious destructive question mark with a groundless, assertative, dogmatic "therefore", with serene equality, "à la noblesse", as an Arabic common saying may put it. For he says: "That which stimulates, that is, immediately affects the senses; we have the power to overcome the impressions on our faculty of sensuous desire, with calling up representations of what in a more direct manner is, useful or injurious. But these deliberations as to what is worthy of desire, with reference to our whole state, that is, as to what is good and useful, is based upon reason. Reason, THEREFORE gives also laws, which are imperatives, that is, objective laws of freedom, which tell us what ought to happen though perhaps it never does take place." (1) Thus the categorical imperative is concluded, brought into the world, without ado, but also without authentication. Life and Königsbergian "Christianity" find

Kant has the great merit of separating virtue from happiness, but in this he was neither alone nor the first. Socrates told his judges: "A man who is good for anything ought not to calculate the chance of living or dying; he ought only to consider whether in doing right or wrong.... The difficulty my friends, is not to avoid death, but to avoid unrighteousness (2), and Plato taught expressly, the Melch of abstraction.... Fancy as one's having thought Kant's

(1) Critique of Pure Reason, p. 602-630 (2) Apology.

① - answered by Kant and in the Critique of Pure Reason, he does not.

from an imperative, an ought, I can do nothing, this imperative is far different from the synthetic a priori propositions, propounded in the Critique of Pure Reason. They may both satisfy the condition of apriority, but what is the legitimacy of the transition from apriority to "ought"? This question itself is not even raised, but passes over such a considerable descriptive question mark with a groundless, assertive, dogmatic "if-then", with serene "optimism", as an answer, as an article common saying may put it. For he says: "That which stimulates, that is, immediately affects the subject, we have the power to overcome the impression on our faculty of sensation desire, with calling of representations of what is a more direct manner is, mental or intellectual. And these deliberations as to what is worthy of desire, with reference to our whole state, as it is, as to what is good and useful, is based upon reason. Reason, therefore, gives also laws, which are imperatives, that is, reflective laws of freedom, which tell us what ought to happen though perhaps it never does take place." (1) Thus the categorical imperative is concluded, brought into the world, without and, but also without rationalization.

Kant has the great merit of separating virtue from happiness, but in fact he was neither able nor the first. He never told us that: "A man who is good for nothing ought not to cultivate the chance of living or dying; he ought only to consider whether in doing right or wrong.... The difficulty of friends is not to avoid death, but to avoid misadventure (2), and place facts expressly."

(1) Critique of Pure Reason, p. 402-403. (2) Ibid.

① - answered by Kant and in the Critique of Pure Reason, he does not

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in the Republic, that virtue is to be chosen for itself alone, even if unhappiness and ignominy are inevitably tied to it. With Kant, however, this distinction is not so pure, for in his highest good, virtue is still tied up with happiness. The "ought" originally so imperative, and so unconditioned, and so categorical, later postulates a condition, a hypothesis, namely happiness, which, to be sure, shall not act as a motive, although, "there it is, like a secret article, (a black market article or a piece of bribery?)" not as a reward of virtue, but (of course) as a voluntary gift for which virtue, after work accomplished, stealthily opens the hand, thus reducing all the rest to a mere sham contract. (1) This is easily seen as in the Critique of Practical Reason, p. 264-265.

And to conclude, one more word against Kant, from the point of view of the ethics of LIFE. "To possess a virtue merely because one happens to respect the concept 'virtue', as Kant would have us do, is pernicious. 'Virtue', 'duty', 'goodness in itself', goodness stamped with the character of impersonality and universal validity--these things are mere mental hallucinations, in which, decline, the final devitalization of life and Koenigsbergian\* Chinadom find expression. The most fundamental laws of preservation or growth, demand precisely the reverse, namely: -that each should discover his own virtue, his own Categorical Imperative. A nation goes to the dogs when it confounds its concept of duty with the general concept of duty. Nothing is more profoundly, more thoroughly pernicious, than every impersonal feeling of duty, that every sacrifice to the Moloch of abstraction.... Fancy no one's having thought Kant's

(1) Nietzsche, Antichrist, paragraph 11.

(1) Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, I, p. 146  
\* Of Koenigsberg, i.e. Kantian

in the Republic, that virtue is to be chosen for itself alone, even if happiness and longevity are thereby sacrificed to it. Kant, however, this distinction is not as pure, for in his highest good, virtue is still tied up with happiness. The "ought" originally no imperative, and so chosen for itself, and so categorical, later becomes a condition, a hypothesis, namely happiness, which, to be sure, shall not act as a motive, although, there it is, like a secret motive, (a black market article or a piece of bribery), not as a reward of virtue, but (of course) as a voluntary gift for which virtue, after work accomplished, gratefully opens the hand, thus restoring all the rest to a mere good. (1) This is easily seen in the Critique of Practical Reason, p. 464-465.

And to conclude, one more word against Kant, from the point of view of the ethics of life. "To possess a virtue merely because one happens to respect the concept 'virtue', as Kant would have us do, is pernicious. 'Virtue', 'duty', 'goodness is itself', 'goodness stamped with the character of impersonality and universal validity--these things are mere mental hallucinations, in which, perhaps, the final devaluation of life and Kantianism's Götterdämmerung find expression. The most fundamental laws of preservation or growth demand precisely the reverse, namely: each man should discover his own virtue, his own categorical imperative. A nation goes to the dogs when it conforms its concept of duty with the general concept of duty. Nothing is more profoundly, one might say pernicious, than every impersonal feeling of duty, that every sacrifice to the notion of abstraction.... Fancy an one's having thought Kant's

\* of Koenigsberg, i.e. Kantian  
 (1) Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, I, p. 146

Categorical imperative DANGEROUS TO LIFE!....The instinct of the theologian alone took it under its wing!---An action stimulated by the instinct of life is proved to be a proper action by the happiness that accompanies it, (he bean est une promesse de bonheur); and that nihilist with the bowels of a Christian dogmatist regarded happiness as an objection....What is there that destroys a man more speedily than to work, think, feel, as an automaton of "duty", without inner promptings, without a profound, personal predilection, without joy? This is the recipe par excellence of decadence and even of idiocy....Instinct at fault in anything and everything, hostility to nature as an instinct, German decadence made into philosophy..... THAT IS KANT." (1) Continued.

This ethical faculty is totalit-arian in nature and what it covers for is the totality of our individual existence. Its growing, over-growing, is the basis of all growth, and its disturbance or paralysis, is akin to the growth of cancer, not to the growth of organs and faculties, but to the growth of the cancerous and organic or faculty. And this is the basis of all growth, and its disturbance or paralysis, is akin to the growth of cancer, not to the growth of organs and faculties, but to the growth of the cancerous and organic or faculty.

In the world of philosophy, Kant and Hegel are the most acceptable old-fashioned men and their dogma has been the most acceptable for such disordered minds, and this is the basis of all growth, and its disturbance or paralysis, is akin to the growth of cancer, not to the growth of organs and faculties, but to the growth of the cancerous and organic or faculty.

(1) <sup>rejection</sup> Nietzsche: Antichrist paragraph 11.

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without inner promptings, without a profound, personal predilection,  
without joy. This is the recipe for excellence of knowledge and  
even of ideology....Instinct as limit in anything and everything, nec-

Continued (1) "THAT IS WHAT" .....

The ethics which directs such criticism to Kant, is obviously not an ethics of reason. From its standpoint, reason is an instrument, a highly valuable and instrumental faculty in man, but in no way, the supreme and unquestionable master. There is in us an ethical faculty, a sense for being, which in its exercise, is not at all at liberty to use one instrumental organ to the exclusion of all else, but must, as it does, subordinate all our powers to its service. It is no doubt higher than reason because it only makes use of that which reason arrives at and may reject it altogether whenever it recognises a need to act on a demand dictated by the findings of the other organs. In fact, most great deeds are those in which our organ, reason, participates the least.

This ethical faculty ~~thus~~ is totalit-arian in nature and what it cares for is the totality of our individual existence. Its pressing, ever-present problem is the whole of man and unless it is disturbed or paralyzed, it aims at the growth of man, not of his organs and faculties, ~~and~~ not to speak of the cancerous growth of one organ or faculty. Anethics like the above-described, the Kantian ethics, is immediately <sup>(x)</sup>hyperfoetation of reason, on account of everything else.

In the world of philosophy, reason has been the most susceptible for such disharmonious development, and in most cases, we find philosophers relegating all other faculties and organs and giving prominence to its dictates. The first author of its bill of rights was Socrates who found it necessary to create a tyrant out of

⑩ - rejected as containing a cancerous

The ethics which directs such criticism is, of course, not an ethics of reason. From its standpoint, reason is an instrument, a slightly valuable and instrumental faculty in man, but in no way, the supreme and unquestionable master. There is in us an ethical faculty, a sense for being, which in its exercises, is not at all of itself to use one instrumental organ to the exclusion of all else, but must, as it does, subordinate all our powers to its service. It is no doubt higher than reason because it only makes use of that which reason arrives at and only rejects it altogether whenever it recognizes a need to set on a demand directed by the findings of the other organs. In fact, most great deeds are those in which our organ, reason, participates the least.

This ethical faculty then is totally alien to nature and what it cares for is the totality of our individual existence. Its pressing, ever-present problem is the whole of man and unless it is disturbed or paralyzed, it aims at the growth of man, not at his organs and faculties, and not to speak of the dangerous growth of one organ or faculty. Just as like the above-described, the function of ethics is immediately a subordination of reason, on account of everything else.

In the world of philosophy, reason has been the most unappealing for such dishonouring development, and in most cases, we find philosophers relegating all other faculties and organs and giving prominence to its dictates. The first author of its bill of rights was Socrates who found it necessary to create a tyrant out of

(\*) rejected as containing a can-conceal

reason, because something else was pressing forward to play the tyrant, in himself as well as in his contemporaries, namely the instincts. The fanaticism with which the whole of Greek thought plunges, after Socrates, into reason, betrays a critical condition of things. On the occasion when a contemporary physiognomist unmasked Socrates and told him what he was--"a crater full of evil desires", the great Socrates, master of irony, let fall a few words indicative of his real nature, and of the real state of things. "This is true", he answered, "but I overcame them all." The case of Socrates was at bottom only the extreme and most apparent example of a state of distress which was beginning to be general: that state in which no one was able to master himself and in which the instincts turned one against the other; a state in which neither Socrates nor his "patients" were free to be rational or otherwise, but where rationality was de rigueur, and had become the last shift possible.

And yet, no matter how this reason could be deified, hypostatized, it can never reach to that level of import and significance where the "whole" man stands. In the end, reason does not "know" things; it only schematizes--it imposes as much regularity and form upon chaos, as our practical needs require. In the formation of reason, logic, and the categories, it was a need in us that was the determining power: not the need to "know", but to classify, to schematize, for the purpose of intelligibility and calculation. The adjustment and interpretation of all similar and equal things,--the same process which every sensation undergoes, is the development of reason. The categories are truths only in the sense that they are the conditions

watching: There is a hygiene of life near the volcano of rationality and its main root thus: The irrational and unreasonable (error) are the natural attitudes against the overpowering of life.

(1) The Will to Power, p. 516  
(2) Id., 517

of our existence, just as Euclid's space is a conditional truth. The instinct which makes us see the utility of concluding as we do conclude, is in our blood, in our constitution; we are it! Logic is bound up with the proviso: granted that identical cases exist, for before one can think and conclude in a logical fashion, this condition must first be assumed. It is "the attempt on our part to understand the actual world according to a scheme of being devised by ourselves; or, more exactly, it is our attempt at making the actual world more calculable and more susceptible to formulation, for our own purposes."

(1) "We cease from thinking if we do not wish to think under the control of language...." Rational thought is a process of interpreting according to a scheme which we cannot reject." (2) Thus, metaphysics may very well be prior to ethics, but its justification at all is certainly ethical.

There should be no doubt as to whether we should decide for *or for life*, whether life must be dominated by knowledge or knowledge must be dominated by life. There is no room for doubt: Life is the higher and it should be the dominating power, for the knowledge that annihilates life will itself be annihilated too. Knowledge presupposes life and has the same interest in maintaining it that every creature has in maintaining its own life, in its own preservation.

The knowledge that contradicts, suppresses, or denies and annihilates life contradicts itself and achieves nothing by so doing, unless it be a further distortion or a final self-destruction simultaneous with the life it destroys. Reason needs very careful watching: There is a hygiene of life near the volumes of rational produce and its maxim runs thus: The irrational and unreasonable (error) are the natural antidotes against the overpowering of life

- (1) The Will to Power, p. 516  
(2) Id., 517

reason, because something else was pressing forward to play the tyrant. In himself as well as in his contemporaries, namely the instinct. The fatalism with which the whole of Greek thought tinged, after Socrates, into reason, betrays a critical condition of things. On the occasion when a contemporary physiologist remarked Socrates and told him that he was "a great deal of evil desires", the great Socrates, master of irony, let fall a few words indicative of his real nature, and of the real state of things. "This is true," he answered, "but I overcome them all." The case of Socrates was at bottom only the extreme and most apparent example of a state of affairs which was beginning to be general: that state in which no one was able to master himself and in which the instincts turned one against the other; a state in which neither Socrates nor his "patients" were free to be rational or otherwise, but where rationality was de rigueur, and had become the last shift possible. And yet, no matter how this reason could be deluded, hypostatized, it can never reach to that level of import and significance where the "whole" man stands. In the end, reason does not "know" things; it only schematizes--it imposes as much regulative and form upon these, as our practical needs require. In the formation of reason, logic, and the categories, it was a need in us that was the determining power: not the need to "know", but to classify, to schematize, for the purpose of intelligibility and calculation. The adjustment and interpretation of all similar and equal things--the same process which every sensation undergoes, is the development of reason. The categories are truths only in the sense that they are the conditions

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 calculable and more amenable to our own purposes. (1) The same truth thinking is we do not wish to think under the  
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 its own preservation.

The knowledge that contradicts, suppresses, or denies and  
 annihilates life contradicts itself and involves its own  
 doom, unless it be a further distortion or a final self-destruction  
 simultaneous with the life it destroys. Reason needs very careful  
 watching: There is a danger of life near the volume of rational  
 passion and its main runs true. The irrational and unreasonable  
 (error) are the natural enemies against the overpowering of life

(1) The Will to Power, p. 216  
 (2) ibid, p. 216

by reason; they are the cures for the rational cancer.

It is to be regretted that the wise men of all ages have  
 pronounced edicts about life, not that most, if not all, of their  
 edicts were against life. But their consensus sapientium is not  
 to be regarded as a proof of truth. For it is not utterly impossible  
 that everyone of them was effete, rocky, decadent. Judgements and  
 valuations of life, whether for or against, cannot be certain; their  
 only value lies in the fact that they are symptoms; they can be con-  
 sidered only as symptoms;--per se such judgements are devoid of sense.  
 For, "the value of life cannot be estimated" (1). A living man  
 cannot judge life because he would be judging himself. He is not  
 only contending party in the dispute, which is enough to vitiate any  
 judgement he may make, but also, the very object of the dispute. How  
 can one be at the same time judge, appellant and defendant, all in  
 one, and pronounce veritable judgements laying any claim to truth?  
 Nor can a dead man, estimate the value of life. No one is responsible  
 for the fact that he exists at all, or that he is constituted as he  
 is. The fatality of his being cannot be divorced from the fatality  
 of the whole universe, past and present. One is necessary, one is a  
 piece of fate, one belongs to the whole and is in the whole. For  
 this reason no one can judge, measure, compare or condemn his existence,  
 for that would mean judging, measuring, comparing or condemning the  
 whole. And how can one judge, measure, compare or condemn the whole  
 when he is not outside but in the whole?

