

CHRISTIAN ETHICS

BY ISMA'IL RAGI AL FARUQI

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*A
Historical
and
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Analysis
of Its
Dominant
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FOREWORD

This book is the result of a rather unusual experience which befel a very unusual man.

Isma'il Faruqi is a Palestinian Arab made homeless by the Israeli seizure of his ancestral lands. Educated first in the mosque in Arabic, then in a convent school in French, he proceeded to Beirut for an education in English at the American University. A student hitherto of outstanding performance, he failed his first year. Nothing is more indicative of his future career than the way in which he sat down to analyze his failure and to discover that his former method of learning—by rote—was of little use to him in the new strange world of the western university. After graduation, he returned to Palestine and began to build a career for himself in the administration of his country and had already begun to achieve a position of responsibility and influence when the upheavals of 1948 deprived his family of their land and himself of a future. Even at that time he seems to have realized that he must henceforth make his way, not in his native Middle East, where his family had for generations wrested a way of life out of the ungenerous Palestinian soil, but in the dangerous fascinating world of the West. He would learn its ways and he would win from it an existence both physical and philosophical. He would become, or rather he would *succeed* as, a man of the West. This he has brilliantly achieved, but it is understandable that he should at the same time come to prize more and more what could not be taken from him—his love of his mother tongue, Arabic, his sense of the great historical tradition of his race, and his commitment to the inheritance of his fathers, the religion of Islam. He became a man of two worlds, intelligently at ease in both and at peace with neither.

He came first to Harvard, and finding his work frustrated by financial problems he broke it off after receiving his M.A. to go and make some money. Starting with a thousand dollars, given him by the American Council of Learned Societies for a translation from Arabic, he entered the contracting business and soon was building quality homes in desirable locations. It is characteristic of Faruqi that his specialty was that he decorated and furnished his homes throughout, relying on his own sense of what is beautiful, and that he sold them as a finished achievement, a poem (with his tongue only half in his cheek) of gracious living. He never lacked for customers. Even more characteristic is that when he judged he had made enough money to give his future a reasonable stability, he finished with business and returned to what he really wanted—the life of a scholar.

At Indiana he achieved his doctorate, and by then had a very good grounding in classical philosophy and in the developing thought of the

western tradition. It was time, he judged, to renew and deepen his eastern learning, and he counted himself very fortunate when the opportunity to do this at an intellectual, critical level was offered him by the McGill Institute of Islamic Studies.

It was while he was in the Institute as a Research Associate that his breadth of understanding for western culture and his innate sympathy for Islamic thought, as well as his evident sincerity of religious concern, suggested to Professor Wilfred Cantwell Smith, then Director of the Institute, that Dr. Faruqi should be attached for two years to the Faculty of Divinity as a Research Associate, to have the experience of living in a Christian environment and of bringing a critical if friendly Muslim mind to bear upon current theological trends. As at that time I was Dean of Divinity, I welcomed the proposal and the ready response of the Rockefeller Foundation that made it possible. Isma'il Faruqi for two years attended lectures, participated in seminars, read widely, and engaged in many a Senior Common Room debate. Looking back on those two years, it seems to me that they were one long, continuous provocative discussion, in which my colleagues and I learned to appreciate Dr. Faruqi as a tenacious disputant, a stimulating colleague, and a warm-hearted friend.

It was out of this experience, probably as yet unique, of being a convinced Muslim appointed to a Christian Faculty of Divinity, that Dr. Faruqi came to write this critique of Christian ethics. If I may offer the reader a suggestion, the important thing while reading it is not to think "But the answer to that is obvious! We Christians start from the conviction . . .," but rather to try to see why a well-educated, deeply religious, and by no means unintelligent person, sympathetic to Christianity but standing outside of its tradition, should see Christianity in the way he does and bring to it the criticisms he does. In the new dialogue of religions, the important thing is not to score debating points, but to come to understanding not only of the other man, but also of how the other man understands us. Dr. Faruqi's book, with much of which he knows I do not agree, forces us to take a truly honest look at ourselves; and this is a very necessary if often gravely disturbing practice. Readers who are not Christians will find it equally provocative and enlightening in other ways, and will, I am sure, welcome this as one of the first studies in which the East has taken the intellectual techniques of the West and brought them to bear upon Christian belief and practice. It is the beginning, many of us believe, of that serious conversation between religious men of many traditions, upon which the future of mankind so largely depends.

Stanley Brice Frost

Dean of Graduate Studies and Research
McGill University

PREFACE

When I first had the opportunity to read *Christian Ethics* in manuscript, I strongly recommended its publication. It is a remarkable and noteworthy book written by a committed Muslim modernist and distinguished scholar whose high attainments were demonstrated in his book on Arabism, *‘Urubah and Religion*, published in 1962 by De Brug-Djambatan.

Christian Ethics is addressed as much to Muslims as to Christians, but it is a deliberate invitation to the Christian to enter into a dialogue and, as such, is a phenomenon in modern Muslim apologetic literature. It is well written, born out of an ardent conviction of Islam's superiority and the necessity of dialogue between the two great religions. It is the first serious attempt by a scholarly, well-trained Muslim to study Christian dogma and ethics according to his understanding of them and is based on a wide and penetrating study of their historical development. Dr. Faruqi encompasses the whole range of Christian history from the Fathers of the first centuries, through the Middle Ages and the Reformation, to the present time. His is not a superficial study, but is supported by copious documentation. His treatment of the Old and New Testaments shows that he has acquired a broad knowledge of modern, scientific literature in these fields. Jesus, Paul, Augustine, Luther, Calvin, Barth, Temple, Niebuhr, and other minor figures are analyzed in their relation to Christian ethics. They all come in for sharp criticism—the ‘personalistic’ ethics of Jesus excepted—yet true appreciation of their teachings is not absent.

The main point to keep in mind, however, is that Dr. Faruqi deserves appreciation and recognition for writing a documented book on Christian ethics according to modern scientific methods of analysis and critical appraisal of source material. It is natural and understandable that Dr. Faruqi is strongly influenced by the fact that he is a modern, rationalistic Muslim. Most Christian readers will be amazed by some of his contentions and judgements. The book is in fact (though not in intention) a vigorous refutation and rejection of Christianity, especially Western Christianity. Paul, its real founder, is shown as the corruptor of the ethics and message of Jesus. Dr. Faruqi describes Western Christianity in terms of peccatism and saviourism, terms which are clearly meant to be condemnatory and to imply a corruption of Jesus' transparent and lofty ethics. It is significant that one of Dr. Faruqi's most frequent reproaches is that in both dogma and ethics the great Christian theologians often talk in paradoxes which lead to confusion.

However, the polemical and condemnatory tone of the book should not obscure the fact that Dr. Faruqi is primarily and sincerely concerned

with establishing dialogue and that he truly longs for a meeting of minds on an intellectual and scientific level. As such it represents a new phase in the age-old debate between Christianity and Islam, or, at least, it signals a possible new phase. Christian theologians should therefore take it seriously. It is well worth their while to learn how a modern scholar of great erudition, with a Muslim philosophical background, interprets and evaluates the writings of such men as Augustine, Barth, and Niebuhr. It will help them to understand why a committed Muslim modernist rightly challenges Christianity on various points of deviation from its true substance, even though this true substance is misunderstood by the challenger.

The most important part of the book is its lengthy Introduction. It is in many respects an impressive piece of work, in which the author tries to explain the fundamental principles governing dialogue as he understands it. This Introduction is the most appealing and the strongest part of the book, and at the same time the weakest. It is evident that the author, before discussing the phenomenology and history of religion, has taken great pains to acquaint himself with the works of western Science of Religion. Undeterred by its often critical and polemical character, he presents his book as a phenomenological study based on metareligious principles derived from the philosophy of values of Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann. These metareligious principles are in fact logical and epistemological categories (coherence, absence of paradox, logicity, rationality, etc.) in which the place of a religion can be irrefutably established in the scale of religio-cultures. Within the content of his philosophy of value and action, Dr. Faruqi asserts with sincere conviction that Islam represents a 'theology-free metareligion' which concentrates on the ethical demand 'Let all men agree to establish divine will first', for 'Islam is the religion of ethicality and commands.' The Islamic spirit is 'rationality itself' and therefore 'permits full-fledged epoché' in understanding another religion, for it acknowledges 'metareligion as the only competent judge of itself and other religions'. Dr. Faruqi states that, in the light of these rational metareligious principles, his judgement of Christian ethics is, properly considered, not a Muslim, but a 'human', a 'rational critique'. Christianity according to him, means exclusively 'the religion of Jesus' as he understands and explains it, and he therefore does not consider his book a 'polemic against Christianity'. His numerous polemical diatribes are directed against the development of Christian theology after Jesus. He consistently calls this development 'Christianism'. The Christian theologians from Paul to Barth are not Christians, but 'Christianists'.

If I understand Dr. Faruqi correctly, the following conclusions may be drawn from his Introduction. He nourishes an intense desire for dialogue,

for communication. As a common ground for dialogue he offers his theory of metareligious principles, the gist of which is that rationality is the universal and logically cogent measuring rod, the only competent judge of religions. Moreover, Islam accepts this norm of judgement, because it embodies rationality itself. *The sincerity of his desire for dialogue is accentuated by the hope that this common ground of rational metareligion will be an effective means of getting away from the pernicious sphere of refutation.* This earnest wish sounds rather baffling and paradoxical in the light of the total context of the book which is replete with refutation of 'Christianism' and triumphant apology of Islam. I, for one, do not hesitate to listen with attention and to learn from his criticisms and attacks on Christian ethics and Christian theological anthropology. Our Muslim brethren have something to say that is worthwhile listening to. But in all honesty I feel constrained to add that Dr. Faruqi's rational metareligion has led him into giving a distorted picture of Christian ethics and has forced him into refutation which, *on principle, he wishes to avoid.*

I am convinced that many Christians today are ready to react positively to Dr. Faruqi's urgent invitation to enter into dialogue with the Muslim world. In the course of centuries a dismal estrangement has arisen between Islam and Christianity, an estrangement that clamours for clarification and attempts at communication and dialogue. Moreover, in our modern secularized world, Christianity and Islam are both passing through a stage of severe crisis, which calls for fundamental reorientation, reassessment, and self-understanding.

Dr. Faruqi is justified in trying to find a common ground. However, I sincerely doubt that his philosophical metareligious principles are the right way to arrive at communication and dialogue. I would urgently invite him to reconsider his theory. The crucial question, it seems to me, is whether, by judging religion on the basis of rationality, he is doing justice to the spirit of either Christianity or Islam. Both are based on a Revelation of God, different as their understanding of Revelation may be. As such they establish their own norm, which is God's inscrutable, gracious Will. Their self-understanding derives from the content and meaning of this act of God. The response to God's act is faith, surrender, obedience. Rationality as *normative* standard belongs to science and techniques, not to religion, for the truth and value of no religion can be demonstrated by rational reasoning. My personal opinion is that dialogue and communication do not need a preconstructed philosophical common standard of judgement, but only sincere desire on the part of men of faith to meet each other, to understand each other as they understand themselves, to enter into each other's spiritual reality, to give account of their own faith and be witness thereof, to be open to criticism and willing to exercise self-

criticism. These are severe demands which require patience and self-restraint as well as forthrightness, humility, forbearance, and mutual respect. They mean that Christians and Muslims would embark together on a spiritual adventure, the outcome of which is confidently left to the guidance of God and His Holy Spirit, Who may guide us into new insights, new decisions, and new truths.

I have consciously and carefully avoided discussion of the many sweeping claims Dr. Faruqi makes for Islam or his sweeping criticisms of the great expounders of Christian ethics. A preface is not the place for such a discussion. My main objective is to explain the reasons for recommending the publication of Dr. Faruqi's book and to claim the serious attention of Christian readers for this first attempt by a Muslim scholar to give his evaluation of the Christian ethics of ancient and modern authors of repute. They will often find it startling reading, and this will help them to realize the barrier that still exists between the Muslim and the Christian mind. The more valid, therefore, is Dr. Faruqi's appeal for dialogue.

Written shortly before his death in 1965 by

Hendrik Kraemer
Emeritus Professor
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INTRODUCTION

Address to the Religio-Cultural World-Community

Books on Christian ethics fill many shelves in almost all libraries. Critical works on Christian ethics are perhaps not as numerous. Nonetheless, there are many of these too. They direct their critique from either of two positions. On the one hand, they stand within the Christian tradition, accepting most if not all that the tradition has so far regarded as essential to Christianity. They certainly seek to extend the Christian's understanding of his faith, to find solutions to the problems he faces. But they do so under the guidance of the tradition. There is hardly ever any departure from the main tenets; so that the analysis is really a deduction, an extension, or an extrapolation. Some works are bolder than others, but all keep close enough to the tradition truly to warrant the appellation 'Christian'.

There are other critical works on Christian ethics which cannot be so called. For they have taken a standpoint that lies outside the faith altogether, and direct their critique under principles which the faith challenges. There have been many atheists in Christendom, representing various schools of thought, the spiritualist as well as the materialist, the serious as well as the cynic. Christians have usually reacted violently to these works. But if they had any real insight or value in them, this was soon digested in the body of Christian thought while the irreconcilable was rejected. For such works were written by dissatisfied Christians, once-believers who came to find the tradition failing in some particular respect to inspire the life-streams of their day.

