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[ON ARABISM]

'URUBAH AND RELIGION

A Study of the Fundamental Ideas of Arabism and of Islam as its Highest Moment of Consciousness

I

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PREFACE

This is the first of four volumes undertaking to present the values of 'urubah. 'Urubah is the essence of the person who is an Arab; and this is not only the inhabitant of the Arabian Peninsula, or of the political territories of the Fertile Crescent, of Northeast and North Africa, commonly regarded as Arab on account of his Arabic-speaking. In addition to the Arabic-speaking peoples, the Arabs include, unlike any other people on earth, millions of non-Arabic-speaking persons living in territories adjoining the Arabic-speaking lands but stretching as far as Siberia, the Philippines, the Danube, Equatorial and East Africa, who represent comparatively higher or lower degrees of Arabness. But Arabs they all are, since their consciousness — and this is the real and final test of Arabness — is not only determined by the values of 'urubah, but represents those determinants to itself as elements of, and in terms couched exclusively by, Arab consciousness. As arabicized Arabs, these people have produced many of the greatest geniuses of 'urubah in the past and the forces of the Arab spirit throbbing within them will yet surpass the fondest expectations. The deepening or intensifying of their arabness of which they, as people and not as individuals, stand in need is, in the twentieth century, equally shared by the Arabic-speaking people who, standing closer to the Arab spirit by virtue of their Arabic-speaking, are always expected to do better than those for whom language is a thornier problem. These are the Muslims of the world.

In addition to the Arabic-speaking and the Muslims everywhere, the Arabs include all those persons who, deprived of the means of identifying themselves as Arabs, nonetheless recognize and adhere to the values of 'urubah to which they have arrived by their own effort, through literature, masters or friends, and stand ready to assist by the means open to them the cause of 'urubah in the world. Just as Islam understood by *hunafa'* (Plural of *hanif*, literally, morally pure) the pre-Islamic persons who believed in the One God and realized His commands to the degree possible without the revelation of the Prophet Muhammad, we understand by the *hunafa'* of 'urubah precisely the non-Arabic-speaking non-Muslims whose consciousness and lives are determined by its values without their becoming either Arabic-speaking or Muslim.

This work, and the three volumes that will follow (if God wills) on 'Urubah and Art, 'Urubah and Society and 'Urubah and Man are meant primarily for the Arabic-speaking, the Muslims and the *hunafa'* in this extended sense, that they may share in the growing consciousness of the Arab spirit of itself by adressing themselves to the problems discussed in this work.

However, this work is not only for the foregoing peoples and persons, but for the others who do not fall in any of these categories. To these, to whom

'urubah, as a hard fact of history endowed with power as well as title to existence, is foreign, and for whom it makes an obtrusive claim on the world, particularly the peoples of the West, this work is intended to reasure as well as to invite. It is the concern of these people that sociologists have been raising with their continual talk of the impact of Western civilization upon the Arab peoples. Historians of ideas have been harassing them with the fact that the Orient, of which the Arab World in our extended sense is the greater part, is undergoing a pervasive revolution in its culture, religion and social organization. Both have been warning the Westerner emphatically that the consequences of this revolution for the Orient, as well as for the West, will be far-reaching and may be decisive. The gloomy tone of their concern over this revolution that has been in the making for over a hundred years and has, since World War I, assumed in their eyes ominous proportions, has been set by Oswald Spengler, who could not see in the Asian-African revolution anything but revenge against the white man of Western culture. After his monumental *Decline of the West*, Spengler wrote in *The Hour of Decision:*

> 'The colored races (by which he understands the Asians, Africans, native and negro Americans) are *not* pacifists. They do *not* cling to a life whose length is its sole value. *They take up the sword when we lay it down.* Once they feared the white man; now they despise him. Our judgement stands written in their eyes when men and women comport themselves in their presence as they do, at home or in the lands of colour themselves . . . To-day, when they are themselves a power, their mysterious soul — which we shall never understand — rises up and looks down upon the whites as on a thing of yesterday.'

(The English is that of C. F. Atkinson, A. A. Knopf, New York 1942, p. 228).

It is hoped that the following pages will not only allay these fears, but produce a reassurance out of which rapprochement, cooperation and participation would grow.

The Arabs, particularly the Arabic-speaking and Muslim peoples, are not only seeking to get rid of the injustice they suffer at the hands of the imperialist powers, nor merely demanding to be left alone so that they may develop their culture and society in peace, without external let or hindrance. They want to exercise their God-given right to play a predestined role in the world. Since they conceive of this role as mankind-redeeming, they expect and seek to obtain the world's assistance in the performance of it. They expect the whole world to respond to their plea not only with understanding but also with cooperation. Their oft-made appeal for justice and universal brotherhood is not intended merely for their own benefit while they are the object of injustice, but absolutely, for the benefit of all humanity.

For both Arabs and non-Arabs, this study has been undertaken with the purpose of recapturing and assimilating in consciousness the meaning and logic of 'urubah as an idea-in-movement. It seeks to ascertain the nature and content

of that idea. Granted that no analysis of an idea-in-movement may claim to be exhaustive, yet all of us, whether Arabic-speaking, Muslim, *hunafa'* or others, must somehow perceive its orientation and grasp its momentum if our consciousness is not to be tossed around by the hard facts 'urubah has pushed, and will push, onto the surface of history. What is the essential principle of 'urubah? What does it and ought it to mean to the Arab nationalist, the Islamist, the Arabist? How does it determine and energize the Arab's will and illuminate his understanding? In what relation does this idea stand to the world? What promise does it hold for man, in whose cause, after all, we are and should be interested? Unless we know the answers to these questions, we shall have no recourse from the fate which has characterized mankind in the twentieth century, the fate of the passive spectator who having been tossed onto the stage unawares has become an actor in the Arab drama *malgré lui*.

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CHAPTER ONE

THE ARABS IN HISTORY

I. THE MEANING OF ARABISM

Arabism, or the pursuit of 'urūbah, is not 'Arab nationalism.' As a reality of Western European political life in the last two hundred years, nationalism has been and still is the conscious will of a sovereign people, who conceive their identity as distinguished from all other peoples, to pursue their communal interest and give it precedence over that of any other people with whom they may enter in conflicting relation. Modern times do not know of any Arab nationalism answering to this definition. The modern Arab states have achieved full independence and sovereignty only very recently and those which enjoyed a fair measure of autonomy before World War II can hardly be said to have had any relations with the outside world. Western type nationalism is also unknown to Arab history. Although there may have been instances where some Arab government did behave 'nationalistically', no such behaviour can be rightly ascribed to the people who, for the most part, submitted passively to rulers who cultivated and pursued ends of their own making. This in no way absolves the people from the responsibility of submission to their rulers; nor is it meant as a defence of their position. The point we are making is simply that the socalled 'nationalistic' action was in no case 'the conscious will of a sovereign people.'

Moreover, in the movements that may be characterized as 'nationalistic,' whether in the period of conquest, the Middle Ages or modern times, Arab consciousness never conceived of a *separatist* identity, closed to all but the select few who already belong to it. The Arabs have always regarded theirs an 'open' society, a community which any human being regardless of race, colour or sect can enter and to excel in which, every human being stands prepared by virtue of nature's endowment to him of reason and moral sense. The Prophet's *hadith*,[1] 'No Arab has any precedence over a non-Arab except in piety,' is a candid expression of an unshakeable determinant of Arab ethos throughout the ages. True, a candidate wishing to join the Arab community would have to satisfy a minimum of ethical requirements. But these are such as he personally may accept or reject. They have nothing to do with race, colour or geography which he can in no way alter. Hence no candidate human being may be rejected a priori. Whereas the idea of the Anglicization or of the Germanization of a billion coloured people would be revulsive to the

English or German nationalist, the idea of the Arabization of the universe would fill the heart of the Arab 'nationalist' with joy.[2]

The only contact 'Arab nationalism' has with nationalism lies not in the field of its connotation but in that of its denotation. Denotatively speaking, 'Arab nationalism' is, like any other nationalism, something that is true of the Arabic-speaking, rather than of any other people. Undoubtedly, many Muslims and many 'hanifs' outside the Arabic-speaking lands pursue the ideals of this Arab 'nationalism.' Nonetheless, 'Arab nationalism' is a fact of these lands alone because that which it connotes is in fact pursued only by the Arabic-speaking people as a whole and not merely by some of its individual members. Although the ideas of 'Arab nationalism' are of the kind that ought to be universally striven after and realized, the empirical 'hard' fact of history is that they have been and are pursued by the Arabic-speaking peoples alone. The denotative reference of 'Arab nationalism' is, therefore, empirical and descriptive. It becomes false as soon as it is understood normatively for it is not the case that the pursuit of these goals ought to be true of the Arabic-speaking alone. Connotatively speaking, 'Arab nationalism' is a contradiction in terms, for that which the Arabs alone pursue is a universal community in which all men would live together as brethren without the alienating, differentiating characterizations of the various nationalisms that answer to the foregoing definition. 'Arab nationalism' is therefore the will of the Arabs to the a-national universal community. It is a-nationalistic because it stands for the Arabs' dedication of themselves as a nation to the cause of mankind, to the cause of constructing the universal human brotherhood. It is a nationalism inasmuch as the pursuit of the universal brotherhood is in fact not merely the affair of individual Arabs, but of the Arab people as a whole and only of them. The Arabs are unique in that universalism is the general substance of their culture and the highest desideratum of their conscious will. Content-wise, 'Arab nationalism' is the will to end all nationalism. Obviously then it should not be called nationalism. To avoid its confusion with the nationalisms of European and American modern history, I propose to call it by the more proper name of Arabism.

Secondly, in talking of Arabism rather than of Arab nationalism, we are immune, I hope, against thinking, as many Westerners do, that that which we are trying to analyse is the product of the twentieth century; or, as some Western-inspired Arab nationalists have thought, of a century or so earlier. Conceived as an offspring of Western nationalism, with similar or identical character, Arab nationalism is of recent origin and certainly new. But conceived as pursuit of 'urubah, Arabism is as old as the Arab stream of being itself since it is the spirit which animates the

stream and gives it momentum. 'Urubah is that which agitated the Arabs to seek their liberty and unity in the twentieth century as well as to press northward towards the Fertile Crescent to give its people their language, culture and religion, in four succeeding waves: As Muslims in the seventh century A.D., as Arameans in the fifteenth century B.C., as Amorites in the second and third, and as Akkadians in the fourth and fifth millennia B.C. Is Arabism then Islam, the revelation which came to the Arab stream of being when it made contact with Divinity through the person of the Prophet Muhammad? Or, is it the religion and culture of the Amorites? Or of the Akkadians? Or of their innumerable descendants whom history has known as Assyrians, Babylonians, Phoenicians, Aramaens, Canaanites, Hebrews, etc.? No! Arabism is much older then all these. Although the content of Arabism is not equivalent to the revelations received in these flights of the Arab spirit, yet it has been kneaded and moulded by them so that its nature cannot be separated from the realms of value discovered, revealed or bequeathed through these great surges of the Arab stream of being. Certainly, at each one of these outbreaks of vitality and power, something new appeared which seemed to give the Arab stream of being a new momentum. Under the impact of revelation, the Arab ethos was rejuvenated and energized. Nonetheless, something eternally and unchangeably Arab persisted throughout history and by so doing, this Arab essence gave identity to the Arab stream and continuity to the events that make up its history. No doubt, the recent centuries are significant in that they have shifted the emphasis previous centuries had laid to new centers. But these centers are new not in the sense that they were unknown to Arabism, but simply that they were not the *foci* of emphasis. The message of Arabism in this century cannot therefore be other than the general legacy of 'urubah.

II. 'YE ARE THE BEST PEOPLE...'

That the Arabs are the best people is for all of us a point of faith. The Qur'anic judgement, 'Ye are the best people brought forth unto mankind,'[3] is a statement of this faith. Those of us who do not believe this on the authority of the *Qur'an*, believe in it as a judgement by the Arab spirit pronounced at its highest moment of self-consciousness. It is an ethically descriptive judgement, affirming that which it takes to be a fact, namely, that the Arab people are the best people brought forth unto mankind. Regardless of whether it is based on religious faith or on faith in the Arab spirit, our acceptance of this item of faith must always needs be conscious. In order to become conscious, it must rest on full awareness

of the grounds on which it stands. That is to say, we must know what goodness is, the scale or order of rank on the basis of which something is judged good, better, or best and, whether or not, and if so in how far, have the Arabs realized the content of goodness to justify this judgement. Acceptance on religious grounds does not obviate the need for this discussion. Religious faith itself could be blind or enlightened; and to enlighten our faith is not only desirable but is a cardinal command in Islam. Indeed, Islam so elevates the enlightened faith and degrades the unenlightened that a case could be made that the latter can hardly be accepted as securing membership in the fraternity of believers.

Our knowledge of the nature of the grounds of this divine judgement must, therefore, be complete and certain. To this end, fortunately, God Himself has come to our assistance by furnishing in the *Qur'an* a description of these grounds, thus explaining one item of faith by means of another. And because the explanation itself has come in the *Qur'an*, it too may be accepted on faith, although like the first, it stands in equal need of enlightenment. The same verse which says, 'Ye are the best people brought forth unto mankind,' continues, 'Ye bid what is good and forbid what is evil and ye believe in God,' thus establishing once and for all what has been and can be the only criterion of this divine verdict, namely, believing in God, enjoining the good and forbidding evil.[4] Hence, Arab goodness is ethical goodness. Our recognition of the nature of ethical distinction as well as the realization of this distinction by the Arabs is prerequisite for our consciousness of greatness.

This Qur'anic explanation is neither merely the 'sufficient reason' nor the condition of the judgement 'Ye are the best people...' It is more than either of these would logically imply. For the relationship between the two is not defined by any conditional prepositions like 'if-then' or 'because.' The Qur'anic explanation of the judgement is the latter's logical equivalent; that is to say, the logical relationship between the two is such that no violence to the meaning of the total verse would ensue from making the first part or the second part antecedent or consequent of a conditional. Their complete convertibility, or logical equivalence, is perfectly clear: the conditionals—if the Arabs are the best people then they enjoin the good, forbid evil and believe in God, and, if the Arabs enjoin the good, forbid evil and believe in God, then they are the best people—have both a truth value of one. The verse, therefore, purports to say, in addition to the fact that the Arabs are the best of all people, that if they are the best people it is because they enjoin what is good, forbid what is evil and believe in God and that, likewise, if they do these things, they would be the best.[5]

However, the verse is not only descriptive. It is also normative; that is

to say, a command issues from it. Neither the fact alone that the Arabs are the best nor the explanation that they enjoin the good, forbid evil and believe in God can by itself constitute a command. These are purely descriptive. But when they are joined together by an equivalence relationship, the result is a statement that is at once descriptive and normative. It is therefore in the equivalence relationship that the normativeness of the verse lies. It is there that the reference to the future, requisite for normativeness, is made. Hence the truth that this verse reveals contains at the same time the fact and the command: The fact that the Arabs are the best people because they enjoin the good, forbid evil and believe in God, and the command that if the fact is to continue to be true of them, the other fact, namely, that they enjoin the good, forbid evil and believe in God, ought to be no less true.

The relation of equivalence presupposes, as it must, the relative character of the descriptive statement which it relates. If it is true that the Arabs were the best people brought forth unto mankind at the time revelation came down, and if goodness is equivalent to conformance with a command, it must necessarily follow that non-conformance to that command should imply the negation of the predicate which the descriptive part had affirmed. Conversely, if this predicate is not presently true of a people, it may so become upon their realization of the content of the command. As such, the command itself in turn becomes descriptive in the different sense of stating the axiological principle that the content commanded constitutes ethical goodness and excellence. This Qur'anic verse therefore contains the three elements of a syllogism:

To enjoin the good, forbid evil and believe in God is to be ethically the best;

The Arabs enjoin the good, forbid evil and believe in God;

Therefore, the Arabs are ethically the best.

For us, therefore, this Qur'anic verse enunciates an axiological principle, asserts a fact and, at the same time, poses a challenge. We have faith in our goodness; but we must continuously make ourselves worthy of that faith. The believer may believe that the Arabs of the seventh century[6] obeyed the command to the full and that they were the best people. And the skeptic may doubt this until a careful study of Arab history has convinced him of its truth. But none may question the fact that the Arabs do not at present obey the command fully and are therefore not the best of mankind; nor that they ought to do so and strive to become the best of

mankind. Being the best of mankind is something that can only be earned, and with great effort—an honour to which the Arabs of today can hardly lay claim. Although by 'the best people' the *Qur'an* meant the Arabs of the seventh century, no relativism of Qur'anic content is here implied. The descriptive statement, 'Ye are the best people brought forth unto mankind,' asserts a historical fact that is eternally true. Like all historical truths this one describes a fact that belongs to history and which no thinking can undo. It should not be confused with the command that is therein implied and whose relevance cannot be so limited to an historical situation.

What is relevant to the Arabs today is, above all, the command. Nonetheless, this historical fact is not entirely devoid of relevance. There is more to it than the mere fact of the worthiness of our ancestors, which belongs to history.[7] Somehow, the fact also purports to say something about us, the modern Arabs. For, in a sense, we too are 'the best,' at least potentially; and this potentiality is not merely the universal capacity of the human kind to ethical goodness. As heirs to the legacy of the ancestors and carriers of their spirit, we stand—doubly qualified for ethical excellence—first, as humans, and secondly, as Arabs. Besides our potentiality as humans, we have already, as Arabs faithful to this faith and legacy, satisfied the first prerequisite of ethical goodness, namely, the recognition of the values constitutive of it. Or, at least, we have the sympathetic attitude of mind and heart requisite for such recognition. Certainly it remains for us to realize that which we have recognized, and that is by no means an easy task. Nonetheless, the fact that we are born Arabs, and that God has chosen the Arabs to receive His revelation, puts us, their descendants, at an advantage over those who have to struggle to appropriate this revelation and to recognize the values constitutive of goodness which we have learned to recognize as we grew up under the Arab spirit's extended wings. As the *Qur'an* puts it, the Arabs 'believe in God.' To believe in God is to recognize that a Being exists who issues commands to us which we recognize and strive to obey, a Being whose nature He has revealed as a realm of values which determine our willing and doing as we recognize them to be what they are. To believe in God is no act of the understanding, of theoretical consciousness alone; but one in which our whole being participates, above all, our value-consciousness and will. Hence, by believing in God, that is, by recognizing the order of values He has revealed and committing our being to determination by them, we have accomplished a good deal towards achieving goodness, for we have thereby not only satisfied the *conditio sine qua non* of all ethicality but have set and carried ourselves a fairly long way on the road to that distinction of our ancestors.

'Urubah then is at once a descriptive and normative concept. It is descriptive in that it consists of that which has made and still makes the Arab Arab. As such it is subject to critical observation and study. It is normative in that that which makes an Arab Arab is not merely determinants which have once determined or today determine the Arab or his ancestors, but which ought to determine the Arab in the future. For, 'urubah is not only that which determines, but also that which ought to determine, preserved in the wisdom of the Arab spirit and standing always ready to be deepened and enriched by the personal discoveries of Arab genius in the realm of values.

Juxtaposed to this preferential standing of the Arabs in the world is a greater responsibility, for a greater realization of value and higher excellence is expected of them. Without such additional requirement, justice would be compromised in their favour—a premonition which is neither becoming of God nor ethically desirable. To be expected to do more than the others is in itself an honour and a distinction. But why, it may be asked, has God been particularly kind to the Arabs?

III. THE ARABS AS CARRIERS OF A DIVINE MESSAGE

Throughout many centuries before Islam, the men who roamed over the lands now known as the Near East had made many a contact with Divinity. Certainly, their particular station in this world had long prepared them therefor. The geographical fact that most of their land was desert and that it lay at the crossroads of countless migrations in all directions had surely been their curse, but also their blessing. For the actualities of this geography had taught them to live under constant threat of extinction. There was little they could do about it; hence, they learned to live with it, to surmount it with their imagination and will. For millennia they bore their poverty with pride and stoically practiced renunciation. They were always ready to wager their lives for the sake of a task or conviction and endured their fate with magnanimous bent of mind. From the dawn of history they were willy-nilly imaginative poets, meditative on matters of destiny and, above all, masters of the forces of life throbbing within them. Even where the desert ended, as on the banks of the Nile or between the Two Rivers, the tropical bounty of nature did not, in the main, arouse or whet their appetite. The taming and disciplining by centuries of desert space-time had engrained a mastery before which their will to live could only bow in obeisance and respect.

In addition to this, nature contributed a great share. The wisdom of countless generations, crystallized in a body of proverbs, common sayings

and poetic verses, was kept alive by their obsession with language to which the fertile imaginativeness and sharp attentiveness of desert-existence had made them prone. Into this legacy they pressed not only their own experience, but also that of the travelling migrant peoples as well as those with whom their own travels brought them into contact. The wisdom of mankind had filtered down to them and was possessed by them in no mean depth or comprehensiveness. All these factors combined to temper their cosmic will to live, to develop their will to ethical life and to whet their aspiration to truth, beauty and goodness. Under the influence of these factors, their souls were gradually opened to the tragicness of this-worldly existence, and a longing within them began to stir for an existence wedded to the values whose negation constituted that tragicness. Thus, as they reflected on their station in the cosmos, the realization slowly dawned upon them that they are the vortex of history, the focal point at which Divinity breaks through to real existence, the substratum of a divine image and message.

It is all the same whether this preparation was itself the cause or the effect of providential choice. That we shall never know. What is significant is the fact of this preparedness. Equally, it is immaterial whether the ancient Arabs are taken to be the tribes inhabiting the Peninsula, the cosmopolitans of Ur and Alexandria, the mariners of Phoenicia, or the gypsy, nomadic tribes, transient even by desert standards, known as the 'Habiru', whom Akh-en-Aten's commissioners in Palestine were complaining against as plundering, like gypsies everywhere, the frontier towns of the realm, *circa* 1350 B.C.[8] All these were Arab peoples, enjoying the same legacy and leading an existence open to the influence of the same natural and environmental factors. The Arabic language of today comprehends the roots from which all the Semitic languages have sprung. As a mirror of Arab consciousness throughout the ages, it has preserved the wisdom of all past generations of Semitic stock.

Long before them and separated by millennia, their ancestors, known as Chaldeans, Amorites and before these, as Akkadians, sent wave after wave of immigrants to these lands from the sandy desert of Central Arabia and gave these lands, by fusing themselves with their local inhabitants, their language, religion and culture. The fusion of the Arab tribes with the Fertile Crescent was so complete that, as a Fertile Crescent people, and not as nomadic tribes from the desert, they have invaded Egypt and supplied it with the Pharaohs known as the Hyksos (shepherd) kings. The Arab transformation of the Fertile Crescent was so deep, the impact of Arabic language and culture was so strong and permeating that even the alien commissioners of the foreign powers that ruled Palestine, for instance, years after the first (Akkadian) Arab invasion,

communicated with their own superiors far away in Akkadian Arabic.[9] To appreciate the significance of this, let us consider the idea that the British High Commissioners for the mandated territories of the Near East were so arabicized as to use Arabic for correspondence with London. The strangeness of such an idea, when compared with an identical situation which occurred centuries ago, is mitigated only by the consideration that the British did not stay there long enough. Such was the Arabic impact.

All those who have inhabited the Near East, whether permanently or transiently, were Arabs. All of them have contributed to the legacy which the Arabs proudly call their own.[10] The term 'Arab is understood by the Arabs as applying equally to all these.'

The history of Arab consciousness may be divided into three periods. The first, which we shall call the Judaic period, does not begin with the first exile of the Hebrews, nor with the establishment of the Kingdom of Judea, but with the migration of Abraham, circa 1750 B.C., beyond which little history is known. Abraham is the father of that long line of prophetic tradition whose flowering constitutes Judaism. The terms 'Hebrew religion' and 'Judaism' usually applied by modern scholars to the religious culture of the pre-exilic and post-exilic Hebrews respectively, rob the prophetic development of its continuity. Presumably, this scholarship which is almost wholly Western and Christian, would like to disengage Christianity from the crass polytheism and immorality of 'Hebrew religion' which it continues to uncover with the assistance of archeology, and to emphasize Christian affinity to the ideas of the exilic and post-exilic Isaiah, Jeremiah, Micah, Zechariah, etc. This dichotomy does violence to the religious idea of prophecy. If both Abraham and Jeremiah were prophets, or, if one prefers, they were both men whom God had chosen for a given purpose, they could not but have preached the same lesson, the same religion, the same God. Though the later messenger may have offered more than the earlier, this 'more' cannot but be an addition to, or a development, never a repudiation of the earlier message. Otherwise a change in divine purpose, detrimental to the idea of God, becomes inevitable. We shall therefore understand by 'Judaism' the religion of Abraham as well as that of Micah, and we shall see what it was that all prophets have held and preached in unison. The Judaic period therefore covers Arab consciousness from its earliest crystallizations in the so-called 'Semitic myths' to the birth of Jesus Christ. The birth of Jesus has ushered in the second period, namely, the 'Christian period,' of Arab consciousness which includes the formative first six centures of Christianity, up to the *Hijrah* of the Prophet Muhammed and the subsequent rise of Islam. The third period of Arab consciousness, namely, the Islamic

period, began with the *Hijrah* and extends to and includes our own day.

From the earliest beginnings of Arab self-consciousness the Arab conceived his existence as one inexorably related to the Godhead and, since the Godhead was the central fact and cause of Being, he regarded himself as the vortex of human existence and history. He conceived the creation of the human race as beginning with his ancestors, and in their tribulations he saw the destiny itself of the human race taking final shape. He understood their life-experience as an effect of divine decree and action. For the point we are making here, it is immaterial whether the Arab's view of himself is, in fact, an illusion, a revelation, or a sublime truth forced into mythological expression by poetic genius. What is important is the mere fact, indubitable in itself, that the Arab did regard his life as interaction with divine will. It is this that sets him off from the rest of mankind and justifies, within the terms of his own world-view, the central nature of the place he occupies in creation. He was the crown of 'creation' *because* only he had the consciousness requisite to see himself as such.

This relationship with Divinity occupied the best moments of his consciousness. It provided the foundation for his moral vocation. From the beginning, the Arab regarded his tribulations as punishment and his happiness as desert incurred by his conformity with, or violation of, moral imperatives which he conceived as divine command. The creation, the fall of man, the deluge, the covenant, the story of Joseph, even the birth idyll of Moses were one and all ideas current in the spiritual life of countless generations in the Near East before the oldest crystallizations of Hebrew consciousness.[11] Indeed the story of the infacy of Moses is identically that of Sargon I (*circa* 3000 B.C.); and the deluge, with hardly any significant change, is a reproduction of a Babylonian story that was current in the Fourth Millennium B.C.

The whole history of revelation is the consequence of the effort of Arab consciousness to formulate its world-view. The divine origin of the Law is at least as old as Hammurabi (1720-1680 B.C., or slightly earlier or later, according to different theories), who conceived of his code as God-given; and perhaps the idea is even older.[12] The necessary implication of this connection with God is that obedience to the law would bring about felicity, and violation would bring about damnation and suffering since Deity was the dispenser of good and bad fortunes. By breaking through history and reaching out to man, by giving him the Law, the Deity was conceived as caring for him, as meaning to show him the road to blessedness. Whenever he came to the edge of the abyss and was about to lose himself to evil, Arab consciousness conceived of redemption as God-sent; and whenever, after adequate moral intussusception, the Arab

stood ready for a further advance on the road of ethical achievement, Arab consciousness conceived of the new-value discovery as divine grant. The contacts the Godhead had made with the Arab stream of being were innumerable. In Arab consciousness, quanta of divine commandments and revelations have been reaching the Arab stream through its prophet-sons, from Adam to Muhammad, and have been getting progressively deeper and more intense as Arab consciousness grew. In the Prophet Muhammad, Arab consciousness conceived itself sufficiently mature to understand God's command that revelation should henceforth be terminated, and to learn to regard henceforward any future discovery of value as devolving upon it alone. Arab consciousness therefore regards all Judaism, Christianity and Islam as moments of its long and arduous course of growth beginning, in childhood with Adam,[13] and reaching the age of reason in Muhammad, the 'seal of the Prophets.'

It is Arab consciousness acting as a substrate of all Semitic religions that constitutes their common ground. Not a community of superficial elements haphazardly met in any or all of them, but the real stream of being by whose spirit they were conceived and in whose spiritual being they have survived, is what gives organic unity to the whole Semitic tradition. The Semitic religions were moments in the consciousness of the Arab stream of being, occurring at times of crisis or of tension-producing growth to reveal to that consciousness the meaning of the Arab stream of being, the nature of its destiny, the ideal method, or 'the Law,' of realizing that meaning and to assist the Arab spirit in its upward march.

IV. THE ESSENCE OF THE DIVINE MESSAGE

As known to, and overwhelmingly acknowledged by, the countless generations of men whose religio-ethical consciousness has been determined by any of the great moments of Arab consciousness, the divine message has been one and the same, repeated with renewed clarity and strength at each contact with Divinity. The form, the range and depth, the intensity and points of emphasis changed, as indeed they had to, between one contact and another. Although the essence of God's messages which gave them their identity never changed, their valuational content changed as the ethos it meant to determine changed and developed. Enriched by the valuational discoveries each of these contacts had brought Arab consciousness was continually growing. It was necessary that the new contact strive to move the Arab spirit to new heights of understanding and depth and, to that purpose, use material hitherto unknown to Arab consciousness.

The essential meaning, however, the central core of the content of all these contacts has been one, identically the same throughout—namely, *that God is, that He is One.* In this short proposition, Arab consciousness compressed centuries of groping and crystallized its insight into a whole number of problems. That God is and that He is One was not the conclusion of an 'evolution of the idea of God,' as the historians of religion might say. Nor was it the sudden uncaused proclamation from heaven to Abraham, Adam or Muhammad that theologians usually make it out to be, but the crystallization and goal of a long process of maturing ethical sense. That God is, is the way, typical of Arab consciousness, of expressing its newly-discovered truth that value is, rather than is made by man; that life and existence are not in vain but are of permanent value; and that their valuableness is not the making, not the assignment of men. That God is One, is the Arab way of saying that value is one, absolute, the same for all men, rather than relative to individuals, groups, times or places. That God has revealed Himself or His will is the Arab way of saying that it is man's duty to seek value everywhere, in the persons of all men. The monotheistic thesis is not purely a metaphysical one, discovered by or revealed to the investigator and seeker of the cause of all causes. It is the thesis of the moral observer and sufferer whose ethical striving had brought him to a new realm of value of which his Arab consciousness had taught him to conceive only in terms of a relation between himself and the Supreme Being. That God is and is One is inseparable from the ethical concomitant of the existence and absoluteness of value; that He has broken through to us is inseparable from the obligation man is under to realize value. Indeed, the 'monotheic'[14] is only the way in which Arab consciousness understands and by which it is capable of expressing the ethical. The ethical is indeed the 'monotheic' and vice versa.

It may be argued that discovery of the truth, 'value is,' is not peculiarly Arab; and that it has been achieved by other cultures—which is indeed true. However, it must be observed that nowhere except in the Arab World had this idea dominated a people rather than a few individuals and that only there had it produced a movement and left lasting effect upon their life and thought. On the other hand, that value is one is definitely an Arab discovery. It is this insight that underlies the notion that God is, this truth that Arab consciousness raises to high pitch of crystallization and intensity in its characteristic notion that God is One. Monotheism is exclusively an Arab thought, a reality of Arab consciousness alone. Its ethical equivalent did not begin to stir the imagination of any other known culture except centuries and, perhaps, millennia after it had taken hold of Arab consciousness. In it the Arab spirit expressed

and saw itself. By establishing monotheism as a category of consciousness, the Arab spirit legislated the cardinal rule of all moral action—namely, that the good is the same for all men, that all men stand to the good in the same relation and that in this they are brethren, children of the one Master in heaven, unto Whom they yearn. All men are equal under the moral law, equally obliged to realize value everywhere, particularly in the persons of their brethren. The peculiar merit of Arab moral sense is then its discovery that ethical concern for oneself is identically one's concern for the others, that self-love is nothing but neighbourly love. To be ethical was then and still is to seek to realize the good in the person of the other, of all others, since the good of all, like God, is absolutely one.

In the Hebrew period of Arab consciousness, roughly 1750 B.C.-1 A.D., whose beginning Arab historiographers have represented as the migration of Abraham from Ur and which God had dictated and crystallized for us in the Torah, this truth was asserted simply because the problem the Arab spirit was facing was that of Hebrew separatism, of the Hebrew 'chosen people' complex. In its Christian period, Arab consciousness regarded this truth as the essence of an altruistic ethic charged with zealous pursuit of the higher, and abandonment of the lower, and whose conscience it acknowledged as the only competent tribunal. Lastly, in its Islamic period, Arab consciousness moved to the logical conclusion of this ethical truth by establishing it as the main determinant of a societal ethic whose tribunal it transferred from the subject-individual to the world-ummah[15] and by universalizing the personal dictates of conscience into law. We shall see, in the sequel, some aspects of the problems posed by Arab consciousness in its commitment to the oneness of God, to the oneness of value, and to the ethical equivalent of this commitment, namely, the love of the neighbour, of humanity. We shall catch a glimpse of the travails the Arab spirit had to endure in its pursuit of this greatest human discovery.

1. A *hadith* is a saying of the Prophet Muhammed which has been handed down through tradition and preserved on account of its interpretive value for Islam.
2. The fact that the cause of Anglicizing India, or Franconizing Indo-China did have an airing at some moment of British or French history does not affect our contention because, in the main, this cause fell on deaf ears and can hardly be said to have even as much as scratched the surface of British or French being.
3. *Qur'an,* 3:110.
4. Tabari and Zamakhshari are agreed that the judgement is not absolute but conditioned by believing in God, enjoining the good and forbidding evil. See the former's *Tafsir,* Al 'Imran, 110, Hadiths No. 7614 and 7615 on pp. 102-3, Vol. VII, Dar al Ma'arif, Cairo, current edition; and the latter's *al Kashshaf,* Nassau Lees ed., Calcutta, 1856, Vol. I, p. 226.

5. Zamakhshari *(loc. cit.)* and Baidawi *(Tafsir*, Maktabat Muhammad 'Ali Sabin, Cairo 1371/1951, p. 85) consider *Ta'muruna* and what follows after it as an *Isti'naf* explicative of the proposition 'Ye are the best people' or a second *khabar* to *kuntom*. In either case, equivalence is meant.
6. Or, as Tabari reports in *loc. cit.*, the *Muhajirun*, or emigrants, who were the first converts to Islam.
7. The three above-mentioned exegetes are agreed that the verb *kuntom* does not indicate a past event, or one that was but is no more, as evidenced by such verses as al A'raf: 86, and the usage, *kuntom fi 'ilm-i-llahi*, which cannot imply a cessation of the event contained. But they do not give the sense in which the verb is both present and past, the sense in which the verse as a whole is both presently and historically relevant.
8. 'Let the king, my lord, protect his hand from the hand of the 'Apiru. If not, let the king, my lord, send chariots... etc.' This is taken from the letters of Tell el Amarna, tr. from the Akkadian by W. F. Albright in *The Ancient Near East: An Anthology of Texts and Pictures*, ed. by J. B. Pritchard, Princeton University Press, 1958, p. 267.
9. As evidenced by the letters of Tell el Amarna. See J. B. Pritchard, *op. cit.*, p. 262.
10. 'As the probable cradle of the Semitic family,' writes Professor Philip Hitti, 'the Arabian Peninsula nursed those people who later migrated into the Fertile Crescent and subsequently became the Babylonians, the Assyrians, the Phoenicians and the Hebrews of history. As the plausible fount of pure Semitism, the sandy soil of the Peninsula is the place wherein the rudimentary elements of Judaism, and consequently of Christianity—together with the origin of these traits which later developed into the well-delineated Semitic character—should be sought for.' *(History of the Arabs*, MacMillan, London, 1956, p. 3).
    See also Zaydan, J., *Tarikh al Tamaddun al Islami*, Cairo, Dar al Hilal, 1958, I, p. 40ff; Jawad 'Ali, *Tarikh al Islam*, Cairo, 1952, II, p. 150ff. Expressing an identical view, Fayez Sayegh writes: 'Many of the earlier stocks which inhabited the eastern and southern shores of the Mediterranean—and which flourished, successsively or contemporaneously, building civilizations and kingdoms of their own at a time when the history of mankind virtually revolved around them—were originally inhabitants of the Arabian Peninsula who left it in successive waves during the Third and Second Millennia, B.C. and proceeded northwards and westwards to the more fertile lands—there to appear on the stage of history under different names—Babylonians, Canaanites, Phoenicians, Arameans, Hebrews, Chaldeans, or Assyrians. The early history of the Near East, which is also the history of civilization itself, is virtually the story of the encounter between immigrants from the Arabian Peninsula, on the one hand, and existing Near Eastern populations and migrants from the North, on the other hand.' *(Arab Unity*, Devin Adair, New York, 1958, p. 12).
11. J. B. Pritchard's *op. cit.*, contains a whole treasure of epics, myths, historical and legal codes whose closeness to the Books of Moses is so striking that it simply shatters the notion that those books are exclusively the Hebrews'. See also M. Jastrow's *Hebrew and Babylonian Traditions*, New York, 1914, and the 1916 Schweich Lectures of Leonard W. King on the Legends of Babylon and Egypt in Relation to Hebrew Tradition, published by the British Academy in London, 1918.
12. H. Winckler had argued that even in pre-Sargonic times, the several divine forms were regarded in Babylon as only partial manifestations of a single deity *(The History of Babylonia and Assyria*, tr. by J. A. Craig, New York, 1907, p. 14) and C. J. Gadd, that the deity's relation to man was one of concern as wel as government. *(Ideas of Divine Rule in the Ancient East*, Oxford University Press, 1948).
13. *Qur'an*, 2:30-37.
14. As a noun, 'monotheic' is intended to mean the galaxy of ideas which constitute the existence and one-ness of God, rather than the form of such ideas, usually signified by the adjective 'monotheistic.'
15. '*Ummah*' is not merely the 'nation' of the English language, nor '*la nation*' of post-revolution France and European nationalism. It adds to the utilitarian, practical connotation of the former, and the rationalistic idealistic meaning of the latter, the cosmological sense of being the eternal reality in which 'nations' in the foregoing senses may come and go and the religio-axiological sense of being the real-existent substrate of divine will. Hence, our use of the Arabic term.

PART ONE

'URUBAH AND THE RELIGIONS OF THE BOOK

CHAPTER TWO

JUDAISM AS FIRST MOMENT OF ARAB CONSCIOUSNESS

Judaism, as the religion whose essence is the recognition and worship of the One God and whose ethic is the universalistic fulfillment of value conceived as His command, is not the religion of Israel. Some Hebrews, preeminently Abraham, Jacob, Ishmael, Isaac and Moses, undoubtedly adhered to and practiced this faith; but the people to which these 'Jews' belonged, namely, the 'Hebrews', or 'Israel', of history, did not at all. Not only have the Hebrews not obeyed any such command of God, but they have not even recognized that God is One, Lord of all. Persistently, for over thirty centuries, they have held closely to the idea that God is 'their' God and no one else's; for although He rules supreme over the whole universe, only they can enter into any kind of respectable relation with Him. He is the God of the others (the 'goyim' or non-Jews) through creation, above all by virtue of His power and might. Hence, the others enter into relation with Him on sufferance. They are His objects. On the other hand, He is God of Israel by both creation and power as well as by love and 'election'. Hence, only the Hebrews are His 'children,' His 'people,' who enter into relation with Him, not as objects, but as subjects of history. The fatherhood of God to all men, His equal compassion towards all creatures, His universal justice are ideas foreign to Hebrew life and history.

In its Judaic period Arab consciousness was engaged in a fierce battle between those who discovered, worshipped and taught the One God of all, and 'the Hebrews' who adamantly resisted that teaching. The whole of Hebrew history is the tale of the struggle of a handful of 'faithful' against their brethren, 'the Hebrews,' who stubbornly rejected—as they still do to the present day—every universalist idea of God that gives all men equal standing in God's sight. Not only were the Hebrews as a whole never converted to the Judaic faith, the faith of Abraham, but, on the contrary, recognizing the dynamism of the new idea, they appropriated it simply to use it as a weapon against their enemies and a means of further self-separation from mankind. That which in the hands of the faithful was a call to One God and brotherhood of all men became in Hebrew hands an exclusivist, particularist, separatist union of 'His' people around 'their' God. The adherents of genuine Judaism were

always a small number of individuals preaching God and warning their fellows against disobedience to His commands. For the most part, they were persecuted, humiliated and repulsed; and Hebrew history is little else but the anecdotes of this continuous repulsion. Indeed, besides the source of revelation, it is through their enemies that the teachings and records of the faithful Jews have been preserved and that we have come to know them. Having transvalued the teachings of these men, the Hebrews combined the legacy of these God-worshipping hanifs with the separatist, tribalist ravings of their rabbis and thus gave us the curious mass of Jew-loving, *goyim*-hating, Lord-of-the-universe, God-of-the-Jews literature which is the Old Testament. But in so doing they have immortalized the memory of those Jews whose teaching can still be sifted from the accumulations of rabbinic material. Despite Hebrew falsification, the genuine voice of the early prophets of God stands out audibly in the Old Testament, and its rocking accusation of the Hebrew rabbis and contemptuous derision of their patchwork are clearly discernible.

Continuous exclusivism is by nature a collective act. Otherwise it would not be continuous. The individual exclusivist cannot procreate exclusivists, or missionarize and thus recruit them among the people, without involving himself in society, *i.e.*, without self-contradiction. He must live out his life and die alone. His example may entice others to follow in his footsteps; but such following presupposes a society from which followers voluntarily exclude themselves, and the exclusivist line is not continuous but broken. Every exclusivist has an existence separate from that of everyone else. Such is the ideal monastic existence of which the monastic *order* is a corruption.

Hebrew exclusivism is continuous. It is passed from father to son and rarely, if ever, relies on missionarizing and recruitment from foreign circles. The Hebrews of history have not existed as individual recruits from a large society, but as a self-sustaining unit within the Arab stream of being. Hence, their exclusivism was collective. It must have had an inception in some event, in some joint act or decision of a number of persons or of a tribe, constituting themselves into the new society and separating themselves from the larger whole of which they had hitherto been a part. Such act or decision must have carried within it the will to the future, to perpetuate its object in time. It must have envisioned the eternal existence of a society, separate and separatist, distinct from all mankind. Above all, it must have been a decision since natural history can in no way account for it within the contact of the Arab stream of being, then confined to the Arabian Peninsula and the Fertile Crescent. Such a decision must have constituted those who made it into the collective whole known as 'the Hebrews' of history. Certainly, as the cause of

their distinctive being, it was the most fateful event of their life on earth.

Unfortunately, the enquiry into the causes, the nature and circumstances of this fateful decision has not attracted many great minds. In Christendom, regard for the Old Testament as holy writ discouraged this kind of scientific enquiry, and the fascination of the enquiry itself was dulled by the view that since God reveals Himself through the events of history rather than the phenomena of nature, Hebrew history was a necessary prelude to Christian history which is conceived as its conclusion.[1] The advent of Jesus, this view holds, was the consummation of a long historical process—the history of the Hebrews—which God has instituted and in which He gradually worked out His plan for man's salvation. Christian moral sense was sufficiently dulled by this view torpidly to accept even the maxima of Hebrew moral turpitude as part of God's over-all design.

In the Muslim World, Hebrew history was regarded as the record of punishment and tribulation God had inflicted upon the Hebrews because of their dogged refusal to worship Him and obey His commands.[2] No differentiation was ever made between Hebrews as individual persons which is the only case under which the failure to obey or to worship could constitute religious sin, and as 'the Hebrews' who as a community are the very clause of every Hebrew individual blasphemous violation of divine command and of most of their individual ethical misdeeds. Muslim thinkers did not see the Hebrews as an organic, self-perpetuating collective, but simply as individuals who had gone astray. The decision instituting the collective must have been entirely outside their purview.

The formation of the Hebrew collective, or Israel, must then provide the key to understanding the struggle between the Hebrews and Judaism. An understanding of that formation should explain the Hebrews' repulsion and persecution of the Judaic prophets and adherents; it should expose the bases of the Hebrew transvaluation of Judaic values.

I. THE EXODUS FROM EGYPT WAS THE RESULT, NOT THE CAUSE, OF HEBREW BEING

As far as is known to this author, two thinkers have addressed themselves to the problem of the formation of Hebrew being: Sigmund Freud and Muhammad Kamil Husayn. Both have tried to establish that the Exodus from Egypt constituted that formative cause. Freud's analysis developed into a psychoanalysis and ended in typical psychoanalystic riddles.[3] Following in Freud's footstepts but free of psychoanalytic fixed notions, the latter's discussion rightly held that separatism is the essence of

Hebrew being[4] but erroneously sought its causes, along with other traits of Hebrew national character, in the Exodus. The real outcome of Dr. Husayn's excellent chapter in *Mutanawwi'at*,[5] entitled 'A Superb Story: The Exodus and the Hebrew Mind,'[6] was the opposite of what he set out to prove, namely, that Hebrew separatism was not something acquired as a result of the Exodus but something required for explaining that Exodus. Allegedly, the Exodus was the event which, by the extremes of despair and hope it simultaneously pressed into the soul of the Hebrews, transformed that soul and made it separatist. 'It is this violent transition,' writes Husayn, 'from the disaster with which they had to contend, to a complete confidence in the future on the further side of their deliverance, which explains the particular mental, psychological and moral traits of the Jewish people.'[7] The fact is, however, that all that the Exodus succeeded in doing was to crystallize in consciousness and embed in the national character, psychological and moral traits which have already been there for a long time. Instead of producing these traits, the Exodus only caused Hebrew consciousness to represent them as national identity.

Under the scrutinizing analysis of Dr. Husayn, the Hebrew soul reveals a number of characteristics.[8] But these are all evident in the life of the Hebrews in Egypt, Palestine and Syria before the Exodus. These are such as may be produced by prolonged persecution and destitution only if separatism and extreme tenacity to life are there also. No doubt Pharaonic oppression over centuries contributed towards making them permanently embedded in Hebrew character. But that they were brought about by persecution cannot be accepted without evidence.[9]

The conviction that their Jewishness accounted for their deliverance and that it would take care of them in the future is itself a derivative of the idea of being the chosen people, separate from mankind, endowed with a logic and destiny all their own, in short—Hebrew separatism. But this, as I shall endeavour to show in the sequel, was all in evidence in the conduct of Jacob and his sons towards their Shechemite hosts, and therefore was ingrained in Hebrew character a long time indeed before the Exodus which was made possible and necessary because of it. Without this Hebraicness—or separatism—it is inconceivable that the Hebrews would have resisted assimilation so successfully during centuries of sojourn in Egypt. To say that their persecution was the cause of their Jewishness is to put the cart before the horse. No doubt, further persecution itself is not conceivable, and successful resistance thereto is even less so, without their separatism. A fortiori then, Dr. Husayn's thesis that separatism was the sudden making of the Exodus-experience is inadequate; since besides the prolonged persecution and successful resistance thereto that it leaves without explanation, the case of the

Hebrews offers prior to the Exodus the further evidence of preparing for and achieving an exodus, which is inexplicable without that separatism. It is not sufficient to say that 'the Egyptians oppressed and ill-treated them before the Exodus because they were a nation of sojourners and the Egyptians at that time were strongly set in their own territory and conquering their neighbours whom they drove before them into slavery like cattle after the manner of conquerors in that era.'[10] For the questions, Why were they sojourners and did they remain sojourners after centuries of residence? Why did they succeed so remarkably in resisting persecution? still remain unanswered. The fact that shatters this view however is that the Hebrews did not enter Egypt as conquered slaves, but as friendly guests invited by no less an Egyptian than Pharaoh himself and carried thither in the royal carriages.[11]

The kind of relationship which obtained between the Hebrews and their Egyptian hosts after four centuries of residence in their midst, namely, economic exploitation, political infiltration, social snobbery, racial separatism, cultural and spiritual isolationism, is deducible from the account given of them in the first chapter of Exodus. 'The children of Israel were fruitful and increased abundantly, and waxed exceedingly mighty, and the land was filled with them.'[12] The King of Egypt admonished his people to rise up against 'the people of the children of Israel who are more and mightier than we,'[13] and put an end to the threat that 'when there falleth out any war, they join also unto our enemies and fight against us.'[14] The Hebrews had never allowed themselves to be absorbed into Egyptian society; and while they worked themselves into a position of financial and political might in Egypt, they gave no evidence of ever identifying their interest and survival with those of Egypt. Since they were to be found in the distant provinces under Egyptian control, they probably had such contacts with the enemies of Egypt as to raise Egyptian suspicion—confirmed by their separatism—that they stood ready to betray Egypt and to stab it in the back.

It would seem that Dr. Husayn's theory, by attributing to the Exodus the effect of forming Hebrew separatism and his description of their pre-Exodus character as containing elements of that separatism, implies an exodus before the Exodus, which is responsible for that character. But the logic of this kind of argument presses us further to postulate another exodus prior to that one, and so on *ad infinitum*.

All this tends to show that Hebrew separatism has always existed. For no matter how far we may go in exploring the origins of Hebrew history, we always seem to find it. Although succeeding historical events have decisive influence in embedding or uprooting the psychological and moral characteristics of a people—and this is a truth which can hardly be overemphasized—yet, the explanation of these characteristics, that is, the discovery of that which brought them about, their *principium fiendi*, cannot be sought in any single event of that history, and at any rate, the case of Hebrew character cannot be so explained wih reference to the Exodus from Egypt. The central and most essential part of Hebrew national character must have already been what it was in Egypt, if it is to produce the historical events it did or be affected by their flow in the manner in which it has been affected. 'The teaching of Judaism,' said Martin Buber meaning the religion of 'the Hebrews' and their *Weltanschauung*, 'comes from Sinai; it is Moses' teaching. But the *soul* of Judaism is pre-Sinaitic; it is the soul which approached Sinai, and there received what it did receive; it is older than Moses; it is patriarchal, Abraham's soul, or more truly, since it concerns the *product* of a primordial age, it is Jacob's soul.'[15]

II. THE DOCTRINE OF ELECTION

Since Hebrew being must have been what it was prior to the Exodus from Egypt, we must look for its formative cause in the earlier, patriarchal period. There, as M. Buber had the insight to see, must lie that which made the Hebrew a Hebrew. What was that formative cause?

The opinion of the Hebrews of history, as well as that of Christian scholars throughout, is that such a cause was the election of Abraham by God Himself to constitute with his descendants a people distinguished from and raised above mankind. One might think that this divine election had a purpose such as the appointment of the Hebrews to be the instruments of God's will and carriers of His message. But this immediately makes of the act of election a hypothetical plan purporting a harmonious relationship between the state of election and carrying out the mission, its *ratio essendi*. On the other hand, the election here intended is clearly one that would persist independently of the realization or otherwise of a purpose. It is not therefore proper to say that God's election had a purpose since there is no necessary connection between them. The election of Abraham and his descendants, 'the Hebrews,' was one which no act by them could circumvent or frustrate.

This kind of election is ethically hard to accept, however demanded by faith. Hence, attempts have been made to make it more palatable. But only two alternatives were possible: the ethicization of election by removing its absoluteness and thus making it an ordinary conditional, or by insisting on that absoluteness but raising 'the Hebrews,' in their capacity as the elect of God, above the moral law. The first alternative

has been followed by Christians generally; the second, by the Hebrews and their descendants, the Jews.

It was Paul that set the pattern of thought which Christians have followed through the centuries. 'There is neither Jew nor Greek ... for ye are all one in Christ Jesus', he wrote to the Galatians. 'And if ye be Christians, then are ye Abraham's seed and heirs according to the promise.'[16] He assured the *goyim* to whom he was preaching that they 'are co-heirs, ... companions and co-partners in the promise.'[17] In poetic transport, Paul reduced the story of Ishmael and Isaac to a metaphor in which the Hebrews, likened to Ishmael and Hagar, are 'after the flesh' giving rise to bondage to the Sinaitic law; and the Christians, likened to Isaac, are the children of the promise that came to Jerusalem, which is the barren Sarah.[18] In the arbitrary election of Abraham, Christian thinkers saw the beginning of a series of events embodying a divine though extremely circuitous plan to redeem man from the state of sin into which he had fallen after his brief stay in paradise.[19] But this stood all on one foundation, *viz.*, that the Hebrews' rejection of Jesus constituted a breach of the covenant and a repudiation of the election. The Jews forfeited their privileges, the Christians hold, by failing in their obligation; and having failed, the Hebrews enabled the Christians, now become elect, to seize the divine promise for themselves.[20]

The Hebrew answer to this Christian challenge was quick and straightforward. God's election of the Hebrews is absolute and irrevocable. God had said, they retorted, through every prophetic mouth, eloquently and uniquivocally through Jeremiah and Isaiah, that the spirit of God which He has put in the mouth and heart of the Hebrews 'shall not depart ... from henceforth and forever.'[21] 'The moth shall eat them (the nations of the earth, as well as the heavens, the earth itself and all that is on it) up like a garment, and the worm shall eat them like wool: but my righteousness and my salvation shall be forever and ever, from generation to generation.'[22] Rabbi Meir took the words of Deuteronomy 14:1, 'Ye are children of the Lord your God,' literally, though not physically; and added that whether the Hebrews act in filial manner or not, they are still the children of God: 'In either case the filial relation remains, for sinful offspring are still children.'[23]

However, such absolute election is offensive to moral sense; and the Hebrew prophets themselves could not but recognize that God cannot be so biased in their favour. To remedy the situation the doctrine of the remnant was invented. According to this doctrine, Israel would be visited with all sorts of punishment, according to its misdeeds. The prophets' stern accusations and severe condemnations of Israel would stand, but they would be foiled by the assertion immediately following, that neither

the moral corruption nor the deserved destruction will ever be complete, but that a remnant will always hold to the word of God and thus earn its salvation from every catastrophe, pick up the Hebrew banner and continue the eternal attachment of 'their' God to 'His' people, 'the Hebrews.' What constitutes the real fantasy in all this is the fact that it is God that punishes and it is He that saves the remnant from His own punishment.[24] Whereas most prophets ascribed the saving of the remnant to divine mercy, Zephaniah had the temerity to decree, on behalf of God, that 'the remnant of Israel shall not do iniquity, nor speak lies; neither shall a deceitful tongue be found in their mouth.'[25] With this, the return to the original absolute election is complete. If heaven decrees that not all Hebrews shall go astray, but some, and that some, the remnant, shall never cease to be righteous, then, the absolute election of the Hebrews is asserted and their irrefragable superiority is forever maintained. The doctrine of the remnant has availed nothing as long as the remnant itself is absolutely necessary, necessarily pardonable and, finally, infallible.

In order to justify this absolute election, the Pentateuch presented the history of Abraham, the great father of Hebrew being, as events consequent upon an arbitrary divine choice that singled out the patriarch from mankind to be the recipient of special divine favour. But this, we shall soon see, is based upon a false conception of God and an erroneous view of human nature.

III. ABRAHAM'S SELECTION WAS NOT ARBITRARY

Ethical universalism and life affirmation were related in what prophetic literature has referred to as the 'covenant' of man with God. God, under every covenant He has entered into with man, required man to be good and, in return, He promised him happiness and the joys of the world. He recognized the righteousness of Noah[26] and therefore saved him from the destruction He meted out to the non-righteous and rewarded him with His blessing.[27] He then renewed the command to be good, which in this instance took the form of sanctifying life and prohibiting its destruction,[28] since man's consciousness was gripped by the value of life which the Deluge had mercilessly destroyed. God promised never to destroy life,[29] but to spare it, if man himself learned to do so. And if man obeyed God's command and evaluated life as he should, the blessings of God's earth would fall to him. This command is universal. It applies to all men as subjects and objects of it. The covenant God entered into was one 'which I have established between Me and all flesh that is upon the earth.'[30]

The content of the command is the elemental condition of life-affirmation, namely, the preservation of life arising from the vesting of it with value.

Although the *Bible* as well as the *Qur'an* represents Noah as a monotheist, the point is really not cardinal to the matter under question. Noah's ethical consciousness is not impossible under a polytheist hierarchy, such as the Babylonian, for example. Indeed, the Babylonians had an identical deluge story in which Noah is called Utnapishtim and the god who favoured and saved him was Ea, although, socratically enough, Utnapishtim's knowledge and cleverness contributed to his salvation. Ethical consciousness, therefore, does not require metaphysical 'coverage.' That is because it is ethical, and the ethical is prior to the metaphysical in reaching consciousness, as we shall see in the sequel.[31] Of course Noah's monotheism could also be accepted purely on faith. However clear and straightforward the emphasis is on universalism and life-affirmation in this covenant of Noah, the Hebrews did not recognize in it any special significance. They took the covenant to be that which God entered into with Abraham and called themselves 'the people of the covenant' after it, because it alone contained, whereas the Noahic covenant did not, what seemed to them to be constitutive of a Jewish people, separate from the rest of mankind.

As told in the Pentateuch,[32] God has chosen Abraham from among the Babylonians and Chaldeans in Ur[33] and commanded him to leave his country, his people and his own father's house and proceed to a strange land.[34] Nowhere does the Pentateuch give any reason for this command, important as it was for Abraham, the person concerned himself, as well as for the whole future development of Judaism. Only a great cause, an equally serious event or situation, could have led to it. And yet, Jewish scriptures are silent about it. The Midrash, a compilation of the scriptural studies of the early rabbis of the synagogue, says on this subject: 'When a flask of balsam is sealed and stored away, its fragrance is not perceptible; but opened and moved about, its sweet odour is widely diffused.'[35] The Midrash does not say how the balsam (in this case, Abraham) was 'sealed and stored away.' Why did Abraham not, or could not, 'open up' to let his fragrance out? What precisely did his 'fragrance' consist of? Why could its diffusion not take place in Ur? The world had to await the advent of the *Qur'an* to know the answers to these questions. Only the *Qur'an* proclaimed the great 'argument which We bestowed upon Abraham as against his people,'[36] and gave God's choice—if 'choice' it may be called— ethical meaning and ground.The great issue was one of idolatry against worship of the one and true God. Abraham, appalled by the idolatry of his relatives and next of kin, reproached them and broke into these strong words to his father:

'Takest thou idols for God? I see thee and thy people in manifest error...'.[37]
'Oh! Father why do you worship an object which neither hears nor sees nor is of any effect. Oh, Father, knowledge has come to me of which you have no idea. Listen to me therefore and I shall lead you on to the right path. Oh, Father, do not worship Satan, for Satan has disobeyed God, and I fear, O Father, that punishment would be inflicted by Him upon you and you be made a comrade of Satan.'
'Are you turning away from my Gods, O Abraham,' said his father; 'if you do not repent and change your way I shall strike you and banish you.' Whereupon Abraham said: 'Peace be upon you! I shall pray God to forgive you; for He has been very generous to me. And I shall withdraw from among you and from the idols you worship and shall worship God so that I may thereby avoid damnation.'[38]

He then considers a star which his people had worshipped and repudiates it as the Godhead because of its setting and disappearance. The moon and the sun which where also worshipped he dismisses as inconstant, becoming and fading away in their course and therefore as unfit guides for man. After these arguments, he reasserts his faith in one God, 'Originator of the heavens and of the earth,' declares himself 'a man of pure faith,' 'not one of the idolators' but 'guided by God' and 'undaunted by that which you (his relatives) associate with God.'[39] Here Abraham asserts his faith straightforwardly and is not afraid of the opposition of his kinsfolk. The enmity that this stand caused is eloquently described in Surah 60 and its effect is the separation of Abraham from his people.[40]

Such rebellion of the son against his father and relatives was too harsh a fate to befall Abraham, though his cause is the greatest of all causes, *viz.*, God-worship against idolatry. It is absurd that God commanded such rebellion without justification; and it is inhuman that, according to these scriptures, Abraham took off and departed[41] without a single emotion of love or compassion for the people he left behind ever stirring within him. On these matters scriptural narrative is significantly silent. And it is here that the *Qur'an* teaches a lesson that cannot be gainsaid. Abraham had prayed for his father, and had asked pardon for him.[42] He explained his harsh fate lovingly to his father by juxtaposing filial duty against the duty to God.[43] Both are great values which ought to be realized, as indeed Abraham had been trying to do hitherto. But when they conflict, and in that case alone, there can be no doubt as to which Abraham should choose. But even in this case, Abraham prayed for pardon for himself and the idolaters. He prayed that God may grant that his case not be taken by the idolaters as cause for further dissension and strife.[44] Even so he hoped his separation from his people would be

temporary, 'until you believe in God alone.' When this grace would come down upon Ur, and his people would recognize the One God, he would return to his homeland. The parallel with Jesus' prayer for his enemies and Muhammad's Hijrah (emigration) to Medinah is striking. The Prophet Muhammad nursed for his native pagan Mecca, despite the persecution it meted out to him, the strongest love and an overpowering concern for its salvation. This points to an incontrovertible fact—that Abraham was ethical as well as monotheistic. The significance of the *Pentateuch's* silence is that, for the Hebrew mind, ethicality is never implied in monotheism because of the universalism moral judgement must always entail. Without its separation from universalism, monotheism could not possibly constitute the grounds necessary for the separatism of the Hebrews from mankind, for the exclusivism essential for Hebrew consciousness and existence.

About three millennia after Abraham's emigration and undoubtedly under the influence of the *Qur'an*, Rabbi Solomon ben Isaac (alias Rashi, died 1105 A.D.) gave in his commentary on the *Pentateuch* an inkling of that which the rabbis of the synagogue who elaborated the *Midrash* did not know concerning Abraham's exodus from Ur. He wrote: 'In this land of idol worship thou are not worthy to rear sons to the service of God.'[45]

In the notes appended to Genesis, J. H. Hertz gave a longer statement about the circumstances that led to Abraham's emigration from his native town of Ur. The redaction is supposedly Hertz's; the content is supposedly derived from 'many a beautiful legend,' and the *Midrash*. The narrator at one place is referred to as 'the Rabbis.' The *Midrash Rabbah*, which is the most important *Midrash*, does not contain, to my knowledge, any part of the narrative there mentioned. The *Talmud* is as silent about Abraham's exodus as the *Pentateuch*. To all other standard *Midrashim* the circumstances of Abraham's life in his native city are completely unknown except the *Midrash Hagadol*, a peculiar compilation of many *Midrashim* discovered at the end of the nineteenth century in Yemen. The compiler is unknown and he has given no reference whatever to his sources. However, the work could not have been done earlier than the thirteenth century, since it includes works by Rashi (d. 1105), Abraham Ibn Ezra (d. 1167), and Maimonides (d. 1204). Besides the story of Abraham, the *Midrash Hagadol* contains 'in many instances ... legends and expositions ... very similar to those recorded in Muhamdan sources.'[46] Although not found in the standard *Midrashim*, most of the narratives of J. H. Hertz in *Pentateuch and Haftorahs* and many more are to be found in *The Legends of the Jews*.[47]

Besides the *Midrash Hagadol* source, *The Legends* draw these stories of

Abraham's life in Ur from a piece of apocryphal literature known as the *Apocalypse of Abraham*, claimed to belong to the first century A.D. and hence, regarded as 'falling within the Talmudic period.'[48] The facts, however, are different. The oldest manuscript of this work, known as 'Codex Sylvester,' after a priest in the reign of Ivan the Terrible, was described as early as 1860 A.D. by Screznevsky, in his *Narratives About the Saints Boris and Gleb*.[49] It was translated from the Slavonic by G. H. Box and published by the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, London, in 1919. Further to this, Box tells us that the *Codex Sylvester* is a translation from a Greek document which was current in Constantinople and which a Russian priest must have picked up on his way to Jerusalem for pilgrimage during the first half of the fourteenth century and brought home to his monastery where it remained as a prized possession. The claim, however, that this *Codex* was originally written in Hebrew or Aramaic between the years 70 to 100 A.D. has not been substantiated. All the arguments advanced on behalf of this claim[50] boil down to the position that a book by the same name has been known to early Christian writers like Epiphanius, and Jewish writers like Philo. This may indeed be true, but it far from establishes that the *Codex Sylvester* is identically the book which was known to these early writers. Indeed, G. H. Box, who holds that the work belongs to the Talmudic period, tells us that Schurer and M. R. James have even advanced positive arguments to the contrary.[51] Box, however, neither quotes nor refutes these arguments. He does not produce any conclusive evidence in support of his thesis. Unfortunately, no final solution of this question is possible because none of the early writers to whom the *Apocalypse of Abraham* has been known quote it directly, and hence, no attestation of sources can be made.

The other source from which the material of *The Legends of the Jews* has been drawn is the *Ma'ase Abraham*. This book is apparently a part of 'the *Sefer Maasoth* (Book of Stories) of Nissim of Kairawan (11th century), (which is) the earliest book composed to entertain and instruct the people,' writes A. I. Shinedling in the *Universal Jewish Encyclopedia*. It contains a number of stories from the *Haggadah* and from Arabic sources which were widely read in the Middle Ages. During the twelth century, numerous books of popular tales and legends appeared. The Hebrew translation of the Hindu Bidpai fables, under the Arabic name *Kalliah wa Dimnah*, was published in Hebrew with its Arabic title intact. The *Universal Jewish Encyclopedia* lists eight *Ma'ase* books, but that of Abraham is not even mentioned.

All this points to, but does not prove, that *The Legends* have drawn their material from sources which cannot be accepted as Hebraic, *i.e.*,

first century A.D. or earlier. A close examination of the texts of these legends, however, furnishes incontestable evidence that *The Legends* have drawn their material from Arabic Muslim sources. Jellinek[52] and Von Grunebaum[53] have already pointed out that *Ma'ase Abraham* is a translation from the Arabic and have drawn attention to many Arabisms such as *Qala al Qa'il* which were literally translated as *Amer Hamagid.* To this list may be added the following dialogue of Abraham and the Angel Gabriel, which betrays unmistakable Islamic form as well as content:

> *'The Angel Gabriel approached him (Abraham) and met him with the greeting, "Peace be with thee", and Abraham returned, "With thee be peace," and asked, "Who art thou?" And Gabriel answered and said, "I am the Angel Gabriel, the Messenger of God," and led Abraham to a spring of water near by and Abraham washed his face and his hands and feet, and he prayed to God, bowing down and prostrating himself.'*[54]

Shapira has published an Arabic text by Qob al Ahbar and claimed him to be the author of *Ma'ase Abraham.*[55] Besides this, there is conclusive evidence, as eloquent as its idea is entertaining, that *The Legends* have borrowed Qur'anic material. Not only do the narratives betray a striking resemblance to the *Qur'an,* but in many instances they have reproduced it word for word and followed its interrogative or exclamatory rhetoric style faithfully.[56]

IV. THE COVENANT WITH ALL FLESH

Following the call of Abraham, the *Pentateuch* lists many blessings and reassurances which God promised to bestow upon him.[57] That among these are land and children is commonplace for the Arab mind. Land and children in the Near East have always been, and still are, the most highly prized possessions. It is natural that God reward Abraham, who has served Him well, with that which he values most. It is natural that Abraham would yearn for and expect such reward for his devoted worship and fidelity, especially since he had broken all relations with his people and was contemplating a migration into the unknown. For that is precisely God's covenant with Abraham which the latter diligently kept at the cost of great sacrifice, namely, that if he worshiped the One God, God would not forsake, but guide and protect him, and bless him with goods and joys. It is identically the same command which characterizes ethical consciousness throughout history. If man believes in God, enjoins the good and forbids evil, God will bestow upon him His blessings, moral

and material. Essentially, and purely in ethical terms, the covenant is the Arab way of stating the fundamental fact of all ethical consciousness, namely, that virtue leads to, or equals, happiness.

The *Pentateuch*, however, does not understand this to be the covenant God made with Abraham. Having left out any explanation of Abraham's exodus from Ur, it regards the blessings as granted by fiat. The *Pentateuch* does not mention any reason why God directed such a fateful command to Abraham. According to these scriptures, therefore, God's choice of Abraham to receive all these blessings is arbitrary. Hence, the Hebrews of history have regarded the statement 'as for me, behold, my covenant is with thee,'[58] and what follows thereafter in Chapter 17 of Genesis, not as the consequent of a conditional, that is God's part of the covenant, 'not a compact between God and the Patriarch, but a statement of the plans which He had designed for Abraham and his descendants.'[59] Thus, the blessings and joys are not the reward of virtue. They are not even gifts showered 'at pleasure;' for this 'pleasure' presupposes valuational grounds the realization of which is the cause of evoking it. The gifts and blessings are granted absolutely by fiat. God wanted to give them for no reason, no ethical reason. He merely 'planned' that the Hebrews become the recipient of His blessings; and nothing that they did or could do could induce Him to alter His plan. Even if an ethical connection did exist between God and the Hebrews, that connection is not 'the covenant'. For this is grounded in some irrational, unintelligible relation of 'His' people to 'their' God.

In order to extricate the Hebrew view of the Abrahamic covenant from the accusation of violating the moral law which demands that divine blessings be earned rather than arbitrarily dispensed, it has been argued[60] that the one-directional form of that covenant was not unique but that it was the common form of many international treaties or covenants concluded between the peoples of the Near East at that early period. It was observed that like the Abrahamic covenant, the suzerainty treaties between the Hittite kings and their vassals were unilateral,[61] and included a preamble announcing the name of the king, a historical prologue recounting the events which brought the vassal into relation with the king, stipulations or obligations of the vassal, a provision for safe-keeping and periodic public reading of the treaty, a list of witnesses and a concluding formula of curses and blessings.[62] This may well be true, but it constitutes no comparability relevant to our issue. However, the resemblance of this Hittite treaty-form to the Decalogue is striking, but the Decalogue is not the covenant. The Decalogue may, by itself, constitute a covenant of a different order. But it is not *the Covenant* which has incepted Hebrew being. The Abrahamic covenant, on the other hand, is

that covenant; and in it, the unilateral relation runs from God to man, not vice versa. God made the stipulations to Abraham and these are binding on Him alone. Upon Abraham, on the other hand, the covenant lays no obligation. It was this covenant, not the Decalogue, which was renewed to Isaac and Jacob, to Moses, Joshua and the prophets after them, though it is quite possible that Moses and Joshua entered into other covenants besides. It must be remembered that the Abrahamic covenant is the first and primordial one from which all other covenants proceed.[63] Whatever the nature of the post-Abrahamic covenants, they all depend upon the covenant of Abraham, which is their final justification and ground. It is opportune here to repeat that it was an already-constituted Hebrew being that stood at Sinai,[64] not merely a human society, however organized,[65] and that it was Abraham's covenant which constituted that being. Just as the Hebrews as a whole invoked the Abrahamic covenant to appease an accusing conscience whenever they departed from the Mosaic covenant (*i.e.*, violated the moral law), their kings, following the original example of David, recoursed to an Abrahamic, *ad hoc* covenant with God[66] in order to establish an indisputable, divinely ordained royal right to power. Finally, Pauline Christianity, anxious to use and, therefore, to preserve both the Abrahamic and the Mosaic covenants for the benefit of the new community, transvalued Yahweh's arbitrary 'desire'[67] in the Abrahamic covenant into 'mercy.' By mercy, it asserted, God has already forgiven and will always forgive all and every human sin and misdemeanour. In order to maintain the Abrahamic absoluteness, it had to make God's mercy just as arbitrary as Yahweh's 'desire'. Indeed it made mercy the very essence and nature of the Godhead. In both cases, the compromise to the moral law is equally disastrous to man's moral life.

The covenant God supposedly entered into with Abraham is that which is stated in Verse 9 of Chapter 17 of Genesis: 'This is my covenant which ye shall keep, between you and me and thy seed after thee; Every man child among you shall be circumcised.' The part of the covenant which falls upon Abraham is, according to the Jews, circumcision.[68] But circumcision is not virtue nor is it in any way related to the ethical. It is categorial and like everything categorial, it may or may not become valuable, depending on its instrumentality to something good or valuable in itself. Circumcision, as such, does not imply any intrinsic good and therefore cannot in itself be either good or virtuous. To avoid this embarrassment, it is referred to as 'the rite of the covenant,'[69] a 'token', or 'symbol' of 'the consecration of the Children of Abraham to the God of Abraham, just as the rainbow was the token of the covenant with Noah.'[70] It is immaterial that other nations practiced circumcision before the Hebrews. Whatever the origin of the practice, henceforth, it is to be regarded as the

distinctive Hebrew mark.[71] It is hard to understand why it has commanded such devotion on the part of the Jews in history. A so-called 'token of consecration of one's life to God' cannot be deemed more valuable than life so that many Jews would rather perish than forego it. At any rate, a token cannot be more valuable, nor even as valuable, as that of which it is the token—namely, the consecration of life to God.

Instead of spelling out the meaning of this consecration, the *Pentateuch* goes on to say, 'my covenant shall be in your flesh for an everlasting covenant',[72] thus raising the value of a token beyond the instrumental and investing it with intrinsic value. The token has become flesh, itself a covenant on a par with that of which it is the token. Otherwise, the following verse[73]—namely, that whoever is not circumcised in the flesh shall be excommunicated and cut off from his people—cannot ever be justified. It is the proof that the token has stopped being a token, that it has become a means of separating the Hebrews from the rest of mankind, supposedly, uncircumcised. The distinction or separateness of the Hebrew from mankind is something understandably worthy for a Hebrew to die for. And Spinoza came quite to the point when he said: 'Such great importance do I attach to the sign of the covenant that I am persuaded that it is sufficient by itself to maintain the separate existence of the nation forever.'[74]

V. THE 'COVENANT IN THE FLESH' AS FOUNDATION OF HEBREW SEPARATISM

That circumcision is not a token—at least that it was not so understood by the Patriarchs themselves or by the writers of the Pentateuchal 'J' material—but a means of setting the Hebrews apart from mankind is corroborated by the encounter of the Hebrews with the Shechemites. Chapter 33 of Genesis tells how Jacob had migrated from the South and pitched his tent in front of the city of Shalem, a suburb of Shechem, on a piece of land which Hamor, King of Shechem, had agreed to sell him for a hundred coins.[75] Chapter 34 goes on with the well-known story that the prince of Shechem had met Jacob's daughter, Dinah, at a party of Shechemite women whom Dinah had come to visit, fell in love with and ravished the maid.[76] It takes care to clear up a very important point: What took place was no rape, but a simple case of love between two young souls.[77] It takes both forceful ravishment and rejection to constitute rape. Dinah, however, was ravished with her consent and was taken to the Shechemite home as wife in full standing. Her case was actually only an elopement which, according to Shechemite as well as Hebrew law deserved

no capital punishment, and was reparable by goods or money,[78] which the prince was willing to give in any measure. When, after the incident, Hamor went to Jacob to ask for the hand of Dinah, he candidly reported the truth: 'The soul of my son Shechem longeth for your daughter. I pray you give her him to wife.'[79]

Here was a king of a whole region whose heir had fallen in love with the daughter of a nomad shepherd whom he suffered to live on his land for a mean price. His was an established, prosperous, happy little kingdom. Jacob's lot, on the other hand, was that of an uprooted nomad with little or no retinue, a few heads of cattle and a few pieces of silver to pay for his occupancy of a little land outside the gates of the city. But the king was so open-hearted and had such faith in the brotherhood of all men that he not only agreed to his son's betrothal to the foreign, rootless girl but went all the way to Jacob to deliver what is and remains a classic in the literature of human brotherhood:

> '... *And make ye marriages with us, and give your daughters unto us, and take our daughters unto you. And ye shall dwell with us, and the land shall be before you; dwell and trade ye therein, and get your possessions therein. And Shechem (the prince) said unto her (Dinah's) father and unto her brethren, Let me find grace in your eyes, and what ye shall say unto me I will give. Ask me never so much dowry or gift, and I will give according as ye shall say unto me: but give me the damsel to wife.*'[80]

Such an attitude would be taken by all mankind as challenging and disarming at the same time. How many could rise up as high as the Shechemites in the matter of brotherly love and cooperation? The Shechemite offer of fraternization was something nobody could have rejected—except the Hebrews! But even the Hebrews were sufficiently embarrassed and could not give an outright 'no' for an answer, however in their hearts they meant to reject their hosts. Therefore they recoursed to deception.[81] 'We cannot do this thing,' they told their hosts, 'to give our sister to one that is uncircumcised'[82] and advised that if the Shechemites would consent to become circumcised and be 'as we be' and 'become one people,' they would then consent to give their daughter in marriage.[83]

True in word as well as in deed, Hamor and Shechem were pleased to hear this[84] and immediately set forth to convince their countrymen that the Hebrews were 'peaceable' with them, that they ought to 'let them dwell in the land and trade therein; for the land, behold, it is large enough for them;' that they should intermarry and fraternize with them and that the price they, as hosts, had to pay to make their hospitality acceptable to the strangers was *only* circumcision.[85] With circumcision they 'will

become one people' with the Hebrews. And beginning with themselves, the king and prince had every male in the realm circumcised. It was no more a case of hospitality or fraternization. The Shechemites were willing, and actually started, to become one with the Hebrews, to lose whatever identity they had and become Hebrews. It would seem as if this were a golden opportunity for the Hebrews to find the lands and settlement they had sought ever since Abraham left Ur. Everywhere they had gone hitherto, they had been tolerated but for a short while. They had wandered all the way to Egypt and were in the middle of the return trip; they were suffered to tarry here or there, but then were pressed to move on, unable to take root at any place. In Shechem they found the ideal ground any nomad, any uprooted refugee could hope for.

Three days later, 'when they (the Shechemites) were sore,' the sons of Jacob 'came upon the city boldly, and slew all the males. And they slew Hamor and Shechem his son with the edge of the sword, and took Dinah out of Shechem's house, and went out. The sons of Jacob came upon the slain, and spoiled the city... They took their sheep, and their oxen, and their asses and that which was in the field. And all their wealth, and all their little ones, and their wives took they captive and spoiled even all that was in the house.'[86]

In other words, the Hebrews had full time to consider and reconsider what they were about to do. As the *Pentateuch* itself says, they deceived Hamor and Shechem; they not only slew their hosts who wanted to identify themselves with them but 'spoiled even all that was in the house.'

The Patriarch's conscience was not bothered in the least by the crime of his sons and men under his command. Significantly, the *Pentateuch* makes him question the value of the crime just perpetrated only after it was all done and over and only with regard to his own security against possible retaliation by the surrounding countryside. 'Ye have troubled me,' he addressed his sons, 'to make me stink among the inhabitants of the land, among the Canaanites and the Perizzites: and I being few in number, they shall gather themselves together against me and slay me: and I shall be destroyed I and my house.'[87] Is it possible that the old man knew that murder makes one stink? What place did he assign to the Lord's call to Noah, his ancestor, to '... the Covenant which I have established between me and all flesh that is upon the earth?'[88] What was wrong with the Shechemites? Why was their offer to become Hebrews rejected? Why, when they gave substance and reality to their will to identification, by circumcising themselves, did they deserve, in Hebrew eyes, to be put to the sword and spoiled? What was their crime?

The *Pentateuch* truthfully reports that the justification the sons of Jacob gave of their deed, namely, 'because they had defiled their sister'[89]

and 'should he deal with our sister as with a harlot?'[90] was sheer rationalization. It accomplishes this refutation of their justification artfully by merely mentioning it in closing the chapter, and thus allowing it to stand alone, without the slightest comment, juxtaposed against all the unanswerable evidence that went before, as if it expected of the reader to entertain no opinion other than that this was certainly not what the Hebrews really regarded Shechem's crime to be.

That Shechem's case was not a rape was certain. Had this matter been their grievance, it would have been raised in the meeting of Hamor and Jacob, and the *Pentateuch* would have mentioned it. Nor can the Shechemites be accused of deceiving the Hebrews. For they stood firmly behind their words and transformed them into deeds the self-same day. Furthermore, the Shechemites must, by Hebrew standards, have been deemed good and honest people; otherwise, the Hebrews would not have dwelt in their midst and purchased their land as if they wanted there to establish permanent residence.