(1) - Twilight of the Idols, II, 2.

(1) Beyond Good And Evil § 6



For a philosopher to see a problem in the value of life, is almost an objection against him, against his wisdom. To question the value of life is as absurd as to ask why does the tree grow. The growth of the plant as well as our life are "given". It would avail us much better if we were unable to set ourselves to understand this "given" rather than to load ourselves to all-day-dreaming. Our nature, however, being submitted through open to the systematic propaganda of those big day-dreamers, designers and bull-whippers, and altered too, has been corrupted. And has become, under their hands, a visionary animal, who has to fulfill one more condition than the other animals and, as yet, our nature against any possible robbery of their innocence of existence. He must from time to time, believe that he knows why he exists; he cannot flourish without a philosophical confidence in life, without the belief in reason in life. But man's will always, from time to time, desires more than life is serious, that in to have as well as in to tragedy, it contains an irreconcilable split, a fatalism-wherever is not only the justification of a philosophy of life, but also the life need for it.

The impulse to knowledge is not the father of philosophy. Philosophy is the outcome of our life-instinct, our impulse to life which have not only made use of knowledge, as an instrument; but which have also made use of knowledge as a means to determine the value of knowledge itself and instrumental. (1) But whenever we consider the fundamental impulses of man with a view to determining how far they may have been noted as inspiring genius or as reasons and copolids, will find that they have all practiced philosophy at one time or another, and that each one of them would have been only too glad

(1) Beyond Good and Evil § 6

to look upon itself as the ultimate end of existence and the legitimate <sup>to</sup> lord over all the other impulses. "For every impulse is imperious, and as such, attempts to philosophise." (1) The will to knowledge, or the will to truth, therefore, has no grounds for its assumed mastery; nor can it claim philosophy as its exclusive contribution. An un-qualified will to knowledge does not inform us about the philosopher nor about his philosophy. It is rather his morality, that is the order in which all his impulses, including the will to knowledge, stand to each other, that will tell us what the man is and what his philosophy is worth.

This will to truth has raised so many issues, laid down so many questions, that at last and because of it, man has grown distrustful; he has lost patience and is gradually turning away. But this will itself, this Sphinx, has taught him to ask questions and question even itself. In fact, man made a long halt at the question, what is this will to truth, until at last, he came to an absolute standstill before a yet more fundamental question. To-day, the question is asked: What is the value of this will? Granted that we want the truth: Why not rather untruth? and uncertainty? Even ignorance? But who is asking who, in here? Is the problem of the value of truth presenting itself to us, or is it we who present ourselves to the problem? Who is the Oedipus and who, the Sphinx?

We would not hesitate to answer these questions if we, once reflect, that nothing can originate from its

like the greater run of metaphysicians,

(1) Beyond Good and Evil § 6.

to look upon itself as the ultimate end of existence and the legitimate  
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 presenting itself to us, or is it we who present ourselves to the  
 problem? Who is the originator and who, the Spinoza?

*Like the question of metaphysics*

are fundamentally inclined to maintain that the falsest opinions (2)  
 are opposite; that truth cannot originate in error; the will to truth,  
 and out of the will to deception. But this belief in the antithesis of  
 values is precisely the metaphysicians' typical prejudice. It is  
 through this "belief" of theirs, that they <sup>exert</sup> ~~exert~~ themselves for  
 their "Knowledge" which in final analysis, they call "the Truth."  
 For it may be doubted here, as it should, firstly, whether antitheses  
 exist at all; and secondly, whether the popular valuations and  
 antitheses of value, so decided and concluded, so apriori, are not  
 perhaps merely superficial estimates, merely provisional perspectives,  
 besides being probably made from some corner, some below--"frog  
 perspectives", as it were. It may be possible that a higher and  
 more fundamental value for life generally should be assigned to the  
 will to delusion; that what constitutes the value of those good and  
 respected things consists precisely in their being insidiously  
 related, knotted and crocheted to these evil and apparently opposed  
 things--perhaps even in being essentially identical with them.  
 The greater part, if not all, of the conscious thinking of a  
 philosopher is secretly influenced by his instincts and forced into  
 definite channels. For behind all logic and its seeming sovereignty  
 of movement, there are valuations, or to speak more plainly,  
 physiological demands, for the maintenance of a definite mode of  
 life: That the certain is worth more than the uncertain, that  
 illusion is less valuable than "truth."  
 "The falseness of an opinion," says Nietzsche, "is not for us  
 any objection to it.....The question is, how far an opinion is life-  
 promoting, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps species-  
 preserving; and we

are fundamentally inclined to maintain that the falsest opinions (to which the synthetic judgements a priori belong), are the most indispensable to us; that without a recognition of logical fictions, without a comparison of reality with the purely imagined world of the absolute and immutable, without a constant counterfeiting of the world by means of numbers, man could not live--that the renunciation of false opinions would be a renunciation of life, a negation of life. To recognize untruth as a condition of life: that is certainly to impugn the traditional ideas of value in a dangerous manner, and a philosophy which ventures to do so, has thereby alone placed itself beyond good and evil".(1)

A very bold, but true statement. Why should we have truth at all costs? What is its value for life? Should truth have a negative value for life, (be it noted that we are not here speaking of the individual's life), must we still want it? Should, on the other hand, error have a positive value for life, must we still reject it? These questions are easily answered once we take position on the major issue of Life and Knowledge. (x) and that is the decision any sane man would take. Now, if life is prior to Knowledge, it should undoubtedly come first.

But that is not all. It remains to be asked, moreover, whether in order that the scientific discipline of pursuing truth and rejecting error may commence, it is not necessary that there should already be a conviction, a belief, so imperative and absolute, that it demands a sacrifice of all other convictions and beliefs. Science, the great harbinger of this will to truth, rests on a belief, for the question whether truth is necessary must be affirmed in such a way that leaves

(x) - But we have shown that Life must dominate Knowledge,

(1) Beyond Good and Evil, 4

are fundamentally inclined to maintain that the falsest opinions (to which the synthetic judgements a priori belong), are the most indispensable to us; that without a recognition of logical fictions, without a comparison of reality with the purely imagined world of the absolute and immutable, without a constant counterfeiting of the world by means of numbers, man could not live--that the renunciation of false opinions would be a renunciation of life, a negation of life. To recognize untruth as a condition of life: that is certainly to impugn the traditional ideas of value in a dangerous manner, and a philosophy which ventures to do so, has thereby alone placed itself beyond good and evil".(1)

A very bold, but true statement. Why should we have truth at all costs? What is its value for life? Should truth have a negative value for life, (be it noted that we are not here speaking of the individual's life), must we still want it? Should, on the other hand, error have a positive value for life, must we still reject it? These questions are easily answered once we take position on the major issue of Life and Knowledge. (x) and that is the decision any sane man would take. Now, if life is prior to Knowledge, it should undoubtedly come first.

But that is not all. It remains to be asked, moreover, whether in order that the scientific discipline of pursuing truth and rejecting error may commence, it is not necessary that there should already be a conviction, a belief, so imperative and absolute, that it demands a sacrifice of all other convictions and beliefs. Science, the great harbinger of this will to truth, rests on a belief, for the question whether truth is necessary must be affirmed in such a way that leaves

(x) - But we have shown that Life must dominate Knowledge,

(1) Beyond Good and Evil, 4

no room for anything else; "there is nothing more necessary than truth and in comparison with it everything else has secondary value." This absolute will to truth is the will not to deceive and not to allow ourselves to be deceived. But to take this position one should have already "believed" that deception is injurious, dangerous, fatal. But is not-wishing-to-be-deceived really less injurious, less dangerous, less fatal? What do we know of the character of existence in all its phases to be able to decide whether the greater advantage is on the side of absolute distrust or absolute truthfulness? In case of both being necessary, whence should science derive the absolute belief, the conviction on which it rests, that truth is more important than anything else, even than every other conviction? This conviction could not have arisen if truth and untruth had both continually proved themselves to be useful, as is the case. Thus, the belief in science, cannot have had its origin in such a utilitarian calculation, but rather in spite of the fact of the in-utility and the dangerousness of the will to truth, of truth at all costs, being continually demonstrated. But this will to truth, implying that I will not deceive, not even myself, takes us to ethics. For, let us just ask ourselves fairly: "Why will we not deceive?" "revelated" especially if it should seem--as it <sup>does</sup> ~~for many~~ seem--as if life were laid out with a view to appearance, with a view to error, deceit, dissimulation, delusion, self-delusion; and when on the other hand, it is a matter of fact that the great type of life always manifested itself on the side of the most unscrupulous credence. Since knowledge can only allow pleasure and pain, benefit and injury, to subsist as motives, will they always agree with the sense of truth? They also contain errors

(\*) with this will to truth, to aggravate the condition of things,

are fundamentally inclined to maintain that the falsest opinions (as with the synthetic judgments a priori held) are the most indispensable to us; that without a recognition of logical fictions, without a comparison of reality with the purely imagined world of the absolute and impossible, without a constant countering of the world by means of numbers, we could not live--that the remembrance of false opinions would be a remembrance of life, a negation of life. To recognize existence as a cognition of life, that is certainly to take the traditional ideas of value in a dangerous manner, and a philosophy which ventures to do so, has thereby alone placed itself beyond good and evil. (1)

A very bold, but true statement. We should have truth at all costs? What is the value for life? Should truth have a negative value for life? (as it is noted that we are not here speaking of the individual's life), must we still want it? Should, on the other hand, error have a positive value for life, must we still reject it? These questions are easily answered once we take position on the major issue of life and knowledge, and that is the decision any sane man would take. Now if life is prior to knowledge, it should undoubtedly come first.

But that is not all. It remains to be asked, moreover, whether in order that the scientific discipline of pursuing truth and rejecting error may become, it is not necessary that there should already be a conviction, a belief, of imperative and absolute, that it demands a sacrifice of all other convictions and beliefs. Science, the great harbinger of this will to truth, rests on a belief, for the question whether truth is necessary must be settled in such a way that leaves

(\*) But we have shown that life must dominate knowledge, beyond good and evil. (1)

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 accurate will to truth is the only not to deceive and not to allow  
 no room for anything else; there is nothing more necessary than truth

⊗ - with this will to truth, to aggravate the condition of things,

for illumination and elevation and their very lowest determinations  
practically require our pleasure and pain. The whole of human life  
is deeply immersed in uncertainty and the individual cannot draw  
it up out of this well, without thereby causing a deep division in his  
whole past, without finding his present activities--those of human and  
heroic, for instance,--inconsistent, and without opposing some and  
disclaiming the passions which conduce to honor, heroism and happiness  
in the future.

But it has come to pass, we have made everything around us clear  
and easy and simple. We have been able to give our senses a passport  
to everything superficial, and our thoughts, a godlike desire for wrong  
intentions. We have contrived to retain our ignorance in order to  
enjoy an almost inconceivable freedom, thoughtlessness, heartiness  
and gaiety--all this, in order to enjoy life. It was only on this  
solidified foundation of ignorance, that our knowledge could rear its  
self; the will to knowledge on the foundation of a far more powerful  
will, the will to ignorance, to uncertainty and unrest. Not as its  
opposite, but as its refinement. And we understand it and laugh at  
the way, as our best knowledge has sought more to retain us in  
this simplified, imagined, falsified world of the way in which  
whether it will or not, it leaves error because as living itself,  
it loves itself. Thus, Mithras viewed the matter, but this was far  
from being the general phenomenon. Rather, the opposite was the case.  
Men do not see any further than their will to truth and recognition  
nothing more independent, more basic, and more necessary. But in this  
their necessity and religion had joined hands and life had to face  
unfathomable but ravens enemies called and stronger.

spirit of initiation the condition of living. (x) with this will to truth, to approximate the condition of living.

in the early days of Ancient Greece, Life had elaborated for  
itself a sort of immunity against the possible onslaught of these  
enemies, particularly truth. That this enemy has attempted to storm  
the life, is proved by the ancient story that King Midas hunted in the  
forest a long time for the wise Silenus, the companion of Dionysus,  
without capturing him. When Silenus at last fell into his hands, the  
King asked what was the best and most desirable of all things for man.  
Fixed and immovable, the demigod remained silent; till at last, forced  
by the King, he broke out with shrill laughter into these words: "Oh,  
wretched race of a day, children of chance and misery, why do ye compel  
me to tell you what it were most expedient for you not to hear?  
What is best of all is forever beyond your reach: not to be born,  
not to be, to be nothing. But the second best for you--is quickly  
to die." Against the wisdom and knowledge of Silenus, against the  
knowledge and feeling of the Greek of the terror and horror of existence,  
that he might endure this terror and horror of existence at all, the  
Ancient Greek interposed between himself and life the radiant dream-  
birth of the Olympians. The overwhelming dismay in the face of the  
titanic powers of nature, the Moira enthroned inexorably over all  
knowledge, the vulture of the great lover of mankind, Prometheus,  
the terrible fate of the wise Oedipus,--all this was again and again  
overcome by Greeks with the aid of the Olympian Gods; or, at any rate,  
it was veiled and withdrawn from sight. It was out of the direct  
necessity to live that the Greeks created these Gods. They could not  
have endured existence, with all their knowledge thereof, if it had  
not been revealed to them in their Gods, surrounded with a higher  
glory. Life, that impulse which calls us into being as the com-  
plement and consummation of existence, seducing one to a continuation  
of the Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music, § 3.4

of life, was itself the cause of the Olympian world which the Hellenic "will" made use of as a transfiguring mirror. Thus do the Gods justify the life of man, in that they themselves live it-- of course, as Gods may do. (1) Life needs illusion. With the help of this illusion, her goal is veiled by a phantasm; and while we stretch out our hands for the latter, life attains the former by means of our illusion. In the Greek's the "will" wished to contemplate itself in the transfiguration of genius and the world of art; in order to glorify themselves, its creatures had to feel themselves worthy of glory; they had to behold themselves again in a higher sphere, where they could see their mirrored images, the Olympians. It is with this illusion that the Hellenic will combated its knowledge, its wisdom, the truth of existence. In dreaming, in enjoying and contemplating this illusion, the Greeks must have completely lost sight of the waking reality and its ominous obtrusiveness. Though it is certain that of the two halves of our existence, the waking and the dreaming states, our will to truth and our will to illusion, the former appeals to us as infinitely preferable, important, and worthy of being pursued, satisfied and lived; indeed, as that alone which is lived; yet, in real relation to that mysterious substance of our nature; we should maintain the opposite estimate of the value of dreams and illusions. For the more clearly we perceive those impulses to illusion, to untruth, to art, and in them, an ardent longing for release, for redemption through release, for redemption through self-surpassing, the more we should feel ourselves impelled to the metaphysical assumption that life, eternally, well suffering, and divided against itself, has need of the rapturous vision, the joyful appearance, the forgetful illusion, the ecstatic (1) The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music, § 3.4