This book is unlike any of these. The author is not a Christian and has never been one. Neither is this a polemic for any religion, not even his own, nor is it a polemic against Christianity. The author holds for the religion of Jesus Christ the same respect and awe he holds for his own, namely, Islam. Just as for the Christian, the God of Abraham, of Moses, of Isaiah and Jeremiah is the same God who sent Jesus, and consequently, the 'word' of all these is equally the divine word, so for the author, the God who sent all these prophets, including Jesus, is the same one Living God who sent Muhammad. This book, therefore, cannot be a polemic against the religion of Jesus Christ, nor for the religion of Muhammad, since in final analysis they must all be one as their source is the same One Divine Source. What is then the point of this book?

One of the cardinal principles that determined the writing of the present book is the new oneness of humanity of which this century had helped all

men become consciously aware. Gone are the days when any people could live alone, could develop or die alone; when any movement of ideas could unilaterally command the ears and hearts of any group of humans alone. The tribe, the city, the nation, the race, the confessional community—all these had once their day, each one determining a unique life- and thought-pattern for its members and thus setting them off from the rest of mankind. In the new community which the forces of time are presently forging, no human can or shall be excluded. It is necessarily a community of the world. Fortunately, this community of the world is not yet, is still being formed; for the material is still malleable and the structure has not yet crystallized and frozen around any set of principles.

But the voices of tribalism, provincialism, nationalism, and sectarianism are still audible—indeed dominant, though they are fighting what from the very nature of the case must be a losing battle. The ‘world-community’, though immature, speaks with the rocking of thunder. “Cultures of the world,” it enjoins, “so reinterpret yourselves as to flow within my streams or doom yourselves to banishment from the life of humanity *sans retour*!” The necessity of history and the desirability of divine will are working to bring mankind into one brotherhood. Though some remnants of it live in the hidden crannies, tribalism has long been exploded. The first half of the twentieth century exploded nationalism and its sinister step-daughter, racialism. As a result of this quake, the walls of these sank into the ground, and the frontiers of the larger religio-cultural formations of mankind rose into prominence. At the end of the last century, it took men as prophetic as F. Nietzsche to catch a glimpse of the greater ‘Europa’; or as Leo Tolstoy to dream of the immense heartland of Asia-Europe as a unity of a unique soul; or as Jamal al Din al Afghani to dream of the Muslim World as a revived brotherhood actively seeking its universalist destiny. Today, all of these are fast becoming realities. Looking at the present world from this perspective, it would seem as if it were divided into four such religio-cultural groupings, to wit: the Christian World, or the West, the Muslim World, the Hindu-Buddhist World, and the Materialist World. Each tends to capture the other to itself while risking in the process the loss of the whole world to the third.

It is in the context of this world-wide debate and tension that this book is written. Though primarily addressed to Muslims that they may stand *au courant* of the streams of Christian ethical doctrine, and to Christians, that they may realize where they have complacently allowed their ethical doctrine to run *ad absurdum*, this work is part of a deeper argument addressed to all mankind. The fact that this is a Muslim work directed to the Christian West should not hide its real purpose, namely, the invitation of mankind to think out the spiritual principles of their future unity which

history and hence necessity, beginning with the military, political and economic aspects, are at work in bringing about. Though specialized in the analysis of the ethical ideas of the Christian West, it is an attempt to uncover the deeper ground between the religio-cultural worlds of Islam and Christianity, in the hope that an awareness of these grounds will serve as basis for rapprochement between the two camps. But it must be clear that this rapprochement between two world camps is not meant against any third. The larger rapprochement of all mankind acts as its guiding and determining principle; for it is in its interest that the lesser harmony of two camps is sought. Equally, though the author is a committed Muslim, this work is not written from the standpoint of the Muslim tradition exclusively. Here, the author speaks as citizen of the coming religio-cultural world-community, whose citizens are the members of the present religio-cultural divisions. The issues he raises may not therefore be pushed aside as illegitimate interference. Interfere with the religio-culture of everyone else, he must, like any other citizen of this new community. For him, as a citizen of the religio-world-community, to wield the knife into the body of Christian doctrine is as painful as it is to the Christian. For that body is equally *his* legacy, acquired by virtue of this new citizenship. Just as the reconstruction of Islamic, Hindu, and Buddhist doctrine is the business of all, so is the reconstruction of Christian doctrine. What the Christian, as Christian, may find unsavoury in this study, this author finds equally unsavoury, though he does so as heir of that legacy. The unpleasant job of criticism, however, the job of the surgical knife, must be done.

This cannot be otherwise. The whole of mankind must reconstruct together the whole of man's religious legacy. In the world of the oncoming future, which is *our* world, nothing cultural or religious is private and everything is public. The tenor of this new world and the momentum with which it is coming leave no room for group likes and dislikes in the matter.

Epoché as Religio-Cultural Disengagement

This study assumes that religion is not a 'scientific' fact which can be coldly examined in the manner of a geological or biological sample. Certainly, religion has many aspects and characteristics which can be so approached and so analyzed. The institutionalized figurizations and conceptualizations of a religion, for example, as well as the annals of history with which it is usually associated may be studied as ideational, psychological, or societal phenomena. But the facts of religious life—and these are, in final analysis, the unique hard data of any worthwhile study of com-

parative religion—cannot ever be the object of scientific study. The most important center and core of religion, which must necessarily escape every such approach will reveal itself to that treatment which regards it as a 'life-fact'.

To regard religious phenomena as life-facts is to approach them with the respect—nay, reverence—which properly belongs to spiritual phenomena. That is to say, to take off one's shoes at their doorstep, to strip oneself bare of presuppositions, of one's varying spiritual cognitions and contending valuations. In order to apprehend them truly, one has to exercise what phenomenologists call an *epoché*, i.e., to get out of oneself and, putting oneself as it were entirely in parenthesis, to exercise by means of the imagination a leap into the religious factum in question. Then—and here we go beyond the technical sense of *epoché*—standing freely and within the life-fact, one has to 'live' it, i.e., to enable himself, and actually to suffer himself, to be determined by the content beheld alone. Only then can he be said to have apprehended the meaning presented, to have not only surveyed that content as it were from the outside but to have 'been' it. For the difference between a life-fact and a scientific fact is precisely that the latter is free of determining power and impervious to whatever determination the examining subject may stand under. It is capable of revealing itself under any circumstance provided the examiner's physical powers of observation are not impaired. The life-fact, on the other hand, is one which, in addition to being scientific in the foregoing sense, is 'alive' with energizing power. It determines the examining subject, and its apprehension in experience is actually promoted or hampered by the kind and degree of his pre-determination by anything other than the life-fact under examination. His capacity to be determined by the object of study is hence of crucial importance. It is of the essence of life-fact cognition to be life-fact determination. Unless, therefore, this determination can take place freely, the subject cannot be said to have fully apprehended his object.

However, it is not necessary that the investigating subject sustain this *epoché* throughout his waking lifetime. True, the longer he can suspend his own religion in *epoché* and the greater freedom he can give himself, in imagination, to fall under the determinants of the other religio-culture, the greater will be his understanding of the phenomena and the deeper his resultant insight into them. But this does not mean that the *epoché* in question must be either permanent or radical. Indeed, it is even necessary that he divest himself of it in order to appropriate the intuitions achieved thereby for the permanent legacy of reason. He must make certain, however, when he moves away from the determining power of the ideas examined, that he has not fallen back upon his old religion and used its

categories for conceptualizing or evaluating the studied phenomena. While standing squarely in the midst of this tradition, the student of a religio-culture not his own must be able to move freely and continually between the three realms of determination: those of his own religio-culture, of the religio-culture under study, and of universal rationality. No study may be fruitful that is not the result of peregrinations of this kind.

That the facts of religious life and experience are life-facts and not merely scientific facts may, of course, be denied; and such skepticism may, perhaps, be never finally and thoroughly extirpated. It stands on a par with that skepticism which sees in ethical phenomena merely the datum of desiring or of being desired, whereas the ethicist usually sees, besides this, the datum of goodness, of value. Where the question is one of whether there actually are present in the given phenomenon one or more data, it cannot be resolved by appeal to common sense, or natural comprehension. The subject who sees two things will call him who sees only one blind, whereas the latter will accuse the former of overpopulating the universe. The fact is that in doing so, both are begging the question at hand; for there seems to be no overarching principle by means of which their difference may be composed. However, if there is no direct rule by means of which this kind of question can be resolved, it does not follow that the difficulty is insurmountable. There is yet the test of living-with-it-awhile; and for life-facts there may surely be no criterion more decisive than that which prescribes 'living' with them awhile. It is here that the utter hypotheticality of the skeptic's position is constrained to show its head. Where the exclusive cognition of the scientific aspect becomes an attitude of the discerning subject, the suppressed 'life' aspects soon take their revenge, as it were, and reassert themselves in the life of the subject with the vigour of a crisis, or revolution. The suppression of the life aspect of the phenomena in question, given the universal degree of sensitivity, had been futile. Sooner or later, life-facts succeed in imposing themselves as facts of being and living. Their essence is necessarily missed where, like scientific facts, they are dissociated from the actual business of being and living.

Religious facts are such life-facts. Theirs is not merely the order of theoretical experience, whether based on the reports of sense or on the analytical deductions of the mind. They certainly have observable and analyzable aspects which belong to that order; but in addition, they have aspects which belong elsewhere, to the order of life itself, the order of *Lebenswelt*. This is why religious meanings must be 'lived' in order to be appreciated; they must be apprehended in actual experience if they are to be cognized. It is this hard fact that gives so much strength and validity to the position of the 'man of religion' who, in speaking of the order of

religious truth, founds it all on the evidence of live religious experience itself. Christianity is undoubtedly the religion of religious experience *par excellence*. Its very nature—which is a mere derivation from the nature of its God—as well as the nature itself of Jesus Christ, its God, are made to rest, in final analysis, on the live experience of the earliest Christians, being continually lived and relived in history. But what was this experience?

Inasmuch as it can be read into the garbled version of the first two chapters of the Acts, this experience was really the beginning of the Christian religion. On the fortieth day “after the passion”,¹ the disciples of Jesus gathered together “in one place”.² Previously, they had also been seeing one another and exchanging their feelings and afterthoughts concerning the momentous events of the Passover. They must have been a sad lot, bemoaning their grief at the loss of their master, at what seemed to them to be the shameful and tragic end of a character who was the very embodiment of purity, of love and selfgiving, of humility and meekness. Why would such virtue end in such ignominy? Why would so much goodness bring such miserable return? Why would such promise of a new kingdom, a new Israel, a new life, and a new hope receive at the hands of none other than that same Israel, such a derisive repudiation as death on a cross? And now that the master is gone from this world, what is to befall us, his disciples? Is there no sign that can inspire us to make any sense of it all? Is Israel forever doomed to this slow death by waiting for a material kingdom that runs against the logic of all and every reality? and if Israel is so doomed, must goodness and virtue perish with her?

In those forty days, the disciples met, discussed, bemoaned their fill but separated in despair. On many occasions, though the Acts report it as occurring once, Peter, having seized upon a bright idea, must have exerted his best efforts to convince his colleagues of it. Forty days have passed, however, without success, without consolation, without answer to the perennial question. Peter’s idea was that all the terrible happenings of the past few days had been prophesied beforehand, that what had happened was the fulfilment of what was foreordained a long time before.³ Psychologically, this was a brilliant way of removing the sense of shame, the consciousness of guilt that tore every disciple apart. What had happened, he meant to assert, had had to happen. But by that token, this necessity, the evil of what had happened was washed away. Hence, it is not something to be sorry for; it is no cause for grief and despondency. Although the Acts tell of Peter’s preaching this view to two new recruits, Barsabas and Matthias, and of the conversion of the latter, the point is really one of Peter’s suasive efforts to win all the disciples over to the new view. But on that fateful day, “When the day of Pentecost was fully come,” so

runs the evidence of the Acts, "they [i.e. 'the eleven apostles'] were all with one accord in one place."⁴ Evidently, during the forty days, accord did not exist among them, though it goes without saying that Peter must have succeeded in convincing a number of them of his view. Among these, Matthias, a newcomer, was to be counted. But on that fateful day, "When the day of Pentecost was fully come," the disciples gathered once more to ponder together. "Suddenly" so the Acts dramatizes the decisive moment, "there came a sound from heaven as of a rushing mighty wind" (Hebrew *ruah* or spirit). It might well have said, in plain English, that suddenly the realization dawned on them that, granted Peter's forty-day old argument, what had come to pass was the real vindication of Jahweh's plan; not for a political, but for a spiritual rebirth of Israel. "Therefore let all the house of Israel", burst Peter, "know assuredly, that God hath made that same Jesus, whom ye have crucified, both Lord and Christ."⁵ To those who are willing to acknowledge Jesus as the Christ, Peter could promise all the inheritance of past Israel as well as of the future.⁶

It was at this moment that the disciples apprehended the experience of beholding Jesus. Their love for the master, their grief over his departure, and their realization that he must have been the Messiah so long awaited, combined to give them this strange but not impossible experience of beholding him as if he were alive and active among them. They themselves, or a later generation, might well have spoken of this experience as 'resurrection of Jesus'. The reality of an experience, especially of an intensely moving experience, may well have been projected to that of which it was an experience. But the experience itself is not only possible, but necessary since it stands as the sole rock-bottom foundation of the religion we are about to study. Undoubtedly, theirs was a deeply religious experience. The 'tongues of fire' were no more than an inner experience after which a person feels compelled to communicate, the more eloquently the more intense the vision, *his experience to his fellows*. This experience of the first Christians defined the nature of the new religion in terms of itself, viz., as the experience of Jesus as the Christ and this, though the meaning of Christ underwent a great transformation, has been true of Christian history to this day. To experience that which the apostles and disciples of Jesus had experienced on that day of Pentecost, to 'be in Christ'—in short, to suffer determination by that which has determined the first Christians—has been of the essence of Christianity.