Had the Shechemites merely pretended to fraternize with the Hebrews, it would have remained possible for the latter to separate themselves from them. Had the Shechemites' fraternization not gone beyond the spoken word, the displayed attitude and the social intercourse, the Hebrews would have maintained the separate, though friendly, existence they desired *vis a vis* the Shechemites. By circumcising themselves, these had committed the crime, hideous in Hebrew eyes, of making themselves identifiable with the Hebrews, and thereby putting an end to Hebrew separateness. Their crime was directed against the highest Hebrew conciousness, the deepest Hebrew instinct, to maintain themselves a closed society, separate, unique and distinguishable from all mankind. Since the Shechemites, like the Hebrews, have taken to the rite of Abraham's covenant, 'a covenant which is in the flesh,' Hebrew separate identity could no more be established or maintained. In those days, there was little else besides the acknowledgement of the Hebrew god and circumcision that could be called Hebrew religion or tradition. The *Pentateuch* gives nothing more as constitutive of, or associated with, the Hebrews' primitive religion. Let us remember that Abraham was a Babylonian who rejected the Babylonian in favour of a new religion which he had founded and a handful of Babylonians had accepted among whom even his father was not to be counted. Jacob and his people were the second generation of Jews. They have hardly had time to develop any tradition. They were constantly on the move, leading a nomadic and unsettled life. They were at odds with practically everyone everywhere. They could hardly request from the Shechemites any more than these had offered and the Hebrews had, according to the *Pentateuch*, required and accepted

as satisfactory[91]—namely, 'if ye will be as we be, that every male of you be circumcised then we will give our daughters unto you and we will become one people.'[92] It may not be argued that the Hebrews feared that the entry of such great numbers of people into their ranks without proper instructions and education might have endangered the unity of their religion and tradition.[93] Abraham and Jacob had previously accepted non-Jews[94] into their ranks, who could not have offered more than the Shechemites. And these new converts were landless and poor, unlike the Shechemites, whose entrance would at once transform the helpless nomads into a kingdom with domain, land and a royal court. Besides, to want to enter a religion prematurely without adequate instruction would hardly constitute a crime punishable by death. On the contrary, it is to be encouraged as Muhammad, 'Umar, and Abu Bakr encouraged the people around them—even the far-off foreigners like the Persians and Byzantines—offering them intensified instruction, and delegating bodies of teachers to teach the new converts the rudiments of the faith. The only reason why the Shechemites were refused was their threat to Hebrew separateness. The Shechemites sought to join the ranks of the Hebrews not because they appreciated or understood Hebrew separatism. They had absolutely no idea of such a thing. They regarded the Hebrews simply as other fellow-beings, as one of the countless number of nomadic groups which had passed by. As fellow-beings, they were willing to incorporate them in their land and kingdom and adopt their god and circumcision. The decision to join was not merely that of the prince-in-love and his father. The whole kingdom gave the decision their wholehearted unanimous support.[95] Indeed, no more proof of their support and welcome for the decision is needed than the fact that they submitted themselves unreservedly to circumcision the same day. In their decision, the Shechemites gave full evidence of their tolerance, of their humaneness, of a universalism which regards all men as brothers. Their merit appears all the greater when we consider that they attained this view without the benefit of monotheism, of the idea of a One God that is Lord of all men. Their ethical universalism stood, as it were, on its own grounds, without the prop of either a theology or a metaphysic.

And yet, precisely here lay their crime in Hebrew eyes. Joining Hebrew society with such universalist spirit was a danger whose future effect might well be the destruction of Hebrew separateness. The Shechemites would accept all and everyone who wished to join and that would be the end of 'the Chosen People.' Moreover, the Shechemites were in the majority, established and powerful, and would not find it difficult to put future decisions into effect that might dissolve the Hebrews in the body of humanity, or at least, annihilate their separateness. It was not

therefore so much the actual entrance of the Shechemites into Judaism that was objectionable as their entrance on the ground and for the reason for which they did. It was their universalism, however naively and innocently it expressed itself.

No matter from which angle this story is viewed, its evidence remains incontestable that the Hebrews slew the Shechemites because the latter had actually converted themselves into Hebrews by circumcising themselves 'in the flesh' and had made themselves indistinguishable from the Hebrews. Shechemite action broke down Hebrew separatism. Shechemite self-Hebraicization was the greatest sin that could be perpetrated against racialist separatism. In Hebrew eyes it was an affront and a danger deserving, and answerable only with, absolute annihilation. The spoiling of the slain Shechemites, however, answers a Hebraic need other than the defence of 'the Chosen People' racialist separatism.[96]

It is not difficult, therefore, to see why, apart from exceedingly few and scattered instances, the Jews have never had a missionary movement among them, and have, down to the present day, always discouraged the candidate-convert from taking the final step. The new convert must have this 'separateness' in his veins and kneaded into his bones; he must already be an outcast among mankind, nursing toward mankind the strongest feelings of hatred and superiority. Above all, he must already feel himself 'other than' mankind. Only then does he qualify to enter the Jewish association. The innocent Shechemites who were slain in cold blood did not, and from the very nature of the case could not, qualify. Their crime was not that they were *goyim*, non-Jews unfit to join the ranks, but that, having taken Jacob and his sons' words in earnest, they circumcised themselves, instituted Jewishness in their own flesh, thereby rendering the Jews in fact indistinguishable from them.

In murdering the Shechemites, the Hebrews proved themselves incapable of understanding the ethical implication of their professed monotheism. The One God, Fashioner of man in His own image, by the worship of Whom they allegedly distinguished themselves from mankind, and Who is the Lord of all, is unthinkable without the brotherhood of all man. *Ex hypothesi*, all men, regardless of race, colour or creed, are His children, created by His hand and in His image. How can they not be brothers mutually obliged to love and assist, rather than reject and slay one another? The monotheistic message may have come down to the Hebrews first and the Hebrews may be eternally proud of this achievement. But the content of this message which is essentially ethical in character they missed from the beginning. Attaching themselves to the fact that the message came to them and not to anyone else, they built over it an ideology of separateness, whereas the inner content of the

message was the exact opposite—namely, the togetherness of mankind. Their ideology is built upon what is outside of, or accidental to the message, rather than on its content and essence. Associated with their denial of the universalistic ethical ideal of human brotherhood, the Hebrews' monotheistic assertion of the One God, Lord of all, becomes empty and vain. To believe in God and not to do or bid the good, and avoid or forbid evil, cannot ever satisfy God's covenant. The Hebrews who allegedly were the first to receive that covenant, were the first to violate it. Their outward tenacity to the truth of monotheism throughout the ages is counter-balanced by their perpetual violation of its ethical content.

VI. JUDAIC MONOTHEISM, AS ARAB UNIVERSALISM, IN REACTION AGAINST HEBREW SEPARATISM

A much more popular theory, though much more removed from the truth, is that the origin of Hebrew separatism should be sought in their monotheism. The fact that it is professedly the sole factor that had originally set them apart from the rest of Semitic stock tends to draw the investigator in that direction. It is doubtful whether it can ever be ascertained that monotheism came before separatism, since either we find separatism wherever we have record of any Hebrew history, or we find ourselves compelled by the subsequent facts of history to postulate it in the period of which we have no records. Therefore there is no apparent reason to assume that monotheism may have been the cause of separatism. But right here, may we not carry our analysis a step further. If we bear in mind that in the case of the earliest Hebrews monotheism was separated from the ethical universalism to which we find it inseparably linked in the founders of Christianity and Islam, a whole new realm of insights is opened before us in which, as separatists, the Hebrews stand divorced from all genuine monotheism.

Separatism casts a sombre question mark upon monotheism. Among the separatist, isolationist, proud Hebrews whence monotheism arose, it is not possible to assume that a human awakening, an extension and deepening of consciousness and a heightening of vision such as are requisite for the breakthrough to monotheism were all possible without awareness of the equality and brotherhood of man—that is, without ethical universalism. The man who is devoid of such awareness is not the man likely to achieve the discovery of monotheism. Such a man has, *ex hypothesi*, a heart hardened and a vision obscured by the absence of the love of man and concern for his welfare. *Per contra*, the person who is

already a universalist in thought and feeling, and who is fighting the separatism and false pride of his people to save them from its iniquities, is ready to receive the monotheistic truth that God is the Lord and Master of these humans whom he regards as brothers to himself and to one another. God would find such a person ready to receive His revelation. Indeed, once ethical universalism is there, monotheism would likely follow, for the ethical purport of the universalist is like a taut bow, ready for the monotheistic arrow. The two are facets—the ethical and the theological—of the same truth of human consciousness, of the same fact of the cosmic station of man.

As far as man knows, the Hebrews have always been separatists. Assuming that they were separatists at the time when they were pagans, the advent of monotheism as a discovery, by a Hebrew or a non-Hebrew, becomes conceivable as a challenge to that very separatism. The monotheistic thesis, with the full ethical universalism which it implies, becomes under this light a divine call of the Hebrews to ethicality, a covenant based upon their acceptance of, and affirmative response to, that call. 'If you believe in God as Lord of all and, therefore, if you abandon your separatism,' God might have appeared as saying, 'I shall send my blessings unto you.' From the religious standpoint this makes perfect sense, since no God could look upon separatism except as evil; no God would wish to see Himself but preached to and recognized by the largest humanity. Politically, no society could regard separatism except as an abomination of which it is worthy and profitable to get rid. Such a covenant would have been in the background of all subsequent Hebrew developments, from the exodus of Abraham down to the present day. It would have dictated and inspired all the pronouncements of the prophets.

In the main, this ethico-monotheistic demand fell on deaf ears. The Hebrews have not only never risen to a full realization of the ethical content, but have persisted in fostering and succeeded in developing separatism to even deeper and more chronic degrees. Indeed, they have transformed monotheism so as to make it serve the opposite of its very purpose.[97]

This insight affects the whole meaning of Jewish history. Whereas hitherto the Hebrews have been represented as a people who had discovered monotheism, or whom God had chosen and blessed with monotheism, and who on that account, had distinguished themselves from the idolatrous Semites and the rest of mankind, according to this view the very opposite must have been the case. The divine call and monotheism have come to the Hebrews because they were separatists, already involved in the immoral commitments of the

'Chosen People' complex. The purpose of this divine call was their salvation, their return to a consciousness of human brotherhood rather than separation. Rather than being an object of credit and desert, monotheism was their persistent challenge and its ministers were the anonymous monotheists, the hanifs, who arrived to faith in God and observed His law without the benefit of the Prophethood of either Jesus or Muhammad. Hebrew separatism was precisely that which stimulated and aroused the hanifs to monotheism. These men were misrepresented by later Hebrews as prophets preaching Hebrew chosenness and separatism, thus involving them in the inexorable illogic of preaching God and separatism at the same time. Their genuine utterances were falsified or added to where necessary in order to harmonize with separatism.[98] But the truth is that these ethically-minded monotheists were the challengers of the Hebrews, who sought to wean them away from the deity of the tribe to the only-God-of-all. Known or anonymous, they are venerated by Arab tradition as men of exceptional moral and religious character who, because of their pre-Christian, pre-Islamic advent, deserve more credit for their superior ethical and religious vision than those for whom Jesus and Muhammad had paved the straight path.

Under this reversed order of the appearance of separatism and monotheism, the latter did not have to be revealed or discovered divorced from its concomitant, *viz.*, ethical universalism—which is a barren and unfounded opinion. Rather, monotheism was revealed to, or discovered by, the more sensitive moral sence in a situation which flagrantly violated the ethical content of monotheism. The advent of monotheism was prompted precisely because its ethical content had been violated. Its whole thrust was directed against Hebrew separatism. The hanif monotheists sought to save the Hebrews by making them ethical in mind and deed.

In Hebrew consciousness, however, monotheism is unimportant because it is not the cause of the election. As we have seen earlier, God's election of Abraham is understood as arbitrary, devoid of grounds, whether religious or moral. The Hebrew mind, and the Western Christian mind after it, are content with the Pentateuchal representation of Abraham and of the Hebrews as pagans, carrying with them wherever they went 'the images that were her (Rachel's) father's', 'the gods,'[99] or the one god Shaddai who was their exclusive private property. It is a commonplace fact in Hebrew and Western scholarship, that as the Old Testament portrays them, the pre-Mosaic Hebrews, the Patriarchs and their people, were not monotheists at all although they worshipped the god Shaddai. Shaddai was indeed *their* god, conceived as a tribal deity belonging exclusively to them. He was their relative and they were his brothers,

uncles, nephews, cousins and kinsmen.[100] No such relation with him was possible for any person that did not 'belong' to their order. Although the Hebrew gods were different from those of their ancestors in Padan-Aram,[101] they were nonetheless gods selected anew by each successive generation of worshippers.[102] 'The principal deity of the pre-Mosaic Hebrews', Albright concludes, under the evidence of Hebrew, Egyptian and Assyrian names of the Patriarchal deity, 'was a mountain god, ... invested with mountain imagery,' and related to his worshippers in a blood, clan relationship.[10] The Pentateuch concept of God, *viz.*, *elohim*, is the same as that of the spirit of the departed ancestors[104] whose cult the Hebrews practiced even as late as the time of Isaiah,[105] as the Old Testament itself relates

Granted that the pre-Mosaic Hebrews were not monotheists at all, it is claimed that Moses was the first Hebrew monotheist, and that after him monotheism was permanently established among the Hebrews. We do not deny that Moses was, in reality, a monotheist. Indeed, he was one of the foremost prophets of God. But the real Moses and the Moses of the Pentateuch are two different persons. It is with the latter that we are here concerned.

Albright, who presented the strongest claim that the Moses of the Pentateuch was a monotheist, did well to warn his reader not to expect that Moses' views are 'specifically like those of Philo or Rabbi Aqiba, of St. Paul or St. Augustine, of Mohammed or Maimonides, of St. Thomas or Calvin.'[106] The monotheism of Moses is presumably different from that of any of these men. According to Albright, the Mosaic monotheist is one who 'teaches the existence of only one God, the creator of everything, the source of justice, who is equally powerful in Egypt, in the Desert, and in Palestine, who has no sexuality and no mythology, who is human in form but cannot be seen by human eye and cannot be represented in any form.'[107] Two questions immediately face us: Was the Pentateuch Moses a monotheist in Albright's sense? And is that sense adequate to deserve the name monotheist?

The Mosaic part of the Old Testament describes Jahweh in terms borrowed entirely from pagan worship. The parallel with Canaanite, Babylonian and Kenite gods is striking. Jahweh, the Books of Moses tell us, is 'a pillar of a cloud' by day and 'a pilar of fire' by night,[108] whose voice is thunder and whose words are lightning and fire.[109] He is a storm-god[110] and a man-of-war[111] who follows 'his' people from place to place and is carried hither and thither in a holy vehicle called 'the Ark.' By origin, he was a god of the northwestern corner of the Arabian Peninsula, worshipped by the non-Jewish, pre-Mosaic inhabitants of Judea and, perhaps, the Kenites and Midianities into whom Moses

married and who introduced him to Jahweh's cult. True, Jahweh became the god of the Hebrews as they came out of Egypt. The domain of this old Arabian god of southern Palestine extended as the political dominion of his followers did. Later, he became the god of the Hebrew amphictyony that invaded Palestine, while Samaria continued to have its own god long after the Mosaic conversion. Indeed, as the Old Testament relates, the conversion of Ephraim (Samaria, or the northern tribes) did not take place until David politically united the two realms, destroyed the temple at Bethel and established Jerusalem as the single capital. Only then did the Hebrew god become the single god of the Hebrews, and Jerusalem, his single abode.

Jahweh, then, was a Canaanite, pagan god whom the Hebrews, coming out of Egypt, borrowed from a corner of the Arab stream of being, along with his cult, the sacrificial system, the seasonal feasts, the calendar, the body of social customs and law, of tradition and folklore as well as the 'Hebrew' language which was anything but 'Hebrew.' This so-called 'Hebrew' language was spoken in Palestine long before the Hebrews ever set foot in the territory, as the letters of Tel el Amarna and the tables of Ugarit (Ras Shamra) clearly prove. The Hebrews that came out of Egypt were far less advanced than the Canaanites, the original inhabitants of Palestine. Hence, they borrowed from the latter all the elements constitutive of their culture. All the appurtenances of civilization were adopted by the nomadic Hebrews whose existence meant little besides shepherding and occasional plunder of the settled Canaanite peoples. So great was the borrowing and, therefore, so close the identification of the Hebrews with the Canaanites that the authors of Deuteronomy conceived of the Hebrews themselves as Canaanites. The Revised Standard Version called the Hebrews 'Arameans' and the King James version, 'Syrian.'[112] The 'God of the Hebrews' was certainly not the god of all or the creator of everything, as Albright affirms. There was a time when he was not even the god of all Hebrews. He was certainly and in every respect a human deity, of masculine gender, conceived as a person, and hence, necessarily as father, brother or uncle, never as mother, aunt, or anything devoid of gender. Albright also asserts that Jahweh is a monotheist god because he cannot be seen by human eye or represented in any form. But if he were really a transcendental god, he would not 'meet' with his creatures, wrestle with them by the hand, and seek to slaughter them as the Old Testament affirms.[113]

Granted that it was really Moses that issued (or conveyed) the so-called 'monotheistic' commandments,[114] it does not follow therefrom that Moses' religion was monotheism. All that we may infer from them is that Mosaic religion consisted, above all, in the worship of one single

deity. But this is monolatry, not monotheism.[115] Similarly, the famous '*shema*' of Deuteromony 6 (verse 4), to wit, 'Hear, O Israel, Jahweh our God, Jahweh is One'—can in no way be construed to imply monotheism without offence to logic. True, the '*shema*' does mean and does imply monolatry. Nonetheless, no interpretation can alter the fact that Mosaic religion did conceive of other peoples as having other gods *and* as having them *de jure*. Moses reported to the Hebrews that 'the Lord commanded (him) to teach' that 'The Lord thy God hath divided unto all nations under the whole heaven' the sun, moon and stars to worship.[116] The claim that although Moses had borrowed from the southern Canaanites their god, yet he transformed the pagan deity into the God of monotheism is utterly false. What Moses succeeded in doing was the nationalization of that deity and the binding together of a number of tribes by means of a covenant. The genius of Moses was his ability to secure the unity of the new nation by another covenant which he conceived between the nation and the deity and which was henceforth to become exclusively that nation's own. Again, this is in every respect monolatry, not monotheism.[117]

According to some authorities, the Hebrews reached to monotheism proper, not in Moses, the Deuteronomic reformers, and the early prophets but in Deutero Isaiah and Jeremiah.[118] T. Meek, for instance, argues that a process leading up to Isaian monotheism began with Hosea who sought to replace Baal, as fertility and production god, with Jahweh whom he called 'husband' (lit. *Ishi*),[119] while retaining whatever seemed to him proper of the Baal practices. To this Meek adds that the establishment of Jahweh's use of an alien people like the Assyrians and the Persians 'eventually led the prophets (presumably, Isaiah and Jeremiah) to see in Jahweh a god of the world, a god universal.'[120] The underrating of alien gods by the Hebrew prophets was gaining momentum until finally, 'to save Jahweh from the oblivion of his people the prophets had to liberate Jahweh from his people and make him the god of the world, who for his own beneficent purposes exalts now this people, now that people, to the end that all may know him and obey him ... This was theoretical monotheism,' exclaims Meek in a transport of emotion, 'which very quickly blossomed into the practical thoroughgoing monotheism of Jeremiah and Second Isaiah.'[121]

That there is a development between the earlier and later prophets cannot be denied. But the problem is one of ascertaining the nature of that development. Hosea, Joel, Amos, Obadiah, Micah, Nahum, Habakkuk, First Isaiah, Zephaniah—none of these anywhere denies the existence of other gods, nor even holds that Jahweh has an unchallengeable dominion throughout the world. These prophets were not interested in underrating the non-Hebrew gods, and this was due to the fact that, in

their view, the worldly lot of Israel was either fair or redeemable. As they saw him, their god was still powerful enough to care for 'his' people, to be effective in seeking his people's advantage. Their god was the reflection of their idea of themselves. But as the worldly fortunes of the Hebrews sank, their god became proportionately greater as the non-Hebrew gods became proportionately smaller. This process of denigrating the alien gods as resistance to them became gradually less possible is none other than resentment, pure and simple. It can never lead to monotheism, because the roots from which it springs are at the farthest possible remove from the monotheic. Its effect is not universalism, but omnipotence for the deity of the tribe—which is precisely what this prophetic development had achieved. Whereas in the older times, Jahweh's power was concentrated only against the particular people with whom 'his' elect came into conflict, now, as their enemies multiplied and the Hebrews were dispersed among many nations, Jahweh's power had to become omnipotence if he were still to save and bless his people as before. Isaiah's assertion that the rival gods are all worthless and inexistent[122] is resentment raised to hysterical pitch, at a moment when Hebrew destiny was at its lowest ebb. It was dictated by the internationalization of the Hebrew problem which constituted Isaiah's whole preoccupation—*viz.*, the liberation of the exiles, their return and rehabilitation in Palestine. The Hebrew assertion that the non-Hebrew gods are vain nonentities is simply the assertion of the prophet's unique faith in his people, in his deity, in the certainty of their victory over their enemies. It is merely the impotent's aggrandizement of his tribal deity achieved by the lessening of the other gods. This Hebrew prophetic development is not the product of an affirmative recognition of the One God, but of a defiance of foreign gods prompted by revengefulness and resentment against them for the humiliation they had visited upon the Hebrews.

The prophets' gradual denial first of power and then of existence to gods which have challenged and then vanquished the Hebrews is far from being monotheism. It is not even monolatry. Monotheism requires the affirmation that God is the God of all, not that the god of a certain tribe has a power that is irresistible to other deities and peoples. Moreover, monotheism must pronounce such affirmation from a knowledge of Him rather than from a confutation of the power of idols or from a disproof of their efficacy. Despite the fact that in Deutero Isaiah or Jeremiah Jahweh does assume universal powers and begins to use other nations to implement his purposes, he remains in his relation to the Hebrews not one whit different from Jacob's or Samuel's god. Their god is god of the Hebrews alone. The non-Hebrews fall within his power only as they become related to the Hebrews as friends, enemies or pawns in

the making of Hebrew history. Jahweh is not their god; they are within his power. He is never interested in them for their own sake, but always for the sake of 'his' people, the Hebrews. Isaiah's famous cry, 'Listen o Isles unto me; and hearken, ye people from far'[123] is not directed to the universe but to Israel. It is in the course of his address to Israel that he sends out the warning to the hostile universe, as what he has to say to Israel 'involves' or has to do with the gentile nations.

We may see then how far removed from the truth is Meek's assertion that Isaiah's or Jeremiah's Jahweh exalts the non-Hebrews 'for his own beneficent purposes.' Besides the purposes, political or worldly, of his people, neither Isaiah's god nor Jeremiah's has any purpose. Lest anyone like Meek or Albright ever misunderstand Jahweh's 'purpose' for the gentiles, Isaiah has given us express statement of this 'divine' purpose: 'Thus saith the Lord God, Behold I will lift up mine hand to the Gentiles, and set up my standard to the people: and they shall bring thy sons (*i.e.*, Israel's) in their arms, and thy daughters shall be carried upon their shoulders. And Kings shall be thy nursing fathers, and their queens thy nursing mothers: they shall bow down to thee with their face toward the earth, and lick up the dust of thy feet; and thou (*i.e.*, thou Israel! As to the genitles, what do they matter?) shalt know that I am the Lord.'[124] The identification of Hebrew purpose with God's 'own beneficent purpose' may be dictated by a peculiarly Western Christian view of God for which neither Isaiah nor Jeremiah furnish the slightest evidence. On the other hand, Meek's assertion that Jahweh exalts the non-Hebrews 'to the end that all may know him and obey him' is flatly contradicted by Isaiah himself. The truth is that Jahweh has acquired his omnipotence simply in order to avenge 'his' people, vanquish their enemies, and reestablish his 'chosen' in the land he had 'promised' them—indeed so that his people may 'set judgement in the earth: and the isles (RSV: coastlands) shall wait for his (*i.e.*, Israel's) law'[125]—so that the Hebrews may achieve absolute mastery in a world which exists solely and servilely to 'nurse' and 'carry' Hebrew sons and daughters around. Nowhere in Deutero Isaiah or in Jeremiah is there any evidence that Jahweh acts for anything 'beneficent' or 'universal.' Expressly, he tells Cyrus, his 'servant' and tool, that Cyrus's whole 'universal' destiny is merely to save Jahweh's people from exile and banishment and put an end to their suffering in Persia.[126] He assures his people that he cherishes them alone of all the nations, that he is their god alone,[127] and that the other nations are pawns which he uses for his people's benefit. 'I gave Egypt for thy ransom,' Isaiah asserts on behalf of God, 'Ethiopia and Seba for thee ... I have loved thee: therefore will I give men for (RSV: in return for) thee and people for thy life (RSV: peoples in exchange for your life).'[128]

From all this we may therefore safely conclude that the Hebrews' distinguishing characteristic was anything but monotheism. The overwhelming evidence is that they were separatists. Indeed, the Old Testament and other Rabbinic literature compel recognition of the fact that the Hebrews were not monotheists at all, although they contain many indictments of Hebrew separatism and idolatry which must be genuine pronouncements of genuine monotheists. But these are without exception persons who stand out from among the Hebrews to reproach and condemn their people's paganism, separatism, immorality and advocate monotheism and ethicality in the name of God and their ancestors who, by their pure monotheism, devoutness to God and obedience to His Law, have earned for them the peculiar place they occupy. To remind the Hebrews of God's covenant, of fulfilling their part of the contract, *i.e.*, their obligation to acknowledge and worship God and be ethical, was felt by every prophet of the time to be the Hebrews' greatest need. Every prophet addressed the Hebrews in such words as these: '... will ye steal, murder and commit adultery, and swear falsely, and burn incense unto Baal and walk after other gods whom ye know not ...?'[129] Amend your ways and doings, and I (God) will cause you to dwell in this place ... For if ye thoroughly amend your ways and your doings; if ye thoroughly execute judgement between a man and his neighbour: if ye oppress not the stranger, the fatherless, and the widow, and shed not innocent blood in this place, ... Then will I cause you to dwell ...'[130] What is peculiarly significant is the fact that the monotheist-ethical call is always on the lip of a person, never on that of the people as a whole to whom it always came as a reproach and challenge. The name 'monotheist' appropriately belongs to those persons alone, the hanifs, and only in respect of their indictment of the Hebrews. It does not apply to those sayings which, dictated by separatism, involve the prophets in the chosen people complex. Nor does monotheism apply, by whatever stretch of logic, to the Hebrews as a whole.

The peculiar significance of the Hebrews in the spiritual development of man is, according to these premises, that of an opponent who, by his persistent opposition, stimulates one, in the hope of meeting and surmounting this opposition, to higher and nobler planes of morality. Their moral station is that of a Mephistopheles *der stets das Böse will, und stets das Gute schaft*. Naturally, in order to appropriate the pronouncements and thought of the hanifs, whether they were Hebrews or gentiles, the Hebrews had to make them conform to their innate separatism. Starting with the case of Abraham, the Hebrews transformed the divine covenant, which is, as we have seen, none other than the ethical consciousness that 'virtue equals happiness,' universal and necessary in content and applica-

tion, into a particularist one-directional promise made by God towards one single member of the human kind in which God binds Himself, without asking any returns, to favour that member and his blood, racial descendants above His other children, above the nations of the world.[131] Allegedly God has done this in full awareness of that people's questionable record and character, that is to say, arbitrarily because the Jew is a Jew.[132] The God who said, 'ye shall have one manner of law, as well for the stranger as for one of your own country: for I am the Lord,'[133] and whose law is 'Breach for breach, eye for eye, tooth for tooth'[134] was now made to command: 'Unto a stranger thou mayest lend upon usury; but unto thy brother thou shalt not lend upon usury.'[135] The God of justice was now made to address His chosen people who neither served nor worshipped Him, who were neither pious nor righteous: 'Ask of me, and I will give thee the heathen for thine inheritance.'[136] The God who said, 'All the earth is mine,' who is its Creator and Lord, was now made to busy Himself with delineating the exact frontiers of a piece of real estate[137] that has no significance whatever in comparison to 'all the earth.'[138] The God of justice who ruled that a father should treat his children equally,[139] was now made to decree '... but my covenant will I establish with Isaac.'[140] Similarly the God who commanded mercy and protection to his 'brother' and the brother's property when he is 'not nigh,'[141] was now made to bless Jacob after he had literally swindled both his father-in-law and his brother of their property[142] and chased the latter out of the land.[143]

There is no doubt that the ethical universalism which the Arab spirit had discerned and sought to assert in this early period of its history was watered down considerably by the resistance movement that the Hebrews had put up to it. Unfortunately, the only records we have of that period is the so-called Old Testament which, ironically enough, upholds Hebrew separatism. Having passed through many separatist generations and hands, the Old Testament must have lost its original moral purity. Stories as well as commandments and laws must have been added or changed to make that book the interminable variation on the single theme of Hebrew chosenness we now have. The God who is the origin of all, Creator of the earth and of the heavens, of Adam and Eve from whom all mankind issued, was now consistently referred to as the god of Abraham, of Isaac, of Jacob, of the Jews, of Israel, never by his real title, God of all. The so-called God of monotheism was now made to exalt one segment of humanity over all, not for its ethical goodness, not in preparation for a universal task, but arbitrarily and for exclusive ends. He was now made to cover up for the sins of 'his' people, to destroy others for similar and identical sins, to gloat over sufferings he had inflicted upon his non-Hebrew

children for the purpose of enabling his Chosen People to murder, to spoil and to possess—such a god as the Old Testament describes is alleged to be the God of monotheism. In truth, such a god is a separatist, tribal, pagan, 'Jewish' god.

The God of monotheism is a God who desires to be known, loved and worshipped by all men, just as He is their creator and father. If all His children are ignorant of Him, He would seek ways and means of revealing Himself to the most promising among them. Once revealed, such a God would demand of His followers—since He made them such that all higher good, including His will, can be realized only through their conscious agency—to spread His name far and wide, to bring all mankind to Him, to construct the one family which is all humanity and of whom He is the father. If He were a devil of a god, he might whip up the enthusiasm and determination of his people to wipe out the rest of humanity, or subjugate and master it, or enslave and play with it, but he would never be content with any one portion of it. The 'God of Israel', *per contra*, is neither the one nor the other. He is obsessed with his people, with the nethermost detail of their daily chores. He watches their daily obscenities and sins without moving a hair. After a few pretentious overtures in the first pages of Genesis, he has spent all his time, energy and intelligence, while the rest of the cosmos rotted, to dispossess a wretched little people of their land, put them to the sword and enter 'his people' into possession of land and whatever tree, beast or child had escaped his 'wrath.' The truth is that this god has never travelled, has never seen the world, not to speak of making it. He is a 'country' man whose world ended with his tribe beyond which everything and everybody is equally foreign and equally an enemy. In short, he is a regional, tribal, separatist god with whom monotheism has absolutely nothing to do.

In vain have the Jews tried to bring this god back to the world. Having once 'nationalized' him, they caused him to work for their tribal welfare—which he did to the best of his ability. Their tribalist plan succeeded but their god was no more the same. Nobody other than his attendants could recognize him and he too could recognize no one. The efforts of Martin Buber in this matter deserve special mention.[144] Interpreting the story of Abraham as a command to establish a 'holy community in the promised land,' he explained the association of the Jews with Palestine as signifying a mission which cannot be realized except in 'the holy matrimony of land and people.'[145] On this basis, he saw in this connection of land and people 'a world-wide significance.'[146] 'The exceptional quality that is here added to the universal,' he wrote, 'makes it a unique category extending far beyond the frontier of national problems and touching the domain of the universally human, the cosmic, and even of

Being itself.'[147] It may be asked here how a particularly 'unrighteous and stiff-necked' people could be elected to perform a moral task at all; whether the moral task assignable to such people could be anything other than that of a tempting Mephistopheles; how the highly particularized spot of earth could have universal significance; why moral mission could be assigned to a model community when it is utterly closed to those who do not already belong thereto, and has well-defined boundaries beyond which it may not go. Compared with Jesus' and Muhammad's admonition to their followers to go out, convey the message and reeducate mankind, how could a God-of-all restrict His mission by joining it inseparably to the political and material welfare of the smallest segment of humanity? Is not the suspicion correct that this god has compromised his universality in favour of 'his people' towards whom he carries a bias against which he struggles in vain? Is it not vain to hide this prejudice, though divine? Is it not a mockery of man, God and cosmos to attribute to an ethically mean, though divine, prejudice, significance in the domain of 'the universally human, the cosmic, even of Being itself?' In typical Jewish innocence, Martin Buber even asserts that 'what has come to pass, what is coming and shall come to pass between land and people is and remains a mystery.'[148] The mystery, in truth, is the power of the mysticism of separatism to make universalism out of its very opposite.

1. For a succinct presentation of this view, see Professor Stanley B. Frost's article '*History and the Bible*' in the *Canadian Journal of Theology*, Vol. III (1957), No. 2, pp. 87-96. Faith, Professor Frost writes, is 'the recognition of a significance which is inherent in them (*i.e.* the events of history) because God himself initiated the events in order to effect His purposes.' The objective element in *Heilsgeschichte* is that such history is 'an account of human history which corresponds to God's view of that history as His own purposeful activity.' (p. 96).
2. Undoubtedly under the Qur'anic statement of fact—'...and abasement and humiliation were brought down upon them, and they became deserving of God's wrath; this was so because they disbelieved in the communications of God, killed the prophets unjustly, disobeyed and aggressed.' (*Qur'an*, 2:61)—construed as a principle of history.
3. Freud, S., *Moses and Monotheism*, tr. by Katherine Jones, A. A. Knopf, New York, 1939.
4. 'A people becomes a nation to the degree that it grows aware that its existence differs from that of other peoples...and acts on the basis of this awareness. So the term "nation" signifies the unit "people" from the point of view of conscious and active difference.' (Buber, Martin, *Israel and the World: Essays in a Time of Crisis*, Schocken Books, New York, 1948, pp. 217-8).
5. Cairo, n.d.
6. Tr. by Kenneth Cragg in *The Muslim World*, January, 1959, pp. 30-40.
7. Husayn, *op. cit.*, p. 35.
8. 'A first class knowledge of passive resistance as a means of withstanding oppression, accumulated through generations of successful patient resistance that knows no parallel (*Ibid.*, p. 36); 2, an extreme caution which chokes any will to revolt or to freedom, since the miracles of Moses were really directed to the benefit of the Hebrews, rather than Pharaoh, in order to instill some self-confidence and faith in their success (*Ibid.*, pp. 36-37); 3, utter agitation and nervousness brought about by their apprehension of the future and increased by their deception to their fellow men (*Ibid.*, p. 38); 4, 'panic' and absence 'of all human compassionateness' (*Ibid.*); 5, tenacity to worldly possessions however small (*Ibid.*); 6, a permanent 'deformation of Jewish temper' brought about by their blind faith that their exodus was made successful by a miracle for which only their Hebraicness could account and hence that their Hebraicness would take care of the future (*Ibid.*, p. 39); 7, lack of faith in their fellow men since only by the destruction of their adversary can their prosperity come about; 8, hence an absence of 'forebearance, chivalry, gallantry and magnanimity'. (*Ibid.*)
9. In Dr. Husayn's description of Hebrew character before the Exodus, (*op. cit.*, pp. 35-37) most, if not all, of these characteristics are illustrated. For example, there is Moses' caution to look around to see if anyone was in sight before avenging the death of a brother (*Ibid.*, p. 36), and the need of the Hebrews for Moses to perform miracles before they believe in his claim regarding the very possibility of redemption. (*Ibid.*, p. 37).
10. Husayn, *op. cit.*, p. 35.
11. Genesis, 46:5. As the Old Testament relates, Pharaoh extended the invitation through Joseph, his minister, saying: 'I will give you the good of the land of Egypt, and ye shall eat the fat of the land...Regard not your stuff; for the good of all the land of Egypt is yours.' (Genesis, 45:18, 20). Indeed, these passages give grounds for the assumption that the Hebrews were invited to Egypt not by Pharaoh, but with Pharaoh's blessing, by Joseph as head of a group which might have included many other Hebrews, which were already in a more or less complete mastery of the economic life of Egypt. Before entering Egypt, *en masse*, the Hebrews were still unsettled, unwanted nomads, ever moving after pasture and security. The invitation extended to them was not designed to give them a refuge or shelter, nor merely food to satisfy their hunger, but 'the good ...the fat of the land.' It further promised them that if they but come, 'the good of all the land of Egypt...(would be theirs).' Obviously, the host knew that Egypt was exploitable and needed additional hands for completing his exploitation and establishing his dominion. In the following chapter, Genesis, 47, the Old Testament tells the details of Joseph's manipulation of the Egyptians, under stress of famine, to surender first their money, then their cattle and finally their land. When their enslavement had become complete, 'Joseph said unto the people, Behold, I have bought you this day and your land for Pharaoh: Lo, here is seed for you, and ye shall sow the land.' (Genesis, 47:23). The famine suddenly disappeared, the granaries were opened, seed distributed so that the capitalists may now enjoy the fruits of the labour of 'the servants of the Lord,' whose daily song was henceforth to be: 'Let us find grace in the sight of my lord, and we will be Pharaoh's servants.' (Genesis, 47:25.) All this sounds frightfully too modern (stock exchange and other kinds of speculative manipulations by extremists of the capitalist or Marxist variety, deliberately instigated to produce economic crisis).
12. Exodus, 1:7.
13. Exodus, 1:9.
14. Exodus, 1:10.

15. Buber, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
16. Galatians, 3:28-29.
17. Ephesians, 3:6.
18. Galatians, 4:22-31. Paul concluded this sermon by sounding the first note of Christian religious persecution of non-Christians: 'Cast out the bond woman and her son,' he ordered the new converts, 'for the son of the bond woman shall not be heir with the son of the free woman.'
19. 'By man's wilfulness and false independence he destroyed that relationship and has become alienated from God, so that life has gone very badly for him ever since. But God...was not prepared to let it go at that. Rather, he was seeking some way of repairing the relationship. His method...was to choose a man, Abraham, and to bring into being through him a nation, Israel, which would be obedient and responsive to God and which would indeed be in the close ralationship with God that was originally intended.' (Frost, S. B. 'Visions of the End: Prophetic Eschatology,' *Canadian Journal of Theology*, Vol. V (1959), No. 3, p. 156).
20. Romans, 11:7.
21. Isaiah, 59:21.
22. *Ibid.*, 51:8. ' I have loved thee with an *everlasting* love.' (Jeremiah, 31:3).
23. *Universal Jewish Encyclopaedia*, New York, 1941, Vol. III, p. 167. In further documentation of this Hebrew view of election, the encyclopaedia quotes Johanan's interpretation of Hosea's story as follows: 'When God told Hosea that Israel had sinned, He expected the prophet to plead in Israel's behalf: "They are Thy sons, Thy beloved...Extend Thy mercy unto them." Instead, Hosea replied: "Lord...replace Israel with another people." To make clear to the prophet His relation to Israel, God ordered him to marry a woman of loose morals. When she had borne him a number of children, God told him to send her away. Hosea could not stand the test and pleaded: "...I can neither send her away nor divorce her." Said God: "If you canst put away your wife of whose fidelity you are uncertain...how can I reject Israel, who are My children, the children of My tried and true servants..."' *(Universal Jewish Encyclopaedia*, p. 168).
24. 'And I will gather the remnant of my flock out of all countries whither I have driven them.' (Jeremiah, 23:3). 'For out of Jerusalem shall go forth a remnant, and they that escape Mount Zion: the zeal of the Lord of hosts shall do this.' (II Kings, 19:31; Isaiah, 37:32).
25. Zephaniah, 3:13.
26. 'For thee have I seen righteous before me in this generation.' (Genesis, 7:1).
27. 'And God blessed Noah and his sons, and said unto them, "Be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth."' (Genesis, 9:1).
28. 'And surely your blood of your lives will I require; whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed: for in the image of God made He man.' (Genesis, 9:5-6).
29. '...Neither shall all flesh be cut off any more by the waters of a flood; neither shall there any more be a flood to destroy the earth.' (Genesis, 9:11).
30. Genesis, 9:17.
31. *Infra*, p.
32. *The Pentateuch and Haftorahs*, ed. by J. H. Hertz, London, Soncino Press, 1958, pp. 53-60; or Genesis, Chaps. 12, 15, 16, 17.
33. Modern scholarship has questioned that Ur was Abrahams' native city. On the evidence the recent excavations at Mari have produced, it is much more likely

that Abraham came from the upper Euphrates basin, since its people had the the same customs and laws as the Patriarchs, and since as the *Pentateuch* itself mentions, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, etc. revisited 'Padan-Aram', where they visited their relatives and obtained their wives. (Genesis, 12:5; 27:43; 28:2, 5, 6; 29:4; 31:18).
34. 'Get thee out of the country, and from thy kindred, and from thy father's house, unto a land that I will show thee.' (Genesis, 12:1).
35. *The Pentateuch and Haftorahs*, p. 45, n. 1.
36. *Qur'an*, 6:82.
37. *Qur'an*, 6:73.
38. *Qur'an*, 19:41-50.
39. *Qur'an*, 6:78-80.
40. Abraham and those with him 'said to their people: "We are quit of you and of that which you serve, apart from God. We disbelieve in you; and between us and you enmity has shown itself, and hatred forever, until you believe in God alone."' (Qur'an, 60:3).
41. Genesis, 12:4,; *Pentateuch and Haftorahs*, pp. 45-6.
42. *Qur'an*, 60:3.
43. *Ibid.*
44. *Qur'an*, 9:114; 60:4.
45. Quoted in *Pentateuch and Haftorahs*, p. 45, n. 1.
46. *Universal Jewish Encyclopaedia*, 'Midrash Hagadol'.
47. *The Legends of the Jews*, compiled by Louis Ginzberg, tr. by H. Szold, Philadelphia, 1913, Vol. I, p. 185ff.
48. Cohen, A., *Everyman's Talmud*, E. P. Dutton and Co., New York, 1949, p. 2, n. 2.
49. *Apocalypse of Abraham*, tr. by G. H. Box, London, 1919, p. xv *seq.*
50. *Ibid.*
51. *Ibid.*
52. *Beit Hamidrash*, Leipzig, 1853-1877, Einleitung, p. 16.
53. Grunebaum, G. E., von, *Neue Beiträge*, p. 129; *The Legends of the Jews*, Vol. V, p. 212.
54. *The Legends of the Jews*, Vol. I, p. 189-190.
55. *Revue des Etudes Juives*, Paris, Vol. LXIX, p. 86 *seq.*, and LXX, p. 36 *seq.*
56. Compare:

    '...One night, he looked at the stars under the clear Mesopotamian sky, and felt, "These are the gods." But the dawn came, and soon the stars could be seen no longer...When the sun rose "This is my God, Him will I adore," he exclaimed. But then the sun set, and he hailed the moon as his deity. When in turn the moon was obscured, he cried out: "This too is no God... There must be one who is Maker of Sun, Moon and Stars"' *(Pentateuch and Haftorahs*, notes by J. H. Hertz, p. 200. This passage is taken with little change from *The Legends of the Jews*, Vol. I, p. 189).

    with the Qur'anic passage:

    'When night outspread over him he saw a star and said, "This is my Lord." But when it set he said, "If my Lord does not guide me I shall surely be of the people gone astray." When he saw the sun rising, he said "This is my Lord; this is greater." But when it set he said, "O my people, surely I am quit of that which you associate. I have turned my face to Him who originated the heavens and the earth, a man of pure faith; I am not one of the idolaters." (Arberry, A. J., *The Qur'an Interpreted*, Allen and Unwin, London, 1955, Vol. I, 158. Surah: 6 Verses 76-80).

Compare also:

...He endeavours to open the eyes of others to the folly of idol-worship and becomes the preacher of the true faith. In his father's house...there stood one large idol and a large number of smaller ones. Abraham broke all the smaller ones and then placed the hammer in the hand of the big idol. "They quarrelled among themselves," he later explained to his dumbfounded father, "and the big one thereupon took a hammer and shattered them all. Behold it is still in his hands!" "But there is no life and power in them to do such things," his father answered in rage. "Why dost thou serve them? Can they hear thy prayers when thou callest upon them?" was the reply. Abraham was thereupon hailed before the ruler of Babylon who cast him into a fiery furnace... An angel rescued him unhurt from its devouring flames.' *(Pentateuch and Haftorahs*, p. 200; *The Legends of the Jews*, Vol. I, pp. 197-8, 213-7).

with the Qur'anic passage:

'We gave Abraham aforetime his rectitude—for we knew him—when he said to his father and his people, "What are these statues unto which you are cleaving?" They said, "We found our fathers serving them." He said, "Then assuredly you and your fathers have been in manifest error." They said, "What, hast thou come to us with the truth, or art thou one of those that play?" He said, "Nay, but your Lord is the Lord of the heavens and the earth who originated them, and I am one of those that bear witness thereunto. And, by God I shall assuredly outwit your idols, after you have gone away turning your backs." So he broke them into fragments, all but a great one they had, for haply they would return to it. They said, "Who has done this with our Gods? Surely he is one of the evildoers." They said, "So art thou the man who did this unto our gods, Abraham?" He said, "No, it was the great one of them that did it. Question them, if they are able to speak." So, they returned one to another, and they said, "Surely it is you who are the evildoers." Then they were utterly put to confusion saying, "Very well indeed thou knowest these do not speak." He said, "What, and do you serve, apart from God, that which profits you nothing, neither hurts you? Fie upon you and that you serve apart from God. Do you not understand?" They said, "Burn him, and help your gods, if you would do aught!"' (Arberry, *op. cit.*, II, 21-22. Surah 21: Verses 52-72).

Compare also:

'And God commanded the fire, "O fire, be coolness and safety for Abraham."' *(The Legends of the Jews*, p. 201).

with the Qur'anic passage:

'*Ya naru kuni bardan wa salaman 'ala Ibrahim*,' *(Qur'an*, 21:69), of which the foregoing quotation is a literal translation.

Compare also:

Gabriel's address to Abraham: 'Be not afraid and disquieted, for God is with thee. He will rescue thee out of the hands of all thine adversaries.' *(The Legends of the Jews*, Vol. I, p. 192).

with the Qur'anic passage:

'Fear not, nor grieve, surely we will deliver you.' *(Qur'an*, 29:33).

Compare also:

Abraham's address to Nimrod: 'The Eternal is God, the only one, and there is none beside; He is incorporael, living, ever-existing; He slumbers not and sleeps not, who hath created the world that men might believe in Him.' *(The Legends of the Jews*, Vol. I, p. 194).

with the Qur'anic passage:

Ayat-ul-kursi (Verse of the throne), of which it is a direct translation: 'God is He besides Whom there is no God, the ever-living, the self-subsisting; slumber does not overtake Him; neither does He sleep. Whatever is in the heavens and whatever is in the earth is His... He is the Most High.' *(Qur'an*, 2:55).

Compare also:

Abraham's address to Satan: 'God in Whom I trust, the God of heaven and earth, will rescue me...He saveth from all sickness those who put their trust in Him.' *(The Legends of the Jews*, Vol. I, pp. 201, 203).

with the *Qur'an:*

'The Lord of the Worlds, Who created me, will show me the way; it is He Who gives me to eat and gives me to drink, and when I am sick restores me to health.' *(Qur'an*, 26:78-82).

Compare also:

Nimrod's address to his people: 'There is a God in Heaven, Who is One, and none beside Him, Who sees and is not seen.' *(The Legends of the Jews*, Vol. I, p. 192). 'The Lord He is God in Heaven above and upon the earth beneath; there is none else.' *(Ibid.*, p. 201).

with the *Qur'an:*

'Wonderful originator of the heavens and the earth—That is God, your Lord, there is no God but He, the creator of all things.' 'Who sees and is not seen' is a direct translation of the *Qur'an*'s, '*La tudrikuhu-l-absaru wa hua yudriku-l-absara*.' *(Qur'an*, 6:103, 7:27).

Compare also:

Abraham's address to Terah: 'The God Who hath created all things, He is the true God, He hath empurpled the heavens, and gilded the sun, and given radiance to the moon and also the stars, and He drieth out the earth in the midst of many waters, and also thee hath He put upon the earth, and me hath He sought out in the confusion of my thoughts.' *(The Legends of the Jews*. Vol. I, p. 213).

with the *Qur'an:*

'Surely your Lord is God Who created the heavens and the earth...He it is who made the sun a shining brightness and the moon a light.' *(Qur'an*, 10:5). 'God makes abundant the means of subsistence for whom He pleases of His servants. And if it is asked who it is that sends down water from the clouds, then gives life to the earth with it after its death, they will certainly say God. Say: All praise is due to God.' *(Qur'an*, 29:60-63; 27:59-61).

57. Genesis, 13:15-17; 15:1-7; 18, 17:4-8; 22:17.
58. Genesis, 17:4.
59. *Pentateuch and Haftorahs*, p. 58, n. 2.
60. Notably, by George E. Mendenhall, 'Covenant Forms in Israelite Tradition,' *The Biblical Archeologist*, Vol. XVII, 1954, pp. 50-76.
61. 'The stipulations of the treaty are binding only upon the vassal (who alone) took an oath of obedience.'
62. Mendenhall, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-60.
63. In prophetic literature, the Abrahamic covenant achieved the utterly irrational level of predestination: 'The Lord hath called me from the womb; from the bowels of my mother hath He made mention of my name...And said unto me, Thou art my servant, O Israel, in whom I will be glorified.' (Isaiah, 49:1-3).
64. Judah Halevi went as far as to assert that 'Moses attained his high estate only

because of Israel whom he led.' *(Universal Jewish Encyclopaedia*, Vol. 7, p. 583).
65. Numbers calls them 'a mixed multitude.' (Numbers, 11:4).
66. Such as II Samuel, 23:5.
67. Deuteronomy calls it by another name: 'Because the Lord loved you and because He would keep his oath.' (Deuteronomy, 7:6-8).
68. *Pentateuch and Hoftorahs*, p. 58 n; Genesis, 17:10-15.
69. *Pentateuch and Haftorahs*, p. 58, n. 10.
70. *Ibid.*
71. 'Unbounded', writes J. H. Hertz, 'has been the loyalty and devotion with which this vital and fundamental intsitution of the Jewish Faith has been and is being observed. Jewish men and women have in all ages been ready to lay down their lives in its defence. The Maccabean martyrs died for it. The officers of King Antiochus put to death the mothers who initiated their children into the Covenant. (I Maccabees, 1:61). The same readiness for self-immolation in defence of this sacred rite we find in the times of the Hadrianic persecution, in the dread days of the Inquisition, yea, whenever and wherever tyrants undertook to uproot the Jewish faith.' *(Pentateuch and Haftorahs*, pp. 58-59).
72. Genesis, 17:13.
73. Genesis, 17:14.
74. Quoted in *Pentateuch and Haftorahs*, p. 59, n. 10.
75. Genesis, 33:18-20.
76. Genesis, 34:1-2.
77. Genesis, 34:3-4. 'And his soul clave unto Dinah, daughter of Jacob, and he loved the damsel, and spake kindly unto his father, Hamor, saying, Get me this damsel to wife.'
78. 'If a man find a damsel that is a virgin which is not betrothed and lay hold on her and lie with her and they be found: Then the man that lay with her shall give unto the damsel's father fifty shekels of silver and she shall be his wife.' (Deuteronomy, 22:28).
79. Genesis, 34:8.
80. Genesis, 34:9-12.
81. 'And the sons of Jacob answered Shechem and Hamor his father deceitfully...' (Genesis, 34:13).
82. Genesis, 34:14.
83. Genesis, 34:15-16.
84. Genesis, 34:18-19.
85. Genesis, 34:20-23.
86. Genesis, 34:25-29.
87. Genesis, 34:30.
88. Genesis, 9:17. It is significant that the Jews make little reference to this covenant with 'All Flesh that is upon the Earth,' symbolized by and personalized in Noah. Indeed whenever they speak of God's covenant, they definitely mean that which God made with Abraham. The covenant He made with Noah is usually ignored.
89. Genesis, 34:27.
90. Genesis, 34:31.
91. Genesis, 34:16.
92. Genesis, 34:15-16.
93. Such, for instance, is the argument of H. H. Rowley: 'If Judaism erected the wall of particularism around the garden, it was to prevent the garden from being trampled down.' *(The Rediscovery of the Old Testament*, Westminister Press, Philadelphia, 1946, p. 205). Certainly, the apostolic fathers of the Church did

not regard the entrance of the large numbers of converts in the formative years of Christianity as 'trampling,' but were rejoiced to witness it; and the *Qur'an's* attitude in a similar situation is classically jubilant and thanksgiving. (See *Qur'an*, 110:1-3).
94. *e.g.*, Eliezer, Genesis, 15:2. Moses allowed the entry of great numbers of non-Hebrews, viz., the Midianites, Kenites, etc. into the Yahweh confederacy.
95. The *Pentateuch* records that 'unto Hamor and...Shechem...harkened all that went out of the gate of his city;' (Genesis, 34:24). they 'deferred not to do the thing' (Genesis, 34:19) and 'every male was circumcised.' (Genesis, 34:24).
96. Genesis, 34:27. We found it earlier in their borrowing, with the intent to steal, from their hosts on the eve of their exodus from Egypt. (Exodus, 12:35-36). The *Pentateuch* insolently adds that 'the lord gave the people (the Hebrews) favour in the sight of the Egyptians, so that they lent unto them such things as they required.'
97 'For wherein shall it be known here that I and thy people have found grace in thy sight? is it not in that thou goest with us? so shall we be separated, I and thy people, from all the people that are upon the face of the earth.' (Exodus, 33:16).
98. Consider for example the self-contradiction of Isaiah's second oracle, as reported in the Old Testament. Speaking of the nation, Israel, he said: 'The whole head is sick, and the whole heart faint. From the sole of the foot even unto the head there is no soundness in it, but wounds and bruises and putrifying sores. Your country is desolate...' (Isaiah, 1:4-6). The Old Testament however adds, right after these sweeping condemnations: 'Except the Lord of hosts had left unto us a very small remnant.' (Isaiah 1:9). This obvious addition to the prophetic oracle robs it of its universalism, even of its moral fervour. For the prophetic mind that is so gripped by the iniquity of 'the nation, Israel' as to pour out such majestic poetry cannot be meticulously concerned with 'a very small remnant.' The prophetic-poetic mind does not think in terms of probabilities and scientific accuracies. Even if it did see the 'very small remnant,' it would still say 'all' where it means 99.9 per cent. Nor does the prophetic-poetic mind switch in the same poem and the same oracle from the consciousness of impending doom (Isaiah, 29:1-5) to that of victory and bliss. (Isaiah, 29:6-9). Such additions are clearly the work of a non-prophetic, non-poetic, calculating hand. A glimpse into these practices of adding and falsifying is afforded us by no less a source than Jeremiah where we read: 'Then took Jeremiah another roll, and gave it to Baruch the scribe, the son of Neriah; who wrote therein from the mouth of Jeremiah all the words of the book which Jehoiakim King of Judah had burned in the fire: *and there were added besides unto them many like words*.' (Jeremiah, 36:32. Italics the present author's).
99. Genesis, 31:19, 30. Recent archeological research has shown that Abraham's pagan 'relatives' at Padan-Aram had the custom of passing the family gods to the first born heir as token of his right of inheritance. And it will be recalled that before fleeing with Jacob, Rachel had stolen her father's gods in order to insure Jacob's right of inheritance, 'peradventure thou would'st take thy daughters from me.' (Genesis, 31:31). From the identity of laws and customs (including that of the wife's obligation in case of infertility to produce to her husband a slave girl of equally high rank—the highest rank being that of the Egyptian slaves—to bear him children, thus recalling the case of Sarah and Hagar), researchers have advanced the view that 'the God of Abraham', 'the God of Isaac,' 'the God of Jacob,' etc., were really the names of the family gods of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, whose real names as the customs of Padan-Aram

indicate, could not be divulged. This is further corroborated by the reticence of the god of Abraham who wrestled with Jacob on the latter's way back from Haran to tell his name though he made himself sufficiently known for Abraham to say that he had seen his god 'face to face'. (Genesis, 33:30). It is not until the Exodus that Jehovah revealed himself by his name. (Exodus, 6:3). All of this further corroborates the view that Jahweh was a pagan, family god.

100. Albright, F. W., *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1940, p. 185.
101. Joshua, 24:2.
102. For a discussion of this Hebrew practice, see Albright, F. W., *Journal of Biblical Literature*, LIV (1935), pp. 188ff.
103. Albright, *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, pp. 186-7.
104. The Old Testament applies the name *elohim* to the ghost of Samuel. (I Samuel, 28:13). For a thorough presentation of this thesis, see Theophile J. Meek, *Hebrew Origins*, Harper, New York, 1950, pp. 89ff.
105. Genesis, 35:2; Isaiah, 65:4.
106. Albright, W. F., *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, p. 207.
107. *Ibid.*
108. Exodus, 13:21.
109. Exodus, 19:16, 18.
110. Exodus, 19:19.
111. Exodus, 15:3. The Pentateuch makes him the 'efficient cause' of all Hebrew military exploits and victories.
112. Addressing Jerusalem, the prophet Ezekiel said: 'Your mother was an Hittite, and your father an Amorite.' (Ezekiel, 16:45).
113. Genesis, 32:24; Exodus, 4:24.
114. 'I am the Lord thy God...Thou shalt have no other gods before me. Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image...Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them nor serve them: for I the Lord thy God am a jealous God.' (Exodus, 20:2-5).
115. This argument has been brilliantly presented by Theophile Meek in *Hebrew Origins*, p. 208.
116. Deuteronomy, 4:14, 19. Likewise, T. Meek has pointed out that I Samuel, 26:19 relates that even for a David Jahweh could not be worshipped outside Hebrew territory where dominion belongs to another god, and, in II Kings, 5:17, that Naaman had to take two mule loads of Hebrew soil in order to enable him to worship Jahweh in Syria. (Meek, *op. cit.*, p. 216).
117. Scholars have questioned even the attribution of strict monolatry to the Hebrews. The condemnation that their people have worshipped other gods was on the lips of almost every prophet. Many Hebrew names are conpounded of names of deities other than Jahweh, and the cults of fertitility were quite common. 'Nothing is found in such abundance by the excavator,' reports T. Meek, 'as the paraphernalia of this cult...The gods of the land would have taken offense if they had been ignored, even as Jahweh did in a later period when the deportees brought into Israel by the Assyrians ignored him. (II Kings, 17:25ff). As gods of the land the local deities controlled its productivity. Jahweh, it was true, was the supreme god by right of conquest, but this department was the larger one of the state and not the affairs of ordinary, everyday agricultural and commercial life. In a word, the early Hebrews, in so far as we are able to discover, were no more monotheistic, than any other ancient people in the same stage of development.' (Meek, *op. cit.*, p. 217).

118. Meek, *op. cit.*, p. 224.
119. Hosea, 2:16.
120. Meek, *op. cit.*, p. 225.
121. *Ibid.*, p. 226.
122. Isaiah, 41:24.
123. Isaiah, 49:1.
124. Isaiah, 49:22-23.
125. Isaiah, 42:4, Jeremiah, 23:5-6.
126. In Isaiah's words Cyrus's destiny was 'to open the blind eyes, to bring out the prisoners from the prison and them that sit in darkness out of the prison house. (Isaiah, 42:7, Jeremiah, 31).
127. Jeremiah, 23:7-8.
128. Isaiah, 43:3-4. Jeremiah's judgement against Babylon (Chap. 51) is a classical expression of Hebrew resentment, which finds no parallel in any literature.
129. Jermiah, 7:9.
130. Jeremiah, 7:3-7.
131. Genesis, 12.
132. 'Not for thy righteousness or for the uprightness of thine heart dost thou go to posses their (the Canaanites) land...Understand therefore, that the Lord thy God giveth thee not this good land to possess it for thy righteousness; for thou art a stiffnecked people.' (Deuteronomy, 9:5-6. See also Deuteronomy, 7:7-8).
133. Leviticus, 24:22.
134. Leviticus, 24:20.
135. Leviticus, 23-20.
136. Psalms, 2:8ff.
137. Exodus, 19:5.
138. Numbers, 34:1-12.
139. 'If a man have two wives one beloved and the other hated, and have borne him children, both the beloved and the hated; and if the first born son be her's that was hated: Then it shall be, when he maketh his sons to inherit that which he hath, that he may not make the son of the beloved first born before the son of the hated, which is indeed the firstborn.'
140. Genesis, 17:21.
141. Deuteronomy, 22:1-4.
142. Genesis, 30:37ff; 31:1-43; 27:1ff; 27:32-33.
143. Genesis, 36.
144. Buber, Martin, *Israel and Palestine: The History of an Idea*, tr. by Stanley Goodman, London, 1952; *Israel and the World: Essays in a Time of Crisis*, New York, 1948.
145. Buber, *Israel and Palestine*, p. x.
146. *Ibid.*, p. xii.
147. *Ibid.*
148. *Ibid.*

CHAPTER THREE

CHRISTIANITY AS SECOND MOMENT OF ARAB CONSCIOUSNESS

I. THE MISSION OF JESUS

A. Methodological Considerations

Fundamentally Christianity came as a solution to the chronic perversion of the Hebrews within the Arab stream of being described in the foregoing chapter. However this may be true in fact, it does not appear to be the case *prima facie*. That Christianity, or the message of Jesus, was such solution to the Hebrew problem may become apparent only when that message is sifted from its unchristian accruements. For this, a rediscovery of the essence of Christianity is absolutely necessary. But the road to such rediscovery is beset with insuperable difficulties.

1. *The Position of the Skeptic Phenomenologist of Religion*

First, there are the extreme empricists for whom there can be no essences of any kind, and least, an essence of Christianity.[1] They hold that just as science has given up the task of discovering the nature of matter, of force, of life, etc., and begun to progress when it directed itself to the question of 'handling' them, of 'directing their behaviour,' so that 'scientist of religion' ought 'to call off the hunt' for the essence of religion and apply himself to learning how religion changes and how to direct that change.[2]

In their opinion, the changing stream of religion *is* religion; and religion is no more than its variations, *i.e.*, 'the sum of the changing states of its adherents.'[3] 'The great religions do not exist as such at all; each is an intellectual abstraction, elicited from a large, and ever growing number of personal instances of it, in individual lives.'[4] To this extreme position they were driven by the consideration of the diversity of interpretations claiming to know the essence of Christianity and the difficulty—hence to be called 'impossibility'—of sifting the true from the false.[5] The essentialist, they are convinced, is as desperate as the existentialist scientist of religion when it comes to distinguishing the genuine from the spurious in religious matters. Hence, rather than pursue a doomed search for essence, the realization dawned on them that they had better attend to the changing stream.

This skeptical position takes Heraclitean pains to emphasize that religions change, and to impress us with the fact of change which it

regards as the key concept and the cardinal truth of all religions. True and undeniable as change is of all religions, the 'phenomenologists' of change give no attention to the presuppositions of change. Their greatest weakness is their disregard of the fact that change presupposes that which changes; that a stream of appearances without a something that appears is a logical impossibility; that if the becoming of a religion is to be directed, and this direction is to be meaningful, there should be an essence—viz., that religion as it ought to be—towards which the change should be directed. To claim as the 'phenomenologists' do that religion is changing towards something undesirable or that the becoming of a religion may or ought to be directed towards a certain goal, is to presuppose an essence of that religion which its becoming had missed, or one towards which its development may or ought to be oriented. Without such an essence acting as the 'ought' of change, any change is as good as any other and to endeavour to direct the change is morally senseless. Without a permanent fixed essence, the choice of that to which the process of religious development is to be directed is arbitrary. No choice may claim to be better than any other unless it claims for that which is has chosen a status of essence. Even the utilitarian pragmatist, by holding that religion ought to move towards that which contributes to the happiness of the greatest number cannot but, in justification of this choice, claim that the service of the happiness of the greatest number is essential to religion, whether uniquely or like every other human pursuit.

Without essence, therefore, there is no escape from relativism of choice; and relativism of choice is moral cynicism. True, the discovery of the essence of Christianity is a very difficult task. Difficulty, however, is not impossibility. To regard it as impossibility is to prejudge it. It is a counsel of despair. 'To call off the hunt' in this matter is to close the doors of investigation, of research and enquiry, to turn one's back on knowledge and wisdom. To give up the task of discovering the essence of Christianity, or of any religion, is furthermore to open the gates of moral cynicism.

2. *The Position of Western 'Orthodoxy'*

Apart from this skepticism whose adherents are extremely rare, there is, second, the body of orthodox Christianity. Starting as a faction in the first century A.D., this body later became the dominant part of Christendom as it annexed one part of the Near East, and then of Europe, after another. This faction, which we shall call Western Christianity for reasons which will become clear later, was anxious to justify itself in its own eyes. It knew that what it taught was distinctly different from the teaching of Jesus and in typical bad conscience it invented the notion that Christ-

ianity is not only that which Jesus, but also and equally, that which his followers had taught and lived. The followers of Jesus, moreover, Western Christianity identified as its own founders and protagonists and proffered upon them gratuitously the religious normativeness which belonged exclusively to Jesus. This extension of normativeness from the personal teaching of Jesus to that of the followers, this faction justified on the basis of a conception of God as the efficient *causus operarius* of a nexus of historical events extending in time and place so as to include themselves. This they held was God's plan, designed especially by Him to 'redeem' fallen man and restore him to original blessedness.[6]

Why did the fathers of Western Christianity force this 'operator' concept into the Godhead, and on its basis dissolve the distinct identity of Jesus' teaching in that of a number of his human followers? Christianity, one would naturally think, is the religion of Christ, not that of any apostles, disciples or other men of Christianity, however great and influential they may have been. All these, at best, are human followers and interpreters. They may or may not be 'Christian;' but they are certainly not Christianity. Far from being identifiable with the religion of Jesus, their teaching is worthy of the appellation 'Christian' only in the measure in which it accords with, or fulfills, the religious teaching of Jesus. The latter alone is Christianity.

Presumably Western Christianity was interested in precluding any contrast of its thought and action with that of Jesus. It was anxious to avoid the embarrassment with which the other Christianities were already indicting it, namely, that it was not 'Christian.' The view suggested itself that Christianity is not the transcendent divine will, absolute and unique as it has been revealed in the teaching and life of Jesus but that will in addition to and as it has expressed itself through the human, fallible, one might even say sinful, interpreters and partisans of a certain faction within the Christian movement of history.

That in Jesus, God made a contact with the world and history and through him, He sent a message which was Jesus' exclusive privilege to conceive, to express and, in his own personal life, to exemplify is, according to this view, only a half-truth standing in need of the complementing 'history' of Christianity. There is no transcendent Christianity in God in terms of which the Christianity of all and everyone, including even that of Jesus—though it be the most perfect—is judged. By definition, this view proclaimed, Christianity is the Christianity of Jesus as well as of certain followers.

By adopting and disseminating such a view, Western Christianity achieved the desired escape from the encounter with Jesus to which it was being challenged. It placed itself squarely on the judge's bench

alongside Jesus—indeed alongside even God—and by so doing, it set itself beyond judgement by either. As we shall see in the sequel, Western Christianity tried in vain to suppress those who contended its Christianity-thesis. Its suppression of them was not political, but religious. Its nature was inquisitional; its enemies were politically harmless individuals or minorities. The fact, however, that it never succeeded in eradicating contention regarding its central tenets as well as its inability to refute the opposite views of the contending Christianities, forced it to regard Jesus' Christianity as insufficient and its own historical self as the required complement perfecting the Christianity of Jesus. The basis of the religious authority of the Church fathers is the belief that the Church is under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, which Jesus Christ had committed to the apostles in order that they might propagate the faith. The power which the Church fathers enjoyed under the assumed guidance of the Holy Spirit was defined by them as capacity to decree what the faith itself was. Three centuries after Jesus, Athanasius was already describing the work of the Church fathers at the Council of Nicea, 325 A.D., as being 'to collect the sense of the scriptures.'[7] And in the Council of Constantinople in 381, the fathers mentioned themselves for the first time as approving authority in the resolution of the Council. As was to be expected, this aroused a storm of protest, and contention as to the nature of the faith itself continued to tear the Church apart with increasing fury. Even after the conquests of Islam, when the Christians who might have objected to recognizing the father's interpretation as authoritative already belonged to another world, the Arab World, and were far removed from any possible intervention in the affairs of Western Christianity, the Council of Nicea of 787 A.D. dared for the first time to acknowledge the fathers' interpretation as definitive in order to assert Western Christianity's claim against alternative claims. This Council introduced its resolution with the statement: 'Following the divinely inspired teaching of our Holy Fathers and the tradition of the Catholic Church;' and with typical bad conscience it found necessary to add, 'for we know that this tradition is of the Holy Spirit which dwells in the Church.'[8]

We must therefore reject both these views as Western aberrations. We must hold fast to the position that the task of discovering the essence of Christianity is, at least for Christians, forever meaningful, significant, absolutely necessary *as well as* possible. We must hold fast to the position that Jesus was the first and only perfect Christian; that only his teaching, his example, his life constitute Christianity.

One might think that the method to discover the essence of Christianity is to start from the Sermon on the Mount as the most important utterance of Jesus, with which everything else must agree. Certainly the

depth and height of its religious and ethical vision leave the most skeptical and fastidious overwhelmed; and perhaps it was never equalled by any other utterance of his. This method, however, is untrustworthy. The Western Christian may legitimately claim the starting point to be the incarnation, the crucifixion or the resurrection, or some other utterance of Jesus, all of which are equally 'given' in the gospels. In that case, the analysis or deduction will reveal a wholly different essence of Christianity. No choice of a single utterance will therefore escape the charge of arbitrariness. What is necessary is a sympathetic acceptance of all the utterances of the four gospels, and then a patient, scholarly and unbiassed testing of them all against one another. Gradually these utterances would fall into two or more wholes, one of which must be internally coherent and fulfilling in every respect the demands of the moral and common senses.

In order, however, to arrive at apodeictic certainty in what we find to be the coherent message of Jesus, a further test is necessary. Any laxity in the observance of the requirements of moral and common sense would make it theoretically possible to construct alternative, though internally consistent, messages of Jesus. In order to remove this possibility of error, the message of Jesus that the above-mentioned analysis reveals ought to be subjected to the further test of coherence with the history of revelation.

The alternative 'wholes' of utterances and events of Jesus' life ought to be put under the purview of that history. Just as, historically speaking, we may not put aside the results of scholarly research in Biblical history and archeology, we ought not, religiously speaking, discard or even relegate to the background the religious fact that the prophets are all prophets, sent by the One God to convey to mankind His teaching and will which must always have been and will always be the same. Although in the course of this history of revelation we may, and indeed must, expect a 'plus' of revelation, *i.e.*, an increasingly greater or deeper measure of the will of God, we can entertain no idea of a 'minus,' of a relapse in revelation, of a repudiation of the will of God already revealed. There may be relapses in the behaviour of man, but not of God. What has been revealed must be confirmed by the subsequent revelation which may, and indeed must, add to it, and thus carry mankind progressively further towards a perfect surrender to God's will.

B. The Internal Coherence of Jesus' Mission

1. *Towards a Reconstruction of the Personality of Jesus*

That the redactors of the New Testament were men of great integrity, that they applied themselves with genuine piety to what they regarded as a sacred task exacting the greatest possible zeal and purity, and that in their endeavour the spirit of God moved and inspired them may all be granted. Nonetheless, we can not claim for their work the status of divine revelation—that is, the status of an infallible coveyance of a pronouncement received from a source candidly known to be divine. Such divine revelation was the prerogative of Jesus alone through whom God spoke.[9] On the other hand, the proof of divine inspiration of the New Testament is the fact that it is interspersed with many direct quotations from Jesus, whose divine origin appears to stand beyond question. But the same revelatory authority could not attach indiscriminately to all its statements. Whereas Jesus' own words must constitute together a coherent whole, a radiating and unique world-view, consistent in every part, the numerous gospels which were current in the first centuries and out of which the New Testament gospels were chosen present us with varied, often contradictory pictures of Jesus Christ.

However, a careful study of the four gospels which Western Christendom universally considers to be genuine reveals that the message which God sought to convey through Jesus is compressed in a relatively small body of verses, first of which are those which reestablish the necessary connection between monotheism and human brotherhood which Hebrew separatism denied. 'All ye are brethren ... Call no *man* your father upon the earth: For one is your father which is in heaven. Neither be ye called masters: for one is your master.'[10] The sweeping majesty of this pronouncement alone establishes Jesus' pure monotheism and ethical universalism.

Jesus saw that to recognize God is no pure act of the theoretical consciousness, but of value-consciousness as well. Hence, he commanded, 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind.'[11] For Jesus, monotheism was so inseparably joined to universal brotherhood that he made one the necessary correlate of the other. In his first lesson he accused the 'hypocrite' Pharisees who 'pay tithe of mint and anise and cummin and have omitted the weightier matters of the law, judgement, mercy and faith.'[12] They are 'like unto whited sepulchers.'[13] Their monotheistic pretences will not do. The worship of the One God must be joined to an honoring and loving of man, of all men, for all men are brethren. Indeed, men ought to love even

their enemies, to bless and do good to them if they are to become 'the children of your Father which is in heaven.'[14] For He is good to all, indiscriminately.[15] To love and honour man, to do good to all men, is to love and honour and do good to God Himself. 'Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brehtren, ye have done it unto me.'[16] Such is the answer of God Himself to the virtuous, altruistic men in heaven who inquire about the reason for their salvation. That monotheism is nonsense and hypocrisy without ethical universalism, and secondly, that although they may differ in theoretical content, they are identical as elements in value-consciousness—this was the great truth Arab consciousness was gradually discerning and Jesus Christ came to teach with unprecedented clarity and sincerity. 'Go,' Jesus commanded his disciples, 'and teach all nations;' convey this new message, carry this new life to all men, for all men are the children of the Father that is in heaven.[17]

The redactors of the New Testament have not always understood even this most basic teaching of Jesus. They have put on his lips such unchristlike commands as that enjoining the disciples *not* to bring his teaching to the gentiles or the Samaritans, but to limit it to the 'lost sheep of the house of Israel.'[18] The modern Christians' explanation that Jesus came to deliver sinners and lost men and, as a redeemer, he could not have been 'interested' in the others is ethically superficial. It runs counter to the religious fact that no human being can be called un-needful of divine guidance, however saved and morally upright he may have become. It is inconsistent with the merciful and bounteous nature of God. Certainly a prophet must, in launching his message, plan his energies and those of his disciples with economy and strategy. Such a command may have been meant to allocate top priority to the 'lost sheep.' But such an explanation glosses over an equally basic aspect of the nature of Christ, namely, that he was not a '*mujahid*,'[19] that he did not conceive of his mission as one fulfillable in the realm of worldly action. The ethical consideration thus prepares us for textual correction of the Gospels and for the historical reconstruction of the real Jesus. Oh this same basis, we must reject as unchristlike the report that Jesus rejected the Canaanite woman's confession of faith and pleas for assistance three times: once with silence; once with the answer that he was 'not sent *but* unto the lost sheep of the house of Israel;' and thirdly, with the ungodly answer that 'it is not meet to take the children's bread and cast it to dogs.'[20] That Jesus responded to the woman's plea is Christlike. That he responded only 'finally,' at the fourth plea, and that he responded with such answers the first three times may be Matthew-like, but it is positively neither Christian nor divine. All that we know of this woman is that she was not

a Jewess but a Canaanite. The Matthew account links Jesus' alleged conduct causally to this fact. Had there been other reasons, serious and justifying such a conduct, Matthew would have mentioned them. That the woman was Canaanite, not a Jewess, was for Matthew justification enough.

The second lesson Jesus taught is that the higher, properly moral, values ought to have precedence in determining our will. Truthfulness, chastity and charity are higher values. By them man's life ought to be guided. Whenever our lives are found inclined towards other lower values or engaged in other lower pursuits, there should be no doubt where the right path is, where our preference should lie. Naturally, a life dedicated to the pursuit of higher, moral value will run counter to that which is obsessed with lower, elemental value, *i.e.*, with existence, pleasure and power. In order to attain and permanently to realize the higher and the moral, the lower and the elemental have to be consistently abated and denied. 'Lay not for yourselves treasure upon earth ... But in heaven ... No men can serve two masters ... Therefore, ... take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat ... drink ... (or) put on ... But seek ye first the Kingdom of God ...'[21] The condition of all goodness, Jesus has defined as observance of God's commandments, but that of perfection, he defined as the abandonment of all that pertains to this world and the dedication of one's total being to God.[22] Indeed, Jesus' vision was so intensely filled with the contrast of the lower and higher values, between this world and God, that in his stronger moments he could see the former only as contrasted with, hindering, and opposing the latter. But this was only the result of moral enthusiasm, of transport in the vision of higher things. For, in other moments, Jesus did not omit, as in the wedding at Cana,[23] to assign to these lesser values the order due. Nevertheless, since man's vocation is the moral and in this he is but a conscript who cannot afford to be sidetracked, it is both necessary and desirable that he deny this world in order to devote himself to God. Indeed, he must cultivate this denial into a discipline and inbreed it in his character. Like suffering, world denial would make men morally tauter and purer, ready to receive and to discover moral truth, ready to realize moral value under all circumstances. It was for the sake of moral excellence that Jesus condemned the world.[34] He saw, as no philosopher had seen hitherto, that turbulent, ever desiring, ever seeking, restless nature was at the root of evil, continuously pulling men away from higher duty. Hence, he condemned it. But, and this is most important, he never condemned it for its own sake; he never regarded it as evil *per se*.[25] His condemnation was conditional: If this world distracts you from pursuing moral, higher value, and—we may conceive of him as adding—there might hardly be any

occasion where it does not do so—then deny it. It is a qualified conditional to be sure; but it is nonetheless most certainly a conditional. If salvation is to be won by a human life thus torn against itself and setting its teeth in its own flesh without ever achieving harmony except in the rarest individuals and moments, some radical transformation must be necessary.[36] The least requirement would be a denial of this world that is relaxed only as rarely as harmony is achieved between it and the higher pursuits. Jesus saw this truth very clearly. On its account the method of salvation he prescribed began with a cessation of the activity actualizing evil, namely, the willing, self-asserting, desiring of the world, of existence, of pleasure and power, within man—and the conflicting with, aggressing upon, destroying of, one's neighbour for the sake of that world. The cessation of this hostility-to-itself of life was the first prerequisite. 'He that findeth his life shall lose it; and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find it.'[27]

The value of this cessation of all hostility is paramount, for it conditions everything and is therefore the most basic. It is 'peace' and to it belongs the reward of blessedness.[28] The maintenance of the 'peace' can be secured only through a systematic neutralization of willing, of every desiring, of every knowing. Hence, against this-worldly wisdom, poverty of spirit; against joy-seeking, mourning; against self-confidence, meekness; against the cruelty of the will to live, mercy[29]—in short, against life-affirmation, life-negation. It is not through evil that evil ends.[30] Man ought not to judge,[31] but to forgive;[32] not to avenge a wrong, but to turn the other cheek;[33] indeed, to give up even that which has been justly taken away;[34] for anything that is more than a yea or nay is evil and ought to be avoided.[35]

The kingdom of God of Jesus has nothing to do with the intime, worldly rehabilitation of the Jewish kingdom which was the desideratum of conservative Jews; nor with the beyond-time, otherworld eschatological concept of the slaves of the Roman Empire produced by their resentment of the worldly Imperium against which they were powerless. Against the slaves' netherworld of the Imperium Romanum, Jesus conceived of the kingdom as something not outside of time, not forthcoming, but something 'within you,' already come.[36] In opposition to Jewish conservatism, he conceived of it as something spiritual, an inner state of blessedness for the entrance to which all that is necessary, once the conditioning 'peace' has been attained, is an act of will, an orientation and commitment of one's being to God—that is to say, to ehtical pursuit of the opposite of 'the world,' to higher moral value. To will goodness, to seek moral value, to accept the kingdom of God is to have that kingdom. That the denial of the world and the affirmation of the kingdom are equally important

ethical

aspects of the new teaching evidence a new, unparalleled height of vision and depth of insight.