In the early days of ancient Greece, life had elaborated for itself a sort of immunity against the possible onslaught of these enemies, particularly truth. That this enemy has attempted to storm life, is proved by the ancient story that King Nixos hunted in the forest a long time for the wise Silenus, the companion of Dionysus, without capturing him. When Silenus at last fell into his hands, the King asked what was the best and most desirable of all things for man. Fixed and immovable, the doctored remained silent; still at last, forced by the King, he broke out with a still fainter into these words: "Oh, wretched race of a day, children of chance and misery, why do ye compel me to tell you what it were most expedient for you not to hear? What is best of all is forever beyond your reach: not to be born, not to be, not to be returning. But the second best for you--is quickly to die." Against the wisdom and knowledge of Silenus, against the knowledge and feeling of the Greek of the terror and horror of existence, that he might endure this terror and horror of existence at all, the ancient Greek interposed between himself and life the radiant dream-illusion of the Olympians. The overwhelming alchemy in the face of the Titanic powers of nature, the Titans enthroned inexorably over all knowledge, the violence of the great lover of mankind, Prometheus, the terrible fate of the wise Oedipus--all this was again and again overcome by Greeks with the aid of the Olympian Gods; or, at any rate, it was veiled and withdrawn from sight. It was out of the direct necessity to live that the Greeks created these Gods. They could not have endured existence, with all their knowledge thereof, if it had not been revealed to them in their Gods, surrounded with a glory. Life, that impulse which calls and lures us into being as the continuation and consummation of existence, becoming one to a continuation

untruth, for its continuous salvation; which vision, appearance, illusion, which untruth, we, completely wrapped up in it and composed of it, are compelled to apprehend as the True non-being. And, following Kant and Schopenhauer, we conceive of our empirical existence as a continuously manifested representation of Primal Unity, whether it be thing-in-itself or will, we shall have to look upon illusion and untruth, as an appearance of appearance, hence, as a still higher appeasement of the primordial desire for appearance, illusion and untruth. That is why, the innermost heart of life, feels that ineffable joy in the naive works of art, in illusion, is untruth, likewise, as an appearance of appearance. In his "Transfiguration," Raphael, has represented for us this devolution of appearance to appearance, where the lower half, with the possessed boy, the despairing bearers, the bewildered, terrified disciples, shows us the reflection of suffering, primal and eternal, the sole basis and the truest truth of the world. The appearance here is the counter-appearance of eternal contradiction. From this now arises, like the ambrosial vapour, a new visionary world of appearances, invisible to those wrapped in the first appearance--a radiant floating intellect purest bliss, a serene contemplation beaming from wide-open eyes. In this is presented in sublime artistic symbolism, both the world of illusion and untruth, consequently of beauty and joy, and its substratum, the terrible wisdom of silence, the world of truth and the truth of existence: intuitively, we comprehend their necessary interdependence. Knowledge kills action; action requires the veil of illusion; Truth is antagonistic to Life; life needs untruth--that is the lesson Ancient Greek Gods teach us.

of life, was itself the cause of the Olympian world which the Hellenic will made out of as a transfiguring mirror. Thus do the Gods justify the life of man, in that they themselves live in it. (1). Of course, as Gods may do. (1). Life needs illusion. With the help of this illusion, the goal is veiled by a phantom: and while we stretch out our hands for the latter, life attains the former by means of our illusion. In the Greek the presentation of gods and the world of art; in order to glorify themselves, the creatures had to feel themselves worthy of glory; they had to behold themselves again in a higher sphere, where they could see their mirrored images, the Olympians. In the Greek Hall the Hellenic will created its knowledge, its wisdom, the truth of existence. In dreaming, in enjoying and contemplating this illusion, the Greeks must have completely lost sight of the waking reality and its common objective needs. Though it is certain that of these slaves of our existence, the waking and the dreaming states, our will to truth and our will to illusion, the former appears to us as infinitely preferable, important, and worthy of being pursued, satisfied and lived; yet, as that alone which is lived; yet, in real relation to the appearance and satisfaction of our nature; we should maintain the opposite estimate of the value of dreams and illusions. For the more clearly we perceive those impulses to illusion, to untruth, to art, and in them, an ardent longing for release, for redemption through release, for redemption self-transcending, the more we should feel ourselves impelled to the metaphysical assumption that life, eternally suffering, and divided against itself, redeemed of the redemption vision, the joyful awareness, the forgetful illusion, the ecstatic

(1) The Birth of Tragedy out of Music, p. 3, 4



acts critically and dissuasively; with Socrates, it is instinct that becomes critic and consciousness that becomes creator--a perfect monstrosity per defectum. (1). Socrates was a typical non-mystic, in whom, through a cancerous superfoetation, the logical nature is to the same excessive degree as instinctive wisdom is developed in the mystic. This practicing of music and poetizing on the eve of his death are the only signs he recognized as to the limits of logic. "Perhaps, he must have asked himself, what is not intelligible to me is not therefore unintelligible? Perhaps there is a realm of wisdom from which the logician, the seeker after truth, the rational, is shut out? Perhaps illusion is even a necessary correlative of truth, and Art, a necessary supplement to science?" There stands a profound illusion, that with the clue of the artist-dreamer, the Socratic rationalist, too, finds a great satisfaction in the present, and like the former, this satisfaction protects him from the practical ethics of pessimism with its lynx eyes shining only in the dark. Whenever the truth is unveiled, the artist-dreamer will cling with rapt gaze to whatever still remains veiled after the unveiling. The Socratic rationalist, gets his enjoyment and satisfaction out of the cast off veil. He finds his highest pleasure in the process of a continuously successful unveiling effected through his own unaided efforts. There would have been no science (logic, truth-finding) if it had been concerned only with that one naked goddess and nothing else. For then its disciples would have felt like those who wished to dig a whole straight through the earth: each one of them perceives that with his utmost lifelong efforts he can excavate but a very

(1) The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music. Section 13  
(1) - The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music, p 17

It was this lesson of Greek gods, immortalized in the poetry of Homer, Hesiod, and Aeschylus, that Socrates received against with demonic power. With Euripides on his side, they co-operated together, the one to destroy and with the notion that to be beautiful a thing must be intelligible, and the other to destroy ethics, with the notion that to be moral, an action must be intelligible, that virtue is knowledge. Socrates, was the only one who admitted to himself that he knew nothing and in his periphrastics through Athens, he found that all the celebrities were without knowledge, even of their own professions, and that they practiced them only by instinct. With this phrase, "only by instinct", we have the heart and core of Socratic rationalism, which condemns existing ethics theoretical, ever Socrates turned, and it shall not be otherwise with the Socrates of today, he saw instinct, illusion, and from this lack inferred the essential perversity and objectiveness of existing ethics. With this phrase, we are offered a key to the character of the rationalist-ethical man by the wonderful phenomenon which Socrates called his daemon. In exceptional cases, when his gigantic intellect began to fall him, he received a secure support in the utterance of a divine voice which manifested itself at such moments. This voice, whenever it came, always dissuaded in this utterly abnormal nature, instinctive wisdom only appears in order to hinder here and there the progress of conscious perception. Whereas in all productive men, it is instinct that is the creatively affirmative force, and consciousness that means critical and destructive force, it is instinct that is the creative force.

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(1) The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music. Section 13

...the Fiji Islands, we see, struggles his parents and as a friend,  
small portion of the enormous depth, and this is filled up again  
before his eyes by the labours of his successor, so that a third man  
seems to be doing a sensible thing in selecting a new spot for  
tunneling. Now suppose it comes to be shown conclusively that the  
antipodal goal cannot be attained thus directly, who will then still  
care to toil on in the old depths, unless in the meantime he has  
learned to content himself with finding precious stones or discovering  
natural laws? It is for this reason that Lessing boldly said that  
he cared more for the search after truth than for truth itself, in  
saying which, he revealed the fundamental secret of Socratic  
rationalism, to the astonishment and anger of Socratic rationalists.  
Besides this, there stands a profound illusion, that with the clue  
of logic, thinking can reach to the nethermost depth of being, and  
that it can modify it too. This metaphysical illusion is added as  
an instinct to Socratic rationalism and again and again, leads the  
latter to its limits, as it did with Socrates himself, where it must  
change into art, that is, summon illusion, appearance and untruth;  
in Socrates' case, music playing and poetizing. "For the periphery  
of the circle of Socratic rationalism has an infinite number of  
points, and while there is still no telling how this circle can  
ever be completed and measured, yet the noble and gifted man, even  
before the middle of his career, inevitably comes into contact with  
those extreme points of the periphery where, staring into the  
unfathomable, he sees, to his dismay, how logic coils round itself  
at these limits and finally bites its own tail" (1). If illusion  
does not here hasten to the rescue, then, the instinctive love  
of life would be so much weakened, that he would perhaps feel the  
last remnant of a sense of duty, to put an end to this world, like

(1) - The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music, p 17.

small portion of the enormous depth, and this is filled up again before his eyes by the labours of his ancestors, so that a third man seems to be doing a thousand things in selecting a new spot for dwelling. Now suppose it comes to be shown conclusively that the antipodal point cannot be attained and that, who will then still come to toll on in the old system, unless in the meantime he has learnt to content himself with finding precious stones or discovering natural laws. It is for this reason that feeling boldly said that he could move for the search after truth than for truth itself. In saying which he revealed the fundamental secret of his reason: rationalism, to the rationalism and anger of Socratic rationalism. He is this, there stands a profound illusion, that with the aim of logic, thinking can reach to the remotest depth of being, and that it can modify it too. This metaphysical illusion is added as an instinct to Socratic rationalism and again weakens, leads the intellect to its limits, as it did with Socrates himself, where it must change into art, that is, common illusion, appearance and reality. In Socrates' case, would playing and posing. For the periphery of the circle of Socratic rationalism has an infinite number of points, but while there is still no telling how this circle can ever be completed and measured, yet the circle and gifted man, even before the middle of his career, inevitably comes into contact with those extreme points of the periphery where, staring into the unapproachable, he sees, to his dismay, how logic coils round itself at those limits and finally bites its own tail. It is illusion that not only hinders to the rescue, then, the instinctive love of life would be so much weakened, that he would perhaps feel the last remnants of a sense of duty, to get on and to this world, like

(1) - (The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music, p. 17)

the Fiji islander who, as son, strangles his parents and as a friend, his friends, and thus a practical pessimism might give rise to a horrible ethics of general slaughter out of pity.

But this was not the only misery, Nietzsche saw in our present conditions. Mightier as the will to truth is, it is not mightier than life, which seducing even the truth-willer by the illusion that he can unathem her, can always have the means to enhance or at least secure itself; her "illusions" are the most crafty, the most effective and the least discernable, and they are always ready at hand, a whole huge store of them. He recognized another greater and infinitely more mischievous pestilence which having achieved mastery over men, has set to drain them of their blood and kill them slowly: The religious-moral idiosyncrasy. And he set unhesitatingly to fight the greatest battle for life ever fought; he felt himself irresistibly urged to throw off the yoke of morality and liberate life.

But who would dare to glance at the desert of the bitterest and most superfluous agonies of spirit in which this most gallant soldier has pined away? Who could listen to the sighs of that lonely and troubled mind, that hyperborean? He does not ask so much of his reader when, before lifting his curtain over the fiercest battles, he says: "I am only too well aware of the conditions under which a man understands me, and then necessarily understands. He must be intellectually upright to the point of hardness, in order even to endure my seriousness and my passion. He must be used to living on mountain-tops,--possessing from strength a predilection for questions for which no one has enough courage nowadays; the

(Nietzsche, Preface. (2) 1st Edition 1844)

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 world. I am not interested in the point of hardness, in order even  
 to endure my existence and my passion. I must be used to  
 living on a mountain-top,--possessing from strength a predilection  
 for questions for which no one has enough courage nowadays; the  
 world is too soft for me, too soft for my will."

courage for the forbidden; his predestination must be the labyrinth.  
 The experience of seven soliditudes. New ears for new music. New  
 eyes for the most remote things. A new conscience for truths which  
 hitherto have remained dumb. And the will to economy on a large  
 scale: to husband his strength and his enthusiasm....He must honour  
 himself, he must love himself; he must be absolutely free with  
 regard to himself! (1) "We, hyperboreans, know too well how far  
 outside the crowd we stand. Beyond the North, the ice, and death--  
 our life our happiness....We prefer to live amid ice than to be  
 breathed upon by modern virtues and other southerly winds." (2)  
 The deterioration of the European race; the reversion of all  
 the noble estimates of value, inherited from antiquity or inherent  
 in man, the shattering of the strong, the spoiling of great hopes,  
 the casting of suspicion on the delight in beauty, the breaking  
 down of every thing Autonomous, manly, conquering and imperious--  
 all instincts which are natural to the highest and most successful  
 type of MAN--into uncertainty, distress of conscience and self-destruction;  
 the inversion of all love of the earthly and of supremacy over  
 the earth, into hatred of the earth and earthly things, until  
 "unworldliness", "unsensuousness", and "higher man" all fused into  
 one sentiment--in short, the war against life, was carried out under  
 the auspices of Christianity. "I should say that Christianity has  
 hitherto been the most portentous of presumptions. Men, not great  
 enough, nor hard enough, to be entitled as artists to take part in  
 fashioning MAN; men, not sufficiently strong and far-sighted to allow,  
 to all the low, the base, the vulgar, and the plebeian. It  
 was one of the greatest of mistakes that they first arrogated the  
 (1) Antichrist, preface. (2) Id. Section 131. and to coin a list  
 of the names of such values. (3) The Genealogy of Morals, §2  
 (4) Beyond Good and Evil, §62

teaching him; men not sufficiently strong and far-sighted to allow  
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 outside the crowd we stand. Beyond the North, the ice, and death--  
 regard to himself" (1) "We, hyperboreans, know too well how far  
 himself, he must love himself; he must be absolutely true with  
 state: to husband his strength and his enthusiasm.... He must know  
 himself have remained dumb. And the will to economy on a large  
 eyes for the most remote things. A new conscience for crimes which  
 The experience of seven solitudes. New ears for new music. New  
 courage to the forbidden; his generalization must be the faithful.

The error of the English theory could be seen more clearly when with sublime self-constraint, the obvious law of the thousand failures sustained with the same theory: what could the masses have to and perishings to prevail; men, not sufficiently noble to see the radically different grades of rank and intervals of rank that separate man from man; -- such men; with their "equality before God", have hitherto swayed the destiny of Europe; until at last a dwarfed, almost ludicrous species has been produced, a gregarious animal, something obliging, sickly, mediocre, the European of the present day. (1).

The English psychologists have shown their crass ineptitude in the study of morals in their common agreement about the origin of the idea and judgement of good. According to their general theory, of which it is not denied they have produced more than one variety, man had originally praised and called good altruistic acts from the ~~from the~~ standpoint of those on whom such acts were conferred, that is, those to whom they were useful. Subsequently, the origin of this praise was forgotten, and altruistic acts, simply because, as a sheer matter of habit, they were praised as good, came also to be felt as good--as though they contained in themselves some intrinsic goodness. But this is all wrong. The real homestead of the concept "good" is sought and located in the wrong place. The judgement "Good" did not originate among those to whom goodness was shown. Much rather has it been the good themselves, that is, the aristocratic, the powerful, the high-stationed, the high-minded, who have felt that they themselves were good, and that their actions were good, that is to say, of the first order, in contradistinction to all the low, the low-minded, the vulgar, and the plebeian. It was out of this pathos of distance that they first arrogated the right to create values for their own profit, and to coin a list

with sublime self-consciousness, the British law of the thousand talents  
and perhaps to prevail; but not sufficiently noble to see the  
radically different grades of rank and intervals of rank that  
separate man from man:—good man; with their "equality before God",  
have likewise swept the feeling of respect; until at last a  
darker, almost indistinguishable shadow has been produced, a progression  
animal, something clinging, sticky, mediocre, the European of the  
present day. (1).  
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theory, of which it is not denied that have produced more than one  
variety, and had originally praised and called good alike  
not from the same standpoint of those on whom men were  
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because, as a short vector of merit, they were praised as good,  
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were good, that is to say, of the first order, in contradistinction  
to all the low, the low-minded, the vulgar, and the plebeian. It  
was out of this feeling of distance that they first arrogated the  
right to create values for their own profit, and to coin a list

(1) Beyond Good and Evil, § 2. (2) The Genealogy of Morals, § 2.