This book has been written under the aforesaid principle of religious-cultural disengagement. The author has endeavoured to maintain the requisite *epoché* at every presentation of the elements of the Christian faith, and to enable those elements, as best thought out and presented by

the great men of Christianity, to speak freely for themselves. All this supports the position that religious facts cannot be understood by the person who has not 'lived' them throughout, who has not suffered himself to be determined by their contents in his most personal and most serious moments of consciousness. But in this case, how can these religious facts ever be appropriated by reason, i.e., conceptualized and systematized? In this process of making public, the personal itself is destroyed. The examiner should not be surprised if what he is left with is the outside shell and husk. Thus, the argument concludes, religious facts, are certainly not to be judged or evaluated by him. Any such appraisal of their worth or analysis of their content is, accordingly, bound to be prejudiced or warped and, at best, inadequate and incomplete. This argument stands at the root of that despair of comparative religion so characteristic of the orthodox and conservative adherents of any religion. According to them, the comparative study of religion stands indicted by its very name and definition. Because it is a study of a religion other than one's own, and religious facts do not reveal their treasure of meaning without life-commitment, without the *engagement* of the whole man, the student does not, *ex hypothesi*, stand determined, or capable of being determined, by its meanings and values—a shortcoming which spells nothing short of disaster for the comparative discipline as a whole. There is thus no hope for a successful study of a religion except for the man who is also an adherent of it, a 'faithful'. For, since no meaning-content may be understood except within the framework of thought and feeling in which it belongs, it is idle for anyone to attempt the study of a religion other than his own.

That a religious fact belongs in a framework of thought and meaning all its own is an easy claim to make. Not only universal religions and great cultures, but every school of thought and feeling, every party and sect, indeed, every 'ism' and prejudice, however empty or insignificant, may constitute its own 'framework of reference' and thus lay claim to the immunity and dignity which such status brings.

Beyond *Epoché*: The Need for Overarching Principles

An *epoché*, it may be contended, is nonetheless a provisional flight of the spirit into the foreign realm of studied phenomena. By definition, it is not permanent. It must ever lack the maturity which characterizes the intimacy and fidelity of lifetime association and all-out commitment. Granted, the *epoché* in question is a great step forward from the sad fixation of the old Western comparative studies of religion in which the religions of the world were treated either as dead-cold data and static external observables in

human behaviour, or as 'enemy territory' which must be reconnoitered in order to be conquered with the least possible effort. Granted too, that the *epoché* regards religious phenomena no more as scientific data but as life-facts; i.e., that the question concerns not the data *qua* data, but the meanings with which they are charged. Yet, it is not the case that these meanings reveal themselves and do so wholly to the man exercising the provisional *epoché* in question. It would seem that what is required here is far more than an *epoché*; namely, that the meanings become operative in the purview of a whole life. Only then will religious symbols and phenomena speak eloquently and will audibly reveal their hidden beauty, their mystery.

This seems again to demand that no religio-culture can be genuinely understood but under principles which it alone furnishes and thus, that every religio-culture constitutes a law unto itself. But to grant such autonomy to a system because it is a system is tantamount to granting it upon demand, and thus to invite similar demands from all and sundry. Since each system takes a whole series of meanings and referata for granted which cannot, *ex hypothesi*, be controverted, to grant it recognition on the level of knowledge, is to grant validity to each of these meanings and hence, to overpopulate the universe of truth. On the other hand, to turn down any claim, however obvious its illegitimacy, is to assume principles by reference to which the claim is rejected. Such principle (or principles) must stand above the claim which it judges and therefore, the claim cannot constitute its own final justification. If then, each system of meanings is to serve as its own judge and may never be subjected to any higher law, there is no escape from granting this privilege to every one that claims it. Relativism in epistemology and metaphysics is the necessary outcome of this view.

This threat to epistemology and metaphysics which facile recognition of meaning-systems brings in its trail is not all there is to the matter. Of graver consequence is the relativism which it entails in moral matters. For, religions do not merely assert; they also command; and this aspect is by far the more conditioned and hence, the higher, the more important and final. If each system may be recognized as such on account of its being a system, it follows that it will have its own ethic, its own set of commands, its own notion of what is ethically imperative; and none may be any better or truer than the rest. Any chance enlistment of goods and evils, provided it is bold enough to claim for itself the dignity of a religion, a culture, a system, may hence justify itself upon presentation. No more is needed than to claim to constitute an integral system; and no more may be demanded.

To condemn relativism, however, is easy, but far from sufficient.⁷ What

is needed is the establishment and elaboration of the higher principles which are to serve as basis for the comparison of various systems of meanings, of cultural patterns, of moralities, and of religions; the principles by reference to which the meanings of such systems and patterns may be understood, conceptualized, and systematized. Moreover, the comparative study of religion is not a merely academic venture. If what we said above about the one community of the world is true, comparative study is a supremely ethical endeavour. This does not mean that there is no place or need for the academic discipline; but it does mean that this branch of learning has, besides the academic, a particularly serious task to perform. That is, to clear the atmosphere of the World-Community of all prejudice and misunderstanding and then to establish positively the *essentia* of man's fellowship with man in this most important aspect of life. The comparativist does not go to all this length merely to put, in eternal and cold juxtaposition, the varying, great and petty, oft-contradictory, meanings and values of the religio-cultures of the world. The purpose of discovering, of digging up, and of looking into values, is never merely theoretical. Values, or meanings, are by nature affective, contaminating, seizing. Just as to understand them is at least for some time and circumstance to be determined by them, to present them in concepts is not merely keeping them in the cold storage of the understanding, but is exhibiting their radiating appeal and power. The purpose is always that they may determine, that men may be moved, that their ought-to-be be done and become real.

This certainly implies evaluation and judgement of the meanings presented. For values may be grasped individually. But they are always present in context of other values with respect to which they occupy a given order of rank. Every value is a value higher than another, lower than another, enhancing or enhanced by another, contradicting, violating, or contradicted and violated by another, alternative to or superposed on, another. The assignment and elaboration of these relations is evaluation, or judgement. There is no escape, therefore, in the comparative study of religion, from some evaluation of the content examined; and it is the principles of such evaluation that are here in question. This is a grave and very difficult task; but it is not impossible. Such principles are not ready-made; and we may not reach them even after long and hard research. But continue this hard work, we must. For the ghost of relativism reappears the moment we give up the hunt, and his presence casts a shadow of suspicion on the value of existence and of life itself. A religion that is valid only for its adherents is no religion at all. Even at best, such a religion is but a tribalist ethic; just as a truth which is truth only for those who accept it and has no claim to the acceptance of all men, is no truth at all, but a mere prejudice.

The principles which we are seeking fall into two kinds: Those which govern the understanding, or the theoretical principles, and those which govern judgement, or the principles of evaluation. The former regulate our grasping of the meanings presented, the religio-cultural phenomena, and our conceptualization and systematization of them. They are the same principles which govern our understanding of all other phenomena, and constitute the foundation of human knowledge in general. The latter are specialized and though they are as axiomatic as the theoretical principles, they constitute the foundation of all religio-culture. They are not alternative to the principles of understanding but, taking them for granted, they look beyond them to the religio-cultures to which they bring, when applied, a new order of meaning. Let us begin with the principles of comparative religious understanding.

THE THEORETICAL PRINCIPLES

First, we have the principle of internal coherence. No system of any kind is worthy of consideration unless it recognizes, as a first criterion of validity, the principle that the elements of which it is constituted are not contradictory to one another. Self-contradiction is fatal to any system. To deny the requisite of internal coherence is to sap the foundation not only of comparative religion, but of the very activity of human discourse, of ideational communication. If we may now entertain one idea or principle and then another in contradiction to the first, the presentation itself loses its point. For, what is the value of an assertion which is as true and valid as its diametrical opposite? Internal coherence is therefore a law governing the validity of revelation. This is not to assert a law for, and hence a limitation upon, God, but man. All it purports to mean is that man is so constituted as to be able to appreciate and act upon that which is coherent with itself. It does not become of God to ask man or, if the reader prefers, it does not accord with common sense that man be asked, to be moral, i.e. to realize value in freedom and responsibility while values or the moral ought is present in his consciousness, at once imperative and not imperative. That which is not coherent with itself though it may in some instance be *theoretically comprehensible*, cannot be acted upon by man, since it tells him that X is and is not, at the same time and in the same respect, imperative.

In the case of Christianity, the test of internal coherence precludes the recourse to paradox as theological principle. This is most crucial and decisive. Paradox is quite possible on a certain level, provided beyond it, on a higher level, an overarching unity is unmistakably assumed and

explicitly given. The paradox here meant, and condemned, is that which is final, which stands as a principle of understanding alternative to the principle of internal coherence. It is not possible for the orthodox Christian theologian to contend this without removing himself outside the game of human communication, or man's encounter with man. Perhaps at one time he felt capable of living alone. Henceforth, he must learn to live with non-Christians and this means inescapably to communicate with them under the governance of the laws of thought. The fact that his own people, the Christians, are getting more and more impatient with him precisely on the account of his tenacity to paradox as a law of theology, should be a lesson. But it is equally a warning that unless he amends his ways and observes the rules of human existence in modern times, he is going to be shoved aside by history. On the other hand, it is not impossible that by accepting such a principle as the rejection of paradox we may be shutting ourselves to some important truths. But the acceptance of paradox as a principle of understanding will certainly mean a loss to truth that is at least as great if not greater. For if the laws of identity, of the excluded middle, and of contradiction are not inviolable laws of thought, the doors will be wide open for all sorts of untruths to commingle with divine truth.

Some historians of religion claim that internal coherence is too large a demand to make on a religious system, that many systems contain unremovable contradictions and that, rather than to solve such contradictions in a system, "the task of the historian of religion is to try to feel and understand the 'adhesiveness' of various aspects of historic religions."⁸ But what does 'adhesiveness' mean? If contradictory aspects of a religion do not constitute different religions but 'are held together' despite their mutual contradiction,⁹ must not there be a synthesis or higher principle which binds them and holds them together? In the presence of such a principle, is it not our obvious duty to seek that principle and understand it as constitutive? And if we succeed in doing so, can we still maintain that the religion is internally incoherent? But in the absence of such overarching principle, how can we talk of 'adhesiveness' at all?

Obviously, the contradictions between aspects of a religion, which can admit of a search for 'adhesiveness' of the whole, are not final, but occur on the lower or more superficial level. Such contradictions occur everywhere, not only in religious wholes. They are tolerable even in high school essays. The contradiction which is a stumbling block to the historian of religions is of another kind. It is final, unarchable, and each arm of it is necessarily constitutive. Here, the comparativist cannot look for 'adhesiveness' because there is none. And here, precisely on this account, he must make up his mind to choose either thesis or antithesis, or assume that aspect of the religion in which the contradiction takes place, *hors de*

combat, outside the realm of his investigation. If he does not, he would continue to affirm and to deny—which is senseless, or he would, out of inclination or boredom be tempted to see ‘adhesiveness’ where there really is none. If, on the other hand, he does take the bold step and chooses, the only argument that may be directed to him is that of not having penetrated the system deeply enough to discover the overarching synthesis. But this presupposes the *invalidity of the paradoxical assertions on the level that really counts*. Such a mistake is one of an elementary sort which the comparativist should correct as soon as possible and without tears. But if he committed no mistake, and chose that side of the contradictory aspects which accords most with the historical tradition, and established his choice academically, he would have made a genuine contribution to the history of religions and to the history of that particular religion.