The conduct and life of Jesus were the perfect exemplification of this doctrine. He was totally committed to ethical endeavour, to the kingdom of God. He came but to show how man ought to live, how he ought to conduct himself *vis-à-vis* the world and existence. This is the meaning Jesus had of redemption. The sin from which he sought to redeem mankind was man's obsession with an insatiable and distracting pursuit of worldly existence, of lower value. And if man's insatiability is, according to some, so ingrained in his nature as to constitute a permanent state of sin, a tragicness from which Jesus Christ supposedly delivered him, then that redemption could not have been achieved on the level of nature. The level of nature belongs to reality from which there is no escape. Indeed, reality presents in many fields of natural life inexorable antinomies. Even under the illegitimate stretching of 'sin' to include sinless nature which is neither willed nor will-able, redemption could not be a departure from nature but a change in our attitude to it. In this case the redeeming act of Christ would consist not in his advent into this world, but in showing that a new attitude to the tragedy of nature is redeeming and by exemplifying that attitude, to establish its human possibility. At any rate, the uniqueness of the new discovery consisted in its bringing the human tragedy to consciousness and placing it in permanent contrast with ethical ends. This contrast in consciousness would then produce the determination of the will in the direction of the ethical, rather than the natural. In either case, therefore, Christ's redemption is not a having redeemed but a having provided a method of redemption. It is not the fact of Jesus' passion and crucifixion that constitute redemption, but the moral truth it was his special distinction to bring, with divine grace, to man's consciousness. The historical events of his life, whatever research may reveal them to be, were made necessary by his life's being an exemplification of this moral truth, not a 'price' paid in exchange for the forgiveness of the sins of others. It is offensive to common sense to speak of 'forgiving' a reality or a state of nature, and to moral sense, to contemplate anyone's 'paying' for the sins of others.

Whatever the nature of sin is, therefore, redemption begins and ends where ethical consciousness and willing do. Not to understand Jesus as a prophet whose message is the bringing of new values and new valuational relations to man's consciousness, but to understand him and his life as the message which God had sent, and then to understand his life not as a divine lesson and example but as an act by which God sought to redeem man, is to rob man of his ethical responsibility and dignity. To the necessary question, why did Almighty God do such a deed, the advocates of

this view furnish answers which imply either that God is another man, a partner who cannot live without his earthly partner; or man is another God, equally important in a large realm of being including both. Such a position is the necessary consequence of the kind of moral despair that brought St. Paul to Christianity, and after him, brought Christianity to St. Paul. He, more than any other Jew, strove as best he could to achieve value, without much success. He pondered Jewish law and all its wisdom, the Roman Empire with all its effort, his own superlative loyalty and zeal—all these, he thought, succeeded only in piling one failure upon another. Vividly the realization dawned on him that all effort is vain. Value is not achievable, not realizable by individual effort, however Promethean. Its realization must be divine. God-made; and that is precisely what Jesus' coming was meant by God to do, and all that is left for man to do is to believe in the miracle that had taken place. Pauline justification by faith therefore allows ample scope for the 'heaving breast' to heave, for the wishful to wish and wish and wish in childlike intensity and innocence. In the realm of morals it is in every part responsibility-free ethical puppetry.

Jesus' devine determination, his ethical consciousness, his attitude toward the whole matter of existence and life, his teaching and method for the redemption of man are all to be found in his conduct throughout his short sojourn in this world and in the gems of wisdom that came from his lips and were preserved together with much alien material in the tradition. Whatever some Christians may say to the contrary, it is idle to argue that Jesus could have said that he came to this world not 'to send peace but a sword,'[37] or 'to set man at variance against his father, and the daughter against her mother;'[38] that for any man of this world '... it is better for him that a millstone be hanged about his neck and he were cast into the sea'[39] than offend a Christian; that raiment and food and wealth will come automatically if one seeks the kingdom;[40] etc. It is the decrepit Jewish conservatism, not Jesus, that dictated, 'With what measure you mete, it shall be measured to you again,'[41] and 'whosoever shall deny me ... him will I also deny;'[42] for Jesus would never answer evil with evil but with love and goodness. Has he not said, '... An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth: But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also?'[43] There cannot be two kinds of moral law, one for heaven and another for men in this world. God's laws could not be the opposite of man's if they both have the same divine provenance. Likewise, it is Jewish resentment, not Jesus, which dictated: 'And whosoever shall not receive you, nor hear you when ye depart hence, shake off the dust under your feet for a testimony against them...

It shall be more tolerable for Sodom and Gomorrah ... than for that city.'[44]

It was Jesus that said: 'Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you,'[45] 'for He maketh His sun to rise on the evil and on the good and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust ...'[46] But it was Jewish cynicism, not Jesus, which dictated: 'Let the dead bury their dead,' when the call of distress made itself heard.[47] It betrays a deplorable misunderstanding of God, indeed a blasphemy, to attribute such ungodly judgements to one so divinely determined as Jesus. And to conceive of him as rebuilder of Israel, a king of the Jews, as organizer of a church- and socio-political movement on one hand, and as a self-denying self-mortifying, self-lacerating Buddhist monk at war with all nature on the other, is honestly to miss the boat altogether. Nothing is gained by such additions. The holy of holies of Christianity—namely, the ethical teaching of Jesus, his world-view, his realization of the tragic nature of human existence, that is to say, of the conflict between values which is innate in the very nature of reality, and his attempt at solving that conflict in exemplary manner in his own life, which is what constitutes his redemptiveness—all this is substantially there, already given in the few genuine statements, anecdotes, and deeds of his life, in the purified Christianity we have described. They shine like gems of rare purity in the midst of ideas, values and judgements which belong to a different, Jewish, slave netherworld or a Western forest-world still unaffected by the civilizing power of ethical universalism or of spirituality. Extending his statement regarding the Old Testament to the New, may we then not say with Clement that 'the sayings accusatory of God (of the divinely inspired Jesus, instead of God as in Clement) are ... rendered void by the opposite sayings which are longside of them ... For they were not written by a prophetic hand. Wherefore also they appear opposite to the hand of God (in this case, Jesus).'[48]

2. *The Transvaluation of the Values of Jesus*

a. The Logic of Transvaluation

The transvaluation of the values of Jesus began with St. Paul. Grown up in the middle of Jewish conservatism and nurtured on rabbinical hatred of the Imperium Romanum as the embodiment of that valuational hierarchy which brought the Jews low, vanquished and uprooted their culture and historical reality, St. Paul practically invented a wholly new religion around the person of Jesus who, paradoxically, was not interested in preaching a new dogma, but a new life and a new way of life. Under St. Paul's activist revolutionism, the nay-saying attitude to lower value and the yea-saying attitude to the kingdom of God became the establishment of a church reorganizing the lives of the oppressed slaves and leading

them in a march against Rome. Quickly Christ's Christianity acquired slogans, symbols and war cries; it organized a movement and an underground and, more important, there was infused into the personality of Jesus, otherwise so disarmingly meek, so divinely dispassionate and non-assertive, so lovingly renunciative, the prerequisites of a world socio-political leadership. The kingdom of God became that which can be gained through general struggle, the necessary consequence of persistent activism in the existential affairs of this world. Evil, instead of being surmounted with Jesus-like goodness and non-resistance, was now to be overpowered through programmatic devotion to the cause and an activist search for objectives.

The Jews who remained truthful to the faith and the law never failed to regard those of them that were converted to Christianity as traitors guilty of the greatest sin of all, the sin of losing their powers of resistance. The converts, for their part, although they were desperate of Jewish faith and law, lost none of their hatred for the Imperium Romanum and its culture and set themselves, as leaders of a new movement which quickly rallied to itself the slave-world throughout the Empire, the task of destroying that Empire.

Naturally, the slave world of the Imperium demanded a heavy price from Christianity for their conversion—a price which the *revolutionnaire*-leaders were quite willing—nay, eager,—to pay. They required not a kingdom of God that *is* and is *within*, but one that will come day after tomorrow as a 'reward' for their effort—a reward meted out in judgement. They demanded to be saved at all costs but without cost to themselves, and were furnished with ready-made guarantees for salvation. Even history was re-presented as a sign-full prelude to an eschatology, *à la juive*, of which Jesus could not even have conceived. For Jesus did not believe in the imaginary causation requisite for any eschatology or finalistic determinism such as St. Paul had taught. However weak, miserable, and corrupt the Roman slave-world was, its people were vain; and the leaders immediately obliged and fed that vanity with ready-made concepts. St. Paul even promised them that they would judge in the hereafter, not only their present masters, and thus avenge themselves against them, but God's angels as well.[49]

The spread of Christianity within the Roman slave-world occasioned a transvaluation of the religion of Jesus which accomodated it to the desiderata of Jewish resentment. The slave-world and the Jews had met on the common ground of anti-Imperium resentment, and this communion laid the slave-world open to determination by ideas which the converted Jews supplied while their Jewish instincts were still untouched by the ethic of Jesus. Dominated by Jewish instincts and ideas, this leadership

decided the eschatology of the new movement, its irreconcilable opposition to the Imperium as a political as well as a cultural entity, its theory of effortless redemption through faith, its inversion of the Hellenic-Roman scale of *Arêté* and *Virtù*. Just as the dominant ideas of this transvaluation were Jewish, the leader that achieved it was St. Paul. What he did not live to do, the primitive church achieved for him under the guidance of the tradition he left behind.

This however was not the only transvaluation. The religion of Jesus underwent at the same time a serious development inspired by completely new ideas stemming from new quarters. These quarters were the 'Western' world. Geographically, the 'Western world' was not at that time confined to Europe, but extended well into the birthplace of Jesus and covered all the territories of the Roman Empire. Western culture, by which we understand the culture of Rome as influenced by Hellenism, stood in the Eastern territories side by side with Arab culture which on more than one occasion it had influenced but never dominated. Western ideology was Hellenic, though it had none of the flowering of the Greek ethic or metaphysic in either pure thought, philosophy or art. The later Greeks' search for God as the unifying principle of being, and for the good as the unifying principle of ethical reality, did not impress Rome. Whether he lived in Rome or Alexandria, Constantinople or Jerusalem, the Western man of the time was, like his Roman prototype, a child of nature. He had never seen himself as 'other than' nature, and was utterly incapable, on the moral level, of seeing nature as 'object.' As citizen or subject of the Roman Empire, his ideology was identically that of the primitive Roman whose life was totally spent in an overactive, one-directional pursuit of existence. That Hellenic culture which did succeed in entering his soul was only that which seconded his affirmative view of existence, his oneness with nature, his innocent, childlike self-assertion. Naturalism was his actuality and yearning. He had never hoped to rise above 'mother nature' which alone furnished him with his norms and ideals. He had fashioned his gods according to nature, and had deified himself with the innocence of nature.

Western man was by far the greater challenge to St. Paul than exclusivist Jewry or the hating slave-world. St. Paul's peculiar genius, however, was able to satisfy all three at the same time, and the Church continued the Pauline task equipped with his precepts and inspired by his example. Her placation of the Western man of eastern, central and northern Europe was uninhibited by the limitation which governed the work of St. Paul, namely, the slave-world. The latter was already under her dominion and nothing but a loose connection remained with the churches of the East where men of entirely different bent of mind and will contended

what St. Paul and his Western followers were teaching in the name of Jesus.

It was for the benefit of Western man that the nay-saying attitude to existence and power started to loosen and break down. For him, the language itself of disciplinary renunciation, illuminative wisdom, ethical universalism, and monotheism was incomprehensible; and to reconcile him, the leaders of Christianity transformed the church into a 'state' which monopolized all the yea-saying energies of the new community.[50] It was for his sake that Christianity invented the sacrifice of the first-born, the drinking of blood, the antagonism and contempt for everything cultured and refined.[51] It was to impress him that it developed a 'cult' with all the pomp and gold that it could muster; to satisfy his Adonic and Aphroditic inclinations that it invented the cults of the Virgin and St. Joseph and slowly introduced into heaven, which it conceived in the manner of Olympus and Valhalla, a hierarchy of higher and lower saints endowed with all sorts of supernatural and sacerdotal powers.[52]

Nonetheless, whether Jew, slave, Roman citizen or barbarian, Christianity took Western man completely by surprise. Until its advent nothing is known to have influenced his soul in favour of an ethical will or even of a consciousness of existence. Until Christianity knocked at his door, he was in a state of unconscious oneness with nature. His contact with the new life-view from the East was an unparalleled event. The new ethic was to him meaningless. It ran counter to everything he had learned to regard sacred, above all to his unbridled ego which he had been slavishly serving and to his imagination which the myths of antiquity had been feeding at the cost of his rational faculty. Naturally, the encounter affected him less than it did Christianity.

The violent existence which in the Western world man had been leading up to the time Christianity knocked at his door had not only made him a child of nature, but had brutalized his soul and character. Everything he could understand only as annihilating, or annihilable by, him. Harmony, balance, compromise, co-existence were values to which the kind of forest existence he had been leading did not draw him. His flat-footed conduct was only a reflection of his spiritual flatfootedness which knew no middle ground. Had Jesus' teaching been presented to him in its candidness and truth, he would have rejected it as incomprehensible. The Western transformation, however, had made it acceptable. The confluence of Western being with Jewish being took place not in Jesus, but in the Western violent understanding of Jesus. Knowing no middle ground, Western man adopted what was mis-presented to him as 'Christ,' applying in good 'faith' the logic of hatred to everything.

It was a stroke of fate that St. Paul conceived of the gentiles as Romans

and Greeks rather than as Arabs or other peoples living further east. Had he chosen to travel eastward or southward, his teaching would have fallen on arid soil, on a soil made arid by the temperance and *largeur de cœur* of Arab spirit, and Christianity would have had a totally different history. Instead, St. Paul travelled north and westward where man stood prepared to receive the spiritual violence he had come to teach. Western man was accustomed to pursue existence only at the cost of neighbour and nature; to pursue science and knowledge only in defiance of a god from whom as Prometheus he had usurped power; to pursue social being only through wars; and finally to seek religious piety only by placating his gods with sacrifices.

b. The Four Great Transvaluations

(1) *In Matters Ethical*

(a) Life Affirmation Became Life Negation

Life with all its bliss and suffering, which Jesus regarded as a gift from God for which He ought to be praised continuously, came to be looked upon with suspicion. Likewise, the elemental values, which in Jesus' balanced judgement were assigned the order due, came to be regarded as disvalues.[53] The moral enthusiasm which, in Jesus, propelled man in his flight towards the higher, moral value, Western Christianity transformed into a firebrand zeal, resting on axiological monism.[54] What Jesus conceived of as necessary training and disciplining, *viz.*, fasting and the curbing of desire and passion, became, in Western Christianity, good *per se*, desirable in and for themselves.[55]

Life, pleasure and power, Christ taught, obstructed the pursuit of higher values. Therefore, reasoned Western Christianity, they should be 'plucked out.' The equally Christian truth that higher value is a realm of intricately connected, mutually dependent individual values which must be all at once the object of desire and will did not draw the attention of the Western Christian. His new pursuit was furious, like his other pursuits; and fury allows no diversity, no chance of division of attention and energy. Therefore, rather than a plurality of higher values, an axiological monism; and the violence within was much better satisfied. Thus, what started out to be a pursuit of Life with a capital L, understood by Jesus as a commitment to all value and denial of none unless such is incontrovertibly demanded by a value of higher order, became a denial first of the lower values and then, in the heated pursuit of the eradication of these, a denial of the properly moral higher values as well.

Jesus' ethic of conditional renunciation, his balanced commitment to all, and preoccupation with the higher, values became an anti-sense, anti-instinct, anti-life mortification ethic. This was a language the Western

Christian could, and indeed did, understand. There *was* a wild beast within him, which he now realized he ought to destroy. And it was easy to convince him of such an ought, to impress upon his conscience a feeling of sinfulness, for his instincts had never been transfigured or spiritualized; they had never entered into any axiological nexus of higher values.

Having thus understood the nature of the new ethos, the Western Christian carried, at the advice of St. Paul, the anti-nature, anti-flesh tendencies of Jesus to untold extremes. The more did he see of his old self in himself or around him (indeed, even in his own 'Christian' church as in the case of Savonarola and Luther), the more extremist, persistent and violent he became in life-negation. The East had merely to suggest the device of monasticism for him to plunge with it to unknown depth.[56] And having tasted the pleasure of cowing himself, of spiritual as well as physical eunuchdom, he thought the whole message of Jesus consisted of such 'triumph over the flesh.'

(b) Universalism Became Christianism

The devotion and loyalty of Western Christians continued to drift away from the original values of Jesus. As their Christianity acquired worldly status, it began to solicit and then to demand the loyalty of the people. Jesus, who once was the focus of all loyalty and yearning, disappeared behind the human carriers of the Jesus idea, first as the corporate church and then as the corporate state. The individual, evocative and moving values of Jesus disappeared under their collective name, Christianity. Christianity, with all its ethical universalism, became Christianism. The land which was not under its banner became a 'heathen,' barbaric territory where a socio-political program was to be instituted under the profession of a missionarizing which did not neglect to bring the new converts under the political and cultural dominion of the church. Jesus' brotherhood of man became not a brotherhood of believers, but a brotherhood of those believers who alone were willing to submit themselves without reservation to the political and spiritual authority of the church. As some believers differentiated themselves from the new territorial brotherhoods by holding fast to Jesus' original teaching and refusing to comply with the church-introduced practices and views, the vials of wrath, now called 'the holy wrath of Christ,' were turned against them as heretics. Even as he preached the equality of all men before God and that distinction before Him can take place solely on moral grounds, St. Paul could not rid himself of an in-bred Jewishness which never rests until the Jew is supreme. 'But Glory, honour, and peace,' he preached to the Romans, 'to every man that worketh good, to the Jew first, and also

to the Gentile.'[57] Nay, God himself is first God of the Jews and is God of the gentiles only 'also.'[58] Indeed, even when the Jews combat Christ and his Gospel, accuse, condemn and crucify him, 'they are beloved for the fathers' (the Jewish ancestors') sakes,' and stretching the point till it really breaks, St. Paul deems that 'they are enemies for your sakes,'[59] that is to say, they have obliged us all to all eternity by being the enemies of Christ![60]

(2) *In Matters Doctrinal*

(a) Rationalism Became Mysticism

The alliance between the mind and the heart became enmity. Ever since the dawn of history, wisdom was recognized by the Arab spirit as the highest prized possession of the most fortunate and blessed of men. The prophet was a man endowed with wisdom; and so were the poet, the surgeon, the religious leader. From the beginning, God was conceived to have blessed men when He taught him the names of the various creatures of the land, sea and air and gave him dominion over them.[61] Knowledge of good and evil is indeed the highest knowledge and certainly the most useful and necessary. Because it challenged its blind attachment to an empty monotheism devoid of ethical significance, Hebrew conservatism had dictated that knowledge of good and evil is sin. Ethical knowledge revolted the Hebrews because it had proved dangerous to their separatism and hence to their whole being. They transformed it into sin and ascribed it to Adam and Eve in order to denigrate it in their tradition-filled legalistic minds.[62] Western Christianity seized upon this Hebrew 'achievement.' It universalized this 'sin,' made it hereditary, and declared it of the essence of humanity. This 'sin' became the groundwork of 'Redemption' and hence of the whole Western understanding of Christianity.

It is not possible that Jesus, who counselled 'Be ye therefore perfect, even as your father which is in heaven is perfect,'[63] could have conceived perfection as excluding wisdom. He commanded his apostles to 'be ... therefore wise as serpents.'[64] He instructed and taught the people around him. That he held knowledge a value, indeed one of the very highest values, cannot be denied. And so, in many of his arguments, Jesus made his case rest on consistency, contradiction or on the depth of insight of his interlocutors. He realized the intimate connection between virtue and knowledge; that without knowledge, moral virtue itself not only becomes questionable but can never be achieved. He did not come to deny the value of knowledge, but to assist and inspire and guide man in his pursuit of good and evil by furnishing him with answers issuing immediately from God. In no case did he denigrate knowledge, wisdom or any pursuit

that seeks to discover good or evil. Nor is there any evidence that he intended his teaching to make the pursuit of wisdom unnecessary. In fact his coming was a liberation of the spirit to pursue wisdom freely, the spirit which Jewish conservatism had been keeping in chains in the belief that Jewish separatism would thus be best preserved.

For St. Paul, on the other hand, 'knowledge,' 'reason' and 'wisdom' were in themselves evil.[65] They had been so regarded by Jewish conservatism; and St. Paul may have given up his allegiance to Jewry but not his prejudices as a Jew. Moreover, knowledge and wisdom were inseparable from Graeco-Roman Antiquity which he, as both a Jew and a *révolutionnaire*, condemned. Thirdly, having once decided on the Christianist course, he could not see in further deliberation, in extended and deepened knowledge, but a threat and a distraction. Axiological monism, like every other monism, is violent. It looks upon every alternative as subversion.[66] Subversion it indeed is, since the very existence of an alternative is the undoing of the original monism. Knowledge, reason and wisdom are precisely the fount of alternatives. Hence, St. Paul decided that they must go.

Indeed St. Paul became the most eloquent enemy of culture. '... I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and will bring to nothing the understanding of the prudent ... Hath not God made foolishness the wisdom of this world? For after that in the wisdom of God, the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe ... unto the Greeks foolishness ... Not many noble are called. But God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise; and God hath chosen the weak things of the world to confound the things which are mighty; and base things of the world and things which are despised hath God chosen, yea, and things which are not to bring to nought things that are.'[67] 'If any man among you seemeth to be wise in this world, let him become a fool that he may be wise. For the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God.'[68]

It was not Jesus but Paul that desired to vanquish the culture of the Graeco-Roman Antiquity. It was Paul and his Western and Westernized followers who succeeded in pulling down that culture until no stone was left standing. Once the worldly dominion of Pauline Christianity was established, every trace of Hellenic and Roman wisdom, philosophic, aesthetic, or historic, was systematically eradicated and laid under foot,[69] the more consistently and pervasively the more furious the battle within between the will to know, the will to power, and the will to goodness on one hand, and the will to faith, the will to negation and the will to hate, on the other. As the vanquishing of Rome and Hellas became complete, there came the Dark Ages, so called by later Western Christians because

their ancestors had extinguished the light of Hellas and the great Imperium was no longer standing, while the light of so-called Christianity was allowed, by their action, to stand unchallengeably alone.

(b) Monotheism Became Trinitarianism

The idolatrous paganism of the Roman Empire could not accept Jesus' professed monotheism. Nor could their instinct for heroworship enable its adherents to see in Jesus a God-sent messenger elected to convey to mankind God's confirmation of the universalism of earlier prophets, against Jewish separatism, and His new exhortation of mankind to pursue the higher spiritual values, against Roman-Hellenic materialism and obsession with lower value. Thus Jesus was raised to equal rank with God. The Holy Ghost, which in Jesus' words stood for the mind or moving power of God, was hypostasized into another godhead. But in order to remain true to the original monotheism, the mystery of the trinity was instituted to effect by faith a unity that reason could not effect. Naturally, Western Christianity presented its transvalued doctrine as 'the only truth;' naturally, it has always been anxious that its adherents regard the doctrine as such. Accordingly, it has conjured up arguments designed to prove its innocence, its objectivity and its loyalty to the teaching and spirit of Jesus. In justification of its transvaluation of the monotheism of Jesus, Western Christianity had persistently offered two arguments: First, that Jesus did regard himself as God; and second, that the disciples had acknowledged him as such. We shall now examine its claims.

I *The Arguments from Jesus' Idea of Himself*

The advocates of this argument for the transformation of the nature of Jesus point to the fact that Jesus had called, or permitted himself to be called, the 'son of man,' the 'son of God,' 'the Christ,' and 'Lord.' This, according to Western Christianity, is eloquent evidence that Jesus regarded himself as a person worthy of worship. Since son of God meant to him what it means for the Western Christian today, Jesus must have regarded himself the second person of the trinity.

'Son of man' is a literal translation of the Hebrew, Arabic and Aramaic *bar-nash* (or *bar-nasha*, a variant) or *bar-Adam* (Arabic *ibn nas* or *ibn Adam*), all of which meant a well-bred, noble man, or simply, man. The Hebrew and Arabic expressions have kept this same meaning to the present day. In Biblical texts the term is used in Daniel in the same meaning but denotes the future leader of the Jews who 'came to the Ancient of Days (*i.e.*, God, to receive directly from Him) ... dominion and glory and a kingdom, that all people, nations and languages should serve him ...'.[70] In the Similitudes of Enoch[71] 'son of man' is attributed to the personage

who is to rescue Israel and reestablish its power and glory 'over all the nations,' as an honorific title. It is immaterial that the 'son of man' was identified now as Enoch,[62] now as an eternal figure;[73] for in both cases the same function, implying the same moral excellence, remains. This is also true of the Davidic messiah whose character and personality, though not his name, were identical with those of 'son of man.' In the synoptic gospels, the term was used in the same meaning combining the different references that it acquired in Old Testament usage.[64]

Originally meaning real demi-gods or angels,[75] the term 'son (or sons) of God,' carried the same connotation of *arêté* or excellence as 'son of man' but raised to a superlative degree. Hence its ascription to demi-gods and angels. Later it acquired more moral colour and came to mean the devout and pious person who consecrated himself to God's service.[76] In another dimension of meaning, the Jews regarded every one of their folk indiscriminately as 'son of God' inasmuch as God was thought of as 'their' father. Their king, present or expected (Messiah), was deemed entitled to this title *a fortiori*. In this dimension sonship was sometimes taken in its literal sense, but in general it carried the connotation of election, of distinction—on whatever basis happened to be relevant—from other human beings, not the literal 'sonship' whether biological or miraculous which by nature cannot be invested but merely happens. In the Gospel of Mark, the sonship of God was vested for the first time in Jesus at baptism; thus it must have signified the election of Jesus for a special and consecrated career.[77] Matthew understood Jesus' sonship as Davidic messiahship.[78] His emphasis, evident in Jesus' speaking of God as his father rather than of himself as God's son, betrays genuine sensitivity to the danger implied in carrying the metaphor too far. In the Epistles and in the Fourth Gospel, evidently a new meaning was introduced: The Father-son concept was no more physical or moral, but metaphysical and miraculous,[79] bearing full evidence of the Greek misunderstanding that befell the ordinary and metaphysic-free 'sonship' of Arab (Palestinian) consciousness.

Besides the literal meaning of *Christos*, i.e. 'anointed', the appellation of 'Christ' had a double connotation: one, particularly Jewish, combining kingship and high priesthood; and the other, generally Arab, since it was entertained by non-Jews as well, expressing the Arab general yearning for prophecy. Whereas the Jews had pressed in their concept all the hope of the restoration of their wordly kingdom in power, gold and glory, the Arabs meant the leader who would lift to the light of consciousness the values of universalism and spirituality which, though repeatedly captured and eloquently expressed by many prophets hitherto, had been beclouded by Jewish separatism and Roman-Hellenic naturalism.

The Western Christian concept of 'Christ' is the result of a misunderstanding of two mutually exclusive and irreconcilable concepts, one Jewish and the other Arab. It combines two widely differentiated elements: Jewish kingship and Arab prophethood, the former being the symbol and expression of revenge and racist self-assertion, and the latter, that of universalist redemption through moral excellence taught and exemplified by the prophet. No wonder that the enemies of Christ were confused, thinking of him as pretender to the Jewish throne at one time and as universal prophet with a message from heaven at another.[80] It adds to this combination its understanding of Sonship of God and, in order to make this hotch-potch of concepts stick together, it introduces a metaphysical, transcendental, miraculous element, thus lifting the whole matter beyond the reach of common sense or reason.

For Jesus himself, inasmuch as insight can be gained into what these terms may have meant to him, 'son of man' and 'son of God' were synonymous with a good, virtuous and upright man, to which any qualifying person had title. By calling himself 'son of man' (He never called himself 'son of God'!), Jesus could have sought to assert the moral requisites implied in prophethood in general, or those still to be exemplified in the unfolding of his career. The disciples, on the other hand, by calling him by these names, meant to assert that this man Jesus was exactly what a man, a leader, a prophet, ought to be; and there can be no doubt that Jesus' behaviour compelled the greatest admiration and respect not only of his followers, but of his enemies as well, whether Jews or Romans. The appellation of 'Christ' must have seemed to Jesus too presumptuous. Even if, *per impossibile*, it can be demonstrated that Jesus did at times think of himself as 'the messiah,' in the general prophetic sense of the term devoid of Jewish worldly rehabilitation or kingship, he at any rate had deemed this appellation inopportune and inappropriate. Hence, his counselling the disciples against its use.[81] 'Son of man' and 'son of God' carried the same kind of moral connotation as 'Christ,' but they were less strong, had a wider denotation, and were far more appropriate. Evidently then, none of the appellations implied anything beyond the allegorical description of ethical excellence. In the notion of 'Christ' there was no implication of divinity whatever, although the understanding of it as implying the highest ethical vision and moral excellence may have implied that such a leader could operate, as prophets had always done, only under divine guidance.

Against this understanding, the apotheosizers of Jesus bring the so-called evidence that Jesus must have thought of himself as divine when he said, 'I and my father are one.'[82] Besides being found only in John's gospel, which is more Greek in its system of thought and categories than

the synoptic gospels from which it is excluded, this statement makes no necessary or self-evident implication of divinity. By it Jesus could very well have meant the simple truth that what he was teaching was the message that God had commanded him to teach; that his spirit was in full harmony with God's. If it is possible for an employee to identify himself with his employer, a lover with his beloved, in order to express their perfect *rapport*, it should be possible and necessary for a prophet to identify himself (*i.e.*, his prophetic soul, or ethical knowledge, not his individuated being) with God Whom he conceives as his sender, master and beloved, and Whose will he teaches. Whereas Jesus often spoke of 'the children of God,' St. John alone spoke of Jesus as the 'only begotten son.'

Western christology holds that the disciples and followers had asked Jesus for the remission of their sins. This implies that those who asked him for forgiveness must have thought of him as endowed with the power to forgive sins. Since Jesus had granted their request, he must have thought of himself endowed with that capacity. But only God has the power to forgive sins. It follows, therefore, that Jesus must have thought of himself, and the disciples must have thought of him, as divine.

This argument rests on the false ground that in the Judaic environment in which Jesus lived and taught, only God was thought capable of forgiving sins. In fact, the Jewish priesthood enjoyed this power and their exercise of it was recognized as proper, legitimate and right. Indeed, to '*kipper*' sins was one of the priesthood's most important functions. However, some Palestinians objected to Jesus' remission of the people's sins and called it blasphemy,[83] thus confirming the Western interpretation that the people did understand that Jesus was, at least implicitly, claiming for himself something blasphemous. There is nothing surprising in this, for it is commonplace that some Jews had misunderstood Jesus. Monotheism had been current since Abraham, and any assumption of divine power would have sounded offensive and blasphemous to many monotheists. What is surprising however is Western Christianity's disregard of Jesus' defence against the Jewish charge. He did not concede to their accusation. On the contrary, he reassured them, not that he was God, nor that he had divine power as if by nature, but precisely that he did not mean anything of the sort. Hence his answer, 'Wherefore think ye evil in your hearts?'[84] God, he explained to them, Who gave me the power to resuscitate the dead, did grant me the lesser power to forgive sins.[85] And, Jesus would insist, unless 'your hearts' are full of 'evil thoughts', you would not regard my exercise of this power as blasphemy; for it does not imply that I am God, but a genuine prophet of God, unto Whom it is all too natural 'to have power on earth to forgive sins.'[86]

Hath not the Jewish priest that power? How much more so should a genuine prophet such as I? And isn't my healing power sufficient evidence of my genuineness? Thus, we can picture the conversation running. Had Jesus, on the other hand, sought to establish his divinity rather than his 'power to forgive sins,' he would have confessed to their accusation and sought to prove his divinity and justify his claim. But he repudiated their charge and blamed his accusers of 'evil thoughts' in their hearts. Jesus did not seek to establish his divinity because divinity was not to be established by an appeal to logical implication. Nor is the power to heal—which he recoursed to as conclusive evidence of his genuine prophethood—a conclusive evidence of divinity, either by the standards of God or of men.

It is also argued that the charge which was directed against Jesus by the Sanhedrin and for which they, in council, had resolved to condemn him, was blasphemy, a purely religious offence directed against God. This charge was made after Jesus had told the council, 'I am (*i.e.*, the Christ, the Son of the Blessed) and you will see the Son of Man sitting at the right hand of Power, and coming with the clouds of Heaven,'[87] thus justifying the Rabbis' understanding that Jesus actually claimed for himself divine status.

The account of the trial of Jesus in the four gospels is rendered in uncertain, equivocal words. Matthew's account of the accusation that Jesus claimed he could destroy the temple and rebuild it 'in three days'[88] makes little sense as it stands. Read against Mark's explanatory remark about the old 'temple' that 'it is made with hands' whereas the new temple shall be 'not made with hands,'[89] it begins to reveal the meaning Jesus had been emphatically teaching—namely, that the old temple signifies a fanatic attachment to the deadening letter of the law, to cult and to ritual which have been severed from any spiritual significance; and such a temple would be quickly swept away by the smallest storm. The new temple, on the other hand, the temple Jesus was building, is one 'not made with hands,' but with the spirit. Its foundation would not be the worldly power of the Jews or the political kingdom for which they earned so strongly, but a monument of hearts united by recognition of God and total obedience to His will. Jesus, it is here obvious, would not let any opportunity escape, even during the trial at which his very life was at stake, without preaching the spiritual kingdom of God against the worldly kingdom of Jewish aspiration.

Only Matthew and Mark report this story of the two temples. That its version in Mark is the true one is further corroborated by the report of another enquiry at the trial common to all four gospels but peculiarly misunderstood by Mark. Jesus was asked whether he was the Christ.

His answer, as reported by Matthew[90] and Luke[91] was vague and evasive. In Luke's gospel, Jesus is reported to have despaired that any of his examiners would understand or believe what he was about to say. The phrase 'you say that I am' is neither affirmative nor negative. If it means any position at all, it certainly proves that Jesus dit not want to answer the question. To this reluctance he was compelled by the fact that even though he may have believed himself to be the Christ, yet that concept meant for him something entirely different from what the Sanhedrin would, and in fact did, understand thereby. Hence his reluctance to answer and his despair of the interrogators' comprehension. Mark alone puts on Jesus' lips a defiant, un-Jesuslike, affirmative answer,[92] implying that Jesus and the Sanhedrin entertained the same meaning of the term 'Christ,' which is absurd. As must have been the case, the term 'Christ' had a different meaning for the questioner than for the questioned, and since this was the case, no categorical answer could have been given. Mark, therefore, has misrepresented Jesus on this point.

That the Sanhedrin had failed to establish their charge of blasphemy against Jesus is borne out by the fact that they changed their accusation in front of the Roman governor. There, taking the evasive answer of Jesus to mean that he was Christ in their sense of the term, *viz.*, in the sense of Christ-king, they directed to him the novel charge of setting himself against the imperial authority of Caesar. Luke gives evidence of this in his account of subsequent events at Pilate's praetorium. 'We found this man perverting our nation, and forbidding us to give tribute to Caesar and saying that he himself is Christ a King.'[93] John's gospel adds a further clarification: 'If thou let this man go,' the Jews reminded Pilate, 'thou art not Caesar's friend: whosoever maketh himself a king speaketh against Caesar.'[94] Hence Pilate's question, repeated in all four gospels, 'Art thou the King of the Jews?'[95] To this question, the synoptic gospels report the same non-committal answer, 'Thou sayst it.' John, however, let no room for doubt that Jesus thought of himself in no such terms. He reports that Jesus gave Pilate a sermon explaining the difference between the two meanings of kingship,[96] after which Pilate emerged convinced there was no crime and no criminal. Jesus had convinced Pilate that he sought no Jewish kingship either for or against Caesar; that he was not a blasphemously mad man claiming for himself the status of God. For if Pilate had found him innocent on the count of contending Caesar's authority as a political king of the Jews, he must have found him innocent on the other count of claiming divinity. The latter claim must have certainly been more odious in Caesar's political eyes than the former. To be a god was greater than to be an emperor. And to be a monotheistic God such as Jesus would have claimed is to be greater than

all the gods and all the emperors; it is to be uniquely deserving of all men's worship, affection and loyalty to the exclusion of all other—gods, emperors, kings or men. But the Gospel-fact is that Pilate found Jesus innocent. Kingship of the Jews and divinity have this in common that they both imply contention of Caesar's authority. If Jesus was found innocent of the former, he could not have been guilty of the latter.

John adds a superbly human note. He intimates to the reader that Jesus seized the opportunity of being alone with Pilate and preached to him God's message, but that Pilate remained suspicious of 'the truth' of which Jesus claimed to bear witness. Universalism and spirituality were not the kind of message which Pilate, the Roman, could have readily accepted. Far from suggesting, therefore—let alone proving—that Jesus thought of himself as God, the Sanhedrin's and the Roman interrogations reveal the opposite. Jesus defended his prophethood, as he ought. The understanding that he regarded himself divine is as ill founded as that which regarded him as 'the King of the Jews.' Both issue from the equivocal meaning of 'messiah.' The Jewish Sanhedrin certainly knew the whole trial was a farce, and they designed it in order to compel the concurrence of the Roman governor. Their real grievance was against Jesus' ethic and universalism which ran diametrically counter to their morbid conservatism and their 'chosen people' complex.

II *The Argument from the Disciples' Idea of Jesus*

Western christology argues that 'the cult of the Lord Jesus was inherent in Christianity from the beginning;'[97] that 'the eventual formulation of an explicit doctrine of our Lord's deity as the incarnate Son of God was necessitated by the fact that it provided the only ultimate intellectual justification of such a cultus.'[98] Jesus had been recognized by the disciples and other early Christians as Lord, that is to say, as object of worship. This recognition, it is argued, must have had a basis in fact, either in Jesus' understanding of himself or in his sufferance of the disciples' understanding of him. It was for this reason that they applied the term *kurios* (lord) to him. This obviously presupposes a cultus which in turn presupposes a religious devotional attitude towards Jesus on the part of those early Christian missionaries who took Christianity to the Greek world. Therefore, it is concluded, original Palestinian Christians must have conceived of Jesus as God,[99] and from this that Jesus is God.

From the hands of Wilhelm Bousset, this argument received complete refutation.[100] That the vocative *kurie* is used in addressing any elder or superior towards whom the speaker wishes to show respect is well known. From the time of the New Testament[101] to the present day, every language has had a respect-signifying vocative which connoted the

same idea of mastery and superiority of the addressee without implying divinity.[102] This usage of the term, therefore, may be ignored.

The term '*O Kurios*' (the Lord, the Master) is not a vocative. It occurs only once in Matthew and once in Mark.[103] There, it is true, Jesus spoke of himself as 'the Lord.' But it is groundless to construe his use of the term as religious. It is common when a messenger is sent after something to command him saying, 'Tell so and so that the master *(O Kurios)* wishes such and such.' This, Bousset correctly affirms, is a profane lordship; it presupposes no cultus and from it, nothing follows for religion.

In Luke and John '*O Kurios*' occurs often. But it is here, Bousset argues, that Hellenic influence begins and the purity of original Palestinian Christianity ends. It is futile to appeal to them, therefore, and *a fortiori* to such usage of the term as is found in the Acts, Epistles or Revelation since all these are the effect of a development which had already taken place in the Christian concept of Christ. The evidence for this is that *O Kurios* is a term which has no equivalent in Aramaic. It was possible to use the word *Mar* (Lord) only as a vocative and more likely in conjunction with a possessive pronoun like *Mari* (My Lord) or *Maran* (Our Lord). But in this form no religious (cultic) meaning is necessarily implied. Since *Mar* was not commonly used as a title of God,[104] such a cultic meaning is all the less probable. The religious usage we find in Luke, John and, particularly, in Paul must then be new, developed under the influence of Greek concepts, in the same manner as Hellenic Judaism came to call Jahweh by the borrowed name of '*Adonai*.'[105]

The advocates of Pauline christology therefore rest their case, in final analysis, upon the fact that Paul and the early Christian community did see in Jesus a person to whom they felt it appropriate to apply the religious concept 'Lord' and to whom they referred as *Maran*, or 'Our Lord.' Even in the absence of unequivocal evidence that Jesus regarded himself, or the early Palestinian community regarded him, as God, his divinity is a presupposition of the faith of Paul and his followers, whose faith is constitutive of Christianity.

This view may do justice to the faith of Paul and to his followers; but it does untold harm to the faith of Jesus himself. It is true that Jesus espoused a cause and for its sake demanded and obtained faith in himself and in that cause. His cause, however, was not the cause of his own person, but that of God, of his God and our God. Would the prophet of God who candidly taught, 'Whosoever speaketh a word against the son of man, it shall be forgiven him: but whosoever speaketh against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him,'[196] think of himself as consubstantial with the Holy Ghost? Did he who counselled: 'Why callest

thou me good? *There is* none good but one, *that is* God,'[107] do so in false modesty, or did he really regard himself as other than deity? Did the person who achieved such humility arrogate to himself the judgeship of the world and claim for himself the glory of coming down on clouds and avenging himself against the malefactors? These and similar notions are far from being the picture Jesus had at other times given of himself; rather, they are the development of the dogmatic *Christianist* community induced to satisfy its own theological and sectarian purposes. That Paul and his fellow Christians have seen or understood Jesus as they did may be relevant for the biographers of Paul and the historians of the early Christian community; as indicative or instructive of the genuine nature and mind of Jesus, they are worthless. And yet, whence did the Christian community obtain these ideas? Granted these notions were inexistent in Jesus and in his first Palestinian followers, how did the latter's representation of Jesus to the Greek world produce such a transformation of them? How is the development of this idea of Jesus to be explained?

The answer to these questions seems to lie in the language habits (as indices of consciousness) of the Arab stream of being. The imaginativeness, the inborn poetic character of Arab consciousness, Arab obsession with the forms of the word as a medium of communication and expression have caused a necessary connection to be established between aesthetic value and every other realm of being, including moral value, the only aspect of the will of God knowable to man. For the peoples of the Arab stream of being it is impossible to communicate or soliloquize without beautifying their speech with figures, metaphors, similes and other literary means. For the person whose consciousness is Arab, the aesthetic forms of the language come naturally when he speaks, and the meanings are clearly grasped when he listens. Just as the aesthetic beauty of the *Qur'an*, recited by the Prophet Muhammad, was appreciated by all and misunderstood by none in Arabia, so the aesthetic beauty of Jesus' speech as well as that of his disciples was clearly understood by the Palestinians and Syrians and started being misunderstood only when, like the *Qur'an*, it travelled outside the Arab stream of being. Even the Gospel of John, which, more than the other three gospels, carries this style of the extreme, is not hard to understand if one assumes an Arab attitude of mind. Such an expression as 'son of God' is perfectly appropriate for a good man, not to speak of a divinely determined prophet like Jesus. Only a crude, naive, and, most important of all, a non-Arab mind could take it literally. Jesus himself spoke repeatedly of the 'children of God' and for him the concept 'God' was inseparable from the concept, 'the Father which is in heaven.' Jesus was indeed the 'word of God,' sent to save the world. His spirit, his wisdom, his word, were 'of God.'

But this is far from implying the identification of Jesus with God. Indeed, Western man's experienced difficulty with the words of Jesus and of his disciples stands on a par with the difficulty experienced by the Persian Muslims with the Qur'anic descriptions of God. Both the Western Christians and the Persians lacked the poetical bent of mind to grasp the meaning behind the figures of speech. But whereas Western man resorted to the facile road of apotheosis, the Persian Muslims swang to the other extreme of unbalanced allegorical interpretation.

III *The Idea of Transcendence and its Communicability*

What lesson can we learn from this account of Jesus' deification by Western man?

God is the transcendent being. This means that it is not possible for man to conceptualize Him. Yet, the Arabs, who were the first to discover the idea of transcendence and for whom the transcendent God is a fact of consciousness, had to find means of describing and communicating that idea. For this only poetry and letters could furnish the means. Where concepts are *ex hypothesi* ruled out, only percepts remain. Percepts can be aesthetic (*i.e.*, sensory) or imaginative. The former are ruled out because, by nature, they are limitative, whereas the latter are boundless and of themselves imply no restriction, though the subject's faculty may impose restrictions upon them. By their means it is possible for one subject to stir the imagination of another. But unless this other is capable of so moving his imagination as to carry the percept, as it were, on its boundless flight, no intuition of the transcendent idea can be had. The transcendent necessarily demands such flight of the imagination as this faculty is by nature incapable of furnishing. And it is precisely at the point where the imagination gives up the flight and succumbs that the intuition of the transcendent idea is obtained.

The imaginative percept is necessarily aesthetic, but now in the corrupt sense of 'beautiful.' The unaesthetic percept is incapable of inducing the movement of the imagination requisite for intuition. And this is the reason as well as the consequence, of Arab obsession with the aesthetics of 'the word.' It was only natural that the non-Arab convert to Christianity, as well as the non-Arab convert to Islam six centuries later, with his undeveloped imagination and his ignorance of the language of revelation, understood the beautiful imaginative percepts as sensory concepts and then racked his brains trying to subsume them under categories of the theoretical consciousness. By asking how Jesus could be the son of God without being himself divine, the first non-Arab Christian, as well as the first non-Arab Muslim who asked himself how God could 'sit squarely on the throne'[108] without being corporeal, proved himself incapable of

representing the transcendent by means of the aesthetic indeed, by any means at all since this is the only medium possible for its representation.

Had there been no strict command that the *Qur'an* is, and is always to remain, an Arabic *Qur'an*, thus orienting the efforts of the non-Arab Muslims to return to and never despair of an understanding of the original revelation in its own tongue and under the light of Arab consciousness exclusively, the same development would have befallen Muhammad's revelation as did Jesus'. The development of Shi'i ideas of 'Ali and the imamate clearly illustrate the point. It runs parallel to the Christian early development.[109] It was a misfortune that hardly any of the Christians of the first two or three generations spoke Jesus' language. Only the Ebionites are known to have done so; and, in consequence, their Christianity was different from that of Greek and Roman culture. The other Christians reconstructed the Christianity of Jesus in terms of Greek and Roman consciousness. To the Ebionites, Jesus was never God, but always the 'prophet of God,' exactly as the Homilean Peter said of him, in consummation of the Seventh Homily: 'But I (Peter) am a Servant of God, the Creator of all things, and a disciple of His Prophet who is at His right hand. Wherefore I, being His apostle, preach the truth: To serve a good man I drive away diseases, for I am His second messenger ...'.[110]

C. The Coherence of Jesus' Mission with the Prophetic Tradition

1. *The Historic Need for Christianity*

At the time Jesus made his appearance, the Arab world was divided between several forces. The Roman force had spent itself and could hardly justify itself even in its own eyes. The imperialist world-view which saw in Rome the ideal pattern to which the 'barbarian' world ought to be moulded gave way to skepticism; and this, through the cultural laissez-faire it inevitably produced, hastened the work of disintegration.[111]

In Palestine, after the destruction of their state by Assyria and Persia and the carrying off of their people into exile and slavery, the Hebrews favoured the name 'Jew' and succeeded in propagating it so well that history has since come to know them no more as 'Hebrews' but as 'Jews.' 'Jew' was deemed preferable to 'Hebrew' because by its connotation of citizenship of the national state, the restitution of which was now the focus of all their thought and passion, it reminded them of their identity which now combined with 'Hebrew' separatism the new 'Judea-State' consciousness which consumed their souls. The majority of them were 'Pharisees' (*Perushim* meaning 'separatists'), rallied around the determi-

nation to remain an exclusivist, closed society and to resist every effort at amalgamation with the rest or any part of mankind. Accordingly, their tenacity to 'the law' and 'the traditions of the fathers' knew no bounds.[112] Their legalism and fanatic separatism differentiated them from the Sadducees who cooperated with the invaders and partook in non-Hebrew practices, and from the middle-of-the-road Samaritans whose greatest departure from the rest consisted in their rejection of Ezra and Nehemiah's orders for repudiation of their non-Hebrew wives. As we have seen earlier, it was the Pharisees who opposed, condemned and crucified Jesus in the name of that law, with reference to which his ethical universalism and spirituality were rejected as '*bid'a*', *i.e.*, as condemnable religious innovation. Chapter 23 of Matthew gives us a candid picture of their moral hypocrisy which masqueraded as conservative piety. Indeed, Phariseeism was so deeply rooted that even the first Christians were not entirely free of it. The New Testament tells us that they made 'no small dissension and disputation' as to whether or not the gentile converts to Christianity would be circumcized as well as obey the Mosaic law.[113] Paul had scarcely decided in favour of waiving the circumcision requirement when he turned around and circumcized Timothy 'because of (*i.e.*, in order to placate) the Jews which were in those quarters.'[114]

The rest of the ancient world was pagan. Arab consciousness had become extremely sensitive to human brotherhood and yearned for a fresh assertion of the universalism which the ancient world had denied and the Jews had so poignantly violated. Egyptian or Persian separatism, where it existed, was foreign; but Jewish separatism was internal, within and of the Arab stream of being itself. Naturally it was the *bête noire* standing in the way of this consciousness's determined drive to reach a universal brotherhood. On the individual level, on the other hand, man had equally fallen prey to the wildest self-seeking. The higher, properly moral values were to be found and realized only among monastic orders and stoics, and even there this realization was more a denial of the disvalues prevalent in their surroundings than the result of an ethical commitment to all value. Tendencies towards ethical universalism developed with the Essenes who, on many points, believed and practised the teachings of the Sermon on the Mount.[115] They had withdrawn from Palestinian society altogether and formed a celibacy-practicing monastic order whose meagre numbers depended wholly on the children entrusted to them by their neighbours for the purposes of general education.[116] It was inevitable in such an atmosphere as the Arab world provided, where except for the Essenes universalism and ethicality were so strongly violated, that a rediscovery and reassertion of that fountain be made.

2. *The Effect of Saviourism upon the History of Revelation*

a. The Fall of Man Is a Misinterpretation

This historic need of the world at the advent of Jesus for a religion satisfying these basic yearnings of the human soul, which is an indubitable fact of history, is implicitly denied in Western Christianity's saviourism, *i.e.*, the doctrine of human salvation as a *fait accompli*.[118]

Christianity shares with Judaism the story of the creation and of the fall of Adam and Eve, of the Deluge, the Patriarchs, the Exodus and the whole of the prophetic tradition. Starting from the incarnation and crucifixion of Jesus which it regards as the work of providence designed to bring about salvation, the Western interpretation of Christianity goes back to Abraham and regards the whole of Hebrew history and the prophetic tradition as the gradual unfolding of a divine plan to save man.

This plan to save man was conceived by God to meet the special situation created by the fall of Adam and Eve. God, it is held, who has created man in His own image, could not see man thus condemned to eternal doom. He therefore conceived a plan for his salvation and incepted a series of events in history designed to bring it about. The divine plan is alleged to have started with Abraham, developed through Hebrew history and the prophets and culminated in Jesus. Western Christianity understands the fall of man in the same manner as the Hebrews. Adam's fault was that of having tasted of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, of good and evil. Wisdom, or ethical knowledge is condemned from the start. It is 'sin,' carefully and unequivocally prohibited by God Himself.[119] To this Hebrew understanding, Western Christianity adds the view that this sinful predicament of man is natural and hereditary, communicating itself necessarily from man to man everywhere.[120] For countless millions of years since the first humans trod on this earth, God suffered all men to sin, to suffer and to die. 'Death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression.'[121] It regards Adam's fall as symbolic of man's natural predilection to seek the good in an imperfect world. 'Wisdom,' or ethical knowledge, are not the highest desiderata of human endeavour, but sin and abomination. Furious as this Western Christianity is in impressing upon him a feeling of sinfullness, it does not stop to consider how God could have condemned man for seeking to know good and evil when He Himself had created him an incorrigible lover of the good and seeker of knowledge and wisdom. That the account of Adam's fall, as given in the Pentateuch, has been 'edited' to consolidate the authority of the Rabbis, who monopolized knowledge while declaring it unworthy and sinful and thus perpetuated their hold on the minds of the people, is obvious. It is

by accident that the Hebraic edition accorded with the saviourism of Western Christianity in denigrating—nay, desecrating—ethical knowledge. Having found this accord, Western Christianity gave it its wholehearted subscription.

Hence, if the historical correctness of the text is granted, it would seem that Adam's taste of the tree was precisely what God, by fashioning him as He did, wanted him to do first and foremost. The fall of Adam, if both the text and common sense are to be trusted, could not have been a 'fall,' a condemnation pronounced in judgement, but the noblest and most human act. Rather than a damnation from which he needs to be saved, Adam's act must have been his ethically worthiest deed.[122]

The will to ethical knowledge is prerequisite for fulfilling the commands of God, but it is sin. The literal treatment of the 'rabbi-edited' story of Genesis which Western Christianity advocates prevents it from understanding the fall except as eternal doom meted out in judgement. Even where it did rise to such an understanding, it could not rid itself of the inborn prejudice against ethical knowledge, on the one hand, and the world of nature, on the other.[123] Such a condemnation is a necessary prerequisite for saviourism.

Western Christianity takes for granted, therefore, that man is a 'fallen' creature and that, having fallen, he is unable to redeem himself. No wisdom and no striving are ever capable of uplifting him. Since it was God that commanded the fall, it is even unethical for man to entertain the very possibility of self-redemption. That would be defiance. Had the fall been not as categorical, not as eternal and irrevocable as Western Christianity had made it, it might have possibly played a healthy role in human ethical life as a further enticement to ethical endeavour. Being utterly decisive and irrevocable, the fall certainly demanded superhuman divine effort to undo it, which Western Christianity was only all too anxious and ready to furnish.

b. Shortcomings of the Divine Plan

The action that God took for the salvation of man is the election of Abraham to constitute out of his blood-descendants a nation. This nation was to grow, achieve state-status by encroaching upon other nations whom God would destroy before them so that the plan might be fulfilled and then itself suffer decay and destruction at the hands of its enemies. This rise and fall of the instrument-nation of God is designed so that, paralleling it, a doctrine of prophethood would dawn upon that single nation's consciousness in which the messenger of God is first regarded as a teacher and warner of ethical truth and genuine worship, thereafter as a mighty king preserving and aggrandizing the realm, then

as a heroic rescuer of his people from the abyss of slavery, exile and physical annihilation, then as a servant sufferer whose task was not to rescue life or kingdom but to suffer exemplary punishment and finally as a redeemer who, by suffering misunderstanding, frustration and death by crucifixion, would vicariously atone for the sins of humanity and save mankind from the doom Adam had brought about. When the 'chosen' nation's consciousness would arrive at this last level of development, the stage would be ready for God, who alone could achieve the desired salvation, to send His only begotten son to be that servant-sufferer and, by undergoing this sad fate, to save mankind from the state into which God had originally placed man on account of tasting of the tree of knowledge of good and evil.

This divine plan, Western Christianity reads into the Books of Moses, the Psalms, the Prophets, the Kings—in short, into the whole range of Hebrew literature and history. The case is absolutely without parallel and stands as the greatest monument to the histrionic genius of Western man. Open any page of the King James version of the Old Testament and you will find the tale told thereon given a title (page title, chapter title, sub-chapter titles) which has absolutely nothing to do with the tale, but is drawn from the phantasmagoric world of that divine plan. It must be admitted that the facts or events of Hebrew history recorded in this literature have been by and large confirmed by the findings of archeology which have increased our knowledge of the Ancient World often as not to omit the least details of the daily life of men that lived thousands of years ago. But granted that there has been no, or little, falsification of fact, the interpretation of the data of Hebrew history by Western Christianity has been the play of the most fanciful imagination. In approaching the Bible the Muslim reader is reminded of the allegorical interpretations of the Qur'an by the Batinis. After reading it, however, he finds himself compelled to admit that by comparison with their Christian colleagues, the fathers of 'the primitive church (whose) needs and interests ... have largely determined the choice and conditioned the presentation of the materials,'[124] the Batinis must have been 'literalists.'

This crass misinterpretation of Hebrew history is defended on the grounds that 'history can be the medium of revelation just because it is event plus interpretation and it is the interpretation rather than the event which can allow history to function in this way.'[125] Surely it is the interpretation of the event, being entirely a matter of ideational representation, that can be the most mistaken, the farthest from the truth. Not only do those events not compel the Christian interpretation, but they compel its opposite, the Jewish interpretation. The 'Old Testament' is Jewish literature, written by Jews in the exile or shortly after, recording the events of

their own history, or of what they regarded as their own history, in satisfaction of their own political, psychological and ideological needs. How and why did the Western Christians see in that thoroughly and purely Jewish history a *Heilsgeschichte*, a prelude to the mission of Jesus as they understand it, is the final question before which Western Christianity stands silent and immobile, but with one word, *viz.*, 'faith.' Aware that Hebrew history does not compel any interpretation but the Jewish, Western Christianity pleads that here 'the choice whether to believe or disbelieve (the Western Christian interpretation) is always ours ... The Christian religion is always a faith; never knowledge, sometimes not even conviction, but always faith ... The historical passages of the Bible now convey that revelation only to those who are already persuaded on other grounds of its truth, or who are willing to venture on that belief.'[126] But against ignoring the incontrovertible fact that Hebrew history was written by Jews as a record of what they regarded as objective Hebrew history and not as *Heilsgeschichte*, Western Christianity asserts that 'in its historical passages as in all its parts, the Bible was written from 'faith to faith.'[127]

Thus, granted the requisite faith, it should be legitimate for anyone to read into any history such 'revelation' as he may choose. Western Christianity may well claim that its interpretation is not a 'human imposition of an arbitrary pattern of significance upon a series of events in themselves without significance.'[128] As the previous quotation has shown, every item of its interpretation is, without faith, the barest assertion. The recourse to 'faith' as refuge from the embarrassing questions which language, common sense, archeology, and the rightly revolted Jew, whose pride in his history is wounded by the Western falsification, pose for the Western Christian interpretation, harbors relativism which in final analysis is nothing but skepticism and un-faith. Faith is arbitrary prejudice unless it is the conviction of truth. Arabic has no word for faith in the Western sense. *Iman* is through and through conviction of truth and is synonymous with *yaqin*.

This curious mixture of fact and 'faith' would be harmless if it were conducted in play, and may even be of advantage in novel writing. But to introduce it into historiography is indeed dangerous. The world has been struggling hard to reconstruct history objectively, and has hardly begun to recover from the loss to human culture and spirit caused by the ideological prejudices of past historiographers. More serious, however, than the offence to truth this Western mixture implies is the universalization of that interpretation. The Western claim is that its interpretation is universally valid for all, not that everybody in fact accepts is, but that everybody ought to accept it. From it, the Western Christian sees moral

imperatives flowing upon all men equally. Those who do not recognize it are 'in sin,' eternally 'damned.' But he is imperturbed by the fact that all this superstructure which he sees binding upon all men rests upon a prejudice—he calls it 'faith'—which, he is willing to admit, is not *necessarily* binding for all. His *takfir*[129] is that of an Alice in Wonderland.

Theologically speaking, it betrays a severe limitation of the Godhead to think that in order to save all men from a terrible fall to which He had condemned them, He had to follow such a long, farfetched circuitous process. The divine plan to arrive at a perfect world by creating an imperfect one and a human capable of perfecting it is circuitous because the additional values of moral freedom and responsibility would make the man-perfected world more value-full than the necessarily-valuated, nature-perfected one. And educational psychology never tires of repeating that there is more value in the child's doing and failing than in the adult's doing the work perfectly for him. In both cases, the emphasis is on the personal freedom and responsibility of man, which give to the achievement of any value a new dimension of properly moral worth. As conceived by Western Christianity, the divine plan can claim nothing of the sort. For the saving act was totally and singlehandedly taken by God. In it man was the passive spectator. Indeed, Western Christianity even portrays man as playing, in the final scene of God's drama, the active role of evil itself, as the crucifier of Jesus. The cross it takes as a symbol of indictment of the whole of humanity. It was not the nationalist, separatist Jew that brought Jesus to the cross, but fallen man, all men.[130] The labyrinthine length of the roundabout plan did not bring additional value. It might have very well been done by the Almighty immediately, acting on the principle of omnipotence and creativity. Omnipotence was granted as the gift of the man of faith.[131] *A fortiori*, it must belong to God.

Granted that salvation must be by divine act and that this act must be 'prepared for' in the consciounsess of the Jews, perhaps the smallest and certainly the most 'stiff-necked' segment of humanity, it is not self-evident that God, the omniscient and all-wise whould allow no word of this final purpose, *viz.*, the incarnation, the crucifixion or death and resurrection, to seep to mankind. He did send prophets, all properly accredited, to speak in His name and convey His word to the people. In order to communicate and teach men that He is and He is One—which is far more important than saving men from their fall, and at any rate the greatest prerequisite for any faith and any salvation—He chose the method of word-communication for thousands of years beginning with Adam, continuing with Noah and, systematically with endless repetition, from Abraham to Zechariah. How are we to explain His reticence to speak of incarnation, crucifixion, and resurrection until after they had

happened? Obviously there must have been a change of divine plan in the last stage. Every revelation that has come from God by means of the prophets has come with the certainty, evident at least to the prophet who was its mouthpiece, that it is final, categorically true, and carrying all that God required of men to do in order to win His complete blessedness. The Bible knows of no revealed word of God that came 'conditionally,' claiming for itself, as it were, no more than the place of a mere stage in a developing consciousness of God's plan. St. Paul categorically repudiated the God-given law as well as all human effort as capable of saving, reserving this capacity to divine action alone. Implicit in his repudiation is his view that the law was not wrong all that time, but that he had discovered its futility only then, upon his conversion. He must then have conceived of God as doing what He did only after He had given up, so to speak, the effort of saving mankind by the Law, philosophy and wisdom, personal endeavour, etc., and not as a climax of an intricately, well-calculated plan in which the Law, and all the prophets' revelations were stages and parts of no significance of their own. The suspicion may therefore not be removed that St. Paul had forced into the idea of the Godhead his own human experience of salvation.

We may therefore conclude from this discussion that the Western interpretation of the prophethood of Jesus does violence to the Biblical prophetic tradition with respect to which it is a radical and revolutionary departure; that conscious of this loss to divine revelation which it nonetheless wanted to appropriate, it imposed an arbitrary interpretation upon the facts and events of Hebrew history which intractably speak of but one theme, the Hebrew-Jewish theme. Thus, incoherent in its inner structure as well as in its relation to the prophetic tradition, Western Christianity has no claim to validity. Naturally it seeks its justification in faith. Faith alone, in the Western sense of the term, can justify it.

D. The Coherence of Jesus' Mission with Ethical Reality

Conceived religiously, the *raison d'être* of religion is man's observance of God's commands to worship Him and obey His will. Conceived ethically it is man's evocation by value to the end that he may realize it. Both conceive of salvation as the goal and end of the straight path they prescribe. Though it is unnecessary in either case that salvation be the conscious objective of striving or of desiring, the removal of salvation as a goal not yet achieved but achievable ruins religion. If the goal is already achieved, what need is there for religion? If universal salvation is an accomplished fact, Christianity, as well as all religion, is vain. If value is already all realized, there is no meaning to human existence.

Thus, instead of conveying to mankind a message entrusted to him by

God, Western Christianity holds that Jesus was sent to save mankind; and against the understanding that to deliver a message from God, whose content is precisely the moral imperative requisite for, and whose observance leads to, salvation, *is* to bring salvation to mankind, Western Christianity holds that the salvation that Jesus brought is not a message, not a lesson, not a system of ideas that can be the object of learning, of observation and conviction, but the act itself of salvation. He came actually and effectively to save mankind. Not that he made salvation possible, not that he laid out a 'straight path' to paradise, but that he had saved, actually and finally performed all that is, or will ever be, necessary for the salvation of man. Salvation is not something to come. It has come once and for all. It has come to all those who would ever be saved; it is already a fact, a past fact. The mission of Jesus was not a message, but an act which he had done and which stands as a historic accomplishment, a *fait accompli.*

1. *Saviourism Implies the Repudiation of Religion and Ethics*

Evidently it follows from this that there can be no need for a religion of Jesus, for Christianity. And yet, that is precisely the second most important point of Western Christianity. The need for religion has not been annulled by the advent of Jesus but reinforced. Indeed, this understanding claims that the accomplished fact of salvation gave religion the sense and direction without which it could not stand.

Western Christianity, therefore, begins its thesis with a paradox: Salvation is a *fait accompli;* and religion is necessary. Undoubtedly, this paradox contributes to the general state of uneasiness in Western Christian ideology, and attempts have been and are still being made at solving it.

The more racially-inclined Western Christians hold that this salvation which Jesus accomplished belongs only to those who adhere to his religion. But this makes of Jesus a sectarian who works only for 'his' people. Obviously, it is a reversion to Hebrew separatism of which Jesus is not only absolutely innocent, but is the divinely appointed enemy. Though its open advocates are extremely rare, thanks to the awakening of the conscience of the whole world to the value of universal human brotherhood, this view continues to characterize a serious amount of Western Christian action in Africa and Asia. But there is little doubt that though its process is slow, this view, or at least the kind of deeds to which it gives rise, is heading towards complete oblivion.

The alternative view is much more widespread and is almost the professed stand of most. Salvation, it is held, belongs to any man who henceforth believes in Jesus. This view restores to Jesus his essential uni-

versalism. Its grounds, however, are faulty. It is usually defended in two ways, neither of which is sound: First, to be saved is alleged to mean, or necessarily to imply, the apprehension or enjoyment of salvation, which is not possible without the recognition that salvation had taken place, *i.e.*, without the profession of faith. Under this view Jesus' salvation is, though a *fait accompli*, still to be appropriated by the saved person, and this can be done by the means of faith. The question, of course, concerns the meaning of 'appropriation.' Presumably, by believing in Jesus and his saving mission, the person puts himself into the state in which the objective, historic salvation of Jesus becomes personal, applying to and touching him in the depths of his soul. In believing, the person is said to enter into 'communion with Christ.' The difficulty with this reasoning is its loose allegorization. How does an event committed by another thousands of years ago 'touch' the soul of a contemporary? What is the precise meaning of 'communion with Christ?' To answer these questions like most Christians usually do is to presume that Jesus brought down a 'lesson' with which one now agrees, acknowledges his concurrence, and proclaims his determination to abide by its imperatives. But all this presupposes that the mission of Jesus was a 'lesson' from his Lord, not actual deed-salvation, not saviourism. If, on the other hand, the 'appropriation' is not really an appropriation and the state of faith, of believing, is itself the salvation in question—which is not an impossible view—the difficulty becomes one of identifying the unidentifiable. Faith is a human psychological and moral state; salvation is a judgement and act of God. Every human state is subject to judgement by God. True, we know some states will entail certain judgements of God, but whatever necessary connections between them—in Islam the whole of ethics and value-theory are viewed as the search for such connections—the human and the divine can never become one. The law of identity stands always ready to indict such confusion of a psychological state of the human subject with the act of the transcendent divine Being.

Moreover, if salvation is not a decision of God earned by one's observance of a straight path and dispensed by His mercy but the state itself of believing that one is saved, then there is no need for the dispenser of salvation because there is nothing to be dispensed. Belief, *i.e.*, the personal state of the subject, is itself its object, namely, salvation. Therefore, while it makes religion in the sense of passive recognition of the fact of salvation necessary, this view renders God Himself unnecessary.

The second ground on which Western Christianity justifies the need for faith is the assumption that to believe in the salvation of Jesus is actually to earn it for oneself. This betrays the fact that the *fait accompli* is not quite accomplished and that it is a potentiality which becomes

actual only in the person who, having believed, has deserved it. Under this view, salvation becomes an actual fact only after faith. Before faith, it exists as a potentiality. And the question becomes one of determining the status of that salvation which Jesus effected. But being a potentiality, Jesus' salvation must be the straight path, the idea of salvation which saviourism had previously denounced. If pre-faith salvation is an idea, a teaching, a lesson, a message, then Jesus' mission was the conveyance of the divine message. He was a saviour only figuratively. If, on the other hand, salvation is an accomplished fact, then Jesus' teaching of religion and ethic were unnecessary.

2. Saviourism Is Finalistic Determinism

Saviourism could be true only if salvation by Jesus were the last act in human history. Had it occurred as a final judgement and conclusion of that history, it could be possible to hold that God desired to 'save' all mankind Himself and lift them, as it were, into His supernal plenum. Even then it is extremely doubtful whether God would use the circuitous route Western Christianity claims He has used. It is blasphenmously unlikely that in order to save man from evil He would have had to surrender Himself helplessly to its forces and suffer at their hand the most humiliating defeat. In saviousrism Western Christianity contradicts God's omnipotence, omniscience, wisdom and mercy. If it should ever be God's desire to save mankind, He would have only to will it. The creator of the universe *ex nihilo* stands in no need of either 'tricks' or 'means' to fulfill His will. His will is being.

According to Western Christianity, however, God 'operated' the course of history. He conceived His end, *viz.*, salvation; elaborated a plan, *viz.*, the whole of Hebrew and Jewish history; decided every item in the processes of history that led to every stage in the plan; executed the plan and brought it to its conclusion, first in the incarnation and finally in the resurrection of Jesus.

This 'fixation' of the nexus of history is supposedly God's purposive activity. Without doubt the activity in question is purposive. But its purposiveness is the kind we meet in mortals everywhere, *and only in mortals*. To act purposively is precisely to deflect the inevitable flow of causality to a stage A which is instrumentally desirable for stage B which is either desirable for its own sake or for something other than itself, *viz.*, C. The movement A—B—C had been originally conceived in the reversed order of C—B—A. Once C is fixed every item B, or others of like instrumentality, is fixed down to the present starting point in space-time. Every change in the course A—B—C is a breach in the finalistic nexus because it would not lead to C but to something else. Every possi-

bility of change is a breach in the purposive activity of the author since it is an alteration of his conception of the reversed order C—B—A. This is the nature of human—the all too human—purposive activity. To extrapolate it to God is to anthropomorphize Him.

Anthropomorphization is an easy trick to which man's poor intelligence recourses in matters religious just as in matters physical and biological. Immanuel Kant has shown, to his immortal credit, wherein lies the predisposition of the human mind to 'fall' into anthropomorphisms of all kinds when he detected in natural phenomena an adaptability to one another. Things and events happen, he told us, 'as if' they were meant to lead to something else. We seize upon this 'as if' character and declare it to be the essence and meaning of the phenomenon in question because of the relative ease with which 'purpose' deludes us into thinking we understand where we do not at all. The trick of the simplest being the truest, of *simplex sigillum veri*, is, though mediocre, the master of our thought. Man has a natural proclivity to subordinate every kind of phenomena to finalistic points of view. The Western Christian misinterpretation of Hebrew history has a perfect parallel in the animistic misinterpretation of natural phenomena.

God's alleged interference in the processes of history is, therefore, an unwarranted extrapolation. As we have seen earlier, the facts and events of Hebrew history are free of it. Though they may have occasioned divine action through the person of Jesus, they never compelled it. The initiative in history is always with man. Not that God is incapable of initiative, but that this is precisely how He had always willed it to be. It is the law of creation.

3. *Saviourism Is the Moral Annulment of Man*

The story of God who, having created man and endowed him as He did, condemned him to eternal doom because he exercised his greatest faculty, incepted a circuitous plan to save him, executed the plan in all details and who, ever since, has suffered and still suffers the rejection of His plan by the greatest majority of mankind, is not impressive. We have seen that it is discontinuous. We shall now see in what ethical sense it is self-contradictory.

God had endowed man with all that is necessary for him to realize value and to fill the world therewith; namely, the capacities to perceive value, or God's will, and to pursue it through purposive activity. More important than even these capacities, God endowed man with moral freedom and responsibility. Man is always free to realize something other than the ethically imperative; though when he does so, he does it under the illusion that it is the imperative he ought to realize. He is by nature given to delusion in valuational perception, and stands therefore in eternal

need of assistance. His moral sense can always be trained to perceive further value. He is the only ethically educable creature. Coupled with his endownmet of value-perception and delusion is moral responsibility. The error of perception or of action is his. This it is that gives him the right to feel self-confident, to respect his own self, to claim, when his perception or action is felicitous, the honour due. And when he fails, he alone of all the creatures accepts responsibility, suffers the resultant loss of value and resolves to try again and undo the evil done. This double-faceted feeling of moral freedom and moral responsibility is a fact, a 'hard datum' in ethical reality upon which the whole cosmic worth of man depends.

The Saviourist view of man denies these facts. It rules man incapable of saving himself, that is, of perceiving and achieving value. Hence God, whom it facilely conceives in the image of man, is made to save him by divine act. If Western Christianity criticizes the God of Islam as utterly transcendent, different and unapproachably removed from man, it is right not because the God of Islam is what it says He is, but because its own God, by comparison, is a man. Having humanized God or deified man, having thus eliminated the essential difference between man and God, it is only too natural for it to be shocked by the distance that separates the Muslim from his God however close the *Qur'an* has described Him to be, as long as man is nature and God is the transcendent God. In the long-winded process that salvation follows man is the puppet devoid of freedom or responsibility. Nobody and no act in the Old Testament after the fall of man has any worth or unworth. All and everything is the work of an outside agency to whom the categories of moral freedom and responsibility, and hence of ethical worth or unworth, do not apply. In the consequence of salvation man is supposed to enjoy a worth he did not earn. Value which he has neither perceived nor realized is declared his. His whole life and destiny is henceforth governed by a scheme which he has not willed, in which he has not participated, indeed, about which he had no knowledge except through the second and third hand reports of the human followers who are themselves party to the claim.

Evidently, by denying him a human self-made salvation (acceding to it by a nod, or 'faith,' however it may be glamourously described, will never do any more than eating of a prepared dish will win for him who partakes of it the desert of the cook), Western Christianity deprives man of his freedom, of his responsibility, of his self-respect. The more of a saviourist Christian a person may be, the less moral stature he enjoys when, completely oblivious of the cosmos around him, he stands face to face with himself in the loneliest solitude and addresses to himself the most fundamental question of all religion: Whither I?

II. THE MISSION OF JESUS IN HISTORY: ARAB CHRISTIANITY AND WESTERN CHRISTIANITY

The Christianity of the real Jesus was understood and appreciated by the men whom the Arab spirit had cultivated and refined and thus made ready to receive the grace of Jesus' teaching. Being strictly the product of a contact between God and a maturing Arab consciousness, Christianity had to contend with very powerful resistance the moment it extended beyond the shores of its birthplace. Once resistance was overcome, it had to contend with misunderstanding—a far more dangerous enemy than resistance.

The development of the first century brought about a division which reproduced the essential differences between Eastern and Western Christianity,[132] between Arabism and non-Arabism. From the earliest days, perhaps not later than 70 A.D., and certainly not later than the first century,[133] the lines were drawn between what the Arab spirit was or was not willing to accept as truth.[134] An Arab and a Western Christianity developed, each betraying a different logic, each possessing a different temper, and each yearning after different ends. The humans, energies, knowledge and ideas of the Roman Empire, both these Christianities sought and divided. There was much common between them: Arab Christianity was once upheld by Westerners, once by Easterners: Western Christianity had as its intellectual capital, once Rome, once Alexandria, once Antioch. The currents crossed and re-crossed, ran parallel and superposed themselves. Despite all this commingling, the two Christianities have remained distinct and, after each attempt at fusion with each other, somehow have regrouped their forces and stood once more face to face. Pure monotheism, ethical universalism, life-affirmation and rationalism somehow managed to gravitate towards one another for they are mutually attractive. There were instances, of course, where these elements were not found together, and others where they achieved different degrees of clarity and emphasis. So did their opposites. Indeed, many of these elements flowered in camps other than those in which they originated; their originators having repudiated or dissolved them within the main bed of their culture. Others were adopted and developed far beyond the expectations of their originators. Asceticism, for instance, originated in the East but it became life-negation in the West; so too rationalism originated in Hellas, but it was rejected in the West and gave rise to theology in the East.

The movements and controversies which agitated the Christian world betray likewise the same kind of division between Arab and Western Christianity, and an equal amount of confusion of the mutually repellent

or mutually attractive elements. In the salient features of their doctrines, the Ebionites, Gnostics, Marcionites, Manichæans, Arians and Nestorians represented Arab Christianity; the Montanists, Donatists and Athanasians represented Western Christianity. The Empire was for a long time torn between the two groups—now supporting the one, now the other.

Insofar as the guiding principles of their religion and ethic were the principles of 'urubah, that is to say, insofar as they were guided, in their ethic and world view, by pure monotheism, ethical universalism, ethical asceticism and rationalism, the first group were Arab movements and their men were extensions of the Arab spirit. All of them held christological views which, although varied in their explanation of the nature of prophecy, were all agreed that Jesus was not identical with God, and that his being was radically different from that of God. All of them held Jewish separatism in reproach and condemnation, though, with characteristic Arab tolerance and spiritual poise, they revered a great deal of the Old Testament and the Mosaic laws and excepted only what seemed to them to compromise God's oneness or the universality of human brotherhood.[135] All of them, moreover, held and practiced an asceticism which was positive, cheerful and bent on realization of the higher values which, it was sometimes even held regrettable, conflicted with the lower, elemental values. All of them, finally, kept an openness of mind and put their trust in man's rational faculties as capable of leading man towards salvation.

From the very early days of Christianity, a number of Christians from Palestine objected to the new ideas that were circulating among the new converts. These men could not keep silent as some of their co-religionists farther afield spread that which they did not recognize as Jesus'.[136] These were the closest to Jesus and were his contemporaries. They spoke his language, and could still hear their elders talk about what they heard from Jesus himself with their own ears. They were not sophisticated at all; and they took Jesus' teaching in all its simplicity as straightforward, ethical, divine truth.[137] It revolted them that St. Paul and his followers were changing, adding, twisting, and diametrically contradicting the simple, divine teaching.[138] Hence, they held St. Paul in reproach and with this began the first contention as to the veracity of what was being taught in Jesus' name.[139] This group of pious, first Christians—the Ebionites[140]—themselves or their parents converted to the new faith by Jesus himself, were Palestinian Arabs who favourably and approvingly responded to Jesus when he preached his message. The term Ebionite comes from a Hebrew word which means poor; and 'poor' was a name applied to the early Christians, especially in the land of Jesus, and meant

to point to their social status as well as to their dedication, since a good number of these first converts chose poverty as a moral purification enjoined by Jesus himself.[141] Their zeal for moral purity, their ethical consistency, conduced them to reject Jehovah as creator of the world since his world was one replete with evil.[142] They held God incapable of doing evil but explained that He could create that which, through the freedom of choice and combination, might produce evil. Thus their idea of a morally pure God, which was the direct teaching of Jesus, brought them close to the Pythagorean and neo-Platonic tradition which, they thought, alone possessed the means to solve the riddle of Jesus' perfect Father-God and evil-full creation. Their inclination towards emanationism was therefore prompted by purely moral considerations. It was Ebionite moral puritanism that opened the gates of Christianity to the neo-Platonism of Alexandria which was shunned by the other Christians as pagan.

The Ebionites heartily welcomed the explanation that since creation took place in stages or series, each of which 'emanated' successively from the one that preceded it, and evil is the work of one of these stages that emanated not from God but from another further down the line, the omnigoodness of God is preserved without contradiction.

Benefiting from his brethren (Saturninus, father of the movement in Syria, who saw that Jehovah was only an angel whom Jesus, appearing in bodily form, came to replace because of his superior moral purity;[143] Tatian, author of the '*Diatesseron*,' or 'Harmony of the Gospels,'[144] which was held in great reverence as the genuine gospel of Christianity throughout Syria; Basilides,[145] the first Alexandrian pantheist and essentialist), Valentinus (c. 140), an Egyptian philosopher, conceived the last of twelve aeons of creation to be wisdom (Sophia) and worked out on its basis the most spiritualized Christian conception of man's vocation. For Sophia's purpose is redemption, and Jesus is such a redeemer whose task was to restore Sophia whom the god of the Jews, as the demiurge, had enslaved. Jesus' work was 'to liberate the spiritual nature in man from the evil material existance and the passions by which it is enslaved and to facilitate its escape into the pleroma (divine fullness).'[146] His '*Pistis Sophia*,' that is, *Faith Wisdom*, composed in late second or early third century, available in a Coptic version, is a perfect specimen of the enthusiasm and completeness of the will to spirituality.[147]

Thanks to the Ebionites and their understanding of Jesus, Christianity entered upon one of its most fruitful connections—the alliance with Pythagorean, neo-Platonic philosophy which was blooming in Alexandria. Of the early Christians only the Ebionites felt the need for an intellectual explanation of the truths of Jesus, and only they had the requisite

openness of mind to make any kind of rapprochement with philosophy. So-called orthodoxy was at the time intellectually not only barren, but opposed to any attempt at intellectual explanation of its faith, to any rational activity as such. It is not surprising that although both the Ebionites and the forerunners of orthodoxy stemmed from the Arab stream of being, the former alone sustained themselves in that stream while the latter found themselves compelled to move out. Already the orthodox were the exception, saying nay to every move of the other Christians. It is not farfetched to assume that the apostles who did emigrate from Palestine did so because of Ebionite irresponsiveness to their freezing tendencies.