The error of the English theory could be seen more clearly when  
juxtaposed with the true theory: what could the masters have to  
do with utility? The standpoint of utility is alien and simply  
inapplicable when we have to deal with as volcanic an effervescence  
of supreme values, creating and demarcating as they do a hierarchy  
within themselves. It is rather "the pathos of nobility and distance,  
the chronic and despotic esprit de corps and fundamental instinct  
of a higher dominant race coming into association with a meaner  
race, an under-race, this is the origin and antithesis of good  
and bad." (4)

The masters' right of giving names goes so far that we may even  
look upon language itself as the expression of their powers. They  
say, "this is that and that is that", seal finally every object  
and every event with a sound, and thereby at the same time take  
possession of it. It is because of this origin that the word good  
is far from having any necessary connection with altruistic acts,  
in accordance with the erroneous beliefs of English moral philoso-  
phers. It is, on the contrary, the decay of aristocratic values,  
that occasions the antithesis between egoistic and altruistic to  
press forth, more and more heavily on man's conscience. It is the  
"hard instinct" which gives rise to such antithesis and finds in  
them many ways of expressing itself.

We may approximate the only coherent, true and psychologically  
tenable explanation of good and evil, when we realize that every-  
where "aristocrat", "noble" in the social sense, is the root idea  
out of which have necessarily developed "good" in the sense of high  
calibre, "with a privileged soul"—a development.

(1) The Genealogy of Morals, § 3.

(2) 'with aristocratic soul', 'noble' in the sense of 'with a soul of

The error of the English theory could be as a more clearly when  
 juxtaposed with the true theory: what could the masters have to  
 do with utility? The standard of utility is alien and simply  
 inapplicable when we have to deal with an effective  
 of supreme values, creating and destroying as they do a hierarchy  
 within themselves. It is rather the power of nobility and distance  
 the church and despotic spirit as they and fundamental instinct  
 of a higher dominant race coming into association with a manner  
 race, an under-race, this is the origin and antithesis of good  
 and bad. (1)

The masters right of giving names goes so far that we may even  
 look upon language itself as the expression of their power. They  
 say, "this is that and that is that", and finally every object  
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 possession of it. It is because of this origin that the word good  
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 "hard instinct" which gives rise to such antithesis and finds in  
 them many ways of expressing itself.

to may approximate the only constant, true and psychologically  
 female explanation of good and evil, when we realize that every-  
 where "aristocratic", "noble" in the social sense, is the root idea  
 out of which have necessarily developed "good" in the sense of high  
 culture, with a privileged soul.

(1) The Genealogy of Morals, § 4.  
 (2) "With aristocratic soul, noble in the sense of high culture" - (X)  
 John A. Hill

which invariably runs parallel with that other evolution by which  
 "vulgar", "plebeian", "low", are made to change finally into bad.  
 "The German 'schlecht' is identical with 'schlicht' which originally  
 and as yet without any sinister innuendo, simply denoted the  
 plebeian man in contrast to the aristocratic man." (1). Similarly,  
 I can think of the Arabic words 'hasan=good and 'jayyed=good as  
 originating from 'hasan=beauty and 'joud=noble descent, and sayyee=  
 bad and radii=bad, as originating from 'saud=the general, the not-  
 unique and 'rade=the weak. The aristocrats call themselves simply  
 after their superiority in power, "the powerful", "the lords", "the  
 commanders", or after the most obvious sign of their superiority,  
 as for example, "the rich", "the possessors." Similarly among the  
 Greeks, the Romans, the Celts, the same etymological interpretation  
 applies. (2)

Whenever the highest caste is at the same time the priestly  
 caste, "clean" and "unclean" confront each other as badges of class  
 distinction. There the idea of political superiority always  
 resolves itself into the idea of psychological superiority, and  
 in accordance with its general characteristics, confers on itself  
 the privilege of a title which alludes specifically to its  
 priestly function. The "clean man" is originally only a man who  
 washes himself, who abstains from certain foods, which are con-  
 ductive to skin diseases, who does not sleep with the unclean  
 women of the lower classes. It is through these qualities that  
 gulfs are cleft in the social plane. The knightly aristocratic  
 values, on the other hand, are based on a careful cult of the

(1) - Genealogy of Morals, § 4.  
 (2) - Id. § 5.

which invariably runs parallel with other evolution by which  
"vigilant", "placid", "low", are made to change finally into bad.  
"The German 'schlecht' is identical with 'schlecht' which originally  
and as yet without any sinister innuendo, simply denoted the  
plebeian man in contrast to the aristocratic man." (1). Similarly,  
I can think of the Arabic words 'nassab' and 'juy' as  
originating from 'nassab' and 'juy' as denoting descent, and 'nassab'  
and 'juy' as denoting, as originating from 'nassab' and 'juy', the not-  
noble and 'juy' as denoting the noble. The aristocrats call themselves 'juy'  
after their superiority in power, 'the powerful', 'the lords', 'the  
commanders', or after the most obvious sign of their superiority,  
as for example, 'the rich', 'the possessors'. Similarly among the  
Greeks, the Romans, the Celts, the same etymological interpretation  
applies. (2).  
Whenever the highest state is at the same time the plebeian  
state, 'plebeian' and 'noble' contrast each other as based on class  
distinction. There the idea of political superiority always  
resolves itself into the idea of psychological superiority, and  
in accordance with its general characteristics, contrast itself  
the privilege of a class which claims a superiority to the  
plebeian man. The 'plebeian' man is originally only a man who  
wishes himself, who separates from certain kinds, which are con-  
ducive to skin diseases, who does not sleep with the plebeian  
women of the lower classes. It is through these qualities that  
he is able to rise in the social place. The knightly aristocratic  
values, on the other hand, are based on a certain kind of the

(1) - Genealogy of Morals.  
(2) - 28. 22.

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physical, on a flowering, rich, and even effervescent healthiness,  
that goes considerably beyond what is necessary for maintaining  
life; on war, adventure, the chase, the dance, the tourney, war--  
on everything, that is contained in strong and free and joyous  
action.  
"All the world's efforts against the 'Aristocrats', the 'mighty',  
the 'masters', the 'holders of Power', are negligible by comparison  
with what has been accomplished against those classes by the Jews--  
the Jews, that priestly nation which eventually realized that the  
one method of effecting satisfaction on its enemies and tyrants  
was by means of radical transvaluation of values, which was at  
the same time an act of cleverest revenge. Yet the method was  
only appropriate to a nation of priests, to a nation of the most  
jealously-nursed-priestly revengefulness. It was the Jews who,  
in opposition to the aristocratic equation (good=aristocratic--  
beautiful-happy-loved by the Gods) dared with a terrifying  
logic to suggest the contrary equation namely 'the wretched are  
alone the good; the poor, the weak, the lowly, are alone the good;  
the suffering, the needy, the sick, the loathsome, are the only  
ones who are pious, the only ones who are blessed, for them  
alone is salvation--but you, <sup>on the other hand,</sup> to all eternity the evil, you aristocrats,  
you men of power, you are <sup>to all eternity, the evil,</sup> the horrible, the covetous, the insatiate,  
the godless; eternally also shall you be the unblessed, the cursed,  
the damned!" (1)

(1). Genealogy of Morals. Section 7.

...on a flowering, rich, and even effervescent decadence,  
 that goes considerably beyond what is necessary for maintaining  
 life; on war, adventure, the chase, the dance, the luxury, war--  
 on everything, that is contained in strong and free and joyous  
 motion.

"All the world's efforts against the 'Aristocrats', the 'mighty',  
 the 'masters', the 'holders of power', are negligible by comparison  
 with what has been accomplished against these classes by the Jews--  
 the Jews, that priestly nation which eventually realized that the  
 one method of effecting satisfaction on its enemies and tyrants  
 was by means of radical transvaluation of values, which was at  
 the same time an act of clearest revenge. Yet the rest of man  
 only appropriate to a nation of priests, to a nation of the most  
 jealously-guarded priestly revengefulness. It was the Jews who,  
 in opposition to the aristocratic question (good-aristocratic)  
 essentially-negated by the Gods (dared with a terrifying  
 logic to suggest the contrary question namely: 'the wicked are  
 alone the good; the poor, the weak, the lowly, are alone the good;  
 the suffering, the needy, the sick, the loathsome, are the only  
 ones who are blessed, the only ones who are blessed, for them  
 alone is salvation--but you to all eternity the evil, you aristocrats,  
 you men of power, you are alone horrible, the covetous, the incontinent,  
 the godless; eternally also shall you be the unblessed, the cursed,  
 the damned!" (1)

It is with the Jews, the Jewish slaves of the Imperium Romanum  
 that the slave-insurrection in morals begins. They performed the  
 miracle of the inversion of valuations by means of which life on  
 earth obtained a new and dangerous charm, by fusing into one the  
 expressions 'rich', 'godless', 'wicked', 'violent', 'sensual', and  
 for the first time coined the term 'world' as a term of reproach.  
 It is with them that the revolt of the slaves begins in the sphere  
 of morals. This revolt begins in the very principle of resentment  
 becoming creative and giving birth to values--a resentment  
 experienced by those who, being deprived of the proper outlet of  
 action, are forced to find compensation in an imaginary revenge.  
 While every aristocratic morality springs from a triumphant  
 affirmation of its fundamental demands, the slave morality says  
 'no' from the very outset to whatever is outside itself, different  
 from itself and not itself. It is this 'no' that is its only  
 creative deed. The slave morality requires as the condition of  
 its existence an external and objective world, objective stimuli,  
 to be capable of action at all, for its action is fundamentally a  
 reaction. The acts of masters, on the other hand, grow spontaneously,  
 for master morality merely seeks its antithesis so as to pronounce  
 a more grateful and exultant yes to its own self. Its conception  
 is fundamentally positive, and as it were, saturated with life  
 and passion as it exclaims, 'we aristocrats', 'we good <sup>ones</sup> ~~men~~', 'we  
 beautiful ones', 'we happy ones'. The 'well-born' simply felt  
 themselves the 'happy'; they did not have to manufacture their  
 happiness artificially through looking at their enemies, or to talk

It is with the Jews, the Jewish slaves of the Imperial Roman Empire, that the slave-laborer in morals begins. They performed the miracle of the inversion of values of which life on earth obtained a new and dangerous charm, by losing into one the expressions 'rich', 'poor', 'wicked', 'virtuous', 'noble', and 'ignominious'. For the first time found the term 'world' as a term of reproach. It is with them that the revolt of the slave begins in the sphere of morals. This revolt begins in the very principle of resentment becoming creative and giving birth to values--a resentment experienced by those who, being deprived of the proper outlet of action, are forced to find compensation in an imaginary revenge. While every aristocratic morality springs from a triumphant affirmation of its fundamental demands, the slave morality says 'no' from the very outset to whatever is outside itself, different from itself and not itself. It is this 'no' that is its only creative deed. The slave morality regards as the condition of its existence and external and objective world, objective stimuli, to be capable of action at all, for its action is fundamentally a reaction. The acts of masters, on the other hand, grow spontaneously for master morality merely as its antithesis as to pronounce a more grateful and exultant yes to its own self. Its conception is fundamentally positive, and as it were, saturated with life and passion as it exclaims, 'we aristocrats', 'we good ones', 'we beautiful ones', 'we happy ones'. The 'well-born' man is left to himself the 'happy'; they did not have to manufacture their happiness artificially through looking at their enemies, or to sink

and lie themselves into happiness as is the custom of resentful men. The masters do not caricature their enemies, they are usually proud of them. Their slaves, however, they regard with contempt and disdain and the words they apply to them always portend a kind of pity and care, and ~~ring~~ ring in a tone in which 'unhappy' is the predominant note. The happiness of the master is necessarily activity; that of the slave is a narcotic, a deadening quietude, a peace, a Sabbath, an enervation of the mind and relaxation of the limits, a purely passive thing. While the master lives in confidence and openness, with himself and others, the soul of the resentful slave squints; his mind loves hidden crannies, tortuous paths and backdoors, everything secret appeals to him as his word, his safety, his balm. He is necessarily more prudent than the master in his vehement and valiant charge whether against danger or the enemy or the ecstatic bursts of rage, love, reverence and gratitude. When the master resents, his resentment fulfils and exhausts itself in an immediate reaction and emits no venom. What ~~the~~ respect for his enemies is found, forsooth in an aristocratic man--and such a reverence is always a ready bridge for love! He insists on having his enemy to himself as his distinction. He tolerates no other enemy but a man in whose character there is nothing to despise but much to honour! On the other hand, imagine the 'enemy' as the resentful man conceives him--and it is here exactly that we see his work, his creativeness: he has conceived 'the evil enemy', the 'evil one', and indeed that is the root idea from which he now evolves as a contrasting and corresponding figure a 'good one', himself--his very self! (1)

(1). Genealogy of Morals, Section 10  
(2) Genealogy of Morals, Section 11

and the words they apply to them always portend a kind of pity and care, and ~~the~~ ring in a tone in which 'unhappy' is the predominant note. The happiness of the master is necessarily active; that of the slave is a narcotic, a deadening delude, a peace, a stolidity, an exorcism of the mind and relaxation of the limbs, a purely passive thing. While the master lives in confidence and openness with himself and others, the soul of the resentful slave is split; his mind loves hidden grannies, tortuous paths and backstays, every-thing secret speaks to him as his word, his safety, his law. He is necessarily more prudent than the master in his vengeance and violent change whether against danger or the enemy or the obstacle bursts of rage, love, reverence and gratitude. When the master resents, his resentment falls and expands itself in an immediate reaction and insinuates no venom. What the master feels for his enemies is found, forsooth, in an aristocratic man--and such a reverence is always a ready bridge for love! He insinuates off having his enemy to himself as his distinction. He tolerates no other enemy but a man in whose character there is nothing to despise but much to honor! On the other hand, imagine the 'enemy' as the resentful man conceives him--and it is here exactly that we see his work, his over-sensitivity: he has conceived 'the evil enemy', the 'evil one', and indeed that is the root idea from which he now evolves as a contrasting and corresponding figure a 'good one', himself--his

(1) 'very selfish'

The two words 'bad' and 'evil' mark a great difference between each other although they both have an identical contrary in the word good. 'Bad' is the master's name for the slave; 'evil' is the slave's name for the master. The really evil according to the resentment morality is just the good man of the other morality; just the aristocrat, the powerful one, the one who rules, but who is distorted by the venomous eye of resentfulness into a new color. "These men who in their relations with each other manifest the greatest consideration, self-control, delicacy, loyalty, pride and friendship, these men are in reference to what is outside their circle (where the foreign element, a foreign country, begins,) not much better than beasts of prey, which have been let loose. In respect of what is outside themselves, they revert to the innocence of the beast-of-prey conscience, like jubilant monsters who come from a ghostly bout of murder, arson, rape, with bravado and a moral equanimity, perfectly convinced that the poets have how an ample theme to sing and celebrate. It is impossible not to recognize at the core of all these aristocratic races the beast or prey, the magnificent blond brute, avidly rampant for spoil and victory: this hidden core needed an outlet from time to time, the beast must get loose again, must return into the wilderness -- the Roman, Arabian, German and Japanese nobility are alike in this need." (1) "Our audacity has forced a way", says Pericles in his famous oration, ~~over~~ "over every land and sea, rearing everywhere, imperishable memorials of itself for good and for evil" (2). This audacity of aristocratic races, mad, absurd, and spasmodic as may be its expression, Pericles sets in special relief and glory as he

(1) Genealogy of Morals, Section 11 (2) Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War.