Secondly, the system or view presented must cohere with cumulative human knowledge. Human knowledge has been compartmentalized in its growth, and every new discovery would have first to cohere with the tradition of knowledge accumulated in its department. When it does not do so at first instance, its coherence with human knowledge in other departments is invoked. What is important to note here is that the state of incoherence cannot remain. The presentation of the new discovery is a challenge which the department concerned cannot ignore. It is bound to meet the intruder with all resources at its disposal in a fight to the bitter end, where it either succeeds and repels the discovery as false or lays down its old tradition in order to rebuild it on the basis of the new truth. For it would have then found out that though the new truth does not cohere with its specific tradition it does so with the larger tradition of other departments. The discoveries of heliocentricity, circulation of the blood, contagion by germs ran counter to the established traditions of the respective departments. The establishment of their truth, the coherence of the new data with the accepted knowledge of other departments was invoked and the result was the rebuilding of those departments’ traditions on new bases. Likewise between physics and philosophy, philosophy and psychology, biblical knowledge and archaeology, theology and all these. Coherence with the larger body of human knowledge is a must for all disciplines, for all genuine discoveries of truth. In the case of religion, no revelation can be an absolute law unto itself but must cohere with human knowledge as a whole, above all, with the history of that revelation, the established factor of the accompanying human situation. The physical, geographic, socio-economic, political, aesthetic, and ideational facts surrounding revelation actually constitute a decisive factor in our understanding of revealed truth. This does not mean that divine truth is *relative* to the human situation and as the materialists claim, that so-called ‘divine

truth' is an outcome of it. But it does mean that revealed truth is always *relational* to the human situation. God does not operate in a vacuum. He uses the facts of history, the realities of the human situation as a matrix or carrier of the divine message. This relationality of divine truth, which it is not oppugnant to reason to call absolute on account of its fixity in the eternal order, is evident throughout the history of revelation. It would have been an utterly futile endeavour on the part of God to have revealed, for example, the Sermon on the Mount to Sargon I, the Mosaic Law to Neanderthal man, or the Qur'an to the Pyramid builders of the twenty-sixth century B.C. These revelations are inseparably related to their accompanying historical situations, and are unthinkable without them.

Thirdly, all revealed truths must cohere with the religious experience of mankind. If God, or Truth, is, and He is the source of revelation, His commands cannot contradict one another. Between one revelation and another, there may certainly be development or alternation, but not outright contradiction or change of purpose. The content of revelation must reveal the unity of its source, which is none other than the unity of truth. A God who today commands the opposite of what He commanded yesterday or of that which He may command tomorrow, is not the God we know to be God.

Fourthly, for a system of meanings, a cultural pattern or a system of religious truth to establish its claim to be a system, its 'truths' must correspond with reality. Contradiction of reality is *ipso facto* invalidation of the system. No theory or view can afford to oppose reality without separating itself, sooner or later, from the life or thought of man. To ignore reality is to be ignored by reality. The data of religious experience must find corroboration in reality. A religion that bases its metaphysic, its morality, its history, or its understanding of the history antedating its establishment on assumptions which run counter to reality must suffer a revision of its theses in the light of the realities they contradict.

Finally, for a religious system to receive title to systemhood and thus to act as principle of explanation overarching any two contending theses, it ought to be such as to serve, in its totality, the upward march of man towards ethicality, higher value and Godhead. A system which deems this destiny of man already realized, impossible of realization, or unworthy of human striving and endeavour, in fact denies the *raison d'être* of morality and religion. But if religion is thus denied its place in human life and existence, what is the justification of the said religious claim as such? Such a system inescapably puts itself in the position of Epimenides, the Cretan, who, by asserting that all Cretans are liars, has given the lie to the assertion itself.

Granted the foregoing principles have been well observed and the religions well understood and presented by the comparativist, has he completed his job and duty? Is the history of religions bound to do no more than to put the religious systems of mankind in eternal and cold juxtaposition to one another?

Certainly yes, answer some historians of religions. The history of religions, they claim, is an academic discipline (i.e. the discipline otherwise known as *Religionswissenschaft*). As such, it can and ought to do no more than understand and, having understood, to pass on this understanding with the objectivity and non-involvement that befits an academic discipline.¹⁰ The question, however, is not whether or not the historian of religions may approach his subject matter with his mind bent upon making the best possible use of his discoveries for the propagation of his own faith. This kind of involvement, characteristic of the greater number of Western studies of non-Christian religions, is doomed. Apart from the ill-repute its studies have rightly earned for themselves in academic circles throughout the world,¹¹ they have produced grave ill-effects which will yet take generations to obliterate. For the Western peoples, this kind of involvement in the study of religions may have succeeded in assisting missionaries in converting a handful of people. But this is far more than offset by the prejudices the involved presentations of the non-Christian religions have perpetrated in the minds of the Western peoples regarding these religions. Such misunderstanding remains at the root of much prejudice between them and the rest of the world. At any rate it is gratifying to read many of the new Western historians of religions disowning and condemning this approach, and resolving to put this branch of knowledge on a par with other academic disciplines.

Rather, in the history of religions, the question is first whether or not, with the best academic conscience, the historian of religions is capable of so understanding a religion and so passing his understanding thereof to his fellow men without willy-nilly, being affected by this personal involvement. Secondly, the question is whether or not, in case some measure of personal involvement is inevitable, the historian of religions ought to become aware of the predicament under which he labours, declare it on the opening pages of his book so that he, as well his readers, may be constantly aware of it. In this case, we would suppose that the historian of religions will seek to keep his predicament in check by the agency of his academic desire to know the truth. Thirdly, the question is whether or not, admitting that some presupposition is inevitable, the historian of religions ought to seek to make that presupposition a set of critical and

universal principles rather than his personal 'religious' stand in the traditional sense of the term. In other words, if a theology of the history of religions is a necessity, that theology must be a critical, and not a dogmatic, theology.

In order to answer these questions we must again raise the issue of the nature of the history of religions, seeking an answer in greater depth and detail. Obviously, the history of religions is not purely an analytic discipline. What it involves is not the relating of an object to its semantic symbol, or the knowledge that a certain aspect of a thing follows upon the assertion of that thing.

THE NATURE OF THE HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

The history of religions consists, rather, of the following three disciplines each of which is a sympathetic discipline and deals, above all, with synthetic propositions and judgements.

First, the history of religion seeks to discover and to establish that a certain human group feels, believes, thinks, knows, and judges as it does. This is certainly an empirical investigation. The accuracy, adequacy, and coherence of its findings can obviously have one test, namely, whether or not the men in question do in fact feel, believe, think, know, and judge as it is claimed they do; and of this, it would seem that they are the best judges. However, this is not as easy to ascertain as it sounds. In case the human group in question is extinct, the findings furnished by the literary and archaeological remains will have to be checked. Internal coherence will here be the supreme law, followed by a more or less rigid coherence with the culture of the surrounding region if communication between the group and its surroundings is adequately established. But however fuzzy the frontier may be on a portion of the perimeter of such knowledge, its *matériaux* are fixed, immutable except by archaeological discovery. The test of coherence can be ruthlessly applied on almost all occasions and the results may be reasonably established as decisive.

The task of establishing such knowledge regarding a continuing group of humans is not so easy, and the test of validity will have to undergo several steps. The first of such steps is to submit the findings of the history of religions to the test of whether or not the humans in question accept the findings of the comparativist as accurate, adequate, coherent, and meaningful—in short, as representative of what they feel, think, know, and judge. If their answer is affirmative, it is a fair assurance that the findings are true.¹² However, a number of difficulties present themselves here. First, the answer of the group must be *their* answer.¹³ Obviously, it cannot

be that of a minority among them, nor the statistical affirmation of every single member without exception. It should be the considered answer of the majority of the group's spiritual and cultural leaders—and this is naturally a very hard victory to achieve for any history of religions work. If it ever comes about, this 'considered answer of the majority' will have to be the measure of the approbative attitude the majority of the group's spiritual and cultural leaders adopt over the years in regard to that work. For it is highly questionable whether, at this stage of the cultural development of the peoples of the world, any such 'majority' could be persuaded to study and judge the work in question.

Secondly, the acknowledgement by a religion's believers, granted the foregoing qualifications, may have been withheld by them because they have misunderstood, or transvalued, their own religion. Certainly, the adherents of a religion can go wrong. Their judgement, therefore, cannot be checked except against the established tradition of the religion as recorded in the literature. This too is not free of difficulties; for it may be a question of checking, one interpretation of the tradition, the historian of religions', against another, the interpretation of that religion's believers. But whether or not the understanding of the tradition by the comparativist is accurate, is not exclusively for the men of religion in that tradition to say. Otherwise, relativism becomes once more unavoidable. True, the comparativist must always heed what the adherents of a religion have to say about that religion as well as about its tradition. However, it is not impossible that the comparativist might excel the men of a religion in the business of interpreting their legacy and tradition. The healthy attitude here would be one where continual answer and rejoinder, or dialogue, takes place, where both the believers and the comparativist show a permanent preparedness to listen, to be refuted, and to reconsider. Naturally, a comparative work can be refuted much sooner by another comparative production or discovery. But in final analysis, acceptance of a comparative work by the adherents of the religion about which it speaks, whether immediate or protracted after another generation had pondered once more all its themes, may not constitute any test of validity in the strict sense; but when it is freely and seriously granted it constitutes the only guaranty of validity. However, it must be remembered that this is the guaranty of validity of whether or not the adherents believe what they are said to believe, not whether a given religion is what it is claimed to be. In the eleventh century, Ibn Hazm, the first comparativist of religions and the greatest Muslim comparativist, wrote a critical analysis of the Old Testament. Unfortunately for both the Christians and the Jews, his analysis was rejected by them for three quarters of a millennium. Today, after Old Testament criticism has passed through almost a century of life,

struggle, and splendid discipline and discovery, some Christians have come to acknowledge Ibn Hazm's analysis as true. Alfred Guillaume pointed out that Ibn Hazm's "criticism of the Old and New Testaments anticipates in many respects and details the criticism of the last century."¹⁴ As a matter of fact, there is hardly a criticism Ibn Hazm directed to the Old Testament which cannot be read today in any Christian Old Testament study. That is real victory! Acknowledgement *mal gré* by a religion's adherents, of a historian of religions' analysis after 750 years. It is not marred by the fact that the Jews have not yet acknowledged it, or that the Christian Biblical scholars have not yet acknowledged Ibn Hazm's other half of the analysis, that of the New Testament.

In conclusion, we may therefore say that Professor W. C. Smith's criterion, namely, "No statement about a religion is valid unless it can be acknowledged by that religion's believers" is more of an operational principle than a test of validity. It is a criterion which acquires significance only where 'dialogue', its pre-supposition, has been a fact for some time, for its effect is always retroactive.

Secondly, comparative religion is the knowledge that that which a group thinks, feels, judges, and knows, is or is not comparable to what we think, feel, know, or judge, or to that which we know other groups to feel, think, know, and judge. Here the validity of the comparison depends solely upon its satisfaction of the general laws of understanding discussed above; it being granted that the objects compared have been adequately understood and their significance properly grasped beforehand. We should hence differentiate here between errors of comparison and errors of understanding that which is compared. The former fall within the purview of the criterion discussed in the foregoing paragraphs. The latter are governed by the laws of logic. Any two items compared must have something in common by virtue of their membership in a third. This is relatively easy to discover and to establish; but the worst pitfall of the whole discipline lurks hidden in the path of comparison. In the dazzle of the discovered common ground the comparativist may lose sight of the ground of difference. In order to do their work properly, the laws of logic must here be supplemented by the requirement that the area and significance of the common ground be never given without a due appreciation of and contrast with the area and significance of the ground of difference. The amount of superficial and mediocre comparisons between the religions of the world made by comparativists is staggering. The criterion will help both the comparativist and his reader to keep in mind the communion as well as the difference and by so doing, keep the search as alive as ever for fresh grounds of communion. On the other hand, restricting comparison to the common grounds is in every case a cause for complacency.

Thirdly, comparative religion is the knowledge that that which a group feels, thinks, knows, and judges is or is not closer to the common findings of the religious experience of mankind. By the common findings of the religious experience of mankind, is not meant the 'common denominators', individual items of a religion, separated from their context and surrounding complexus of meanings, and superposed on one another in superficial identity or community, such as the Golden Rule which we see flashed in interreligious conventions as occupying the place of a supreme commandment in every religion of the world. Rather, the common findings of the religious experience of mankind are those religious truths which natural comprehension had found to be true, desirable, and imperative and which the religious experience of mankind has corroborated. The conclusion that these common findings are themselves normative, and that to compare and to contrast a religion with them is, in final analysis, an attempt to evaluate that religion, cannot be avoided. However, it should not be forgotten that an exceedingly long and arduous task awaits us all in merely understanding the religion other than our own, and that it would be sheer pretension—indeed folly—to attempt an evaluation of that which we do not yet know perfectly. Evaluation, like comparison, but perhaps in a much deeper way, presupposes perfect knowledge of the evaluated. Indeed, evaluation itself is a perfection of that knowledge, for no knowledge of a thing is complete unless it includes the estimation of the place that thing occupies in the valuational hierarchy. It is not a question of preventing the comparativist from exercising rash judgement in this matter. For his judgement to be valid, significant, and valuable, the highest standards of scholarly and intimate acquaintance with the object evaluated must have been achieved.

Evidently, if the work of the comparativist is what we have said it is, then surely, it cannot be devoid of either interest or effect in man's life. Both the comparativist and his reader have something at stake in this work, and by virtue of this concern, the comparative study of religion is not an 'idle' discipline. It does and ought to influence living man in some way; and it should be every man's concern that this influence is for the better. The comparativist does not dabble with materials which are dead and removed from contemporary interest, but with religious, ethical, and aesthetic valuations which are alive and always seething with energizing power and moving appeal, not because their adherents are alive—these may have perished with their civilizations without the theoretical chance of a return, millennia ago—but because the religious, ethical, aesthetic values present in their valuations, are always real and alive. They reach far beyond the graves of their adherents precisely because values do not die. Any exposure to the thought of the adherents is *ipso facto* an exposure to

eternal values forever endowed with, and always exercising, their energizing power and moving appeal. Education itself is not, in essence, of a different nature than this exposure to value by means of thought; and virtue is teachable, not because the thought recorded in words actually influences the will, but because it exposes the will of the learner to the ontic influence and moving power of values. Education does no more than serve as carrier for value-content which is itself live and powerful, i.e. educative. The teacher of virtue can in fact do no more than the comparativist: To enable values to do their work on the will of the reader by enabling him to confront them face to face; such confrontation being possible either by the immediate route of example-actualities (deeds, states, attitudes) or in the imagination where it is evoked by means of concepts (mental pictures of deeds, states, and attitudes) communicated by words. The latter is naturally the more universal, the more rapid, and the more possible.