For their part, the Ebionites performed such a total wedding of doctrines with the Alexandrians that their sect became wholly fused with them and were hence to be known as Gnostics. Naturally, a conservative little remnant of them resisted the intellectualized doctrines and fell back upon a closer observance of Mosaic Law. This remnant was subsequently known as 'The Ebionites.' Of them the historians' observations that they were Judaic, worshipping Jerusalem as the abode of God, conservative and leading a monastic life in a closed society,[148] were not off the mark. The others were now known only as Gnostics; and as Gnostics, they not only fertilized Christian thought, but constituted and developed it whether by directly contributing the written statements of the faith or inciting the orthodoxy to think out suitable refutations in rational terms.[149] Gnosticism, which had now become the doctrine of the greater number of Ebionites, had the most salutary effects on the development of the Christian faith. The whole science of textual exegesis, commentary, narrative and criticism of the gospels owes its beginning to three Ebionite-Gnostics: Heracleon, author of the first commentary on St. John's gospel; Tatian, whom we have just mentioned; and Marcion, author of the first attempt to define the canon of the New Testament.[150] Even Justin Martyr (d. 163),[151] a friend of Tatian and himself a Gnostic, could still speak only of 'Memoirs' of the apostles, of which a large number of versions circulated. The church felt the need of assigning which gospels were acceptable only when it was faced with Gnostic claims supported by varying gospels. The assignment of holiness to the four gospels must have been still fresh in Irenaeus's (d. 190 A.D.) mind to make him write that the gospels are necessarily four because the seasons, the wind of heaven and the faces of the cherubim are all four in number.[152]

The Ebionite-Gnostic attitude to knowledge is best exemplified in Justin Martyr.

'We are taught that Christ is the first-born of God, and we have shown that he is the reason—Word of whom the whole human race partakes; and those who live according to reason are Christians, even though they are accounted atheists. Such were Socrates and Heraclitus ... Whatever has been uttered aright by any men in any place belongs to us Christians; for next to God, we worship reason—Word (or Christ).'[153]

The attitude of the orthodoxy is exemplified by Tertullian who, following in the footsteps of St. Paul, had no use for any philosophical pursuit. 'Wretched Aristotle', he wrote,

'who taught them dialectic, that art of building up and demolishing, so protean in statement, so far-fetched in conjecture ... self-stultifying since it is ever handling questions but never settling anything ... What is there common between Athens and Jerusalem? What between the Academy and the Church? What between Heretics and Christians? ... Away with all projects for a "Stoic", a "Platonic" or a "dialectic" Christianity. After Christ Jesus we desire not subtle theories, no acute enquiries after the gospel ...'.[154]

This sharp disagreement concerning the value of philosophy and knowledge set the note for differences in other fields. Irenaeus tells that the Ebionite Gnostics (Marcion) granted salvation to all peoples. Undoubtedly, with such universalist views of salvation as they held, they could not but extend salvation to all men. All men participate in the Christ that is the 'Word,' that is 'reason.' Only the Jews were not saved; but they certainly could be saved if they abandoned exclusivism.[155] Another liberal Gnostic Clement of Alexandria (c. 200), gave us in Book III of his *Stromata* (or Miscellanies) a testimony of monasticism existent in the rational justification as discipline and exercise for an enhanced spirituality.[156] Gnosticism could reconcile not only the basic functions of life, but even the refined *joie-de-vivre,* with spiritual endeavour. Indeed, in Paul of Samosata, bishop of Antioch from 260-272, it even brought together that which belongs to God and that which belongs to Caesar; for Paul was at once bishop of Samosata and pro-consul of Palmyra's Queen Zenobia.[157]

But it is in its christological views that Gnosticism made the most significant advances. Its view on the trinity and most other theological questions followed from its christology. Before its wedding to Alexandrian philosophy, Ebionitism held that 'Christ was not born of the Virgin Mary, but was generated, a mere human being, of the seed of Joseph.'[158] Their emphasis on the moral aspect, however, was supreme. They held Jesus to be 'superior above all others in the practice of righteous

ness and in integrity of life;[159] but they insisted that he was a human being.[160] As they adopted the doctrine of the Logos, they propounded a more elaborate theory of the union of Jesus with the Word. The views of Justin Martyr and Clement were too facile to satisfy the searching mind.

It was Paul of Samosata who rose to this great challenge. He invented the doctrine of 'union through instruction and participation'[161] in order to avoid the difficulties which an awakened consciousness was beginning to discover in any kind of union of the human with the Divine. 'The humanity of Jesus,' Malchion reports Paul as saying, 'was united with the Wisdom as instruction (*discipline*) is united with the learner by participation, but not as if it were formed according to the substance in the body.'[162] The union between God and Christ is not one of substance, not one of being, but one of 'Wisdom according to participation.' The status of Jesus is not essentially different from that of other prophets who participate in God's wisdom, though it may differ from them in degree or intensity. Jesus was a man in whom the Logos dwelt.[163] Even this 'dwelling' of the Logos within Jesus did not begin with the incarnation, nor at any sudden moment; for Jesus 'progressed towards the attainment of divinity.'[164] Conversely, 'Wisdom' took upon itself a process of 'self-evacuation into Jesus' out of pure 'compassion' for man, struggling as he was to attain it.[165] These views had overrun all the Eastern and North African provinces of the Empire and penetrated deep into Mesopotamia, the Arabian Peninsula, Persia and Armenia.

In defence of these views, many a controversy arose. Beryllus, bishop of Bostra in Arabia, waged the first battle.[166] Anxious to prove that Jesus was purely human, devoid of individual godhead, that his divinity was a derivation from the Father, an efflux of the divine essence,[167] he presented the case to a synod convened in Bostra in 244 A.D. to condemn him.[168] Undaunted by the synod's condemning decision, Beryllus continued to preach what he was convinced to be the truth until orthodoxy chose another Arab (Syrian), Origen, to arbitrate the dispute. Origen's liberal mind and reconciliatory attitude succeeded in bringing Beryllus to agree to an amended but still Gnostic christology. The agreement preserved the inferiority of the position of Christ *vis-à-vis* the Father and maintained Jesus to be a creature. Its only achievement was Beryllus' concession that the Logos being eternally emanating from God, is co-eternal with Him. Evidently, the tolerance, sympathy and appreciation these two Arab minds showed towards each other was not appreciated, and their opponents continued to be restless while the Gnostic forces were prospering. Less than twenty years later, the antagonism erupted again, this time against Paul of Samosata, at Antioch. The period 264-273 saw almost every year a synod convened at some seat of learning for the

condemnation of Bishop Paul. Although the number of resolutions made against him was staggering, no eclesiastical authority could unseat him from the bishopry of Antioch. What the church had failed to do, the state finally did by bringing down the kingdom of Palmyra and putting his followers to flight and dragging their queen, Zenobia, to Rome as captive in 273.

Fifty-two years later (in 325), the Council of Nicaea, instead of settling the dispute, succeeded only in adding fuel to the fire.[169] The adherents of the Eastern churches submitted a crystallized Christian creed which, in perfect earnestness, they believed to be the truth of Jesus: First, that the son was created out of nothing; hence, he is different in essence from the Father; that he is Logos or Wisdom is only of Grace and is not so in himself; second there was when he was not; that is to say he is a finite being; third, he was created (as Logos) before everything else, and through him the world is administered; fourth, in the historical Christ, the human element is merely the material, the soul is the logos, etc.,[170] thus going as far as they could to make Christianity remain rational and consistent with monotheism.

This was fundamentally the same position as that of the Nestorians, theologians of Antioch, who emphasized the human side of Christ's nature and the one which they advocated in the 'Nestorian Controversy' with Cyril, Patriarch of Alexandria, a hundred years later. Although a Roman synod, responding to Cyril's appeal, had condemned Nestorius in 430, the latter's popularity was gaining ground, thereby illustrating that the two Christianities answered completely different yearnings in the peoples of East and West. In answer to the political exigency the popularity of Nestorius commanded, and allegiance to Arab Christianity expressed, the Emperor refused to consider the decision of the Council of Ephesus discharging Nestorius. Cyril implored Delmatius to come to the rescue, and the latter ordered his cloistered monks to march over the imperial court and wrench from the emperor's hands the order desired.[171]

To a reconvened *ad hoc* council the Athanasians submitted a contrary creed to the effect that the son was divine, identical in substance with the Father, a necessity of the Father's nature, an independent personality, personal, self-subsistent. Next, by methods which could not be called innocent without very convincing evidence, fifteen out of the eighteen bishops who originally sighed the Nestorian creed mysteriously withdrew their signatures. Significantly, the remaining three were Arius, Theonus and Secundus, all Egyptian presbyters. Upon this, the Council rejected the Nestorian creed, decided in favour of Athanasius and, significantly, banished the three men of religion to Illyria, the barbarians' frontier in

the north; and Constantine appointed no one but Athanasius to replace Arius in the bishopry of Alexandria.[172]

The same opposition to these ideas, which consistently represented the basic intuition of the Arab spirit, kept erupting anew with every generation as a fresh controversy with a new name and persisted until after the rise of Islam. That alone which changed with the times were the churchmen who gave their names to the controversies and the places of emphasis. The Monothelite controversy raged over the duality (Duophysitism) or singularity (Monophysitism) of the nature of Christ, and abated only after the Persian invasion of Syria, Egypt and North Africa, in 614, had forced a pseudo-solution which actually solved nothing. Since one party upheld 'one energy' in Christ and the other somehow 'commingled energies,' the solution simply put the two views together and spoke of a 'one divine-human evergy.' It was not surprising that the issue erupted shortly after as the Adoptionist controversy. In another direction the divergence of views regarding the place and nature of evil erupted as the Pelagian and Semi-Pelagian controversies in which St. Augustine figured prominently. In yet a third direction, the fundamental difference between Arab Christianity and Pauline Christianity regarding the purity of monotheistic worship erupted in the iconoclastic controversy between Pope Gregory II and Leo the Isaurian.

Per contra, the movements which developed among the adherents of St. Paul and which represented Western Christianity were characterized by essentially non-Arab tendencies. All of them grew as a reaction to something Arab consciousness had brought forth: pure monotheism, ethical universalism, ethical asceticism, life-affirmation, rationalism and, later on, the union of this world-view and life-view with Alexandrian philosophy. Under St. John and St. Paul's inspiration, Tertullian, Cyril, Dionysius (Bishop of Rome, 259-268), Athanasius and Augustine instituted movements based on the ideas of trinity, incarnation, godhead of Christ, redemption and forgiveness of sins, and justification by faith—all of which were soon to become official church dogma. Later on, Western Christians pushed oriental symbolism into iconolatry and introduced the idea of 'theotokos' or mother of God.

Earlier, we have examined the views of Western Christians on the problems of rationalism and monotheism. Their ideas on the problem of life-affirmation crystallized in the Montanist movement which, seconded by Novatianism and Donatism its successors, became the father of Catholicism.[173] Under its aegis, the opposition itself between Christianity and the world was raised into an ideology. Life below was turned into a rehearsal for the approaching end of the world. Their fanatic self-negation and condemnation of the flesh prevented the Montanists,

as well as the Western Christians whom they influenced, from even recognizing the higher values. Their spiritual violence in respect to the lower values blinded their moral sense.

The difference between Arabism's life-affirmation and Pauline life-negation, coupled with disciplinarian asceticism and self-mortification, culminated in the Arian controversy,[174] the Jovinianist controversy where Jovinianus (c. 373) reproached the Western Christians' belief that starvation leads to happiness, the Vigilantian controversy in which Vigilantius advocated the first 'Wahhabi' condemnation of Western Christian sacerdotalism and monasticism, and the Paulician controversy which remained an issue between East and West till the ninth century when over 100,000 Paulicians were massacred by the forces of Theodora (844 A.D.), Tepbrike their capital captured (873 A.D.) and their power broken.

In the western end of the Empire, Theodosius drove out the last Arian elements, and the conversion of Clovis to Athanasian Christianity brought Arianism among the Teutonic peoples to a quick end.[175] But the victory of Catholicism over Arianism was not complete until 550 in Gaul and 589 in Spain.

Arab Christianity was then rationalistic, tolerant, affirmative, optimistic, purely monotheistic and universalistic. Western Christianity was the opposite. Instead of speculative intelligence and subtle refinement, the Western Christian bishops excelled in public administration of the territories assigned to them. With them, Christian issues were not a matter for debate, for searching, hairsplitting analyses or deep, enlightened insight, but for authoritative decision.[176] Questions of doctrine were resolved by authority, *i.e.*, by orders from above; questions of faith, by discipline, *i.e.*, by obedience to the 'above'; questions of conscience, by conformance with the opinion of those who stood above. Obviously, Western Christianity was already too Romanized to feel any sympathy with or patience for those who deliberated and insubordinated themselves. Besides, Arab Christianity was fast distinguishing itself as a religion of the East, which Western man had always held as radically different and alien. Latin racialism, rather than Christian universalism, determined the conduct of the Western Christians towards their brethren in the East.

The difference which started out as a Western misunderstanding became greater as Arab consciousness learned the wisdom of the Greeks and the West narrowmindedly rejected that wisdom as pagan. Arab attempts at systematization and rationalization were regarded as heresy; and heresy, Roman exclusivism regarded as worthy of censure, punishment, persecution and death. Western Christianity failed to learn from the intolerance, persecution and death visited upon it by the Roman

Empire in the first two centuries of its life. It taught the separation of church and state as long as the latter was supreme and the church's fortunes were meagre. Indeed, in that period, it radically condemned the state as evil and as devil's work. Once the emperors became Christian and the state capable of serving church purposes, the state gained favour in Christian eyes and cooperation with it became a matter of service and virtue. Later, when the church came to dominate the state, the latter became the arm and sword of God, objection to which was heresy deserving of death. Inquisition and persecution became church official business. Obviously, the history of its state-relations is that of a ruthless will to power of an unscrupulous political party.

The Arab Christians continued to philosophize while their opponents were growing stronger. Soon they realized that their future was neither with Rome nor with Constantinople, but with the Arab stream of being further east, and they began to emigrate, as individuals, to Arab lands where they felt they could preach the true gospel of Jesus to sympathetic, though pagan, souls who were in every respect brethren and whose only default was that they had not yet heard that gospel.

With the 529 edict of Justinian closing the Academy and the 543 edict condemning the three chapters of Nestorian theology which Chalcedon had previously approved, came the beginning of the end of Arab Christianity in the Roman Empire. The Arab Christians' emigration eastward moved with an accelerated pace. Naturally, the Arab stream of being welcomed them as its own returnee-sons.

These persecuted Christians, suffering 'for the (genuine) sake of Christ,' found refuge in the Eastern world and rehabilitated themselves within its bounds.[177] By fleeing to the East, they proved their spiritual affinity with the spirit of the East. For its part, the East too felt itself attracted by the truly Christian world and expressed this sympathy in the bet that 'Umar, urged by his follew-Muslims and advised by the Prophet, placed with the pagan Meccans on the resurgence and eventual victory of Byzantium over pagan Persia.[178] From then on the encounter of the two Christianities was no more a domestic family dispute within one empire, but an open opposition between two cultures. As each of them became entrenched in its own camp, it acquired greater unity with the respective culture until it dissolved therein.

Having grown up under the influence of the culture of Antiquity, the Eastern, Arab Christians learned the best that Hellenic culture could offer with open mind and heart. With the religion of Jesus to animate and energize them, they occupied the seats of culture in Alexandria, Antioch, Qinnasrin, Ra's al 'Ayn, Harran, Jundaysapur, Edessa, Caesarea; and their intellectualism endeavoured to give the religion of Jesus the ad-

vantages of an enlightened rational system. When they moved eastward, this learning was with them already a tradition, lived and developed, with which now they fertilized the Arab spirit and set it on another great march towards divinity. For very soon afterwards, the Arab spirit was to establish once more an epoch-making contact with God. The indisputable evidence of this connection is the fact that as soon as the travails of birth and regeneration were over, the Arab spirit called and welcomed to its bosom the fairest flowers of Christianity;[179] and these found themselves impelled to dedicate to it the whole fruit of their genius.

Jesus was born and grew up as a Jew. Against Jewish separatism and Roman worldliness his consciousness was developed and readied for the receipt of the spirit of God. Thereafter, he proclaimed the results of his vision which are consubstantial with the values which make up 'urubah. His Christianity was as much the product of the Arab spirit as the monotheism of Abraham and Moses, or, as we shall see, the Islam of Muhammad. That he was 'used' by St. Paul for unchristian purposes and out of this abuse and transplantation a Western Christianity arose that opposed, combatted and pushed the Christianity of Jesus out of the Roman Empire, was the work of a Western spirit that fed and grew on violence. The salutary element in all this is the fact that Western Christian conscience has equally been captivated by the ethic of that same original Jesus. The resulting conflict between this condemning Arab conscience and the Western, unbridled brute will to 'the world' has remained to this day Christendom's greatest embarrassment.[180]

1. An exemplary presentation of this position is to be found in Smith, Wilfred C. *The Comparative Study of Religion (Reflections on the Possibility and Purpose of Religious Science)*, Inaugural lecture, Dec. 8, 1949, Faculty of Divinity Publication McGill University, Montreal.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 49-50.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 53.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 54.
6. '...Christianity accepted the Old Testament history and added to it the story of the ministry, death and resurrection of Jesus, together with the birth and growth of the Church, *and declared that in these events the character and the will of God are to be known.*' (Italics this author's.) Frost, Stanley B., 'History and the Bible,' *Canadian Journal of Theology*, Vol. III, 1957, No. 2, p. 87.
7. *De Decretis*, 20; *Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers*, N.Y., 1892, Vol. IV, p. 163.
8. Actio VII, Mansi, xiii, 378 A.D.; Bettenson, Henry, *Documents of the Christian Church*, Oxford, 1950, p. 130.
9. The New Testament compares in revelatory status not with the *Qur'an*, but with the hadith. That which compares with the *Qur'an* is that saying of Christ pronounced under the direct revelation of God. It is these words of Jesus that constitute the Evangels, not the reportative four gospels of the disciples. See W. C. Smith, 'Some Similarities and Differences between Christianity and Islam: An Essay in Comparative Religion,' *The World of Islam*, ed. by J. Kritzeck and R. B. Winder, MacMillan and Co., London, 1959, p. 52.
10. Matthew, 23; 9-10.
11. Matthew, 22:37-8.
12. Matthew, 23:23.
13. Matthew, 23:27.
14. Matthew, 5-44-45.
15. *Ibid.*
16. Matthew, 25:40.
17. Matthew, 28:19.
18. Matthew, 10:5-6.
19. *I.e.*, holy warrior.
20. Matthew, 15:22-28.
21. Matthew, 6:19-23.
22. Matthew, 19:16-21.
23. John, 2:1-10.
24. Matthew, 12:39-45; 13:15.
25. That self-mortifying monasticism which sees in the world only evil, 'sin' and 'disvalue' and seeks salvation in the cessation of all willing, activity and life is a later development of which the Christianity of Jesus is free.
26. Matthew, 12:43-45.
27. Matthew, 10:39.
28. Matthew, 5:9.
29. Matthew, 5:3, 4, 5, 7.
30. Matthew, 5:39.
31. Matthew, 7:1.
32. Matthew, 6:14.
33. Matthew, 5:39.
34. Matthew, 5:40.
35. Matthew, 5:37.
36. Luke, 17:21.
37. Matthew, 10:34.
38. Matthew, 10:35.
39. Mark, 9:42.
40. Matthew, 6:33.
41. Matthew, 7:1.
42. Matthew, 10:33.
43. Matthew, 5:38-39.
44. Mark, 6:11; Matthew, 10:14-15.
45. Matthew, 5:44.
46. Matthew, 5:45.
47. Matthew, 8:22.
48. *The Clementine Homilies' Ante Nicene Fathers*, Scribners, New York, 1926, Vol. VIII, p. 297.
49. I Corinthians, 6:2, 3.
50. Case, S. J., *The Evolution of Early Christianity*, Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1923, p. 341.
51. *Ibid.*, pp. 166ff.; Renan, Ernest, *The History of the Origins of Christianity*,

Bk. VII, Marcus-Aurelius, Mathieson and Co., London, n.d., Chap. XXXIV, pp. 359-365.

52. Ayer, Joseph C., *A Source Book for Ancient Church History*, Scribner, New York, 1933, pp. 213ff.
53. 'If ye live after the flesh, ye shall die: but if ye through the Spirit do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live.' (Romans, 8:13). 'It is good for a man not to touch a woman. Nevertheless, to avoid fornication, let every man have his own wife...It is good for them (the unmarried and widows) if they abide even as I *(i.e.*, unmarried)...So then he that giveth her in marriage doeth well, but he that giveth her not in marriage doeth better.' And then, posing as connoisseur woman-psychologist, St. Paul counsels: Womans 'is happier if she so abode (unmarried) after my judgement.' (I Corinthians, 7).
54. 'Whatsoever is not of faith is sin.' (Romans, 14:23). 'From the true Christian idea that the flesh must be crucified and the lusts thereof, that those who would come after Christ must deny themselves, etc. Christians soon came to look on suffering in connection with religion as meritorious in itself, and were willing to endure the greatest physical agonies for the peace of conscience thence derivable. The New Testament (Jesus) opposition between spirit and flesh was laid hold of and perverted.' (Newmann, A. H., *A Manual of Church History*, Philadelphia, 1906, Vol. I, pp. 316-7.
55. 'For I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing...If I do that I would not, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me. I find then a law, that when I would do good, evil is present within me...But I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members.' (Romans, 7:18-23).
56. The first Christian monastic organizations were those founded by St. Anthony (b. 250) and St, Pachomios (b. 292) in Egypt. Although the former was eremetical, yet it soon developed, in the lifetime of the founder, into a community of disciples-and-masters (a genuine *madrasah!*) engaged in spiritual self-perfection, learning and contemplation. The latter was the first of its kind, a coenobium, but it 'attached considerable importance to manual work, so that (it) became a sort of agricultural colony.' (Sarton, G., *Introduction to the History of Science*, Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1927, Vol. I, p. 347). St. Basil, who introduced Pachomian monasticism into the Roman Empire, was a disciple of Pachomios and like him 'insisted upon the importance of labor and the vanity of excessive asceticism.' *(Ibid.)* Western monasticism began with Athanasius, who modelled it after the Antonian orders. However, Athanasios eliminated the study element and overemphasized eremeticality and self-mortification. His influence corrupted the Pachomian sister movement, and its fire was not mitigated until St. Benedict, in the sixth century. Pachomian monasticism did not return to the West until the middele of the tenth century. *(Ibid.)*
57. Romans, 2:10.
58. Romans, 3:29.
59. Romans, 11:28-30.
60. There is a striking parallel between this and the logic of Jacob's children: If you want us to accept your hospitality and goodness, they told the Shechemites, you must pay us a price. (See *supra*, p. 41 ff).
61. *Qur'an*, 2:31-34; Genesis, 1:26, 28; Genesis, 2:19-20.
62. For a further discussion of the problem of knowledge of good and evil as 'the fall of man,' see *infra*, pp. 121–122.
63. Matthew, 5:48.

64. Matthew, 10:16.
65. 'Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy . . . and not after Christ.' (II Colossians, 2:8).
66. Consider, for instance, the motivation evident in the following verses: 'Take heed lest by any means this liberty of yours become a stumbling block to them that are weak. For if anyone see thee which hast knowledge sit at meat in the idol's temple, shall not the conscience of him which is weak be emboldened to eat those things which are offered to idols; And through thy knowledge shall the weak brother perish?' (I Corinthians, 8:9-11).
67. I Corinthians, 1:20-28.
68. I Corinthians, 3:18-19.
69. 'Many of them (that believed) brought their books together, and burned them before all men: and they counted the price of them and found it fifty thousand pieces of silver.' (Acts, 19:19). What happened later, *i.e.*, the rest of what happened to Graeco-Roman Antiquity, may be best learned in Gibbon, E., *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Chap. XVI *et seq*. Durant writes that 'The greatest of historians (Gibbon) held that Christianity was the chief cause of Rome's fall.' For this religion, he and his followers argued, had destroyed the old faith that had given moral character to the Roman soul and stability to the Roman state. It had declared war upon the classic culture—upon science, philosophy, literature and art. It had brought an enfeebling oriental mysticism into the realistic stoicism of Roman life; it had turned men's thoughts from the tasks of this world to an enervating preparation for some cosmic catastrophe, and had lured them into seeking individual salvation through asceticism and prayer, rather than collective salvation through devotion to the state. Durant, Will, *Ceasar and Christ*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1944, p. 667. This view of the effect of Christianity upon Rome is shared by Ferrero, Guglielmo, *The Rise of Ancient Civilization*, New York, 1921, VII, p. 74; and White, E. L., *Why Rome Fell*, New York, 1905, 5v.
70. Daniel, 7:9-14.
71. Enoch, 37:71.
72. Enoch, 71:14.
73. Enoch, 45:4.
74. That is, as suffering servant, *Parousia*, simply man, Davidic mesiah, etc.
75. Genesis, 6:2, Job, 1:60 Job, 37:7.
76. David was given the title 'son of God' as the typos of righteousness, Psalms, 89:26.
77. Foakes-Jackson, F. J., and Lake, Kirsopp, eds., *The Beginnings of Christianity*, London, 1920, Part. I, Vol. I, 398.
78. Matthew also linked up the two appellations in the confession of Peter, Matthew, 16:16.
79. Foakes-Jackson and Lake, *op. cit.*, p. 403.
80. Matthew, 26:63; Matthew, 29:11.
81. Matthew, 16:20.
82. John, 11:30. However, it should be read in the light of the anecdote reported in Mark, 3:31-35. Jesus had no regard for blood relation. He conceived of his brothers and mother as being the disciples, 'For whosoever shall do the will of God, the same is my brother, and my sister and mother.' It is significant that the non-Arabs from Paul to the popes of Rome and emperors of Constantinople doggedly insist on the sonship of Christ as if it were a blood relation to the Godhead.

83. Matthew, 9:3.
84. Matthew, 9:4.
85. 'For whether is easier to say, Thy sins be forgiven thee; or to say, Arise and walk?' (Matthew, 9:5).
86. Matthew, 9:6.
87. Mark, 14:61-62.
88. Matthew, 26:61.
89. Mark, 14:58.
90. 'You have said so. But I tell you hereafter you will see the Son of Man seated at the right hand of Power.' etc. (Matthew, 26:64).
91. 'If I tell you, you will not believe; and if I ask you, you will not answer. But from now on the Son of Man shall be seated...You say that I am.' (Luke, 22:67-68, 70).
92. Mark, 14-62.
93. Luke, 23:2.
94. John, 19:12.
95. Matthew, 27:11.
96. John, 18:36-38.
97. Rawlinson, A. E. J., *The New Testament Doctrine of the Christ*, Longman's, London, 1926, p. 236.
98. *Ibid.*, p. 237.
99. Weiss, Johannes, *Earliest Christianity*, tr. by F. C. Grant, Harper, New York, 1959, Vol. II, p. 459. Here, Weiss's estimate of the Kurios title agrees with that of W. Robertson Smith, *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites*, London, 1927, pp. 68-9, whom he quotes approvingly: 'When a man addresses any superior he calls him "my lord" and speaks of himself and others as "thy servants," and this form of politeness is naturally *de rigueur* in presence of the King...In the Old Testament this usage is constant.'
100. Especially in *Kyrios Christos*, Second Edition, pp. 77-84; and in *Jesus*, tr. by J. P. Trevelyan, Williams and Norgate, London, 1906, pp. 195-211.
101. Examples of this usage of *Kurie* in the New Testament are to be found in Matthew, 13:27; Luke, 13:8; 14:22; John, 11:21; etc.
102. Foerster, W., and Quell, G., *Lord*, A. and C. Black, London, 1958, reprinted from Kittel's *Bible Key Words*, pp. 13-36.
103. Matthew, 21:3; Mark, 11:3.
104. Except in Daniel, 2:47; Daniel, 5:23. Even here, *Mar* is used not absolutely in the sense of 'the Lord' but in conjunction with other terms such as 'Lord of Kings' and 'Lord of heaven.'
105. Dalman, G., *The Words of Jesus*, p. 182, quoted in Rawlinson, *op. cit.*, p. 233.
106. Matthew, 12:32.
107. Mark, 10:18.
108. *Qur'an*, 13:2.
109. MacDonald, D. B., *Development of Muslim Theology etc.*, Scribner, New York, 1903, pp. 30-32.
110. *Ante Nicene Fathers*, Vol. VIII, p. 270.
111. 'The contagion of these skeptical writings (Cicero, Lucian, etc.) had been diffused far beyond the number of their readers. The fashion of incredulity was communicated from the philosopher to the man of pleasure or business, from the noble to the plebeian, and from the master to the menial slave who waited at his table, and who eagerly listened to the freedom of his conversation...The people... were filled with doubts and apprehensions concerning the truth of these doctrines to which they had yielded the most implicit belief.' (Gibbon, E., *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Methuen and Co., London, 1913, Vol. II, p. 55-6).
112. Newmann, *op. cit.*, p. 48. The New Testament tells that they 'held council against him (who held that it is lawful to do well on the Sabbath days) how they might destroy him.' (Matthew, 12:10-14). Consider also the 'Apology of Stephen'. (The Acts, 7: especially verses 51-53).
113. The Acts, 15:2.
114. The Acts, 16:3.
115. 'There are ...people called Essenes, numbering 4000, and in my judgement so-called after their piety...It is ethics, to which they devote all their strength, under the guidance of their ancestral laws, which no human soul could have devised apart from divine inspiration...The greater part of their lore is conveyed figuratively after their time honoured fashion... They are taught piety, holiness, justice, the management of affairs, citizenship, the knowledge of what is truly good or bad or indifferent how to choose the right and shun the contrary; and in all this they employ three rules and standards, namely, the love of God, the love of virtue, and the love of man.' (Philo, 'On the Virtuous Being Also Free,' Sect. XII, *The Works of Philo Judaeus*, London, Henry G. Bohn, 1855, Vol. III, p. 523). Josephus' account of them is no less enthusiastic. See *The Works of Flavius, Josephus* London, G. Bell and Sons, 1909, Vol. IV, pp. 151ff.
116. Newmann, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 52. *The Works of Philo Judaeus*, Vol. IV, pp. 219ff. There Philo acknowledges his indebtedness to Josephus as source of his information regarding the Essenes.
117. When this necessity for the appearance of Christianity, based upon the violation of it in the Arab stream of being of the first century, A.D. is considered in light of the general principle that the new contact with God can come about only when the stream has readied itself therefor by realizing the values previously revealed to the full (the pagan Hebrews becoming ethical before the revelation of monotheism and, as we shall see later, the Arabs realizing the values of Jesus before the revelation of Islam), there seems to be an insoluble contradiction. However, the contradiction would disappear if we remember that the first Christians who listened approvingly to Jesus were of course Jews; but they were Jews in whom monotheism must have been realized to the full, and therefore Jews in rebellion against their brethren's separatism. The case is identical with that of the companions of Abraham who rallied to him and departed from Ur. They must have been prepared by their revolt against Chaldean particularism, to accept the new monotheism he was preaching.
118. For an analysis of this doctrine, and particularly of its ethical significance, see *infra*, pp. 100 ff.
119. 'And the Lord God commanded the man, saying, Of every tree in the garden thou mayst freely eat: But of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it: for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die.' (Genesis, 2:16-17).
120. 'Wherefore, as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned.' (Romans, 5:12).
121. Romans, 5:14.
122. For the first time, the *Qur'an* reestablished the truth of the story of Adam who, far from being the father of sin, is the father of the prophets, and whose learning, received from the hand of God, was superior to that of the angels to whom he taught the names (essences, definition) of the creatures. (*Qur'an*, 2:30-32). God had commanded him to pursue the good. ('Do not let Satan drive you away

from Paradise, where you will be in misery. Here, in paradise, it is not given to you to suffer, either to hunger or to go naked, to thirst or to fall to exhaustion.' *Qur'an*, 20:116-9. He also commanded him to avoid evil, and that is the nature of the tree whose fruit he was forbidden to eat. The mistaken identification of the tree as 'the tree of life and of knowledge' is neither God's nor Adam's. It is a deliberate lie told by Satan to Adam in order to lure him, prone as he was to seek and pursue the good, to transgress God's command and to do evil. 'Satan enticed Adam saying, O Adam, shall I show you the tree of life and power eternal?' Adam ate of the tree and committed a transgression and an evil deed; but God corrected him and he atoned and was rightly guided. *(Qur'an*, 20:120-2). Adam, therefore, did commit a misdeed—that of thinking evil to be good, of ethical misjudgement. He was the author of the first human mistake in ethical perception, committed under enthusiasm for the good, with good intention. It was not a fall, but a discovery of the nature of the universe, of the fact that the good is possible to confuse with the evil and that the pursuit of the former is neither unilateral nor easy but must be done with utmost care lest what one has taken for good turns out to be in fact evil. Its discovery by Adam is, though involving a misdeed on his part, a decisive advance in human perfection. Certainly it is no 'fall'. The divine command chasing him out of paradise is nothing but the realization that henceforth, Adam's pursuit of the good will always be subject to perceptual errors. Hence, God's admonishment given in the same breath with the command to leave paradise: 'You will all leave paradise, as enemies one to the other (Satan and Adam) until guidance comes to you from Me. Whoever follows My guidance will neither go astray nor suffer; but he who turns away from my guidance, his life shall be hard and he will be blind on the day of judgement.' *(Qur'an*, 20:123-4).

123. Such, for instance, is the case of Paul Tillich who understood the Fall as 'transition from essence to existence' but upheld the Christian prejudice that such transition is unworthy and condemnable in order to make room for saviourism. See his *Systematic Theology*, Vol. II, Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1957, pp. 29-31. When finally salvation did come through Jesus, it did not move man back to essence. It merely taught him to regard existence no more as condemnable. True, existence as 'estrangement' had 'marks' (sin, *Hubris*, concupiscence) which, Jesus had shown, could be surmounted. *(Ibid.*, pp. 125-6). Nonetheless, the saved man is not a man standing outside existence, but in existence surmounting its antinomies and disvalues. *(Ibid.* pp. 116ff). The definition of the Fall as transition to existence, therefore, had availed nothing.
124. Frost, Stanley B., 'History and the Bible,' p. 93.
125. *Ibid.*, p. 94.
126. *Ibid.*, pp. 95-96.
127. *Ibid.*, p. 96.
128. *Ibid.*, pp. 95-96.
129. The attribution of faithlessness (in the sense of ungodliness) to those who do not share the faith.
130. In an exaggeration that cannot be explained except as transport of the feeling of guilt at the West's racialist (not religious! for how could violence be called religiously Christian?) persecution of the Jews, Paul Tillich has moved to the opposite extreme. Against all knowledge and history, indeed against Jesus' own pronouncement as recorded in Matthew 23, he asserts that 'the Pharisees were the pious ones of their time, and they represented the law of God.' *(Systematic Theology*, Vol. II, p. 132). In his zeal to allay Western anti-Semitism, which he

wrongly ascribes to the religious teaching of the fact of the Jesus-Jew conflict rather than to the Western exploitation of that conflict for racialistic ends, Tillich has gone as far as to repudiate the Jews' responsibility for the crucifixion and drop it down on Jesus himself. 'Jesus,' he writes, 'was involved in the tragic element of guilt, in so far as he made his enemies inescapably guilty...the innocent one becomes tragically guilty in respect to the very one who contributes to his own death.' *(Ibid.*, p. 133). Evidently, here the transport of Western guilt-feeling has run away with all reason.
131. Mark, 11:23.
132. Ayer, *op. cit.*, pp. 161-4, 165ff, 429ff.
133. The disputed dates of the writing of St. John's Gospel.
134. Ayer, *op. cit.*, p. 240.
135. Case, S. J., *op. cit.*, pp. 78ff.
136. The literature known as Clementine 'Homilies' and 'Recognitions', regardless of whether they were written by Clement or by some Ebionites, illustrates the nature of doctrinal warfare Pauline Christianity was conducting in the second century, A.D. For a discussion of the degree of syncretism Christianity attained in the third century, see Ayer, *op. cit.*, pp. 150ff.
137. 'He (Celsus) asserts that "they have forsaken the law of their fathers, in consequence of their minds being led captive by Jesus" ...those Jews who have received Jesus as Christ are called by the name of Ebionites.' (Origen, *Origen Against Celsus*, Book II, Chap. I, *Ante Nicene Fathers*, Vol. IV, p. 429).
138. Case, *op. cit.*, pp. 166ff.
139. *Ibid.*, pp. 26ff.
140. 'Refutation of the Ebionites Who Disparaged the Autority of St. Paul,' title of Chap. XV, Book III, of Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, *Ante Nicene Fathers*, Vol. I, pp. 439ff.
141. Betraying either a misunderstanding of their dedicated poverty or an unchristlike lack of appreciation of 'poverty of spirit,' Origen wrote: 'We do not understand the expression as the Ebionites do, who are poor in understanding—deriving their name from the poverty of their intellect, "Ebion" signifying poor in Hebrew...' (Origen, *De Principiis*, Book III, Chap. I, Sec. 22, *Ante Nicene Fathers*, Vol. IV, p. 371).
142. As a character in the *Clementine Homilies*, Peter held all immoral things ascribed to the God of the Old Testament as lies, and that the Old Testament contained much that was true but also erred on many points. (III: 38-40). The immoralities are the work of pseudo-prophets. Betraying a worthy scholarly approach, these books make the point that because the so-called Laws of Moses were told orally to some seventy wise men and a few of these attempted later to write them down, authority does not belong indiscriminately to everything they contain. (III:47).
143. Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, I, 24, 1-2.
144. Bethune-Baker, James F., *An Introduction to the Early History of Christian Doctrine to the Time of the Council of Chalcedon*, Methuen, London, 1920, p. 66.
145. Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, I, 24, 3-5. It was Basilides that taught the story of the Crucifixion which came to be associated with the faith of Islam. The Qur'anic version, being purely reportative in form, has preserved that story as it was commonly held by Christians in the Arabian Peninsula. In the words of Irenaeus, 'The unborn Father (See *Qur'an*, 112:3) sent his first-begotten mind—and this is he they call Christ—for the freeing of them that believe in him from those who made the world. Wherefore he suffered not, but a certain Simon, a Cyrenian,

was impressed to bear his cross for him; and Simon was crucified in ignorance and error, having been transfigured by him, that men should suppose him to be Jesus.' (*Qur'an*, 4:156-8). Betraying an obviously unfair prejudice against Basilides, Irenaeus adds that the crucifixion of innocent Simon took place 'while Jesus himself took on the appearance of Simon and stood by and mocked them.' (Irenaeus, *op. cit., loc. cit.*, reproduced in Bettenson, H., *Documents of the Christian Church*, Oxford, 1950, p. 51). The tone of Irenaeus's attack against Valentinus may be gathered from the statement of Eusebius: 'And the same Irenaeus, having unfolded with the greatest vigour the unfathomable depth of Valentinus's much-erring matter, lays bare that his villany was concealed and hidden like a reptile in a hole. (Eusebius, *The Ecclesiastical History and the Martyrs of Palestine*, tr. by H. J. Lowler and J. E. L. Oulton, SPCK, London, 1927, Vol. I, p. 113).

146. Newmann, *op. cit.*, p. 189.
147. See Ayer, *op. cit.*, pp. 76ff.
148. Newmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 174-5.
149. Hippolytus tells that it was probably in response to Gerinthus, an Alexandrian Ebionite living in Asia Minor, that St. John's Gospel was written. (Book VII, Chap. 23 in *The Refutation of All Heresies, Ante Nicene Fathers*, Vol. V, pp. 114-5.)
150. Foakes-Jackson and Lake, *op. cit.*, p. 144.
151. Of Al Jitt (Gitta) near Nablus in Palestine.
152. Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, III, 11. *Ante Nicene Fathers*, Vol. I, p. 426.
153. Martyr, Justin, *Apology*, I, xlvi; II, xiii; *Ante Nicene Fathers*, I, p. 178; Bettenson, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7.
154. Tertullian, *De praescriptione haereticorum*, (c. 200), VII, quoted in Bettenson, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8. But even for Tertullian, Christ was not yet what he later came to be in Christian orthodoxy; for he held the essence of the Godhead to be unequally distributed among the hypostasized elements, and whereas the Father is the whole essence, the son is only a derivation and portion thereof. ('*Pater enim tota substantia est, Filius vers derivates et portio.*') Tertullian, *Adversus Praxean*, Quoted in Foakes-Jackson and Lake, *op. cit.*, p. 171.
155. 'That Cain, and those like him, and the Sodomites and the Egyptians and others like them, and, in fine, all the nations who walked in all sorts of abomination, were saved by the Lord, on His descending into Hades, and on their running unto Him and that they welcomed him into their kingdom. But the serpent which was in Marcion declared that Abel, and Enoch and Noah and those other righteous men who sprang from the patriarch Abraham...did not partake of salvation.' (Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, Book I, Chap. XXVII, 2, *Ante Nicene Fathers*, Vol. I, p. 352).
156. Commenting on this book the editors of the *Ante Nicene Fathers* rote: 'The melancholy consequences of an enforced celibacy are, here, all foreseen and foreshown; and his Book...is most useful as a commentary upon the history of monasticism, and the celibacy of priests, in the Western Churches.' (*Ante Nicene Fathers*, Vol. II, p. 381, n. 1).
157. Foakes-Jackson and Lake, *op. cit.*, p. 167.
158. Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, Appendix, Chap. III, *Ante Nicene Fathers*, Vol. III, p. 651.
159. *Ibid.* Cerinthus and Theodotus taught the same views. (Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, I, 24, 1, 2; Tertullian, *Against All Heresies, Ante Nicene Fathers*, III, p. 654). Carpocrates and his followers did likewise, though 'he differed from them in this respect, that inasmuch as his (Jesus') soul was steadfast and pure, he

perfectly remembered those things which he had witnessed within the sphere of the unbegotten God. On this account, a power descended upon him from the Father...and it...ascended again to Him.' (Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, Book I, Chap. XXV, *Ante Nicene Fathers*, Vol. I, p. 350).

160. 'The Ebionites, who will have the Son of God to be a mere man,' (*Constitutions of the Holy Apostles*, Book VI, Sec. II, vi, *Ante Nicene Fathers*, Vol. VII, p. 452).
161. *Secundum disciplinam et participationem.* See Malchion, *Ante Nicene Fathers*, Vol. VI, p. 171.
162. Malchion, *op. cit.*, p. 171.
163. *Ibid.*
164. Athanasius, *De Synodis*, c. 45, Neander, *Church History*, Vol. II, pp. 328-9. 'Christ became great tnrough Wisdom...Having been anointed by the Holy Spirit, he was given the title of Christ. He suffered according to his nature, he worked miracles according to grace. For by his unflinching, unblenched will and resolution he made himself like unto God.' (From a manuscript entitled 'The Key of Truth,' purporting to give Paul of Samosata's views, tr. by Conybeare from the Syriac in *The Key of Truth*, Introduction, p. xciv).
165. Malchion, on Paul of Samosata, *Ante Nicene Fathers*, Vol. VI, p. 171.
166. Eusebius, The Ecclesiastical History and the Martyrs of Palestine, tr. by Lowlor, H. J. and Oulton, J.E.L., SPCK, London, 1927, vi, 33.1, Vol. I, p. 202.
167. Foakes-Jackson and Lake, *op. cit.*, p. 165.
168. Bethune-Baker, *op. cit.*, p. 109.
169. On the effects of that council, G. Sarton wrote: 'Christianity added religious rancor to racial enmities. No international hatred is truly perfect unless the self-righteousness of both parties is enhanced by a feeling of religious superiority. In this case, the theologians of Nicaea had provided the necessary touch of perfection.' (Sarton, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 348).
170. Newmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 340-2.
171. Newmann describes Cyril's operation in this vein: 'Cyril had from the beginning of the controversy made the fullest use of all the means at his disposal for arousing hostility to Nestorius: the fanatical monks, clergy, whose vanity had been injured by the appointment of a foreigner rather than one of themselves to the patriarchate; the corrupt and powerful Pulcheria, the emperor's sister...It was never the intention of Cyril to overcome his opponent by fair means...By bribery and other means all influential parties in Constantinople were conciliated.' (Newmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 340-2).
172. 'Thus the Athanasian party,' concludes Newmann, 'was for a time victorious and the Arians (Easterners) were suppressed as far as possible by imperial force.' (Newmann, *op. cit.*, p. 330).
173. Ayer, *op. cit.*, pp. 106ff.
174. Because of his support for Nestorius, Arius was discharged and banished to Illyria. There he preached to and converted almost the whole north of Christian Europe. Ulfila, the first translator of the *Bible* into Gothic, was an Arian, and Arianism continued to be the religion of Northern Europe and Spain until the seventh century. Arius' doctrine was as follows: 'The Father alone is God, he alone is unbegotten, eternal, wise, good, unchangeable. He is separated by an infinite chasm from man. God cannot communicate his essence. Jesus, the perfect "image" of the Father, is the executor of His thoughts, himself a creature made not of the essence of the Father but out of nothing, by the will of the Father... in time. Het is not eternal, and there was a time when he was not. Neither was he unchangeable by creation, but subject to the vicissitudes of a created being...

The son does not perfectly know the Father and therefore cannot perfectly reveal him. He is essentially different from the Father *(heteroousios)*.' *(Ante Nicene Fathers*, Vol. VI, pp. 292-6).

175. Arius, Bishop of Banealis in Egypt and founder of Arianism, was born in 280 and learned theology under Lucian. He was well steeped in Aristotelian logic and could not accept either trinity or the divinity of Christ.
176. Foakes-Jackson and Lake, *op. cit.*, p. 168.
177. On the splendid cooperation between Nestorian Christian churches and Persia, see Bethune-Baker, James F., *Nestorius and His Teaching*, Cambridge, 1908, pp. 37-43.
178. Tabari, Abu Ja'far M. Ibn Jarir, *Tafsir*, Surah 30, Verses 2-3.
179. Masarjawayh, Yuhanna Ibn Massawayh, Hunayn Ibn Ishaq, Thabit Ibn Qurrah, Costa Ibn Luqa, Yahia Ibn 'Adiyy, Matta Ibn Yunis, Ibn al Bitriq and many others. These men made Dar al Kikmah (House of Wisdom) in Baghdad the lighthouse of the world.
180. The above is an account of the genesis and growth of Christianity inasmuch as this genesis and growth are relevant for an understanding of 'urubah. It is needless to point out that Western Christianity was to undergo in the Renaissance, in the Reformation and in modern times generic transformation which set it on glorious roads of accomplishment. By not addressing ourselves to its later developments, no underestimation of the importance of modern Christianity is implied. Indeed, such an investigation will, it is hoped, be the object of this author's next study.

PART TWO

'URUBAH AND ISLAM

CHAPTER FOUR

THE NATIONALIST DENIAL

I. THE PLACE OF ISLAM IN ARAB NATIONALISM[1]

In an insight rare among orientalists as well as among the theorists of Arab nationalism, H. A. R. Gibb has rightly discerned that to hold the mission of Muhammad and the memory of the Arab Empire the central fact of all history is of the essence of Arabness.[2] Although other components are needed to complete Arabness, none of these occupies the position of this characteristic. For, a man could exemplify all or any number of them without necessarily being an Arab. But if he holds 'the mission of Muhammad' and 'the memory of the Arab Empire' to be 'the central fact of history,' he has thereby passed on the other side of the line. Once there, he may complement his Arabness by mastering Arabic, the legacy of thought, of law and custom, learn to love and endear himself to the community. Or, his consciousness may remain limited to the barest essential notions necessary to make his profession meaningful to himself and recognizable to his community. But to stand on this side of the line he has established unquestionable right.

In their overhasty acceptance of Western European notions of nationalism, many Arab theorists are prone to call Professor Gibb's definition 'religious,' seeking thereby to repudiate it as recalling, and therefore encouraging, a dreadful sectarianism which they wish by all means to see banished from the actualities of Arab consciousness and life.

Some reject it outrightly as something evil and of the past. Others refuse any place to Islam in nationalism because, having confused it with the sad histories of religious governments, they are prone to save the Arabs from iniquities they consider necessary to any association of Islam with national life. A third group are satisfied to take notice of the problem of the place of Islam in nationalism and refrain from involving themselves in its clutches hoping that something will eventually happen to enable them to have and not to have Islam. The first are the 'convinced', the second are the 'confused,' and the third are the 'ambivalent' nationalists.

This problem has hardly received the serious consideration due by thinking Arabs. Its discussions are nearly always elusive and confused even among the 'convinced' nationalists. Instead of clarifying the issue so that future investigators might carry the problem further towards a

solution, which is the least they are expected to do, nationalist thinkers have universally distorted its outlines and rendered any attack upon it the more difficult. So that, although the answers of the 'convinced,' the 'confused' and the 'ambivalent' nationalists offer different solutions, they are all unclear and perplexing.

A. The Convinced Nationalist Position

N. A. Faris and M. T. Husayn fairly represent the first group. They dismiss Gibb's definition by declaring it applicable only to those regions of the Arab world where national consciousness is still weak,[3] giving the reader to understand that religious consciousness belongs to backwards regions and is incompatible with national progress. 'Religion,' they are convinced, 'is not a basis for nationalism in its true meaning, because the nationalist bond is other than the religious, which it has suspended in the modern nations.'[4] In its search for unity, nationalism must abandon religion 'because of the religious diversity it implies' and because, in the particular case of Islam, religion 'carried within it the seed of division of the Arabs.'[5] Although Islam brought about the only national unity the Arabs have ever known, it did, in certain instances, cause diversity. This is indeed true. But because it is true, the nationalist argument may not rest on the fact of diversity without distinguishing between the unifying and the divisive elements of religion. Nationalism must not only analyze and expose the divisive 'seed,' but answer the rejoinder which is certain to come from the Islamist camp that the divisive factor is not 'religion' but merely its abuse.

May the same abuse not be existent in so-called 'nationalism?' Particularly, why should Islam carry the seed of preventing the unity of the Muslim and Christian, and nationalism should not carry such a seed preventing the unity of the Arab and Kurd, or Arab and Berber, or Syrian and Egyptian? The answer to those questions must lie in the direction of distinguishing genuine from spurious religion and genuine from spurious nationalism. Nationalism would then have to show, in case it upholds its repudiation of religion, that in genuine religion there are necessarily divisive seeds—a task no nationalist has attempted—and not merely indict religion with the crimes and sins of its abusers. The valuational argument against religion is double-edged.[6]

Unable to use this valuational argument against granting place to religion in national being, the convinced nationalists recourse to a descriptivist analysis of religion and nation, hoping to arrive at a separation of them by exposing the dissimilarity of their foundations.

Arab nationalism, they will argue, is different from Islamism[7] in that the former acknowledges, whereas the latter rejects, as 'foundation (the

fact) that the Arabs are a nation, distinct in its fundamentally constitutive parts from other nations.'[8] That the Arabs are a nation is not acknowledged by the nationalists exclusively. The Islamists may point out that God himself has called the Arabs a nation,[9] that His Prophet has referred to them as 'my nation.' On the other hand, that the Arabs are fundamentally different from other nations is not in question. As elements in the empirical realm of facts, these differences cannot be denied.

But selection can and must be made between them. Not all empirical facts are relevant for constituting a distinct nation. National being must rest on some and not on others. If the distinguishing characteristics constitutive of the Arab nation are a number of categorial real-existents, like colour, cephalic index, etc.—then obviously, religion has no place in the foundation of national being. But an Arab nationalism that seeks to make of itself an entity constituted of such parts succeeds in producing a caricature of the unethical variety of Western nationalism.

If, on the other hand, the 'fundamentally constitutive parts' are the evaluations of the Arabs, then religion becomes relevant since it is the determinant of these evaluations *par excellence*. The question of deciding which evaluations shall serve as a foundation for national being is not one that can be divorced from religion. A fortiori, the very act of the nationalist, namely, the selecting of evaluations for blessing or condemning, is itself religious activity. As if in order to deprive us of the pleasure of calling them 'religious ministers,' Faris and Husayn failed to give us any specification of those evaluations which they deem 'fundamentally constitutive' of the Arab nation. But their failure robs their argument of its point.

Instead, they have attempted to specify the purposes of national being. Nationalism, they tell us, 'calls for Arab unity, for a state based on modern foundations, secular and independent of religion.'[10] Great as the purposes of 'Arab Unity' and 'modern foundations' may be, it is not obvious that they are the exclusive cultivation of 'secular nationalism,' or that they are by nature antithetical to Islam. The Islamist is no less enthused in the pursuit of them than the nationalist. If 'modern 'means something satisfying to the demands and needs of the living rather than the dead, then it is undoubtedly the purpose of all. On the other hand, that there is more to it than the common meaning of service and efficiency, the 'convinced' nationalists have given us no indication.

Unfortunately, the writings of the 'convinced' nationalists leave much to be desired by way of conceptual precision and clarity of ideas. The contentious assumption that Arab nationalism demands, whereas Islamism opposes, 'modern state foundations,' put forward without further

qualification or analysis, is neither enlightened nor enlightening. When is a foundation 'modern' and when is it 'secular?' Precisely what is it, in religion, that such foundations ought to be 'independent' of, and why? What are those foundations in favour of which, that which religion has to offer ought to be rejected?

The same lack of conceptual precision characterizes the third purpose of nationalism, thus making it a poor support for the thesis that Islam has no place in Arab nationalism. Nationalism, we are told, calls for 'the adoption of that which is valuable in modern civilization, in science, in production methods, in economic and social organization.'[11] Here a whole and complete ideology could be surreptitiously accepted or implied under the term 'valuable.' Besides being extremely unamiable in its implication for Islam, this argument is worthless as long as its advocates do not give any indication of what is valuable and disvaluable 'in modern civilization, in science ...' etc.

The nationalist grounds for separating Islam from Arab national life evidently carry no weight. The question of the relation of religion to nation is unchallengeably determined by their similarities alone, however unexpected the role of these similarities may have turned out to be. Although they are opposed to granting Islam any place in nationalism, Faris and Husayn inadvertently gave it all credit for everything good the Arab world has produced.[12] In a part of their work devoted to the factors of rapprochement and unification, religion is treated as one of the original elements unifying the Arab peoples, and Faris and Husayn elaborate, with great length, that Islam has rendered great service to the nationalist cause.[13]

What more is needed, one may here ask, to make the appearance of the mission of Muhammad Gibb's 'central fact of history?' It is hard to see how it is possible to be a nationalist and reject the consideration that that event which, in the words of Faris and Husayn, made that nation 'enter history at all,' 'acquire historical being as a nation,' and 'illustriously participate in human civilization' is the 'central fact of history.' Besides, Faris and Husayn recognized Islam to be an original factor of Arab unity.[14] True, they have added to it history, language and mentality.[15] But Arab history is for the most part Islamic history, and they have already told us that Arab renaissance itself is only a side-current of the general Islamic renaissance of the nineteenth century.[16] The other factors, namely, language and mentality, are just as much conditions of togetherness and unity and *desiderata* worthy of deepening and pursuit, in nationalism as they are in Islam, if not more so. The other factors of rapprochement and unity that Faris and Husayn give, *viz.*, the printing press, the cinema, communications, economic interest, internal and

foreign political factors,[17] etc., are neither goals nor foundations of national being, but instruments and tools which can be put to any use for or against the nation. If nationalism regards them as desirable, it does not do so exclusively.

We may therefore conclude that, far from justifying his rejection of Gibb's proposition, the 'convinced' nationalist has, furthermore, given us no valid substitute. He has not affirmed anything. He has simply denied.

B. The Confused Nationalist Position

Another class of nationalist thinkers deny place to Islam in Arab nationalism but for different reasons. Like the 'convinced' nationalists they argue for a complete separation of Islam from the state. Their argument rests not on any theory of state or of society, but on the refutation of the opposite view that Islam ought to be the sole determinant of political and social life.

The view that Islam ought to be the sole determinant of political and social life has become in the Arab world the bugbear of public debate. In the enthusiasm to knock it down, this view, known as Islamism, or 'Religious Government' is represented now as one thing, now as another, but always as the focus at which all Arab disvalues converge. Every refutation of this view so far advanced has been futile for the simple reason that Islam, being a normative realm of value, is dissociable from any reality that is identified with it. Islam is not the Muslims' social system, nor the Muslims' theological, aesthetic or any other system, but that which all these strive to realize. Like all value, it may not be confused with its *matériel*. As value, that is to say, as ideally self-existent essence *sui generis*, Islam can, not only extricate itself from the reality with which it is associated but set itself as the judge of that reality. In itself, it is not affected by the conformance or otherwise of that reality to its own principles and structure. Any criticism, therefore, directed to that reality cannot ever discredit Islam. To refute it, the critic must address himself not to the realities which sought to realize Islam, but to Islam itself, to the realm of value which constitutes it; and this no nationalist has dared, or will dare, to do. Instead, nationalists have, with mediocre consequence, addressed themselves to the historical *matériaux* of Islam, and, whether deliberately or naively, have hoped that logic-deficiency would produce the fallacious extrapolation requisite for refuting Islamism. That they are 'confused' is indubitably the very least that can be said of these refutations.

The 'confused' nationalist is then the person who seeks to establish the nationalist thesis by refuting a straw-man which he takes to be the real Islamist. The 'confused' tradition was encouraged to come into existence, though by no means incepted, by Abd al Raziq's *Al Islam wa Usul al*

Hukm;[18] but the classic of these Quixotic treatiess is Khalid Muhammad Khalid's *Min Huna Nabda'*.[19]

Khalid gives two definitions of 'religious government.' First, he gives the definition held by his opponents that 'religious government' is 'one which rules in accordance with the word of God and enforces all the prohibitions of divine law.'[20] This definition must be acceptable to Khalid, since he sees in the governments of Abu Bakr, 'Umar Ibn al Khattab and 'Umar Ibn 'Abd al 'Aziz 'great and glorious instances of "religious government."'[31] In his view then such governments must have satisfied the given definition and thereby deserved the titles of 'great' and 'glorious.' However, a government which rules in accordance with the word of God and enforces all the prohibitions of divine law is beyond reproach. Khalid therefore offers a second definition which runs diametrically counter to the first. 'Though it may call itself religious and presume a relation to religion,' he writes, 'religious government draws neither its principles nor its actual conduct from the Book of God or the Sunnah of His Prophet.'[22]

Which shall the reader take? The contradiction may be removed by considering either its conformance with, or its violation of, the word and law of God as a contingent accident; and it would seem logical that the first definition is the more correct. It stands to reason that the religious government that violates the word and command of God has missed its nature rather than that the religious government that conforms therewith has missed hers. It is more natural for a human institution to draw out for itself, or have drawn for it, an ideal pattern which it then seeks successfully or unsuccessfully to realize, than to begin with a sinister pattern and call a deviation therefrom to the good, an accident. And yet this is precisely what Khalid would like us to do. He considers the second definition of religious government as valid and the first one as a definition of 'theirs,'[23] *i.e.*, the advocates of Islamic rule. The excellence of the governments of Abu Bakr and 'Umar is accidental; for it would have been natural for them to be as bad as the governments that followed.[24]

Besides the recourse to natural comprehension, the question could perhaps be dealt with from the standpoint of whether Khalid's preferred definition is synthetic and therefore a generalization from experience, or analytic and therefore a priori. If it is the former, it is not necessary and a religious government that does rule in accordance with the word of God would not be an 'unnatural exception.' If, on the other hand, the definition is analytic, as Khalid does endeavour to show, it is the barest assertion that it should draw its inspiration 'from the ambitions and personal interests of its leaders' than from the word of God, and violate rather than conform with that word.

Having therefore postulated, without much reason for so doing, his definition of religious government and excluded every good government as 'hard and unnatural exception,' Khalid is now ready to open his fire against religious government. But it commits his argument to the inconsequence of flogging a dead horse, of repudiating an institution which has already been hopelessly indicted in its definition. The position of the Islamist who clings to Khalid's first definition has remained safely at a distance. And the case of Islamism stands untouched by the Quixotic battle that is waged under its view far out on the distant field.

Khalid directs to religious government the severest accusations. It draws its principles 'from the ambitions and personal interests of its leaders,'[25] he writes. Its constitution is the 'obscure religion' and the *Qur'an* which is 'susceptible to many interpretations.'[26] It is anti-rational and ultra conservative, holding that the ancestors had said the last word on everything and that our salvation is in imitation rather than invention.[27] It denies opposition, even advice, directed against its policies and decrees and seeks absolute monocracy.[28] It avoids progress or change and seeks permanence in stagnation.[29] It is cruel and repressive in the application of its zealotous vision.[30] Khalid then illustrates these 'instincts' of religious government by pointing to examples drawn from history as well as from the contemporary world.

At each of these accusations one is tempted to repeat to Khalid the same answer, namely, that what he criticizes is certainly condemnable and runs counter to the teaching of Islam. A government of which what he says is true stands as much condemned by 'Islam' or 'religion' as by Khalid and 'nationalism.' The name 'religious government' then is here abused and has availed nothing. But Khalid stands in no need of such reminders, for he has warned his reader beforehand that his essay is meant to elevate religion 'to a plane ... beyond reach of those who blame it for the flagrant errors and evils which so-called religious governments have committed in its name.'[31] If then, a bad religious government is not properly speaking 'religious,' criticism may not be directed to it as 'religious' but as 'government.' Its evil does not necessarily flow from its religiousness ... since it has none. Its name has been usurped. All that is permissible is a critique of that government in terms of utility, reason, religion or morality. Yet, Khalid insists that what he has analyzed is 'religious government;' that the evil characteristics he has discerned in certain examples of religious government are not accidental, but 'have been so firmly established that they have become inseparable from religious governments everywhere.'[32] They belong to it 'by nature,'[33] and that is why he has called them 'instincts.'

Such is the confusion. There are other times when Khalid betrays a

real need to be reminded of the Islamic teaching—when he speaks not of religious government, but of 'national' government, attributing to it characteristics which, one expects, would belong to nationalism exclusively, and shows its superiority not to the so-called religious government of Zayd or 'Amr but to the genuinely religious government whose 'necessary,' 'fundamental,' 'instinctive' 'nature' he claims to have analyzed. His praise, 'under national government, opposition is a national duty,'[34] does evoke the rejoinder, furnished by Khâlid himself in his preface,[35] that under Islamic government, opposition is an Islamic duty. The observation that although a national government may become guilty of the same abuses, it can be dismissed by a conscious public opinion and parliament, deserves the answer that there is nothing in Islam which prevents the healthy functioning of a conscious public opinion, and a responsible parliament of *Ahl al hall wa al 'aqd*,[36] capable of discharging the government that goes astray. That Al Hajjaj has sat unremovable on the throne of Iraq as the head of a religious government is as much an argument against religious government[37] as the fact that Nuri al Sa'id occupied the same throne unshakeably as head of a national government is an argument against national government.

C. The Ambivalent Nationalist Position

Islam cannot be exiled from public life with such tricks, however clever or Quixotic. This realization itself has driven a third group of thinkers to decide the question of the place of Islam in Arab national life by allowing both the negative and the affirmative answers to stand side by side. Thus they would have Islam with the Islamist as well as not have it with the convinced nationalist, until something beyond them would change the situation fundamentally and from without. These are the 'ambivalent' nationalists. To this class usually belong the scholarly thinkers whose studies have led them to appreciate the difficulties involved in either the affirmative or the negative answers. Judging the question satisfactorily insoluble in either direction, the 'ambivalent' nationalists point to the 'facts' of Arab thought—namely, the absence of solution—and either bemoan its inconsequence in despair or faithfully hope for a solution to come about in good time.

In an otherwise excellent study of Arab nationalism which has won him an Arab League prize,[38] Munif al Razzaz recognized that Islam must have a place, and he assigned to it the fourth position—after geography, language and history—in constituting the bases of 'urubah.[39] He recognized that Islam is not a matter for individual, personal conscience alone and described it as a culture and civilization which deeply affected both Muslims and Christians, Arabs and non-Arabs.[40] Unfortunately, he never went beyond these generalities to analyze this influence of Islam or to make precise the nature of its relation to nationalism. In another passage, he definitely condemned religion for trying to determine Arab national life.[41] But, although the ambivalence is left without solution, there is neither awareness nor mention that ambivalence is there at all.

With Hazim Nuseibeh[42] ambivalence becomes more pronounced. Islam is treated both as the founder of a state, a national history and a civilization as well as the controversial factor *par excellence* of unity and disunity in Arab life. Nuseibeh quotes Muhammad Iqbal approvingly when the latter writes, 'the state, from the Islamic standpoint, is the means whereby the Islamic concepts of life are realized in a definite human organization; (that) the ultimate reality, according to the *Qur'an* is spiritual, but the life of the state consists in its temporal activity.'[43] But he is careful to qualify this statement by limiting its validity to the 'early' days, the 'founding period' alone. To this limitation, he is led by the consideration that the spread of Islam has brought with it the reduction of Arab hegemony and influence in the affairs of the empire. After the Umawis, Nuseibeh believes, the interest of Islam was no more identical with Arab interest. Iqbal's statement, therefore, would not be true if applied to the contemporary situation.[44]

In addition to contributing to the birth of a nation and a state, Islam contributed to 'the birth of a national history and the birth of a civilization.'[45] 'Because it satisfies one of the prerequisites of national consciousness, (and is believed capable of making) a unique contribution towards solving the dilemmas of today,[46] ... Arab nationalism requires the Arab-Islamic legacy in order to discover its own essence and its sources of strength.'[47]

Despite the limitations imposed, all this indicates that, in the ambivalent nationalist's mind, Islam—with its legacy—is indispensible and occupies a major—indeed the most important—place in Arab national life. For there can be no more important factor in Arab nationalism than that which gives it its own 'essence' and is its 'source of strength.'

All this notwithstanding, Nuseibeh assigns to Islam the place of a 'controversial' factor in Arab nationalism. Along with race, Islam is not one of the certain factors of Arab nationalism. These are exclusively 'language,' 'historical traditions' and 'common interests.'[48] Rather, Islam is a 'controversial' factor, treated along with race in a separate section.[49] Indeed, it is not even controversial. 'It is now realized,' he writes, '—at least by the leaders of thought—that in order to forge a progressive and homogeneous nation religion must be taken out of politics, as was done in the West after the Reformation.'[50] Anxious to

ensure the participation of the Christian Arabs in national being, he sees such separation of Islam from political life—modelled after the Reformation—absolutely necessary,[51] thus betraying the opinion that there can be no sense of Arabism that might accomodate the religious feelings and hopes of both Christian and Muslim Arabs. Since both Christianity and Islam are thus ruled out from political life, there is every reason to believe that 'ambivalent' nationalism will have no room for any religious values at all. And since the non-religious elements are 'so intermeshed' with the Islamic elements 'as to render their untangling well-nigh impossible,'[52] the likelihood is that the bath will be discarded with the baby. Nuseibeh has previously ruled that the Arab-Islamic legacy is indispensible for nationalism. Now he, along with 'the leaders of thought,' is repudiating Islam. But the Islamic element cannot be rejected without rejecting the Arab element from which, *ex hypothesi*, it cannot be separated. The ambivalence is in reality less ambivalent than we have supposed.

Finally, in the hands of Fayez Sayegh, 'ambivalence' becomes conscious, articulate. It is no longer an unworthy inconsequence in the mind of the 'ambivalent' nationalist, but an act of nationalist thought which is not opprobrious at all. Indeed, Sayegh even deems it desirable.

'No Arab,' writes Sayegh echoing Gibb's observations, 'Muslim or non-Muslim, can fail to realize that the generative event and the point of departure of his national history was the rise of Islam, and that Islam permeated the legacy of the civilization built by the Arabs in the golden periods of their history, as well as the social, political and cultural fibres of Arab life to-day.'[53] Recognizing Islam's role as the origin of Arab nationhood, Arab civilization and the Arab world-view and life-view,[54] Sayegh concludes that Islam is a 'potent element of Arabism,' a 'unifying factor in Arab society' and a 'determinant,' however partial, of Arab national being. So precise and clearcut is the affirmative part of his 'ambivalence'.

The negative part consists in what seems to Sayegh to be the facts of history and contemporary Arab national life. Islamization and Arabization, he writes, have in history been distinct and separable.[55] Islamization is less comprehensive, and did in fact operate 'in isolation from the total concept of Arabization,' for it is but 'one facet' thereof.[56] This leads him to conclude that they are not identical.[57] Obviously, he has underrated the Arabicizing effect of Islam. For a person to become a Muslim, he must learn to live with religious, ethical and aesthetic elements which are necessary moments of Arab consciousness. He must regard the *Qur'an*, which is Arabic in its language and Arab in its form and ideas, as the dominant—nay, sole—determinant of his consciousness. Sayegh's

separation of Islamization and Arabization contradicts his own assertion that 'Islam as a religion encompasses more than mere theological dicta and ethical precepts; it embraces principles of socio-political organization, with direct relevance to almost all aspects of the daily life of all members of a society permeated by the spirit of Islam.'[53] Obviously, one may speak of a difference on the level of Arabness between the Egyptian and the Afghan though not on the level of Islam. But this difference is not one of kind but of degree; and, being one of degree, it does not permit the separation in question. One may speak of a difference in degree of Arabness between the Egyptian and the Afghan just as naturally as one does in fact speak, and indeed, must speak, of a difference between the Yamani and the Kurdi, or the Qordofani. Conversely, Arabization may be regarded as 'a facet' of Islamization. Modern Arabic has been propagated outside the Peninsula because the word of God is an Arabic word and hence in satisfaction of a religious imperative. The ethnic Arabization of the Near East and North Africa is the embodiment of the *religious* principle of Islamic fraternity.[54]

On the contemporary scene, Sayegh observes that Arab nationalists have been guided by ideas and values and have formulated their problems and hopes in terms borrowed from the secular West rather than from their own Islamic legacy.[55] Certainly, the 'factuality' of this statement may be put to question; and at any rate, the judgement is premature. As to its desirability, it is not acceptable at all if the Arab nationalist is to respect himself and honour his own legacy by attempting to make himself continous with his past. However, it is right here that Sayegh takes the decisive step that takes him to the nationalist camp and puts him in the forefront of its 'ambivalent' enclave.

Arab nationalism, he tells us, may become free of ambivalence only if it develops into one that is 'devoid of socio-political Muslim ingredients.'[56] It will become same and pure not if its present form should develop into something consonant with the Arab legacy—which is primarily an Islamic legacy—but only if Islam itself develops into something that will make room for a nationalism of the Western type.[57] Thus, the Western type secular nationalism, which was a contending party in the ambivalence, now sits on the judge's bench and demands that the other party, *viz.*, Islam, 'develop' into something that will remove the ambivalence.

Pushing his insight further, Sayegh suggests the possibility that this ambivalence could also be removed by the Muslims persisting in their present secularism and religious indifference, or even by their developing some form of 'militant agnosticism and thus disengage Arabism from the ingrained Islamism at the root of its currently subconscious ambivalence.'[58] But the classic statement of 'ambivalence' is the following

suggestion which he gives towards the end of the discussion: 'The pragmatic nature of the modern Arab awakening ... may enable Arab nationalism to survive the ambivalence pertaining to the place of Islam within Arabism ... without seeking to reconcile them within harmonious speculative systems ... without experiencing serious strains or agonies.'[59] In other words, ambivalence is really not at all something which must be solved, but survived. It does not really matter if it continues to characterize Arab nationalism provided the latter's pragmatic genius can invent ways of evading issues and of bypassing hard and uncompromisable questions like the place of Islam in Arab national being, with no attempt at solving them at all.

II. THE NATIONALIST CONCEPTION OF 'URUBAH

'Arabness', or ''urubah', is a modern concept. In the past, it was the substantive form of a verb *'aruba* which meant 'to become eloquent,' as by freeing oneself of an incapacity of speech, whether physical or linguistic.[60] Although the Arabs have always regarded language and eloquence as possessing exceedingly high value, yet the word *'urubah* has not been used to express its modern meaning except in modern times.[61]

'Urubah is that which makes the Arab Arab. It is his essence and definition—the total sum of characteristics or aspects of his being, which distinguish the Arab from the non-Arab. These can all be the object of scientific study and measurement, whether physical, psychological, social or religious.

However, that is not all. 'Urubah is not merely a descriptive concept but is also normative. It does not only explain by signifying and denoting something existent; it equally signifies and denotes elements which are not existent in the given case but ought to exist. Hence 'urubah explains as well as commands. It is as much what the Arab is as what he ought to be regardless whether or not, and if so in how far, he already is it. In 'urubah a system of values which determines, as well as ought to determine, Arab being is always implied. Arab emotional life, self-consciousness, sense of the beautiful, Arab ethos and sense of obligation, Arab political outlook and will—all these enter the constituency of 'urubah, both as actualities and as ought-to-be-actualities. Religion, which is the expression (figurized and symbolized or completely spiritual and devoid of external appurtenances) of man's world-view and life-view, permeates the whole constituency of these elements; and Islam does so *par excellence*. The analysis of the nationalist conception of 'urubah will then reveal the place the Islamic values occupy in the realm of value which nationalism

discerns. Indeed, the nationalist analysis of 'urubah, whether descriptive or normative, should prove instructive in our attempt to analyze and evaluate what nationalism hopes for the Arab to be. And since the normative elements of 'urubah are the idea Arab culture has of man, the ideal pattern of person and society around which Arab legacy itself revolves, nationalism's analysis of them. *i.e.*, its discernment, selection and ordering of the contents of those ideals, must betray its judgement of the whole Arab-Islamic legacy.

The nationalist meanings attributed to 'urubah fall into two classes. On the one hand, 'urubah is regarded as the existential ground of Arab awakening, the real cause and condition which justify Arab awakening and nationhood, and, there, as a purely descriptive concept. On the other hand, 'urubah is regarded as the idealistic end of this awakening, its final cause and purpose. In the former case, the 'greater Arab nation' is something that is, but is prevented from assuming appropriate actual form by foreign imperialism or by internal reactionism. In the latter case, the 'greater Arab nation' is still inexistent. Although it has the potential to acquire real existence, it is not yet real, but ought to be realized. The difference between them is that which separates real from ideal existence. The one sees 'urubah as an actuality on which to build and form the basis of which to act; the other sees in 'urubah a body of ends or purposes or values at which to aim and towards which Arab striving ought to be directed. Externally, *i.e.*, politically, both were equally dynamic: the first by seeking to remove what it considered to be a hindrance to the coming into form of the nation; and the second by seeking to realize that which it perceived as valuable. Both tendencies commingled and separated in the same person, and never hardened into two distinct camps or schools. Although they always worked hand in hand, yet there is little doubt that the normative view of 'urubah was the more dynamic intellectually for it alone felt the need to lift under the lucid light of reason and, as it were, store in consciousness for the ready use of reason and political leaders, the ideals of man, society and world order it silently and immediately discerned;[62] whereas the descriptivist tendency spent its energies on convincing the Arabs themselves and the world that what it describes is real.

A. The Descriptive School

The greater number of Arab nationalist thinkers are descriptivist. They have succeeded in listing and analyzing the existential realities on which Arab awakening is founded. Ibrahim Jum'ah,[63] George Antonius,[64] Sati' al Husari,[65] George Hanna,[66] Ahmad Sa'id,[67] Hazim Nuseibeh,[68] Munif al Razzaz,[69] Faris and Husayn[70] and many others have furnished more

or less uniform analyses of these components. The first of these analyses is probably the most comprehensive and exemplary. Calling the components 'fixed realities,' Jum'ah lists the unities of geography, of history, of resistance to foreign aggression, of language, culture and thought, of political and economic interest, of psychological and behavioural nature, and of 'moral and existential interest.'[71] While repudiating the geographical and religious factors,[72] George Hanna adds the factors of social unity expressed in common traditions and customs, of the consciousness of unity upon which he lays particular emphasis and which he declares the most important of all.[73]

Faris and Husayn define 'the present Arabs (as being) all those ... whose mentality shows the characteristics of Arab mentality regardless of the religions to which they adhere or the races whence their ancestors came.'[74] They have given us an analysis of Arab mentality which reads more like vituperation than 'analysis.'[75] 'Arab mentality' falls in the book as one of the 'factors of rapprochement and unification,' but it is hard to see how a list of sinister qualities such as they have enumerated can contribute to rapprochement and unity. They had previously warned their readers[76] that they intend to investigate not a pure theory, but the real, actual, living Arab human person. The good qualities which the Arab, whether settled or Bedouin, has developed and maintained during his centuries-long existence, the qualities of character which presuppose the continuity of a people's history, are all abstracted and forgotten. It is the barest presumption to pick up a list of bad qualities, rather than a list of no less evident good qualities, and say this is the modern Arab.[77] Such chance enlistment of disvalues cannot be taken seriously as a definition of the Arab. If it were established beyond doubt that these disvalues are really Arab, a list of them may serve in describing what the Arab is not. As to what he is, positively, no list of disvalues can, *ex hypothesi*, claim to instruct.

B. The Normative School

Arab nationalism has still to produce a systematically normative description of 'urubah.[78] So far, Zurayq has laid out the need, and Ishaq Musa Husayni has attempted a methodology for such a study.[79]

In Husayni's opinion, 'urubah consists of and is equivalent to three elements in conjunction, the absence of any one of which is sufficient to negate the existence of 'urubah. These are the Arabness of language, of mind and of heart. The first is defined as the ability to read, write and speak literary Arabic. The second is the awareness of the Arab of himself and of his society as Arab, the knowledge of Arab political, literary, moral, social and intellectual history. The third is a composite element.

It includes the conviction of the Arabs' title to existence and liberty—a conviction derived from the Arab legacy, from the consideration that the Arabs have made genuine contributions to world civilization in the past and are determined to make new ones in the future. In addition, Arabness of heart includes the conviction that one is a part of the Arab whole, sharing in its blame or praise, as well as the conviction of 'the unity of language and thought and seeks to deepen that unity and make of it a sound foundation for any possible future relation.'[80]

All three elements of 'urubah may exist in various degrees of intensity or scope, affecting thereby the intensity of 'urubah to which theirs is directly proportional. For Husayni, all three are of equal value for 'urubah,[81] and they define it in such a way as to accomodate all variations of political, economic and social doctrine, all interpretations of the human legacy in general, or of the Arab legacy in particular, but while giving all Arabs a unity of purpose,[82] *viz.*, the Arabness of language, mind and heart.

It will at once be noticed that the Arabness of language and mind are theoretical concepts. Arabness of heart, *per contra*, is axiological, though Husayni has added to it some theoretical elements. The conviction that the Arabs are entitled to liberty and permanence may be the naive, though intense and candid, love of the illiterate Arab, which is the determination by the values of existence and liberty for one's people and next-of-kin. But no matter how naive this love for one's people may be, it must rest on the existence, in their life or in their yearning, of certain values which the illiterate Arab senses though he may not be able to describe. By themselves, existance and liberty are insufficient determinants of 'urubah. However basic these values may be, they cannot satisfy our moral yearning, nor provide grounds from which such satisfying elements could be deduced. Indeed, with regard to higher moral value, existence and liberty are so moral-free that they may, by a dedication of them to moral disvalue, become disvalues themselves. From the self-evident moral fact that an existence dedicated to crime is unworthy and/or deserves annihilation, it follows that at least some of the worth of existence is derivative from that to which it is dedicated. From the self-evident moral fact that an existence dissociated from all moral value has so little worth that we speak of it as vegetative or animal, it follows that whatever worth (besides the purely utilitarian) is ascribed to existence is derivative from the moral values to which existence is usually instrumental. 'Urubah, therefore, cannot be satisfied with 'existence.' It demands an existence dedicated to moral value, and the problem is one of defining and analyzing the contents of moral value—a task of the necessity of which Husayni has given no indication that he is even aware.

That this love for one's people must be derived from the knowledge of the Arab legacy, from their contributions to world civilization can hardly be required as a condition of the possibility of that love. Surely, acquaintance with the legacy and the understanding of its contributions would enhance the love for its people, provided such love is already there. The desire for the free existence of one's people can also exist without, or with very little of, such consciousness of logical derivation. Logical derivation is the work of the discursive reason, not of the heart, and together with the study and understanding of the legacy it constitutes the second element of Husayni's definition of 'urubah. To define the third element of a definition by its second element involves Husayni in a *circulus*.

On the other hand, the conviction that one is part of the whole, sharing in their praise or blame, may distinguish the Arab from the non-Arab who conceives himself as belonging to another people. But it leaves entirely untouched the problem of differentiating between the ideals which an Arab may entertain who feels himself part of the whole.