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each other although they both have an identical meaning in the word  
'good'. 'Good' is the master's name for the slave; 'evil' is the slave's  
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outside themselves, they revert to the innocence of the beast-of-prey  
consciousness, like brilliant monsters who come from a ghostly host of  
murder, arson, rape, with bravado and a moral equanimity, perfectly  
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Lectures on the Future of Europe, "over every land and sea, tearing everywhere,  
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(1) Genealogy of Morals, Section II  
Nietzsche, History of the

describes their nonchalance and contempt for safety, body, life and  
comfort, their awful joy and intense delight in all destruction, in  
all the ecstasies of victory and cruelty,--all these features of the  
'barbarian' and of the 'evil enemy'. The very essence of all so-called  
civilization is to train out of man, the beast of prey, a tame and  
civilized animal, a domesticated animal. Its real tools are the  
instincts of reaction and resentment, by the help of which the  
aristocratic races, together with their ideals were finally degraded  
and overpowered. "These beasts of vindictive instincts that have  
to be bottled up, these slaves, represent the decline of humanity;  
these tools of civilization are a disgrace to humanity, and constitute  
more of an argument against civilization, more of a reason why  
civilization should be suspected. One may be perfectly justified  
in being always afraid of the blond beast that lies at the core  
of all aristocratic races and in being on one's guard. But who  
would not a hundred times be afraid, when one at the same time admires  
than to be immune from fear, at the cost of being perpetually  
obsessed with the loathsome spectacle of the distorted, the dwarfed,

the stunted, the envenomed? There is no doubt we suffer from 'man', today;  
but what has produced this repulsion?  
It is that the worm 'man' is in the foreground and pullulates; it is

that the 'tame' man, the wretched mediocre and unedifying creature, who  
has learned to consider himself a goal and a pinnacle." (1) The

The above passages have been universally misunderstood. They  
were taken to imply that Nietzsche would approve of a policy of  
physical violence, oppression, murder, arson, rape and torture, on  
behalf of to-day's Germany, Arabia or Japan. But this only shows  
the want of understanding that modernity enjoins. In these  
descriptions Nietzsche meant to bring home to us, how, in history,

(1) Genealogy of Morals, § 11.

the motives 'good' and 'evil' were produced and slowly evolved. When he describes the ideal man he wishes us to produce now, he is very clear as to attribute to him a predominance of spiritual values. Where he uses concrete physical qualities, he speaks only metaphorically, as I shall show later on.

There is another origin of the 'good' as the resentful slave has thought it out: it is not surprising that the lambs should bear a grudge against the great birds of prey. But that is no reason for blaming the great birds of prey, for taking the little lambs. And when the lambs say among themselves, "those birds of prey are evil, and he who is as far removed from being a bird of prey, who is rather its opposite, a lamb,--is he not good?" then, there is nothing to cavil at in the setting up of this ideal, though it may also be that the birds of prey will regard it a little sneeringly and perhaps say to themselves: "We bear no grudge against them, these good lambs; we even like them!" What wonder if the suppressed and the stealthily simmering passions of revenge and hatred, exploit for their own advantage and belief that "the strong have an option of being weak," and the bird of prey of being a lamb. Thereby do they win for themselves the right of attributing to the birds of prey the responsibility of being birds of prey. When the oppressed, the down-trodden and overpowered say to themselves with the vindictive galle of weakness, "let us be otherwise than the evil, namely, good; and good is everyone who does not oppress, who hurts no one, who does not pay back, who hands over revenge to God, who holds himself, as we do, in hiding; who goes out of the way of evil, and demands in short, little of life; like ourselves, the patient, the meek, the just", they are simply helping themselves to live on their slave-life.



describes their nonchalant and contempt for safety, body, life and comfort, their calm joy and intense delight in all destruction, in all the ecstasies of victory and cruelty,--all these features of the 'evil' and of the 'evil enemy'. The very essence of all so-called civilization is to bring out of man, the best of prey, a tame and civilized animal, a domesticated animal. The real fools are the instincts of reaction and resentment, by the help of which the aristocratic races, together with their ideals were finally degraded and overpowered. These birds of vindictive instincts that have to be bottled up, these slaves, represent the decline of humanity; these fools of civilization are a danger to humanity, and constitute more of an argument against civilization, more of a reason why civilization should be rejected. One may be perfectly justified in being always afraid of the blood beast that lies at the core of all aristocratic races and in being on one's guard. But who would not a hundred times be afraid, when one at the same time admires them as a human from fear, at the cost of being perpetually oppressed with the loathsome spectacle of the distorted, the dwarfed, the stunted, the envenomed. There is no doubt we suffer from 'man', it is in the word 'man', is in the form and qualities; it is that the 'man', the wretched mediocre and meddling creature, has learned to consider himself a good and a pleasure. (1) (1) The above passage has been universally misunderstood. They were taken to imply that Nietzsche would approve of a policy of physical violence, oppression, murder, rape and torture, on behalf of to-day's Germany, Arabia or Japan. But this only shows the want of understanding that mediocrity enjoys. In these descriptions Nietzsche means to bring home to us, how, in history,

Abot, 5. Nietzsche's 'man' is not a good man, but a bad man, a man who is in the form and qualities; it is that the 'man', the wretched mediocre and meddling creature, has learned to consider himself a good and a pleasure. (1) (1)

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trodden and overpowered say to themselves with the vindictive gusto  
of weakness, "Let us be otherwise than the evil, namely, good; and  
good is everyone who does not oppress, who hurts no one, who does  
not pay back, who hands over revenge to God, who holds himself, as  
we do, in hiding; who goes out of the way of evil, and demands in  
short, little of first like ourselves, the patient, the weak, the just,"  
they are simply helping themselves to live on their slave-lives.

77  
This dismal state of affairs, this sorry scheme of things, has, thanks  
to the counterfeiting and self-deception of weakness, come to  
masquerade in the pomp of an ascetic, mute and expectant virtue, just  
as though the very weakness of the weak--that is, forsooth, its being,  
its working, its whole unique, inevitable inseparable reality--were  
a voluntary result, something wished, chosen, a deed, an act of merit.

In these circumstances the genius was born and lived. He saw  
the Roman master race and its masterly value exemplified around him,  
and he could only react to it, from the very nature of things. At  
the apex of his consciousness, along with goes an apex of another  
'unconsciousness,' he broke into these words:

"Blessed are the poor in spirit; for theirs is the kingdom of  
heaven. Blessed are they that mourn; for they shall be comforted.  
Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy. Blessed are  
the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God.  
Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth. Blessed are  
they which hunger and thirst after righteousness, for they shall be  
filled. Blessed are they which are persecuted for righteousness  
sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Blessed are ye when men  
shall revile you, and persecute you, and shall say all manners of  
evil against you for my sake..... Rejoice and be exceedingly glad,  
for great is your reward in heaven.... Ye are the light of the world....

"Agree with thine adversary quickly, while thou art in the way  
with him, lest at any time the adversary deliver thee to the judge,  
and the judge deliver thee to the officer, and thou be cast into  
prison..... Let your communication be yea, yea, nay, nay; for what so  
ever is more than these, cometh of evil. And if any man will sue thee

This dismal state of affairs, this sorry scene of things, has, thanks to the counteracting and self-deception of weakness, come to pass in the camp of an ascetic, man and exhorter of virtue, just as though the very weakness of the weak--that is, forsooth, its being its weakness, its whole nature, inevitable inseparable reality--were a voluntary result, something willed, chosen, a deed, an act of merit. In these circumstances the genius was born and lived. He saw the Roman master race and its masterly virtue exemplified around him and he could only react to it, from the very nature of things. At the apex of his consciousness, although he was an apex of another 'unconsciousness', he broke into these words:

"Blessed are the poor in spirit; for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Blessed are they that mourn; for they shall be comforted. Blessed are the meek; for they shall obtain mercy. Blessed are the peacemakers; for they shall be called the children of God. Blessed are the merciful; for they shall inherit the earth. Blessed are they which hunger and thirst after righteousness; for they shall be filled. Blessed are they which are persecuted for righteousness sake; for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Blessed are ye when men shall revile you, and persecute you, and shall say all manner of evil against you for my sake. Rejoice and be exceedingly glad, for great is your reward in heaven. Ye are the light of the world. Agree with thine adversary quickly, while thou art in the way with him; lest at any time the adversary deliver thee to the judge, and the judge deliver thee to the officer, and thou be cast into prison. Let your communication be yea, yea, nay, nay; for what ye ever in more than these, cometh of evil. And if any man will see these

at the law, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloke also. But whosoever shall smite thee on the right cheek, turn to him the other also. And whosoever shall compel thee to go with him ~~to~~ a mile, go with him twain....."

"Love your enemies; bless them that curse you; do good to them that hate you; and pray for them which despitefully use you and persecute you..... But unto thy father which is in secret: And thy father which seeth in secret shall reward thee.... Lay not for yourselves treasures upon the earth, where moth and rust doth corrupt and where thieves break through and steal.... Take no thought for the morrow: For the morrow shall take thought for the things of itself. Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof.... Take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat or what ye shall drink, nor yet for your body what ye shall put on..... For all things do the gentiles seek.... Judge not that ye be not judged. For with what judgement ye judge, ye shall be judged, and with what measure you mete, it shall be measured to you again....."

"For I am come to set a man at variance against his father, and the daughter against her mother... and a man's foe shall be of his own household... Come to me, all ye that labour and are heavily laden, and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon you and learn of me; FOR I AM MEAK AND LOWLY IN HEART; and ye shall find rest unto your souls. For whosoever shall save his life, shall lose it.... But whoso shall offend one of those little ones which believe in me, it were better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and that he were drowned in the depth of the sea....."

at the law, and take away thy coat, let him have thy shirt also.  
 But whosoever shall smite thee on the right cheek, turn to him the other also. And whosoever shall compel thee to go with him a mile, go with him twain....  
 "Love your enemies; bless them that curse you; do good to them that hate you; and pray for them which despitefully use you and persecute you.... But unto you that do this, your Father which is in secret, shall reward you in secret. Lay not for yourselves treasures upon the earth, where moth and rust doth corrupt, and where thieves break through and steal.... Take no thought for the morrow: for the morrow shall take thought for the things of itself. Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof.... Take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat or what ye shall drink, nor yet for your body what ye shall put on.... For all things do the Gentiles seek.... Judge not that ye be not judged. For with what judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged, and with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again....  
 "For I am come to set a man at variance against his father, and the daughter against her mother.... and a man's foe shall be of his own household.... Come to me, all ye that labour and are heavily laden, and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon you and learn of me; for I am meek and lowly in heart: and ye shall find rest unto your souls. For whosoever shall save his life, shall lose it.... But whoso shall offend one of those little ones which believe in me, it were better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and that he were drowned in the depth of the sea...."

THINGS WHICH ARE NOT, TO BRING TO CONSUMPTION THOSE THINGS THAT ARE; etc., etc., etc."  
 ".....Sunnachs for the kingdom of heaven's sake.... IF THOU WILT BE PERFECT, GO AND SELL WHAT THOU HAST AND GIVE IT TO THE POOR, AND THOU SHALT HAVE TREASURE IN HEAVEN; AND COME AND FOLLOW ME.... It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter through the kingdom of God.... And all things whatsoever ye shall ask in prayer, BELIEVING, ye shall receive.... And whosoever shall exalt himself shall be abased; and he that shall humble himself shall be exalted.... For all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword. Thinkest thou that I cannot PRAY to my father, and HE SHALL PRESENTLY GIVE ME MORE THAN TWELVE LEGIONS OF ANGELS?....  
 ".....And the commandment WHICH WAS ORDAINED TO LIFE, I FOUND TO BE UNTO DEATH.... But if ye through the spirit shall mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live.... MIND NOT HIGH THINGS;.... but as the root of virtues, for by means of it, life is sown and made rather condescended to men of low estate.... AVENGE NOT YOURSELVES, for it is written, vengeance is mine. I will repay thus saith the lord.... I WILL DESTROY THE WISDOM OF THE WISE, AND WILL BRING TO NOTHING THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE PRUDENT.... THE WORLD BY WISDOM KNEW NOT GOD. IT PLEASSED GOD BY THE FOOLISHNESS OF PREACHING TO SAVE THEM THAT BELIEVE. FOR THE JEWS REQUIRE A SIGN AND THE GREEKS SEEK AFTER WISDOM. BUT WE PREACH CHRIST CRUCIFIED; UNTO THE JEWS A STUMBLING BLOCK AND UNTO THE GREEKS FOOLISHNESS. BUT UNTO THEM WHICH ARE CALLED BOTH JEWS AND GREEKS, CHRIST, THE POWER OF GOD AND THE WISDOM OF GOD.... NOT MANY WISE MEN AFTER THE FLESH, NOT MANY MIGHTY, NOT MANY NOBLE ARE CALLED: BUT GOD HATH CHOSEN THE FOOLISH THINGS OF THE WORLD TO CONFOUND THE THINGS WHICH ARE MIGHTY; AND BASE THINGS OF THE WORLD AND THINGS WHICH ARE DESPISED HATH GOD CHOSEN, YES, AND

THINGS WHICH ARE NOT, TO BRING TO FOUGHT THINGS THAT ARE; etc.etc.etc."

An animal, a species, an individual is corrupt, decadent, when it loses its instincts when it selects and prefers that which is detrimental to it. Christianity is called the religion of pity, but pity is opposed to the tonic passions which enhance the energy of the feeling of life, and hence, its action is depressing. A man loses power when he pities and by means of his pity, the drain on the general strength of mankind caused by suffering is multiplied a hundred fold. Pity, furthermore, thwarts the law of development which is the law of selection. It preserves that which is ripe for death; it fights in favor of the disinherited and the condemned of life. Thanks to the multitude of distortions and abortions of all kinds which it maintains in life, it lends life itself a sombre and questionable aspect. Schopenhauer was right in considering the feeling of pity as the root of virtue, for by means of it, life is denied and made more worthy of denial. The depressing and infectious effect of pity thwarts those instincts which aim at the preservation and enhancement of the value life, for by multiplying misery, as much as by preserving it, all that is miserable, it is the principle agent in promoting decadence.

The Ancient Greeks and Aristotle recognized in pity a morbid and dangerous state, of which it was wise to rid one's self from time to time by a purgative, namely, tragedy. (1)

The theologians, the Christian theologians, universally regard such things as the senses, the honours, decent living, science, as beneath them, as detrimental and seductive forces, temptations, against which one should keep guard. They fail to realize that what they call virtue, humility, chastity, poverty, pity, in a word, holiness

THINGS WHICH ARE NOT, TO BRING TO FOUGHT THINGS THAT ARE; etc.etc.etc."