Like any other branch of knowledge but perhaps in a pre-eminently higher degree, comparative 'knowing' cannot therefore ever be separated from 'doing'. That in the content studied, known, and presented, there is truth which is of value to the subject, truth which may, will, and ought to influence somebody's future action somewhere, is the presupposition not only of comparative religion, but of all research. If some object of knowledge can be imagined which is absolutely of no value to anyone and which cannot ever become such as to affect for better or for worse anybody's life in the future, then that object is not worthy of being known. But to know an object to be, that is to verify it, is to relate it to some future action by means of which such verification can take place. Action, however, presupposes value. It would not take place and cannot take place unless it is preferable to non-action. Action, and hence verification, require therefore that that which is to be verified is such that its verification is better than its non-verification. That object whose truth or untruth are equivalent cannot ever be verified, and hence, cannot be the object of knowledge.

Evidently, this kind of knowledge would be impossible if every religious system were a law unto itself. For if it were granted that no religion may be judged by any laws foreign to it, it would follow that no religion may be judged at all and there would be no ground on which the claim that any old prejudice constitutes a religion and thus serves as a law unto itself may be denied. This is nothing short of relativism. Our standpoint, however, is not that of relativism, and hence, it is incumbent upon us to establish the principles by which religions may be evaluated. Few comparativists have elaborated their metareligious principles, and we shall examine their findings in the next section. For the moment suffice it to note that the largest majority of books written on religions other than their

authors', betray that their authors have preferred to profess a relativist thesis, while in actual practice they subjected the religion under study to a ruthless judgement by standards which their own religion, or culture, had supplied. We do not know of any analytical book on Islam, for instance, written by a Christian, which does not reveal such judgement of Islam by Christian or Western standards.

There is therefore, in this as well as in any other branch of research, no escape from evaluating. To the principles of evaluation we must now turn.

METARELIGION: PROLEGOMENA TO ANY COMPARATIVE STUDY OF RELIGION

Recourse to metareligion is not made necessary solely by comparative evaluation. The theoretical principles themselves are not wholly applicable without evaluation. Strictly speaking, as all knowledge presupposes evaluation, our understanding of a religion must needs presuppose some application of evaluative principles. We have said earlier, that in order to qualify as a system entitled to furnish principles to govern the comparativist's understanding of its contents at least in the short run, i.e., prior to the submission of this understanding to higher criticism, a religious-cultural system must cohere with the common findings of the religious experience of mankind.

These common findings cannot be mere empirical generalizations. For the religious experience of mankind is so vast and variegated that, if it were considered, the only empirical generalizations that can be arrived at would be the superficial 'lowest common denominators' we condemned earlier. A selection of the items to serve as materials for the induction in question is imperative. But how are these materials to be selected?

After the rules of understanding religious systems (the theoretical principles of internal and external coherence) have been scrupulously applied to a religion, we may expect that the internal contradictions of a religion have been removed. But in deciding which element in a given contradiction is to be rejected and which is to be rehabilitated, the comparativist must fall back again on the principle of internal coherence. Here, the same kind of difficulty we meet between the religions is met within the one and same religion. The solution in both cases is the same. Where serious self-contradictions occur, the religion in question has to be reconstructed with a view to keeping its structure coherent and systematic as well as to keeping that structure in coherent relation with the history of revelation which is foreign to it and is yet acknowledged by it.¹⁵ But there are cases where the religion in question does not acknowledge any

history of revelation other than its own and where, obviously, this test cannot apply. Here, the investigator has to fall back completely upon metareligion.

Metareligion consists of six main principles which we shall outline. A full elaboration of them belongs elsewhere.¹⁶ For the moment, and in order to proceed to Christian ethics which is our subject, we must content ourselves with the shortest possible enunciation of these principles.

Being is of Two Realms: Ideal and Actual

It may be difficult to establish critically and by incontestable proof that God exists. This does not mean that we wish to doubt or to deny the existence of God. Without implication of doubt or denial, let us assume that God does not exist. When the problem is couched in these terms, it is demanding too much to ask critical theology to produce its 'proofs'; and at any rate, this is not the place for it. Viewed from a completely different and new angle the problem presents us at once with an incontestable, self-evident truth, namely, that being is of two levels or realms, the actual and the ideal, the is and the ought, fact and value.

The ideal is that through which the actual is what it is. It can, under certain views of metaphysics and epistemology be assigned the mental status of concepts. This is of course wrong; but for the moment it does not matter. What is important here is simply the undeniable fact that the ideal and the actual are different kinds of being, that they are two. Fact and value belong to two realms of being, whatever the kind of being one wishes to assign to either. Had the actual and the ideal been one being, it would be impossible to order the actual into the orderly cosmos that we have. To do so presupposes principles of ordering which can either be identical with the ordered actualities, or have issued from the latter as given. For if this given constituted all being, if it were all that there is to reality, both what we call the actual as well as the ideal would be given as identical or successive data in an ever-flowing manifold of sense, and there would be no ground for any derivation from that manifold, of one of its data as principle of order or structure of the rest. From the standpoint of ethics, the argument is perhaps clearer. Fact and value are two orders of being. If this duality were not true, and fact and value belonged to the same order of being, it would be groundless to judge one 'fact' by another. In being, all data are alike. My contention, namely, that being is of two levels, would be merely another such given fact. What is then the sense of contending it? To do so is to presuppose a principle, a non-fact, by which the fact is judged. Just as no sifting of the actual can give us the ideal, since to sift already presupposes the principle of selec-

tion, no abstraction or generalization from facts can lead to value, for *ex hypothesi*, we as yet have no principle by means of which we can separate the valuable 'facts' from the non-valuable; and without such separation, no empirical generalization from the valuable facts is possible. As in metaphysics and epistemology, the denial of the ideal as a realm other than the actual reduces experience to the chaotic stream of the manifold of sense, so in ethics such denial reduces ethical phenomena to a senseless flow of affective states. In both cases, it is sheer skepticism, denying without affirming anything but, rather, contradicting itself at every cognition and every act in the skeptic's life and existence. It does not make any difference whether one is an idealist or a realist in the philosophically traditional sense of the terms. Nor is any such position advocated here. All that is asserted is that there are two realms of being, not one; and we call the argument therefore self-evident because its denial involves one either in thoroughgoing skepticism, or in self-contradiction the moment he 'cognizes' or 'evaluates'.

Being, therefore, is not monistic. There are, at least, two realms. But may our world not be a pluralistic order of several realms? The answer must be negative, and for the same reason. If being were of three, more, or an infinite number of realms, we would fall back into the same difficulty of ordering the manifold without ex-manifold principles to act as principles of ordering. The manifold of being would be on a par with the manifold of sense though admittedly, it is not the object of sensory experience.

Ideal Being is Relevant to Actual Being

Since the ideal realm acts as principle of classification, of the order and structure of actual being, it follows that it provides the pattern by which the actual is or is not what it is, the standard by which the actual is or is not valuable. Indeed, in this sense but only in this sense, the ideal may even be said to 'cause' the actual to be what it is since, without it as structuralizing principle, we can neither be said to 'have' the actual, nor to make the evaluative judgement. A genuine grasping of the ideal is, furthermore, *ipso facto* grasping of the actual. True, there are many groundless prejudices which claim to be graspings of the ideal and the problem of distinguishing the genuine cognition from the false is a serious and grave problem of epistemology. But this does not alter the fact that a genuine cognition of the ideal is a cognition of principles which are somehow operative in the actual.

Similarly, value is not indifferent or irrelevant to fact. Our assertion that value is that through which the fact is or is not valuable, means that

ideal value is the *prius* of all that is good, moral, or beautiful. It is the standard of valuableness, of goodness in its most general sense, which facts, whether by nature or through man's agency, are supposed to realize or embody if they are to be valuable at all. This is only a corollary of the first principle, that there are two realms of being, fact and value. For if value were irrelevant to fact, its existence as a realm of being would have availed nothing and the embarrassment that the fact of a contention is as much a fact as its opposite and hence, that there is no point in differentiating the one from the other, would face us poignantly all over again. If the assertion itself of the existence of two realms of being is an assertion of truth, then surely it is so on the presupposition that to assert the existence of one or three such realms is not just another assertion, but an assertion of untruth. Hence, the realm of ideal being is of no use in helping us get over our difficulty if that realm were utterly separate and removed from, irrelevant and unrelated to, the realm of actual being.

Monism in metaphysics cannot be separated from monism in ethics. For if all there is to being is the one realm of facts, then all facts must be equally good, equally evil, or equally a-valuable. The first two are the opinions of the pantheists: the first denoting the scholastic optimists for whom all being is good and evil is a privation of being; and the second denoting the Hindu pessimists for whom all being is evil and good is the cessation or nihilation of being. The third is the opinion of the cynics of all times and places, for whom the whole process of life and existence is no more than a mere "scratching when we itch". All these opinions are wrong, contradicted by ethical phenomena and, above all, except for the cynic who finds his hortation engraved on rock by lightening, involving their claimants in self-contradiction.

Relevance of the Ideal to the Actual is a Command

The whole realm of ideal being is relevant to the whole realm of actual being. But this relevance is not unqualifiably the same for all the members of either realm. In the realm of the ideal, some members are impossible of realization unless one or more of their 'colleagues' has been realized. In other words, some are conditioned by others; and this conditioning relation among them organizes them into a hierarchy in which the more conditioned occupies the higher place, and the less conditioned, the lower place. For example, the value of existence is the most unconditioned. It stands at the base of the pyramid and thereby conditions all the other members of the ideal realm. Light, mass, and language are 'elemental' members which condition the higher aesthetic members of painting, sculpture and architecture, and poetry. These arts themselves are 'pre-

paratory' members which condition the higher and 'final' value of beauty.

Secondly, the members of the ideal realm fall into one or the other of the theoretical-valuational division according to whether or not it can be meaningful of each to say that it ought to be. Even though it may be already realized in the situation, the valuational member of the ideal realm may meaningfully be asserted to be such that it ought to be; and of the given reality realizing that member, that it ought to be as it then is. Moreover, wherever the theoretical ideal is realized, it is realized necessarily; for it 'acts' in the actual realm with the necessity of natural law. Indeed, it is hard to distinguish between the theoretical ideal and natural law wherever the former is not an object, but a relation. In that case, the theoretical ideal is itself the law of nature. The relation of the theoretical ideal to the actual is a disjunctive either/or. The actual *either* realizes, *or* does not realize, it. This is none other than the law of identity. The valuational ideal, *per contra*, does not constrain the actual into conformance with it. It merely commands it to do so. Neither is it the case that the valuational ideal is affected by whether or not it is realized in the actual. Its ought-to-be or command, persists regardless of its realization in the actual. For it is of the nature of a command, as distinct from natural law, that despite all its obligatoriness, it may and may not, be realized. There is no middle ground between realizing and not realizing the theoretical ideal. Certainly, the actual can realize only a portion of the theoretical ideal; but inasmuch as it does, it cannot be said to be what the ideal prescribes for it to be, and is therefore not the ideal actualized.

But it is where man is involved that the relevance of the ideal realm speaks most eloquently as command. In the absence of man, the relation of the ideal realm to the actual is that of what is to what ought to be. Where man does enter into the situation, the relation assumes the more intimate form of moving appeal. Here, it is a command, properly speaking. Its polarity comes prominently into view, presenting itself as a tension between the ideal and the actual; in the one as a tendency to be realized and in the other, as a tendency to realize the *prius* that is not realized in the given situation. Regardless of whether or not man obeys the command, the ideal realm persists in its commanding. It judges the actual situation as praiseworthy or condemnable; whoever enters the situation stands under its command to realize the value in question; and hence, under its judgement as to whether he is, or is not, as he ought to be; whether he has, or has not, fulfilled what he ought to do.

Although all this does not go beyond the laying of a claim, of a command, for the ideal can in no way constrain man to realize it but must always depend upon his deliberate, active response to its moving appeal, the denial of this essential relation is impossible. Such denial, or the claim

that value does constrain and succeed in actualizing itself (the alternative, viz. that value neither constrains nor commands, being that of cynicism) opens the door to axiological or finalistic determinism or the view that value is, or is not, realized by necessity. This view is contradicted by the facts of ethical life and being. The feelings of moral responsibility, of moral guilt, of conscience, the ethical freedom implicit in the ever-present possibility that man may act otherwise than he does—all these indubitable phenomena axiological determinism is bound to repudiate as illusions and psychic complexes. If the valuational ideal gives itself existence in the realm of actual being by its own power, what is the sense of contending that the actual situation could have been otherwise? That the assertion of the opposite is a deed which could have been other than what it is and which could have asserted the 'truth' of determinism rather than the 'untruth' of freedom? If the forward march of value or disvalue is inevitable, then everything that will be will be regardless of whether it is valuable or the opposite. This is genuine fatalism; and it leaves no room for striving even if the cause be that of truth as it is in this case. The advocacy of the position that value realizes itself necessarily is already in contradiction with the content advocated, for to advocate a truth is to seek to realize value, whereas the assumption is that value needs the striving, or mediation, of none.