Faris and Husayn, who come close to Husayni's combination of the Arabness of mind and heart when they define the Arab as a person who, among other things, 'takes pride in Arab history,'[83] fall short in the other direction of not making precise such a general concept as 'Arab history' in which the Arab is supposed to 'take pride.' Besides being an ethically questionable act by any morality, academically, 'to take pride' is a loose term unsuitable for scholarly use as *definiens*. Pride is an attitude, that is to say, a continuously held judgement relating in an order of favour, the object of pride to other objects in the realm of valuational consciousness. By itself, it does neither tell what value is assigned to the object of pride, nor define the degree of favour in which the object of pride stands to other objects. It does not imply any identification of the other objects to which it means to relate its object. 'Arab history' is a general term covering a whole multitude of things, many of which are sublime and good and many others are bad or completely evil. Neither 'Arab history' nor any other history is absolutely free of facts in which no man in his senses would want to take any pride, or of others in which varying degrees of pride are taken. The implication is that pride is taken only in certain actualities of Arab history, but the authors have specified none and the reader is left devoid of any principle by means of which those actualities can be identified. The whole question is one of assigning a place, theoretically in Arab history and valuationally in the hierarchy of the heart, to 'the mission of Muhammad'—by defining the value of its relations to the rest of Arab history. Thus, the least that can be said of this sort of definition is that it is vague. The failure to make precise, or in the case of Faris and Husayn, even to identify that of which the Arab is presumably

proud and to assign its value relationship to world history, precludes any definition of Arab identity in the world and in history.

Lastly, the requirement of conviction of the unity of language and thought is academic and stands to the emotional, immediate feelings of love for one's people entirely superfluous. This is not to deprive it of all value but to observe that it can move and determine only the will of those whose consciousness of the legacy has been developed to a considerable degree, and that hence it is not necessarily a requirement of the heart.

Thus, this threefold requirement does not add appreciably to the third and most important element of 'urubah, namely, the desire for liberty and survival for one's people. What they do add is theoretical, not valuational, and the axiological foundation of that desire remains unchanged by either, unless in their wake they uncover valuational elements and bring them to bear. But such implication is not necessary.

The fact that this analysis of 'urubah can accomodate any variation of political, social and economic doctrine Husayni regards as an advantage, which in fact it is, as long as 'doctrine' is taken to mean the form of political, social and economic organization. We should be as far removed as possible from identifying 'urubah with any given social, political or economic form. But although 'urubah is, and always should remain, open to change in the form, mechanics, style and momentum of organization—in short, in everything instrumental—it is absolutely committed to the pursuit of socio-political and economic values which are beyond change. Certainly, our understanding of the relationships of these to other values and to their real-existent *matériaux* may develop and grow. But this growth and development may run only in the direction of how better to serve those values and achieve a more perfect realization of them. It is this fixity of value that anchors 'urubah to its past and legacy and gives it both its identity and credentials in the world. Without it, 'urubah would run adrift and, unable to decide which is harmonious with or injurious to its nature, would finally destroy itself.

If 'urubah were so valuationally contentless as to accomodate variations of form as well as purpose or content, then it necessarily implies none. However, in the chapter entitled 'Arabization of the Arabs,' we find to our delight, in violation of the logic of the foregoing analysis, five principles listed in answer to the specific question of how can the depth or superficiality of 'urubah in a country be judged:[84] First, the people's cherishing and appreciation of Arabic and its literature; second, their pride in and their understanding and aesthetic presentation of Arab history; third, their love for Arab customs and traditions; fourth, their preservation of the ntaional legacy with its political, religious and other worthy institutions; fifth, their readiness to defend the honour of 'urubah

and homeland.[85] One couldn't wish for a passage more replete with valuational content and which renders obsolete Husayni's whole previous analysis of 'urubah. This fivefold valuational content is obviously necessary to 'urubah and is logically implied thereby. 'Urubah is then not free of fixed, unalterable values; and its analysis should have begun right here.

Although Husayni warned the reader that the three elements are equivalent in value and stand equally determinative of 'urubah,[86] he betrays a groundless prejudice in favour of language and, at least in one place, he definitely assigns to it 'the most important place in nationalism.'[87] The Arabic language, he holds, is the only bond left uniting the Arabs. It is 'the strongest,' 'eternal and golden' bond holding the Arab peoples together.[88] Despite this inconsequence, he stands definitely on the side which holds all three elements equally necessary for 'urubah, and he assigns the same place on the scale of 'urubah to all persons deficient in one or the other of these elements.[89]

This, of course, is unwarranted. The Arabness of language, that of mind and that of heart do stand in constant tension with one another. The avenues leading to them, the methods, disciplines and materials are not identical but widely different.

The Arabness of heart is itself wide enough to hold within it both the Arabness of language and of mind, since neither of these could be achieved without an emotional attachment to the utilitarian, aesthetic, moral and religious values of Arabic and the Arab legacy. Thus, Arabness of heart must be prior—at least on account of this comprehensiveness which, in actual existence, acts as a conditioning prius and presupposition of willing Arabness of language and mind.

Moreover, no value ever stands alone, as it were, unrelated to other values. Since both its perception and realization are never in the abstract, but in a situation full, or deprived, of many other values, no action realizing it is possible unless it is based on a preference of some value to others. Since their non-realization and, indeed, inaction itself necessarily imply the realization of some other value, no value can be either perceived or realized except as standing in a hierarchy of values, hence, as occupying a specific place in that hierarchy. It is therefore all the more inconsequential that Husayni has given no principle on the basis of which judgement of the pursuit of the constitutive elements of the Arabness of language, mind and heart becomes possible.

Both the descriptive and the normative nationalists conceive of 'urubah as something desirable in itself. Whatever they may conceive its constituents to be, they both regard them as valuable. If they are already realized such constituents ought to be enhanced and at any rate preserved. If they

are not yet actual, they ought to become so, and their realization is the duty of every Arab.

C. The Factitive School

Besides the above-mentioned descriptive and normative schools, there is another which stands on the other side of the descriptive/normative alternation. Both the descriptive and the normative theories understand 'urubah as something either in the living Arabs and/or in their legacy and spirit. The descriptivists see 'urubah as an actual character of Arab men and society, and the normativists, as ideals in Arab legacy which men and society ought to develop and realize. The former take for granted that the actual reality in which they see 'urubah is Arab. and the latter, that the legacy in which they see 'urubah is Arab, The factitive school stands outside this bifurcation precisely because it does not take the Arabness of either actuality or legacy for Arab. It questions this Arabness and holds something non-Arab by nature, or insufficiently Arab, to be constitutive of 'urubah. The Arabness of which it conceives is not genuine but factitive.

Because of its particularist disposition, this third school considers 'urubah as the message, not of all the Arab peoples of today, but of the Peninsular Arabs of the seventh century who spilled over the surrounding lands and enriched themselves with the native cultures. The inhabitants of these lands, who, under this uninstructed view, are neither Arabs nor possessors of the pre-Islamic Arab legacy from the Akkadian conquest up to and including Christianity, have kept their old non-Arab identity and culture and 'survived,' as separate nations, the invasion of the Peninsular Arabs.[90] It may be here asked who are these Arab, non-Arab nations and in what does their non-Arabness consist? Egypt, Lebanon and 'Greater' Syria,[91] which Fayez Sayegh furnishes as instances,[92] are unmistakably Arab if the tests of language, history, culture, interest and destiny were to be applied. The remaining test, namely, the will to be part of the Arab nation, is not universally shared by all inhabitants. But it is shared by an overwhelming majority of them in each case. Other Arab nationalists look upon this as a challenge. The extension of this will to those who do not have it and its deepening and intensification in all is not only desirable but is the main task of this century. The Phoenecianist of Lebanon, the Syrianist of Syria and Pharaonist of Egypt, Sayegh tells us, would like to see their particular, non-Arab nationalisms revived and hold that 'it is in their diverse, ancient and continuous traditions, submerged perhaps but not eradicated in the process of "arabization," that the principles of the new traditions and revived cultures should respectively be sought.'[93] Thus, Lebanon should endeavour to become more

Lebanese, and Egypt more Pharaonic, rather than to complete the Arabization process begun in the seventh century. But since these provincialisms regard Arab culture as a mixture and outgrowth of these native 'non-Arab' cultures, literary Arabic as an inflexible and inadequate language whose purity has been preserved because of its peculiar relation to the *Qur'an* and spoken Arabic as having had 'to undergo essential diversification in the various (so-called) Arab communities,'[94] it is hard to see what was particularly Arab in the Arabization movement of the seventh century, unless it be Islam.

If, therefore, we recognize, as we must following Sayegh's thought, that Islam is the dominant element in the Arabization process, we can appreciate the gravity of his contention that the search in the soul of the so-called 'Arab' peoples is 'a resumption of the initial Muslim Arab invasions of the seventh century—with the difference that now the struggle is within the already arabicized countries, the non-Arab world, instead of being an assault from without, as it was then ... The struggle of Arabism with Syrian or Egyptian nationalism, for example, or with Lebanese provincialism, and the struggle of Islam with Christianity are thus two modes in which that earlier struggle is being resumed.'[95] Besides contradicting his thesis that Arab being is a continuous stream since ancient days,[96] Sayegh is here denying the Arabness of Lebanon, Syria, Egypt. According to him, these provinces are nations and countries—partially arabicized it is true—but still throbbing with their own religion, which is not Islam, and their own culture, which is not Arab. Indeed, he asserts that an Arabism that does not give these 'self-contained entities, antedating and surviving both in their being and in their cultural self-unfolding the relatively short-lived period of Arab-Muslim expansion,'[97] is an unworthy movement which deserves only rejection. To strive to make 'thorough (the) Islamization and Arabization of the Arab World ... the consummation of the unfinished process,'[98] is evil. The alternative which Sayegh defends is the eternal maintenance of a national, religious and cultural pluralism,[99] within a framework of regional common interest,[100] guided by 'the traditions and revived cultures' 'submerged but not eradicated,' of Phoenicianism, Syrianism, Pharaonism and the like.

This then is the meaning of 'urubah as Sayegh understands it. Not only Islam, but equally the Arabness of the Peninsular Arabs have no place in it at all. These are precisely that which nationalism must fight off lest their resurgent vitality stamp out the particular provincialism. Obviously, such an ideal has not yet raised itself to regional, not to speak of worldly, universality. It wallows in the moral filth of particularisms and partisan fanaticisms of a decadent colonialist era where all sorts of morbid self-

assertions were instigated—indeed sometimes created, their fires fanned and their growth encouraged—by imperialist powers that learned too well the Roman lessons of *divide et impero*. If, amidst the Arabness of Lebanon, the Phoenicianists may have their particular non-Arab culture, there remains no reason why in the midst of Phoenicianism every tribal, village and family grouping may not have its own non-Phoenician culture.

The absurdity to which the logic of particularist nationalism leads, especially when its particularism is so flagrantly particular, is conspicuous enough.

Sayegh's provincial nationalism stands beyond the bifurcation of descriptive/normative because it questions the Arabness of Arab actuality and legacy and asserts that something non-Arab is and/or ought to be 'urubah, or the content and purpose of the renaissance movement of the Arab world. We shall now consider another theory which, equally with Sayegh's, stands outside the said alternation but for a different reason. Whereas Sayegh's provincial nationalism is factitive because it brings into 'urubah something which is non Arab, this theory is factitive because, while taking for granted the Arabness of Arab reality and legacy, it understands 'urubah as being essentially something not distinctly, uniquely and sufficiently Arab. Sayegh found his solution in the co-existence of Arab and non-Arab elements in a tolerant pluralistic whole. This theory finds its solution in a monistic whole whose essence is Arab but only insufficiently so. This is Professor C. K. Zurayq's view of 'urubah.

The 'urubah which is so desirable for us and the consciousness of which Zurayq seeks to cultivate in *Al Wa'i al Qawmi* is 'the same as that of the ancestors.'[101] It consists in a composition made of elements derived from the national legacy, as well as from the cultures and civilizations of other people, harmonized and welded together with their own offshoots, outgrowths and oppositional currents.[102] As the ancestors' success consisted in doing precisely this, so the Arabs of the future, if they are to realize the essence of their national message to the world, ought to 'digest the science of the West and add to it the diverse elements which arise in East and West in reaction thereto and harmonize them all within a new unity which will then become the message of future life and which the Arabs will contribute to the world.[103] In this scheme of things, the Arab spirit is not creative of culture, although it may be creative of the synthetic form which comprehends that which other national spirits have created. Undoubtedly, the synthesizing process presupposes a great deal of ingenuity; but of that spiritual dynamism which creates culture, which discovers and christens values, which causes civilization or de-

structive barbarism to be, as far as the reader is able to see in *Al Wa'i al Qawmi*, 'urubah has none. Essentially, it is and remains, according to this view, a transformer of something non-Arab, a developer of something alien to it. Indeed, at best it may be a transfigurer, but positively not a creator. This role remains the exclusive property of the West in modern times, as it belonged to Hellas, Persia and India in the past.[104]

Apart from resting on a one-sided interpretation of Arab culture and history,[105] this view is obviously that of a sinking soul which can no more justify itself in its own eyes. Hence, it recourses to the trick of pretending to correct and harmonize the extravagances and exaggerations of the other souls in order to give itself something to do and thereby justify its existence. The level of decadence and degree of inner weakness at which it rests becomes obvious when we consider, *in concreto*, the 'transfigurations' such a view plans to do to Eastern and Western achievements in the various fields of human endeavour. It is here that the 'transfiguring' role reveals its essential, uncreative, broker-like nature, however ingenious or inspired. The West, the advocates of this theory usually hold, has developed a certain value in one direction without continence or equilibrium. The East, or another portion of the West, has overdeveloped the same value in another direction and thus reached undesirable limits. Hence, the argument runs, Arabism ought to avoid both excesses and maintain a golden mean in which the virtues of either are achieved in harmony and unity.

We do not deny that this view has had its eloquent mouthpieces. Taha Husayn defended it at one time,[106] as he has defended Pharaonism[107] and Arabism at other times. Charles Malik has been its persistent and most bombastic exponent.[108] Their efforts however have been wasted on a mediocre view which makes no necessary requirement upon those who wish to implement it but that of discovering a mediocre mean between extremist pursuits by non-Arabs of non-Arab values.

Eleven years after the publication of *Al Wa'i al Qawmi*, Zurayq addressed the UNESCO Conference in Beirut on 'The Essence of Arab civzation,'[109] and gave a further elaboration of his concept of 'urubah. Anticipating the criticism that a 'urubah which not only synthesize diverse elements, but whose very essence is synthesis, cannot be creative, Zurayq argued that synthesis does not mean 'a hodgepodge of many heterogeneous elements' which, if true, would certainly make 'urubah uncreative.[110] Arab civilization is creative, he asserts. Hence, he concludes, this creativity must have proceeded from a unity of outlook, of endeavour and of final accomplishment.[111] But if the creativity of 'urubah is itself in doubt, it cannot be posited as a major premise in a syllogism whose conclusion asserts that creativity. Zurayq's argument, which does

precisely this, is a *petitio principii*. That 'urubah is creative cannot follow from the premises that it is a synthesis, that synthesis is not a hodgepodge, but an effect of a unity which must be there, unless creativity is logically deducible from synthesis. In this case the argument does not prove but begs the question at issue. Zurayq however does not stop at the mere assertion of synthesizing unity. He has analyzed it, thereby giving further substance to the thesis of the address as a whole. The analysis, it should be noted, does not help the above-mentioned *petitio* argument which Zurayq presented independently.

The unity of Arab civilization, he tells us, is threefold: It consists in the unity of God, of the Islamic community and of truth.[112] The unity of God was the core of the new spirituality the Prophet had brought 'in the realm of belief.'[113] The unity of the community, derived from the unity of God to whom alone the members owe a loyalty superior to any they may entertain to race or country,[114] is the same spirituality brought into the realm of human relations.[115] Since the unity of God was restricted to religious consciousness, the unity of the community thence derivable must have been an exclusivist, religio-confessional unity. Zurayq sees this implication clearly and admits 'that this unity was limited to those who were within Islam itself.'[116] Such an exclusivist community can hardly claim to be universalistic, and Zurayq finds consolation in the fact that the other great contemporaneous community, *viz.*, Western medieval Christendom, whose claim to universalism is, for Zurayq, apparently beyond question,[117] betrays the same kind of exclusivism and that both communities stand alike in their difference from and opposition to 'the modern naturalistic view of the universe.'[118]

Thus, by regarding the unity of God proclaimed by the Prophet as belonging to 'the realm of belief,' Zurayq has laid Arab civilization open to the charge of exclusivism. The community based upon the unity of belief is necessarily a religious community and Arab universalism is one 'limited to those who were within Islam.' Had he regarded the unity of God as belonging to the realm of action, as axiological unity of human purposiveness, the resultant community would have been recognized for what it was—namely, the universal community under the moral law—and Arab universalism would then be an instance of ethical universalism, the only *uni*-versalism possible, any universalism not anchored in the *one* moral law being necessarily a hodgepodge. Arab universalism, or the Islamic community, as we shall see in the sequel, is universalist on account of its openness, of its will to the universal community under the moral law and of its significant achievement of that ideal, not on account of its numbers. Numerical universality is an impossible ideal that is never a requisite in matters ethical. That the Arab community was not mathematically universal is a fact, but not an argument.

Zurayq came very close to discovering this meaning of the unity of God. Realizing that unity of belief and of community were nonetheless inadequate to account for Arab civilization, he sought and found the complementing cause in the Arab notion of the unity of truth.[119] Rightly, he points out that this unity kept the culture standing even when the unity of community was crumbling.[130] 'Truth was to Arab thinkers not subjective and relative, but objective and absolute, and the duty of man was to learn it and abide by it.'[121] But this unity of truth Zurayq conceived as discursive, not valuational. Hence, he could see 'the great activity of commentation' upon the Qur'an as well as upon Plato and Aristotle as the 'two facets of the one and only truth,'[122] but had no eye for the human mind and will that stood in front of the Qur'an and the Greek masters and declared: This is the truth that is worthy of learning (hence commentation) and of adopting (hence the universal community). The essence of Arab civilization must then be sought not in the discursive unity of truth, but in the axiological unity of human willing which accepted the truth as truth. Contrary to Zurayq's assertion, Arabic thought is not 'like that of the Latins ,... one of reconciliation and synthesis' by nature, but by choice and decision, once the valuational fifth sense had been laid open to determination by the overarching unity of God.

This must have been the greatest creative act of the Arab spirit. It is immaterial that Arab civilization has used Hellenic, Persian or Indian elements in the rubric of culture and civilization. No culture and no civilization can be free of elements borrowed from the outside. Zurayq's pains taken to show that the resultant total was not a conglomeration but a compound[123] were beside the point. Even if it were granted that Arab civilization was a compound, and not a hodgepodge, the creativity of the Arab spirit is not thereby established.[124] The provision of an atmosphere of tolerance and such other conditions as may be necessary for collection and synthesis may be 'sufficeint to their (the Arab's) dying credit;'[125] but it does not establish creativity, which remains a matter affecting the kind, rather than the mere existence of a synthesizing principle.

III. THE ARAB NATIONALIST CRITIQUE OF ISLAMISM

The arguments which Arab nationalist thought has leveled against Islamism are generally of two kinds: those which seek to establish the impracticality, difficulty or impossibility of the Islamist idea; and those which seek to establish its undesirability. As we shall see, whereas the first has failed to prove its point, the second has not even produced an articulate presentation of its thesis.

A. Arguments from Practicality

After spreading out the map of the Muslim countries and impressing the reader with their vast expanse and great diversity, Sati' al Husari, for instance, asks his reader to agree with him that the nationalist is far easier to realize than the Islamist ideal of unity.[126] In addition to not realizing that distance is continually shrinking with every scientific advance, that it did not prevent the formation of the British Commonwealth, nor the union of Hawaii and Alaska with the United States, or that of Siberia with Russia, Husari must have forgotten that the present boundaries of the Arab countries, whether internal or external, are the work of European imperialism drawn out with pencil and paper in London, Paris or Geneva. They are factitious; and 'every plan which seeks to limit us within these artificial geographic boundaries is near-sighted and mad. Since the whole world, in East and West, is moving closer towards greater unities than the national, it is our duty to seek the greater unity in observance of the logic of the times if not that of Islam.'[127]

Husari however has a point, namely, that the unity of the Arab countries must be the first sought even in an Islamist overall scheme, because, as he says, the Arab world is the fulcrum of the Muslim world—which is true. To oppose Arab unity is to oppose Islamic unity; and, arguing against the Grand Sheikh of Al Azhar, he makes the sound point that Arab unity is the logical 'first step' to Islamic unity.[128] He repudiates the Islamists as inconsistent if they do not work for Arab unity, which is much easier and more possible to bring about at this time.[129]

In like vein, Muhammad Mustafa 'Ata treats the problem exclusively from the angle of advantage to the Arab cause which Pan-Islamism and Pan-Arabism promise. He regards Pan-Islamism as a last moment 'S.O.S.' measure designed to save the dying Ottoman state and attributes its failure to the uncandidness of the Ottoman Pan-Islamists, the impotence of the Ottoman state, and the impossibility of political union between widely divergent, widely spaced, racially and culturally different countries.[130] But he hastily adds that Arab unity would constitute the first line of defence of Islam and the Islamic world.[131]

Both Husari and 'Ata overhastily dismiss the question of Islam as soon as they have compared the advantage and facility of realization of Arab unity and Islamic unity. Neither seems to realize that even after such a solution, the problem remains untouched. Nationalism does not merely seek the unity—*per se*—of the Arab countries—to which everybody consents. It determines the kind of unity, the bases and principles on which that unity shall take place; and it is here, rather than in the strict desirability of unity, that its distinction lies. To unite the Arab countries on nationalist basis is, the Islamist fears, to do so on a basis which makes

Arab union with other Islamic countries, as a later second step, impossible. For the real question is not which countries to unite, but what ideals around which any countries, Arab or Islamic, ought to unite; that the problem of the relation of Islam and 'urubah remains unsolved as long as the qusetion of what values—Islamic or non-Islamic—ought the future life of the so-united peoples be based upon and developed, remains without answer.

B. Arguments from Impossibility

Islam, the nationalists allege, is not possible for use as principle of unification because it is not universally adhered to by all Arabs. There are confessional minorities in the Arab world which cannot be omitted and which oppose the Islamist unity because they do not belong to the faith of Islam.[132] Illustrating this point, N. A. Faris and M. T. Husayn write that 'the Lebanese Christian whose dignity as citizen and as Christian independent Lebanon has guaranteed is inspired by fear at the idea of living in an Islamically oriented state which, though it may treat him with sympathy and guarantee his rights with justice, would nonetheless regard him as a 'dhimmi'[133] not endowed with the same rights as those of the Muslim citizen.'[134]

This argument is unanswerable as long as Islam is represented not as a body of values which God revealed and Muhammad exemplified, but as the body of doctrine, social customs, and practices of all sorts which came to be associated with Islam in succeeding periods of time. Islam is an 'ought' whose 'is' may be the example of the Prophet Muhammad, but of no one else. It is precisely that by which every other 'is' is judged. To confuse that which a certain Muslim individual or group once did or presently believe, opine and do with that which they *ought* to believe, opine and do is to commit the naturalistic fallacy.[135] Though not obvious, the above argument of the nationalist is based upon such confusion. It can hold no weight as long as it identifies, *à la* Khalid, Islam with precisely those actualities of its history which every enlightened Muslim regards as an aberration.[136] On the other hand, if Islamism is incapable of transcending the actualities of Muslim history and feels itself and the future inextricably bound to fidelity and loyalty to those actualities and seeks to reproduce them in an identical repetition, the Arab confessional minorities are perfectly correct in their opposition and resistance. But such is not the case with Islamism and the Islamist may repudiate the accusing finger pointed to the historical actuality saying, that is not Islam!

The alternative nationalist position is that the confessional minority is incapable of identifying itself with a community which lays its foundations

on the valuational precepts of the *Qur'an* and Sunnah of the Prophet.

Without anticipating the next chapter, it should be noted that the Arab confessional minorities may have resisted, and remained dissociated from, the dogma of Islam. But they have not been immune to Islamic influence, particularly as regards world-view and life-view. Islam itself is not made of a stuff other than that of which the world-view and life-view of Jesus and Moses were made. All three religions, in essence, are expressions of the Arab spirit in its struggle for ethical excellence. Their founders have one and all figurized them in categories which belong to Arab consciousness exclusively. Moreover, the Arab confessional minorities have influenced Islam and were influenced by it far more than some of them, determined by personal or foreign divisive interest, are willing to admit. It is a commonplace truth that, whereas the Arab Christian villager in say Rammallah, Palestine, would recite as confession of his faith such a different *credo* from that of his Muslim neighbour as the Athanasian or Apostolic formula, he would in all candidness give identically the same answer as his Muslim neighbour to all questions affecting world- and life-view. Although their faith is different, their sense of value—religious, moral and aesthetic—is identical with that of the Muslims.

Furthermore, the Islamist may point out that the nationalist alternative is not devoid of similar minority difficulties, perhaps more serious and thorny.[137] Such are the problems of the Kurds, the Berbers, and the like—all of whom speak languages more or less non-Arabic. Literary Arabic, which is the standard by which the Arabness or otherwise of a person is for the most part decided in the nationalist theory, is not the possession of many so-called Arabs. And the question whether or not the Arabness of a person necessarily implies that he know some Arabic, that he worship and make valuational judgements in Arabic, that he think and express his thoughts in Arabic, or that he use Arabic exclusively in his household, or literary Arabic in every discourse, is not settled. If use of literary Arabic is a prerequisite, very few Arabs are Arabs. If, on the other hand, some knowledge of Arabic is a prerequisite, it is not evident that many Pakistanis, Western Sudanese and Indonesians are not, and the Kurds, the South Sudanese and the Berbers are, Arabs. The Kurds and the South Sudanese, for example, were included within the modern political bounds of the 'Arab world' by British, not Arab, action. Why should they be included and not the Pakistanis, Somalis and Western Sudanese? It is certain that all these know some Arabic, and the greatest majority of them make their ethical judgements and worship in Arabic. It is equally certain that all these conceive of their identity in terms furnished by Arab consciousness exclusively. The little command of literary Arabic they have is not less than that of many so-called Arabs. On the

other hand, their will to Arabic is not less strong than in some indisputably 'Arab' territories, provided the degree of cultural development in the compared instances is the same. 'Arabic speaking' is really an ideal to which the new society ought to be educated.[138]

It is not evident why the solution of the problem of the national minorities that Faris and Husayn, for instance, offer in the name of nationalism—namely, that the Arab majority 'ought not to persecute the national minorities which have lived with them since ancient times,' that it 'ought to treat all citizens on a basis of perfect equality with one another and thus guarantee their cooperation,'[139]—is not acceptable in the case of every kind of minority, including the confessional. For it cannot be argued that tolerance, hospitality, equality-for-all, liberty and cooperation are not as much enjoined by ideal Islam as by ideal nationalism, or that they have been violated in the actual history of Islam more than they have been by that of nationalism. Indeed, if anyone has any cause to be proud of his record, the Muslim certainly does.

Perhaps the case of the minorities—whether confessional or national—cannot be solved unless one is prepared beforehand to grant them the right to secede from the main body of the ummah if they so choose. This right Faris and Husayn are ready to grant to the two main national minorities, the Kurds and the Berbers, but on the condition that the respective countries in which they live 'liberate ... (themselves) once and for all from every foreign influence and every internal reactionary dominance.'[140] For, 'the British have exploited the cause of the Kurds, the Yazidis, the Ashuris in Iraq, ... the southern tribes in the Sudan ... and the French, the Berbers in the Maghrib—in order to break the unity of the people's struggle against colonialism.'[141] If asked whether or not, once the required condition is met, the nationalist will grant the national minorities the right to secede if they so choose, the nationalist would certainly answer in the positive. But we know why he will remain unperturbed about the outcome of the *ad hoc* referendum: He knows, as well as the Islamist, that a referendum free of foreign and reactionary intervention will show the deeper unity of these minorities—national or confessional—with the Arab stream of being, with the ummah.

While it is undeniable that the foreign colonialist powers and the internal reactionary forces have used the national minorities, it cannot be overlooked that these same powers have made equal, if not greater, use of the confessional minorities—and for a much longer period of history. Indeed, even if, *per impossibile*, the minorities did decide for secession, the Islamist cannot accept that decision with the self-contained, complacent indifference of the nationalist. True, the fact that his ethos has no room for moral indifference may never absolutely extricate him from the

charge of affecting other people's decision. But *in hoc signo*, he already belongs to a higher order of ethical existence.

The solution of the problem of minorities can be found not in the mere liberation from foreign colonialist or internal reactionist influence, but in the approaching of these fellow humans religiously and nationally dissimilar to us as brethren worthy of all respect, love and concern, with the purpose of assisting them, as a brother would a brother, to discover for themselves the values which make up our ethos—in the religious, moral and aesthetic realms. Until such discovery is made (the process cannot be forced at all since it consists in the person's own subjective grasp of the values in question), the Arab world must continue to treat them as brethren worthy of further advice and assistance. Although the process may be hastened by education, it cannot be 'pushed,' and the failure of the minority to discover its identity in the majority must always be the demerit, not of that minority, but of the majority in the midst of which it lives.

C. Arguments from Undesirability

This is by far the strongest argument directed against Islamism by the nationalists, and the most serious. It is the only one free of methodological errors,[142] for it attacks Islamism precisely where the latter holds its values and principles. Since Arab nationalism still lacks a world- and life-view, and this is a prerequisite for any comparison with—let alone a conclusive critique of Islamic values—no attack upon their valueness has met with any success.[143]

Islamism, Faris and Husayn write, 'seeks to erect the state and the social, political, economic and intellectual system on a foundation of Islamic teaching,'[144] whereas 'Islam, although it has well played its great role in the past and led the Arab nation to glory, is an unsuitable foundation for Arab life in the present and the future.'[145]

That is indeed a grave statement; but the evidence Faris and Husayn give in its support is ridiculous. They tell us the story of a rumour circulated in Egypt in the first year after the Revolution that Al Azhar had presented a body of laws to the Government by means of which, if promulgated, Islamic rule would have been reinstated in Egypt; that both Government and Al Azhar had repudiated the rumour and that the Minister of Waqfs had pointed out at the time that the present circumstances do not tolerate its appearance. Granting top interest to such rumours, one may still inquire about their relevance to the point at issue. The reasoning, Islam is an unsuitable foundation for Arab life in present and future because the Egyptian government has, by repudiating a rumour to this effect, implied that it is not suitable, is a *non-sequitur*. What Islamic

teaching is undesirable for use as a foundation? And why? What is the Islam that may not serve as a basis for Arab life and why? What is this 'Arab life in the present and future' for which Islam is an unsuitable foundation? Supposing certain provision of the shari'ah are proved incompatible with the requirements of modern life—is this evidence for the undesirability of Islam? To think that it is presupposes a petrified, *froschperspektive* conception of Islam identical with the very conception of it against which the whole argument of undesirability rests.

Without further ado, as if their point had the certainty of an apodeictic demonstration, Faris and Husayn proceed to contrast the 'backwardness' of Islamism with the 'progressive' program of nationalism. They describe nationalism as adopting, in its program for the national community, 'the eternal and the useful in Arab civilization, the valuable in modern civilization,' a thesis which appears to them so self-evident and platitudinous that, in the certitude that all readers will recognize it for what it is, they omit to give it any analysis or clarification. Instead, they go on to say that Arab nationalism seeks 'to separate religion from state and enable the individual to worship his God as he pleases; to organize individual and social life on science and justice.'[146]

Does Islam seek to prevent the individual from worshiping God as he pleases? Does Islam organize individual and social life on a basis other than science and justice? Does all the meaning of separation of religion and state consist in freedom of religious worship, science and justice? If so, Islamism may very well join the camp advocating separation of religion from state; but if it did, it would have been at the cost only of the common sense of language. The Islamist has as much at stake in the cause of freedom of religious worship, of individual and social justice, as the nationalist. If separation is the means and justice is the end, there is no doubt that the Islamist would grant the desirability of justice and cooperate in its realization. If, on the other hand, separation is not only an instrument but has intrinsic value, *i.e.*, if it is desirable in itself regardless of instrumentality to justice, it may well be asked what is that intrinsic value? What does a separation of Islam from the state mean? In vain does the reader look for an answer. Instead of an answer, a so-called thesis of Islamism is stated as the sole remaining alternative: 'Or, would the Arab World seek to construct a religious, Islamic community in which the teachings and systems of Islam be completely applied?'[147] —without taking the least effort to inform their readers what is so objectionable in the 'teachings and systems of Islam.' Their incoherence appears all the greater when we consider that they object to a 'system' which modern Islamism has not even propounded. That Faris and Husayn have given this unpropounded system as antithesis to nationalism betrays

their prejudice of understanding the Islamist cause as one which seeks to replace the railway and airplane with the camel, which (besides being frogperspectival and childish) is unworthy of a treatise that claims to seek 'an objective, correct understanding' through an 'analytic discussion.'[148]

It is far from objectivity and analysis to accuse an opponent of what one thinks he might have meant, while the opponent himself has not yet presented any more than the barest generalities. It is regrettable that the nationalists are terrified by the word 'Islam' and 'Islamic' on the lips of the Islamists and therefore hasten to reject Islam *in toto* before they even ask the Islamists what they mean. As the Islamists are prone to condemn the nationalists without asking them what precisely is it that they object to when they object to Islam and on the basis of what valuational system do they seek a new institution or principle to replace the old one, the nationalists are keener to discredit their opponent than to think out, in clear and distinct terms, the content of their own stand. While the Islamist speaks of Islam, the nationalist speaks of 'modern civilization' or the 'valuable in modern civilization.' Like the Islamist, the nationalist does not seem to realize how empty his talk must remain until he has analysed the content of these concepts; that until the Islamist has done precisely this, or the nationalist has done it for him, to argue with Islamism is vain; that all dispute only helps the enemy and silence is far more becoming than speech.

D. The Argument from the *Status Quo*

Optimistically, Faris and Husayn answer their either-or question[149] that 'the Arabs have taken the first (the nationalist) road and although the distance covered in the various countries differs, they are anyway on the road of nationalism. And we would rather see them complete their march on this wide illuminated road of civilized nations in the modern age.'[150] This flagrant implication that Islamism is not 'a road of civilized nations' is unamiable to say the least, and adds nothing to the argument. Faris and Husayn think that the issue between nationalism and Islamism stands at least closer to a solution in favour of nationalism if the present orientation of the Arabs is any indication. In substantiation of this significant claim, they advance the evidence that 'the Arab world has undoubtedly meant to appropriate the means of this material civilization, its economic, political and social systems,'[151] that although the Muslim Arabs have done so only reluctantly at the beginning, they have now become accustomed to them and actively seek more of the same. 'They do not argue any more,' the authors explain, 'about the good of the machine, the need for chemical fertilizers or for taking quinine tablets to combat malaria.

They do not argue the importance of the automobile and railway, the use of economic organization, the founding of commercial companies and banks, or whether the Arab governments ought to acquire modern weapons or hold tightly to Damascus swords and other antiques. Nor do they question whether the natural science and the technical arts are consistent with faith or of the devil.'[152] What is the relationship, one may ask, of these things to nationalism? Granted that they are all desirable for and desired by the Arabs, what is it in nationalism that may enable the Arabs to acquire them but is wanting in Islamism? What difference does it make whether the pursuit of these things is nationalistic, or Islamistic? The statement that 'the Arabs do not ask whether a certain theory accords with or differs from religion, or whether this or that method of application has been known to and practiced by the ancient Arabs,'[153] suggests the answer—obviously false—that Islamism *necessarily* rejects any method of application unknown to the ancient Arabs. On the other hand, the question whether or not a certain theory accords with religion is a position with which, if true of Islamism, the nationalist needs not concern himself, and far less blame the Islamist therefor, until the Islamist has specified, or the nationalist has done so for him, in which aspect does what accord with, or differ from, what. Once more, there is no escape from the charge that nationalist theorists act as if in a state of panic. And this cannot be explained except as a consequence of the fact that they have not yet thought out their position.

IV. ARAB NATIONALISM AND AXIOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY

Underlying the nationalist-Islamist controversy, expressing itself for the most part in the matter of the state and political being, is a deep-silent and far graver controversy of another kind. It is a battle between the values of the Muslim world and those which nationalism discerns as values. That there is another value hierarchy and that it is striving to overthrow the Islamic hierarchy cannot be denied. For unless there is such a hierarchy, it would not make any difference for the nationalist whether Islam, or anything else, inspired and guided his movement. We shall attempt to ascertain the nature of nationalist axiology and determine its relation to, or strife with, the Islamic hierarchy of value.

There is a brand of Arab nationalism which sees in the present life of the Arab world nothing but disvalues. Arab thought, attitude or action, on the religious, individual, social, political or aesthetic level—every aspect and mode of Arab being is filled with the opposite of that which ought to be.[154] Arab spirituality is inexistent; only a farce of it remains.[155]

Spirituality is nothing but progress, and its only living example is Western civilization.[156] Any nation that wants to live and grow must adopt it, and do so *in toto*, for it is indivisible. The alternative to this is the return to the dawn of thought and repetition of the development of that civilization throughout its long history.[157] Since that is impossible on account of the continuous friction with the West, the only salvation left for the Arabs is to adopt Western civilization in its totality.[158] In its blind and furious drive towards Westernization, this brand of nationalism is even incapable of discerning Western disvalues. 'The service of the nation's interest,' M. Wahby asserts, 'is the *raison d'être* of political life; and in its loyalty to these interests, the state has the right to sacrifice every other principle and liberate itself from all mental and emotional limitations standing in their way. Thus the state may adopt contradictory positions as the need for them arises: frankness and fidelity towards the nation; ambiguity, deception, trickery towards other peoples.'[159] Obviously this is a case of inferiority complex so acute that the patient has become valuationally blind. Since, on the one hand, he refuses to see anything disvaluable in Western civilization that is unworthy of adoption, and on the other, anything valuable in Islamic civilization that is worthy of preservation, Wahby's affirmation of the former cannot be taken seriously It is made absolutely—without recourse to any principle distinguishing good from evil. Had such a principle been assumed, it would have served as the measure of distinction of the good from the bad, and the adoption of Western civilization would have been selective. Instead, this view recommends total adoption. Its purpose, therefore, cannot be the realization of value, but of Western civilization as such; not the rejection of disvalue, but of Islamic civilization as such.

Fortunately, this variety of Arab nationalism is not popular and its adherents are exceedingly few.[160] A more popular brand is that which seeks to replace Islamic values with Western values especially in the field of state and social organization. Its emphasis is laid almost entirely on the problem of separation of state and religion.

The first systematic work exemplifying this view is that of 'Ali 'Abd al Raziq.[161] This excellent and scholarly study of the place of the caliphate in Islam establishes its point beyond dispute that neither in the *Qur'an*[162] nor in the hadith[163] is to be found a single command enjoining the establishment of a caliphal—or any other—form of government, that prophethood and kingship are entirely independent functions[164] and that Islam is separate from the state[165] as it was separate from this historical caliphate.[166] The attempts to refute this view attacked it at the point where it is unvulnerable, namely, by contending the aforementioned theses.[167] Its critics were many, including no less a body than Hay'at

Kibar al 'Ulama' at Al Azhar which summoned 'Abd al Raziq to a hearing and condemned the book on August 12, 1925. None seemed to realize that if 'Abd al Raziq's conception of the state is granted, every one of his conclusions must follow. None suspected that his conception of state was not an Islamic one, but a Western one, borrowed, as it were, from Thomas Hobbes and John Locke whom he even acknowledges in the opening chapter, and whom he had the opportunity to study during and after his stay in Europe. Moreover, what he borrowed from English political thought he presented not as 'English,' but as 'Islamic,' supported by the authority of Ibn Khaldun, who shares the same view but draws therefrom different conclusions.

'Kingship,' asserts Abd al Raziq, quoting from the *Muqaddimah* of Ibn Khaldun, 'is nothing but overpowering and ruling by vanquishing'.[168] This he supports with the words of the Persian emperor Anu Shirwan, 'Kingship is by means of soldiers,' and of Aristotle, 'Kingship is a system supported by soldiers.'[169] He goes on to describe this institution, borrowing further from Ibn Khaldun, that 'Kingship is an honoured, pleasure-filled post, affording enjoyment of all worldly goods, satisfaction of the passions of the flesh, furnishing all the delights of the soul. It is natural that men would compete to get it, and would give it up only under forceful compulsion.'[170] The Hobbesian *bellum omnium contra omnes* is, among the electorate of the Orthodox Caliphs, the state of absolute freedom from any mastery whatever except God's, just instilled by the new faith, which causes them to refuse to submit to any man except under the power of the sword,[171] but which soon relapsed to its Hobbesian archetype under Mu'awiyah and Yazid.[162]

The Leviathan-caliphate is of course anxious to safeguard and perpetuate itself and to that purpose it seeks out and vanquishes every threat to its security, dignity or to the reverence it commands in the hearts of the people. 'It is natural,' 'Abd al Raziq agrees, 'that kingship must become a devouring monster, a devil of a jinni whose claws reach out to every person hesitating to give it absolute obedience. It is natural that kingship be the instinctive enemy of every science, however objective, should its loyalty ever become suspect, however farfetched or far romoved the influence of that science on public life may be.'[173] This account of the nature and genesis of kingship is Hobbesian enough. That its end and purpose are Lockean is evident from 'Abd al Raziq's attempt at distinguishing prophethood from kingship, for the purpose of separating Islam from the state.

Prophetic leadership, he tells us, which is a holy power that God vests in His messengers, is completely other than kingship, unlike the power of kings or sovereigns. 'The prophet's sovereignty is spiritual, stemming

from faith, and resting upon a heart whose candid submission is followed by the submission of the body. On the other hand, the sovereignty of the state is purely material, and is dependent upon the submission of the body without any relation to heart or to matters spiritual. The one is an affair of divine grace and guidance, the other, of satisfaction of wordly interests and needs. The first is properly speaking "religion," the second, "the world." This is God's; that is man's. One is a religious leadership, the other is political; and never the twain shall meet.'[174] This extremely harsh dichotomy between religion and state rests upon 'Abd al Raziq's Hobbesian analysis of the origin and nature of the state. If its birth is so bloody and its nature so violent, it should follow that the state be removed from everything spiritual, and its function be limited to serving the 'worldly' and 'bodily' interests of men through whip, stratagem or brainwashing.

However, all this hangs by the single thin thread of an original definition of the state. 'Abd al Raziq's method has been analytic, and his definition stands at the beginning of the analysis. It is a priori. The analysis is meant to demonstrate the definition. Realizing that the only demonstration of which the definition is capable is historical, he proceeds to survey the history of the caliphate emphasizing such instances and aspects of it as might bear out the contention of the definition. Obviously, his recourse to history has been selective. At best it can only illustrate, but not demonstrate, the definition. For, had the example of history included both the fact that the caliphate 'stood at the farthest remove from religion' as well as the fact that it has at other moments preached and implemented the religious teachings of Islam—which it must if, in order to demonstrate, rather than illustrate the definition, it is to be taken *in toto*—it would not have yielded the evidence 'Abd al Raziq has drawn from it. Indeed, if, *per impossibile*, it could be proved that the whole of Islamic history is an instance of the Hobbesian thesis, it cannot constitute evidence against the other thesis that the life-view and world-view of Islam prescribe that Islamic history ought not to have been so. At best such a thoroughgoing evil history may prove that the community of Muslims did not realize God's plan or the expectations of His Prophet. But from the very nature of the case, it cannot instruct us about the content of the divine plan; and, a fortiori, it may not pretend to instruct when its evidence is borne out, not by its totality, but by a selected collection of items.

Furthermore, 'Abd al Raziq's evidence that neither *Qur'an* nor hadith contain any commands enjoining the establishment of a caliphate or any other form of government itself assumes a view of religious authority as sterile and ossified as the jurisprudence which reads such enjoinment in

the least utterances of *Qur'an* and hadith which he has sought to refute. It assumes that no command or value can stand in Islam unless it is either the express content of a Qur'anic verse or hadith or is derivable through the logic of analogy from such express enunciation. It fails to see in Islam a life-view and world-view which holds implications reaching the farthest details of human life without having to give express pronunciation but to the most general and abstract principles. In short, it has not grown to the maturity requisite for understanding Islam as a complete *Weltanschauung* whose principles can be arrived at by abstract deductive analysis, in the movement of thought, rather than in a worn out, barren and unimaginative scramble for verbatim commands and prohibitions which most of Islamic jurisprudence has been in its four centuries of stagnation. The principle that it is government's business to preach and execute the teachings of Islam, and thereby to realize the Islamic vision in the universe, may not be demonstrable by verbatim authority; but it follows necessarily from the Islamic axioms that faith, by itself and devoid of committment to the life and destiny of the ummah, may command, but can never justify; that individualistic concern for one's own salvation is worthy but concern for the salvation of others is worthier; that intent and conscience condition ethical goodness but the right act completes it. As Iqbal put it, 'the ultimate Reality, according to the *Qur'an*, is spiritual, and its life consists in its temporal activity. The spirit finds its opportunities in the natural, the material, the secular ... The state according to Islam is only an effort to realize the spiritual in a human organization.'[175]

'Abd al Raziq's contention that, whereas it is perfectly reasonable that the universe may adopt one religion and enter into a single religious unity, it is unreasonable that it may effect a single political unity,[176] is based upon a conception of the state which sees its purpose limited to the pursuit, and exhausted in the satisfaction, of material needs—in short, as a consumers, cooperative society. But such divorce of the state from every higher department of value is unwarranted.

'Abd al Raziq argues that the pursuit of the material needs of men—which, he deems, stands at the farthest remove from God's will—is matter for human, not divine judgement.[177] Here, God gave men the liberty to be determined, not by His judgement, but by their own decisions, according to their own findings, their own interests, wishes, passions and prejudices.[178]

One may ask for a justification of this utilitarian view of the state which 'Abd al Raziq carries as a presupposition and posits as an axiom in the content of his a priori definition of the caliphate.[179] In the case of Hobbes and Locke, their views on government followed from an empirical epistemology to which their philosophic speculations had led them. 'Abd al Raziq's work has no antecedent philosophic discussion. It is not a development of a philosophy which, though it started with some irreducible facts or principles, is largely presupposition-free. It is much less a development of Arab philosophy. It is certainly a new departure, but for all its scholarliness, a dogmatic one. Indeed, it is even a *petitio principii*. For 'Abd al Raziq bases the argument, as a whole, on the authority of the *Qur'an* and hadith, both of which stand at the farthest possible remove from supporting or implying any British empiricism at all.

Uitlitarianism in politics—that fruit *par excellence* of British empiricism which Anglo-Saxon thought has bequeathed to mankind and which a number of Arab nationalists, under the effect of a national inferiority complex and a superficial acquaintance with the religious vision of the Arab spirit, are now endeavouring to transplant to Arab life—is, along with utilitarian ethics, based upon skepticism, upon faithlessness in the ability of man, or God, to arrive at any apodeictic knowledge of value. Hence, value is so only to him who perceives it, and the only evidence that a thing is desirable is the fact, empirical and measurable, that it is actually desired. Necessarily, it follows from this that no man, prophet, caliph or neighbour, can be judge of another's good; that government is evil made necessary by the *bellum omnium contra omnes;* and that the best government is that which neutralizes the natural state of war and rules least. By being civil, men give up their innate right of being determined by their own personal (relative) valuational perceptions in the pursuit of certain values. And since civility, or 'politicality,' is thus a sacrifice, it ought to be, and is, restricted to those pursuits which aim at the lowest possible values in any axiological hierarchy, namely, the values of existence, of life (otherwise called security or defence) and of vegetation in comfort and without violence. More than this, the state may not control unless it be the education of the young when it is geared towards training them to be good citizens, *i.e.*, persons who have learned to acquiesce to the state's control of the activities of vegetation, to vegetate without violent offence to their compatriots so that the state's control could be reduced still further, and, above all, effectively to resist any attempt by the state to usurp further power or control the pursuit of other values occupying a higher order of rank. This last is precisely what utilitarians call the 'public' or 'civil' spirit and its development, 'political stability.'

Evidently this is all based upon a truncation of the hierarchy of value into that which may be controlled by the state and that which may not be so controlled. What is the justification for this division? The ethical facts, *i.e.*, the phenomena that constitute valuational perception, speak a different language. They tell us that life on the vegetative level, however

peaceful, comfortable and pleasant it may be, is only an elemental value, a *terminus a quo*, which is desirable for its instrumentality to higher value; that the meaning of human life is far from being exhausted with the realization of such a terminus; that, indeed, it has not begun. They further tell us that this meaning of human existence is one and the same for all men; that men are not free to misconceive it and, as it were, dehumanize their own persons; that in its realization every human being is a conscript and not a volunteer. Rather than a valet ministering to our vegetative needs by defence, public works, the post office and other 'services,' the community, as a corporate body, is a leader and inspirer of its members, whose prime duty is the mobilization, organization and ordering of human efforts towards the realization of man's predestined goals; that man's empirical reality is, rather than something to be served and pampered, something to be transcended in the direction of the highest human ideal; that a community which does not always exist in a state of total mobilization in the pursuit of that ideal has forsaken its humanity for the *Unreizfähigkeit* of vegetative life.

It would have undoubtedly made decisive difference had 'Abd al Raziq been determined by an Arab, rather than an English, conception of state. At any rate, his conclusions are necessarily vitiated, because of this dependence, by any inconsequence that can be shown in his conception of the state. And yet, it is extremely doubtful if 'Abd al Raziq, as well as the nationalists who follow in his footsteps—and they are by no means few!—would accept the epistemological and metaphysical presuppositions of a utilitarian theory of state.[180] But even if they do not see these presuppositions, it is all the more surprising that they did not detect its ethical presuppositions which are no more acceptable than the more abstract metaphysical ones. Evidently, their real purpose is not the adoption of any part of utilitarianism except its political theory. But by that very token, what their attempt finally amounts to is the denial, the mere denial, of the Islamic theory of state. In this sense, they share with the utilitarian his fear that the state may 'mobilize' him and play the role of determinant in the realization of higher value. And, rather than accept state determination as one's own, they prefer, like their utilitarian prototypes, to have no realization of higher value at all and thus prevent the state from ever engaging in such activity. Once more, it is a denial, not an affirmation.

A third, and by far the most popular brand of Arab nationalism, is keenly aware that only Arab values may determine national being and life. The non-Arab values present no difficulty and are quickly rejected. Although the Islamic, admittedly, cannot be dispensed with with such ease, the advocates of this view are resolved that whatever is accepted is so by virtue of its Arabness alone.

The repository of Arabness cannot be the Arab legacy, since that is at the same time Islamic and the two aspects are inextricably intertwined. Hence, the recourse is made to the 'Arab Nation,' which is taken to denote a distinct ethnic being, running continuously from pre-Islamic days. It is the principle by which the Arabian can be sifted from the Islamic. The 'Arab Nation' is both descriptive and normative. In the former case it is the real actuality; in the latter, pre-Islamic Arab culture, perhaps affected by Islam as well as Christianity and many other cultures, but still keeping a unique essence which is the substrate of these 'foreign' influences. In the culture of the pre-Islamic Arabian Peninsula, this unique essence is manifestly revealed. However, the standard nationalist claim that the idea of the Arab nation as in-formed by a unique pre-Islamic, Arab essence, by which nationalism usually understands the Arabic speaking peoples of the Near East and North Africa, is sufficient by itself to support an ideology and sustain a morality, is not self-evident. As we have seen, its first weakness is the questionableness of the principle constituting 'the nation,' which it usually takes to be that of Arabic-speaking. Its second weakness is that because it seeks to dissociate 'urubah from Islam, it must point to pre-Islamic Arabia as the origin of the nation and the cradle of its culture. Its claim that it can include the Islamic legacy by calling it 'Arab' is futile as long as no principle is given by which to differentiate within the Islamic legacy that which is, according to them, Arab from that which is universally recognized as Islamic.[181] Hence and until such principle is offered, nationalism must recourse—as it does indeed—to the culture of pre-Islamic Arabia, whose Arabness is alone beyond question.

Besides this undue truncation of the Arab stream of being, that which pre-Islamic Arabia offers has dubious value. True, it is possible to admire the hospitality of Hatim Tay', the fidelity of Al Samaw'al and the bravery of 'Antara, for instance, all of whom were chronologically prior to Islam. Equally, it is possible to admire the heroism of 'Umar, and the eloquence of 'Ali, the former as Arab statesman and the latter as Arab orator. Indeed, not only is it possible to admire every value in itself, separate from the culture in which its discovery was made, but necessary to do so. For each value is a value by its own right, in itself; it does not depend upon anything outside itself to make it valuable. Heroism would and ought to be admired regardless whether its subject is 'Umar, Siegfried or Jesse James. The valuableness of a value is not affected by anything other than the axiological nature of that value.

We may therefore argue that culture and ideology are irrelevant when the valueness or otherwise of a value are called into question. Nonetheless, they become suddenly important, and their influence decisive, when the

matter concerns the order of rank of a value. Granted peace and victory, for instance, are values and therefore desirable in themselves, to what order of rank do they belong as compared with each other and such valuational pairs as brotherhood and tolerance, ethicality (or the commitment to all value) and universalism, or such valuational antinomies as charity and justice, love of one's neighbour and love of the remote *(fernstenliebe)*? Upon the assignment of this order of rank depends all that man ought to do. Here, the recourse to the Arab factor exclusively is the recourse to the ethic of Arab tribalism. Had 'Umar's conduct been dictated by that ethic, he would not be the hero we admire today, but another Abu Lahab.[182] That does not mean that his courage, his defiance and steadfastness in danger, his discipline and cool presence of mind in the most adverse situation would have become disvalues. All these are values and will remain values. However, values are rarely pursued alone and by themselves. Moral reality is one where many values are realized and violated at the same time, and moral goodness is not measured by the exclusive cultivation of any one or group of values. Hence, though axiologically incontrovertible, 'Umar's heroism would not be morally praiseworthy unless the values involved in each of his heroic acts were realized when they were and those other values or disvalues involved therein were violated when they were; unless, in short, the ethic inspiring and directing that heroism was what it was, namely, Islamic.

Furthermore, although many of the values of the pre-Islamic Arabian Peninsula passed over to Islam, its ethic was completely supplanted by that of Islam. True, hospitality, fidelity and bravery continued to be admired and pursued and are so today. It is also true that in our pursuit of these values we try, consciously or otherwise, to emulate their pre-Islamic exemplars. Nonetheless, successive Arab pursuit of them is not unrelated to the other values constitutive of Islamic ethic. Although we appreciate these values, yet they do not exist in our consciousness *in solo*, but occupy places assigned to them in the Islamic hierarchical order of values. Do not courage, bravery or valour appear to us as worthier when they are realized in a good cause, an ethical, God-approved cause than otherwise? Does not hospitality appear to us worthier when, in addition to the fulfillment of all its requirements, it is accompanied by the thought that God's hospitality is far superior? that in dispensing our wealth, we are really dispensing God's, for everything is His? that its present realization is not restricted to the guest, the next of kin or the fellow countryman because he is a guest, next of kin or compatriot, but because he is a human, and that the same hospitality would be extended to all humanity? These relationships in which the realization of a value stands to other values in the realm do not change the axiological nature of the value in

question, but the ethical worth of the deed realizing it. Only such value would escape this ethical charge (positive or negative) as may be realized without the agency of a human person acting in a context of human persons. Doubtless then that the greater part of our ethical existence is subject to determinations which cannot come from individual values, but from the hierarchy of value as a whole; in other words, not from a number of values drawn and conceived from cultures outside the pale of Islam, but from the valuational order created in our consciousness by Islam.

Although Arabism is prior to Islam in both the order of time and that of real existence, *i.e.*, the empirical world, Islam is to a large extent constitutive of 'urubah. Islam came to 'urubah at a time when the Arabs' consciousness of identity was still vague. There was no consciousness of national identity. The consciousness of tribal identity did not transcend the memory of a few heroes among the not-too-distant ancestors. There was no specific, geographically bounded land that the Arab could call his own. In the desert he was a rover, and 'home' was any place where the camp happened to stand. There were towns and there were urban societies. But the urban societies did not look upon their urban residence except as a temporary evil necessitated by trade. As soon as the opportunity would come, the Arab would leave his town and move, lock, stock and barrel, into the open desert. In such a move he used to feel regenerated, and in the wide spaces he recuperated his spirit from the oppressive ceiling above, whether physical or social. Even the aristocrats of Mecca held towards their city the same feeling, notwithstanding its capital position in trade, communications and religion. As it has been the family custom to send all children to the desert to grow in their tender years, the Prophet Muhammad too was sent by his uncle, under the foster parenthood of Halimah to the tribe of Banu Sa'd Ben Bakr, for the express purpose of 'breathing the pure air of the wide desert spaces, the air of liberty and personal independence, and to learn the purest Arabic'.[183] Meaningful in this matter is the rapid evacuation of Mecca and its holy shrine at the approach of Abraha in 570 A.D., and the notorious answer of 'Abd al Muttalib: 'I am the owner of the camels and the temple has an owner who will defend it.'[184]

It may be argued that although the Arab did not feel particularly associable with any specific land or town, he did see himself belonging to the desert, to the Arabian Peninsula as a whole. The Arabian Peninsula has geographic boundaries of which the Arab was conscious; for the international caravan trade in which he constituted a vital link taught him the geographic identity of his domain. This was especially true in the case of the maritime routes and boundaries. But the Arabian land was a

peninsula, not an island. And where the Peninsula was connected to the mainland in the north, the boundary was never more than a political, imaginary line. It was precisely over this bridge that the Arabs have spilled into the continents of Asia and Africa. And here, the desert is continuous and the peoples inhabiting the lands lying immediately beyond are of the same stock and family. This fluidity of the boundary in the north prevented the growth of a consciousness of a bounded home.

Likewise, there was little living mythology to constitute a tribal or national culture. There has always been an extraordinary amount of poetry. But, granted what may not be unquestionably granted after Taha Husayn's uncovering of the factitious character of so-called pre-Islamic poetry,[185] namely, that this poetry is genuinely pre-Islamic, there is little ideological content and less awareness of common identity in it. It hardly ever soars beyond the personal; and where it does reach the tribal, it does not do more than record genealogies and, returning to the personal, give account of exploits in which a person or a tribe, rather than the 'nation' or the 'race', participated as such.[186] Even in poetic description of the personal, there is no evidence of an awareness of something present, a quality, value or characteristic which is unknown to the other tribes. That in which one tribe excelled, other tribes excelled or did not excel, thus making it a matter of degree, rather than kind. In short, the Peninsula Arabs of pre-Islam were far from being either separatists, like the Jews, or non-separatists like they were to become later on. Their default was that they were a-separatist. This is also true of their pre-Islamic religious life.

With the advent of Islam, the Peninsula Arabs of the seventh century acquired many values unknown hitherto. But these were not mere additions to stored wisdom. They affected Arab life and character in such wise and became so much a part of that life and character as to become inseparable therefrom. Islam has transformed the ethos of the Peninsular Arabs by fusing their soul with the Arab spirit which, in the persons of other branches of Arab stock, have achieved levels of development unknown to the Peninsular Arabs. These did not share the advantages of migration, although their consciousness stood ready to assimilate the discoveries of those of their brethren that travelled, sharpened their vision and polished their souls. Although Islam was not received as something foreign to them, but as a new breakthrough of their own Arab consciousness, yet, its effects were all pervasive and basically transfiguring.

Finally, instead of merely denying, the task of the Arab nationalist should be one of ascertaining the nature of this transfiguration, of defining the values constitutive of the Arab ethos for two purposes: the

expression of these values in crystal-clear concepts or moving percepts for the ready use of the soul; and the stimulation of the soul, under the spell of those same values, to realize the values already discerned and to rise to the discovery of the unknown.

1. Although, in this chapter, 'Arab nationalism' refers exclusively to nationalism in the Arabic speaking lands, the presentation as well as the critique of the nationalist thesis are applicable to nationalism in whichever province of the Arab stream of being it happens to exist. Arab nationalism is here taken as exemplary, but only from the standpoint of its relation to Islam, of African, Turkish, Persian, Pakistani and Indonesian nationalism.
2. 'Whatever ethnographers may say,...all those are Arabs for whom the central fact of history is the mission of Muhammad and the memory of the Arab Empire, and who in addition cherish the Arabic tongue and its cultural heritage as their common possession.' (Gibb, H. A. R., *The Arabs*, Oxford, 1944, p. 3).
3. 'As to the *religious* factor to which Gibb has pointed, it is considered by some Arabs, especially in those regions where religious feeling is still strong and national consciousness weak like the Arabian Peninsula and North Africa, as one of the fundamental bonds unifying the Arabs. But the direction in which national consciousness is developing and the great and fast advances which this consciousness is making with the spread of modern culture, show that the religious factor is being repudiated.' (Faris, N. A. and Husayn, M. T., *Hadha al 'Alam al 'Arabi*, Beirut, 1953, p. 12 fn).
4. Faris and Husayn, *op. cit.*, p. 46.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 48.
6. With a special reference to Islam, Professor Costi K. Zurayq has repudiated such a challenge in a statement that has become classic among Arabists. Our confusion of the place of religion in nationalism, he wrote, is due to the fact that 'we hardly differentiate between the religious spirit and religious sectarianism. Genuine nationalism cannot ever oppose genuine religion, because in its essence, nationalism is only a spiritual movement which has for purpose the resurrection of the inner energies of the nation and the actualization of its intellectual and spiritual potentialities so that it may present the world its share of civilization and culture. It is therefore necessary that this spiritual movement, *viz.*, nationalism, should meet religion and derive thence its strength, life and nobility...If nationalism opposes anything at all, certainly this is not the religious spirit, but the destructive fanaticism which raises the sectarian bond to a higher plane than the national and resists to diffuse itself within the all embracing bond of the fatherland. Indeed this fanaticism often exploits the innocent religious feeling for its own ends and partisan ambitions.' (Zurayq, C. K., *Al Wa'i al Qawmi*, Beirut, 1938, pp. 126-7).
7. 'Convinced' Arab nationalists would not be caught discussing the differences between religion and nationalism without giving some mention of their similarities. True to type, Faris and Husayn introduce their discussion of 'Arabism and Islamism' with such enthusiastic statement of their points of agreement as to contradict their original rejection of Gibb's view. 'However,' they wrote, 'the Arabs have entered history at all, and acquired historical being as a nation, and illustriously participated in human civilization, only through the appearance of the Prophet Muhammad as preacher of the mission of Islam.' (Faris and Husayn,

op. cit., p. 204). They then tell us that the Arabs and Muslims revere the person of Muhammad, the former, as a hero and ideal man, and the latter, as Prophet. Likewise, the *Qu'ran* is revered by the Arabs as the classic and guardian of their language; by the Muslims as revelation. Similarly, Islamic civilization is admired as expression of Arab genius, informed in the Arabic language and as one whose heroes were Arabs; while Muslims admire the geniuses of Arabic regardless of their religion. To crown this list of similarities, Faris and Husayn are even careful to point out that in modern times the renaissance of the Arabs is not unrelated to the renaissance of Islam. (*Ibid.*, pp. 205-6).

8. Faris and Husayn, *op. cit.*, p. 206.
9. *Qur'an*, 3:110.
10. Faris and Husayn, *op. cit.*, p. 206.
11. *Ibid.* This statement is certainly the kind that evokes applause, as it indeed may, but not discussion. It is all the more astonishing that it should come from the pen that directed the following comment on D. Miqdadi's book, *Tarikh al Ummah al 'Arabiyyah*, and 'other books by M. I. Darwazah, A. M. al 'Aqqad, Haykal' (M. Husayn or Yussuf?): Such books may not be considered a scientific work on history, but rather, oratory designed to arouse enthusiasm.' (Faris, N. A., 'The Arabs and the Study of Their History,' in *Dirasat 'Arabiyyah*, Beirut, 1957, p. 9).
12. *Supra*, n. 7.
13. Faris and Husayn, *op. cit.*, pp. 46ff.
14. *Ibid.*
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 37ff, 41ff, 49 ff.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 206.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 55ff, 76ff.
18. 'Abdul Raziq, Ali, *Al Islam wa Usul al Hukm*, Cairo, 1922. Unlike the tradition to which it has given rise, this work is a very scholarly discussion of the thesis that there is no textual evidence that government is an integral part of Islam. For a discussion of its thesis, (see *infra*, pp. 159ff).
19. Cairo, 1950, tr. by this author, American Council of Learned Societies, Washington, D.C., 1953.
20. Khalid, K. M., *Min Huna Nabda'*, p. 117.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 123.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 129.
23. 'They understand such a government to be one which rules in accordance with the word of God...etc.' (Khalid, *op. cit.*, p. 117).
24. 'The good fortune and success which...made (these) governments particularly glorious and excellent examples does not provide a counter argument to our thesis concerning the futility of religious government. These great and glorious instances of religious government which are so unique amidst hundreds of corrupt forms that they can be safely regarded as hard and unnatural exceptions...' (Khalid, *op. cit.*, pp. 123-4).
25. Khalid, *op. cit.*, pp. 123-4.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 130.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 131.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 132.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 133.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 134.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 118.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 141.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 129.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 142.
35. 'The Prophet therefore assured us that the most noble, magnanimous and heroic jihad (holy war) is a word of right in the face of an unjust tyrant.' (Khalid, *op. cit.*, p. 2).
36. The notables of society in whom lies the power 'to bind and to loosen.'
37. Khalid, *op. cit.*, pp. 132-3.
38. al Razzaz, Munif, *Ma'alim al Hayat al 'Arabiyyah al Jadidah*, Beirut, 1956.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 216.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 277.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 272.
42. Nuseibeh, Hazim, *The Ideas of Arab Nationalism*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1956.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
44. *Ibid.*, pp. 26-7.
45. *Ibid.*, pp. 24ff, 28ff.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
48. *Ibid.*, pp. 65ff.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 88, p. 96.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 91.
51. *Ibid.*
52. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
53. Sayegh, Fayez, *Arab Unity: Hope and Fulfilment*, Devin-Adair, New York, 1958, p. 91.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 90.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
56. *Ibid.*, pp. 18-9.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 91.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 90.
54. See review of Sayegh's *Arab Unity* by this author in *The Islamic Literature*, May, 1960, pp. 197-200.
55. Sayegh, *op. cit.*, p. 91.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 93.
57. 'Whatever happens must depend on developments less connected with the ideas of Arab nationalism and Arab unity than with Islam and its place in the mind and heart of Muslims.' (Sayegh, *op. cit.*, pp. 93-94).
58. Sayegh, *op. cit.*, p. 93.
59. *Ibid.*
60. *Lisan al 'Arab*, *Al Munjid*, *Muhit al Muhit*.
61. Husayni, Ishaq Musa, *Azmat al Fikr al 'Arabi*, Dar Beirut, 1954, p. 49.
62. Instead of due credit, some theorists have seen in Arab inclination to discussion of ideals a shortcoming and an abomination of the Arab mind. 'Its (Arab unity's) vagueness as to form and its general indifference to instruments and methods... These...weaknesses may be attributed to a psychological-existential attitude of the Arab mind; they equally reflect an imbalance in the Arab outlook on socio-political affairs, marked...by the overshadowing of realistic-utilitarian values by idealistic values.' (Sayegh, *op. cit.*, p. 84). Zurayq, on the other hand, in an inspired passage, blames the Arabs for not having defined their message (normative 'urubah) in unequivocal terms. 'The final purpose of any nation is the mission it holds for human culture and civilization. The nation which does not

feel that it has a mission to perform in this life cannot ever reach the true level of nationhood, and its existence as a nation would not be justified...The Arab nation ought to have a unique and noble mission among the nations. Every Arab ought to feel that the natural circumstance of his nation and its unique history have prepared his nation for a task that cannot be performed by any other people, that Providence has prepared the Arabs for this unique task... In order to define this mission and understand its true essence, we must profoundly study and ponder our physical environment, the development of our society and our cultural legacy. Indeed, we must reach out, beyond all these to the spirit and personality of our nation. It is a shameful failure that our thinkers and leaders have not yet fulfilled this crucial task in our national life and have not delineated in clear and precise manner the unique mission that is ours.' (Zurayq, *op. cit.*, p. 52, p. 54).

63. *Al 'Imlaq al Jadid: Al Qawmiyyah al 'Arabiyyah*, Cairo, 1958.
64. *The Arab Awakening*, H. Hamilton, London, 1938.
65. *Ara' wa Ahadith fi al Wataniyyah wa al Qaymiyyah*, Beirut, Third Edition, 1957.
66. *Ma'na al Qawmiyyah al 'Arabiyyah*, Beirut, 1957.
67. *Al Qawmiyyah al 'Arabiyyah: Thawrah wa Bina'*, Cairo, 1959.
68. *The Ideas of Arab Nationalism.*
69. *Ma'alim al Hayat al 'Arabiyyah al Jadidah*, Beirut, Second Edition, 1956.
70. *Hadha al 'Alam al 'Arabi.*
71. Jum'ah, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-73.
72. Hanna, *op. cit.*, p. 21.
73. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
74. Faris and Husayn, *op. cit.*, p. 18.
75. *Ibid.*, pp. 49ff. The authors regard this mentality as a factor of rapprochement and unification among Arabs, along with history, language and religion and claim that it is different from that of the French people, the African negroes, the Eskimos, etc. Its characteristics are the following: It is dominated by 'the religious spirit, in its oriental meaning, whose most important components are belief in the unknown and surrender to destiny,' It is the mentality of 'an agrarian people, whose econonomic life is based on agriculture and simple handicrafts where a few powerful leaders, tribal chiefs and feudal lords exploit a majority of ignorant, destitute, diseased peasantry who till the soil...with primitive tools, older than time itself.' *(Ibid.*, p. 50). They took care to show that the etymological derivation of the Arabic word *mihnah* (profession) from *mahanah* (contempt) testifies to the *bedouin* mentality which regards only invasion and conquest as praiseworthy and holds in contempt all work and industry as unbecoming of the strong but fit for the vanquished and the weak. *(Ibid.*, p. 50, fn.) Arab mentality is also that of a people who know only one kind of government, *viz.*, 'the theocratic, tyrannical kind in which a very powerful few subjugate the people by means of the whip as well as *religion* and thus coerce them to do their bidding,' *(Ibid.*, p. 51) and who call the people '*ra'iyyah*' (pasture), which comes from the same root as *ra'a* (to graze flock). *(Ibid.*, p. 51, fn.) Finally, Arab mentality is 'individualistic' being 'the direct result of tribalism, feudalism and centuries of tyranny.' *(Ibid.*, p. 52). The Arab 'grants his loyalty to the state under coercion; he is isolationist, suspicious and fearful of strangers, uncooperative with his own fellows, prone to jump into sectarian, partisan or tribal feuds without regard to the greater national interest...incapable of persistent, continous effort...' *(Ibid.*, pp. 52-53).
76. *Ibid.*, preface, p.4.

77. The attempted enlistments of Arab disvalues abound. Another such attempt that pretends to be scholarly is E. A. Salem's 'Problems of Arab Political Behaviour,' in *Tensions in the Middle East*, P. W. Thayer, ed., Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1958, pp. 68-80. See especially pp. 71-79.
78. See in this regard 'Concerning a National Ideology,' Chap. 4, in Nuseibeh, *op. cit.*, pp. 57ff.
79. Husayni, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-67.
80. *Ibid.*, p. 60.
81. *Ibid.*, p. 61.
82. *Ibid.*
83. Faris and Husayn, *op. cit.*, pp. 18, 43, 204.
84. Husayni, *op. cit.*, pp. 113-141.
85. *Ibid.*, p. 122.
86. *Ibid.*, p. 61.
87. *Ibid.*, p. 67.
88. *Ibid.*, p. 133.
89. *Ibid.*, p. 61.
90. 'There are also counter-currents of Provincialism, or nationalism, within the Arab World, going beyond the genesis of Arab civilization to the pre-Arab golden ages in Egypt, in Lebanon, or in (Greater) Syria. Though admitted—to various degrees and in various connotations—to be 'Arab' countries, these "nations" are nonetheless envisioned as self-contained entities, antedating and surviving, both in their being and in their cultural self-unfolding, the relatively short-lived period of Arab-Muslim expansion and entrenchment and the by-no-means total "Arabization" of the now-"Arab" countries.' (Sayegh, Fayez, *Understanding the Arab Mind*, published by the Organization of Arab Students in the U.S., 1953, p. 31. A resume of this work appeared under the title, 'The Search in Our Souls,' *The Muslim World*, 1952).
91. The appellation given by the Syrian Nationalist Party to the lands covered by Palestine, Trans-Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, to which the appellation, 'Fertile Crescent,' corresponds.
92. Sayegh, *Understanding the Arab Mind*, p. 31.
93. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
94. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
95. *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.
96. Presented in his *Arab Unity: Hope and Fulfillment, supra*, Chap. I, n. 10.
97. See fn. 90 above.
98. Sayegh, *Understanding the Arab Mind*, pp. 32-33.
99. 'The Arab World.' Sayegh asserts, is 'multi-national despite its Arabism.' *(Understanding the Arab Mind*, p. 31).
100. Sayegh, *Understanding the Arab Mind*, p. 34.
101. *Al Wa 'i al Qawmi*, p. 54.
102. *Ibid.*
103. *Ibid.*, p. 55.
104. *Ibid.*
105. With a keen eye for the various souls of different cultures, Oswald Spengler speaks of 'the three Aristotles,' of Hellas, of Arab culture and of Western scholasticism.
106. Husayn, Taha, *The Future of Culture in Egypt*, Washington, D.C., 1953.
107. See Sati' al Husari's discussion of Taha Husayn's magazine articles on the subject in the former's *Ara' wa Ahadith fi al Wataniyyah wa al Qawmiyyah*,

pp. 117-140.

108. Malik regards Lebanon as the most fitted and gifted to play this role; for it alone 'understands the holy of holies of the West, with love, patience, and profundity, in a manner the East cannot grasp, and in the best way by which the West itself can tell its own tale...Similarly, it understands the holy of holies of the East, with love, patience and profundity, in a manner the West cannot grasp and in the best way by which the East can unfold its own secrets.' (Quoted in 'Lebanon, "Land of Light,"' by N. A. Faris in *The World of Islam: Studies in Honour of Philip K. Hitti*, J. Kritzeck and R. B. Winder, ed., McMillan, N.Y., 1959, p. 337).
109. The text of the address appeared in *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 3, No. 2, April, 1949, pp. 125-139.
110. *Ibid.*, p. 131.
111. *Ibid.*, p. 132.
112. *Ibid.*, p. 130.
113. *Ibid.*, p. 127.
114. 'Their (men's) ultimate loyalty remains that which ties them to God and makes them brethren within Islam.' *(Ibid.)*
115. 'It would be more correct to say that it (Arab civilization) was universal by virtue of its spirituality.' *(Ibid.)*
116. *Ibid.*, pp. 127-8.
117. 'Each of these two systems was complete in itself, each looked upon the other as being outside the fold, material for conversion or for conquest, so that humanity as a whole was not united in practice or, strictly speaking, even in belief.' *(Ibid.*, p. 128).
118. *Ibid.*, p. 128.
119. *Ibid.*
120. *Ibid.*, p. 129.
121. *Ibid.*
122. *Ibid.*
123. *Ibid.*, pp. 131-2.
124. *Ibid.*, p. 132.
125. *Ibid.*
126. Husari, *Ara' wa Ahadith*, pp. 96-97.
127. Qutb., Syed. 'Mabadi' al 'Alam al Hurr,' *Al Risalah*, No. 1018, Jan. 1, 1953.
128. Husari, S., 'Rad 'Ala Tasrihat al Shaykh al Maraghi,' *Al Istiqlal* newspaper, Baghdad, reprinted in *Ara' wa Ahadith*, pp. 167-170.
129. Husari, *Ara' wa Ahadith*, pp. 94-105.
130. 'Ata, Muhammad Mustafa, *Al Qawmiyyah al 'Arabiyyah wa al Isti'mar*, Cairo, 1957, p. 15.
131. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
132. Husari, S., *Al 'Urubah Awwalan*, Daral 'Ilm li al Malayin, Beirut, 1958, pp. 99ff.
133. A resident non-citizen protege living under the protection of the Islamic ummah.
134. Faris and Husayn, *op. cit.*, p. 209. See Fattal, Antoine, *Le Statut legal des non-Musulmans dans les pays d'Islam*, Beirut, 1958, the most comprehensive treatment of the subject.
135. The naturalistic fallacy consists in defining value, right or goodness in non-ethtical terms, under the assumption that there are composite concepts analyzable into parts. But being simple, such definition of them in non-ethical terms implies the committment of a kind of definist fallacy, violating the law of identity. (Moore, G. E., *Principia Ethica*, p. 10).

136. Al Ghazali, Muhammad, *Min Huna Na'lam (Our Beginning in Wisdom)*, tr. by this author, Washington, D.C., 1953, pp. 4, 19. Al Zayyat, Ahmad Hasan, 'Al Jami'ah al Islamiyyah hia al Ghayah,' *Al Risalah*, No. 730, June 30, 1947. Al Tantawi, 'Ali, 'Al 'Arabiyyah wa al Islamiyyah,' *Al Risalah*, No. 1019, Jan. 12, 1953.
137. Hourani, Albert, *Minorities in the Arab World*, Oxford, 1947, Chap. XIII, XIV.
138. Consider in this light, Husayni, *op. cit.*, Chap. VI, 'The Arabization of the Arabs,' pp. 113ff.
139. Faris and Husayn, *op. cit.*, p. 171.
140. *Ibid.*, p. 165.
141. *Ibid.*, pp. 158-9.
142. Except where it bases itself on the fact that other peoples have repudiated their own religions as bases for national unity and action, and then vitiate itself by a *non-sequitur*. See, *e.g.*, Husari, *Al 'Urubah Awwalan*, p. 105; Faris and Husayn, *op. cit.*, pp. 212-3.
143 Thus George Hanna summarily dismisses the question of religion in 'urubah, calling it a 'hindrance to the growth of Arab nationalism', *(Ma 'na al Qawmiyyah al 'Arabiyyah*, p. 61). by saying that 'urubah is not Islam, nor is Islam 'urubah *(Ibid.*, p. 72) and that whoever does not understand 'urubah in this manner, be he Christian or Muslim, us unfaithful to his religion, untrue to his 'urubah. But he hardly substantiates his argument. He is satisfied to give the barest mention that 'the Muslim conquests have helped propagate Arab language, thought and civilization' and that 'at the time when the nationalist idea was crystallizing in the nineteenth century, the Christian Arabs were no less enthusiastic therefor than their Muslim brethren,' *(Ibid.*, p. 71) without ever asking the question as to the nature of the relation between 'urubah and Islam. So too, Muhammad 'Izzat Darwazah places Islam as well as all religion at the farthest distance removed from 'urubah because 'religion is a practice that concerns the individual conscience alone.' *(Mashakil al 'Alam al 'Arabi al Ijtima'iyyah wa al Iqtisadiyyah wa al Sivasiyyah*, Dar al Yaqzah al 'Arabiyyah, Damascus, n.d., p. 19). But with typical bad conscience, he immediately proceeds to reassure the non-Muslim Arabs that 'Islam, which is the religion of the majority, guarantees the rights of those citizens or others who live with the Muslims in peace and friendship...' *(Ibid.*, pp. 19-20). Apparently, Mr. Darwazah does not realize that the problem is not one of reassuring or apologizing—there is no basis-in-fact for a bad conscience—but one of analyzing the relationship against the pretensions, prejudices and superficialities of former generations. 'Abd al Latif Shararah follows suit, in claiming that religious nationalisms in Arab countries are just other species of regionalism, 'a prominent example of which is Zionism...' and that they are reactionary movements seconded by the imperialists to secure dissension and make their domain easier. *(Fi al Qawmiyyah al 'Arabiyyah*, Beirut, 1957, pp. 84-87). Mr. Sahrarah shows no sign of awareness that there is any sense in which religion and nationalism cover the same ground. Sati' al Husari is aware of a mutual influence of religion and nationalism *('Ara wa Ahadith*, pp. 31-41); yet, he does not consider Islam even a factor of Arab unity. Rather, it is a cause of division; and he counsels the Arabs to drop Islam as a foundation for unity. *(Al 'Urubah Awwalan*, pp. 99-100). His quotation of the common saying, "Religion belongs to God but the fatherland belongs to all," betrays a defective understanding of Islam as a matter for individual conscience alone. *(Ibid.*, p. 101). Munif al Razzaz, in a comparatively refreshing undertaking, assigns to Islam the fourth position after geography, language and history in constituting

the basis of 'urubah. *(Ma 'alim al Hayat al 'Arabiyyah al Jadidah*, p. 276). Rather than a matter of individual conscience, he rightly describes Islam as a culture and civilization which deeply affected both Muslims and Christians, Arabs and non-Arabs. *(Ibid.*, p. 277). Unfortunately, he does not go beyond these generalities to analyze this influence of Islam and clarify the nature of the relation between Islam and 'urubah.