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(1) Antichrist, § 7.  
(1) Antichrist Section 9.



had done inevitably some harm to life, then any sort of horror  
and vice. However, they shrank from the starkness and dishonesty  
position to all things. The pattern that grows out of this state  
their dishonesty, they call 'truth'; that is to say, to send one's

eye's once and for all, in order not to suffer at the sight of  
falsity. It is indeed, their profound self-protective instinct  
which forbids reality even to attain to become in any way, or even  
to raise its voice. For without so ever their influence has extended,  
violations are today-today, and the concepts 'truth' and 'false' have  
necessarily changed places. That which is most deleterious to life  
is now called 'truth', that which enhances it, calls for  
to be justified it and renders it triumphant, is called 'false'. (1)

in Christianity, neither morality nor religion comes in touch  
at all with reality. Nothing but imaginary effects, false salvation,  
grace, punishment, forgiveness of sin, repentance, justification of the  
devil, presence of God, the last judgement, everlasting life.

this purely Christian world is not to be concerned with the world  
of dreams, however. For the latter, as we have said, reflects reality.  
whereas the former falsifies it, deprecates it and denies it.

Once the concept 'nature' was taken to mean the opposite of the  
concept God, the word 'natural' had to negate the meaning of

ecumenical. The whole of that Christian world takes its root in  
the hatred of nature, that is reality. It is the expression of  
profound dishonesty in the presence of reality. But doesn't this  
give us a clue to a perfect understanding of Christian theologians,  
for who is the only kind of man who has reason for wriggling out of

reality by lies and fictions that are directed against life, except  
he who suffers from reality and life? But in order to suffer from  
reality and life must one not already be a bungled portion of reality  
and life? (1)

The Christian concept of God, leads inevitably to the same  
conclusion. A race that still believes in itself, also has its  
own God. In him, it honours the conditions which enable it to  
remain uppermost, that is, its virtues. It projects its joy over  
itself, its feeling of power, into a being whom it can be thankful  
for such things. When confined to this, Religion is a sort of hero-  
worship, a sort of gratitude. But such a God must be able to benefit  
as well as to injure, to act the friend as well as the foe. The  
monstrous castration of a God by making him a God only of goodness,  
would lie beyond the pale of the desires of such a community.

The evil God is just as urgently needed as the good God: for a  
people in such a form of society certainly does not owe its  
existence to toleration and humaneness. "What would be the good  
of a God who knew nothing of anger, revenge, envy, scorn, craft and  
violence? who had perhaps never experienced the rapturous ardours  
of victory and of annihilation? No one would understand such a God;  
why should one possess him? Of course, when a people is on the  
road to ruin, when it feels its belief in a future, its hope of  
freedom vanishing for ever; when it becomes conscious of submission  
as the most useful quality, and of the virtues of the submissive  
as well as self-preservation measures, then its God must also modify  
himself. He then becomes a tremulous and unassuming sneak; he

...except reality by lies and fictions that are directed against life, except  
 he who suffers from reality and life, but in order to get a free  
 reality and life must not already be a damaged portion of reality  
 and life? (1)

The Christian concept of God, leads inevitably to the same  
 conclusion. A God that still believes in itself, also has life  
 own God. In him, it means the conditions which enable it to  
 remain upright, that is, the virtues. It projects its joy over  
 itself, its feeling of power, into a being when it can be thankful  
 for such things. This confined to this, Religion is a sort of hero-  
 worship, a sort of gratification. But such a God must be able to benefit  
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 monstrous creation of a God by making him a God only of goodness,  
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 people in such a form of society certainly does not owe its  
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 as well as self-protection measures, then the God must also really  
 himself. He then becomes a tremendous and unmasterable power.

his 'chosen' people. Since then he has gone travelling over foreign  
 counsels 'peace of the soul', the cessation of all hatred, leniency  
 and 'love' even towards friend and foe. He is forever moralising,  
 he crawls into the heart of every private virtue, becomes a God for  
 everybody; he retires from active service and becomes a Cosmopolitan....  
 Formerly, he represented a people, the strength of a people, every-  
 thing aggressive and desirous of power lying concealed in the heart  
 of a people: now he is merely, the good God....In very truth, Gods  
 have no other alternative, they are either the will to power in  
 which case they are always the Gods of whole nations,----or, on the  
 other hand, the incapacity for power--in which case they necessarily  
 become good." (1).

Now let us face the facts, with the requisite daring, "the  
 courage for the forbidden": Is it not the same instinct, by which  
 the subjugated reduce their God to 'goodness in itself', they also  
 cancel the good qualities from their masters by diabolising the latter  
 God? and therefore the good God is the ~~alternative~~ abortion of  
 decadence as well as the devil?

When the pre-requisites of ascending life, when everything  
 strong, plucky, masterful and proud has been eliminated from the  
 concept of God, and step by step, he has sunk down to the symbol  
 of a staff for the weary, of a last straw for all those who are  
 drowning; when he becomes the pauper's God, the sinner's God, the  
 sick man's God, and the attribute 'savior', 'redeemer', remains over  
 as the one essential attribute of divinity, what does such a degeneratig  
 meta morphosis fo f the Godhead imply? Does it not imply that  
 his kingdom has become larger? Formerly all he had was his people,

...the 'chosen' people. Since then he has gone travelling over foreign lands, as his people have done, but "he remained a 'Jew', he remained the God of the back streets, the God of all dark corners and hovels, of all the unwholesome quarters of the world....His universal empire is now as ever a netherworld empire, an infirmary, a subterranean empire, a ghetto-empire....and he himself is so pale, so weak, so decadent...."(1). This God has undoubtedly degenerated into the contradiction and denial of life, instead of being, like the Greek Deities, the transfiguration of life, and its eternal yea. With this God war is declared on life, on Nature and on the will to life. He has become a sort of formula for every calamity of this world and for every lie concerning a beyond! In this God, nonentity is deified and the will to nonentity is declared holy. There is no doubt, of course, that the subjects of this God, may, as they have done, find pompous names for all these atrocities. Here the manner of killing time is to practice the casuistry of sin, self-criticism and conscience inquisition. The ecstasy in the presence of a powerful being, called 'God', is constantly maintained by the means of prayer; while the highest thing is regarded as unattainable, as a gift, as an act of 'grace'. Here, the body is despised, hygiene repudiated, as sensual; the church repudiates even cleanliness (the first Christian measure after the evacuation by the Arabs of Spain, was the closing of the public baths, of which Qartaba, (Cordova) alone, possessed 270). Christian, too, is the moral hatred of the earth's rulers, the 'noble', and at the same time a sort of concealed and secret competition with them (the subjugated leave the 'body' to their master--all they want

(1) Antichrist, § 17.

his 'chosen' people. Since then he has gone travelling over foreign lands, as his people have done, but "he remained a 'Jew', he remained the God of the back streets, the God of all dark corners and hovels, of all the unwholesome quarters of the world....His universal empire is now as ever a netherworld empire, an infirmary, a subterranean empire, a ghetto-empire....and he himself is so pale, so weak, so decadent...."(1). This God has undoubtedly degenerated into the contradiction and denial of life, instead of being, like the Greek Deities, the transfiguration of life, and its eternal yea. With this God war is declared on life, on Nature and on the will to life. He has become a sort of formula for every calamity of this world and for every lie concerning a beyond! In this God, nonentity is deified and the will to nonentity is declared holy. There is no doubt, of course, that the subjects of this God, may, as they have done, find pompous names for all these atrocities. Here the manner of killing time is to practice the casuistry of sin, self-criticism and conscience inquisition. The ecstasy in the presence of a powerful being, called 'God', is constantly maintained by the means of prayer; while the highest thing is regarded as unattainable, as a gift, as an act of 'grace'. Here, the body is despised, hygiene repudiated, as sensual; the church repudiates even cleanliness (the first Christian measure after the evacuation by the Arabs of Spain, was the closing of the public baths, of which Qartaba, (Cordova) alone, possessed 270). Christian, too, is the moral hatred of the earth's rulers, the 'noble', and at the same time a sort of concealed and secret competition with them (the subjugated leave the 'body' to their master--all they want



is the 'evil'. Christian is the hatred of the intellect, of pride, of  
 conscience, of freedom, of intellectual liberty. Christian is the  
 hatred of the senses, of the eye of the senses, of joy in general.  
 When Christianity set forth in <sup>the world</sup> ~~the world~~ among beasts of prey  
 where it no longer met with expected men but inwardly savage and  
 self-asserting men in whom an inordinate desire for intellectual  
 for a discharge of the inner tension was predominant, it did not lack  
 expedients. Aiming at mastering them, its expedient was to make them  
 ill, inter-physically, though it had to concede to many of their  
 instincts, by Christianizing them. Such are the sacrifices of the first-  
 born, the drinking of the blood at communion, sexual and non-sexual  
 torture in many a form, the great pain of the self, etc. Since the  
 beast-of-prey does not respect suffering, he is repaid, in order to  
 acknowledge to himself that he suffers, and explanation, which  
 Christianity immediately furnishes. The tempting devil; in his man  
 had an mighty and terrible enemy at whose hands he had reason not  
 to be ashamed. For the sinner of women, a beautiful saint, and for  
 the sinner of men, a Virgin Mary, have to be pressed into the foreground.  
 To insist upon chastity only intensifies the remorse and provokes  
 of the religious mood and makes the only winner and more enthusiastic.  
 To give the pleasure of believing himself delivered from sin, it  
 is not a necessary prerequisite that he should be sinful,  
 but only that he should feel sinful. It, however, which is above all  
 necessary, then reason, knowledge, and scientific research must be  
 brought into evil repute: the road to truth must become the forced-  
 den and every other road to truth must be controlled.

Since strong hope is a much greater stimulant of life than any single  
 realized joy could be, then sufferers must be sustained by a hope  
 for all this is such a thing as a will of God which determines what  
 that no activity can contradict, that cannot ever be realized; the  
 hope of another world. ~~It~~ (It was precisely on account of this  
 power of hope that the Greeks regarded it as the evil of evils, that  
 it remained behind in Pandora's box. ~~It~~ The sufferers should not be  
 let to die; they must be sustained to furnish the class for the  
 priests to rule and to add more suffering into the world; no suicide  
 is therefore tolerated.) All this was done because Christianity  
 wanted to rule over certain soils, on which Aphrodisiac or Adonis  
 cults had a rule, or over men who were not already decadent like  
 the Jewish ~~the~~ slaves, among whom Christianity sprang. In order  
 to be able to say no to everything that represents the ascending  
 movement of life, prosperity, power, beauty and self-determination  
 on earth, the instinct of resentment, become genius, had to invent  
 another world, from the standpoint of which that yes-saying to life  
 appeared as the most evil and most abominable thing.

Morality is here no longer the expression of the conditions  
 of life and growth, no longer the most fundamental instinct of life.  
 It has become abstract, it has become the opposite of life,--morality  
 as the fundamental perversion of the imagination, as the 'evil eye'  
 for all things. Christian morality is 'chance' robbed of its  
 innocence; unhappiness polluted with the idea of 'sin', well-being  
 interpreted as a danger, as a 'temptation'; physiological indisposition  
 poisoned by means of the canker-worm of conscience.

Christianity draws a sharp distinction between Christianity and the



What does the 'moral order of the universe' mean? That once and for all there is such a thing as a will of God which determines what man has to do and what he has to leave undone; that the value of a people or an individual is measured according to how much or how little the one or the other obeys the will of God; that in the destinies of a people or of an individual, if praised or rewarded according to the degree of obedience. But what is the reality of all this? A parasitical type of man, flourishing only at the cost of the healthy elements of life. The priest, here, abuses the name of God. The priest calls the state in which he determines the value of things, 'the kingdom of God'. The priest means thereby such a state is attained, 'the will of God'. This 'will of God' must be known--to this end, a 'revelation' is necessary. The priest and thereby together with church edicts, formulated once and for all, what he wanted, what the 'will of God' was, (not forgetting the details portions of meat; for the priest is a consumer of beef-steaks.)

All the natural events of life, birth, marriage, death, this help parasite appears in order "to demonstrate every natural value" in his language, to 'sanctify' everything. Disobedience to God that is to the priest, so the 'law', now receives the name of 'sin' and the means of reconciling one's self with God, are of course of a nature which renders subordinate action to the priest all the more necessary, for he alone is able to 'save'. That the priest lives, it is therefore indispensable that people should sin.

"Christianity denies the church." From this it will be seen that Nietzsche draws a sharp distinction between Christianity and the

Church, as the latter still contained some elements of order and is different from the denial of authority characteristic of real Christianity. This church was not Jesus, but an insurrection against the 'good' and the 'just' against the hierarchy of society, not its corruption as has been said, but against caste, privilege, order, formality, against the aristocratic values of antiquity.

It is not a 'faith' which distinguishes the Christian: The Christian acts, he distinguishes himself by a different mode of action. He does not resist his enemy either by words or in his heart. He draws no distinction between foreigners and natives, between Jews and Gentiles (the 'neighbor' really means the co-religionist, the Jew). He is angry with no one, he despises no one. He neither shows himself at the tribunals nor does he acknowledge any of their claims. He never ~~was~~ under any circumstance divorces his wife, even when her infidelity has been proved. All this is at bottom one principle, it is all the outcome of one instinct. The life of the Savior himself was naught more than this practice,--neither was his death. For he died not to save mankind but to show them how one ought to live. He no longer required any formulae, any arguments, any rites. His proofs are 'inner lights', inward feelings. He did not even realize the fact that there are or can be other doctrines, but was incapable of imagining a contrary judgement. Wherever he encountered such things, he denounced and only denounced such blindness--for he alone sees the light. He alone knows the mode of life which makes one feel

Church, as the latter still contained some elements of order and is different from the denial of authority characteristic of real Christianity. This church was not Jesus' but an institution against the 'good' and the 'best' against the hierarchy of society, not the corruption as has been said, but against caste, privilege, order, formality, against the aristocratic values of antiquity. It is not a 'religion' which distinguishes the Christian. The Christian acts, he distinguishes himself by a different mode of action. He does not reject his enemy either by words or in his heart. He draws no distinction between foreigners and natives, between Jews and Gentiles (the 'neighbor' really means the co-religionist, the Jew). He is angry with no one, he despises no one. He neither shows himself as the tribuna nor does he acknowledge any of their claims. He never acts under any circumstances divorces his wife, even when her infidelity has been proved. All this is at not on one principle, it is all the outcome of one instinct. The life of the Savior himself was taught more than his practice--rather was his death. For he did not so save mankind but to show them how one ought to live. He no longer regarded any formulas, any arguments, any rites. His words are 'inner lights', inward feelings. He did not even realize the fact that there are or can be other doctrines, but was incapable of imagining a contrary judgment. Whatever he encountered and things, he possessed and only possessed even blindness--for he alone sees the light. He alone knows the mode of life which makes one feel

'divine', 'saved', 'evangelical' and at all times a 'child of God'. The Christian Church was built up out of contradiction to the life of Jesus, and his gospel. Its whole history is that of a gradual misunderstanding of the original symbolism. The fatal feature of Christianity lies in the necessary fact that its faith had to become as morbid, base and vulgar, or as rational, to meet Arabian Aristotelianism, as the needs to which it had to minister were morbid, base and vulgar or rational. For after Jesus, St. Paul took over, and he was the reverse of a Christian. He only used the person and life of Jesus seeing that it could serve for a whole conflagration in the Imperium. But in doing so, he distorted the Christianity of Jesus. *Later on, St. Thomas completed the distortion.*

When the center of gravity of life ~~is~~, is laid, not in life but in a beyond--in nonentity--life is utterly robbed of its balance. The great lie of 'personal immortality', 'last judgement', 'resurrection', destroys all nature in the instincts--everything in the instincts that is beneficent, that promotes life and that is a guarantee of the future. With it, the very meaning of life is constructed as the effort to live in such a way that life no longer has any point. Why show any public spirit? Why study and learn? Why collaborate with one's fellows? All these things are merely so many temptations. One thing only is necessary: that everybody, as an 'immortal soul', should have equal rank and lay claim that his salvation is of eternal importance. And yet it was to this miserable flattery of personal vanity that Christianity lured all the bungled, the botched, the whole refuse and offal of humanity, and with this scum and dross on its side, triumphed.