The realm of ideal being, therefore, is relevant to man, as member of the realm of actual being, in that it issues to the latter a 'command' which he can always miss; in that it furnishes for him the desideratum not the necessary determination, of his being, his membership in the actual realm, his cosmic stand.

The genuine ought-to-be therefore is the call of being, of ideal reality itself. It is eternal and immutable. It does not change; it is our understanding of it that changes. Reality has no whim, it has no contingent opinion. To ascribe these to ideal being is to anthropomorphize it. It is not therefore the command, the ought-to-be that changes in any part of its being, but our knowledge of it. And if it ever was, at any stage, true, there cannot be a radical departure from that truth though, admittedly, there can and must be, addition and development. It is possible that any man's knowledge of the command issuing from the ideal realm of being, be wrong; and this situation can be set aright only by radical conversion. But no claim of genuine knowledge of the command is compatible with any change of its content. Reality does not change its 'strategy'; for being is not a person, and ideal being is the 'wholly other' than either persons or things.

Actual Being is as Such Good

That the realm of actual being is at all is, as we have just seen, an elemental value standing at the root of the whole ideal realm and in some measure conditioning every member therein. This is particularly true of the valuational ideal. In a sense, every value 'loves' to be realized; every value tends towards the realm of actual being and this tendency is its ought-to-be-real. The value of real-existence is elemental: it conditions everything that is and every value that ought to be. For the value of everything depends first and above all, on the *valuability of its real-existence as such*. Every value is thus built upon it and would therefore lose its validity unless to be real-existent at all is itself good. For if it were not valuable to be real, it would not be valuable for any value to be realized. But a value whose realization is not valuable is a contradiction in terms. The value of real-existence stands therefore as an axiom of all axiology and morality. It cannot be denied without nihilating all axiology and all ethics.

The realm of actual being, of real-existence is this-world. This-world is good; to enter it, to be in it, is as such valuable. Certainly while he is in it, man ought to realize many and high values which tax his being in this world so much that he may almost be said to deny this-world. But, in truth, all his sacrifices would be futile unless they are conducted for the sake of this-world; unless in final resort, they bring about more 'this-world'. That man may have this-world and have it abundantly is the first answer of every why of any value, high or low. Any religion, world-view or philosophy which declares this-world to be fundamentally, essentially, and as such perverse, evil, disvaluable, not-worthwhile, sets off with a false start and denies itself the right to contend in what is valuable and not valuable to man. For the man who doubts the value of his membership in the actual realm, of his being actual-existent, has no right to contend in the matter of finding out what the value of actual-existence is. Of what value can the knowledge of the valuableness or otherwise of this-world be to the person for whom the value of this-world is questionable? For unless this-world, the world of actual being, is valuable, knowledge of anything in or concerning it, cannot be justified. And if one argues that he seeks to know for the sake of knowing only, he must have forgotten that the knowing state which he is striving after is itself a part of this-world whose value is put to question. The will to knowledge, therefore, no less than the will to anything else, is justifiable only on the assumption that willing, i.e., being in the realm of real-existence, is better than not-willing. Apart from the alternative of dying, i.e., from exiting from the realm of real-existence, all the man who denies the value of real-existence can do is merely to exist in a perfectly deedless, actionless, speechless state.

Schopenhauer, who taught that to be real is evil, also taught, and did so very consistently, that death is the only cessation of that evil, 'the real aim of life', and hence preached an ethic of death through suffering, through voluntary starvation.¹⁷

In asserting that the realm of actual-being is good, valuable for its own sake, we do not mean that it is perfect, that it cannot become better than what it is. The realm of actual being is good fundamentally, elementally; that is to say, its existence as such is a value. No matter how filled it may be or become with disvalue, it cannot be or become so evil that the desirability of its existence *per se* is put to question. Indeed, our indictment of it as full of disvalue presupposes the value of its existence of which the indictment is an appreciation as a value that is being 'lost'. Nor is the assertion that the realm of actual being is good and perfectable, a paradox, for the two parts of the assertion are not mutually exclusive. That actual being is perfectable is the axiom of morality. The striving that is vain and futile—the denial of this axiom is precisely the assertion that all striving is so—can never be moral. The impossibility of realization, or the theoretical inexistence of actual being, is contrary to the very nature of value; and the certainty of the existence of the ideal realm of being, of values, has, for counterpart, that of the 'valuefiability' of the realm of actual being.

Actual Being is Malleable

To 'valuefy' the world, i.e., to cause the realm of the actual to embody the structure and content of the ideal, value-realization must be possible. Otherwise, value would have no ought-to-be (for only the possible can be an ought) and without this, it would not be value at all. But what meaning can have this capacity of the realm of actual being to change its character into the likeness of the ideal realm, in the world of today? in the present state of human knowledge? The world is an ordered cosmos thoroughly pervaded by law; and inasmuch as it is so, it is complying with the necessary dictates of the theoretical ideal being. How can the valuational ideal being prescribe for the world something other than what the theoretical has prescribed for it? We have said earlier that the theoretical constrains the real into compliance with it. How then can the same real be changed into something else and follow another prescription? In a world dominated by the theoretical ideal, there seems to be no room for any other dominion. Man, is equally part of this world. He too stands as much determined as the least element. For him to follow other determinants than he willy-nilly falls under as a member of the realm of actual being, is idle.

That the world, or realm of actual being is an orderly cosmos, is certainly true. Without such a universal and necessary orderliness, experience itself would not be possible, not to speak of our knowledge of the world. But this orderliness of the cosmos consists precisely in that, in the case of every single phenomenon therein, there is always a sufficient amount of determination to bring that phenomenon about. The world is so poised, so determined by the theoretical ideal realm of being, that whatever happens therein does so under a complete set of preceding determinants. And it is this completeness of determination that constrains the phenomenon to take place, to be. Man, too, as part of actual being, stands no less determined in every moment of his life. But for all its completeness, its sufficiency to bring about the given phenomenon, no causal nexus is closed to further determination should it arrive to intercept the production of the consequent phenomenon. That determination is always complete means definitely, that there is no gap, no shortcoming, no vacuum of determination at any point of space-time. The given phenomenon must and will always come about. But it certainly does not mean that further determinants will not enter the situation, should they occur. Every phenomenon in the realm of actual being, whether it be the thunderstorm on top of Everest or the passion deep in a certain human soul could be other than what it is and hence, must have been open to further determinants had they arrived. To assert the possibility for a phenomenon to be other than what it is, is not to assert the possibility or existence of 'gaps' in cosmic determination but that of 'extras'; not of 'less', but of 'more' determination. Where a phenomenon turns out to be other than what it was expected, it is not due to a 'shortage' of determination which has come to be 'filled', but to an addition of unexpected determination.

This is still all too unclear. For if we had granted that the realm of actual being is an orderly cosmos, a shortage of determination must be as detrimental to orderliness as an addition. For if it is true that no less than the necessary determinants of it would produce a phenomenon, it is equally true that no more than these would be called for to produce that same phenomenon. This is indeed true. Nonetheless, the possibility of a certain phenomenon being other than what it is, is a real possibility, not a hypothetical one. Its explanation lies not in an extra of determination which produces it, but in one which deflects the course it takes. Determination, in the whole realm of actual being, is complete at every point of space-time. The entrance of any extras of determination is not necessary to produce the phenomenon but its entry into the causal nexus deflects it, as it were, from its normal course at the end of which that phenomenon would have taken place, to another course where another phenomenon will take place. The completeness of determination is the

world's ontological efficiency. Its openness to receive new determination and thus deflect the courses of its causal threads, constitutes its dirigibility. That is all that is meant by the assertion, 'the world is malleable'. Whether in his own person or in nature, man can and in fact does give new direction to the causal, forward push of reality, in order to become something else, something other than he would otherwise be. This he does because he is susceptible, in addition to the blind determination of ontological reality, to a determination of another order, to the moving appeal of values, to determination by the ideal valuational realm of being.

Perfection of the Cosmos is Only a Human Burden

Only man is susceptible. Every other member of the realm of actual being comes to, and goes out of, existence entirely under the dominion of the theoretical ideal being in the realm of the actual. The whole course of its existence is one continuous movement from state *a*, fully determining state *b*, and the latter fully determining state *c*, to the end of that course. The elements, organic matter, plants, and animals—all are mercilessly subject to inevitable laws. Only man, although he is not free from these laws which operate in him as much as in any other member of the realm of actual being, is capable of deflecting the courses of the causal threads of destiny to ends other than what they would reach if left alone. This is a peculiar distinction of man, to stand in the cosmos with the exclusive possession of the power to alter the courses of necessity. His significance in creation is precisely this, that he is the only creature who holds the key to the entrance of the valuational ideal into the actual. Man is the bridge which values must cross if they are to enter the real. He stands at the crossroads of the two realms of being, participating in both, susceptible to both. The question whether a fair number of aesthetic values and all elemental values are always present in the world outside the agency of man may remain an open question. It may never be finally decided whether the aesthetic values embodied in the landscapes on the other side of Saturn do, or do not, belong to the realm of actual being; whether or not if man were utterly exterminated, there would still be sense in the assertion that the elements have value. But it is indubitable that the higher values of both aesthetics, ethics, and utility can never see the light of the real sun except and unless they have been put there through the mediation of man.

That man is the 'crown of creation', that he is 'in the divine image' are merely beautiful poetical notions unless they refer to this fact. The realm of actual being may be moulded into the pattern of the ideal, but it can be so moulded only by man, the person who is susceptible to determinants issuing from a source other than the theoretical which constrains reality

into strict compliance. That is man's cosmic status: to bring about such necessarily 'potent' world into likeness with the realm of ideal being, to perfect the world by deflecting its causal potency to ends which embody values. In this man is at once subject and object. Nature within—indeed, the soul within—as well as nature without, stand in the same need for such perfection.

But if there is God and this cosmos is His creation, what does all this mean?

It means, first, that God is, since the 'realm of ideal being' which is totally other than the realm of actual being is really the one and only Transcendent Being. Secondly, that the realm of the ideal is relevant to the realm of the actual means that God is concerned for this world and does not merely co-exist with it; indeed, that it is, as far as His nature can ever be known to us, His only concern, just as all that is given to us to know about the metaphysical nature of the ideal realm of being is that it has a pattern which is desirable to embody in the realm of actual being. Thirdly, that this relevance is a value means that God's concern for this world is a desideratum, a command which, in order to be realized, must be obeyed. That the realm of ideal being is 'composed' of a theoretical order and a valuational order means that God's acts are necessary and unavoidable in the realm of nature, (they constitute the laws of nature); but that they are, besides this, for man is also nature, only commands where man's destiny is concerned. Commands are, precisely, determinants which may or may not 'act', according as they are or are not obeyed. Fourthly, that the realm of actual being is good but imperfect, means that God has created it for a purpose, and that this is that it may be perfected by man. Man is not free to condemn God's work and creation, to seek a facile exit therefrom. Fifthly, that the realm of real being is malleable means that obedience to God's command is possible, that ethical felicity can be real actuality, that man and world do not stand forever beyond perfection, i.e. beyond salvation, but within reach of paradise. Finally, man is the only being susceptible to additional determination means that only upon man falls the duty to obey God's command and that he is moral in so far as he subjects himself to the command. But, as we have seen, to do so is to give the value-order of the realm of ideal being real existence. Likewise to obey God's command, to perfect His creation is to be moral and thus to fulfil the requisites of the human viceregency of God on earth.

These truths can certainly be elaborated into a full dogmatic. To do so or to present them as theological principles would not have been true to our intention. Rather, we hold these truths to be the self-evident elements of a philosophy that is critical, by any standard or sense of the term. These are

rational, not dogmatic truths. They are open to question, to be sure; but whosoever wishes to contend them cannot do so from the standpoint of dogma. A critical rational claim can be refuted only by another. As for the thoroughgoing skeptic, enough has been said to point out his incoherence with what he does and claims.

The Muslim-Christian Dialogue

The value of setting out on these introductory pages the presuppositions of the analysis we are about to begin is to point out to our reader that this critique of Christian ethics is not something that is purely Islamic, i.e. non-Christian; and that as such, i.e., as the opinion of another religious community, it can be put aside. However interesting the opinion of a foreigner may be to a religious community, so the claim runs, it cannot be taken seriously. True, it may be important for the strategists of that community who will regard it as an occasion to learn of the attitudes of the other community so as to serve the purposes of evangelization or conquest more efficiently. There is not, however, the slightest intention of taking it as a work which can teach the community about which it is written something regarding its own religious culture. The fact that it is written by a non-Christian, from a standpoint other than that of the faith, is a sufficient argument against it.