144. Faris and Husayn, *op. cit.*, p. 208.
145. *Ibid.*, p. 209.
146. *Ibid.*, p. 212.
147. *Ibid.*
148. *Ibid.*, preface, pp. 3-5.
149. *I.e.*, either Islamism or nationalism, *op. cit.*, p. 212.
150. Faris and Husayn, *op. cit.*, p. 212.
151. *Ibid.*, p. 213.
152. *Ibid.*
153. *Ibid.*, p. 215.
154. Wahby, Muhammad, *Azmat al Tamaddun al 'Arabi*, Beirut, 1956. This whole work is a wholesale indictment of Arab life, of which the following statements are exemplary: 'Arab life, in all its foundations and expressions...is morbid, lagging far behind the civilized world...For the Arabs use the modern systems and concepts with antique minds and for antique purposes. Democracy with them is a feudalist tool, science is a bungling ignorance...and ethics is a collection of hateful, frigid, negative prohibitions.' (p. 14) 'For the Arab, an idea is an emptied form, always in need of an appearance of might it if is to become real, since Arab mentality has been informed by persons of might (rather than ideas).' (p. 66).
155. *Ibid.*, p. 84.
156. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
157. *Ibid.*, p. 87.
158. *Ibid.*
159. *Ibid.*, pp. 96-97.
160. Khedive Isma 'il, Taha Husayn, Hasan Mu'nis, Salamah Musa, Amir Buqtor, Sa'id 'Aql, *et al* have flirted with it at one tme or another.
161. *Al Islam wa Usul al Hukm*, Cairo, 1925.
162. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.
163. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
164. *Ibid.*, pp. 48ff.
165. *Ibid.*, pp. 64ff.
166. *Ibid.*, pp. 81ff, 95ff.
167. Bakhit, Muhammad, *Haqiqat al Islam wa Usul al Hukm*, Cairo, 1925; Husayn, Muhammad al Khidr, *Naqd Kitab al Islam wa Usul al Hukm*, Cairo, 1925.
168. 'Abd al, Raziq *op. cit.*, p. 26.
169. *Ibid.*
170. *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27.
171. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
172. *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.
173. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
174. *Ibid.*, pp. 68-69.
175. Iqbal, M., *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Lahore, 1958, p. 155.
176. 'Abdul Raziq, *op. cit.*, p. 78.
177. *Ibid.*

178. *Ibid.*
179. *Ibid.*, pp. 1-11, particularly, p. 6.
180. Faris and Husayn, for instance, admit that while agreeing to the physical and epistemological foundations of theoretical and applied, natural and social, science, it is possible to differ about the moral foundations of modern civilization. (Faris and Husayn, *op. cit.*, p. 213). But may Islamism not claim that right here lies its difference from nationalism, that whereas nationalism is inclined to accept a utilitarian, relativist thesis, Islamism insists on a non-utilitarian, absolute, moral foundation, which it finds in Islam? It suspects that modern civilization is based on a different foundation, or at least, a moral foundation which it is not prepared to accept without question. If, as Faris and Husayn themselves say, Western man too is stirring with uncertainty regarding these foundations, the Arabs may, a fortiori, withhold a wholesale adoption, and 'their discussion of the problem of the attitude of Islam to modern civilization,' which Faris and Husayn have ridiculed at the beginning, would then not be 'a useless irony and futile stupidity, rather than a well-founded investigation.' *(Ibid.*, p. 214).
181. Nationalism, write Faris and Husayn, 'takes pride in the Muslim Arab heroes who produced the Islamic Arab legacy, only because that legacy is Arab, and its producers are, for the most part, Arab.' (Faris and Husayn, *op. cit.*, p. 206). Presumably, there must be an elemental opposition between the Islamicness and Arabness of a historical figure, a book of ideas, a scientific invention or a heroic deed of the ancestors. If so, what is the nature of this opposition? To what 'Muslim Arab heroes,' or 'Islamic Arab legacy' does it apply and how? The emulation of the atheist Frenchman who takes pride in his Chatholic compatritos who built up the glory of French literature and culture, suggested by Faris and Husayn *(Ibid.)*, begs the question at issue.
182. *Qur'an*, 111:1-5.
183. Haykal, Muhammad Husayn, *Hayat Muhammad*, Cairo, 1956, p. 112. See also Hasan, Hasan Ibrahim, *Tarikh al Islam*, Vol. I, Cairo, 1957, p. 75.
184. Ibn Hisham, *Sirat Rasul Allah*, 34, tr. by Guillaume, A., Oxford, 1955, p. 25.
185. See his *Fi al Adab al Jahili*, Cairo, 1952, pp. 87ff.
186. See for instance, Muhammad Ahmad Gad al Mawla and others, *Ayyam al 'Arab fi al Jahiliyyah*, Cairo, 1953, which may be taken *in toto* as illustration of the point, in question. See also, Amin, Ahmad, *Fajr al Islam*, Cairo, 1955, pp. 36-37.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE ISLAMIST ASSERTION

I. THE ISLAMIST NOTION OF QUR'ANIC SUFFICIENCY

The Islamist, no less than the nationalist, is anxious to reconstruct Arab society, rejuvenate and develop its spirit. No less romantic than the nationalist, he yearns for an unknown which he has not yet fathomed. He relies on a mighty concept—Islam—feeling certain that it will furnish him with all he needs. The concept of the 'nation,' upon which the greater number of nationalists rely, and in which they seek to find the yearned-for values, has little tradition, hardly any historic validity; and the nationalists have so far offered little to fill this void. Their recourse to the Arab legacy is beset with difficulties the moment they insist that they seek it as Arab and not as Islamic; for the two are intertwined, and no precise distinction between them has so far been offered.

The concept of Islam, *per contra*, does furnish a long established tradition, a legacy rich in values the moving appeal of which is still strong enough to move mountains. The legacy is unequivocally Islamic; that is to say, the Islamist is fully entitled to make of it such use as he pleases, unfettered by the kind of ambiguities which beset any nationalist recourse to that legacy. Furthermore, the concept 'Islam' easily lends itself to distension so as to enable the Islamist to outdo all opponents by welcoming every new value discovered as aready 'included' within Islam. The classical representatives of this position are al Ikhwan al Muslimun (the Muslim Brethren), and its classic expression is a word of advice given by al Murshid al 'Am (the Supreme Guide), Hasan al Banna, to a group of young followers: 'If the communists,' he has reportedly said, 'argue with you saying, "Our principles are humane, tolerant, assisting the poor and the weak, realizing equality among men, social, economic and political justice," then answer, "So be it; our principles do more than include yours. You can boast of no principle that we cannot match or excel."'[1] This same idea is found in almost every book or pamphlet associated with the movement.[2]

That the *Qur'an* or that Islam contains a complete world view which has satisfied and moved men to glory can hardly be denied. Indeed, it is a platitude. Nothing is gained by representing the problem in these terms. On the contrary, by focussing his attention on the abstract forest, *i.e.*, on Islam as a whole, as it were, both the Islamist and the nationalist lose sight of the concrete trees standing before them, *i.e.*, the individual

values of Islam, whether as objects of the search or hindrances in the path. Loyalty to Islam as a whole is made of a stuff not unlike that of any other loyalty—to nation, race or ideology. All these loyalties tend to degenerate into fanaticism as soon as sight is lost of the individual concrete principles or values which make up the concept in question. Then, with the help of the dislocative fallacy,[3] the central notion is made all-inclusive in appearance but remains empty in reality. All sorts of commands, or systems, are deduced from it, because it has been emptied of any concrete meaning which might restrict such deduction. Fanaticism is precisely such attachment to an emptied principle.

Secondly, the appeal to Islam, that is, to the whole, cannot move but those who are already determined by it. Those who are not so determined cannot respond, simply because Islam is a theoretical concept devoid as such of moving appeal. That which has this power is not Islam but the values of which, as a body, Islam is the theoretical concept. If a call to Islam does sometimes carry such moving appeal at all, it is because the listener, being left to his own resources to discern the meaning of that concept, is moved by such values as he takes to be constitutive of Islam. This moving appeal does not make Islam itself normative, exercising moving power. It simply leads to a confusion of the locus and fount of that power, *viz.*, the values, with their collective name, Islam. Islam's so-called appeal is purely derivative from those individual values which constitute it. And an appeal to Islam as such harbours within it the germ of relativism.

Rather than call to Islam, that which the Islamist should do is call men to the values of Islam. Besides being genuinely effective, such a call would place loyalty where it belongs and clear the air of misunderstanding as to the identity of the values which make up Islam. Islamist scholarship would then have the task of elaborating the nature of these values, their order of rank and their mutual relationships and dependencies. The fact that the Islamist has so far done little of this cannot be explained except as valuational cloudedness.[4]

How can the values of Islam be reached? That is to say, how can they be established for knowledge? In the literature of Islam, there is no systematic statement of the values of Islam. In the *Qur'an*, the hadith, the works of exegesis, theology and jurisprudence, we find commands and recommendations to do the right, or appealing descriptions of the goods which ought to be the objective or the effects of right action. How can the values of Islam be elicited from all these?

Things and all real existents can have extrinsic good only. Their goodness is derived from something else that is good and to which they are expected to lead. This second stage good must have intrinsic goodness;

it must be good for its own sake if it is not to lead to another good, and so on *ad infinitum*. That for the sake of which everything in a nexus of good things is good is the value. Value is that through which everything good is good. Similarly, right action is that which aims at and realizes a good. But just as goods vary in the degree of goodness, so right actions vary in their degree of rightness. The common error of seeing in the right and the good two generically different, ultimate categories stems from the failure to recognize that what we call the right act among many alternatives is one which aims and achieves a good whose order or rank in the value hierarchy is precisely the highest among many alternatives and whose slight or violation of other values is the least.

Right actions, therefore, as well as goods of all kinds, presuppose values from which they derive their rightness or goodness. It is possible to deduce values from the valuables. The values of Islam embodied in the literature of Islam can be reached by a process of abstraction, a movement from the particular to the universal, from the law to that for which the law is brought, from things or deeds to values, from extrinsic to intrinsic goods, and then from elemental to preparatory and thence to the final values.

In the case of Islam, this process of value discovery is particularly simple, though by no means easy. From the standpoint of axiology all the literature of Islam is squarely based on the *Qur'an*, the most pervasive and basic. To it therefore, all processes of abstraction must lead. Even the value of the life of the Prophet and his sunnah is derived from the fact that they are but an illustration and exemplification—the best and most perfect—of the *Qur'an*. The infinite variety of literature, of exegesis, tradition collection and interpretation, of theology, jurisprudence and law, are illustrative, a fortiori, but to a greater or lesser degree of immediacy and correctness.

To reach the values of Islam, all that is necessary is the discovery of the values of the *Qur'an*. The return to the *Qur'an* is therefore justified since it is the most basic and the primordial source of everything valuational. There is no subject matter to which the *Qur'an* is not relevant. Not that it instructs regarding every subject matter, but that by identifying the final values that ought to determine human purpose and destiny it conditions the valueness of every other value that any subject matter could have. Moreover, it provides the principle of ordering values into a hierarchy in which every value, however elemental, preparatory or final, has a place in which it conditions, or is conditioned by, or stands in an equivalence relation with, other values. Departments of human activity and endeavour that are not explicitly or implicitly dealt with in the *Qur'an* still fall within the purview of its overall government of human life. Free opinion *(ra'y)*

may travel as far and as wide as it wishes regarding the *matériaux*, real and existential, of all values. Indeed, it may discover, as it must, new values as well as new dependencies of value relationships and revolutionize thereby the human ethos. But whatever is discovered must find its place within the Qur'anic hierarchy of value. It may not transcend the final values, or the general statement of human destiny, of the *Qur'an*, but occupy a place conditioned by the lower, and conditioning the higher members of the hierarchy. Besides this, a return to the *Qur'an* has the advantage of overarching an endless labyrinth of exegetical, theological and jurisprudential disagreements which have long troubled the mind of the ummah and many of which have crystallized into permanent sects and divisions. It carries a unique freshness of approach and focuses all Muslims towards a unity in the *Qur'an* which they have long sought for politically and socially.

But a return to the *Qur'an* is not as unilateral as it seems. Besides the divergence of readings, linguistic and literary interpretation, which by themselves have produced in the past an extraordinary amount of literature, there is in such a return the promise of a resumption of the richer debate regarding Qur'anic content—granted its reading and meaning are reasonably established—regarding the Islamic, not the Arabic, meaning of the *Qur'an*. Moreover, the return to the *Qur'an* should open up a radically new debate, unknown to our ancestors: Granted the Islamic meaning (all shades) of a verse are given, what is the valuational level on which these meanings stand? Can an ordered hierarchy be made of these Islamic meanings? If, at the top of the hierarchy, stand values whose relationship with lower values is one of conflict, is the nature of the hierarchy such as to grant to the former, and deny the latter, existential, if not axiological, priority? In other words, may a Muslim violate a lower Qur'anic value for the sake of a higher Qur'anic value? If so, by what principle should such conflict- or equivalence-relationship between Qur'anic values be decided? The answers to this kind of question are yet to come.

II. THE NEED FOR AXIOLOGICAL SYSTEMATIZATION

The claim of the Islamists, therefore, is far from substantiated. 'When we ask that the Book of God and the sunnah of His Prophet be put into effect,' they explain, 'we do not seek thereby the implementation of the Qur'anic provisions only, but the making of the *Qur'an* a program to be followed down to its utmost detail.'[5] An observance of every detail, however particular, of the *Qur'an* is downright impossible, and our desires

for the case to be otherwise are here to no avail. Not only do some verses contain commandments that run counter to others; the same verse sometimes, commands first one thing, then another, and then either repeats the first thing or gives a third new one.[6] It is easy to see that in the latter case, that which is expressly preferred in the same or following verse is prior to and supercedes the alternatives originally given. This understanding usually dubs as narrow-minded the attempt to observe any one of the alternatives on the strength that it is commanded by the *Qur'an*.[7] But it is a little more difficult when the commandments occur in widely separated verses.[8] In this case, the usual recourse is to find a third verse overarching the two and prescribing the preference of one to the other; or to remove the conflict by declaring it apparent, that is to say, by providing another level of meaning on which the conflict does not arise.

This procedure may be easy if both alternatives and solution belong to the same level of generality, the same order of ethical being, that is to say, if they are both instrumental or intrinsic goods, ought-to-do's or ought-to-be's of elemental, preparatory or final values, real existents like things, acts and states or ideally existent essences like values. But when the orders of being and generality are mixed up, the case becomes extremely difficult. As long as the alternatives in question have not been referred to the same order of being and restated in terms belonging to the same level of generality, no solution is possible. Indeed, no such conflicts may be solved unless we have the principle or principles which give order to the hierarchy, so that by its means we may refer the conflicting provision to its place in the hierarchy and thereby decide which of the alternatives occupies the higher order of rank and therefore ought to be preferred. For this purpose, it is necessary to refer all Qur'anic provisions, all goods, first to the values which are their first principles and then assign to these values their proper place in the hierarchy. Even if there were no conflicts, this interpretation of the *Qur'an*, that is, an axiological systematization of it, is extremely essential if we are to grasp its spirit, surrender our will intelligently to its determination, and make of it, as the Islamist wishes, a constitution for man and society.

It is needless to point out that our ancestors have achieved remarkable studies constituting a tremendous wealth of insight, though none of them has followed this method systematically. It would be sheer folly to think that we can do without their work or that we can afford to overlook the insight of their research or the wisdom of their vision. The return to the *Qur'an* is axiological, not epistemological. Every road to genuine understanding of the *Qur'an* must take the long, circuitous, hard road of digesting the legacy of thought not only throughout the thirteen centuries of Islamic existence, but throughout the millennia of Arab existence. The

new discipline should study the thought of our predecessors as possible avenues of interpretation but regard them all equally as props and landmarks in understanding the *Qur'an*, the quintessence of the whole legacy. For although they give incalculable help in clarifying many problems of linguistic as well as Islamic meaning, none of them has achieved the axiological systematization we need today.

Nor should this axiological return to the *Qur'an* be confused with the 'return to the *Qur'an*' advocated by Ghulam A. Parvez.[9] With him, the *Qur'an* is the only *authority*. The sunnah has no authority whatever unless and inasmuch as it accords with the *Qur'an*. It follows that, where it is thought to differ therefrom, Parvez would deem it unworthy to follow even if, under the prevalent or traditionally acceptable rules of tradition-criticism, it is proved genuine. This method leads to an unnecessary impoverishment of the Islamic ethos which, disciplined by the *Qur'an* has achieved new heights of world-view and life-view perspectives. In the axiological system we are proposing, the Qur'anic is the highest value. Where it is genuine, the sunnah partakes of the same authority as the *Qur'an*. Whereas our axiological return implies comparative assignment of an order of rank between the Qur'anic and the sunni—the sunni lower remaining as valid as the Qur'anic higher—Parvez's 'return' necessarily implies outright rejection of the sunni, for it is one of authority, of epistemological trustworthiness. The epistemologically untrustworthy is the probable and the false, whereas the axiologically different is the lower, the equivalent or the higher on the valuational scale. All are equally valid, *i.e.*, all are equally values, appealing and commanding.

When such axiological systematization of the *Qur'an* is completed, the Holy Book of Islam may be looked upon in a new light. The ought-to-do's and ought-to-be's which make up the true and ideal shari'ah could be obtained from such a systematized *Qur'an* by a simple operation of immediate deduction complemented by all the worldly wisdom which assigns to ends their proper means. We would be able to pursue the more valuable, the higher, regardless whether or not our pursuit accords or conflicts with the letter of Holy Writ. In case of conflict with the Qur'anic or sunni letter, we would remain confident that our evaluation is the one intended by God and His Prophet. Such understanding of Qur'anic revelation must have been that of the Prophet and of the orthodox caliphs Abu Bakr and 'Umar, who contravened the literal meaning of some of its commands.

An axiologically systematized *Qur'an* sheds new light on the divine origin of the *Qur'an*. The *Qur'an* is divine in value and in idea, in meaning and in letter. That certain values are higher than others, and therefore prior as far as our duty to realize them is concerned; that value is more

important than the valuables, and therefore should be given priority in our willing; and that the letter of the *Qur'an* stands comparatively lower in ethical significance than meaning, idea or value, have no bearing upon the divinity of the *Qur'an's* origin. There is nothing in the divine standing of the *Qur'an* to preclude that it is of different levels, of levels different in their axiological import and ethical relevance to man. There is no implication that the lesser level may not be superceded by the higher, or that the latter has no priority over the former in determining our will.

With this a whole range of so-called problems of reconciling Qur'anic commandments (*ta'azir*, *hudud*, etc.) with modernity are swept away without the slightest prejudice to the acceptance of verbatim revelation from God. That reform which is conducted on the basis of the axiologically superior order of rank of its purpose, rather than on that of the rejection of the Qur'anic or sunni command realizing the lower value, may henceforth not be attacked on the basis of a rejection of divine command, or of the division, into acceptable and unacceptable parts, of a religion that is whole, indivisible and one.

Consider, for instance, the Qur'anic verse, 'The man-thief and the woman-thief, cut off their hands ...'[12] Literally. the verse commands the realization of a real-existential condition, *viz.*, having the hand cut off in the case of the proven thief. The values this verse seeks to realize are purification through penitence, education through example and retribution. These do not all stand on the same level. A cutting of the hand that realizes retribution but violates the other two cannot be deemed obligatory. Furthermore, all three values are in turn instrumental to the higher values of social justice and the ummah's felicitous existence. Both of these will require that the cutting of the hand would further realize them, even if it may do so but to a very limited degree. If, on the contrary, the punishment in question does violence to them, it would not only be undesirable, but would constitute a crime or sin against the higher values, even if its realization of the lower were complete. Thus, it was on the basis of this reasoning that Caliph 'Umar waived this command in the year of drought and famine. Equipped with such insight into God's purposes, we too may waive it as long as a just distribution of wealth does not obtain in our society and the purificative and educative effects of it prove insignificant. In doing so, we would be obeying the higher command, affirming its higher order of rank as compared with the lower. True, we would violate the lower command, but we would not be repudiating it. Both are divine and obligatory. But God has assigned to them different priorities.

Without an axiologically systematized *Qur'an*, the most radical views could consistently be held along with the most conservative if all that is

required is 'the observance of the *Qur'an*'. For the whole question revolves upon what is in the *Qur'an*. Should the axiological systematization reveal, as it must, higher and lower values, it is unislamic to require unqualified, literal observance 'down to the utmost detail'. As we have seen, such an observance would put the higher values on a par with the lower, the moving supreme principle of the *Qur'an* with the detailed particularized ordinances. Certainly some values are more entitled to our enthusiasm and endeavour than others. To regard all Qur'anic values equally obligatory, as belonging to the same order of rank, is moral apathy and stands at the farthest possible remove for Qur'anic spirit.

In a *non-sequitur* argument upon which the whole Islamist thesis is made to rest, Hasan al Banna asks the question: 'Is it our duty to rule with the *Qur'an?*' and answers: 'Let us mention the verses which prove that the observance of the Book of God is a duty imposed on us which we may in no way escape; that such escape may not be rationalized as due to circumstances and conditions, for these are of our own doing and our duty is to remove them.'[13] He then lists a number of verses which enjoin the Prophet and the Muslims to rule themselves and deal with one another by 'that which was revealed,' or 'that which is in the Book,' or 'that which God sent down.'[14] He then concludes: 'These are clear verses, containing the most decisive evidence that it is our duty to rule by that which is in the Book of God.'[15] The conclusion certainly follows from the verses, but how widely off the mark! It is far from that which he started out to prove, *viz.*, the duty to observe the *Qur'an* literally, 'down to its utmost detail.' 'That which is in the Book' is anything from the letter to the highest meaning, from the concrete goods of utilitarian worth to the ordering principle of the whole hierarchy. Are they all deontologically equivalent? What is to determine our choice between them? By what higher principle should the choice be made? There is no escape therefore from the need for an axiologically systematized *Qur'an*. It behooves us all, Islamists and others, to undertake this systematization rather than take up a call which cannot, *ex hypothesi*, take us anywhere beyond the affirmation of a name.

III. THE QUR'AN AND GOD

We may now return to the central question of Islamism: Supposing the axiological systematization of the *Qur'an* were completed, can the hierarchy of value therein contained provide all that is necessary for the renaissance of the Arab spirit and all that may become necessary for the felicity of mankind?

Before this question can be answered, we must first face an issue of a different kind: What is the relation between God and the *Qur'an?* The *Qur'an*, we know, is a body of some six thousand verses. It is composed of concepts and has the status of representations recorded for the ready use of reason. Its content is divine; and so is its form, the language, the style, the imagery, the conceptual and perceptual tools of its expression. Both content and form are sublime, dictated directly and immediately by Heaven.

We should not underestimate the importance of predicating mystery *(i'jaz)* to the form of the *Qur'an*. Al Nazzam[16] and al Murdar,[17] who have argued against the divinity of Qur'anic form, have missed an extremely important connection between the religious and the aesthetic realms of value, or an essential characteristic of human, or at least Arab nature. For, it may be rightly argued that the aesthetic itself, which the value of Qur'anic form is, has ethical value, that it affects character, that the moving appeal it contributes reinforces that of the ethical values and thus helps to produce ethicality of action. It may also be argued, perhaps less certainly, that human, or at least Arab, character is such that it remains immune to an ethical value unless it comes joined with aesthetic value, clothed in aesthetic garb. And it may also be argued that it is of the nature of all value, particularly higher value, to tend towards aesthetic value; that the aesthetic is not a secluded realm but pervades all other realms of value. It was not by accident that the impossible challenge to men and *jinn* to produce another *Qur'an* was for the most part taken by the tradition to refer to the aesthetic form. Contrary to al Nazzam's allegation that the *Qur'an* is divine solely because it gives knowledge of otherwise unknowable events of the past and correctly predicts the events of the future,[18] the *Qur'an* is divine because it is the expression of a body of values, aesthetic, religious and ethical.

Now we may ask, are these divine values sublimely expressed in the *Qur'an* all the values that God has? Are divine wisdom and will exhaustively expressed in the *Qur'an*? In my humble opinion, it is blasphemy to claim that all God's wisdom and will are in any thing on which man can lay his hands or grasp, including the *Qur'an*.[19] Certainly there are senses in which the *Qur'an* is infinite to fathom or grasp. But despite this self-evident truth, it is still a body of values, figurized, conceptualized and particularized in this Arabic Book that is the *Qur'an*. Figurization, conceptualization, particularization—all these are limitative; whereas God, the transcendent Being, is beyond this or any other limitation. He is the Absolute in every respect.

God cannot be conceptualized; neither can His wisdom or His will. Like Him, these are infinite, and the infinite is precisely that which no

concept can comprehend. Of course we may converse about the infinite, but for this purpose we either use determinate concepts to express an aspect, mode or part of the infinite, or an indeterminate concept to express the infinite's totality.[20] But there can be no determinate concept of the totality. That would be a contradiction in terms. The *Qur'an* uses now the one, now the other method, but nowhere claims to conceptualize God, His wisdom, or His will. On the contrary, it expresses God's inconceptualizability in the most emphatic manner.[21]

The *Qur'an* too is infinite. That is its contentual *i'jaz* or mystery. If both God and the *Qur'an* are infinite, yet their infinity cannot be of the same nature. What is then their difference?

First, the nature and relations of the *matériaux* of the Qur'anic values are infinite. The *matériaux* of these values, or the categorial, real existents in which these values become realized, their relationships and dependencies with one another, of which the *Qur'an* gives only illustrative examples, are by nature inexhaustible. The *Qur'an* rarely calls the values by name. It does not speak of them as values. It does speak of their *matériaux*. When it commands the realization of a value, it specifies the bringing into being of a valuable thing, a valuable act, attitude, intention, condition or state. Whatever *matériel* it specifies, it does so as an instance and an example, the purpose being always that of causing a perception of the value, of which the given is an instance. And, having done so, the *Qur'an* leaves it to 'those who know,' 'those who reason,' 'those who have a mind,' etc., to think out the infinite number of other *matériaux* instantiating the value. Had the *Qur'an* been merely a theoretical, philosophical treatise, it would have given the general rule first and then an example in the case of every value. But this Socratic ordering would have annihilated its sublimity. Taking for granted that the people to whom God addressed it were masters in the art of the word, the *Qur'an* preferred the sublime form to a systematically precise presentation.

It is not only our prerogative, but our sacred duty, to seek out, investigate and ascertain the *matériaux* of Qur'anic values. This, of course, is an infinite process. Life and existence present us with an inexhaustible array of real-existents each of which is the *matériel* of some value. Our greatness, our felicity, our Islamicness are directly proportional to our capacity for, and our achievement of, the ordering of the infinite stream of being under the categories of Qur'anic values.

Implied in the position that 'All that God has expressly commanded or prohibited shall be commanded or prohibited and that which He has not expressly commanded or prohibited may be left to the discretion of the *mujtahid* (interpreting) jurist; in the position that the imperativeness of the moral imperative is a function of the meaning the *Qur'an* assigns

to the concepts of *haram* (that which is prohibited), *fard* (that which is commanded), *makruh* (that which is advised against), *mandub* (that which is recommended), *ja'iz* (that which is indifferent), and the like, is the erroneous presupposition that the *Qur'an* commands the *matériaux* it mentions, not the values that make these valuable. For example, the advocates of these views allege that God has expressly commanded the times at which fasting should begin and end. Hence, they conclude, the observance of these times is a *hukm* (law) of Islam. On the other hand, God nowhere expressly commands the organization of a state or the form such a state should take. Hence, they conclude, whereas the observance of fasting hours is final and of deep concern for Islam, the existence, nature and form of the state have no finality and are matters of indifference for Islam. Similarly, it is argued that God has strictly prohibited pork, but only advised against slavery; He has strictly enjoined ablution, but only recommended holy war *(jihad)*. Hence, they conclude, ablution is *fard* and pork is *haram;* but slavery is only *makruh*, and holy war only *mandub*. These fallacious conclusions would not be possible if values are distinguished from the valuables. The latter, being commanded only for the sake of the former and enjoying in the *Qur'an* purely instantial status would be evaluated on the basis of their instrumentality to the values commanded rather than for their own sake.

These views reveal that their proponents hold that there are not two things, the values and their *matériaux*, but only one—the *matériaux;* that the real existent valuables are themselves the values. But to confound value, or that through which the good thing is good, with its *matériel*, or the good thing, is to deny the apriority of value, and to do so is to run eternally in the circle of A is good for the sake of B, and B is good for the saek of C, and C is good for the sake of D, *ad infinitum*, without ever arriving at something intrinsically good at which the finalistic nexus can come to rest. No *matériel* can be good for its own sake, but must derive its goodness from something else belonging to a different order of being.

Besides this infinite demension of value which imparts its infinity to the *Qur'an* and which can perhaps be called the vertical dimension, the *Qur'an* is infinite in a second respect, namely, in its valuational meaning. This second dimension of Qur'anic infinity may be said to run horizontally because it concerns the universe of relations that obtain between values and between their *matériaux*. Every value stands at the focal point of a field of relations reaching between it and the whole valuational realm. Its realization or violation reverberates throughout the universe. This world of relation is an ordered one; and the principles governing it are precisely those which assign to the various values their respective order of rank. Of the order of the hierarchy the *Qur'an* has given us no systematic statement, but a number of individual principles, with ample illustrations, from which God has left it to us to discover and to grasp the whole complex of relations which constitute that order. Likewise, real existents are governed by relations of instrumentality to one another, there being nothing absolutely useless except in idea. Without implying finalistic determinism, the fact is that everything may have a purpose, a *raison d'être*. The knowledge of the relations of real existents is 'world knowledge,' but it is indispensible for any knowledge of value relations.

Contrasted with the naive orthodox understanding of the *Qur'an*, which assumes that God's commandments concern not values or their relations but the real existent *matériaux* of values and their real relations, is the Arabist axiological understanding in which the given elements are *matériaux* of values presented for the purpose of enabling us to discern the ideally existent values, the proper object of every yearning and striving. It is in this sense that the *Qur'an* is said to be the key that unlocks the depths of valuational meaning. We may therefore deepen our knowledge of the *Qur'an* and we may extend it, but neither bottom nor end will ever become visible.

However infinite and divine is the *Qur'an*, therefore, in these senses, there is no implication that there may not be any values outside of it, not outside of it in man or the world, but outside of it in God, its Originator and Maker. We may argue that since the *Qur'an* is the last revelation God sent down to man, it should contain all the values hitherto discovered by, or bequeathed to him, regardless of whether their realization has or has not been accomplished—which is true. But we may not argue that the *Qur'an* contains all the values that God has, that the end of the *Qur'an* is the limit of His wisdom, and its commandments are all there is to His will. That would be blasphemy and at best insolent vanity. In God, there are and must be values which are not in the *Qur'an*. The latter is infinite in the *matériaux* as well as in the relations and meanings of its values, but it is determinate in the number, kind and scope of its values and value hierarchy. God, on the other hand, is infinite in every respect; and values, being His will, must be as infinite as divine nature itself is.

The Islamist does, of course, contend all this. For him the *Qur'an* is all there is or can be to God's will. There is nothing beyond it. Every unknown value is only a value undiscovered but discoverable therein. He is unaware that the discovery of new value in the *Qur'an*, indeed, of every new meaning and interpretation, presupposes a certain fixity in the *Qur'an* as a whole. The *Qur'an* may be infinite in the two respects we have mentioned and, perhaps, in many more. But it must be contentually finite (*i.e.*, for human knowledge) in at least one respect if the discovery of any new value, meaning or interpretation is to be established at all.

It is undeniable that discovery of new value is an eternal process, and the field in which new value may be discovered is, according to the Islamist, the *Qur'an*, and only the *Qur'an*. In addition it must be granted that the genuineness of the discovery of new values must be testable. The first principle by which this can be done that suggests itself is the principle of coherence with the rest of the *Qur'an*, with that which is already known. The *Qur'an*, being the work of the Divine Author, could not but present itself as a coherent well-structured value hierarchy. And in order to make the test of coherence possible, this value hierarchy must be finite; its structure completely graspable. If, according to the Islamist, the *Qur'an's* value hierarchy is infinite—which he must hold if every new value is discoverable therein—its inner structure can never be discerned completely, and all we can ever hope to have must forever be an incomplete, indeterminate concept of it. Such a concept, in no respect complete or graspable, can *ex hypothesi* offer us no assistance in judging the genuineness or otherwise of a value discovery. A so-called discovered value cannot be tested for coherence with something indefinite, unknown or indeterminate, which the *Qur'an* is under this view. To attempt it is to race on an interminable track and hence to doom the result thereof beforehand.

The Islamist indeterminableness of the Qur'anic value hierarchy opens the gates of relativism since by postulating that no value or structure so far discovered in the *Qur'an*, whether by the Prophet or by fourteen centuries of Islamic existence, is final or exhaustive, it destroys the last means by which any new discovery could be established as genuine or spurious. And without adequate means of proving that a new discovery is or is not Islamic, any value or principle might be superseded by another, not yet discovered but discoverable at a later time; any interpretation, past, present or future, would be as good and valid as any other. This Islamist view of the nature of the *Qur'an* makes relativism inevitable. Yet relativism, being the child of skepticism, it utterly irreconcilable with our faith in God. The *Qur'an* is necessarily determinate in its value hierarchy, and that which is outside of that hierarchy is so not in the creation, but in God.

IV. THE QUR'AN AND PROPHETIC REVELATION

Relativism notwithstanding, it may still be argued, if there are values in God other than those in the *Qur'an*, the *Qur'an* must then be imperfect, for the imperfect is that to which a good could be added. How could God, in all His goodness, love and mercy, send us an imperfect book, or, in the

language of this discussion, hold from us values which are good for us? If there were such, they must have been all given in the *Qur'an*. If this alternative makes God's wisdom in but one sense only exhaustible, the other detracts from God's goodness and makes His promise[22] pretentious.

The answer to this is obviously that the *Qur'an* is not imperfect. It contains all the values which God desired to reveal. God could have sent this revelation through another person to another people and He could have sent it all in one stroke. The fact is, however, the He sent it through that Muhammad and to the Arab people over a period of twenty-three years for the simple reason that He wanted that revelation to be understood, His values to be recognized for what they are. We cannot escape the conclusion that it was God's plan to send revelation *in quanta* in the measure Muhammad and his people could understand, digest and realize the message. This too follows from God's love and mercy; for without it, it is possible that the cause of Muhammad would not have been appreciated and the new Muslims might never have been converted.

It is not of the nature of God to 'play' with prophecy, which He would have done had He sent the message to people who had no capacity to understand or realize it. But it is of His nature to assign it to those who, and at the time they, are prepared to be fertilized and leavened, and thus bring it forth through them into history as an existential reality. Moreover, God Himself has told us so.[23] He does not call on a prophet saying, 'Go, and tell this people, Hear ye indeed, but understand not; and see ye indeed, but perceive not.'[24] Just as He did not create the universe in jest,[25] He does not send a prophet to be rejected and ridiculed. This does not mean that no genuine prophet has ever been rejected; but it does mean that his rejection, wherever it occurs, is not the act of God, but the act of man who is free to accept or to reject.

The facts of this history of revelation—namely, that revelation has come down *in quanta* before on the earlier prophets—and the fact of ethical phenomena—namely, that our valuational sense is more apt to recognize a value when it is very well realized or badly violated in the situation at hand—make the contention more plausible that God gave all that could have profitably been given; that the Islamic revelation was the last of a series of revelations which got successively and progressively higher and deeper, more ethical and comprehensive. As long as God does not wish to reveal His will to us, the Islamic revelation remains the most perfect, the highest and the best.

At this point the Islamist might argue that there can be no further revelation. For the Islamic revelation made it of the essence that Muhammad is the last of the prophets and that religion has been completed with the revelation he brought.[26] 'There shall be no prophets after

Muhammad,' is a fact inseparable from Islam. This is of course true; there shall be no prophets after Muhammad. But is prophecy the only way at God's disposal to communicate with man? Is direct, immediate verbatim revelation the only way a new value may be discovered and recognized? If God is as infinite as the Islamic revelation says He is, may we hold that He can in no other way communicate with man? Is God's omnipotence bounded by the limitation that 'there shall be no prophets after Muhammad' put upon the means at His disposal?

Obviously, no. To repeat, God is infinite and this means that no limitation of any kind is consistent with His nature. This need not imply that He may contradict Himself, by doing that which He said He would not do. For what He revealed remains the truth for eternity. To hold that God may, if He so wills, find means other than revelation to communicate with man does not imply any selfcontradiction on the part of God. All that is claimed here is that it is wrong so to limit God's will; that His omnipotence and mercy, knowing no bounds, could, if He so willed, find other means of communication than prophetic or Muhammadan revelation. *It is neither claimed that He has so willed, nor that He shall will so at all.* No new prophetic revelation is forthcoming; to claim the contrary would be blasphemous pretension. Nonetheless, the fact that we cannot know when God may will to communicate with us in a new way should not obviate our need to prepare ourselves and stand ready to receive such communication when and if it should ever come forth.

The effect of such persistent mobilization would surely be the perfecting of ourselves, the deepening of our moral vision, the broadening of our consciousness—all of which are valuable and desirable for their own sakes. Furthermore, self-perfection can be achieved only through a complete and genuine realization of all values given to our consciousness —that is to say, through thorough conformance with the bequests so far received from God. To stand in readiness to receive God's communication is to be a perfect Muslim, for the highest desideratum of God's bequest cannot be but the realization of the values that bequest has brought. Just as, in order to receive the monotheistic call, the pagans had to be the most ethical; and in order to receive the Christian call, the recipient Jews had to be the most monotheistic; and in order to receive the Islamic call, the Arabs had to realize in themselves the monotheistic as well as the Christian values; so now, if we are to stand prepared for a breakthrough from the Godhead, we ought to become the best Muslims; we ought to realize the highest values Islam has brought about. It is not unthinkable that we, who have been the recipients of so many such consequential communications from God and who stand at this time fully conscious of such valuational void and negation as the world now witnesses, may be nearing

some such communication for which the crisis in our souls makes us all the tauter, and the long, burning suffering makes us all the purer. It is vain to think that we are perfect Muslims; it is blasphemy to think that we are really ready to receive a new message from God; it is insolent stupidity to think that the new message from God can be something foreign to Islam.

V. THE QUR'ANIC MEANINGS ARE 'IDEAS OF REASON'

This will to readiness, if we may call it such, is not foreign to Islam. 'His will,' 'His law,' 'His command,' the 'Names of God'—these are not definitive concepts but, if we may use the Kantian expression, 'ideas of reason' whose use can be only regulative.[27] Just as they do not and can-not define God, nothing is or can be sufficiently adequate to define them. The *Qur'an* has specified several laws, commands and aspects of God's will, and gave us the exact number of ninty-nine names. But in every case the *Qur'an* has also told us that God's will, law and names are infinite. There can be for man no complete knowledge of them.

The infinitude of meaning which makes a concept an 'idea of reason' implies that from the very nature of the case, however clearly and whatever amount of content a definitive analysis thereof may reveal, there will always be more. The concept of such an idea can never be determinate; and because of this necessary characteristic, the Kantian 'ideas of reason' may be used simply to guide the investigator in his research. They appear to be reachable, discoverable in experience, but they elude the most persistant investigtation.

In the *Qur'an*, on the other hand, while the same infinitude exists, the content which has so far been revealed may and should be used constitutively; that is, it may be legitimately regarded as constituting, though only in part, the concept in question. Whereas the Kantian 'idea of reason' is forever wholly elusive, the Qur'anic 'idea of reason' is so only at the end of its meaning-dimension. Every progress and discovery is a genuine capture of it, of a part thereof is to be sure, but of its content nonetheless. The gain thus achieved is not merely pedagogic, affording epistemological guidance alone, but a genuine knowledge of such being as is denoted by the Qur'anic idea of reason. The Kantian 'idea of reason' prescribes despair because that which has been grasped under its eternal allurement never turns out to be what one had set forth to seek, neither in whole nor in part. The Qur'anic, prescribes hope in future research because the results already achieved give partial though incomplete satisfaction in the grasp of the original objective. Every achievement is

ipso facto constitutive of the Qur'anic 'idea of reason.' Thus the Kantian 'idea' fascinates the theoretical mind and entices it to further research without ever giving it satisfaction; the Qur'anic makes the discovery of further content a moral and religious obligation while it lends itself to some, though ever partial, grasp of its object.

One may ask, what is the wisdom of obliging men to seek something they, *ex hypothesi*, can never completely grasp or discover? Besides the pedagogic element which in this case would satisfy the religious desideratum of concentrating attention on God, there is a direct advantage of a different order. Since the Kantian 'idea of reason' is theoretical, a little knowledge of it would not be of any benefit because what is needed is explanation; and this, only a complete knowledge (a finite concept) could give. The Qur'anic 'idea' is, *per contra*, axiological. Its *raison d'être* is not explanation but obligation; and this, any knowledge of content, however little, will produce. Knowledge of all the Qur'anic content may have explanatory use which would be welcome. But the prime purpose of this knowledge is ethical. The object it brings to consciousnes is valuaitional, and the knowledge of the valuational is also an exposition of the self to its moving appeal and determining power.

VI. THE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF VALUE-DISCOVERY

To search for new meaning and content of the Qur'anic concepts 'will,' 'law,' 'command' and 'names' of God is therefore an essential command of Islam. It does mean that we are enjoined to seek new values and new moral imperatives. But in what sense, we may ask, can these values and moral imperatives be 'new?' If discovery of new values signifies a new contact with God, what particular conditions must it satisfy if it is to escape the charge of superfluity and spuriousness? In other words, how would a general test of value-intuitions elaborated by theoretical philosophy apply in the concrete case of Arab consciousness in its Islamic moment?

First, the new values must be so far unknown, not present in, or not given to, Arab consciousness in any of its moments thus far; it being granted that no value can be new to Islam as such since this is the collective name of all values. But this limitation does not amount to any more than the methodological principle that in searching for value, for the ethical, we should never go outside what is valuable and ethical. In plain English, we should not commit any naturalistic fallacy.[28] It does not prescribe to us which occupants in the realm to discover but points to us the boundaries of the realm which we ought not to transgress. Hence,

the command to be Islamic cannot amount to more than the command to be moral and the prerequisite of Islamicness of a value is no more than its value-ness. Granted then that the 'new' values to be discovered should be 'values,' they must be 'Islamic' in the further sense of falling within, or cohering with, the valuational hierarchy recognized by Arab consciousness in its Islamic moment, of 'belonging' in the culture of Islam. The 'new' values must be rehabilitated; that is to say, their relationships with other values in the Islamic hierarchy have to be worked out and established. For the discovery of value as such is, despite its importance for axiology, useless for ethics, for obligation, which never comes in the abstract, but in a concrete situation, related to many alternatives, to other oughts and values.

Arab consciousness should be understood in its general sense, inclusive of all the moments of its history. By itself, the *status quo* present consciousness of the Arab stream of being will never suffice. The value discoveries must cohere not with any general referendum results, but with the spirit of the Arab stream of being. Where general ignorance and decadence prevail upon the living members of the ummah, the spirit of the bygone generations should lift them from their moral lethargy and show them the way to the future. This confirmation by the spirit of the community rather than merely by public poll is also necessary for the continuity of the community. New value-discoveries must then cohere with the legacy of the ummah, with the Arab spirit in its richest and highest moments. This is the second condition of coherence.

Values, however, do not necessarily harmonize with one another. Their pursuits often run in different and opposite directions. The fundamental structure of their relations with one another is antinomic. The spirit of the ummah is a body of such antinomically related values. In what sense then can the new values 'cohere' with the spirit of the ummah?

Obviously, the coherence can be only in terms of the most general tendencies of the spirit of the ummah. We may safely assume that a discovery which reveals values which can by nature occupy no place on the road of the three foundational wills—the wills to know, to do, to be—to the three corresponding final values—genius, heroism, saintliness—cannot be regarded as genuine by the ummah. Such, for example, would be skepticism, moral indifference, relativism, all types of axiological monism, etc. This does not mean that individually these are devoid of all value, that they cannot be valuable under any circumstance. A measure of any one might even be necessary. But a measure of skepticism, applied for the purpose of sifting the true from the untrue, for instance, is not skepticism. Skepticism is the denial that anything could ever be known as true or untrue.

It will be at once observed that, whereas the orientation of the foundational wills towards genius, heroism and saintliness cannot be controverted, the pursuit by the ummah of the values of genius, heroism and saintliness is conditional upon their harmonization with the conscience of the ummah, its determination by other equally high values. For instance, no final value may be pursued at the cost of freedom, or of the higher, properly ethical values. Likewise, values which conflict with the deep attachment—nay, commitment—of the ummah to the final values of genius, heroism and saintliness and to the ummah's traditions of pure monotheism, ethical universalism, life-affirmation and rationalism can have no place in the ummah's ethical consciousness. This does not mean that conflicts with the final values, or with monotheism, universalism and life affirmation are not possible. Indeed, such conflicts are inevitable, for they belong to the nature of the valuational realm. Heroism itself conflicts with genius and both conflict with saintliness. What the ummah must reject as spurious is not the discovery of such value as would conflict with these, but of that which conflicts with the ummah's commitment to them. Any value may in some respect conflict with them, and such conflicts can be only decided in the concrete instance in which they occur. But the commitment of the ummah to these final values and traditions may not be contradicted. Life-renunciation, racialism, polytheism (valuational pluralism), for example, do not only conflict with the individual values of life, of human brotherhood and of monotheism (value-realism) respectively, but with the ummah's total tradition, with its sense of vocation, its self-dedication and destiny. Within these general boundaries any new value may be reconciled with the spirit and wisdom of the ummah.

Thirdly, the discovery of new value must be a collective discovery. For it to establish itself, the insight has to be also that of the ummah, the Arab stream of being. True, discovery can be made only by a living person endowed with mind and existing in a concrete situation. Just as there is no value-contemplation in the abstract, there can be no value-discovery outside an existential situation. Likewise, once the discovery is made, the test of its coherence with our legacy of divine and human wisdom lies with it. One need not go outside that value to demonstrate this relation with the discoveries of the past. Whether or not there is such coherence is an objective question determined by the nature of the value discovered. So too, whether or not a given value would lead man's will to know, whose object is the expression in concepts or percepts or truth, his will to do, whose object is giving real existence to the highest values, and his will to be, whose object is the persistence of the real-existent value-monuments, forward towards the final values of genius, heroism and

saintliness, and in comparison with other values would stand on a higher or lower order of rank, depends upon the nature of the value discovered. It would seem that all that a discovery of new value needs to establish itself as genuine, and therefore imply a fresh contact with divinity, lies in the nature of the value discovered. What then does an approval of the community add to the validity of a genuine value-intuition, of a new, real revelation from heaven?

The purpose of value-discovery is not theoretical, but ethical, and the prophet or leader does not seek in order to describe but in order to realize. This is not to depreciate the activity of the theoretical consciousness. for the theoretical value of a value, that is, its contribution to the explanation of the constitution of the universe in which it stands as one among countless essences, is nil as far as the prophet or leader is concerned. Its significance is wholly moral. Hence, except for the philosopher investigating the metaphysical status of value, it is idle to describe values as essences constitutive of the universe. The discovery of the philosopher seeking the metaphysical status of value is not what is intended by 'value-discovery' in the first place. His discovery is value-graphic.

The case is otherwise with the moral discovery of value. Its object is not metaphysical identification, but description of the axiological nature of the new value in order to enable it to do its work of determining the human will. That is of paramount importance to everyone. And we may therefore say that if God means to reveal a new value, He certainly would so intend it to be realized, and not merely located and identified. God could have revealed the values of the *Qur'an* to Moses or to Jesus. Indeed, He could have revealed the whole *Qur'an* to Muhammad even in one day. But He did not for the very reason that the Arab stream of being would not at that time have responded to such a revelation. Man had yet to be trained and cultivated to see these values as they are, namely, values. Had He done so notwithstanding the stage of the ummah's preparation, the revelation would not have served its ethical purpose, though to some metaphysician, it might have increased his theoretical knowledge of the universe. The approval of the ummah is not therefore a test of validity in the strict sense, but a test of whether or not the discovery is intended by God to make history. Value-discovery or revelation, like the prophet, that does not come in *its* time, but before or after *its* time, is dead in *its* time.

It is not possible that this ummah, which has developed its soul until, through intussusception within, and nature's work without, it has prepared itself for revelation and whom God has blessed with so many bequests and such a perfect revelation as He sent through Muhammad, is not the carrier of His will. It follows from this that wherever God has

revealed a new value, He did so in order to give that value real existence. But value-realization which, in the case of all higher and final values, could be brought about only by communal effort is impossible unless the ummah is prepared to receive it consciously and allow itself to fall under its determination. Therefore, for a valuational discovery to find an echo in the ummah—that is, for the people to recognize that what in the discovery has just been brought under the light of consciousness and reason is precisely that which they have been sensing but in their stammering forth were unable to express—is a sure sign that it is God's will that that value be realized, in short, that through this discovery He is re-establishing a contact with the ummah.

It may be asked, since values are so by their own nature and God's revelation is for all men, why is the opproval of the ummah, as distinguished from the rest of mankind, a test of the presence or absence of divine contact? Is it not possible that such discovery and therefore divine contact occur in a community outside the bounds of the ummah?

It should be borne in mind that what is required for a valuational discovery is not merely a person, or even a discerning person, but a valuationally sensitive being whose sense for values has been trained and prepared by the living of a tradition accumulated by many long generations. Similarly, for the ummah to respond to a discovery, it is necessary that the vision of the people be already trained, disciplined and enriched by the valuational bequests so far received from heaven. Of all men, it would seem that the members of the ummah stand best prepared to make such discoveries, although this prerogative need not necessarily belong to them exclusively. By belonging to the ummah, the members have already harmonized their own spiritual yearning with the accumulated legacy of divine bequests and prepared themselves, through this harmony, for receiving that which may fertilize and develop that legacy. Just as the ummah stands better prepared for this task than the rest of mankind, the Arabic speaking members of the ummah stand better prepared than the others. For, of the ummah, those who have imbibed and lived the wisdom of the forefathers to the fullest and deepest extent, who speak their language and sense their feelings, who are moved by the same emotions, stand better prepared than the others. This need not rule out those non-Arab Muslims who have achieved these requirements and, thereby, a fair measure of Arabism, from participating in the new discoveries. Indeed, men of the calibre of Shah Waliyyullah, Sir Hindi and Muhammad Iqbal are great mounts of Arabism despite their being non-Arabic speaking.

Fourthly, value-revelation by God is not theoretical, but ethical; not explanation, but action. God is not likely to reveal a value by which the

ummah is incapable of being determined, a value whose realization is not possible. From this it follows that we may rightly expect a value truly revealed by God to achieve real existence even if eventually. In methodological language this amounts to the principle that value is perceived where it is realized or violated; and, in the latter case, the perception of violated value is itself an awareness of a desideratum unrealized and the setting in motion of a nexus of events leading towards its realization. When the religious man says that the prophet is always successful, he in fact means identically the same thing as the ethicist when he affirms that to perceive value is to lose one's ontological equilibrium, to fall under its moving appeal and, determined by it, to incept a series of events calculated to give that value real existence. Hence, a genuine value-discovery cannot be constituted by the mere expression in concepts for the ready use of reason of its axiological content. It must take the form of an *event* in history. Indeed, a genuine discovery of value scorns conceptual expression—which is never as clear or intense as the sensing of value. Compared with the certainty and focus of valuational insight, conceptual expression is beneath the discoverer's dignity. It is a waste of time for the person who has fallen under the fascination of the new value. Deed, rather than expression, is the first and necessary consequence of value-discovery.

And yet, although the Islamic moment which witnessed the greatest value-discovery of all time brought its achievement in conceptual form, the deed part of the achievement, the conversion to Islam and the erection of the Arab Empire, were the most sublime 'event' of history. The vision of the divine realm, of which it pleased God to give His Prophet a glimpse, was both enacted and conceptualized; enacted by Muhammad and conceptualized by God. If a conceptualized discovery of value was possible then, though coupled with or followed by the realizing event, may no conceptual discovery be possible today that might be followed by events at a later period of history?

The revelation of Islam took place in the shape it did in order to establish once and for all what the values are which, hitherto, have been the object of a number of revelations and around which a whole mass of controversy had accumulated. The *Qur'an* is replete with instances of divine contact or action which in the past had taken place in the form of deed or event, whether through the agency of inanimate nature or conscious man. Later on, however, so many of these revelations have been the subject of contention that their veracity was in doubt, and each of the contending parties claimed that its book contained the truth. The coming of the Islamic revelation in 'Book' form was primarily intended to settle all these differences once and for all. The *Qur'an* was meant to

put an end to controversy regarding the nature of the legacy of the ancestors, of the bequests God had made to them.[29]

Since the *Qur'an* was revealed, there has been no contention about the nature of previous value-revelations. Moreover, there has been no contention regarding the *Qur'an* itself, and no further revelation. The *Qur'an* was definitely the last revelation to come in conceptual form because its purpose included that of settling all previous controversy and proclaimed that there would be no need for such revelation ever after.

The event which, as a form, the new value-discovery may assume must be one in which the ummah participates as a whole. Obviously, the ummah must have leaders in whom the consciousness of the new values is actuated and crystallized. But their leadership must find an affirmative response—indeed, an action-response—which constitutes or in turn effects the ummah-action. If such a collective event takes place, then it may be safely assumed that the new value has determined their willing, that the discovery has 'succeeded' and that the purpose of the revelation has been met.

1. Quoted in Husayni, Ishaq Musa, *Al Ikhwan al Muslimun*, Beirut, 1955, p. 77.
2. 'The Ikhwan firmly believe that in Islam are to be found all the elements of the desired renaissance; that Islam has brought such a comprehensive reform program that it carried our nation, in the past, towards immortality, and enabled it to lead humanity for a number of centuries. Because of its adaptability and possibility of development, Islam is capable of carrying our nation there once more, to reinstate it in the place of world leadership it deserves and to guide its civilization towards peace, prosperity and stability.' (Al Ikhwan al Muslimun, *Durus fi Da'wat al Ikhwan al Muslimin*, Qism al Tullab, 1955). See also al Banna, Hasan, *Dusturuna*, Cairo, p. 5; *Ruhon wa Rayhan*, pp. 374, 381; *Da'watuna*, p. 11; *Ila Ayyi Shay'in nad 'u al Nas*, p. 23; and many sinilar passages in *Min Khutab Hasan al Banna*, Vol. I and Vol. II, of which the following is exemplary: 'You may then say, without doubt or fear, that the Ikhwan al Muslimun are a *salafi* (traditionalist) call, a sunni way, a Sufi truth, a political organ, an athletic association, an intellectual cultural society, a business corporation, a social idea.' (Quoted in Husayni, *Al Ikhwan al Muslimun*, p. 79).
3. In its generic form, the dislocative fallacy consists in deducing a pluralistic ethical theory, *i.e.*, one which involves two or more material imperatives, from a monistic value theory, *i.e.*, one which recognize one and only one intrinsic or final value.
4. Muhammad Shawqi Zaki, a member of the Ikhwan, lists some one hundred and fourteen books produced by the Ikhwan *(Al Ikhwan al Muslimun wa al Mujtama'*, Cairo, 1954, p. 138), of which the works of Syed Qutb *(Al 'Adalah al Ijtima 'iyyah fi al Islam*, published in English translation by the American Council of Learned Societies, Washington, D.C. 1953). 'Abdul Qadir '*Awdah (Al Islam wa al Awda' al Siyasiyyah, Al Islam wa al Awda' al Qanuniyyah, Al Islam wa al Awda' al Maliyyah* Muhammad al Ghazali *(Al Islam wa al Awda' al Iqtisadiyyah, Al Islam wa al Manahij al Ishtirakiyyah, Min Huna Na'lam*, cited *supra*, p. 175), Jamal ud Din 'Ayyad *(Nuzum al Harb fi al Islam, Nuzum al 'Amal fi al Islam)*, and 'Abdul Mun-

'im Khafagi *(Al Islam wa Huquq al Insan)* are the most important. All these have attempted to elaborate the values of Islam, and many have achieved significant progress in some specialized departments. None, however, has achieved the desired axiological systematization of the whole of Islam. A fuller discussion by the author of the need for an axiological systematization of the Qur'an, incorporating and expouding parts of this chapter and analyzing the prolem from the standpoint of the history of *naskh* doctrine has appeared in *Islamic Studies*, Karachi, Vol. I, No. 1, March, 1962, pp. 35–52.
5. al Banna, Hasan, *Dusturuna*, pp. 4-5.
6. The following verses are typical: 'And if you fear that you cannot do justice to orphans (Women orphans were taken as wives in order to protect them, and sometimes too many were brought under the same roof to make harmony and equity possible), marry such (non-orphan) women as seem attractive to you, two three or four; but if you fear that you may not do justice, then marry only one... that comes closer towards making you avoid injustice.' *(Qur'an*, 4:3). 'And those who, when great wrong is directed to them, defend themselves. The reward of evil is proportionate punishment. But whoever forgives and amends shall be rewarded by God; for He does not love the wrong-doers.' *(Qur'an*, 42:39-40; Another verse similar in idea is 2:194). 'But when the prayer is ended, disperse abroad in the land and seek of God's bounty...And when they see merchandise (trade opportunity) or sport, they break away towards it and leave thee standing, say: That which is with God is better than sport or merchandise.' *(Qur'an*, 62:10-11).
7. Such is the usual condemnation of the person who insists upon the right to avenge a wrong, or to marry *four* wives, or to be one of 'those who spend the whole night in prostration and prayer.' *(Qur'an*, 25:64).
8. Contrast, for example, the verses mentioned in the two foregoing footnotes with the following: 'Those who fight (in God's cause) with their properties or their lives, God has preferred in great measure to those who do not. God has promised both good. But He has granted the former a great reward.' *(Qur'an*, 4:95). 'And glorify the name of thy Lord morning and evening. And during part of the night adore Him, and glorify Him throughout all night long.' *(Qur'an*, 76:25-6).
9. '*Qur'an* is a well known book of unquestioned authenticity and the Legislature will find no difficulty in determining whether a particular provision is or is not repugnant to Qur'an. Not so in the case of Sunnah. No one has a clear idea of what Sunnah exactly signifies.' Parvez goes on to say thet the Sunnah is embodied in several hadith anthologies of varying degrees of authenticity and concludes: 'Equipped with material involving so much confusion and lacking full reliability, the Legislature will find it very difficult indeed to say with any degree of precision whether a provision is or is not repugnant to Sunnah.' (Parvez, *Fundamentals of Islamic Constitution*, Karachi, 1956, pp. 24-25).
10. For an illustrative list of actions which the first caliphs took in violation of the express (literal) commands of God in the *Qur'an* and which they justified with reference to reason *(ra 'y)* rather than text as being the real intention of God, see Hasan, Hasan Ibrahim, *Tarikh al Islam*, Cairo, 1957, Vol. I, pp. 250-1.
11. Quoting from the *Qur'an* ('Would you then believe in one part of the Book and disbelieve in another. Verily, the desert of those who do so shall be shame in this life and the strongest punishment on the day of judgement'. *Qur'an*, 2:85), the Ikhwan directed the following reproach to the government of Egypt: '...It is not lawful to believe in one part of it (Islam) and not in another, to accept pne part and reject another.' *(Al Ahram*, October 9, 1952, quoted in Faris and Husayn, *op. cit.*, p. 208). 'Islam,' Al Banna said, 'has a total, comprehensive meaning

determining all things...If the ummah is to be genuinely Islamic, and not merely in the matter of worship—which is necessary unless its Islamicness is wanting—all cases ought to comply with the commands of Islam and fulfill its spirit.' *(Min Khutab Hasan al Banna*, Vol. I, p. 11).

12. *Qur'an*, 5:38.
13. al Banna, Hasan, *Dusturuna*, p. 5.
14. Beginning with 'O ye who believe, obey God and the Prophet and those in authority from among you; and then if you dispute in anything, refer it to God and the Prophet...That is best and finally the most becoming of you.' *(Qur'an*, 4:39), al Banna quotes the following verses: 3:103; 4:14; 16:64; 5:49; 6:114; 6:92; 6:153; 7:2; 5:34; 5:45; 5:47; 58:5.
15. al Banna, *Dusturuna*, p. 6.
16. 'The mystery *(i 'jaz)* of the Qur'an lies in the telling about past and future events. Its purpose is to discourage counter claims, to prevent the Arabs from pre-occupation with contention by prejudging them incapable. But if they (the Arabs) were let free, they would have been able to bring a surah like the Qur'an's, equally eloquent, poetically beautiful and well-ordered.' (Shahrastani, M. A. K., *Al Milal wa al Nihal*, ed. by Badran, M. F. A., Azhar Press, Cairo, 1947, Vol. I, p. 82).
17. 'Men are capable of creating that which equals the Qur'an in eloquence, poetical beauty and literary excellence. He (al Murdar) exaggerated the doctrine of the createdness of the Qur'an and accused those who did not share his views of blasphemy.' (Sharhastani, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 102).
18. See fn. 16 above.
19. 'Say: If the sea were ink for the words of my Lord, the sea would be spent before the words of my Lord are spent, though we brought replenishment the like of it.' *(Qur'an*, 18:109). See also *Qur'an*, 31:27.
20. Of the first kind are the names of God; of the second kind are the Qur'anic phrases such as 'Nothing is like unto Him;' 'The Sublime of the heavens and of the Earth;' 'Glory be to God who is so unlike any description of Him;' etc.
21. *Qur'an*, 6:101; 6:103; 17:111; 21:22-3; 37:159; 39:67; 43:82; 59:1; 112:1-4.
22. 'Today I have completed for you your religion and perfected My blessing which I granted unto you.' *(Qur'an*, 5:3).
23. 'No Prophet has been sent by Us but, with God's permission, that he might be obeyed.' *(Qur'an*, 4:64). 'Prophets have been rediculed before you, But that at which they scoffed befell those that did scoff.' (2:41) 'By His words, God sought to establish the truth and confound the unbelievers from their roots...that He might cause the truth to triumph and bring the falsehood to naught even though the guilty disbelieved.' (8:7-9). 'We certainly assist Our messengers and the believers, and We do so in this life, in this world, and whenever they come to a decisive stand against their enemies.' (37:171). 'And certainly Our word has already gone forth to Our servants, to Our messengers, that they will surely be helped and that Our hosts will surely be triumphant.' (40:51).
24. Isaiah, 6:9. This singificant passage gives insight into the inner working of the Hebrew mind which seeks not only to make of Hebrew infelicity something willed by God for the Hebrew's own good but goes to the extreme of attributing to divine will the failure of divine action—which in this case is necessary to preserve their exclusivist chosenness.
25. *Qur'an*, 21:16; 44:38.
27. *Qur'an*, 5:3.
27. On the nature of ideas of reason, see Kant, I., *Critique of Pure Reason*, F. Max Muller, tr., London, 1949, pp. 459ff, and on their regulative use, *Ibid.*, pp. 516ff.
28. See *supra*, Chap. IV, n. 135, or Moore, G. E., *Principia Ethica*, Cambridge, 1956, p. 10.
29. 'However, We sent you the Book that you may demonstrate to them that in which they have disputed among themselves, and a guidance and mercy to a people that believe.' *(Qur'an*, 16:64). 'And We have sent the Book in truth, confirming the Book which has been received before and surpassing it...God has laid out before you such principles of religion as We had recommended to Noah and revealed to thee, and such as We had recommended to Abraham, to Moses and to Jesus, namely, observe the precepts of religion and do not divide yourselves therein. Verily, the unbelievers have found themselves too proud to respond to thy call.' *(Qur'an*, 3:3; 42:13-14).

CHAPTER SIX

THE ARABIST SYNTHESIS

We may therefore conclude from the foregoing discussion that without Islam, Arab nationalism runs aground in ethical shallowness and superficiality. Islam has not only furnished our ethical ideals, but has ethicalized whatever values our pre-Islamic ancestors had; that is to say, it has related vainglorious, one-directional pursuits of one value or another to the total realm of value and thereby transformed them into ethical willing proper which aims at all value in the hierarchical order that Islam has given them, on the one hand; and moved the fountainhead of ethicality from the narrow sphere of individuated being to the universalist sphere of the world-ummah. As monotheism, universalism, ethicalism, rationalism and word-affirmation, Arabism is unthinkable without Islam. Islam is not merely the fairest flower the Arab stream of being has captured in its continual contact with divinity. It has interacted with this flower and this interaction exercised a formative influence upon it. Islam may well be said to be constitutive of Arabism though it is not exactly equivalent to it. And we shall soon see in what sense some of the contents of Islam may be said to be the contents of Arabism without making them identical.

I. THE PLACE OF ISLAM IN ARABISM

A. The Arab Stream of Being

The Arab stream of being is infinite like time. Neither its beginning nor its end can become the object of knowledge. It has always existed, though the consciousness of its existence may have started to be at a certain time. But even this consciousness is as old as history, although it has known periods of comparative weakness or strength. The *locus classicus* of this stream of being is the Arabian Peninsula, 'the fount of pure Semitism' and the principal source of the stream.[1] There was a time, though history does not record it, when the Arab stream of being ran in the Arabian Peninsula only. Several millennia ago this stream overflowed its banks and so annexed the adjoining lands that they became part of the stream, inseparable from and identifiable with it. Today the whole of Africa north of and including the Savannah lands south of the Sahara, the greater part of the Nile valley, the eastern shores of Africa, the whole of Western Asia and most of its southern shores and islands are just as

much constitutive of the Arab stream of being as the Arabian Peninsula. Indeed, the Arab stream has penetrated the jungle lands of Africa and reached the southern Steppes of Russia and the Danube basin.

All the peoples inhabiting these lands are Arabs inasmuch as they partake of the Arab spirit which is the soul of the Arab stream of being. To do so is to recognize the Islamic valuational hierarchy, and to lay onseself open to determination by its member-values in their respective order of rank. The concensus *(ijma')* of the people may be constitutive of belonging to the stream if it is clearly intended to include both the recognition of, and determinableness by, the value hierarchy. Doubtless, the clarity of understanding and, hence, the profundity of conviction on the one hand, and the forcefulness of determination and the resultant intensity of the commitment (Islam) to value on the other, differ as widely among individuals as nature's endowment of personal gifts to them. A oakistani, a Nigerian or a Croatian may possess it in a degree as high as vr higher than any Meccan, Syrian or Egyptian. But commitment to Palue of the many communities within this stream on the whole varies in one direction only: It becomes progressively weaker, just as the stream water becomes progressively shallower, the further it is removed from the principal bed of the stream.

All these lands are equally constitutive of the stream, although they differ very widely as to their consciousness of belonging to, and their cultivation of that which makes them part of, the stream, *viz.*, the Arab spirit. Some of them have sought more or less to alienate themselves from the stream, whether by their own action and choosing or by that of an imperialist power occupying their territory. But none of them has succeeded in extricating itself—except on the external and superficial level—of their Arab identity; and certainly none of them has found or created a non-Arab spirit by which they may identify themselves. The modern nationalist Turk, Persian, Indonesian or Nigerian may call himself non-Arab, but his consciousness still has no categories other than the Arab which it may call its own. His nationalism, whether deliberate or forced, old or new, is nothing but a naive provincialism which, however substantial, strong and energizing it may be, is still devoid of the sense of mission which gives a stream of being genuine significance. No wonder that these petty nationalisms, including the Western type nationalism of the Arabic speaking peoples, like the *shu'ubiyyat* of older times, rest, one and all, on a utilitarian axiology. As caricatures of their Western European archetypes, these nationalisms are doomed never to behold the universally moral, the ethically final, but to wallow in particularism and utility until a stream of being endowed with destiny and conscious of its mission—be it the Arab or some other stream—sweeps them off to oblivion.

What is surprising in these *shu'ubiyyat* is that they live purely on the Arab ethos of their peoples. Turkish soldiers, for example, are no doubt ready to lay down their lives for Turkey. But what answers can and do these heroic souls give if they were asked to turn the light of consciousness on that which they conceive to be the ideal that makes their self-sacrifice worthwhile? Is this ideal not that of Islam? and hence, of the Arab stream of being? Will they not articulate it in Islamic terms? and hence, in ethical categories and axiological elements of Arab consciousness? Would not their *shu'ubiyyat* vanish into nothingness in such moments?

B. The Meaning of 'Islam'

That is the Arab stream of being. What is Islam? Islam is surrender. But not every surrender is Islam. To be Islam surrender must be to God. God's will or command, inasmuch as it is knowable and has become known to us is the realization of value. Again, not every realization of value is Islam. Value realization is Islam only when it is conducted in accordance with the hierarchical order and complies with the conditioning principles which determine the order of rank in that hierarchy. Naturally value realization is primarily man's, and we may not demonstrably speak of a purposive activity in nature. Nonetheless, we should remember that it is impossible demonstrably to exclude it therefrom; that teleological explanation of natural phenomena does in fact enlighten our scientific research and that in many instances it is indeed the only explanation possible. And in an extended sense, it is not therefore oppugn to reason to speak of nature *as if* it were Islamic, inasmuch as it too realizes value without conflicting with any Islamic principle of value hierarchization.[2]

We may conclude from this that, though necessary, man's submissiveness is not crucial to Islam. The crucial part in any definition of Islam is God's will; *i.e.*, values as members of their hierarchical realm related to one another in such order as God has dictated. In answer to the question, what is Islam, we may then say that Islam is a body of values constituting an ideal realm, a transcendent supernal plenum of value at the center of which stands God.

Islam, however, has acquired many meanings. Marking a second meaning, Islam has come of mean the ideal response (the ought-to-be's and ought-to-do's) of these values, the pattern and method and means of their realization in the world of actual existence. Although in this sense Islam is human, since it is only through human willing and action that these can be realized; yet it cannot change. In this second meaning, Islam refers to the ideal *shari'ah*, the Law, the human response to God which ought to be. Thirdly, Islam has come to mean the actual response of Muslims in history—their attitudes, ideas, feelings of determination, etc.

In this sense, it is the consensus and practice of the adherents of the faith, whether early or later-coming, the *sahabah*,[3] imams, jurists or teachers. Whereas the Law, the ideal *shari'ah*, is an ideal pattern discernible and realizable by man but never exhaustively discerned or realized, the human response to God belongs to history, is actual and, like all actual realities, is subject to evaluation and judgement by the ideal.

Fourth, standing between these two responses to God's will and commands, is the response of the Prophet Muhammad, his *sunnah*. It is actual and belongs to history; yet it is in a sense ideal and, as such, is endowed with authority. For the response of Muhammad is not that of an ordinary mortal. Though, as mortal, he was not infallible, the Prophet, in fact, was unerring.[4] He was peculiarly blessed with divine grace. He acted perfectly, as man ought to act and responded to God's command as that command ought to be responded to. Hence, his *sunnah* is the perfect actualization of the ideal. As such it is as normative as the ideal itself. We deem the ideal normative and refuse to attribute this quality to any exemplification simply because we assume that no actualization of an ideal can be perfect. Since perfection really belongs to the Prophet's actualization, nothing separates it from the ideal except metaphysical status. There is nothing in normativeness to preclude its belonging to something actual. It is not the exclusive power of the ideal. Indeed, the normative real—which must be the perfect actuality of its type—carries greater emotive power than the ideal value of which it is the actualization. But it remains, of course, an actual real-existent.

Hence, in the *sunnah* of the Prophet, we have not only an exemplification of Islam, but normative Islam itself in real-existential form. Thus faith in Muhammad is joined with faith in God. God commanded us not simply to believe in Muhammad, but to obey[5] and follow him as well.[6] God also said that Muhammad's path is the true path,[7] that his spirit is God's spirit;[8] and, equating obedience to him with obedience to divine will,[9] his leadership with divine leadership,[10] God promised those who follow the example of Muhammad that they shall be the felicitous,[11] the saved in paradise.[12]

The *sunnah* of the Prophet, therefore, occupies a unique position between the ideal, transcendent *shari'ah* in heaven and the cognitive and practical consensus of the ummah. It is certainly Islam—made, relatively to man, all the more perfect by becoming instantiated in an actual, real-existent, *viz.*, the life of the Prophet. Contrary to the allegation of Ghulam Ahmad Parvez, whose problem is in final analysis one of hadith textual criticism, the *sunnah*, when genuine, enjoys the same validity as the *Qur'an* although it belongs to a different order of realilty: The *Qur'an* is the conceptual expression of value; the *sunnah* is its ideal ought-to-be.

Fifth, Islam has come to mean the stream of being which, activated and led by the Prophet in the seventh century, has grown into a community and a history endowed with distinctive ideology and institutions and which has developed a civilization of its own. It corresponds to the term 'Christendom.' This, as well as the second (aforementioned) usage of the term 'Islam,' are odious; for in both cases one finds an appellation of something by a name of which it is not worthy. Nothing can be worthy of the name of a value except that value itself. The users of this innovation, among whom there are many Muslim thinkers, often commit the naturalistic fallacy, *à la* John Stuart Mill, by confusing Islam as value, or ought-to-be, as ideal *shari'ah*, or 'the Law' with Islam as history—the ought with the is.

The first of these meanings which we are ascribing to Islam here, namely, the totality of the ideal realm of value, is ethically the highest and metaphysically the most basic. It is the meaning to which Islam in the second sense, that is, as *shari'ah* or deontology, is the ideal way man ought to respond, and Islam, in the third and fifth senses, as Muslim behaviour and practice and, collectively, as civilization or history, is the way man actually responds. 'Islam' as the realm of value in heaven is that to which all these are referrable and by which they are all explained. The axiological meaning of Islam, namely, the transcendent realm of ideally self-existent value essences, *sui generis*, is the final cause of everything Islamic in the world below.

C. On Confusing Islam with the Arab Stream of Being

Before we embark on a comparison of Islam with 'urubah, let us clear the field of some misconceptions. No meaning of Islam may be compared with the Arab stream of being except, perhaps, Islam in the fifth sense, namely, Islam as civilization and history. And this, we have seen, is a misapplication of the term 'Islam.' Nonetheless the differences between this 'Islam' and the Arab streams of being are many and striking.

First, unlike the Arab and other streams of being, Islam, in the sense of civilization and history, had a start in history. It started as an idea, as a representation by God through the Prophet to the Arab community. It was only when the Arab stream of being accepted Islam that Islam acquired any real existence, any history. Whatever real existence this Islam has had, it was never separated from the Arab stream of being. It was the Arab stream of being that expanded, had a history, built a state and developed a civilization. Islam did not come into existential being *ex nihilo;* nor did it ever create for itself a consciousness or spirit that was not Arab. Its original Arab spirit was never dislodged or even contested by the particular spirit of the ethnic groups that embraced Islam, as was

to happen to Christianity after the Reformation. There has never been an Islamic civilization *of* India, *of* Africa, *of* Arabia, but only an Arab-Islamic civilization *in* India, *in* Africa, etc. True, Arabness was not always and everywhere of the same degree of intensity and depth. But nowhere has Islamic civilization understood itself in terms other than those of Arab consciousness. The confusion of Islam as civilization with the Arab stream of being is possible only when this sense of Islam is confused with the other senses, particularly the first and second—Islam as the realm of value and as the ideal ought-to-be and ought-to-do of value. Just as Islam in the sense of civilization never extricated itself from Arab consciousness and, therefore, made every moment of its life an Arab moment, the Arab stream of being never extricated itself from the Islamic consciousness of value.

A more flagrant and less pardonable mistake is the confusion of Islam in the first sense (as the realm of value) with the Arab stream of being. As realm of value, Islam has fertilized, developed, transformed or transfigured the Arab stream of being. But it is not itself that stream. The difference between the two is that between subject and object; better still, between the final cause and the substance in which it brings about its effect; in short, between value as ideally self-existent essence and its categorial, real existential, human 'carrier.' Accordingly, Islam throughout the life of the Arab stream, but especially since Muhammad, furnished the *élan*, the ends, the conscience and the guiding star. Without it Arabism might have remained confined to the Arabian Peninsula and the Near East, limited to the monotheism and spirituality of its Judaic and Christian moments and beclouded with particularist tribalism among its heathen and Jewish members on the one hand, and associationism[13], irrationalism and life negation among its Christian members on the other. But it cannot be confused with the Arab stream without offence to common sense.

The transcendent realm of value that is Islam established its immediate contact with the universe of real existence once and only once. That was through the person of the Prophet Muhammad. The Prophet's companions and all the Muslims after them did not have any such contact with the Ideal realm. What they received was not Islam, in its transcendent ideality, but Islam conceptualized in the *Qur'an*, exemplified in the Prophet's life. This means that what the converts to Islam received was an Arab *Qur'an*, whose Arabness was not accidental but essential. God has oft repeated that the *Qur'an* is an Arab *Qur'an*[14]. These divine statements are not tautologies; they are not analytic, but synthetic propositions, affirming of the *Qur'an*, and of Islam in consequence, the fact that they are given solely in terms of Arab consciousness, necessarily in-

formed in the Arabic tongue, necessarily figurized in Arab ethic and culture and necessarily embodied in the Arab stream of being. Islam has had and can have no history. The 'history of Islam' is the history of an Islam-transfigured Arabism.

Islam, being the transcendental ideal values themselves, could acquire real existence only by determining the consciousness and will, the soul of a real-existent people—in this case, of the Arab stream of being. Islam does neither expand nor grow. Its heavenly poise suffers no change, no becoming. That which grows is our human consciousness of Islam; that which expands is the people whose consciousness and will have been determined by Islam. Islam cannot travel; its place is always one and the same, *viz.*, heaven. It was the Prophet and the Arabs after him that traveled, not the values, not Islam, however both Prophet and Arabs have been completely absorbed by the fire and moving appeal of these values, however determined and affected was their ethos by Islam. It was they that traveled, as Arabs moved by the value-determinants that constitute Islam. In order to become Muslims, the converts to Islam had to learn an Arabic *Qur'an;* that is, ethically and religiously to think in Arabic, and to think in terms of ideas of Arab consciousness. They had to emulate Arab conduct; that is to realize values whose ought-to-be's and ought-to-do's have been constructed as particulars of Arab personal and social life. It was not Islam that spread outside the Peninsula, but Arabism, however mastered and guided by Islam in every respect. For Islam, to repeat, remains where it has always been, in heaven, as an order of values ideally self-existent, *sui generis*.

The mission or *risalah* of Arabism consisted precisely in its service as the real-existential reality destined to diffuse Islam in the world. And since Islam as ideal being cannot be diffused but requires a real existent in which it may be diffused as its guiding spirit, Arabism diffused itself and by so doing diffused Islam. Hence, the Prophet's requirement that the non-Arab converts ought to be Arabicized and the divine dispensation that the *Qur'an*—the main fount of Islam—is divine in its Arabic and hence untranslatable, thus establishing once and for all that the ideal values can be reached only through the medium of Arab consciousness.

No comparative evaluation of the Arab stream of being and Islam is possible. It is nonsensical to say that one is better or more important than the other. For they belong to different orders of being; and Islam is, by definition, precisely that by reference to which evaluation itself takes place. Nor is this divinely favoured position of the Arab stream of being, that is, favoured in comparison to the Faustian, Hellenic, Chinese or Hindu streams of being, something instituted by man or something that

anybody's thinking could alter. But it must be emphasized, this is not an arbitrary divine choice as we have found the case of the Hebrews to be.[15] It is a destiny which has grounds in geography and roots in history,[16] prepared for and earned by millennia of suffering and experience. It is divine not in the sense that its author or efficient cause is God, but that He is its purpose and final cause. It is the necessary consequence of an inexorable Arab will to the good that has persistently sought its object throughout the millennia known to history.