Christianity is as much in need of sin and illness, as Ancient Greece was in need of magnanimity and a super abundance of health. The natural vision motive of the whole system of salvation is to make people ill. Not everyone who likes can be a Christian, no man is 'converted' to Christianity--he must be sick enough for it. The man who possesses enough courage both for health and for contempt, will rightly have no sympathy for an ethics that taught men to misunderstand the body and life, which would not rid itself of the expectations of the soul, which combat in health a sort of enemy, devil, temptation, which persuaded itself that it was possible to beat a perfect soul about in a convulsed body, and which to this end, made up for itself a new concept of 'perfection', a pale, sickly ideal,--so-called 'holiness'. Christianity as a European movement, was from beginning to end, a general accumulation of the rock and scum of all kinds. It does not express the downfall of a race; it is a conglomerate assembly of all the decadent elements from everywhere which seek each other and crowd together.... It is not national or determined by race--it appealed to all the disinherited forms of life and had its allies everywhere.... Everything well-constructed, proud, high-spirited and beautiful is alternative to its own and eyes....

1) And God hath chosen the weak things of the world, the foolish things of the world, and the base things....

"Will any one look into the history of how ideas came to be manifested in Christianity? We had the courage to do it. Come!"

"Here we have a glass opened into those primary workshops. All that a moment, dear Mr. Indifferent and Polite; your

eyes must first grow accustomed to this false changing light---Yes! Enough! Now speak! What is happening below down yonder? Speak out! Tell what you see, man of the most dangerous curiosity---for now, I am the listener."

"I see nothing. I hear the more. It is a cautious, spiteful gentle whispering and muttering together in all the corners and crannies. It seems to me that they are lying: A sugary softness adheres to every sound. Weakness is turned to merit, there is no doubt about it."

"Further!"

"And the impotence which requires not, is turned, to 'goodness', craven braveness to weakness, submission to those whom one hates, to obedience to authority (namely, obedience to one of whom they say that he ordered the submission---they call him God.) The inoffensive character of the weak, the very cowardice in which he is very rich, his standing at the door, for his forced necessity of waiting, gain here fine names, such as 'patience', which is also called 'virtue'. Not being able to avenge one's self, is called 'not wishing' to avenge one's self, perhaps even 'forgiveness' (For they know not what they do---we alone know what they do). They also talk of the 'love' of their enemies and sweat thereby."

"Further!"

"They are miserable, there is no doubt about it, all those whisperers and counterfeits in the corners, although they try to get warm by crouching close to one another, but they tell me that their misery is a favor and a distinction, given to them by God, just as one who beats the dogs he likes best; That perhaps this

misery is also a preparation, a probation, a training; that perhaps it is still more something which will one day be compensated and paid back with tremendous interest in Gold? Nay, in Happiness! This they call 'blessedness'.

"Further!"  
"They are now giving me to understand that not only are they better men than the mighty, the lords of the earth, whose spittle they have got to lick (not out of fear; not at all out of fear! But because God ordained that one should honour all authority)----not only are they better men, but that they also have a 'better time', at any rate, will one day have a 'better time'. But enough! Enough! I can endure it no longer. Bad air! Bad air! These workshops where Christian ideals were manufactured---verily, they reek with the crassest lies."

"Nay, just one minute! You are saying nothing about the masterpieces of these virtuosos of black magic, who can produce whiteness, milk and innocence out of any black you like: Have you noticed what a pitch of refinement is attained by their chef-d'oeuvre, their most audacious, subtle, ingenious and lying artist-trick? Take care! These cellar-beasts, full of revenge and hate---what do they make, forsooth, out of their revenge and hate? Do you hear these words? Would you suspect, if you trusted only words, that you are among men of resentment and nothing else?"

"I understand, I prick up my ears again (Ah! Ah! Ah! and I hold my nose). Now do I hear for the first time, what they have said so often: 'We good, we are the righteous,'----

(1) - Genealogy of Morals, p. 14.



made it their 'piety' to destroy. They were actuated by an instinct of mortal hatred of everything that stands erect, that is great, that is lasting, and that is a guarantee of the future. Christianity was the vampire of the Imperium Romanum, this most admirable work of art on a grand scale, which was strong even to resist bad emperors. But our stealthy cankerworms, who under the shadow of night, mist and duplicity, insinuated themselves into the company of every individual, and proceeded to drain him of all his seriousness for real things, of his instinct for realities, this cowardly gang, who have step by step alienated all 'souls' from this colossal edifice, the Imperium, was not strong enough for the corruptest form of corruption, for them. The whole labour of the ancient world in vain.

Thus, in the whole of the Christian world, and in Europe in particular, Nietzsche found morality in an awful state, corrupted by Christianity. All the philosophers of morality too, were not better. Either they were open or disguised Christian theologians or, and this is even worse, they were concerned with morality as a science, trying to give it a basis but at the same time regarding morality itself something given. (1). Nobody thought of considering the types and forms of morality, because in their imperfect knowledge they thought of morality in an arbitrary epitome as that of their environment, their zeitgeist, and were ignorant of other nations, eras and past ages. In every attempt of theirs, the problem of morality itself, its innermost content, has been omitted. What they thought as giving basis to morality proved merely a learned form of good faith in the prevalent morality, a new means of its expression.

And they demand, they call for revenge, but the triumph of righteousness; what they hate is not their enemy, no they hate 'unrighteousness'. 'Godlessness'; that they believe in and hope is not the hope of revenge, the intoxication of sweet revenge (---'sweeter than honey'). And Rome call it? But the victory of God, of the righteous God over the 'godless'; what is left for them in this world is not their 'brother in hate', but their 'brother in love', as they say, all the 'good' and 'righteous' on earth.

"And now do they name that which serves them as a solace, against all the troubles of life---their phantasmagoria of their anticipated future blessedness?"

"How? No I hear right? They call it 'the last judgement', the advent of their 'kingdom', the 'kingdom of God'---but in the mean-while, they live in 'faith', in 'love', and in 'hope'."

"Enough! Enough!"

After all the question is, to what end are falsehoods perpetrated. In Christianity, holy ends are entirely absent. Its ends, the poisoning, the calcination and the denial of life, the contempt of the body, the degradation and self-pollution of man, by virtue of the concept 'sin', are bad ends. Consequently its means are bad means. It matters greatly to what end one lives: whether one preserves or destroys by means of falsehood. It is quite inevitable to protect the Christian and the anarchist together. Their object, their instinct is concerned with revolution and destruction. Christianity found its mission in paving an end to the organization of humanity, precisely because life threatened through it. That which stood there, there perishing, the Imperium Romanum, the most magnificent form of organization that has ever been achieved, or which man could

made it their duty to destroy. They were content by an instinct of mortal hatred of everything that stands over, that is great, that is lasting, and that is a guarantee of the future. Christianity was the vampire of the lap-rim Roman, this most admirable work of art on a grand scale, which was strong even to resist bad emperors. But our steadily conservative, who under the shadow of night, this and dogmatically, immersed themselves into the company of every individual, and proceeded to drain him of all his seriousness for real things, of his instinct for reality, this cowardly gang, who have step by step alienated all 'souls' from this colossal edifice, the Imperium, was not strong enough for the corrupt form of corruption, for them. The whole fabric of the ancient world in vain.

Thus, in the whole of the Christian world, and in Europe in particular, Westerners found morality in an evil state, corrupted by Christianity. All the philosophers of morality too, were not better. Whether they were open or disguised Christian theologians or, and this is even worse, they were concerned with morality as a science, trying to give it a basis but at the same time regarding morality itself something given. (1). Nobody thought of considering the types and forms of morality, because in their imperfect knowledge they thought of morality in an arbitrary opinion as that of their enlightenment, their religious, and were ignorant of other nations, even and past ages. In every attempt of theirs, the problem of morality itself, its innermost content, has been omitted. What they thought as giving basis to morality proved merely a learned form of good faith in the previous morality, a new name of its expression.

It is as a result of a predominance of christian values, of a Christian transvaluation of values, that morality in Europe is 'herding animal morality.' For in principal moral judgements, Europe is unanimous in its knowledge of good and evil. But that which ~~therein~~ therein, ~~calls~~ calls itself good, which is ever coming more and more to the front, to preponderance and supremacy over their instincts, is the instinct of the herding animal. Indeed, with the help of a religion which has flattered the sublimest desires of the herding animal, things have reached such a point that we always find a more visible expression of this morality even in the political and social fields: the democratic movement is the inheritance of the Christian movement. That its tempo, however, is a bit too slow and sleepy for the impatient ones who are sick and distracted and the socialists who, more than ordinary democrats, want a quick 'free society', that is the autonomy of the herd, and their drive is well surmised in their maxim: **Ni Dieu! Ni Maitre!**

Another characteristic of modern man is his notorious feeling of 'guilt', his 'bad conscience'. But this too is the result of the same instinct. Where natural forgetfulness, such a necessary measure which nature endowed to the impulse of life, fails, man becomes capable of ~~binding~~ <sup>ing</sup> himself with promises, and this state, he masquerades to himself as one of 'free will', of 'responsibility' and as such, one of superiority. At the same time, arising from this feeling with equal necessity is his having his heel and rod of chastisement ready for those who promise when they have no business or break their word, once they have spoken it out. It is this knowledge of

It is as a result of a predominance of Christian values, of a Christian transvaluation of values, that morality in Europe is "hardening animal morality." For in primitive moral judgements, Europe is unanimous in its knowledge of good and evil. But that which is there, the idea of itself good, which is ever coming more and more to the front, of preference and approval over their instincts, is the instinct of the herding animal. Indeed, with the help of a religion which has fostered the sublime desire of the herding animal, things have reached such a point that we always find a more visible expression of this morality even in the political and social fields: the democratic movement is the inheritance of the Christian movement. That its tempo, however, is a bit too slow and sleepy for the impatient ones who are sick and disgusted and the socialists who, more than ordinary democrats, want a quick "free society", that is the anatomy of the herd, and their drive is well exemplified in their name: NI MIEL! NI MIEL!

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responsibility, this power over himself become a dominating instinct that has become his conscience; But how was natural forgetfulness corrected? By and through the exemplary public punishments: stoning, breaking on the wheel, trampling by horses, dart-throwing, boiling the criminal in oil or wine (prevalent even in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in Europe). It was by the help of these images and precedents that man eventually committed to memory a few "I will not's". (1). The history of morals provides a clear genealogy of the consciousness of sin, of 'bad conscience'. The moral 'ought' originates from the 'unique material ought' (Schuld in German means both debt and guilt; Ce que je dois, can also mean either debt of 'ought'), and punishment developed as a retaliation absolutely independently of any preliminary hypothesis of the freedom or determination of the will. The idea that the wrong-doer deserves punishment because he might have acted otherwise, is, in fact, exceedingly late and a refined form of human judgement and inference, to place it at the beginning of the world is a clumsy violation of the principles of primitive psychology. On the contrary, punishment was inflicted out of anger at an injury, and anger which vents itself mechanically on the author of the injury. But this anger was kept in bounds through the idea that every injury has its equivalent price and can be paid off though it be by means of pain to the author. (2) Thus legally sanctioned schemes of valuation for individual limbs just even as recompense his injurer, and not merely cold, unfeeling, and parts of the body were actually enacted. The Roman Twelve Tables decreed that it was immaterial how much or how little the creditors in spite of the provocation of personal insult and wrong, the cut off, thereby granting the creditor by way of repayment and compensation a certain sensation of satisfaction, he then have a piece of perfection. It is possible to conceive of

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(1) Genealogy of Morals II Section 4  
(2) Ibid. II Section 4

the satisfaction:  
"De faire le mal pour le plaisir de le faire",  
"Puisse-je mes yeux, voir le dernier Romain,"  
"En son son dernier soupir,"  
"Moi seule en être cause, et mourir de plaisir!"  
Horace sister-Horace, Cornelle  
Thus, the question of the origin of conscience resolves itself  
when another question is asked: Why can suffering be a  
compensation for 'owing'? Because the infliction of suffering  
produces a very high degree of happiness. A growing spiritualization  
and deification of cruelty pervades the whole history of  
civilization. The time is not so long past when it was impossible  
to conceive of royal weddings and national festivals without  
executions, tortures, auto-da-fés or to conceive of an aristocratic  
household, without a creature to serve as a butt for the cruel and  
malicious baiting, the sympathia malevolens, of the inmates.  
It is therefore in the oldest and most personal relationship, the  
relationship between buyer and seller, creditor and owner, where  
the individual first confronted and matched himself against  
individual, that the feeling of 'ought', of personal obligation  
has its origin.  
The home of Justice is not to be found in the sphere of reactive  
feelings. For when it really comes about that the just man remains  
just even as regards his injurer, and not merely cold, moderate,  
reserved, indifferent (being just is always a positive state), when  
in spite of the provocation of personal insult and calumny, the  
lofty and clear objectivity of the just and judging eye, is untroubled,  
we then have a piece of perfection. It is possible to conceive of  
a whole society, blessed with so great a consciousness of its own





power of activity and aggression, which devote some of their strength to damming and keeping within bounds this overflowing of hysterical reactivity and to forcing it to some compromise. By law, the stronger power, puts an end to the fury of resentment, partly by taking the victim of resentment out of the domain of revenge, partly by substituting for revenge a campaign of its own against the enemies of peace and order, partly by linking and enforcing settlements, partly by standardizing certain equivalents for injuries to which equivalent resentment is finally referred, thus eventually it steers the very opposite result to that always desired by revenge. To talk of intrinsic 'right' and intrinsic 'wrong' after the manner of being is nonsensical. Intrinsic, as intrinsic, aggression, exploitation, even annihilation can not be wrong inasmuch as life itself is essentially, there is in its original functions, something which functions by injuring, persistently exploiting, and annihilating, and is absolutely indispensable without such a character. It is the instinct of freedom, forced into being latent, forced back, broken back, imprisoned within itself and finally able to find vent and relief only in itself. That is the beginning and end of 'bad conscience'. It is this same active force which is at work on a more grandiose scale in those potent states and organizations, through which it builds states, that have, internally, on a small and better scale and with a retrospective tendency, that, through a process of self-expansion, makes itself a bad conscience.

The value of selfishness is directly proportional to that of him who possesses it. It represents the source of the line of mankind his value is very great, for the promise of the future

which gives the well constituted individual such an extraordinary right to egoism. If he represents descending development, decay, chronic sickening, he has little worth, and the justest fairness would have him take as little room, strength, and sunshine as possible from the "wohlgerathene". In this case, society's duty is to suppress egoism, for such egoism may manifest itself in an absurd, morbid and seditious manner, whether it be a question of the decline and pining away of single individuals or of whole classes of mankind. A morality and a religion doctrine encouraging patience, resignation, helpfulness, and co-operation in word and deed may be of the highest value within the confines of such classes, even in the eyes of their rulers: for it restrains the feelings of rivalry, of resentment, and of envy.--feelings which are only too natural in the bungled and the botched,--and it even deifies them under the ideal of humility, of obedience, of slave-life, of being ruled, of poverty, of illness and of lowliness. This explains why the ruling classes and individuals of all ages have always upheld the cult of unselfishness, the gospel of the lowly and of "God on the Cross."