It is hoped that the Christian reader will not brush aside this book as the opinion of a non-Christian. For though the author is a Muslim, this work is neither a 'Muslim's' nor an 'Islamic' critique, but a human critique of Christian ethics. Indeed, inasmuch as truth is not even human, it is an 'absolute' critique, or simply 'critique'. Its aim is not to show how Christian ethics appear to Muslim eyes, nor to bring anti-Christianity arguments which constitute the kind of objection traditional Christianity arouses in the mind or heart of a Muslim. Rather the aim of this work is to analyze the main ideas of Christian ethics as such, with no more presuppositions than the barest which the human mind must impose if conversation is to be at all meaningful. As it has been already pointed out, nobody can deny them without falling into self-contradiction and incoherence. Based upon them, the analysis is rational, critical; and the only argument that may be brought against its principles is an error of reasoning.

But this analysis is not only a system of deductions from the presuppositions. The general principles under which the main themes of criticism have been treated are such deductions. The materials on which these principles were applied, however, are drawn from the Christian tradition

and here all sorts of empirical errors are possible however strongly we may hope that the Christian reader will recognize these materials as his own. The analysis therefore can be true only inasmuch as the materials themselves are Christian. However, the possibility of error that this consideration engenders does not make the treatise a dogmatic work which a Christian may be relieved from taking seriously because he is a Christian. Where error has taken place, it constitutes an argument against the point in which it occurs, but not against the work as a whole.

Yet, this is a Muslim's work which, it is also hoped, Muslims will recognize as embodying the Islamic spirit. This spirit, being none other than rationality itself (in Islam, faith, or *iman*, means conviction based upon certainty of evidence), permits and encourages a full-fledged *epoché* for understanding another religion and endorses metareligion as the only competent judge of itself and the other religions. This means that Islam fully welcomes the suspension of all dogmatic theology including its own in the hope of achieving a just understanding between the religions and a just peace between their claims. It accepts wholeheartedly the six principles of metareligion, even when stated in the purest philosophical form, i.e., devoid of theological language, resting its hope on the healthy stand that whatever is oppugn to reason must *ipso facto* be repugnant to Allah. Moreover, the cause of humanity looms too large and great in modern times to allow communal prejudice to hamper its advance on the ideological level. In its fourteen centuries of history, Islam has well known tragedy, being continuously engaged in battle with its older sisters, Judaism and Christianity, which could not tolerate its 'after-them' appearance in the world, or with the religions of India from whom it has gathered the larger number of its adherents. Tragedy always arose from contending theological assertions regarding the nature of God. By accepting a theology-free metareligion, Islam is in fact pleading with the religions: "Let us drop our old questions regarding the nature of God, which have brought nothing but deadlocks; and let us turn to man, to his duties and responsibilities which are, in fact, none other than God's will. Let God be Whom He may; is it not possible—nay, necessary—that all men agree to establish divine will first?"

This appeal is ethical, *par excellence*. It is life- and action-oriented. It transcends the strictly theological positions without prejudice to any camp. True, its presuppositions are critical and, as such, deal a decisive blow to cynicism. But the real object and goal of the approach is the will of God; for man is something in the discernment of which all men, apart from the cynics, are one brotherhood. The discernment that is here in question is not of theoretical truth, but of value. In the former, where the comparative study of religion has so far been deadlocked, the issue has

always been that of a 'true' discernment against a 'false' one. Obviously, whether dogmatically or otherwise, the true could not keep company with the false, and mutual advance in the cause of humanity was impossible. All that is possible in these circumstances is 'mission', a sinister category in human relations in which the majority of mankind are declared enemies whom it is the duty of the faithful to 'convert'. Naturally, the other party, which is in every case the majority of men, looks upon mission as subversion worthy of the greatest combat effort.

It is otherwise when the goal is value, or the will of God, the ought arising from the ideal realm of being. Every person here sees more or less of that ought; but whoever sees less does not necessarily see falsehood. Every consciousness of value is a consciousness of genuine value. But not everybody is conscious of all the values present, possible, or absent in any given situation. There can certainly be vision of more or less value, but not of a 'false value', for there is no such thing. Even between the most opposing moral stands, the question is never one of 'error' in perception which may be 'corrected' but of a loss of genuine perception of being which can be increased. A misdeed is not an act committed in pursuit of a disvalue, *simpliciter*, but one committed in the pursuit of a value, usually inferior or pertaining to self, in a situation where superior values or values pertaining to others furnish the higher obligation. It is then an occasion where the misdoer sees less than he ought to see of the moral factors involved in the situation. However, the point at issue is that though he sees less, the miscreant is still the brother who is right in what he sees, but inadequate in that he does not see more. What he sees may and should not be refuted—for 'less' discernment is not necessarily 'false'. These are categories which belong only to one dimension of being, the theoretical. 'More' and 'less', on the other hand, are categories which belong to the other dimension of being, the valuational. The two are neither synonymous nor mutually exclusive. The more and the less perception of value are both 'true'. Both are perceptions of genuine value, of the ideal realm of being; and the discrepancy of the less can be filled only with more value-discernment. Only such a view is compatible with brotherhood. The brother who does not discern enough is given more to discern; and the discernment of value being paramountly a beholding of them in deed, in the actual realm of being (the direct perception of the 'wholly other', of the ideal realm, being ruled by definition) the brother who *sees* more can and should only *do* more. For if, as it is his claim, there is more to see in the ought of the ideal realm, it follows that there must be more for him to do, and the 'done' is the only evidence he can give of the 'more' that he claims to have perceived.

This, we believe, is a stand which is true to the deepest insights of

Christianity. Every Christian will grant that, in the ethical vision of Jesus, the dissenter, the 'enemy', the man who sees 'less' of the ought, the 'sinner' is a man worthy of love, and few will deny the principle that because he is a sinner he is worthy of more love. If the default of such a man was a default in truth, namely, falsehood, nobody in his senses would enjoin man to love him as sinner, that is, to accept his falsehood. Falsehood can and must never be tolerated. The only response of which it is worthy is refutation, absolute rejection. But where the default is not one of truth, but of value, rejection cannot ever be absolute, but must bend to the higher strategy of the good deed. It cannot be denied that the love of the sinner can be translated only into the good deed done towards him. It can never be an 'argument' given as a refutation.

And now we may ask, will the Christian World accept this invitation to *communicate*, on rational basis, with the Muslim World? Is the Christian prepared, in the interest of enabling the Will of God to become supreme in the world, to suspend, in continuous *epoché*, the teachings of his dogmatic theology? Is he willing to match the Muslim's effort to found the universal brotherhood under the moral law?

Shortcomings of the Christian Comparative Discipline

For several hundred years, many Westerners have been studying the non-Christian religions; and among these, many have spent a lifetime of study and research in Islam. These students of Islam have been Christian for the most part; and a number of them have been Jews and agnostics. Some have written their works as *engagé* Christians, and have included many anti-Islamic polemics. Others have done so as religious thinkers and scholars, allowing—inasmuch as it was for them possible—their religious commitment not to determine their presentation or analysis. It cannot be doubted, that in their discovery, collation, edition, or translation of many unknown manuscripts, they were *solely given to their scholarly calling*. True, the greatest majority of their presentations and analyses of Islam were prejudiced by Western, if not strictly speaking Christian, categories of which it was hardly possible to get rid, human beings being what they are. The fact remains, however, that their energies have rendered great services to the cause of human learning and hence, to the Muslims of the world. Their debt which the Muslim hopes someday to pay back seven-fold is a heavy one. However, of those which were produced in the consciousness of Christian religious commitment and conviction, very little can stand the test of academic scholarship and objectivity. This does not mean that no Christian missionary has produced a scholarly work.

Indeed, many if not most, of the so-called a-christian works on Islam are the works of churchmen. Such works were not addressed to anyone in particular. There was nothing peculiarly Christian about them. On the other hand, those works which were addressed to Muslims by convinced and committed Christians were hardly more than proselytizing essays.

And yet, this is the only kind of work that is here relevant, namely, the work which its author is willing to subtitle 'The Christian dialogue with other religions', 'The Christian address to Islam', 'The Christian presence amid Islam', or the like. Comparative religion, History of Religion, *Religionskritik*, *Religionswissenschaft* or *Religionsgeschichte*—all these may and may not be Christian. In fact, the widest majority of them are not. As such, they do not interest us. This is not to assert that such works are of no value, that they are not scholarly, or that they are not 'Christian' products. They are. But they are not addressed to non-Christians from the standpoint of Christianity. The anthology of essays in methodology entitled *The History of Religions*¹⁸ is a good instance. It contains eight essays by eight leading comparativists who are all Christians. But only Professor W. C. Smith's article, "Comparative Religion: Whither—and Why?"¹⁹ has the certain merit of establishing the desirability of such Christian address to the non-Christians, on a basis other than the missionary or the a-religious,²⁰ which has so far been wanting in Christian-Muslim encounter. The other essays do not even seem to be interested in Christians talking as Christians to non-Christians but in their talking coherently, rationally. They are certainly interested in achieving the highest standards of objectivity; and as J. M. Kitagawa has argued in the opening essay, that comparative pursuit which is there in question is "the subject matter of academic discipline,"²¹ as if religion to religion discourse is by nature dogmatic and missionary, 'moral' rather than 'intellectual' and hence unworthy of constituting an academic discipline. Only the missionaries, or the committed Christians, attempted the task. True, these attempts have always been, and still are, faltering. The commitment of these scholarly missionaries to Christianity has been such as to prejudice the objectivity of their presentation. But it is not to the a-religious scholar that we must turn. Such a man belongs to the nineteenth century Western rationalist tradition which has now been outgrown. We must continue to look to the committed Christians, but to such of them as understand their Christianity in a way that is consistent with the requisites of meaningful discourse and fruitful communication. It is unfortunate that so far, the Christian comparativist has been either the paradox-ridden missionary who conceives his vocation as one of proclaiming the Gospel *pereat mundus*, or the a-religious scientist for whom religious truth has but the observable, external dimension. Without prejudice to what each type may

or may not have contributed to world-culture, it may safely be assumed that the religious world-community needs neither one, and that should the Christian community produce no other type, Christian communication with other religions is doomed. What is needed is not a new philosophy of comparative religion, but, on the part of the Christian, (for the majority of today's comparativists are Christians) a new understanding of the Christian faith.

Let us then sample the work of those Christian comparativists who have written as *engagé* Christians. They are very few to begin with, and they have hardly yet fallen into 'types' or 'schools'.

BISHOP STEPHEN NEILL AND HENDRIK KRAEMER

Bishop Neill claims that in the comparative study of religion, "the only method which promises results is that of self-exposure, as complete as possible, to the impact of a religion as a whole.... The new approach is that of engagement, personal involvement in something which is of deep concern to us."²² He does not analyze his terms, 'self-exposure' and 'personal engagement', and is therefore not aware that such an exposure is fruitful only if it ensues in determination of the investigator by the content investigated. Thus, without pointing to the apparent contradiction involved, he boldly asserts that personal engagement implies no "indifference to truth or the abandonment of all objective criteria of judgement."²³

Neill then gives three principles which "set forth... the ground from which we make our approach to the other faiths of the world;"²⁴ his metareligion.²⁵ The first, he tells us, is the 'principle of contingency' which for him means that "there is a beyond in dependence on which the world exists and man can find his freedom."²⁶ This, it is immediately noticeable, combines our two first metareligious principles, but it is given without justification, dogmatically. The appeal to them is not rational. The second principle is that "human beings... are creatures which can form purposes."²⁷ This is our sixth principle. But having asserted purpose as a category of human life and characterized it in the most human of terms ("We are accustomed to working out our own purposes slowly, patiently and by the use of materials that are always more or less refractory"²⁸) he extrapolates this characteristic to God for the purpose of justifying the obvious Christian dogmatic tenet of *Heilsgeschichte*, where the divine purpose in the universe "emerges only slowly, through many setbacks and apparent failures."²⁹ The third principle is that "the future is a world of glorious possibilities, influenced indeed but not predetermined by the past."³⁰ This is our fifth principle, laying it down that the world is malleable, perfectable, capable of being transformed into the likeness of ideal being.

This is all very promising. For though Neill has made no attempt at establishing this metareligion critically, it does not mean that it cannot be so established. All three principles, we have seen, are differently worded statements of our metareligious principles. Neill's groundless attribution of a staggering purposive efficacy to God or ideal being, is not itself a principle but a wrong deduction from a principle, and may therefore be discarded, thus allowing metareligion to stand alone, completely dogmatic-free. Had Neill stopped here, he would have carried the adherents of other religions towards a genuine dialogue.