The mission of the Arab stream of being makes it not only 'open' to receive every human being, but utterly restless until it has embraced the whole of mankind. In the language of the Old Testament, the divine mandate conferred upon the Arab stream of being is a 'covenant' in the full legalistic meaning of the term; that is to say, it implies first and foremost a duty that must be discharged before any benefit whatever can be derived. There is no tacit faith, as in the case of 'the Chosen People,' that however failing in the discharge of their duty the Hebrews may be or become, and however deserving of God's wrath and punishment—even annihilation—there will always be a remnant that is incorruptible and deserving which will justify God's uninterrupted election of them. This doctrine of the remnant which resounds from one cover of the Old Testament to the other, and which the Western Christians misunderstand as necessary to justify a consummation of an uninterrupted course of divine action in history culminating in Jesus Christ, is a trick of Jewish genius designed exclusively to justify a chosenness that has long lost its grounds.

The Jew wants to be God's elect regardless of covenant, of ethical duties and responsibilities; but he lacks the courage of the Nordic 'blonde beast' to say so openly and unequivocally.

Per contra, the election of the Arab stream of being to be God's instrument is clear-cut. God Himself has defined its boundaries: If the ummah does not carry out God's purpose, God would punish them, annihilate them, *and hand over His charge to another people.*[1] God is not bound to the ummah. He is bound only by the covenant, though this notwithstanding, everything must in the end proceed from His mercy. Indeed, the realization of God's purpose demands not only that He does not delay it on account of an impotent remnant that still believes, but that He gives it over to another people despite that remnant as soon as the chosen ummah itself has become disinclined towards that purpose and has lost, in the main, the capacity and readiness to give it existential reality. The Islamic idea, voiced by many an Islamic modernist, that the Muslims, whom God has given and who profess Islam, yet do not practice it; whereas the Western peoples practice Islam, thereby giving themselves more title to it than the Muslims,[18] is utterly without parallel in the whole

span of Jewish history and runs diametrically counter to the presuppositions of salvation in all Protestant and Catholic theology.

D. On Confusing Islam with 'Urubah

The mistaken identification of Islam, in the senses in which it is most likely to be understood when it is so identified with the Arab stream of being is thus exposed. But it is not as easy to expose the confusion of 'urubah with Islam.

'Urubah is the soul of the Arab stream of being, its 'pneuma.' Its metaphysical status is not that of a 'concept' or representation. Nor is it that of a Platonic idea. It belongs to the realm of real existence, though it is not material. It is a spiritual real-existent *sui generis*, belonging to an order of being different from that of matter, organic life or consciousness. The realm of real self-existence, as separate from that of ideal self-existence which comprehends the Platonic ideas as theoretical essences and the value-essences of the religious, ethical, aesthetic and utilitarian domains, is not limited to the popular domains of matter and organic life. Besides the domains of matter, of organic life with its vegetable and animal spheres, and of consciousness, there are the domains of the historic, whose constituents are the streams of being, and of the spiritual, whose constituents are the souls of the streams of being. True, every category of real self-existence depends upon all those that stand before it, since it includes them all and is conditioned by them. But every domain brings a new element which is inexplicable by the categories of the less conditioned domains. Just as the categories of matter can never explain the life of the organism, and those of organic life can never explain the phenomena of consciousness, so the categories of all these cannot explain the histories of the streams of being; and historical categories, the momenta of the souls of streams of being.

The Arab stream of being has its own logic, its own 'mind.' Although it is open to determination by elements metaphysically foreign to it, yet it resists explanation. There can be no prediction of its whither and why; for these, in final analysis, spring from its own depth. Although it presses towards its destiny with overwhelming forcefulness, yet the course and the nature of that destiny are forever unknowable. No amount of outside determination is adequate to reduce the given effect which is always produced by the complementary—nay, substantial—action of determinants lying unseen in its inner being and acting from within. That is its soul. It gives the humans in the stream their cosmic identity. Every instinct, idea, feeling, yearning, and desire they have had or entertained in their long history is of its doing; every event within the stream, or engaging the stream in universal history, is, at least partially, its effect.

The momentum of the Arab stream is affected by events outside of it, but not the power, direction or level of that momentum. That is dependent upon its inner nature, its latent power—in short, its soul. It is this soul that gives the stream its cosmic *élan* and creative efficacy on cosmic scale. 'Urubah is inseparable from the stream. It has existed as long as the stream itself has been in existence and will continue to exist as long as the stream lasts. Obviously, then, it is prior to its history, prior to any contact with divinity it has achieved.

'Urubah, or the soul of the Arab stream of being, is a real self-existent entity which grows and develops. It does so by virtue of an inner power which is as inexplicable as that of life in the organism and must itself constitute its own context of intelligibility. But it is not indeterminable. Besides the fact that everything under it—and this means the whole realm of real self-existence, since it is the highest domain—stands thereto in a conditioning relationship, 'urubah is open to a plus of determination, and has actually been determined by, God who through revelation exposed the stream of being to His values. These divine determinants, breaking through history and descending upon the Arab stream from above, brought forth, in successive stages, formative influence upon its soul, upon 'urubah.

When 'urubah is understood to be the soul of the Arab stream of being, it is not possible to confuse it with Islam in any of its senses. It is not Islam in the third sense (of actual Muslim behaviour and determination) since it is normative, unknowable and immeasurable, whereas Islam in that sense is subject to sociological study and scientific measurement. Is it Islam in the sense of civilization? Obviously not; since, as we have already shown, that which is usually called by that name is Arab civilization achieved by the Arab stream of being pursuant to its fertilization and quickening by Islam in the first sense. Is not 'urubah then Islam in that sense of ideal self-existent value, ideal ought-to-be and ought-to-do?

No. 'Urubah is not Islam in this sense either. True, one external order of events has affected the nature of 'urubah; that is its contact with divinity. It is equally true that 'urubah's contacts with divinity have in every case so radically transformed it that it has become largely co-intensive with the values they revealed. 'Urubah is co-intensive with the values of Islam, just as it has been co-intensive with the values of Jesus, of Moses, Abraham and the other prophets in its earlier stages of development. Nonetheless, 'urubah remains metaphysically different from Judaism, Christianity and Islam. To confuse them with 'urubah is to commit the naturalistic fallacy, to confuse two separate entities belonging to different orders of being. By digesting and assimilating the other-worldly determinants of religious revelation (*i.e.*; the ideally self-existent value-

essences of the supernal plenum), 'urubah does not become these essences. What happens metaphysically to a real self-existent when it falls under the determination of an ideal self-existent and what happens to the latter when it determines a real self-existent are eternal problems for the student of metaphysics. But whatever the answer may be, the determined never becomes the determinant.

While Islam remains the total valuational realm at the center of which stands God, 'urubah remains the spirit of a living, organic body of humans—the Arab stream of being—whose value-consciousness is determined by that field in the valuational realm to which their previous contacts with divinity had prepared them, that is, by Islam as introduced by Judaism and Christianity. 'Urubah is co-extensive with the Arab stream of being and depends upon, affects and is affected by it; whereas Islam is neither co-extensive, dependent upon, nor affected by the Arab or any other stream of being. 'Urubah reflects all the values present in the consciousness of the living, but equally in that of all past generations of humans who participated to any degree in the Arab stream of being. 'Urubah is as much the spirit of Imru'ul Qays and Samaw'al, of Moses, Abraham and Jesus, of Cerinthus, Marcion and Justin Martyr, of Hunayn ibn Ishaq and Yahya ibn 'Adiyy, as it is that of Malik Shafi'i and Abu Hanifah. Unlike values in their ideal being existing beyond time or history, 'urubah is an historical phenomenon, a describable reality appearing on the canvas of history.

E. Christian Arabs and Non-Arabic Speaking Muslims

The spiritual real-self-existence of 'urubah does not enable it to fall under alien determination. Should the Arab stream of being ever become so determined, it would not be proper to say that 'urubah, its soul, has fallen under such determination. The humans and indeed the whole stream of being may so fall, but not 'urubah. In that case, we may say that the stream has lost its soul; that it has died; or, like everything else that dies, that it has been assimilated by another stream with a different soul. 'Urubah would still be there to judge the dead, or self-denying stream, although like Pharaonism or Hellas, its existence would be confined to recorded history. The Arab stream of being is itself only as long as 'urubah is its soul. If 'urubah is ever separated from it, the stream would no more be the Arab stream. Either, then, the Arab stream of being is itself, or it is dead.

The Arab stream of being, however, has been strong and alive for millennia. It has withstood the greatest travails of history. Indeed, history itself is, for the greatest part, the record of these travails. 'Urubah, its soul, has been growing uninterruptedly. It has become ethically worthy

when it learned, at the hand of Abraham, the great truth that God is and is One; at the hand of Jesus, that the higher value is the prior, and at the hand of its greatest son, Muhammad, that the Oneness of God, the priority of higher value, as well as the totality of value, must become real in this world, in this humanity. These lessons taught to the prophets by God were bequeathed by them to 'urubah, in-forming and imprinting upon it indelible marks from which it is inseparable.

Those Arabs who, as Jews or Christians, resisted Islam have not thereby surrendered their 'urubah. At the very least, their 'urubah must be that which, in the seventh century, stood ready to receive the Islamic dispensation. In reality their 'urubah did not stand still. It developed in a direction most favourable to Islam, just as the Arabism of the Muslim Arabs had done.

Their Arabism today has thirteen and a half centuries of Islamic history in it and is affected by the *kalam* of the theologians and the *tariqah* of the Sufis, no less than by the *adab* of the poets and the aesthetic splendour of the serai. Of course, their Arabness is, like that of many Muslim Arabs and non-Arab Muslims, unconscious and uncultivated. Whether or not and, if so, in how far Arabness has taken possession of their consciousness is a matter of education and enlightenment, and it is undoubtedly one of the first problems of Arabism in the twentieth century.

The Christian Arabs accepted the ethicalizing transfiguration Islam brought to their Arabism in both the personal field and the ummah's. Indeed, in the ummah's establishment by Islam, they saw the Arab soul itself assume substance and shape. As necessary organs of that body, they found it their sacred duty to cultivate for its use the culture of Antiquity of which, in Alexandria, Caesarea, Antioch, Ra's al 'Ayn, Damascus and Jerusalem, they have been the guardians. The ummah was no less theirs than the Muslim's: In its expansion, as Palestinians, Nabateans, Ghassanis and Lakhmis, they have spared no energy against the invading hordes of East and West; and in its defense they laid down their lives side by side with their Muslim brethren.

On the individual level, they held fast to the emphasis Christ laid on disciplinary life-negation—which is all very healthy and necessary for Arab ethos while accepting wholly the new values Islam has brought and its ethicalization of Arab pursuit of older ones. This difference between a Muslim and a Christian Arab does not constitute a difference in culture or religion or ethics, but in personality. Many a Muslim Arab can be found who surpasses his Christian brethren in this Christian emphasis. The difference between them is that between two personalities—a variation within Arabism. The fact that some Christian Arabs do sometimes

regard themselves as separate from the ummah is due, on the one hand, to the exaggerated un-Islamic, un-Arab sectarianism of some Muslim rulers and, on the other, to the ignorance of Christian Arabs and the effect of centuries of influence upon them from Western Christianity. But it is nothing that education and an enlightened study of Arab history would not cure.

As Christianity was being misunderstood in the foreign land to which the apostles had traveled, it devolved upon the Christian Arabs to preserve the faith in its purity. The Pauline and other epistles and the Gospel of John they never accepted as part of the Christian testament, but regarded them as an aberration *(ghuluww)*. Unlike the Western Christians, they did not find any opposition between Jesus' teaching and the love of knowledge, the mastery of reason, the absolute unity of God and that healthy egoism, the pursuit of life and well being. The wisdom of Antiquity was regarded by them as a great gift from heaven; its cultivation, as a great privilege and honour. To this task they laboured themselves magnificently until they were persecuted and discriminated against because of these ideas. Finally, when Western Christianity triumphed, the adherents of Arab Christianity had to flee to save their lives and their faith. Many were annihilated or forcibly driven out of the Western world by their so-called co-religionists. Thanks to those that escaped, Christianity was not only saved in its purity, but the wisdom, knowledge and culture of Ancient Greece was saved for all mankind. In their new quarters throughout the mother-Arab world to which they returned and in which they found themselves at home, they set forth to put the Arab soul into possession of their legacy. Contrary to cliché theories on this subject, this legacy was not a challenge to Arabism—or to Arab Christianity, or later on to Islam—but to Western Christianity. The conflicting relation with the culture of Hellas is as old as Christianity itself. 'Urubah, by now fully absorbed in the Islamic values, was not only consistent with and agreeable to it, but looked upon it as in every respect part of the same fabric of value by which it itself was determined. Accordingly, it not only welcomed its returned sons and honoured them but gave them, in the persons of Yahya ibn 'Adiyy, Ishaq ibn Hunayn, Thabit ibn Qurrah and a host of others, its own soul and body to cultivate.

Hence, the Christian Arabs have a very important destiny to fulfill. Christ's Christianity has suffered all kinds of mutation as it spread among non-Arabs. It is their peculiar distinction and merit to have remained true to Jesus' own teaching, to 'urubah which, through the person of Jesus, received and absorbed the values bequeathed by heaven. It is equally their merit to have preserved the legacy of Greece safe against the hatred of the Pauline West, and to have presented it that the Arab soul may be

fertilized thereby and themselves to undertake a great deal of that fertilization. Furthermore, it is their duty, not only to live up to this legacy, but to become conscious of its nature and possibilities and, having thus sensed its wither and why, to lift under the lucid light of consciousness and reason a picture of the Arab soul true to the original Christian bequest which was so misunderstood and misinterpreted in the West. Western Christianity is a challenge they neither can nor may ignore.

Just as 'urubah, by the hand of Christian Arabs, ought to help restore Western Christianity to Christian truth, that is, to itself, Arabism should, by the hand of the Arabic speaking Muslims lift the Islam of the non-Arabic speaking Muslims to consciousness of inseparability from the Arab stream of being of which they constitute a very large and a very important part. Muslim humanity beyond the Tigris, the Arabian Sea and the Sahara, which is the object of 'urubah's most fervent pride, constitutes one ummah whose spirit is 'urubah. The fact that this ummah is guided by God and forever set in motion by His prophets does not make its soul less Arab. The task of the non-Muslim Arabs in the modern age is definitely a matter of restoration of truth; that of the Muslim Arabs, the rehabilitation within the ummah of its larger segment.[19]

The Arab stream of being, therefore, has indeterminate frontiers on all sides: Horizontally, it is made indeterminate by the adherence on one side of non-Arab Muslims whose Arabism, generally, has gone a long way towards perfection but stopped short of making Arabic their daily language, and on the other side by the adherence of non-Muslim Arabs who have lived every value Arabism recognized, including the Qur'anic values, but have regrettably maintained a pseudo-consciousness of a separate identity, under the indoctrination, encouragement and political instigation of foreigners in pursuit of imperialistic aims. Vertically, the Arab stream is indeterminate above because of its commitment to Islam, an infinite realm of value; and below, because the metaphysical force of its soul which lies at its depth, silently determines every movement and, therefore, is itself indeterminable.

II. THE ARABIST CONCEPTION OF 'URUBAH

A. 'Urubah as Piety

We have seen that the essence of the divine messages which have moulded and formed the Arab spirit is the consciousness that God is and that He is One. We have also seen how these messages have become constitutive of 'urubah. And we have arrived at the definition of 'urubah as the soul of the Arab stream of being, eternally determined by the realm of values

God had revealed. If, as we shall now endeavour to show, we can establish that values are all that God may reveal to us of His nature, that they are all that can ever enter our consciousness regarding Him and, hence, is ever possible for us to know of Him, it will follow that to be an Arabist, *i.e.*, to be determined by 'urubah, is all that God expects of us; that Arabism is, and is the highest form of, piety.

In our tradition, axiology has been pursued as science of the causes of revelation, and axiological methodology as science of the attributes of God. The former sought to elicit from the historical, situational circumstances of revelation *(nuzul)*, as well as from the underlying meaning of the *Qur'an* and hadith, the values which God intended to enter our consciousness and determine our will. The latter sought to establish the metaphysical status of values and to discover their inner structure and order by posing two basic questions: First, in what sense are God's attributes predicable of Him; and second, which attributes are prior to which?

Axiological methodology, or the *science of the sifat*, started under inauspicious circumstances. On the whole, the language of the *Qur'an* was not enigmatical to the Arabs. They understood it with ease and readily perceived its meaning. Qur'anic language was undoubtedly the most sublime they had ever heard; but it was such that they could judge it the most sublime. They appreciated it directly and immediately. Poetry being with them almost an instinct, they had a natural predilection for figures of speech, a natural capacity for understanding figurative meaning while contemplating the aesthetic beauty of the figurative expression. The non-Arabic speaking Muslims, however, were not as fortunate. For them the language of the *Qur'an* was no more sublime, but mysterious, enigmatic. And since they were devoid of the poetical imaginativeness of the Arabic speaking people, they could not know which meanings to take figuratively and which to take literally. The religious faith that the *Qur'an* is literally the word of God discouraged them from interpreting anything figuratively. And when they found that this method led them back to their old pagan conception of the Godhead, they swung, in religious fervour, to the other extreme of interpreting everything figuratively. No interpretation could then satisfy them unless it had been sought in almost direct opposition to the apparent meaning.

Since God was the pivot of the new consciousness, His nature was the first to become subject of a controversy occasioned by the literal over and against the figurative understanding of His attributes. The *Mushabbihah* group observed a faithful loyalty to the letter.[20] As their name indicates, they *likened* God to man, since the *Qur'an*'s description of Him is quite anthropomorphic. The *Mu'attilah* group, in exaggerated interpretiveness

and flair for allegorical explanation, sheared the attributes of all content.[21] Between these extremes, the *Sifatiyyah*, which included the majority of the ummah, stood for the immediate perception of Arabic speaking man and recoursed to figurative interpretation with measure and proportion.[22]

The understanding of the nature of God by the contemporaries of Muhammad, and therefore their understanding of the attributes of God, was the truest and healthiest, though the least theorized. It is typified in the following eloquent words of 'Ali Ibn Abi Talib: 'God ... whom no striving can reach, and whom no intellection, however deep, can fathom. Nothing can define Him; nothing can describe Him; nothing can measure Him. He stands beyond time, however stretched it may be[23]'. That the contemporaries of the Prophet have readily understood the language of the *Qur'an* is a fact. Its meanings were clearly grasped. Had they been asked to define the status of the attributes of God, they would have affirmed that each is real, that it belongs to God, while holding at the same time that God is transcendent, that He can never be the object of knowledge. Their compliance with the Qur'anic principle—'There is nothing like unto Him.'[24]—was complete. Some attributes they understood figuratively; others, literally without ever recognizing this movement from one level of interpretation to another as problematic. They heard the Prophet describe God using the same words and concepts of the *Qur'an*,[25] but it never occurred to them to ask whether the divine attributes were predicates of the divine Self, or of divine action and will. Nor is it possible to suggest that their lack of questioning on this subject was the result of inconsequence or intellectual immaturity, for they indeed raised many questions concerning many other things in the *Qur'an* and addressed them to no one less than the Prophet himself. How then did the attributes become object of a misunderstanding which gave rise to 'the science of the *sifat*?'

Ma'bad al Juhani (d. 80 A.H.) and his student, Ghaylan ibn Marwan, were the first Muslims to regard the divine attributes as problematical. Impressed with God's transcendence, they and their school the Qadariyyah,[26] were seized with spiritual panic when they saw the new Muslim converts in Iraq and Persia entertain an anthropomorphized conception of the godhead. For, they argued, God does not act; man alone acts. If God did act, *i.e.*, if He were the efficient cause of becoming in nature, man would not be free. His ethical responsibility and hence his moral dignity would be impaired. God therefore cannot be omnipotent, and indeed He cannot act at all; for every divine action is intrusion into the ethical realm of human action.[27] The divine attributes, they concluded, were not predicative of God, and to prove their point they recoursed to

figurative and allegorical interpretation of such attributes as make the slightest allusion to human-like activity. With great zeal they removed from consciousness all the data of our knowledge of God and thus hoped to keep the idea of Him pure and transcendental.

From a diametrically opposite direction, another school, *viz.*, the Jabriyyah,[28] achieved the same results. Its adherents were anxious to preserve the transcendental status of God, threatened as it was by the anthropomorphisms of the new Muslims. Like the Qadariyyah, Jahm ibn Safwan (d. 128 A.H.) rejected all the attributes through allegorical interpretation. When he came to divine creativeness and action, he realized that an allegorical explanation of them would bring God's efficacy to a quick end, and with it, the divine determinism of human action from which, as a presupposition, he arrived to these results. The Qadariyyah had held that all power belonged to man except creation which is God's exclusive act, and natural phenomena *(al af'al al mutawallidah)* which some Qadaris ascribed to God and others ascribed to none.[29] Anxious to achieve a neutralization *(ta'til)* of these two attributes, Jahm attempted to prove that they must belong to God simply, without recourse to allegorical interpretation and sought a way by which their simple, immediate meaning can be kept without impairing God's transcendence. For this purpose, he introduced a distinction between definitive attributes, *i.e.*, those which affirm something of God's self, like 'divine eye' and 'divine hand,' and predicative attributes, *i.e.*, those which affirm a quality of the divine self, like omniscient and almighty. This distinction was readily accepted by both schools. Through allegorical interpretation, definitive attributes were quickly reduced to predicative ones. Thus God's hand was said to stand for His might, and His eye, for His knowledge. The Jabriyyah took a further step, which the Qadriyyah also accepted, when they identified the definitive attributes with the divine self. God, they thought, is not a being who has knowledge, and therefore whom knowingness defines though in part, but Himself knowledge. In other words, they sought to keep the substance indefinable by identifying it with its accidents; for if the accident is itself the substance, obviously it cannot any longer inform about a substance of which it has been the accident. Both schools in this way rejected the attributive character of the divine attributes.

The first step, namely, the reduction of definitive attributes to predicative ones, is understandable; and there is no doubt that the contemporaries of the Prophet must have understood them in this fashion. But the need for identifying the predicative attributes with the divine self is not obvious. The Mu'attilah, now including both the Jabri and the Qadri variety, have recoursed to it in order to preserve the unity of God and

save themselves from involvement in association of something else with Him. This deeply religious motive was given classical expression in the famous argument of al Khayyatt, the Mu'tazili.

From the major premises that knowledge is either created or eternal, and that creation of knowledge can be either in God's self, or in other than God's self, or nowhere, al Khayyatt deduced that creation of knowledge cannot be in God's self. This conclusion he regarded as necessary; for without it, God would be subject to change and becoming. Nor can creation of knowledge be in an other-than-God. If it were, this 'other' would have knowledge which God does not have and God would not be God. Finally, knowledge cannot be nowhere unless it is inexistent and therefore not created. From this enthymematic reasoning, al Khayyatt concluded that knowledge is eternal. Turning now to the relation in which such eternal knowledge may stand to God, al Khayyatt argued that since knowledge cannot be eternal and outside God—the alternative involving us in *shirk*, or association of another god (or eternal thing) with God—knowledge must necessarily be eternal in God's self.[30]

Thus, the Mu'attilah opened the gates of controversy. A claim such as they were making challenged the direct and intuitive understanding of the majority of Muslims. 'Abdullah Ibn Sa'id al Kullabi was the first to reationalize the Muslim intuitive understanding. Starting with the definitive attributes, he called them necessary because God ascribed them to Himself. There can therefore be no doubt that He does have a hand, though with equal certainty, we do know that God's hand cannot be a human hand. What a divine hand is, al Kullabi concluded, must forever escape us because of the transcendental character of God. And yet, the belief that God does have a divine hand is inevitable. To reject this attribute is to reject God's own word.[32] Turning then to the predicative attributes, al Kullabi thought that the only true meaning they can have is that which original linguistic usage gave them. God has knowledge and hence He is knowing. We can perceive the meaning of this proposition simply and immediately; but the mechanism, or how, of God's knowledge will escape us. Since in either case the how necessarily escapes us, the distinction itself of definitive and predicative becomes, for the Sifatiyyah, entirely unnecessary.

However, the Sifatiyyah did not refrain from criticizing those who took the attributes too literally, the Mushabbihah. These, they thought, were guilty of anthropormorphism.

With Abul-Hasan al Ash'ari, the simple Sifatiyyah intuition became a rationalized argument. Al Ash'ari argued that the attributes of God are co-eternal with Him. If God has not always been knowing, for instance, then there must have been a time when He became knowing. For what

He had at one time done or created necessarily implies some knowledge in its author. If, on the other hand, God has not always been knowing, then He must have always been not-knowing. Now a being who has always been not-knowing cannot have become knowing. But God must have been knowing at some time as His creations evidence. Therefore, He must have always been knowing.[33]

Now then, continues al Ash'ari, either God is knowing by Himself or by a knowledge that is not-Himself. In the former case, He Himself must be knowledge and consequently knowledge must itself be knowing and the knower must be identified with his knowledge—which is absurd. It takes a knower to know that knowledge is knowledge and the test of knowledge is that by it the knower knows. Man cannot know by non-knowledge, but by knowledge alone. Hence, God cannot be His attribute of knowledge (and His attributes generally) but must have a substantive quality by virtue of which He may be said to be what the predicative attributes say of Him.[34]

By this argument, al Ash'ari sought to establish that the divine attributes are co-eternal with, and distinct from, God; and yet, they are predicable of God. Hence, they are not other than God. But they are not He, since He is transcendent and beyond definition. As his famous dictum states: 'The divine attributes are not God, and they are not other than God.'[35]

There can be no doubt that God's nature can never be the object of knowledge. God stands beyond experience, beyond the phenomenal world which our knowledge can never transcend. True, we do have a priori disciplines; but these are analytical, purporting to describe the formal structure of knowledge like logic, or synthetic, but based on propositions which find their fulfillment in immediate intuition, whether aesthetic as in the case of Euclidean geometry, or emotional as in the case of ethics and aesthetics. But just as He cannot be the object of aesthetic experience, God cannot be the object of intuition. Is then the description of Him futile, and consequently, all the divine attributes utterly uninstructive concerning Him?

From the beginning, the problem of the *sifat* has been couched in ontological terms, and the question that weighed in the mind of the early theologians was whether or not the attributes instructed us about God's essence, His ontological being. This presentation of the problem precluded all solution, for it juxtaposed in antinomical alternation the transcendence of that essence and the *Qur'an*'s fact of predication of attributes to that essence. The theologians, with all the refinements they added to the problem, did not bring it one whit closer to solution, for none had applied himself to the question of its form treated

it in the same ontological context in which it was originally presented.

It was Ibn Taymiyah who, to his immortal credit, has opened the road to a solution of the antinomy. Not that he lifted the problem from the fixation under which it suffered, but the kind of observations that be advanced suggested the lines along which a solution should and could be reached. Three such observations cleared the road for solution: First, the Mu'attilah are really, though unconsciously, Mushabbihah, and *vice versa*.[36] For the reason why the former reject the literal sense of the attributes and substitute for it the allegorical is precisely the fact that they can understand only that meaning of the attributes which is empirical and derivable from sense experience. And since such empirical sense runs counter to God's transcendence, they find themselves compelled to reject it. On the other hand, the Mushabbihah, starting from the same sensory, empirical meaning beyond which they are incapable of going, set out to reject *(ta'til)* those attributes which refer to God's transcendence, like eternity, creation, perfection, etc. Second, although al Ash'ari's *Maqalat al Islamiyyin* has given the most certain statement of Islamic doctrine there is,[37] nonetheless, it erroneously held an arithmetical conception of God's unity and on this ground ruled out any multiplicity that may therein be contained. Ibn Taymiyah reproaches al Ash'ari for holding that God is one in Himself, that only His manifestations of Himself are many and that, consequent upon this view, he has distinguished between the attributes of essence and those of the act. With al Ash'ari, multiplicity has become the work of the discerning human mind. It does not lie in the divine being where it really belongs. Against this, Ibn Taymiyah observed that God is at once one and many.[38]. His unity is not mathematical, but organic, and as such, it does not necessarily exclude multiplicity. God's essence is one but His attributes are many. Indeed, it is not even possible to conceive an essence that is devoid of attributes, or of an attribute that does not belong to an essence. Hence, Ibn Taymiyah concluded, 'to talk of (*i.e.*, to describe) the attributes is to talk of the essence.'[39]

Third, having admitted a multiplicity of attributes in organic relation to divine essence, Ibn Taymiyah is now ready to press for the limitlessness of their number.[40] Al Kullabi had distinguished ten attributes which he described as 'standing between divine essence and act.' Al Ash'ari had reduced them to seven and al Baqillani set their number at fifteen. Ibn Taymiyah reproaches them all for this, which he regards as a limitation upon God's infinity. Any kind of limitation is arbitrary when it poses a threat to God's transcendence *(tanzih)*. The divine attributes do not develop into new ones by analysis or composition; and Ibn Sina and al Farabi, who attempted precisely by such means to regroup the attributes into a unity of thought, have committed a reductionist fallacy.[41]

If we can perceive multiplicity in the world that is otherwise one, why may we not hold to a multiplicity of attributes in a God that is One?[42] *Tanzih*, or the keeping of God's transcendence, should not be observed at the cost of *ta'til*, the reduction of the attributes. The *tanzih* of the philosophers (and of course of the Mu'tazilah) is a deconcretization of reality—a dislocative fallacy. It is idle 'to purify the essence of God by emptying it of its content.[43]

Fourth, not only are the attributes infinite in number as each of them, being an attribute of perfection, is infinite in degree, but they also belong to different orders of rank. A hierarchical structure pervades them all. Some are closer *(akhass)* than others. The closest attribute to divine essence is will, rather than al Jubba'i's 'eternity,' al Baqillani's 'might' or al Basri's 'knowledge.'[44] The relationship which binds the divine attributes together, to establish which Ibn Taymiyah wrote a whole book, *Jawab Ahl al Iman*, is comparative goodness or hierarchy *(tafadul)*. It does not mean that attributes differ from one another in degree of perfection or in nature, but, these being equal, that attributes serve different ends and by so doing, their diversity contributes to the harmony of the total Being of whom they are the attributes.

These four insights of Ibn Taymiyah constitute his greatest contribution to the solution of the problem of the *sifat*. He certainly came very close to such a solution and may be said to have missed it only because the conceptual tools of modern philosophy were not at his disposal.

The attributes as well as the names of God are then multiple and innumerable. His transcendence demands that no limit of degree or number apply to anything divine. They are final in themselves; they are hierarchically related to one another and stand in a relation of harmony in their own realm, *viz.*, God. Obviously then, they are values. And the question to which Ibn Taymiyah has really applied himself is that of the metaphysical status of values.

Under this light, the problem of the *sifat* acquires new significance. It is no more the ontological problem of how accidents attach to substance, nor the scholastic problem of how a substance that is eternal can have attributes that imply action, and therefore, becoming. It is rather, from the standpoint of axiology, the question of what makes a value valuable, and from that of theology, what can be known of God, of His nature or of His will?

Speaking like a Kantian, thought not from the standpoint of a critical philosophy but that of transcendence and fundamentalism, Ibn Taymiyah thought of God as a Being so unlike anything our faculties can imagine that He can never be the object of knowledge. Neither reason or tradition,

nor intuition or illumination will ever lead to a knowledge of Him. Doubtless, this is the Qur'anic view of God to which we must, as Arabs, remain true. It is dictated by the idea of *tanzih*. If God is incomparable to anything at all, absolutely unimaginable in every way, evidently he cannot be known, since all material (as opposed to formal) knowledge derives from our experience of comparable things. However, although we cannot know Him, we do know that He exists and we can love and obey Him.

Even to speak of our relation to God as love is confusing. For love presupposes a measure of that knowledge of its object which is impossible in the case of God, as well as a measure of affinity, concordance or similarity which is even less possible for us in our relation to Him. It is not really possible for us to love God Himself, but His order, His law, His commands which, after all, can alone become the object of knowledge as elements not in the theoretical but in the valuational consciousness.

This philosophers' (Mu'tazilah, Mu'attilah) God was certainly the result of long processes of abstraction, the 'idea' of a being from which all the data of knowledge had been removed. Therefore, such a God is merely an abstraction and His oneness, the arithmetic notion of unity. Such contentless idea of God could even fit the atheists at one extreme, and the pantheists who saw God in everything, on the other.[45]

Although God is forever beyond human knowledge, He may yet command and we may yet love and obey Him. This is an incontrovertible fact of experience. The object of love and obedience is not the God of ontology but that of axiology. The former is the impossible (transcendental) object of theoretical knowledge (metaphysics). The latter is the possible and real object of valuing and desiring. The God of axiology is not any less real (has no less ontological status) than the God of ontology. But, as value, God can be known, loved and adored, whereas the God of metaphysics must *ex hypothesi* forever remain an = X. Values, or divine attributes, are therefore God; but they are not God in Himself, *an sich*, but as He enters our consciousness. Values are instructive; but they instruct us not about God's nature, but about His will. Values are not God *in esse* but *in percipi*. They are the 'phenomenal' God that is the object of knowledge as well as desire. Hence, the divine attributes—which was the only way a theologically-inspired consciousness could have conceived of the philosophical concept of modern times, namely, value—are real, simple and irreducible, many and hierarchical as Ibn Taymiyah had found out. Indeed, having transferred their status from ontology—where they were treated as accidents of a substance—to axiology where they can be described, Ibn Taymiyah could, as indeed he did, speak of them in the most anthropomorphic fashion.

The attributes are real and many, but they do not constitute plurality

except from the standpoint of human knowledge. From the standpoint of Being, the attributes are all one; they all come to focus, as it were, in God, and arise thence as divine will, organically fused into the unity of divine Being. The 'idea of reason' which everyone of God's attributes is may not be used 'constitutively.' As such, it is most abstract, detached, unreal and cold. Even then, its instructive value is nil. That is to say, we may not think that a certain divine attribute constitutes a part of divine being. And if we do, there is no reason why we should endeavour to make a part of Him, part of us. The case is different if we take that attribute 'regulatively;' *i.e.*, if we think of it as the moving power of a single divine will, as ought-to-be of value, whose perception is at once determination by it. In this case, the idea of reason is so full of warmth, power and moving appeal that it bursts forth, breaks through to our personal lives in the space-time of history and so moves us around 'as if' we existed solely to receive it and by so doing to fall under its determinant power. The attributes are therefore literally real, and their reality is anchored in the fact of their moving appeal which produces love and obedience in us.

To know, to seek to know and to teach God's will is genuine felicity. To love and obey His will is truly to worship God. God's will is analytically the good in its general sense. It is the collective name of the realm of values which Arab consciousness discerns—whether discovered by man's labour or bequeathed by divine grant. God's attributes are precisely values, conceived from the standpoint of their perfection (each value being the archetype of all its instances, in itself the most perfect of all it qualifies) of their ideal, *i.e.*, non-existential, nature. By conceiving of them as attributes of the Godhead, Arab consciousness has recognized them as a priori, absolute though relational, and ideal rather than existential. As divine attributes, Arab consciousness recognized values as transcendent; and by conceiving of them as divine will, Ibn Taymiyah has established their moving, energizing power which is the empirical *factum* of their ideal being.

Arabism, we have seen, is the spirit of the Arab stream of being as determined by value. The contacts this stream of being has had with divinity are significant because of the values they have brought to Arab consciousness. But values are not independent of God, not something the Godhead entrusts to the prophet as a person might entrust an object to another. That which is entrusted in the stream's contact with divinity is God inasmuch as His divine essence can ever become known to man. By revealing value God reveals His will, and this is the last and only really important thing for man. To be an Arabist is to seek value, to realize the will of God, to emulate His attributes; and Arabism is therefore the highest worship of God, the highest piety.

B. 'Urubah as Ethicality

In Judaism the Arab soul revolted against the separatism of the Hebrews. Besides this and the establishment, in consciousness, of the being and oneness of God, it did little else. In confronting such a grave violation of value as Hebrew separatism, the Arab soul mobilized its finest geniuses, the *hanifs* or prophets, to express its great condemnation. Despite the height of ethical vision and the degree of moral sensitivity which, acting as the principle by which judgement is reached, are presupposed by this condemnation, the Arab spirit was neither mature nor resourceful enough to furnish yet an ethical ideal capable of recapturing the ethos it set free from separatist determination. It is not then incorrect to call its achievement in the Judaic period a negative one. For besides the affirmation of God and His unity its only ethical merit during that period was the one of indicting and condemning separatism. Although to condemn separatism implies an affirmation of universalism, yet to imply affirmation and to affirm are widely different. In Judaism, the Arab spirit saw its implication in favour of universalism, but it did not affirm. To do so would require ideals of morality and conduct, moral imperatives and schemata of action which Arab consciousness was not prepared to furnish. In Judaism, the Arab revolution was only partially completed.

In the person of Jesus and his gradual revelation of God's religion, *i.e.*, in his revelation of monotheism in its plenum of implications for ethics, the Arab revolution of the human ethos achieved further ground. Christianity was precisely this positive affirmation of an ethical ideal the way for which was cleared of obstacles by the negative action of the hanifs in the earlier, Judaic centuries. Undoubtedly, Christianity was a divine movement, incepted by divine action and aimed at giving man the ideal to live by and the road to follow. It posited and asserted the ideal in its fullness: All men are children of God, the Father Who is in heaven. Although its categorical imperative sought the moral perfection of the subject, and assumed the *summum bonum* of ethical striving to be a state of the subject in which he becomes the pure and innocent child united to his Father, it conceived the road to such perfection as one in which the welfare of the neighbour is always the aim of ethical striving. It emphasized the higher moral value, the spiritual and the ethical rather than the material and the elemental. It demanded self-mastery and instituted ascetic exercise. All these helped give the Christian ethical ideal an extraordinary moving appeal and power. By it, the Arab spirit made enormous and daring strides forward on the road of ethical fulfillment.

Christianity laid down that the road to salvation is selfdisengagement from the hold of worldly values, self-purification from the lure of higher disvalues like pride and facile optimism, self-dedication to the love of

God and the pursuit of a union with Him in saintliness. It further laid down that the road to all this is charity and love of neighbour, the zeal of pursuing which determines the intensity and level of realization of salvation. Thus in the Christian framework, this world had the status of a *pons asinorum* of salvation and the neighbour, that of a means to the self-purification and subjective disengagement necessary for salvation. And since salvation is conceived of as personal, evidently the tribunal governing the ought-to-do could not be but conscience, for only it can in final analysis judge whether the self had really been purified, disengaged and committed. Necessarily then, the greatest emphasis was laid on the cultivation of conscience, so that the judgements it issued might come nearer the salvation values it was meant to serve.

This orientation of the gaze inwards required by the new religion was the most energizing factor that Divine Providence sent, at the proper time, to the Arab stream of being, stagnant under the morally-deadening languor of externalism and confirmism so characteristic of the Fertile Crescent of the time. It succeeded wonderfully in breaking down Pharisee conservatism and Sadducee hypocrisy. Its spirituality dissipated, though not without a prolonged strife, the crass collectivism and vain worldliness of the Imperium Romanum. The fresh contact with God through the person of Jesus leavened the moral life of the whole stream and sent it out on foreign ground to deposit a rich alluvium, a new dimension to the human ethos. The world became a superior one when the welfare of the neighbour, spiritual and material, became the object of universal desire and, thereby, the standard of moral worth. Granted, it was an unseen, personal, attitudinal rather than actional standard, and its tribunal was the personal conscience of the moral subject; yet both its moving appeal and the moral preparedness of Arab consciousness were such as would literally 'move mountains.'

For many centuries Christianity was the discipline of Arab consciousness, the groundwork of Arab spirituality. To a significant measure it still is. The Arab spirit fed itself and grew on the realm of value that Jesus laid bare before it, until it became ready to face Divinity once more and, through the person of the Prophet Muhammad, to complete its revolution of the human ethos. For the coming contact with God through the Prophet Muhammad was not to repudiate one wit the revelations hitherto made from Adam to Jesus. Nor was it to reduce their significance for man's salvation. It is not consistent with God's nature, nor becoming of His mercy, to change His mind and alter today that which He had commanded yesterday. What Jesus, like Abraham and Moses, had brought was true and the truth is one; what he brought was real and the reality of the real is unchangeable. Value never stops to be a value,

though its order of rank may change with the discovery of newer realms of value. At every fresh contact with man in history, God has confirmed what was revealed before and urged a fuller realization of the values already bequeathed.[46] The Prophet Muhammad never tired of repeating that which God Himself commanded: 'Say: "We believe in God, and that which has been sent down on us, and sent down on Abraham and Ishmael, Isaac and Jacob, and the Tribes, and in that which was given to Moses and Jesus, and the prophets of their Lord; we make no division between any of them and to Him we surrender."'[47] The purpose of the Islamic revelation was not to supersede or supplant, but to confirm, and as it were, to build over the legacies of the past.

Still dissatisfied despite the enormous gains made by Christianity, and urged by the phenomena of transvaluation of the values of Jesus that were taking place, the Arab spirit restlessly sought new means to realize the values inherent in its discovery of the oneness of God. If, in its Christian moment, the Arab spirit had any shortcomings, these were certainly not in the realm of the content of the ideal, not in the value or in the ought-to-be, but in the particular realm of the ought-to-do. Christ had rightly emphasized the higher and de-emphasized the lower values. In groundless extrapolation, Christianism de-emphasized the whole realm of real existence. This undue depreciation did not fail to affect the whole moral system. The pursuit of value in its ideal self-existence is impossible; for to pursue value is to give it real existence, and the world is the only realm of being we know that is real. Moreover, there can be no knowledge, let alone pursuit, of value without falling under its determination; that is to say, without self-engagement in the web of causal nexus that is the real world. Lastly, gnoseologically speaking, the gaze towards God, *i.e.*, towards value, is impossible unless it is itself at the same time a gaze towards the world, towards real existence. From this it follows that the emphasis upon, and the pursuit of, the highest personal values are both misplaced and vain unless they are at once an emphasis and a pursuit of them not only in the person of the neighbour, and much less in the self, but in the whole body and abode of humanity. Whereas Christ rightly taught the love of the neighbour-at-large as oneself, Western Christianity unduly reduced 'the neighbour' to a means of self-salvation and thus disturbed the balance between the neighbour's and the agent's welfare. Furthermore, the Arab spirit perceived danger in the Western Christian reasoning that, since real existence was of lesser value than ideal (otherworldly) existence, the welfare of the self as well as of the neighbour must also be divided into two departments of different valuational order with hardly a bridge on which the twain could meet. It was not long before this perception of danger was substantiated in fact. The turn towards

monasticism which development of ascetic discipline had taken and the separation of state and church during the first three and a half centuries[48], brought about and confirmed the resultant imbalance. Hence the Arab spirit found it necessary to reaffirm the value of real existence in order to remove it from the danger zone. Real existence is as valuable as ideal existence. Though the ideal may be more appealing than the real which is usually challenging, the real in which the ideal has been actualized is higher and more appealing than the ideal therein realized. Indeed, even prior to its transfiguration by the ideal it has actualized, the real has the unique status of being that to which the ideal, *qua* ideal, tends. It is of the nature of the ideal to 'emit' its energizing power for the sake of, and to 'beam' that power towards, the real. No value is ontologically indifferent to real existence because by definition no value is devoid of ought-to-be. Finalism, on the other hand, or the tending of the real towards the ideal, is an exclusively human category. The non-human and the cosmic do not know it. Cosmically, only the ideal is earth-directed, impelled to seek real existence. It is not easy or even possible to dismiss the view that real existence is to ideal existence a perfection and a fulfillment.

This insight of the Arab spirit into the genuine value of real existence produced, when coupled with the commitment to value implied in the fact of God's revelation of it for man's pursuit, a tension which grew to explosive measure towards the end of the sixth century A.D. The Arab spirit conceived itself lagging too far behind the ought-to-be. The departementalization of ethical striving into spiritual and temporal had resulted in a wonderful growth of the former, and also a further decay of the latter. But being the necessary condition of the spiritual, the temporal decayed and obstructed in turn the movement and progress of the spiritual, despite the indubitable fact that it pushed it, though only in consciousness, to ever higher planes of purity and intensity. Hence, Arab consciousness sought to reconfirm the unity of ethical striving. The result was a general mobilization of all faculties of the agent. And, by thus bringing the temporal into the domain hitherto solely occupied by the spiritual, namely, the ethical domain, the Arab spirit eliminated their tension in consciousness and harmonized therein their pursuits. It ruled that the separation of church and state was a predicament which unfortunately befell Christianity because of the circumstance of being born in the midst of a hostile and powerful pagan Roman Imperium. Under the insight that Jesus would not have refused the contribution of the state to the realization of the spiritual cause had that power offered to dedicate itself to God, the Arab spirit moved on to the position not that the church should seek power, but that the state should be dedicated to the *total* welfare of man, to the spiritual, no less than the temporal. The state

may not disengage itself from the pursuit of value, of any value, on any account. As the most powerful organ in society, to limit its jurisdiction to the one realm of lower value rather than to the other would be tantamount to not wanting more value to be realized, to contradict the axiom that the real existence of a value is a value, and hence, that it is God's will to realize value. In vain did the Arab spirit argue with itself that the separation of church and state is really a separation of capabilities, that the state blunders when it pursues the spiritual. The history of centuries was present to prove the contrary; namely, that the state had with its tremendous power effectively supported and contributed to the success of the cause of paganism in Rome and of Zoroastrianism in the East. In the case of Christianity history furnished the evidence for the obverse of this fact; namely, that the state did not fail when it took upon itself the task of combating Christianity, but managed to do so with far reaching consequences and a success that lasted for centuries. Besides, value is not such as could be enhanced by departmentalization. The relationships that obtain within its realm are organic in character. No value or group of values can be pursued in isolation from the rest without affecting the valuableness of the whole pursuit. If departmentalization were desirable, specialization would *ipso facto* be more so. But that is utterly false in the case of the pursuit of value.

Enriched by this experience of Christianity, Arab consciousness moved to the total commitment of the whole person to the total realm of value. The moral subject must dedicate his entire self, mobilize all his efforts and plunge into the battle for value with his whole being. The command of God to realize His will, that is, to give real existence to value, dominated Arab consciousness which could henceforth never be satisfied with individualized volunteer work. It wanted conscripts who, out of love for value, would pursue it all the time as well as accept the organization of their pursuit. Just as the spiritual and the temporal are both missed unless they are at once the object of every moral act, the former becoming empty and the latter crass, so the pursuit of any one value would end up in moral unworth unless it is made in full consciousness of its order of rank, and hence of its dependencies of relations in the hierarchy, unless the whole will of the moral agent is willing it, not merely his body, or his social, ethical, aesthetic or religious self. Both alternatives suffer from misplaced concreteness: Just as there is no isolated value unrelated to the other members of the realm, so there is no political self that is not organically related to every other 'self' in man. With the Prophet Muhammad, Arab consciousness established the unity of value as well as the unity of striving after value.

This double unity was the greatest achievement of Arab consciousness

since its contact with Divinity through the person of Jesus Christ. Possessed by the breakthrough that this discovery provided, the Arab soul sought to translate it into ethical reality and them, in order to preserve the continuity, flowering and permanence of such reality, to give it institutional form in society.

To achieve the first objective, Arab consciousness pondered the relation of the moral subject to his neighbour, dominated hitherto by the Christian value of charity. Until Christianity the goodsvalue of the object of charity had been the standard of measurement of the ethical worth of the deed. But with Christianity, Arab consciousness moved to the deeper plane of intent and will. In the parable of the one-farthing charity of the old woman and the fortune-charity of the vainglorious, this insight found classical expression[49]. Charity, ethical charity, moved from the object to the subject and in his determination, in his intent and will, in the degree of intensity of his desire to transcend himself and reach his neighbour, it found the new measuring rod. Even when the utilitarian value of the object of charity went down to zero, *i.e.*, when charity had no object, the moral value of charity was still there, perhaps even untouched. For the will to self-transcendence towards the neighbour, alone satisfied the ethical prerequisite.

From the unity of value and of striving after value, Arab consciousness was pressed by the divine command to give more real existence to more value, to deduce that the moral subject should, in addition to intending and willing the neighbour's good, actually enter the spatio-temporal web of causal *nexus* and incept the series of events best suited to bring about that good. Recognizing the full significance of its Christian discovery, Arab consciousness was nonetheless dissatisfied with the mere intention of bringing about the good. It now demanded, in addition thereto, the attempt, in actual deed, to do so. By prescribing this new demand, the Arab spirit did not revert to the pre-Christian ethic of consequences. For here, as in Christian morality, bringing about the consequence was not moral because of its goods-value to the recipient, but because of the self-engagement of the subject in the web of space-time and history that it implies. Hence, the new discovery affected the moral subject, the doer, alone. Arab consciousness conceived of the moral man as one who actually interferes, for better, in everything around him since everything could be better than what it is—as one whose responsibility as well as jurisdiction covers the whole world, despite the Arab's relatively humble station in the cosmos. It made ethical distinction proportionate to the scope and depth of the subject's engagement in the web of history, to the degree of 'historic danger' in which he conducts his life below. And true to type, the Arab of the seventh century thought that it was his own personal duty

to bring about the good of the whole world; for to change the whole world into the ideal picture, the Arab did not deem beyond his duty and scope. He lived in a state of continuous aggression upon space-time and literally conceived of history as something *to be made*, and by *him*. It was this inner tension in Arab ethical consciousness that compelled the political, social and military non-entity that were the Arabs of Medinah to send to the emperor-gods of Byzantium and Persia the message, 'You shall acknowledge God, His unity, His will and all that follows therefrom, or else ...'.

C. Arabism as Universalistic Ummatism

1. *The Ummah and Axiological Methodology*

a. The Ethic of the Act

Both the ethic of intent and the ethic of act presuppose the neighbour, for in both, the subject's thought is on a human target. In the former, however, the ontological neighbour is neither implied nor important. He is a neighbour-at-large and, in the case of zero-utility, he may very well be 'the idea of neighbour' since the presence of this idea in the subject is sufficient to make his act, or will, or intention, moral.

The ethic of intent is a personal ethic. It is of its nature never to become public. The ethical materials with which it deals need have no tangible reality. They all lie exclusively in the subject, in all that constitutes and determines his will. His will needs have no ontological effects; and if it does have such, they are irrelevant for the ethical issue at hand. Individual, personal conscience is the only faculty that can ever 'know' or grasp such materials. It is the only tribunal that can judge the moral subject and, in final analysis, the only power that can really congratulate or condemn him. The neighbours and the state may condemn and coerce or congratulate and glorify the subject. Conscience, however, makes short play of all their work. Its judgement is alone valid in the last resort.

In the ethic of act, on the other hand, the neighbour is the real, personal, historic neighbour. Only such a real-existent neighbour could be the other pole of a real relation—such as the ethic of act requires. This presupposes not only the world of history, but the existence of the subject in a historic society of humans among whom such relationships are possible. It implies that the moral subject can never achieve ethicality, and much less felicity, unless he stands in a context of subjects so related to one another as to make possible his entrance into real relations such as moral values presuppose. This context of subjects exercising their moral vocation and engaging themselves in mutually affecting real actions, is society. Man's social being, therefore, is not accidental to his

salvation, but essential thereto. It is the only road salvation can take.

The difference between the ethic of intent and the ethic of act is not one of replacing conscience but of adding to it. Conscience, in the latter, loses none of its jurisdiction or power. The Arab spirit made the move to a deeper plane without repudiating its previous achievement. It was not interested in repudiation because the previous achievement was a genuine discovery of value. What it achieved was the discovery of another truth, affecting the same ethical phenomenon. To the conscience of the Christian ethic of intention, the Islamic ethic of act now adds 'the law.' The law, or the quintessence of cumulative ethical truth discovered or received by, and crystallized in, Arab consciousness throughout its history, is a public institution which can know and judge the ethical situation arising in the act, while the purely subjective aspects of the act continue to be judged by conscience. It is meant to take care of the ontological relations in space-time which conscience is incapable of handling or effectively affecting.

It was not by accident that while Jesus relegated the Law to a place of minor importance and even of irrelevance and concentrated all his effort on the inner determinants alone, on conscience, the greater mass of Qur'anic revelation constituted a body of law and directives for action in all spheres of human life. Both Christianity and Islam stressed the subjective moral law equally. But Islam, since it has required men to enter into real relations with one another, could no more hold the subjective moral law by itself sufficient. Actions and real relations are public; they demand 'public' law to regulate them. And since Islam mobilized man for the ethical struggle and demanded total self-dedication to the realm of value, it was natural that it would bring the greater part of man's life under the purview of public law. However, let it be repeated, this publicization of the judgements of conscience did neither repudiate nor even affect its inward, personal competence, but was an extension of its jurisdiction. Islam did make its law 'total' because of the earnestness with which it regarded man's ethical vocation. Against moral evil, it conceived human ethicality as a real, total war to the finish.

For purposes of explanation we have said that in its Islamic moment Arabism 'added' to Christianity by discovering the value of society and extending the jurisdiction of conscience. 'Addition' however is a wrong concept. What takes place is not a mere addition, but an organic growth. Once 'added,' the new material cannot ever be separated from morality, and moral conduct can never escape from being judged by it. The hanifs who observed the revelations of Abraham and Moses and who came before the revelation of Jesus may not be judged by the Christian revelation. Those who observed the revelation of Jesus and who came before

the revelation of Muhammad may not be judged by the Islamic revelation. To deem the ethic of Abraham, Moses or Jesus incomplete is to do so on the grounds, not of the ethic judged, but of the succeeding revelation which, having wrought a new dimension to the human ethos, had furnished the grounds with respect to which the preceding ethic is judged inadequate. Today we deem all non-Islamic ethic inadequate. But the grounds for this judgement have become known to us only in the revelation of Muhammad. From the standpoint of God, *i.e.*, of the total plenum of value in heaven, every ethic is inadequate, including the so-called 'Islamic' ethic; and this will continue to be the case as long as that supernal plenum is not wholly revealed—which will never be the case. On the other hand, every revelation that has come has literally turned a new leaf in the moral life of humanity: Whereas everything before it it has left, as it must, for the judgement of the previous revelation, it has established since its arrival an absolutist jurisdiction over everything that is or happens. The new revelation subjects every hitherto-valid moral proposition to *naskh*, *i.e.*, revision, which implies like the new revelation itself no repudiation at all, but a re-judgement on the basis of the newly revealed value. *Naskh* is indispensible for religion inasmuch as the discovery of new value necessarily implies the inadequacy, never spuriousness, of the old values. That the old values, and the ethic based upon them, become inadequate upon the discovery of new value follows analytically from the discovery of value.

The ethic of 'the act,' and of 'the law,' which the Prophet Muhammad has brought to us from heaven, has revolutionized the ethical life of humanity. In its trail, a whole new 'field' of value, inconceivable without the breakthrough of the ethic of the act, has entered our ethos. That is the field of societal value. 'Society' or 'humanity' as a community bound together in faith, purpose and act, and therefore in destiny, is definitely an Arab idea, an Islamic discovery. Its axiological significance is such that, once its discovery was made, the whole complexus of moral life underwent radical change. We shall ascertain the depth and extent of this change in the sequel.

b. Society's Significance for Value-theory

It is a peculiar characteristic of value that when its realization is sought in society, it tends to reveal more of the nature of that value itself as well as of its relationships with other values. By revealing these further dimensions, it makes possible levels of realization which would definitely be missed if the same values had been sought outside society. This takes place on four distinct levels.

First, on the level of knowledge: A value may be realized directly,

onesidely, as it may be realized critically when the process of realization is subject to continuous review, criticism and questioning by the many subjects in whom it is taking place. This is not the academic discussion of the classroom which in a way could be held anywhere. Though the benefit of the academic discussion is not denied and may well prove of particular worth in the given situation, the discussion referred to here is the existential one which accompanies realization in history of a group or hierarchy of values. It is not verbal or conceptual but existential, made out of deed and attitudes. The historical context, the dangers, abysses, midnight watches, surprises and all sorts of unknown factors which enter into it, give to the realization in question an ontological dimension of which the academic dialectic of the schoolroom is forever devoid. An existentially critical realization of value, which can take place only in society, produces a deeper penetration by the realizing subject of the nature and relation of the value being realized.

Secondly, on the level of existence: The individual's value-realization produces some realization in the others automatically, if it takes place in society. The very existence of a material filled with value has a moving appeal which may determine the sense of others into causing similar realization in themselves or in others. The circles to which this influence spreads depend, in extent, upon the station the individual occupies and the order of rank of the value realized. The higher the social position and the higher the value realized, the larger will be the circle and the greater the impact. This gratuitous value would be lost if its realization in the individual had taken place in isolation.

Besides this pedagogic advantage value-realization in society has over individualistic realization, there is the further value of a more direct contribution following from the transitiveness *(ta'addi)* of any value-realization. The effects of a value-realization are not limited to the individuals directly affected, but extend for better or for worse, to all society and indeed to the whole world. Just as an enlightened physics has long ago abandoned the theory of single causal threads running separately, though in bundles, for a field theory of causation where all causal threads converge on a point of space-time from which effects radiate in an infinite range, ethical theory ought to abandon the theory which sees in value realization threadlike effects emanating separately from every deed. Every deed that is ethically significant causes not one, but a whole 'field' of effects and affects the valuational weight of the world. It is immaterial that all men or some should become aware of these effects. They are in the world and, from the standpoint of God, inescapably affect the general position of the whole—thus increasing or reducing the tension between the real and the ideal.

Third, on the level of the ought-to-do: Whereas the values and their ought-to-be's are always the same regardless whether or not they are realized under individualism or societism, the case is altogether different as concerns the ought-to-do. The influence of society upon the ought-to-do is cardinal. Since the ought-to-do presupposes ethical existential reality, *i.e.*, a complex of relations, of humans as subjects and objects of these relations, a historic situation where value is not realized but realizable, the entry of the society-factor on its stage changes the whole structure of the ought-to-do. Indeed, society must necessarily change the ought-to-do of every value since, although the value is one, its realization in the individual and in society are two widely separate things. Realization of that value in society is not a quantative repetition of its realization in the individual. It is structurally different, because the ought-to-do has to take into account a much wider existential situation and reconcile itself with a greater number of dependencies in which factors may enter that would necessitate a revision of the existential decision in favour of that realization.

Fourth, on the level of value: Unlike the second contribution, which in both of its kinds is quantitative, the uncovering of deeper content and further value-relations which value-realization in society produces is qualitative. The societal context of value-realization does not affect the nature of value *in esse*, but by revealing new values and new dependencies of valuational relations, it changes the order of rank of the hitherto revealed values. The actual confrontation in global existential reality of the conflicts and antinomies which value-realization entails in the totality of mankind brings under focus of the moral sense new relations and entirely new values of which isolationism and individualism forever deprive man. Universalist societism opens up entirely new vistas in the ideal realm of value. So great is the discovery of humanity, so wide are the vistas it lays open and so drastic is the upsetting of the order of rank of all that had been revealed or discovered hitherto, that the highest values revealed to Jesus—the values of charity, of love, of innocence and purity—move, under the new ethic, to the lower status of *conditiones sine qua non* beyond and over which stand the values of the ummah.

c. *The Universalist Character of the Ummah*

Society then is not an accident in ethical life. It is not even a mere necessary condition. We have seen that society is the subject of all value discovery.[50] Not that value intuition occurs in the ummah as a supra-personal entity, but that its affirmative response to the individual's discovery of value guarantees the genuineness and validity of individual, personal value-sensing. Society plays the regulative role of approving and allowing itself

to be determined by the new discovery, or rejecting and, therefore, exposing the discovery as spurious. We have also seen that in the particular case of the Arab stream of being the legacy of divine bequests occupies the center of the 'wisdom of man' and delineated the axiological boundaries of those bequests beyond which no value intuition could be valid. Here society plays a genuinely creative role in man's cognition and realization of value, and its existence as context for value-realization affects the general balance of worth and unworth of the whole universe.

Society, however, is not any conglomeration of humans. A business corporation or country club are not society because their pursuits are specialized, limited to the realization of one or two elementary values, whereas society is an organization for the pursuit of all value. Since value is one and its order or rank is one, the ethically imperative must be one and its pursuit cannot be limited to any particular group as distinct from other groups. If the purpose of society is the pursuit of total value, it must follow that society is universal, permitting the exclusion of no human being. Every group separatism is tribalism and rests on a contradiction of the unity of value, of the unity of God. Separatism, which every nationalist, tribalist or group particularism is, necessarily implies either self-contradiction or cynical relativism, the former if it insists on the unity of value, the latter if it repudiates it. Every non-universalist community limits its service, leadership or any advantage thence derivable to a few persons, whereas society's membership is by nature open to all regardless of subscription or even the need therefor. It is of its essence to be total—total in its interest, concern and pursuit of value, as well as in its membership. Any limitation upon its jurisdiction or extent is arbitrary and prevents it from being what it ought to be. We should as little accept a consumer cooperative's title to 'societyship' as that of the French, German or American nation. Both kinds fail to give society its essential totality.

Ethicality, or the pursuit of value as such, and universalism, or the pursuit of value in all human objects, therefore go hand in hand, mutually implying and supporting each other. Both rest on the common foundation which constitutes the essence of the Arab message, namely, the unity of God and the revelation of His will as value. Both demand a society in which every human stands in the position of neighbour to every subject. Both prescribe that only in the full-time engagement of his total being *vis-à-vis* all humanity for realizing the whole realm of value can man begin to fulfill the meaning of his station as God's vice-gerent.

The ummah, or Arab stream of being, is a society wherein moral vocation is defined and the subjects are determined by the total realm of value and such inner value relationships as were revealed to it by God, through the agency of its prophet sons. The nature of the ummah is not

material, but relational and should never be mistaken for anything physical or existential. The ummah's being is a consensus of souls, a union of visions and wills. It is made of approbations and condemnations, of assents and dissents from judgements and commandments that are purely ethical in nature and scope. The drive for the ummah is spiritual and its material is the whole of mankind since every man is by nature entitled to its privileges and bound by its duties.

There is but one ummah. Its singularity is inextricably bound to the absoluteness of value, the Oneness of God, for it is constituted by the very fact that it is a consensus and that it is a consensus ordered, blessed and enriched by divine value-bequests. The ummah may and may not envelop the world, although universality follows from its nature. The fact that it does not include the world does not prevent it from exercising every one of its functions as if every human being was its member. Hence, it can have no alternative, though it may have enemies. Its enemies can be individuals as well as groups. But no group may claim that it is an ummah by its own right without challenging the ummah's claim or compromising the unity of value. For if two ummahs are to co-exist, there must be two hierarchies of value, and one of these must be false and spurious. On the other hand, the claim of the Arab stream of being to be the only ummah cannot be contended. Providential choice or history had established the necessary connection between it and the unity of value and thereby transformed the Arab stream of being into the ummah.

Until Muhammad's revelation, all discoveries of value had for purpose the repudiation of separatism as well as the betterment of individuals, their moral good and salvation. To that end the individual's membership in society might have been enjoined as instrumental. But with the revelation of Muhammad, society was invested with a value other than that of an instrument. It did not lose its value as means, but in addition thereto it acquired the final value of an end in itself. Man was henceforth obliged to seek the ummah's good, the ummah's salvation and felicity. It relieved him from the psychopathic obsession with his personal self and welfare, whether material or spiritual, to which the previous ethical exaggerations had exposed him, and gave him the real, the historical body of mankind to better and to save. By focussing his consciousness and concentrating all his yearning and striving on mankind as the potential ummah whose actualization is the highest moral imperative, the revelation of Muhammad also sought the individual's salvation and felicity. This losing of oneself in the service of the ummah-ideal fulfills, as it creates the needs for, a superman-individual in whom every personal value is realized to the utmost. Personal value is always a by-product of moral striving which must always be out-going, other-oriented. The moment ethical striving

turns inwards, towards the self, the result is inevitable warping and blunder. Although Arabism assigned to the individual the place of a means for the world-ummah, it regarded him as its end and goal without making the ummah subservient to him. Besides the new dignity of being God's vicegerent, *i.e.*, of being deemed worthy of being the means of God's purpose, the Arab, as member of the ummah, was in fact the substance of that divine purpose. Arabism, therefore, is certainly humanism; but it is humanism purified of all sentimentality by the universalist concreteness of the world-ummah.

However, this in no way implies that the ummah is always right. The ummah may suffer division on questions of the highest as well as the lowest ethical significance. It may commit evil and allow itself to fall under the determination of a spurious value-intuition. Not immune against falling into prejudice, it is always possible to enlighten, educate and guide the ummah. Indeed, this is precisely the eternal duty of the ummah's worthiest sons and the particular problem they face in this century. Criticism of the ummah's approbations and disapprobations is a holy duty to all. But criticism presupposes values, and these can be only those of the ummah bequeathed by God. Criticism of the ummah is then possible only in loyalty to Arabism, its spirit, which in the given instance is thought of as having been contradicted or left unheeded. There can be no going outside the ummah except to what is wrong and disvaluable. Change and development are tolerable only provided the ummah's identity is preserved. True, change and growth are eternal, natural processes; but they presuppose an unchanging substrate that changes and grows. If development and growth could so transform the ummah as to cause it to acquire a new identity, then the validity of the truth or of the value upon which this identity itself rested or was deemed desirable in the first place would be repudiated, and there would remain no more reason why the new state should not be transformed into another as soon as it has been realized.

The ummah, therefore, is an Arab idea. That is to say, it is a value, conditioning and conditioned by the whole valuational hierarchy, revealed by God to His Prophet Muhammad at the moment the Arab stream of being was pregnant with destiny-forces and ready to capture the heights of the supernal plenum of value. As a value, the ummah was revealed to the Arab stream of being complete: grounded in the ethical phenomena that move the ethos from intent to act, from conscience to law, and from the person to mankind, it brought with it a new methodology, a new phenomenology, and a new ideology.

2. *The Universal Brotherhood under the Moral Law*

The Arabs are inspired by the millennia of history and achievement

behind them, but they are bewitched by the ideal of universal brotherhood to which they today betray as great a weakness as their ancestors had done throughout history. They are completely under its spell and will not rest until they have made it a fully actualized reality. Nothing is dearer to them than God, nothing worthier than doing His will, of which the highest stage is precisely the realization of this ideal. Independence from foreign domination, unity and progress in the fields of the physical, the social, the economic and the intellectual which they are now furiously and comprehensively seeking—however necessary these values may be, they are all preparatory. They are sought as means to something far greater and more significant, namely, the universal brotherhood under the moral law, which follows directly from the existence and Oneness of God—the sole determinants of all their being, yearning, striving and history.

Brotherhood is a consensus of souls, of wills and of agents.[51] It is a consensus of *souls* when the brethren perceive values for what they are; when they perceive them in their genuine order of rank and in the perspective of the dependencies and *complexi* of relationships with other values; when they have raised these valuational percepts under the lucid light of consciousness and acquainted themselves, to the degree requisite for communication, with the perceptual or discursive crystallizations in which the endowed among them have given expression to these percepts. Brotherhood is a consensus of *wills* when the brethren voluntarily 'open up' their decision-making faculty for determination by values; when the brethren are determined by the higher value when it conflicts with the lower, the more when it conflicts with the less, and by that which the brotherhood has chosen when that value stands in a relation of equivalence with another value; when the brethren commit their energies, lives and being to the pursuit of value; when they seek to realize value in every act, disposition or intention. Brotherhood is thirdly a consensus of *agents* when the brethren disturb the inevitable flow of events, by deflecting their course or incepting a new series, with a view to giving real existence to value; when they 'engage' themselves in the web of causality and play in its midst, at the risk of comfort, happiness and life, the role of the 'traffic' policeman and guide, who channels traffic to the goals of his choice; when the brethren act in order, in harmony and in complementary reciprocity with one another so that the more and the higher may be realized by the cooperative effort of all. The brotherhood is universal when every human being is an actual, or potential, member; when the sole standard of measurement among men is the clarity and depth of his soul-consensus, the totality and intensity of his will-consensus and the heroism of his agent-consensus. That is, respectively, the true meaning of Islam's master concepts of *taqwa*, *salah* and *falah*.

The material, social and ethico-personal expressions of brotherhood follow upon this threefold consensus. A member of the brotherhood is loved by every other member not as himself—that is of little value when compared with the universal brotherhood that is God's will—but as the microcosm in whom the whole world-ummah comes to focus. Every member, actual or potential, is served, assisted and guided by every other member standing within his circle, not as a favour, not as a means for the agent's salvation, not as an instance of some abstract though universal, general notion of duty, but purely out of determination by the value of the member as brother, as the focal point at which, for the agent, the world-ummah comes to focus. The values regulating the relationships of the members of the brotherhood among one another are therefore derivative from the consensus, in the sense that they find in that which constitutes the consensus their final justification.

There may always be some humans who for one reason or another, of their making or otherwise, stand outside the brotherhood. But there can be no person that is not a member, potentially. If the material, social and ethico-personal expressions of brotherhood are to be exercised *vis-à-vis* the member-brethren, because of their actual membership, are they to be denied to the potential members?

No! Membership in the brotherhood consists in the threefold consensus. The first of these, which is the condition of the other two, is the soul-consensus. This is not one which concerns the theoretical, but the valuational consciousness. The difference between one culture, community, civilization and religion and another is not one of truth. The difference is essentially valuational. It is perilously dangerous to construe the difference as theoretical. In matters of truth, the untrue, the false, should be uprooted mercilessly without delay by all the means at one's disposal. Obviously, there can be here no room for alternatives, no opportunity for tolerance. But in matters of value, the diversity is not always deliberate evil. In most cases, it is an immaturity, an insensitivity, due to deficient training or talent, to see the situation as it really is. Hence, diversity in the perception of value is not to be condemned and fought, but lovingly tolerated. The valuational dissenter is, by definition, invincible. Nonetheless, for all his opposition and power, he is educable, trainable, guidable. One meets the valuational dissenter everywhere. He is ubiquitous, in the home, the field, the classroom, the army or the headquarters of the brotherhood. Wherever he is found, the dissenter is the 'younger' brother standing in the greatest need of understanding, sympathy and assistance. Such is the standing of the non-member, of the minority when the brotherhood becomes the nation, the continent and then the universe.

In its history the Arab spirit has had many moments of magnanimity which can and ought to inspire mankind to a new level of tolerance in valuational matters. When the first wave of Arabs, the Akkadians, moved into the Fertile Crescent and settled the land between the two rivers, their god became suppreme, but it never suppressed the native gods. The Babylonian god, EnLil, did not even lay claim to lordship over the deities of Ea and Eridu. In his article on Babylon in *The New Schaff Herzog Encyclopaedia of Religious Knowledge*[52], G. W. Gilmore wrote that 'the principle of centralization, of nationalization, was clearly at work in the sphere of religion as well as politics. But this was limited by another principle, that pre-eminence among the gods did not involve supercession of other gods in their own seats of worship ... Marduk had his seat only in Babylon, just as Asshur never set up his throne and temple in Babylon even during the Assyrian period'.

It relied on its god to win the hearts of the foreigners by his own power, the moving appeal of the values of its spirit. Arab history knows of no wilful destruction of places of worship. But it does know of the transformation of many into Arab places of worship by the hands of their own people after the values of Arabism had already won their hearts. As far as due respect to the neighbour's valuational judgement is concerned, the Arabs have a history without either blemish or parallel.

Afraid lest later generations should claim the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem as a worthy site for a mosque, Caliph 'Umar lovingly declined the invitation of the Bishop of Jerusalem to tarry and recite his noon prayer there. Guided by such devotion to the cause of neighbourly love and brotherly tolerance, Arabism is proud of the many churches and synagogues that still stand in its midst since the earliest days.[53]

The general purpose of the brotherhood is the realization of all value. Its highest purpose is the realization of the highest values. Its political purpose is its self-perpetuation. Its eternal activity is education, the preparation of the future members for membership and their training for realizing the highest axiological purpose. Everything in the life, being and activity of the brotherhood and its members is geared towards this end, namely, the education of mankind to enter progressively in the three *consensi*. Everything else is a means towards this end.

In Arab consciousness, therefore, following a value and a command revealed by God and flowing, as it were, immediately from His existence and unity, every human being is a neighbour to whom love, respect, and brotherly assistance is due. In the Judaic periods the Arab realized this value to the extent of opposing Hebrew separatism and asserting strict monotheism as the basis of all spiritual and ethical structure. The great

and genuinely universal extent to which, as the disciple of Jesus, he later sought to re-educate the world is for the Arab a source of confidence that his legacy has not been in vain and that his sense for the genuinely valuable and universal has not been erring. As to the inner purification, the sensitivity of conscience and the warmth of personal love he has realized and bequeathed to mankind through the person of Jesus, there is no parallel except in Sufism, which is of course also an Arab realization. However, in the Christian period of Arab history, brotherhood was one of hearts, and the Arab spirit had to rise to the realization that the brotherhood of hearts must develop into the brotherhood of total being if it is not to disintegrate into sentimentality. The work of the heart needed consolidation and had to be buttressed and reinforced against destruction. The Arab spirit had to recognize that totality was not realizable by the heart, though this had contributed to it significantly. That as object of willing and striving the totality of being presupposed the totality of the person in willing and striving, the engagement of his mind and arm in addition to his heart, was beginning to dawn on human awareness. And it was not long before that spirit articulated the new ideal in the revelation God sent down to Muhammad. The Arab of the Arabian Peninsula then set out to realize the universal brotherhood conceived as a three-fold consensus of all men—in short, as universal brotherhood. He succeeded to the extent history could permit.

Wherever the Arabs went during that period, they entered as genuine liberators and fraternity makers. Their wondrous success was nothing but the work of the brotherhood values which animated them and to which the wills of the non-members quickly yielded. The difference between theirs and other conquests, particularly those that the world has been witnessing during the expansion of Europe to the other continents during the modern period of history, is as simple and yet as great as that between fraternal liberation and redemption on the one hand, and exploitation, racialist, vanquishing enslavement on the other.

The claims of the Europeans that they entered the African and Asian territories as liberators does not convince the most naive. The unmistakable fact is that they did so as a superior race whose larger needs and greater adeptness in the handling of strategic weapons justified, in their own eyes, the enslavement and dispossession of the inferior 'native' races, whether red, yellow, black or white. This explains why, in the matter of conversion of these 'natives' to European religion, culture or even language, European history cannot furnish a single case of a people's conversion, though it can certainly furnish many instances of wholesale annihilation. Over a hundred years of French colonialism in Algeria and of British colonialism in Egypt and India have not scratched the surface

of these countries which are now surprising the world with their vitality and determination to repudiate the European intrusion as an unfortunate and sad interval in their history.

Per contra, the Arab stream of being enveloped the then-known world and still does so. The Arab spirit is not only cherished in the distant fringes as it is in the Peninsula, but is regarded, for the most part, as the true identity of the humans living under its extended wings. Just as the 'native' cannot be subdued, and much less converted to the language, culture and religion—in short, to the whole valuational hierarchy—of the conqueror, he can, and in actual fact of history did, embrace the man and the valuational hierarchy of the man who entered his land as genuine brother and proved in deed as well as in disposition, intent and word that he valued his brother-native at least as much as he valued himself. It was this reputation of the Arab of the seventh century that preceded his march, not that of his weapons or horses which in every case were inferior to the native's war preparations. It was Arab brotherliness that spread conversion, not war panic, in the ranks of the enemy, even in the many cases where the new converts to Arabism were not converts to Islam but preserved their Christianity, Judaism or Sabeanism. It was Arab brotherliness that disarmed the opponent and made the Arab invincible. The arrest of his march at Poitiers was the result of his slackening in holding the values of Arabism supreme. The conversions of the seventh century to Arabism will remain forever inexplicable without Arab brotherhood, without Arab feeling and commitment to the universal brotherhood of all men under the one God that is in heaven.

Even as then, the Arabs today seek to become effective in the world; but at the same time they do not lose sight of the fact that effectiveness is not necessarily the position of military power which, in the physical power-dominated mind of the modern world, it usually is. Their own history had taught them that the greater effect in history belongs, in the long run of centuries, to the position of moral power. It is their moral power which they want to put to work so as to bring about the universal brotherhood. On the other hand, in seeking the members of the human race to join their brotherhood, the Arabs do not intend to have another international organization in which the enmities, differences and divergencies of the peoples of the world are reproduced. Their brotherhood is one, under the moral law which is one, for it is the will of God who is one. It is essentially a consensus; not a hotchpotch amalgam, but a community. That it is an open, universal society in no way implies that it is ethically pluralistic. Ethical pluralism is incompatible with Arabism; and if it is true, *i.e.*, if the moral law is many and each person, group or society can have its own that is valid only for that person or group,

monotheism is futile and the universe has no alternative to Protagorean relativism on the individual, and Machiavellian opportunism on the international level. But if the wisdom of mankind and history is to be heard and credited, relativism and opportunism end up in real and moral ruin, no matter how protracted their temporary material advantage may be. And if human choice is limited to this alternative, then Arab choice is definitely for being the objects, the patients of this evil, rather than its perpetrators. For as patients, injustice would not enter their will and their heart's communion with justice would go on uninterrupted, *à la* Socrates. Fortunately, the choice is not so limited. Relativism and Machiavellian opportunism are self-contradictory, the consequence of valuational blindness and ethical apathy. Universal brotherhood is the worthiest ideal *and* is possible; and the Arab ethos, having passed beyond the stage of wishing and intending, cannot now rest until it has realized it by the work of the arm, *i.e., by the act and in history.*

What is 'the work of the arm'? The expression suggests compulsion, but its meaning is the diametrically opposite. Tolerance and freedom are the first principles of any Arab conception of the ought-to-do. But does not tolerance contradict the monism of the moral law?

No. Monism of the moral law does not necessarily imply intolerance or compulsion, though many people have thought the contrary, including St. Augustine. Monism belongs to the level of being. Its thesis purports that value is one and the same for all, as God, Whose will is value, is one and the same, Lord and Mover of all. Tolerance or compulsion, on the other hand, are not characteristics of the realm of valuational being, but of action. A person may perfectly perceive the unity and absoluteness of value without needing to 'compel' others to realize them. That which he cannot escape, however, is the need to enable the others to perceive the same value, and this is the universal obligation of man to instruct, teach and educate his fellowmen. It follows analytically from the perception of value since value is that which 'moves' and to perceive value is to fall under its 'moving' appeal. Having fallen under the moving appeal of value and not willing that other beings fall under the same power is a contradiction of one of the basic axioms of axiological phenomenology, namely, that the apprehension of value as well as the real existence of value are themselves values.

We have seen how intolerance in valuational perception is futile and only education can bring the valuational dissenter to see the reality as it is, compulsion being forever incapable of producing the soul-consensus which is the father of the other two *consensi.* Furthermore, to educate is not to indoctrinate. The former necessarily implies acquaintance, through the process of dialectic and communication, with other alternatives. It

presupposes knowledge as being the right opinion, and decision as being the choice of the right one among alternative opinions. Similarly, the purpose of education is virtue and this is the right act, freely chosen and entered into from among alternative avenues of action. Just as soul-consensus is an assent, rather than a compliance, will-consensus is a free participation. A world of perfect automata is no better than our warring, intolerant world; and one made perfect through the free participation of mutually respected brethren is a world far greater in value than one perfected necessarily, or without the consciousness of free choice and participation, as if by automata of duty. For, if the purpose of the brotherhood is the realization of value, of more value, of the higher value, it should follow that since the properly moral values of personality, namely, freedom and human dignity, are the higher, the brotherhood which does not realize them is less worthy, less felicitous than that in which these personal values are realized in addition to all the others which are equally realized in both. Indeed, the brotherhood which allows these values to be violated has incurred upon itself a guilt whose significance is multiplied by the height and mass of the non-personal values it has successfully realized.

3. *Sufism: The Eclipse of the Ummah*

Joined by overhasty disciples and attacked by overhasty critics in the lands removed from the ethicalizing influence of the ummah, Arab consciousness was not intense enough to withstand either the one or the other, and the ummah-ethos began to soften under their influence. When the few who lost none of their determination and zeal looked up to the ummah for assistance, they found its consciousness either preoccupied with the development of the law required by the widening kingdom, or with the analysis of abstract theological dogma required by the continuous misunderstanding of the new converts. The jurists focussed their minds on the details that would make the law absolutely complete, and the *mutakallimun*, on the distension of old concepts or appropriation of new ones that would make the creed accomodate the new discoveries of philosophy.[54] Between both, the warmth of the moving appeal of the ummah-ethic cooled off and Arab consciousness was laid bare to the persistent attacks of ethical individualism, better known as Sufism, which usurped from the ummah-ethic the leadership of life in the Arab world and monopolized the satisfaction of the spiritual yearnings of the people.