The preponderance of an altruistic way of valuing is the result of a consciousness of the fact that one is botched and bungled. Upon examination, this point of view turns out to be: "I am not worth much", simply a psychological valuation; it is the feeling of impotence, of the lack of the great self-asserting impulses of power. This valuation gets translated, according to the particular culture of these classes, into a moral or religious principle. It tries to justify itself in spheres whence, as far as it is concerned, the notion

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 of sinning and the value of the good.

'value' hails. The interpretation by means of which the Christian  
 sinner tries to understand himself, is an attempt at justifying his  
 lack of power and of self confidence; he prefers to feel himself  
 a sinner rather than feel bad for nothing. It is in itself a  
 symptom of decay when interpretations of this sort are used at all.  
 In some cases, the bungled and the botched do not look for the  
 reason of their unfortunate condition in their own guilt (as the  
 Christian does), but in society: when however, the Socialist, the  
 Anarchist and the Nihilist are conscious of the fact that their  
 existence is something for which some one must be guilty, they are  
 very closely related to the Christian, who also believes that he can  
 more easily endure his ill case and his wretched constitution when  
 he has found some one whom he can hold responsible for it. The  
 instinct of revenge and resentment appears in both cases here as  
 a means of enduring life, as a self-preservative measure, as is also  
 the favour shown to altruistic theory and practice. The hatred of  
 egoism, whether it be one's own, as in the case of the Christian,  
 or another's, as in the case of the Socialist, thus appears as a  
 valuation reached under the predominance of revenge, and also as an  
 act of prudence of the preservative instinct of the suffering in  
 the form of an increase in their feelings of co-operation and unity.  
 At bottom, the discharge of resentment which takes place in the act  
 of judging, rejecting, and punishing egoism, be it one's own or that  
 of others, is yet another self-preservative instinct on the part of  
 Christianity. We may withhold, however, what we feel  
 towards the modern Christian, this Third-world politician,  
 who has mastered the art and the science of the art and  
 pleasure and everything that genuine Christianity would condemn.

...the interpretation by means of which the Christian  
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 ...lack of power and of self-confidence; he pretends to feel himself  
 ...a sinner rather than feel that he is in itself a  
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...Thus, do religion and morality co-operate, hand in hand, in  
 their fierce common struggle against life. This "Life" however,  
 they have a way to appropriate for, thus too, do they call their end,  
 their ulterior ideal. The word Life has also been used by several  
 other pursuits. There is something highly seductive about it, that  
 both its affirmers and deniers should not only call their purpose  
 'life', but also think that it is it they pursue when they are  
 running after its opposite and enemy. What is then this "Life" after  
 all?

"And this secret spake life herself unto me" said Tarastustra,  
 "Behold, said she, I am that which must ever surpass itself."

The first condition this 'Life' imposes is a cheerful, general  
 'yea' to everything that natural life brings. To the permeating  
 influence of spring everyone easily succumbs. It takes no effort  
 whatsoever to pursue the springly chapter of life, for our own life  
 impulse is strong enough to move us in its search. However, it has  
 been quite possible for many natures to be so corrupted by  
 Christianity that their 'conscience' has stunted even this very  
 impulse. Christian asceticism has attacked it with all its force  
 and there are many people to whom this is only 'temptation'. But  
 Life is mightier than Christianity and its impulse has not only  
 pervaded the whole life of almost all the Christians of the world,  
 but has, in the Borgias, and the Renaissance, succeeded in overcoming  
 Christianity in the latter's very head-quarters, Bagdadian Italy  
 and Bagdadian Vatican. We may withhold, however, what we feel  
 towards the modern Christian Westerner, this THIS-worldly politician,  
 who has mastered the atom and the skies and seeks comfort  
 and pleasure and everything that genuine Christianity would condemn

Thus, as religion and morality co-operate, hand in hand, in their fierce common struggle against life. This "life" however, they have a way to appropriate for, thus too, do they call their end their inferior ideal. The word life has also been used by several other purists. There is something highly seductive about it, that both its affirmers and deniers should not only call their purpose 'life', but also think that it is if they pursue when they are running after its opposite and enemy. What is then this "life" after all?

"And this secret speaks life itself into me," said Tertullian. "Behold, said she, I am that which must ever remain ideal."

The first condition this 'life' imposes is a cheerful, general 'yes' to everything that natural life brings. To the permeating influence of spring everyone easily succumbs. It takes no effort whatsoever to pursue the springly chapter of life, for our own life impulse is strong enough to move us in its search. However, it has been quite possible for many nations to be so corrupted by

Christianity that their 'consciousness' has been even this very impulse. Christian asceticism has attacked it with all its force and there are many people to whom this is only 'temptation'. But life is mightier than Christianity and its impulse has not only pervaded the whole life of almost all the Christians of the world, but has, in the forests, and the wilderness, succeeded in overcoming Christianity in the latter's very head-quarters, the monasteries and Pachistani Yashams. We may withhold, however, what we feel towards the modern Christian Westerner, take this worldly politician, who has mastered the atom and the skies and seeks comfort and pleasure and everything that genuine Christianity would condemn

as crassest sin, in his day as well as in his night and dreams; when he, Christianity's ultima negativus, poses as a Christian, anti-semitic, and defender of the faith. It has been truly said there was only one Christian and he died on the cross. Why has it come about that Christianity went on degenerating after the death of its founder? Because the healthy man, and there were and still are many healthy men, can only will that which enhances his own health and life and because, demanding the renunciation and denial of health and life and joy and opposing them, Christianity had to suffer the worst misfortune that can ever be, namely, interpretation: its reconciliation with its arch-enemy. On the other hand, there are tragic instances where Christianity's claws have wrought severe wounds on many men of genius, an awful instance of which is Pascal, who doubted his own genius as originally sinful, whereas it has been corrupted only by his Christianity.

Natural life should be welcome. Our faith in the instincts should be resumed and cultivated. Our acceptance and affirmation should not be limited to its positive elements. We should remember that destruction and annihilation are the conditions that make birth and growth possible: these are the other side of life and should therefore be taken unconditionally with itself. We should not recoil with horror at the sight of decay and destruction in nature.

We usually do, on account of the naiveté of our life-impulse, which in its simplicity and candour, shudders at the sight of its own decay and destruction in other living things. But when we understand how both are inseparably connected, how the one must

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 its own decay and destruction in other, living things. But when we  
 understand how both are inseparably connected, how the one must  
 and the other cannot be separated, we are freed from this anxiety.

necessarily imply the other, then our life-impulse will not grumble  
 at such sights. We would certainly have to take sides: with life  
 or with annihilation? But if we are not already decaying, we know  
 well what we shall take. Armed with such a resolve, for the acclama-  
 tion of life, and fully confident in our will, we shall be immune  
 against pessimism and the nausea of death. But that is not all. It could not be even in the case of the weakest  
 will to life: For even there, this will is sufficiently strong to  
 desire power, and in so doing, desire more than life. But what is  
 power? Power is the will to growth and the forces of assimilation and  
adaptation working to that end. Power is the will to procreation  
which discharges itself in love and in the possession of woman and  
children. Power is the generation and storing of vitality which,  
 when conscious of its sufficiency, makes itself felt as a tension,  
and glorify itself in overcoming them. Power is the will to overcome  
and seeks obstacles to overcome death in recreating oneself in one's  
progeny. Power is the tension that vents itself on the marble, and  
 the cardboard in immortal works of art. Power is the transcendental  
 vision of the innermost truth of reality and existence. Power is the  
 joy over itself. Of this power, every live creature has some. Man is capable  
 through his consciousness, to achieve the greatest amount and  
 highest level of power. With man, this will to power can reach such  
 a degree of tension that his own life starts to whisper in his ear:  
 "Behold! I am that which must ever surpass itself!" From here  
 onwards, real virtue begins: from here onwards man's acts, as to  
 whether he responds favourably to this inner calling, become  
 virtuous or vicious, virtuous <sup>ous</sup> in the old sense of Arete and virtue,  
 "free from Christa a moral acid."

...necessarily imply the other, then our life-impulse will not crumble at such slight. ...we would certainly have to take sides with life or with annihilation, but if we are not already deciding, we know well what we shall take. Armed with such a resolve, for the realization of life, and fully confident in our will, we shall be immune against pessimism and the terrors of death.

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power? Power is the will to grow and the forces of assimilation and adaptation working to that end. Power is the will to preservation and seeks to preserve itself in love and in the possession of woman and children. Power is the generation and storing of vitality which

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"free from Christian moralistic ideas."

No, when man has understood most clearly the reality and nature of the world as it is, he must have thereby, necessarily understood more than the present reality. He has thereby, understood the language which in her often-distorted and stunted attempts, she has tried to speak out but only stammered forth. In his consciousness he articulates her half uttered speech and now builds up the imperatives which make the easiest and most economical realization of that type possible. For the self-surpassing of life is the production of a MAN who surpasses living man in everything: Who is a sort of SUPERMAN. Only inasmuch as we work for his arrival, does our action have moral worth. "The SUPERMAN is the meaning of the earth."

This is the first principle of the ethics of life. Obviously, it does not concern itself with the norms under which men can just live their life on; happily, contentedly perhaps, but where no great motives stir. On Kant's principle, an action <sup>(x)</sup> may be a good action, but it is devoid of moral worth. An action becomes ethical only in so far as it proceeds from the will of life-surpassing. If it should be correct, that is, based on a correct understanding of reality, it is ethically fortunate and happy. If, on the other hand it is incorrect, that is, based upon an inexact understanding of reality, it is not immoral, though necessarily, ethically unfortunate and unhappy. Does this mean that the ethics of life-surpassing is thereby reduced to individual desiderata or fancies?

(x) - may very well satisfy the categorical imperative and yet be a question of mere utility. On Nietzsche's principle, such an action may

the Christian. (1).

(1) Nationalist Section 2

When man has understood more clearly the reality and nature of the world as it is, he must have thereby, necessarily, understood more than the present reality. He has thereby, understood the language which in her often-distorted and attempted attempts, she has tried to speak out but only stammered forth. In his consciousness he articulates her half-articled speech and now builds up the imperatives which make the easiest and most economical realization of that type possible. For the self-surpassing of life is the production of a man who surpasses as living man in everything: who is a sort of SUPERMAN. Only inasmuch as we work for his arrival, does our action have moral worth. The SUPERMAN is the meaning of the earth.

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No, for at the gate of this ethics stands guard the sceptre of genius, of the communal genius, the political genius, which demands unquestionable obedience. For another peculiarity of the SUPERMAN, is that he can never be produced by individual effort. It takes a whole community a whole race to execute the program that leads to his realization.

It is therefore the life-surpassing will that is at the root of the ethical worth or unworth of our actions. If we notice the history of man with this in view, we shall not fail to see that civilization started only as man became aware of a SUPERMAN ideal to will, to rear and to attain; and its whole course is the story this creative and vital force ever self-transcending, self-bettering and ascending over man himself. This is man's ethical superiority over other creatures.

What is the SUPERMAN, as Nietzsche conceived him? The problem, it must be kept in mind, is not one of replacing mankind in the order of living beings, but one of finding the TYPE of man that must be reared, must be willed, as having the highest value, as being the most worthy of life and surest guarantee of the future.

This more valuable TYPE has appeared often enough in the past; but as a happy accident, as an exception, never as willed. Such lucky strokes of great success have always been possible and will perhaps always be possible. And even whole races, tribes and nations may in certain circumstances present such lucky strokes. He has rather been precisely the most feared; the terrible in itself. It is from out the very fear they provoked that arose that other will, the will to rear the type which has now been so universally attained; the domestic animal, the gregarious animal, the sick animal man,-- the Christian. (1).

(1). Antichrist Section 2 (2). Thus spoke Zarathustra, 73-8

(1) Antichrist Section 3



The Superman is not a novelty in the world. He has existed. To find him before and trace his characteristics, a general survey of the whole world, past and present is necessary with a view to find those instances where the giant has grown most and highest. But before beginning the search one thing is imperative: "What is more harmful than vice?--Practical sympathy with all the doctored and the weak. The weak and the doctored shall perish: first principle of our humanity. And they even ought to be helped to perish. Not contentment, but more power; not peace at any price, but war; not virtue, but toughness. What is bad? All that proceeds from weakness. What is good?--All that enhances the feeling of power. The will to power, and power itself. That is happiness--The feeling that power is increasing.--that resistance has been overcome." (1)

To look for the Superman, one should feel something to be surpassed and remain true to the earth. He should have suffered from men. To undertake such work, one should be prepared for a long suffering, superior to the whole of mankind in power, loftiness of soul and in contempt (2). "For the great despots are the great reverers."

The question is now and where the giant has his birthplace grown most vigorously. This has always taken place under conditions very opposite to ours. There man has grown, the danger of his situation had been enormous, thus compelling his inventive faculty and dissolving powers to find their way up under long oppression and compulsion, and his will to life to be

increased to the unconditioned will to power, to over-power. Where such conditions <sup>have</sup> prevailed and man has overgrown, danger, severity, violence, peril in the street and in the heart, inequality of rights, secrecy, seductive art, and devalry of every kind have been necessary for his elevation.

In his general course of action, the consistency of such MAN is so broad that owing to its very breadth it can be surveyed only with difficulty. He possesses the capacity to extend his will over great stretches of his life, and of despising and rejecting all small things, whatever most beautiful and 'divine' things of the world there may be among them. He is colder, harder, less cautious and more free from the fear of "public opinion". He does not possess any of those virtues and things which are counted among the "virtues of the herd". If he is unable to lead, he walks alone. He asks for no "compassionate" heart, but servants, and instruments. In his dealing with men his one aim is to make something out of them. He knows that he cannot reveal himself to anybody: to become familiar is bad taste.

He wills something great. And in so doing, he also wills the means thereto. His unscrupulousness is a factor in his strength of will. It is thus in keeping with that enlightened form of despotism which every intellect in its service; it even has the courage for unholy means; it creates without hesitation, allows itself convictions and uses, but never submits to them. The need of faith is a proof of weakness.

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Once all these prerequisites are satisfied, then we are ready for the greatest task ever undertaken, the task of the TRANSVALUATION OF ALL OUR VALUES. This is the first task that will produce the SUPERMEN that we saw in Ancient Greece and in Rome and in whom we are still wont to be rapt. For our present values are the opposite of those which make a race of supermen possible. To will the superman is to transvalue our current values. Once, good and bad, ~~undermanly~~ <sup>what was really</sup> denoted what was really good, supermanly and bad, undermanly. Christianity has transvalued those values by changing their places, the good with the bad, and the bad with the good. What we need now is the breaking of all Christian tables, <sup>he</sup> transvaluing of its values and <sup>the</sup> reinstitution of good and bad where they belong.

The second task that will produce the SUPERMEN, presupposes a political community, a community where morality is not abstract but is one with politics and law, such as the Arabian Islamic community. In such a field one can plant, legislate, command, educate the future lords of the earth whose business will be no more the rule of nations but that of men. What is the task of him who has all these means to the SUPERMAN, the Philosopher-King? His task is twofold;

First, like Plato's, is the ascertaining of reality and the discovering of the norms inherent therein. Plato called it philosophy; Nietzsche called it Dionysianism. Second, is, once he has taken possession of the reality-ideal, to strike out the laws which will make this reality-ideal embodied in the heart and soul of every man, and to constrain every member of the community to obey and work and fit in the general system, that the production becomes possible and more efficient, of these excellent, these geniuses, these hero-beautifuls, ----in short, these seupermen.