Sufism managed to cut the moral agent loose from his attachment to the ummah by appealing to God as object-center of all Arab yearning and striving. Its work was made easy by three facts: First, the central position God occupied in Arab consciousness. This contributed greatly towards

disarming opponents. Second, the weak level of consciousness of value among the converts, and their consequent indeterminableness by Arab values, due to their ignorance of the Arabic language. Third, the gradual weakening of the will to value among the Arabs themselves made them incapable of persistently sustained resoluteness and therefore of surmounting the opposition.

The central idea of Sufism is that to detach oneself from the gods of idolatry, which is prerequisite to true monotheism, one must detach himself not only from the idols of worship but from every object of desire or yearning since these too, though little at times, are no less idols than the statues of the temple. When a state of perfect freedom from all is reached, it is possible to enter into the proper relation with God, which is determined by love and in which God stands as the sole object of all desire. Monotheism, the Sufis taught, necessarily implies and is equivalent with, ethical monism.

From the position that God Himself is the sole object of all desire, the Sufis deduced that the relation that binds man to Him is love, that salvation, which is the consummation of that relation, consists in union with Him.[55]

Thus the cardinal concern of a Sufi is for his union with God, and his greatest feeling is the love of God. As we have seen in the case of the ethic of intent, in striving after God the neighbour might be to the Sufi of some help, but the realization of his objective concerns his own being, his own soul alone. However, in his striving after union, the neighbour may be of great, and sometimes of decisive, assistance. For the method of salvation is a path *(tariqah)* along which man ought to tread his way to the Most High. Like any 'path' that goes to the 'summit', it gets progressively more difficult as it leads to stages *(maqamat)* or mystical states *(ahwal)* which get progressively 'purer' or 'wiser'. Who can underestimate the value of a friend who, by continual advice and guidance, would show the 'path' to the traveller and provide through his unswerving fidelity and encouragement, the moral support that a mortal needs in an ascent such as this? Indeed, without the example of a friend to emulate, the ascent itself might be exceedingly difficult and perhaps altogether impossible. Nonetheless, the neighbour, conceived as fellow brother or elder shaykh of the *zawiyah* (lit. corner, the Sufi fraternity), is here an instrument 'deployed' by the moral agent to achieve his own personal salvation. The salvation of the neighbour is here not an end in itself.

To enter the Sufi brotherhood it was necessary first to repent. But Sufi repentence *(tawbah)* is essentially contrition, not for the evil or sin of existence, of society or of man, but for the Sufi himself. His sin is personal, and he represents it to himself as that of estrangement from God, of

falling under the moving appeal of gods, of things, even of God's paradise itself.[56] Once repentance is achieved and the person is initiated into membership in the brotherhood, then through a scale of promotions, he is subjected to a program of worship designed to focus his consciousness on God. Essentially the practice is one of moral psychology; it uses verbal repetition *(dhikr)* of the name or names of God, theopathic utterances, litanies drawn from the *Qur'an* and other invocations, as means of achieving such focus. Obviously the observance of the law and moral conduct in this world, just as prayer, fasting, voluntary poverty and other ascetic practices add further prop to the general uplift towards divine reality *(haqiqah)*, the perception of which is the well known *gnosis* of mystics everywhere. When this is achieved, the words of the recitations lose their apparent meanings and reveal the lights *(anwar)* which, according to Suhrawardi, become gradually 'substantialized' in the heart and thus unlock the gates of union with the Divine.

However, lest any observance of the law in this world should imply, however remotely, any actual involvement therein, the law should be observed in the consciousness that it is only a symbol of something much more worthy and nobler. In its letter it is fit for the uninitiated, for the rough and tumble life of every day in an ungodly world—a medicine for the sick.[57] As a symbol it is for the graduates of the Sufi *via purgativa et illuminativa* the mirror of a wisdom which in them is living and active. Hence, obedience to the shaykh of the brotherhood is greater than observance of the law, with which they can now dispense; and the Sufi saint is greater than the prophet, who does not have the advantage of such 'live' wisdom. As the former lives 'the Word', the prophet merely conveys it.

Evidently, Sufism shifted the fulchrum of ethical life from act back to intent, advocated the rule of conscience rather than law and taught its disciples to unlearn to value the works of the arm higher than the works of the heart. The Sufi's love of God detached him from his neighbours, though it preserved an affinity with and concern for his colleague in the brotherhood. The last object of all his strivings remained a personal union with God which affects only his own person and can, in last resort, be effected by his own effort alone. It cannot be disputed that the good Sufi loved God first and last; nor that his concern for his own salvation was the effect rather than the cause of his love for God. Certainly he was no egotist. But it can hardly be denied that his love for God was something that left the neighbour 'outside', and that precisely on this account it was realized in most cases at the expense of his neighbour, and consequently of the ummah. Certainly Sufism had its missions; and no self-made Sufi was ever admitted to a brotherhood. Everyone had to undergo

the system of discipline under the tutelage of a shaykh who required and always obtained unquestionable obedience. Nonetheless the person called was one called to effect his own personal salvation. The caller's achievement, on the other hand, was moral; but its ethical value according to Sufism was elementary—that of a commendable deed. It was in no wise organically related to, not to speak of being identifiable with, his own salvation.

On the other hand, the colleague in the brotherhood may be exalted and his brotherly guidance extolled. Indeed, if he is a shaykh who has achieved some union with God, he is worthy of being worshipped, since the God we worship has in that measure been embodied in him through union. Nor does the fact that through union all men become in fact one being help the neighbour; for the ethical meaning of the union, the final moral imperative it requires and from which it proceeds, has no room but for the subject-agent alone.

Thus the spiritual groundwork for disintegration was laid down. The social and political effects were soon to spread their webs of weakness and deterioration on the canvas of Arab history.

4. *The Awakening: Ibn Taymiyah*

The discussion of Arabism as piety[58] led us to the view that God *in esse* is beyond knowledge. But although we may not know God *in esse*, we certainly may know His will since this is what He has revealed through the prophets. We can love and obey not the Divine Being Himself, but His will. For us humans, therefore, God's will is God *in percipi;* and since God's will is none other than the ideal realm of values, to know them is to know God *in percipi*, and to fall under their determination is to obey divine will. This, we have seen, was Ibn Taymiyah's substantial contribution to the science of the *sifat*. This doctrine, however, was meant to refute the Sufi position. Ibn Taymiyah's greatest counter thesis ran as follows: That which is beyond man's knowledge cannot be the object of a union.

The Sufi claim is therefore a vain delusion. Neither reason or tradition, nor intuition or illumination will ever lead to a knowledge of God; and neither asceticism or contemplation, nor mortification or the leveling of one's faculties through repetitive incantations may ever lead to a union with Him, though these may lead to a union with an idea. This idea-god may command great passion among the Sufis; but he remains a subjective god. He never goes out to the sphere of daily life to instruct, command and lead man to a life of ethical felicity, of balance and harmony in this world. However intellectualized, the conjunction *(ittisal)* of al Farabi, Ibn Tufail and Ibn Rushd, as well as the union *(ittihad)* of

the Sufi poets, constitute a state of ecstasy which is and remains a subjective state of the subject. As such, the Sufi ideal can in no way imply for the Sufi an existential involvement with himself or with others as objects of creation and history. The world passes the perfect Sufi by without necessarily eliciting from him any concern at all. Such an ideal is bound to relax the hold upon us of the *shari'ah* or law—we may add, any law or custom—and then of Islam itself—or, we may say, any religion whatever, as Sufi leaders have persistently maintained.[59] Evidently, Sufism rests on a groundwork of relativism.

The love of God, which in Sufism is an emancipation and detachment from space-time and a freedom for and attachment to a Divine Being so distended as to include all values as well as none, became, thanks to Ibn Taymiyah, a disciplined humility and commitment to a transcendent Being Whom we know only as a hierarchy of moral imperatives deeply involving us in this world. From the individualist subjectivism of Sufi culture, Ibn Taymiyah moved the Arab back to the original universalist objectivism which puts the ummah, rather than the individual, on the foremost pedestal of ethical reality. Ummatism, or Arab world-societism, may begin in orthodox conformism with the law. But it never finds rest until individual will is annihilated, *in actuo*, in the law and conscience of the ummah, which is the will of God.

The implications of this doctrine for society and for man-in-society are enormous. The conception of God as a hierarchy of moral imperatives mobilizes man not only for the welfare of his neighbour, but for that of all mankind. It demands that the subject transcend his self, proceed to the outside world and there so to influence, change and move it as to bring about the desiderata commanded by those imperatives. This transcendence beyond the self towards other selves is the ought-to-do of the most elemental attribute of God, namely, the fact of His being a willing Being. God's will is not a necessity of logic, as al Razi has argued, but a fact given and discernible in personal experience. Divine will is the will to real-existence by all the divine attributes. It is the will to fill the world with realizations of these attributes, to the extent possible outside of God. Hence, it seeks real existence and by so doing it furnishes the basis of all affirmation and optimism. The attribution of will to God is ethically significant not because of what it informs about God, but on account of its investment of the realm of real existence with value, and its making necessary the revelation by God of His other attributes so that they may be given real existence in all men.

From this theological standpoint regarding the nature of God and the divine attributes, Ibn Taymiyah recaptured the dynamic conception of society which characterized Arab ethos in the formative years of the Arab

soul. The ummah, he held, is not a community in being, whatever the common factors may be, nor one in intent and feeling, but a community of act. The static factors that so many Arab nationalists have cited in justification of Arab unity or nationhood,[60] *viz.*, the community of geography or origin or history, of national formation, etc., he refuted one by one—not excluding the unifying factor of common political and cultural history. It is not the *facta* of identity that make the community. The factuality of a community, however closely knit together, cannot justify the existence or continuity of the community. Just like every other fact of real existence it too can be good or evil, desirable in itself or worthy of destruction. The justification of a community therefore must be sought in the relation in which it stands to the will of God, *i.e.*, to value. Unless faith is understood as including a determination to realize ends (*i.e.*, unless something else is added to it which by itself it can in no way imply, namely, the commitment and self-engagement in the *nexus* of realization of ends—in short, the community of the act), it too cannot provide any justification. Instead of the community of faith and the *facta* of identity, Ibn Taymiyah furnishes the dynamic community of striving after the same ends and destiny. Such community is not fixed, not motionless. It grows stronger or becomes weaker, and travels beyond the frontiers of its birthplace. A society built on it can never be closed, but is always open and indeed, ever stirring with a will to eternity and ubiquity.

The community of ends and destiny, and hence of act, implies an ethic of self-transcending engagement in the affairs of the world as of man. It demands of the member to influence history, to give real existence to every value in the hierarchy of ends—in short, to live dangerously. Changing the face of the whole world is not too much for it to ask. It knows no compromise, and no half-measures save those which are dictated by the personal limitations of capacity affecting the moral subject. Even so, it already judges the impaired capability, in the words of the Prophet: 'If thou shouldst notice an evil, change it with thine own arm; if thou can'st, with thine due advice; and if thou can'st, with thine heart; but that is the weakest faith'.

Against the individualism of Sufism, Ibn Taymiyah held every member of the community responsible, to the extent of his capacity, for all the other members personally which stand within his sphere of influence as well as for the community as a whole. As the Prophet had said, when all members of the community are conscious of their responsibility and conscientiously discharge their duty 'by the love, compassion and sympathy they bear to one another they resemble a single body. When one of its organs suffers, the whole body is affected and responds to the local

suffering with general fever and insomnia'. And as he illustrated by dovetailing his fingers, a member of the community is to another as a part of a mutually reinforced construction is to another.

Ibn Taymiyah is the one person who effected for the Arab ethos the Copernican revolution which transferred its focus from the individual back to the ummah, and thus returned it to its original roots in Arab consciousness from the earliest beginnings down to Muhammad, and whose effect is just beginning to dawn, not only on the world, but on Arab consciousness itself. It may well be said that since Ibn Taymiyah's days the Arab spirit has been occupied in the attempt to grasp the full meaning of this revolution. Until Muhammad Ibn Abd al Wahhab (1115 A.H./1703 A.D.—1206/1792), the attempt was purely intellectual and the problem was one of intellectually grasping that meaning. With Ibn Abd al Wahhab, a new stage was set, and the intellectual grasp, however little or incomplete, began for the first time to express itself in action. But in that stage the Arab spirit, commanding only partial grasp of the Taymiyan revolution, bound the cause to the commitment and action of princes and states.

With the advent of World War I, that stage was irrevocably concluded by the populization of the striving to give real-existence to the values discerned. For the Arab anti-Ottoman revolution was no more the work of princes or governments but of the people at large who have then become conscious that the self-realization of the ummah was their own business. The Wahhabi principle, that the cause can prosper only under the commitment of the prince, gave way to the voice of the awakening masses of people insisting that henceforth the whole body of the ummah must take up the issue.

Likewise, the Wahhabi experiment of Artawiya, followed up by the Sanusi experiment of Jaghbub, were the beginning of Arab awareness that the realization of ethical value cannot take place in abstraction of the socio-economic. The great significance of these experiments was the learning by the Arab spirit of the lesson that ummatism cannot be realized in the communal moralization of conduct alone, but in its communal organization as well. The discovery that socio-economic life was the *materiel* of which ethicality was made, moved Arab consciousness to an assignment of the only ought-to-do that neighbourly love may seriously accept as its vehicle and instrument, namely, the sharing with one's neighbours of the activities of production and the enjoyment with them of the fruits of production. Built upon a foundation of tolerance and freedom and still holding to the truths and values of Sufism, though not its excesses, Arabism was certain not to understand the sharing of production and consumption as communism, but as cooperation. Hence,

Artawiya was the first 'Taymiyan brotherhood' and Jaghbub, the first 'Sufi cooperative society.' They were classical examples of that reconstruction of Arab life Arabism yearned for. Jaghbub, for instance, was a ruin near a sunken spring at which desert brigands raiding caravan routes from the Central Sudan to the Mediterranean gave one another rendezvous. Under the new Arabism, it became a model village, surrounded by irrigated orchards, supporting the leadership of a large movement (the Sanusiyyah) and even an armament industry. Large buildings were erected by artisans attracted to it from the corners of the Arab world as well as a system of impregnable defences. All this activity was conducted on the principle of cooperation: The members entered freely, their will being the only subscription in the society's share capital. They produced and consumed together, not in kolkhoz-collectivism, but in the small holders' individualist way, each according to his own patronage, tempered and spiritualized by the cooperation of all, and the proportionate sharing of all in the support of the experiment and the whole movement[61].

And yet, every moment of all this organized, cooperative 'worldism' was never devoid of spiritual significance and mission. The village itself stood as a system of concentric circles at the core of which stood 'the mosque.' But this was not so much a place of worship as an academy in which not only were the future leaders of the movement trained and disciplined, but one where the people at large were educated and enlightened in regular sessions. 'Its' light permeated all the circles and reached out to the surrounding desert where it spiritualized the least pursuits of the matters of living. In Jaghbub the Arab spirit produced the model of the 'socialist-democratic-cooperative community' that inspired the ideal of the Arabist Revolution of Egypt in 1952.

In that revolution, Arab awareness proved its maturity and established once for all the necessary connection between all departments of value, which make of value-realization a whole that cannot be divided into separately pursuable parts. Finally, Zionist aggressions and colonization in Palestine and the Suez invasion by the Zionist hordes and their imperialist godparents pressed home to Arab consciousness the realization already in the making that, in addition to populism and comprehensiveness, value-realization cannot take place leisurely, but under stress, and requires not partial but total commitment of all energies, a persistently sustained mobilization of the total being.

True, modern Arab consciousness still has a long way to go before it can say that it has fully grasped the implications of the valuational discoveries of the Arab spirit. Nonetheless, none of these implications is, in a sense, really new. For the Arab spirit had lived them all at one period or another of its long history. The Taymiyan revolution is really a return

to the values which determined Arab ethos in every one of its migrations outside the Peninsula and received their perfect crystallization in the glorious rise of the first century of the Hijrah. Arabism is only the modern expression of that same ethos. But whereas the same values were pursued in the first as in the fourteenth century, they were not pursued in the first with the consciousness that they were the object of pursuit. The Arab of the first century realized the ummatic values while under the spell of 'God's command,' of 'God's face' and 'God's sake;' under the spell of his attachment to the person of the Prophet, the breath of holy fire the Prophet had breathed into his closest companions. The ummah and its values were byproducts of the Arabs' ethical striving. The misfortune and, at the same time, the greatness of the modern Arabs is, in the absence of a prophet like Muhammad, their consciousness that these same values are the ideals they yearn for and their commitment to pursue them for their own sake: Not the identity of these values, not their order of rank in the hierarchy, not their inter-dependencies and relationships have been touched by the change, but their relationship in the Arab mind with salvation. Whereas in the first century the Arab spirit conceived of them as consequence and effect, the modern Arab has learned to recognize them as antecedent and cause of salvation. Evidently, in the divine order of things, this new consciousness confers upon the Arab spirit a new dignity, the dignity of being able, in the inevitable absence of prophecy, to play prophet to itself. It also does away with the religious sectarianism of the last two hundred years and the dislocative fallacy which has hitherto characterized the Arabs' conception of the term 'Islam.' The Arabs were Muslims to be sure, but they were 'Islamists' first, seeking to defend, apologize for and practice an 'Islam' whose axiological content had been dislocated and distended until it could comprehend all while in fact it comprehended none. Their claim for a return to the *Qur'an* or the classical period of Islam was misconstructed as a return to the Middle Ages understanding of the law or the ways of pre-Islamic Medina, precisely because their consciousness was not one of Arab values themselves. The modern Arabist is not satisfied with general concepts like 'Islam' or ''Urubah' but seeks with all his powers to grasp the values and oughtto-be's of which these terms are the appellation. What distinguishes him from his first century ancestor is precisely this, that he acts out of love for and under the determination of the values of 'urubah. He is a realist whom only the concrete, ideally-existent individual values can move. But in his determinableness by the values of 'urubah, he is one with his farthest ancestors.

D. 'Urubah as World Affirmation

Perhaps the most characteristic feature of Arab consciousness is the fact

that it regards man's life on earth as in every respect subject to a one-directional determination by something outside of it; that this something affects and judges human life from the lofty height beyond. A thoroughgoing naturalism—where human life is exclusively determined by categories that belong to the realm of real existence—has always been foreign to it. Indeed, it has always seen naturalism as an aberration, a denial of the best that is in man. Nor has the kind of thoroughgoing neutralism concerning the world, or a-naturalism, in evidence in the Buddhist way of life, ever been comprehensible to it. Since life on earth has always appeared to the Arab mind as the realm in which the transcendent can and ought to be realized, it has assumed a position distant from both the extreme of nature furnishing the norms and that of the norms being absolutely oblivious to it.

From the dawn of Arab consciousness, the Arab mind has recognized two realms of being: the realm of real-existence, of matter and life, and that of ideal existence, of transcendent being, which in every respect is different from the first. Arab consciousness had identified the second realm with God simply, until a more developed theology taught the lesson that God possessed an elaborate will and a hierarchy of divine names or attributes; that He stood within an elaborate order of being in which angels do the divine bidding and men of this world lead an eternity of reward or punishment following judgement on a day which would put an end to this world and incept the other. This, of course, is theological nicety. What is important in it is the fact that the two realms constitute distinctly different orders of being, both equally real, equally present and equally involving man. Yet, despite their radical difference, these two orders of being are most intimately connected.

First, the other-worldly realm is beyond time and beyond space, although it hovers over time and space as an accompanying, yet separate, continuum. True, the one is creator and the other a creature. But Arab consciousness, despite its strong emphasis on God's creation and sustenance of the universe and man's status of created being, never regarded creation as something given, as something which can ever be the object of knowledge. As the act of the transcedent God, creation is surrounded with the impenetrable wall of transcendence which Arab consciousness remained satisfied to circumambulate, never to penetrate. That the two worlds are different in nature implies that the categories and forms of knowledge applicable to the one are not applicable to the other. Hence, from the earliest times, the Arab mind conceived and discoursed about that realm in metaphors and figures of speech 'borrowed' from the world-realm. It cannot be doubted that some knowledge of the other-world is implied; otherwise the figurative way of speaking would communicate

nothing, would be devoid of sense and useless—which is not the case. Whatever instruction such discourse may convey, it must be in every respect different from either the empirical knowledge of the world-realm or the a priori knowledge of analytic meaning and of the forms of thought.

The rational establishment of the reality of this other-wordly realm has been the object of the most persistent efforts of Arab consciousness. The Arab soul accepted this transcendent reality on faith, because it saw therein the only explanation of its own nature. From the earliest times, it conceived of its destiny as God-made, of its bliss or woe as God-sent, and of its wisdom and law as revelation. On the other hand, Arab theology—Judaic, Christian or Islamic—has tried in vain to establish that reality by means of proofs and demonstrations borrowed from the realm of nature. Prior to Ibn Taymiyah, it did not occur to the Arab mind that the method of approach to the problem of the existence of the transcendent God precluded any satisfactory solution.

The arguments that orthodox theology adduced in support of a transcendent reality, namely, the ontological, the cosmological and the teleological arguments, all sought to arrive to God by applying categories derived from experience—and therefore inapplicable to anything beyond experience—to a transcendental realm beyond. This infelicity, Islamic theology passed on to Christian theology where it lingered until Kant had, by dividing the world into phenomena and noumena, first blocked every avenue of escape, and then refuted each of the rational arguments by exposing the unwarranted extrapolation on which it is founded. These proofs—all as dead as doornails—continued to be treated with reverence in the Catholic Church and were recently brought back to life by Muhammad 'Abduh[62] in Islam, and Paul Tillich[63] in Christianity. Whereas the latter attempted the feat by means of the ontological argument, 'Abduh did so by means of the cosmological. Both attempts were doomed to fail. The argument from the moral order of the universe advanced by the Mu'tazili theologians[64] could not solve the problem because it too, like the metaphysical proofs, attempted to establish a metaphysical God Whom it conceived as 'cause,' in the naturalistic sense, of a morally ordered universe.

Our discussion of the divine attributes has shown that the attributes are God, but that they are God only inasmuch as He is knowable. If, however, our knowledge of God is insecure, our knowledge of the attributes must be so, *a fortiori*. The only confidence we may have in the latter is derivative from our acceptance of God which, it would seem, can rest on faith alone. Faith, then, as opposed to rational demonstration, appears to be our only hope of avoiding skepticism.

This is of course unwarranted. The reality of the attributes does not

need to stand on faith. It can hold its ground unaided, by itself, against any attack which the reality of nature can withstand. Both are susceptible to the same kind of test, or demonstration possible in ontology. Barring thoroughgoing skepticism, which, if held—as it must—regarding values as well as objects in nature, leads to self-contradiction and puts its adherent in the position of Epimenedes, the Cretan liar, the ideal selfexistence of values is capable of the same proof as the real self-existence of things.

This reverses the arrangements of faith. Whereas, if faith was the only security, our knowledge of the attributes would depend on that of God, now an independent establishment of the attributes would extend its support to our acceptance of God. Indeed, there is no other hope, nor ground, for this acceptance save the reality of the attributes. From them, does our knowledge of God receive its credentials. As to the attributes, their self-existence is a question of ontology, subject to the rigorous standards of any critical philosophy. But it must be remembered that the self-existence of the attributes, which is the question of the self-existence of values, is not real but ideal; and that only a naive realism would limit self-existence to the real.

Rather than depend on faith for validation, therefore, values validate it. Values are a priori, absolute, ideally self-existent essences, existing *sui generis;* and it is their reality that best serves the interest of faith. If values are real and are God *in percipi*, God as-He-appears, certainly there must be God, the Something that appears. As the great Kant has said, it is nonsensical to speak of an appearance without something that appears. God, according to this reasoning, would be established for knowledge—not as a primal cause or source of being, or cosmos-designer, but as a presupposition of axiology, as 'that-without-which' valuational phenomena would not and cannot be.

This God-as-a-presupposition that our theory seeks to establish is not the God of al Farabi[65] and Ibn Rushd.[66] These, and particularly the latter,[67] have sought to establish a God that is a presupposition of thought; whereas this God is a presupposition of being. The suspicions that the former, even if firmly established, succeeds in demonstrating an idea-God rather than God, can never be allayed. That which is established in thought can never pass across to being except on the bridge of the ontological argument. *Per contra*, a presupposition of being has no need of such bridges since it is already anchored in being. Certainly we may not speak of a noumenon as 'causing' its corresponding phenomenon, causation being a natural, not transcendental, category. And, applying this caution to God, it is evident that we are unable ever to have any knowledge of Him. Transcendental knowledge is forever impossible; God *in esse* is unknown and unknowable.

The transcendental character of God and His consequent unknowableness would be catastrophic for religion if—as being, primal cause, etc.—He was that of which the world of nature is phenomenon. What use can religious life have for such Ibn Rushdian or Farabian cold presupposition of thought? Even our God, who is the presupposition of being, is no less immobile. Neither of them moves or acts. The God of the philosophers was rightly criticized by the Orthodoxy as distant and unmoving—a dead God.

However we may not entertain any hope of ever knowing God *in esse*, we need not lament it, since this impossibility is a fact of our own God-made nature and since God Himself has told us that a knowledge of Him is impossible. Though this is true, we may yet know God's will; and this is more than sufficient for every religious purpose. We should be satisfied, with Ibn Taymiyah, that we are nonetheless able to love and obey Him—and that is all that matters. God's will—which alone is given for us to know by reason as well as by revelation—is His attributes understood as values commanding their own realization, to which our discussion of the divine attributes has led us.

That values are, that they are knowable, and that they are realizable, which we shall endeavour to show in the sequel, will not therefore only establish the faith of the Arab soul in itself and justify its world-affirmation, but will, it is hoped, turn a new page in the history of the most hopelessly embattled problem of theology.

1. *That Values Are*

Being confronts us on a number of levels. There is first the manifold of sense, the realm of objects in the real world of which our consciousness takes possession through the media of sense and out of which it constructs the body of knowledge known as the empirical sciences. There is, secondly, mental being, the realm of concepts and thought, the acts of consciousness itself, their contents and the relations and dependencies of those contents. There is, thirdly, ideal being, the realm of essence, of the ideal entities through which the objects of the real world and their relationships are what they are, and out of which our consciousness constructs the a priori sciences. There is, fourthly, the realm of value which, like the third realm, is ideal but which gives the real being in which it is instantiated, not its theoretical structure, but its axiological significance. This is not a department of the third realm; for besides affecting every member of the third realm, it can affect every member of all other realms. True, being never confronts us on any one of the levels exclusively, but on all levels at once. However, the four realms are distinctly different realms of being! It is the fourth realm of being that interests us here; and

the first question is whether or not it is a fourth realm at all. Far from recognizing values as attributes of the Godhead constituting an independent realm of their own, modern man has relegated them to the status of the first realm, as attributes of things,[68] or feeling states of a sensing subject,[69] or granted them the mental status of reflective generalizations and discursive concepts.[70]

Value is that through which the valuable object is valuable. It is therefore that object's principle—as idea— affecting that object by giving to it its axiological significance. When we bring that object into real existence, we cannot prevent it from being valuable and likewise, unless we realize the essence of that object in all the details of its real being, we cannot cause it to be valuable. Values are independent of us. They will 'reside' in their respective real existents only if the real existents are what the values dictate that they shall be and only as long as their own prerequisites are irrefragably maintained. Real existents, or the *matériaux* of values, are in our power; we can bring them into existence and change them to something else. Values are out of our hands. If it were in our power to 'value-fy' or 'disvalue-fy' a given real existent, we should be able to give it such value or disvalue as we may desire—which is not possible. For when we do, we would be fooling only ourselves. The relation governing any value and its *matériel* is fixed, one-directional and independent of our efforts. Where their proper *matériaux* are, values are always entailed; but this does not make them dependent upon their materials. Only their entrance into the real is dependent, and this is governed by the decree that those materials be what they ought. In their own mode of being, *viz.*, the ideal, values are independent, self-determined *vis-à-vis* even the existence or non-existence of their *matériaux*.

The view that value is a simple, irreducible quality of things, like colour is a simple, irreducible quality of coloured objects, advocated by G. E. Moore[71] and his followers,[72] fails to explain why such a quality as goodness should be so unlike all other attributes. It has no measurable correlate, like colour or cohesion, which physics or another natural science may study. It alone, of all other attributes of things, possesses moving appeal; and this is not conferrable upon it by man or nature as colour, form and other attributes usually are. By classifying value in a class in which it has nothing in common with the other members—except that it is simple and irreducible—nothing is gained. The qualities of simplicity and irreducibility, values equally share with other categories of being besides the attributes, *e.g.*, with the elements, with matter, energy, life, consciousness, etc. There is no reason why value should not join these categories instead of the category of attributes.

The view which assigns to value the status of a state (whether thinking

or feeling) of the subject permits of several forms depending on whether the subject is understood as the individual, the group or mankind. In the first case, it is known as Protagorean relativism, in the second, as cultural relativism, and in the third, as ethical relativism, better known as humanism. Protagorean relativism is, like its theoretical corollary, skepticism, involves self-contradiction as soon as it advances its claim. It would be alright if its hortation, Nothing is good in itself, but to the person who thinks or feels it so, were found engraved by lightning on a rock. But for the cynic to do even as little as to communicate that thesis is to contradict it. Life itself for the cynic must be no more than 'scratching when we itch.' The cynic may vegetate; he certainly may not philosophise or argue. The right to do so is denied him by his own thesis.

Cultural, or group, relativism is known in three forms. If it bases itself on the thinking of the group, it is the axiology of theoretical democracy; if it does so on facts which belong exclusively to the group, regardless of the group's thinking, it is that of fascism; lastly, if it mixes the two bases, it is the axiology of nationalisms everywhere, whether the democratic or totalitarian variety. In all these forms, no satisfactory definition of 'the group' has been given. Their delineation of its human, spatial or temporal boundaries can be only arbitrary, and this, together with the fact that no cultural group is culturally pure, gives rise to impossible problems in determining the good of the group. Besides these epistemological difficulties, cultural relativism runs counter to the basically human notion that the 'group good' may itself be subject to further judgement, thus presupposing standards whose validity and application cannot be limited to any segment of mankind. And the fact of the universal perception of many values being no less a fact than cultural diversity and multiplicity poses a challenge which can be met, as cultural relativism does meet it, only arbitrarily.

Universal or human relativism, the strongest of relativist theories, is amenable to a variety of interpretations: value is constituted by the fact that it answers man's natural needs and wants; that it produces in man a certain effect; or that man perceives it as such. In all these forms and the many doctrines to which they in turn give rise, the common presupposition is that the relation of a good thing to man is constitutive of the goodness of that thing. The attractiveness of humanism lies in its simplicity, in its limitation of the field of valuational study to man. Its motto is 'man is the measure of all things.' An object, act, attitude or work of art is valuable solely because some relation to man makes it so.

Granted that values presuppose a certain relation, even at times a necessary relation, to man, it is not evident that their valueness is constituted by such relation. In the former case, relationality is asserted; in

the second, relativity or humanism. Though not obvious, the difference between them is great: the opposite of the relational is the substratum; that of the relative, the absolute. There are relative substrata as well as absolute relations. From their confusion, disastrous conclusions arise for value-theory and ethics. That values are relational to him does not make man giver or creator of them. His being is simply a point of reference in that relation. Many values somehow 'accord with,' 'satisfy' or 'realize' man's nature, but they are not constituted by this accordance. Indeed, relationality to man affects only the real-existent in which value is, the valuable object alone, and this relation of 'accordance' does not even enter the moral situation. It does not reach that which makes that object valuable, *viz.*, the value. On the contrary, the object is valuable for man because it is in itself valuable. Moral commands impose themselves at the cost of accordance with the subject. Again, man alone can perceive value and consciously pursue and realize them. But their axiological nature is not affected by this dependence. Only their entry into the real world is so. In themselves, they neither are the relation, nor depend upon it in any way. They are absolute.

Thirdly, the view that values are concepts, or empirical generalizations of subjective or objective facts, assigns to them the status of mental being. This view finds its confirmation in the fact that values are not sensory but ideal. It recognizes that ethical propositions are not analytic—neither tautologies, nor purely hortatory—but synthetic, purporting to attribute to a subject a predicate, *viz.*, valuableness, which has been abstracted from a number of other subjects. Its main interest, or consequence, is the denial of normativeness to ethical discourse.

That value is the empirical generalization of an objective fact is the view of Schopenhauer,[73] whose prime interest was to demonstrate that ethical discourse is incapable of influencing the will. It is equally the view of empiricists everywhere; of R. B. Perry and C. I. Lewis, the princes of modern ethical naturalism. The former holds that value is constituted by being the object of an interest,[74] and the latter, by being the actual apprehension of it by a subject in experience.[75]

Besides committing the naturalistic fallacy when they identify normative value with the empirical *facta* of nature and the dislocative fallacy when, for the purpose of a presentable theory of morals, they distend the basic notions of 'interest' and 'value-apprehension' to include all sorts of values, axiological naturalism denies, with the metaphysical theory of Schopenhauer, normativeness to either value or ethics.

Unlike these theories, and not without the influence of Hellenic and gnostic philosophy, Arab consciousness has held the opposite view, that no one knowingly commits evil, that virtue follows necessarily from

knowledge of value, that morals can be taught and values have the ability to determine action and volition. This preeminently Socratic view has been held by most Arab philosophers and particularly by the Mu'tazilah.[76] A classical example of it is to be found in the encyclopaedic writings of Ikhwan al Safa.[77]

Both views are partially true. It is as indubitable that some men are made virtuous through teaching as it is that some men know what is good and are not virtuous. Real life is full of instances of either case. The antinomy arises from the assignment to values the status of mental being. The denial of normativeness assumes that values have no other being than the mental, that the relation of values to consciousness is merely one of reflective thinking. Its assertion, on the other hand, assumes that all there is to value is the status of mental being which can be more or less clearly grasped by the mind, forgetting that besides the reflective relationship of values to reason, there is yet their emotive relationship to the will.

The fact that we communicate about values by means of concepts leads us to attribute to concepts what belongs solely to the values. Hence, we say that ethics is teachable. Such ambiguity does not arise in case of sensory objects, for we do not confuse the actual chair with its concept, whereas we easily fall into this error in the case of values, because their existence is not real, but ideal. Values do have efficacy, the power to mould the real. Once perceived, a value does command and move. As Hartmann has found out, in its presence, the real loses its equilibrium and moves towards it by becoming that which it prescribes; for value is a genuine 'Prime Mover' in the Aristotelian sense, and this normative character of value is indirectly transferred to moral discourse, which is normative only inasmuch as it brings to consciousness that which is itself normative.[78] That the influence of value upon human willing is mediated by reflection makes moral discourse normative and the teaching of virtue possible. In this sense, and in this sensee only, we may say that moral discourse is descriptive — in that it describes in reflective concepts that which is by itself normative.

Now then, if values are the conditions of the possibility of everything valuable, the first principles of their valuableness; if they are absolute, *i.e.*, they are not relative to any subject, do not come into or out of existence (only their *matériaux* being capable of doing so) through the will of any subject, but subsist in themselves independently of the consciousness of them and of their relationality to things and persons; if they are independent of their *matériaux* and have a spontaneity of their own to invade them; if they are not representations *(Vorstellungen)*, but have a genuine power and tendency to mould and influence the real into their likeness—then they must have self-existence. For whatever we find to have

these properties, we normally call a self-existent entity. In fact, values even have more than ordinary self-existent entities; they have moving appeal, the power to influence the real, which categorial real existents do not have.

Every single argument that can be adduced in favour of the existence of the Taj Mahal or the moon holds in favour of values. But it must be noted at once that the kind of existence of the two is different. In the case of the Taj Mahal and the moon, it is real existence; in the case of values, it is ideal existence. Knowledge of value, if it were possible (and we shall see in the sequel that it is), is therefore genuine knowledge of being and stands on a level with every kind of theoretical knowledge. Its object is just as independent a reality as spatial relations are for geometrical knowledge, or bodies are for physics and chemistry. Values are objects of possible value-discernment, but they do not come into being in the first discernment of them. They are neither views, thoughts, nor empirical generalizations. In the beholding of them, the subject is purely receptive and is determined by the object, the self-existent value which abides as unaffected with respect to its self-existence by his beholding, as does any object of knowledge by the fact that it is known.

Real existence belongs to objects of sense, things and events, to whatever is actual and presentable to sense, including psychological data. But these are not the only existents. There are the mathematical and logical objects and the essences of every kind which persist throughout the changes and vicissitudes of real existents, and which are not abstracted from their instances but are known entirely a priori. These have ideal self-existence, *i.e.*, the kind of being of *that-through-which* the real instance is what it is.

Between essences and real existents, there is an ontological relationship: The structure of the former reappears in the latter. It is not the case that what thus reappears in real existents exhausts the whole realm of essences, or all that there is to any given essence. Such a question will always remain open. It is the case, however, that the a priori knowledge of essences and of their structure constitutes a foundation for all knowledge of the real. It is upon this fact of the one-sided agreement of the ideal and real structure of being that all a priori knowledge of the real rests. Unless such agreement is there, it will be incomprehensible how a few formulae elaborated a priori, on paper, can succeed in forcing a set of materials prepared in their likeness, to reveal the same internal structure as theirs and stand fast as buildings and bridges.

Yet, the unsophisticated, including philosophers most of the time, are too prone to think of real existence alone as being. The rest is the domain of nothingness. One is only naturally inclined, naïve as we all are, to count only the real as being and to relegate whatever is not real to non-

being. Ever since Ibn Sina reintroduced the world to the distinction of 'essence' and 'existence' and was mistaken by many scholastics who have subsequently eliminated the distinction between essence and concept, not only did the word idea itself change meaning and become equivalent to representation, but idealism itself degenerated into representationalism. 'Ideality' became the mode of being of that which subsists in and for the presentation of a subject.

Values do not suffer any change when they pervade real existents. They are not 'divided' among their *matériaux*, nor found whole in each of them, but preserve their ideal mode of being regardless of the real existence or inexistence of their *matériaux*. Like everything ideal, values are never 'actualized,' never 'real-ized.' Only their materials are actualized and given real being. The impact of value on their materials remains 'ideal,' a divine touch which transfigures those materials into valuables. The how of this touch, being something which is anchored in the transcendental realm though it reaches into that of real existence, is itself transcendental, and hence, forever beyond our reach. For philosophy, it remains an irreducible category.

2. *That Values Are Knowable*

a. The Gnoseological Credentials of Value-sense.

Values, or what theology calls 'the divine attributes,' are the direct object of the moral sense acting through emotional intuition. Since they are self-existent essences and play such a significant role in man's life while the higher values entirely depend upon him for the realization of their real existents, man must have some means of cognizing them. No fate could have been more sorry than man's had he been left, despite his innate incapacity not to desire value ('Man is doomed to love the good.'—Plato), with no means to know what it is. Unfortunately, this is not so.

The knowledge of value is different from that of real existents in that it uses different gnoseological avenues. When we behold reality, regardless whether it is presented to us through sense as in actual life, or through concepts as in a novel or through percepts as in a work of art or any combination of these, as in most cases, three distinct cognitive acts take place.[79]

First, there is the act of grasping the theoretical situation with as much of its theoretical details as would give the subject knowledge concerning it. Such theoretical knowledge is always presupposed in valuation. To evaluate there must be something to be evaluated, and this is impossible without theoretical knowledge of that thing. A comprehensive or exhaustive knowledge is not necessary. But sufficient theoretical knowledge to evoke in the subject an evaluating attitude is indispensible if there is to be valuation at all.[80]

Second, there is the internal, properly private, personal and silent act of taking sides by the valuational sense. As yet, this act, which follows upon grasping the theoretical content of the situation is not necessarily conscious or articulate. It is a 'silent' act, consisting of the feeling itself of approval-disapproval, preference-aversion, decision for-decision against, love-hatred, esteem-contempt, etc.[81]

Thirdly, there is the act of grasping that which has determined the taking of sides. This is a fully conscious, discursive act. It consists in the rational analysis of one's 'silent' feeling and in turning the spotlight of reason upon the value which our emotive sense had sensed in the situation in question. This act does not occur only when we are questioned about our attitude and opinion and have to give an answer in words. It can be silent too. For the answer we give may not be discursive but silent—like a deed, a wordless reaction, or even an absence of action. The cognitive, discursive act of consciousness would still have taken place, even if its object was simply to tell our own selves that such and such emotive or feeling act had taken place. It is present in all acts of rationalization.

The first act belongs to theoretical consciousness, for it is the graping of a categorial material, be it an object of nature, an act, a situation, etc. Hence, it can be ignored. The third act is discursive, properly theoretical and belongs to philosophy and psychology as such. Although it is always a consciousness of value which determines the taking of sides; yet it is not necessary that such consciousness be explicit, for the taking of sides is not directed against the value itself, but against the categorial material, the real existent, the natural object or situation in question. It is one thing actually to take sides, and another to lift that under the presupposition of which the taking of sides had taken place to the lucid light of consciousness and reason. Obviously, in the latter operation, a thousand mistakes and errors are possible. But they are not mistakes of intuition of value, mistakes committed by the valuational sense, the organ of value consciousness. They are, rather, errors of reflection; and of their kind are the disagreements of philosophers, theorizers and ethical thinkers throughout the ages. Hence this act too may be ignored.

The second act is that of the valuational sense. Its object is value. It senses value where value is present and senses its absence as a privation. Like any other faculty, the perception of value by the moral sense is a perception of a 'given,' an 'object' which is 'thrown out before' it. A peculiarity of the moral sense is that, in addition to sensing its object when it is present, it senses value when it is absent, and becomes aware of that value as something that ought to be. The moral sense is not discursively conscious, but it can become so when, by a different act, the subject directs the spotlight of reason upon it. But it enjoys the full

innocence and immediacy of sensing its object, the value, firsthand, without ever waiting for reason to effect any transpolation or abstraction as takes place in the empirical sensing of objects in nature. For the valuational sense senses the value directly; it does not abstract it from its instance, as reason does in the case of a discursive universal (a concept), and in this its cognition is aprioristic. Our value sense condemns and approves reality apriorily. Obviously it could neither condemn nor approve reality if it awaited that reality to furnish the very value by which the reality presented to sense is to be judged.

When the good things are mixed with the bad as given reality always has them, the good can never be arrived at unless it was first presupposed as the principle of selection under which the good things were first sifted from the mixture. We should bear in mind that experience gives us objects not as valuable, but simply as being. It gives us the effects of objects on us, not as valuable, but as affections, as feeling-states which are simply being. The naturalist's proposition, 'X produces Y in Z', is non-valuational. For the knowledge of value, a treatise made of such propositions is worthless. Things and feeling-states can all be, or not be valuable, only by reference to something else. Value is not found indiscriminately in them. As in the case of the good and bad things, if feelings were all pooled in as 'data,' value could never be empirically generalized from them. Such generalization would be possible only if feeling-states had already been sifted into valuable and not valuable. But such sifting is impossible without 'value' acting as principle of classification.

This primary consciousnes of value is perhaps never absolutely correct in its application, in the actual valuation it confers upon the empirical data. Nonetheless, it is always a genuine consciousness of value.[82] Not that that which it senses as valuable is always really so; but that the consciousness of value is itself always candid. It never fools its subject. What it reports is always exactly what it beholds, though this may be unreal. Likewise, as it does not cheat its subject, it cannot follow his liking and agree or not agree with his ethical principle since it itself is nothing but the expression of that very principle in consciousness. Naturally, not everyone is conscious of every value, just as not everyone has insight into every mathematical proposition.[83] But where anyone does have genuine valuational consciousness, he is not free to sense value in anything at random, but only in that which is itself valuable; and this is, in him, a direct witness to the value itself. The value itself, therefore, can be discerned by its presence in consciousness. Such primary consciousness is the datum of valuational research.[84] The discovery and establishment of it in ethics has first been accomplished by Kant, to his immortal credit.

For it was he who described the 'moral' law as a 'fact of reason.' This 'fact of reason' is really only the fact of the a priori emotional intuition of value.[85] There is then an a priori of man's emotionality. Feeling, preferring, loving, hating, etc., have their own a priori content which is as little dependent upon inductive experience as are the laws of pure logic. Here, as there, we encounter a *Wesenschau* of the acts in question and their contents, of the foundation and their relational contexts.[86]

The Kantian identification of the a priori with the rational is mistaken because the bifurcation of experience into 'sensuous content' and 'thought' is simply incomplete. There is an a priori of the affections[87]. The objects which are discerned through feeling, preferring, loving, hating, etc., are 'a priori' as well as 'content.' They are neither borrowed from thinking nor sensuous in the sense that the toothache or the touch of a smooth surface are sensuous. Such objects constitute an independent realm of being, an a priori '*ordre du coeur*' or '*logique du coeur*', as Max Scheler was fond of saying, borrowing the expression of Pascal.[88]

b. Value-sensing and Revelation

Values then, or God-in-percipi, are knowable by man without revelation; but this does not means that man could have achieved the knowledge he now has of them without revelation. The possibility of value knowledge does not imply the realization at a given date of a given amount of knowledge. Indeed, without revelation, modern man's knowledge of value would certainly not be what it is. The human work of discovering values is painstaking and awefully slow.

The elemental and the preparatory values would have been discovered by man without help from any quarters. This is because of the little level of development of the value-sense that their discernment requires. Given plenty of time and experience, man would have reached the level of ethicality unaided, but only at the cost of tremendous masses of value which he would have had to miss until then. The value of the real-existence of values would have been violated all that time, and his countless mistakes and blunders would have meant great losses of higher value.

It was in order to prevent these losses of value and hasten man's march upwards that revelation came down. Revelation was not necessary except in the sense that, by nature, all values tend towards real existence. Because their real-inexistence is a privation and a disvalue, God revealed His will, *i.e.*, values, to man and made some men prophets. By this, only assistance in human cognition of value was meant; and, in fact, no more than this was revealed. This is not necessity in the strict sense, but mercy. Divine mercy is the religious way of expressing the axiological fact that the real inexistence of value is a tension in value. It constitutes their

peculiar polarity which we call ought-to-be. The fact of this polarity hastens man's realization of their ought-to-be's. The individual nature of all higher value precludes that God would do anything more than reveal those values to man. The realization of moral value presupposes the deliberate work of man himself. A man saved and a world made felicitous or value-full by God are neither saved nor value-full. The former is a puppet—and the latter, a machine. A moral value realized by an agency other than man is not the value that it purports itself to be. Every moral value necessarily implies the deliberate, free action of the agent for its realization. This action is not participation, for it must be wholly his—and much less 'faith' in a redemption achieved by someone else. That which is realized under what goes by the name of 'justification by faith,' may be another value of a different order of rank, but it cannot ever be the moral. By definition, the moral must be earned by the agent alone. A world in which value has been, is or can be realized without man's individual, personal striving action and responsibility, that is to say, by divine action as in some views of Jesus' redemption, or necessarily, as if by law of nature, is ethically inferior to one in which every inch of progress and value-realization is earned by the sweat and effort of man.

Although, therefore, the real existence of value is a value and its real-inexistence is a privation, a disvalue, God did not 'redeem' man, but presented him with a gift of assistance in the discovery of that which, if he but realizes, would bring about redemption. But redemption is an incorrect description, for what is striven for is not salvation from evil and sin but purely and simply more goodness. Felicity, or *falah*, is correctly the ideal of a man who has been 'created in the best of manners.'[89] To aspire to more goodness is his eternal predicament. God's mercy consists in that He shortened the road to value, the *Sirat al Mustaqim* (straight path) by giving man, as it were, a lift, not on the level of value-realization (That would have vitiated man's ethical worth), but on that of value cognition. Hence, God's contact with man was in every case a revelation of new dependencies of values, communicated in book or tablet form, a conceptual presentation of values, figurized or symbolized as commandments with Moses, as examples and parables with Jesus, and as law with Muhammad. This had the effect of opening new horizons in the valuational realm for man's cognition and realization; and, in fact, man did avail himself of the new discoveries and achieved progress which would have otherwise cost him extraordinary suffering and cost the universe value loss and privation. But, by nature, revelation was strictly speaking a discovery of value, not a realization. If man's moral stature is not to be impaired, this is the only form of assistance permissible to man.

The object of revelation and the object of man's striving, namely, the

values, are one. To assist man in the exercise and training of his faculties so as to perceive them and their deeper relations is to bring these to his consciousness. Determination by that which consciousness has discovered, yearning, striving after and realizing value, i.e., projecting value as an objective of action and then incepting the nexus of causally related events which give that value real existance—all these, which together constitute *falah*, are the work of man alone. They are categories which we find only in man. Transferring them to God or to His prophet acting by His power is unwarranted extrapolation in strict science, and puppetization of man in morals.

The foregoing analysis paves the way for a sound theory of prophecy. The prophet is not an other species than man.[90] Nor is his intellectual faculty, *i.e.*, valuational sense, qualitatively different from other men's. It is identically the same. The difference is quantitative; that is to say, in the prophet the value sense is stronger than, indeed the strongest of, all men. But it is the same faculty of emotional intuition and its object, that which is sensed, the value, belongs to the same realm as the objects of any man's emotional intuitions. However, if the difference between the prophet and other men is one of pure quantity, it would be hard to distinguish between a prophet and the genius. It would be impossible to tell where the one ends and the other begins. But the difficulty is not insoluble, for to prophecy belongs another characteristic which, though unique, is still quantitative, namely, that the prophet does not discern simply a vista of the valuational realm which other faculties are not strong enough to discern, but the whole valuational realm. Every prophet has had a glimpse of this whole realm; and that is the only significance of their being all called 'Muslims,' since Islam is the name of that realm in toto to which they had access and which determined their thought and striving.

This vision of value, common to all prophets, does not necessarily imply that they must have all bequeathed the same legacy of scripture and deed. For they conceived their duty as being one of enabling their people to capture the values they discerned, to discern and realize them. Consequently, their 'communication' had to be restricted to that which could profitably be shared by their fellowmen. They would have defeated their own purpose had they distributed their efforts equally among all that the value realm contained. Especially, they had to conceive of the ought-to-do within the particularities of their land and people, since the realization of all value must have a start in a given field of human existence in this world. And above all, the prophet is inextricably determined by those values which are violated in his situational field and therefore press foremost on his attention. Equally, he is inevitably limited by the state of development of the valuational sense of the people to whom he is sent.

For if he is a prophet, God would not have sent him (*i.e.*, enabled him to behold the realm of value) in vain. He must succeed, *i.e.*, he must bring his fellowmen to a realization of value. The prophet who does not take the contingencies and limitations of his situation into account might very well have not existed at all. History knows many a frustrated prophet (and therefore a non-prophet claiming prophethood) whom life, history and time have silently passed by.

The need for prophecy is human, as we have had occasion to see. It is not necessary; for man is capable of discovering value by his valuational sense and to coordinate and express his discoveries by reason. The attempts of the philosophers and theologians to prove the contrary were wasted.[91] Al Ghazali's 'basic' argument that if God commands us who may disobey Him—which follows from the fact of diversity of movement by a Mover endowed with will—there must be means of His communicating His commands to men,[92] is undoubtedly true; but it does not prove the need for prophecy. That which it establishes, namely, that there ought to be means of communication between men and God so that they may know what His will is if they are to observe it, is satisfied in every man—for every man has the ability to cognize God's will, to sense value. And if this is all that is required to achieve prophecy, al Ghazali's 'general argument,' for the establishment of prophecy, which posits a peculiar species of prophets as 'miraculous' in themselves to the rest of mankind as humans are to the animal kingdom,[93] becomes groundless. Prophecy does no more than spare man's effort and save him from suffering in the matter of value cognition and discovery. It is a divine measure, instituted out of God's sheer mercy, to improve man's moral economy. Nor is divine mercy the 'compassion' of the anthropomorphist theologians. As we have remarked earlier, it is the ideal ought-to-be arising from value and 'beamed' towards man, the *conditio sine qua non* of its entry into the world of real existence.

Revelation then is a road to felicity. It is valid, efficient and unmistakable. But it is not the only road. The other road is man's value-sense. But contention on the second road and the slow progress made by man made revelation a dire necessity. For revelation is really nothing but value discovery raised above the level of contention. The lofty height of its source, the numinousness of its technique, the aesthetic sublimity of its form—all these are pillars supporting its above-contention status. Revelation is then meant by God to correct, assist and propel man's reason in its conceptualization of the reports of value-sense and to prod the latter to see for itself the further realms of value there are. But born, as it were, in contention, revelation aims at correcting given works of reason, not reason as such, which is perfectly capable of achieving its objective unaided.

Inasmuch as he has discovered for himself, man is felicitous; inasmuch as he has tried and erred, he is not lost, but can trust revelation to set him right. It is of the nature of revelation to complement, not to supplant, human work.

However, human disputation has not spared even revelation. Man contended in the content of that which has been revealed. It was thus that the *Qur'an* was sent not as another revelation, but as the last revelation men may hope to receive from heaven. The purpose was to establish once and for all the truth of all previous revelation, as well as to bring into the human ethos and vision the total realm of value. But its most important purpose was to confirm man's ability henceforth to proceed on the road to value by himself, to reassure as well as to warn him that there shall be no more prophets and no more divine gifts of either value discovery or of value conceptualization. It expressed man's faith in himself as well as the Deity's confidence that he has now achieved the age of wisdom to enable him to steer his way alone.

Although we do, and always will, hope for fresh contacts with the Godhead, we cannot ever expect such contact to come in satisfaction of the kind of objective it had come with in the past. Rather, a fresh contact with Divinity can come only after valuational discovery has been effected, and the realization of great masses of value completed. If there may be any contact in the future, it shall be one with the purpose of 'blessing' our completed achievement, rather than effecting that achievement. The achievement itself remains our own work and, if successful, our own pride.

3. *That Values Are Realizable in This World*

Being is a continuum on two main levels, real existence and ideal existence. Real existence is the level of matter, life and consciousness. Ideal existence has, first, the level of theoretical essences, of the patterns and essences which the real necessarily follows; and second, the level of values which constitute what we have called God-in-*percipi* and which the real ought to follow. The fact that the valuational is not necessarily realized or realizable in the real is simply the fact of its different method of determination. Whereas the theoretical 'coerces'; the valuation 'moves.' Hence, its unreality is no indication whatever of unrealizability. The converse is the truth: That values are realized and not realized is itself the evidence of their realizability.

That values are realizable in this world presents therefore no difficulty. That all values are perfectly realizable is not so obvious. Ever since St. Paul, it has even been held, as necessary presupposition according to some understandings of Christianity and Islam, that the real is by nature incapable of realizing all the ideal, and another existence has been projected with the express purpose of enabling the ideal to find therein a possibility of complete and perfect fulfillment. Everlasting life after death in paradise arrived at by a final judgement in which the realization of the ideal is rewarded with more realization, and privation of the ideal is punished with more privation is the work of a consciousness of value that has suffered from ages of frustration at seeing value realized and not realized, cognized as well as rejected. Its presupposition is the despair that values are all realizable.

Being, however, has a different truth to tell. Its stratification into two levels rules out the possibility of a third, for a realized value cannot be but real; and an unrealized value, but ideal. The paradise in which value is realized must necessarily be as much a piece of this world as a beautiful landscape, a heroic deed or a noble disposition all are. A value realized outside the real world is a contradiction in terms. Realization can be only the entrance into this real world that we know. There may be other real worlds than our planet; but if our talk of them is to be intelligible at all, it must be the same talk concerning this real world we already know and into the likeness of which the 'other' worlds must be conceived. For our discourse on paradise to be intelligible at all, paradise must be either this world or an extension of it. An a-real paradise is by definition one that can have no real existence. On the other hand, an ideal paradise is by definition one concerning which no intelligible proposition can be made and the existence of which can never be proved. An assertion of its existence must forever remain meaningless. Unlike the rest of ideal being, its existence cannot be inferred as 'that through which' because, *ex hypothesi*, there is no reality realizing it.

The realization of all value is possible though difficult, and the final judgement is both divine and final since it is an incontrovertible judgement by value as to whether or not the real *materiel* instantiating it is exactly what the value alone prescribes it to be; since only under this condition will it 'dwell' in the real and the real can be said to have realized it. As regards the theoretical essences, there has been no paradise because their paradise already is and has always been. They are always realized in the real since they constrain it to follow their own patterns and structures. This is exactly the purport of God's ordering of the universe, His *sunnah* around which all creation, *i.e.*, real existence, runs. Theoretical essences are the prius without which reality would not be what it is; they are its 'first principle.' The value essences, on the other hand, could not by nature have had a paradise. It is of their nature to have instead of paradise, the promise of one. But there is nothing in that promise to imply that the paradise proper to values is or must be non-real. That it is an ought-to-be-paradise that is not, does not mean that, when it does

come about, it will do so on a third level of being—which is nothing but the barest, unwarranted and unneeded assertion. The paradise of the *Qur'an*, and hence of the Arab tradition, is purely a realization of total value; but an ideal realization is not realization, and a non-real realization is a contradiction in terms. If, therefore, paradise is possible, and there can be no doubt that it is, it need not be outside this world, in a phantasmagoric 'third' level of being. It belongs to this world; and only in it can it have real existence. Indeed, paradise has always existed in this world, but only in a certain measure. The prophets, and Muhammad *par excellence*, have incepted a program of realization and built up a tradition of men and teaching to continue and further their work. The completion of the work, however, is man's responsibility and duty and when effected, it will be the cause of his greatest pride.

Arab paradise is different from the Hebrew paradise in that it is universal. It is not paradise until the all realizes the all. It is different from the Western Christian paradise in that it is not a kingdom which God brings about for any reason whatever, but one which man, certain of his own vocation, convinced of his own station in the cosmos, strives to bring about by his own Promethean effort which, unlike that of Prometheus, has all the encouragement, sympathy and applause of the transcendent realm, of God. If God were to bring this real paradise by divine action, man would be left without dignity, responsibility or honour. He would enter paradise not as a victorious hero, but as a puppet. The love of God to man is the inner tension in value towards the real. It is the ideal ought-to-be of value. But as such, it does not realize; it simply commands. It leaves realization to the cosmic organ, *viz.*, man, instituted precisely for that purpose.

This is why prophecy has existed solely in the field of cognition, *i.e.*, of value discovery and of its conceptualization. The moral nature of man cannot take more than assistance in the field of cognition, since the slightest intervention in the field of action inflicts upon it the most devastating consequence. Jesus, like many prophets before him, restricted his mission to teaching, that is to say, to cognition. His miracles were action, but they were signs, subordinated to teaching, to value establishment in consciousness. Moses and Muhammad took to action in addition to their work in the field of cognition. But they acted as men, whereas they spoke as God. It was God who spoke when they spoke, but it was as man that they acted. This is not the separation of conscience and arm, 'Church and State,' of secularism and religious government. Conscience cognizes as well as acts, and so do both church and state. The state acts—and indeed ought to act—religiously when it gives real existence to ideal being, to values. The church acts as man, not as God, whenever it

seeks to bring men into consciousness of value. Through His prophets God has only 'spoken;' and this is true in all cases.

In the particular cases of Moses and pre-eminently in that of the Prophet Muhammad, action was 'religious' inasmuch as it was the realization of the ideal which God communicated. For this ideal was not theoretical but valuational; it demanded its own realization. Muhammad's action, therefore, participated in the ideal realm not in that God acted through him as in the case of divine speech, but in that it gave real existence to superlative masses of value, in that Muhammadan action was the best suited and the most efficacious for bringing about the exact matériaux of the highest and largest masses of value. But for all its fitness and all its felicity and all its success, Muhammadan action was through and through not divine in the least, but human, all too human. And this, instead of depreciating the Prophet's deeds, is the only view which gives them the honour and credit due. We do not honour him for giving us the *Qur'an*. God gave it to us; we do honour him for having been worthy of being God's mouthpiece. Muhammad was wise, to be sure, but his prophetic wisdom was derived, since it was God that spoke through him. In matters where revelation had not come to him, he was humble enough to admit ignorance, to ask for and receive advice from others. 'You are better knowers of your worldly affairs' was with him a constant reminder that in worldly wisdom he was one among his contemporaries.

On the level of action, had Muhammad been the will-less puppet through whom God acted, he may be entitled to the honour due to a divine instrument, but not more. In fact, the honour due to him as a human seeking to realize the ideal which God brought to his consciousness is far superior. His action was always 'religious' because it always sought and realized value, not because it was authored by transcendental power. Always to act so as to realize the highest values—what more can be asked of anyone, human or angel?

Although no more may be asked than to act so as to realize the highest values, yet no less than that can be accepted of man as man. For a person who is not moved by the loftiest emotion, determined by the highest vision, and whose consciousness is not dominated by ideas of noble ring, is not a man in full possession of his humanity. This is not the request that the highest values be realized by every man, but that they should be the center of his continuous devotion and yearning. Indeed, man is morally defective unless the highest values are the object of his innermost spiritual longing. The longing for the highest is ingrained in human nature. It is at the root of the revolt of conscience at all moralities which set up one or several values short of the summit of the valuational hierarchy. By achieving that which is at the same time the minimum and

the maximum of morality, the Prophet Muhammad has set himself as the exemplar of humanity.

1. As far as historians can determine, all the migrations that resulted in permanent settlement moved in an irreversible direction from the Peninsula to the lands of the Near East..None seem to have entered the Peninsula for permanent settlement. The Persians, Greeks, Romans and Ethiopians made transient invasions which left no effect in the substance and life of the stream.
2. The *Qur'an* speaks of nature as recognizing God's sovereignty. 'Do you not see,' the *Qur'an* addresses man, 'that whatever is in the heavens and on the earth, sun and moon and stars and mountains and trees and animals and hosts of men, worship God alone?' *(Qur'an*, 22:18).
3. The companions of the Prophet, who occupy a place of unique authority in the Muslim understanding of Islam.
4. *Qur'an*, 42:24.
5. *Ibid.*, 3:31; 4:59.
6. *Ibid.*, 7:158.
7. *Ibid.*, 36:4.
8. *Ibid.*, 42:52.
9. *Ibid.*, 4:80.
10. *Ibid.*, 7:157.
11. *Ibid.*, 48:17.
12. *Ibid.*, 48:10.
13. That is, the association of other beings with God.
14. *Qur'an*, 16:103; 26:195; 12:2; 13:27; 20-113; 39:28; 41:3; 42:7; 43:3; 46:12.
15. *Supra*, Chap. II.
16. *Supra*, Chap. I.
17. 'O you who believe, what (excuse) have you that when it is said to you, Go forth in God's way, you should incline heavily to earth?...If you go not forth, He will chastise you with a painfull chastisement, and bring in your place a people other than you...' *(Qur'an*, 9:38-39). 'And if you turn back He will bring in your stead another people who will not be like you.' *(Qur'an*, 47:38). 'We are certainly Powerful to bring in their place others better than them, and We shall not be overcome.' *(Qur'an*, 70-41.)
18. See for example, *Al 'Urwah al Wuthqa*, issue of Sept. 11, 1884 (31 Dhu al Qi 'dah, 1301); May 15, 1884 (18 Rajab, 1301), in Tawfiq Press Edition, Beirut, 1328, pp. 190-202, and 160-172, respectively.
19. The contention, propagated by the ummah's enemies for the purpose of dividing the ummah against itself, that this production of the ummah by Arabism is imperialist work carried out by 'Arab' racialism against the Persian, Indian and other races, deserves a clarification on account, at least, of the *naïveté* of many estranged members of the ummah. The purpose of imperialism is exploitation, and it is based on the principle that the other person is racially of a lower order of humanity out of which he may never rise to the level of the imperialist. The native's learning of the language, his conversion to the religion, and his adoption of the customs of the imperialist do not acquire for him that status but simply make of him a more useful tool in the imperialist's exploitation of his fellow-men. While this is undoubtedly true of the expansionist contact of racialist, exploitative Europe with the rest of the world, it is equally undoubtedly false

of the association of the Muslim Arabs of the Peninsula with the peoples beyond. True, they missionarized for a religion and in its trail, as demanded by that religion itself rather than by any sense of racial superority, for a language and a culture. But history can produce no case where non-Arab people have not been received as brethren in the Arab family upon their conversion to Islam. The Schechemite invitation to the Jews—'Let us take their daughters to us for wives, let us give them our daughters...let them dwell in the (our) land (and with us)...become one people.' (Genesis, 34)—which runs diametrically counter to the most basic principle of imperialism, has been on the candid lips of every Muslim Arab soldier, tradesman, governor, missionary who ventured out into the non-Arab world. To the implementation of this invitation the Islamic institution of polygamy rendered great service by bringing about the rapprochement of the elder members of society thus making their fraternization more complete and pervasive and hastining the process of unification of the two peoples. The expansion of 'urubah is an expansion but it is the oppsite of imperialism.
20. The Shi'i Hishamiyyah (followers of Hisham ibn al Hakam and Hisham ibn Salim al Jawaliqi), Mudar, Kuhmus, Ahmad al Hujaimi, Daud al Jawaribi and other thinkers known as al Hashawiyyah. The views of these and some of the hadiths they have misinterpreted or fabricated to establish the legitimacy of their *tashbih* are given in Al Shahrastani, *Al Milal wa al Nihal*, ed. by M. F. Badran, Al Azhar Press, Cairo, 1910, Vol. I, pp. 175-9.
21. Shahrastani, *op. cit.*, pp. 149 *et seq.*
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 145ff.
23. *Nahj al Balaghah*, ed. by Muhammad 'Abduh, Cairo, n.d., Vol. I, p. 14.
'The essence of religion is knowledge of Him; the perfect knowledge of Him is faith in Him; the perfect faith in Him is recognition of His Oneness; the perfect recognition of His Oneness is loyalty to Him; and the perfect loyalty to Him is the rejection of all attributes, for every attribute is other than the subject of which it is the attribute. To describe God is to compare Him; to compare Him is to divide Him into parts and to divide Him is to be ignorant of Him...To point to Him is to limit Him; to limit Him is to multiply Him. To ask wherein of Him, is to include Him, and to ask wherefore is to exclude Him. He is a Being who has not come to be, who exists without ever having not existed. He is *in* everything without conjunction, *other than* everything without disjunction, alone without loneliness. *(Nahj al Balaghah*, Vol. I, pp. 14-16). ((God is)) the first who has no "before" and nothing is before Him, the last who has no "after" and nothing is after Him...He is neither in time and therefore in different times, nor in space and therefore in different times, nor in space and therefore mobile to different places...' *(Ibid.*, pp. 160-1). To the question of Dhi'lab al Yamani, Have you seen your God, O Prince of Believers, 'Ali replied: 'Or, would you have me worship that whom I do not see?...But it is not the eyes that see God like they see things, but the heart that sees God through the truths of faith.' *(Ibid.*, p. 334). Although the style of 'Ali is unique and consistent and hence recognizable throughout *Nahj al Balaghah*, it is not impossible that the so-called sermons and speeches of 'Ali ibn Abu Talib should some day be proved to belong to another author of later date .If this happens, it may prove that the text was of later redaction or edition, but not that the ideas were not current during the life of the Prophet and the period of the Orthodox Caliphs. It cannot be by sheer accident that the later Sunni as well as Shi'i generations of Muslims (at the supposed time of the writing of 'Ali's speeches) were unanimous in regarding those speeches as being the genuine work of 'Ali.

24. *Qur'an*, 112-4.
25. 'Ali ibn Abu Talib, *op. cit.*, pp. 161-2.
26. 'The Qadariyyah (also known as the Mu'tazilah) is the school which hold that man can be the sole author of his acts, whether right or wrong; that his acts earn for him reward or punishment in the other world; that since God is transcendent, neither wrong nor injustice can be ascribed to Him...' (Shahrastani, *op. cit.*, pp. 61-62).
26. Shahrastani, *op. cit.*, p. 62.
28. 'The Jabriyyah is the school which holds that man is by nature incapable of action...that all action is the work of God alone.' (Shahrastani, *op. cit.*, pp. 132 *et seq.)*
29. See the views of Thumamah ibn Ashras al Numayri in Shahrastani, *op. cit.*, p. 105.
30. Al Khayyatt, *Kitab al Intisar*, ed. by N. A. Nadir, Beirut, 1957, pp. 81ff.
31. Shahrastani, *op. cit.*, p. 148.
32. *Ibid.*, pp. 164-5.
33. Al Ash'ari, Abu al Hasan, *Kitab al Luma'*, ed. by R. J. MacCarthy, Catholic Press, Beirut, 1953, p. 11.
34. Ash'ari, *op. cit.*, p. 14.
35. Shahrastani, *op. cit.*, p. 152.
36. Ibn Taymiyah, Taqiyy al Din Ahmad, Risalah xi, 'The Great Hamawi Faith' in *Majmu'ah al Rasa'il al Kubra*, Vol. I, Al 'Amirah al Sharafiyyah Press, Cairo, 1323, A.H., p. 428.
37. *Kitab al Nubuwwah*, Al Muniriyyah Press, Cairo, 1345 A. H., p. 49.
38. Ibn Taymiyah, Risalah i, 'Al Furqan', in *Majmu 'ah al Rasa 'il al Kubra*, Vol. I, pp. 101-2.
39. *Ibid.*, pp. 440, 465, 103-4; see also Risalah xi.
40. Ibn Taymiyah, *Minhaj al Sunnah, Bulaq*, Cairo, 1321 A.H., Vol. I, pp. 236-7.
41. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 257.
42. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 236; Vol. II, p. 257; Risalah xi, *Majmu'ah al Rasa'il al Kubra*, Vol. I, p. 38.
43. *Minhaj al Sunnah*, Cairo, Bulaq. Vol. II, p. 29.
44. *Ibid.*
45. Consider, for instance, the following passage of Ibn Sina: 'If it is said that He is mighty, what is meant is that He is that self from whom derives not only the factual existence of all, but the factual existence of general, not particular possibility. Thus everything that derives of Him does so necessarily...And if it is said that He is *haqq*, it is meant that His existence is eternal...And if it is said that He is alive, it is meant that He exists and that His existence is incorruptible...' (*'Uyun al Hikmah*, ed. by A. R. Badawi, Institut Français d'Arch. Or.; Cairo, 1954, p. 59). There appears to be no reason why, if one understanding may accept such deductions, another may not accept all sorts of other deductions completely at variance with the Islamic God-idea.
46. 'Say: "O People of the Book. You shall have no standing until you perform the Torah and the Gospel and what was sent to you from your Lord." (*Qur'an*, 5:68). And reassuring them that they have not been altogether failing in this duty, the *Qur'an* continues: 'Surely, they that believe, and those of Jewry, and the Sabaeans, and those Christians, whosoever believes in God and the Last Day, and works righteousness—no fear shall be on them, neither shall they grieve.' (*Qur'an*, 5:68. See also 3:3; 5:46-7; 5:66).
47. *Qur'an*, 3:84.

48. It was not intil 341 A.D. that Constantine decreed the prohibition of pagan sacrifices, and 353 A.D. that Constantius ordered the closing of pagan temples and thereby put an end to pagan worship. Thus the state was brought for the first time to work for the spiritual cause.
49. Mark, 12:41-44.
50. *Supra*, p. 236–8.
51. Agent, in the sense of *agens*, present participle of *agere*, *i.e.*, acting, as opposed to patient.
52. *The New Schaff Herzog Encyclopaedia of Religious Knowledge*, Funk and Wagnalls, New York, 1908, Vol. I, p. 409.
53. The story of Leo the Isaurian, Emperor of Byzantium, (717-740), is no less moving. Influenced by the puritanism of Islam, the strict monotheism of Arab consciousness, he regarded the icons of his fellow Christians as beclouding the unity of God and inviting idolatry. He therefore ordered their destruction in every church and house of worship, and won for himself the title of iconoclast. Nothing escaped his 'Islamic' rage throughout the Byzanthine Empire. Indeed, he was determined to obliterate every representation of deity from all Christendom. Naturally he expected the Arab caliphate not only to support him morally, but actually to cooperate with him in the destruction of all icons in the churches lying within the Arab stream of being.
The Umawi caliph refused and endeavoured to explain to the dumb-founded emperor that the untiy of God was not something enforceable upon the mind of the people, that a unity of God achieved by indoctrination is far inferiror to a unity of God that dawns on the mind that freely prepares for its conception, that the Arab spirit would not participate in the violent overthrow of any idolatrous or quasi-idolatrous practice, though it was willing, and indeed felt it its duty, to enable this as well as any other value to speak to all, to move by the power of its own appeal the wills of those who freely yielded to its determination. The Arab quarrel with Byzantium and Persia was from the start the latters' rejection of the Arab plea that they allow the voice of God to be heard, that they tolerate the Arab call to value and not interfere with the influencing by the values of God of the ethos of the people for whose benefit they were revealed. The economic and geopolitical explanations of these quarrels do not even understand the problem, let alone explain it.
Removed from the scene of local wars, the Crusades and succeeding foreign invasion, the icons of the Church of St. Catherine atop Mount Sinai were recently discovered intact (In 1958-59 by an expedition of experts sponsored by the Universities of Alexandria, Princeton and Michigan), having been saved from Leo's iconoclasm by the Arab power in whose territory the church lay and by their distance from foreign invasions. Those icons of Mount Sinai stand as a monument to an Arab tolerance that betrays the Arab spirit's pledge to the love of the neighbour, a pledge which conditions even the very basis of the value that is the object of the pledge, namely, the perception of the unity of God by that neighbour.
54. Al Tawhidi, Abu Hayyan, *Al Imta' wa al Mu 'anasah*, ed. by Ahmad Amin, Cairo, 1939-1944, pp. 11-12.
55. We should not omit to mention that the Sufi conception of ethicality as desire for and union with God has produced poetry of unparalleled height, refinement and beauty.
56. Rabi 'ah al 'Adawiyyah expresses this idea eloquently: 'O God! Whatever share of this world Thou hast allotted to me, bestow it on Thine enemies; and whatever share of the next world Thou hast allotted to me, bestow it on Thy friends. Thou

art enough for me...O God! If I worship Thee in fear of Hell, burn me in Hell; and if I worship Thee in hope of Paradise, exclude me from Paradise; but if I worship Thee for Thine own sake, withhold not Thine everlasting beauty!' (tr. and quoted by R. A. Nicholson in *The Mystics of Islam*, London, 1914, p. 115).

57. The expression is Tawhidi's. See his *op. cit., loc. cit.*
58. *Supra*, pp. 218-227ff.
59. Notably, Ibn al 'Arabi, in *Fusus al Hikam*, Cairo, 1946, pp. 64ff.
60. *Supra*, pp. 139-140ff.
61. We may therefore say, without meaning any persons, that the 'Robert Owen' of Arabism was neither a miner nor a shopkeeper—but a saint, led to 'cooperation' by the dictates of his saintlinses, rather than the 'demands and pressures' of his digestive system.
62. 'Abduh, Muhammad, *Risalat al Tawhid*, Cairo, 1956, p. 30; *Al Islam wa al Nasraniyyah*, n.d., pp. 56, 58ff.
63. Tillich, Paul, *Theology of the New Testament*, Chicago, 1951, Vol. I, pp. 204-208.
64. Notably Wasil Ibn 'Ata and al Khayyat, see Nadir, A. N., *Falsafat al Mu'tazilah*, Al Rabitah Press, 1951, Vol. II, pp. 94-95.
65. A. Farabi, *Al Siyasat al Madaniyyah*, Hyderabad, 1346 AH, pp. 15 *et seq.*
66. Ibn Rushd, *Tahafut al Tahafut*, Beirut, 1930, ed. by M. Bouyges, pp. 350-353.
67. *Ibid.*
68. The position of the English intuitionist school, especially after G. E. Moore.
69. The position of ethical naturalism and ethical subjectivism, from the Platonic Thrasymachus and Gorgias to C. I. Lewis *(Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*, Lasalle, Illinois, 1946) and C. L. Stevenson *(Ethics and Language*, New Haven, 1944).
70. The position of ethical conventionalism and descriptivism, following J. S. Mill, J. Bentham and David Hume.
71. *Principia Ethica*, New York, 1952, pp. 7-10.
72. Notably A. C. Ewing.
73. 'Ethical discourses and preaching,' he wrote, 'will just as little produce a virtuous man as all the systems of aesthetics from Aristotle downwards have succeeded in producing a poet.' (Schopenhauer, A., *The World as Will and Idea*, tr. by R. S. Haldane and J. Kemp, London, 1948, Vol. I, p. 474).
74. Borrowing Berkeley's famous words, Lewis affirms that with respect to goodness, '*esse est percipi*'; that 'the mode of feeling remains the head and front of the whole matter, and no more precise test of objective value would be true to our intent.' (Lewis, C. I., *Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*, pp. 404, 407).
75. 'Any object, whatever it be, acquires value when any interest, whatever it be, is taken in it; just as anything whatsoever becomes a target when anyone whosoever aims at it...That which is an object of interest is *eo ipso* invested with value.' (Perry, R. B., *General Theory of Value*, pp. 115-6).
76. Nadir, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 159ff. Jarallah, Zuhdi, *Al Mu'tazilah*, Cairo, 1947, pp. 203ff.
77. *Rasa'il*, Dar Sadir-Dar Beirut, 1959, Vol. III, pp. 346ff.
78. Hartmann, Nicolai, *Ethics*, tr. by Stanton Coit, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1932, Vol. I, pp. 239-241.
79. Hartmann, Nicolai, *Metaphysik der Erkentniss*, Ch. LXXII.
80. *Ibid.*
81. Hartmann, N., *Ethics*, Vol. I, pp. 102-4.
82. *Ibid.*
83. *Ibid.*, p. 223-4.

84. *Ibid.*, pp. 99ff.
85. *Ibid.*, pp. 176-179.
86. To will the 'good' as the 'evaluation' of what is good is a priori only in so far as it is based upon the a priori facts of the Value-content given in moral cognition, or is 'fulfilled' by those facts. In Kant's terms, on the other hand, where the a priori is supposedly derived from a function of the will instead of from the content of moral intuition, it is not possible even to speak of 'moral insight'. Hence, 'moral insight,' as a basis for moral behaviour, is replaced by a 'sense of duty' and the criterion of the 'morally good' becomes the negative test according to which a 'good will' always wills against inclination. To be sure, Kant did not make the criterion of 'counter to our inclinations' a constituent part of the good will itself, but he did make it a constituent part of our cognition whether or not a given volition is good.
87. It might be here pointed out that for Kant too the affective faculty has its own a priori principle, namely, 'finality' which it applies in the field of art through 'judgement'; that it is precisely this that accounts for the capacity of 'judgement' to provide a common and meeting ground between understanding (cognitive faculties) and reason (faculty of desire) through their a priori principles of conformity to law and final end respectively. *(Critique of Aesthetic Judgement*, Introduction, Sec. IX, Meredith tr., Oxford, 1911, pp. 37-39). This is indeed true. However, the a priori principle of finality is itself a 'formal' principle, whereas it is our contention that through the emotional faculty we behold an 'object' that is no less 'content' and 'being' than that which we apprehend through the cognitive faculties. The difference is that though both the Kantian affective faculty and our valuational sense employ a priori principles, the principle of the former is 'formal' and empty whereas that of the latter is contential and concrete.
88. Scheler, Max, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materielle Wertethik*, 1921, p. 59; see also, Hartmann, N., *Ethics*, Vol. I, p. 177.
89. *Qur'an*, 32:7; 64:3.
90. Predominantly, the view held by the Orthodoxy, advanced by al Ghazali in *Ma'arij al Quds*, Cairo, 1927, pp. 3,15-45. 'Just as the human species is distinguished from other animals by the rational soul...Similarly the souls of prophets are distinguished from men's souls by a guiding and guided intellect which is above all (normal) intelligence, rules and governs it through divine excellence.' *(Ma'arij al Quds*, p. 144). Also, 'Beyond reason there is another grade in which another eye is opened by which one sees the unseen and the future and other things as inaccessible to reason as intelligibles are to the discriminative (cogitative) faculty.' *(Al Munqidh min al Dalal*, ed. by Jamil Saliba and Kamel 'Ayyad, Syrian University Press, 1673/1956, p. 106). Quoted in *Prophecy in Islam*, by F. Rahman, London, 1958, pp. 96, 112, n. 9, respectively.
91. See, for instance, the arguments listed by Ibn Sina, Ibn Hazm, al Chazali, etc. by F. Rahman, *op. cit.*, Chap. II, III.
92. *Ma 'arij al Quds*, pp. 4:8, 151.
93. *Ibid.*, pp. 3, 15-45, 144.

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