But no sooner has Neill stated his principles than he begins, without notice, an uncalled for dissertation in specifically Christian dogmatic theology. After he has had his say as a Christian and has laid down all the dogmatic, paradoxical teachings of the Christian Church, Neill claims, without evidence or argument, that "no other interpretation of the being of God is possible,"³¹ that "Christian faith claims for itself that it is the only form of faith for men, [thereby casting] the shadow of falsehood, or at least of imperfect truth, on every other system;"³² that "in Jesus, the one thing that needed to happen has happened in such a way that it need never happen again.... [The] permanent relationship between God and the whole human race.... has been established.... For the human sickness there is one specific remedy, and this is it [the Gospel]. There is no other.... Why [then] look for any other?"³³ This is hardly compatible with his own declarations on previous pages that his "approach will [not] be prejudiced," that he will not "distort everything we see by looking at it through our own spectacles."³⁴ His approach, requiring all these dogmatic statements is certainly not that of the person who "stand[s] within the truth" and who has "everything to gain and nothing to lose by exposing [himself] to questioning."³⁵ If all this Christian dogmatism is necessary, it is certainly futile, not to say hypocritical, to promise the reader that Neill's "approach to the other forms of human faith must be marked by the deepest humility;" that he "must endeavour to meet them at their highest.... [and] expose himself to the full force of these other faiths in all that they have that is most convincing and most alluring;" that "he must put to school with them, in readiness to believe that they may have something to teach him that he has not yet learned."³⁶ Indeed, if, as Neill has claimed "no other interpretation of the being of God is possible" than the Christian dogmatic interpretation, and as he himself has asked, in surprise at his own reasoning, "why look for any other?" the 241 pages that followed must not be a "comparative study of other faiths" at all, not a "Christian Dialogue with other Religions,"³⁷ but another, perhaps more shrewd but certainly doomed, attempt at evangelization. This much he himself concedes when he asserts, on the same page, and as a consequent of the

claim that "there is no other [remedy than the Gospel]....Therefore [*sic*] the Gospel must be proclaimed to the ends of the earth and to the end of time."³⁸ Evidently, in Neill's mind, despite Neill's words, there can be, for the Christian, no honest 'dialogue' with the other religions. Only mission and proselytization are possible. Otherwise, he tells us, the Christian would be "changing the Gospel into something other than itself."³⁹

True to this Christian predicament, Neill found no need to recourse, in his 'dialogue' with Islam, for instance, either to the original source-books of Islam or to any book on Islam written by a Muslim. Except for two Qur'anic quotations, every quotation and idea he gives on Islam or the Muslims, comes from a non-Muslim, oft expressly missionary, book on Islam by another Christian. It is certainly unbecoming of a scholar to rely wholly on second- and third-hand sources in treating any subject; but it is impertinent of a comparativist to approach another religion armed not only with the *Dogmatik* of his own religion, but with a number of notions and prejudices borrowed from missionary treatises openly antagonistic to the religion to which he addresses himself.

True to the missionary type, rather than to the comparativist, Neill concludes his dialogue with Islam with a proselytizing call borrowed from Kenneth Cragg,⁴⁰ and with the declaration that the Christian's only "task is to go on saying to the Muslim with infinite patience, 'Sir, consider Jesus. We have no other message.'"⁴¹ But rather than leave His so-called 'dialogue' at this sad yet peaceably-dismissible ending, he turns to the offensive. "It is not the case," he writes, "that the Muslim has seen Jesus of Nazareth and has rejected him, he has never seen him, and the veil of misunderstanding and prejudice is still over his face."⁴² This charge is undoubtedly false. Its refutation, however, does not belong here. What does belong here is only a comment which, for argument's sake, is prepared to grant the contention. How true, we may say in tentative reply to this gross accusation, is Jesus own word, namely, "Beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye?"⁴³

Hendrik Kraemer, on the other hand, is perhaps the most systematic of those Christian thinkers for whom comparative religion can never be anything but a branch of missiology. He recognizes that metareligion, in the form of presuppositions, is indispensable for the comparative study. In this, comparative religion is said to be on a level with other pursuits. None is *voraussetzungslos*,⁴⁴ not excluding epistemology itself.⁴⁵ He does not believe that either *epoché* or *Einklammerung der Wahrheitsfrage* can fulfil what they promise because the existential situation of the observer and investigator is inescapable.⁴⁶ According to Kraemer, the existential situation must affect the 'understanding' to the point of determining it

decisively according whether the investigator in question is in favour or against the religion in question. Indeed, borrowing the worlds of Péguy, Kraemer insists that "the true historian [of religion] should not be *désintéressé* but *passionné*."⁴⁷ The question for him is simply, "Which presuppositions?" and the answer is, "Certainly Christianity."

This is of course exaggerated. *Epoché* is not theoretically impossible, as it is here claimed to be. It is not impossible, in the imagination, to suspend even the existential situation. Otherwise, the existential could not itself be the object of investigation, as it has been with many 'existentialist' thinkers. Furthermore, consciousness itself is equally a situation. But its situational reality has never been claimed to affect thinking about consciousness. The human mind is capable of going outside itself in order to examine itself. *A fortiori*, it must be able to go outside an existential situation. Metareligion, then, is necessary, not because objectivity is impossible, but because having understood a religious notion, there is still the need to relate it to human life, to evaluate it, or better still, to assign to it a place in the existential activity of man. This is undoubtedly necessary, as we have shown above; but it is a different matter from understanding a religion, where *epoché* and internal and external coherence are the only principles. Kraemer's mistake lies precisely here, in that he takes the second activity which is no doubt existential and evaluative as constitutive of the first, of the understanding. "The real beginning and end of all understanding of religion," he asserts, "is theological; that is to say, it starts and ends with taking sides in the great question: What do you think of God and Man? and I would add: which God do you choose?"⁴⁸ This claim, however, he never substantiates.

His whole argument stands on the negative side of denying that the various schools of Christian thought have erred in their attempts to discover a sound metareligion—which is not untrue. He criticizes Rudolph Otto, for instance, for suggesting an identity of final purpose based on the identity of means and objectives of Christian and Indian mysticism.⁴⁹ In fact, Kraemer is right. But, enthused by his easy victory, Kraemer jumps to the extreme of reducing religion to the sum of man's efforts to apprehend the transcendent ideal realm of being.⁵⁰ Elsewhere, Kraemer speaks of the "intractability" of the Christian religion as inexplicable metaphysical "remainder" of truth;⁵¹ but here, he lacks the charity to acknowledge this intractability to the other religions, to religion as such. Kraemer also agrees with the skeptic phenomenologist of religion who denies that all these efforts of man at apprehending imply a something that is to be apprehended and a true method of apprehending it. Without such implication, i.e. without truth to be the object, man falls into the predicament in which James B. Conant, among other skeptics, wants to

keep him enchained. Incoherently, the skeptic phenomenologist speaks of directing rather than understanding these efforts, unaware of the futility and vanity of directing a goalless, objectless, essenceless process. Meta-religion, Kraemer insists, "cannot be cogently and universally demonstrated;" and a "valid concept of the 'Essence of Religion' is not to be expected."⁵² Thus, the claims of Otto, Harnack, Bousset, and Hocking are dismissed by Kraemer with the warning that "the Christian faith... stubbornly refuses to be fitted into a general concept of religion, [or] to be explained as a special variety of the genus Religion."⁵³

But if Kraemer is willing, as he must be, to grant to the other religions the extraordinary privilege of possessing an irreducible core of 'intractability'—and any fiction, prejudice, or illusion is always wont to claim for itself such distinction—what happens to the religious communication between men? Is it all doomed to consist either of condemnation or of mission? Kraemer himself speaks eloquently against such an aberration. "We are not," he declares, "invoking the right of prejudice."⁵⁴ In fact, however, he leaves room for nothing else. His categorical denial of "Essence of Religion," of a "norm of religious truth," precludes under his own assumption and in his own words, any "talk about the superiority of one religion over another;" and rules that such talk would "always" and "logically" amount to nothing more than "the confident assertion of one's own religious Ego as the standard."⁵⁵ Thus, having destroyed the foundations of comparative religion, Kraemer pointlessly bemoans, "as long as there is no universally acknowledged norm of religious truth" the only thing left for the comparativist is to "entertain the idea of the *Absolutheit*... of Christian faith... of the revelation of Christ."⁵⁶

A. C. BOUQUET AND ALBERT SCHWEITZER

In his Introduction, Bouquet accepts our theoretical principles as inevitable if discourse is to be meaningful. "There cannot be different brands of truth. Truth is fact, and even if of infinite extent, must possess unity and consistency. Its various branches must cohere, must fit together and must make sense."⁵⁷ Even where the truth claimed in a certain department of knowledge seems to run counter to that claimed by another, as between theology and science or Bible and history, the attempt must be made at reorganization of the whole department which backs the incongruous truth. "No department of the whole truth," Bouquet writes, "could be of such a character that it could be at variance with or in contradistinction to other departments of the whole truth."⁵⁸ That is as far as Bouquet is willing to go in the matter of understanding Christianity as well as the other religions of the world. This principle of internal and external coher-

ence, however, is not what determines Bouquet's treatment of the other religions, or of Christianity. In the case of Islam,⁵⁹ for instance, there is no analysis that bears out any application of the principle, however ruthlessly; and in the case of Christianity for which Bouquet gives no *ad hoc* treatment, he takes all its paradoxes and contradictory assertions for granted. For, for him, the Christian dogma is not another religion to be 'analyzed', but the yardstick of the analysis.

Besides the principle of coherence, Bouquet's metareligion includes two other principles. First, the existence of a Self-Existent being "engaged in bringing material substance into existence *ex nihilo*."⁶⁰ Bouquet arrives at this principle by means of arguments borrowed from the philosophy of science. According to F. Hoyle and T. A. Lyttleton, upon whom he depends,⁶¹ new matter is somehow being generated in space all the time while some matter is being lost on its frontiers. While basing himself upon this fact the scientist asks, with the noncommittal disposition that befits empirical science, "May it not be that it is a property of space that wherever space occurs, then matter may appear in it from nowhere, and to just such an extent in total throughout the observable universe as to balance the loss over the frontier horizon of the universe? That is, new material created from nothing, throughout space,"⁶² Bouquet asserts with the certitude of a dogmatic theologian, that "Something brings it [i.e. new material substance] into existence without being dependent on anything else, and this is only another way of saying that that Something, whatever it is, is Self-Existent."⁶³ This obvious *non sequitur* is, for Bouquet, an "obvious inference."⁶⁴ That there is an ideal realm of being that is wholly other than the actual cannot be denied. But the assertion of its existence cannot be made on 'scientific' grounds. Some scientists have gone to the extreme of denying any truth at all of which the scientific theory, as such, or can be, an explanation, asserting that scientific theories are mere working hypotheses whose sole validity is the control they give man over the forces of nature; that they are, and should be, dismissible without scruples at the first sign of disservice that purpose which is their only *raison d'être*.⁶⁵ But even if the existence of a Self-Existent that creates new substance *ex nihilo* could, under the scientific theories in vogue, be capable of proof in the strictly 'scientific' sense, it can hardly be said to satisfy the requisites of theology. An uncaused 'First Cause' of the coming into space of new material substance is as 'cold' as outer space.

Bouquet's second principle of metareligion, namely, the communication of this Self-Existent with men under "some kind of intimacy" producing in men the consciousness of "living under the controlling and purposive guidance of the Self-Existent" would never follow from a scientific assertion of its existence. It must, as Bouquet is only too wont to do,

be asserted dogmatically, thus multiplying the metareligious principles unnecessarily. In our case, it is hoped that we have amply demonstrated that the relevance of the ideal realm of being to the actual is a necessary, material (not-logical) implication of the principle of the existence of the ideal realm as a realm of value whose essence is that it ought to be actual.

Bouquet apparently aims at a 'scientific', not merely critical, criterium of religious truth. "To examine the pragmatic effects of experimentally accepting their [the men of religion's] deliverances, to test them by the light of reason, and to consider whether the latter are in any way confirmed by the sciences as not improbably true"—is a test which no religious truth can pass, including Bouquet's own. Indeed it is somewhat vain to claim this much for scientific truth whose categories are by definition other than the religious; and the consequence of such high demands is either the repudiation of religious truth or the compromise of intellectual honesty. It is a disservice to religious knowledge as a whole.

The application of these principles to the religions under examination, the Christian faith and non-Christian religions, fails. Instead of an application of the criteria of validity to Christianity, Bouquet has given us a perspective account of the history of primitive religion preceding and leading to Christianity,⁶⁶ a similar account of its diffusion,⁶⁷ rise,⁶⁸ and expansion.⁶⁹ Finally, he applies himself—and his best energies, for this is the most significant part of the book—to the elaboration of a particular theory of the logos.⁷⁰ This chapter certainly does not belong to a comparative study of religions, but to a study of Christian systematic theology. It is perhaps on this account that Bouquet opens the book with the announcement, "This is a work in a series which is concerned with Christian theology."⁷¹ This is the last that the reader hears of Christianity as a religion among the religions of the world, for the rest of the work is concerned with other things.

Bouquet has treated the religions of India at some length; and Marxism at still greater length. This is irrelevant to our present interest. However, the absence of application of the strictly scientific tests and the principle of coherence is conspicuous. As to the treatment of Islam, to which Bouquet has devoted sixteen out of four hundred and fifty pages, it is marred by prejudices and misunderstandings of the type with which missionary books have made us familiar.⁷² Like Bishop Neill, Bouquet has relied in this study of Islam on non-Muslim secondary and tertiary sources. But this is enough to disqualify his study of Islam, which, in fact, reads more like pages torn out of an anti-Islam, infuriated missionary's diary than a rational, academic work.

At the opposite pole of Neill and Kraemer, another convinced Christian and missionary shares the position with A. C. Bouquet. This is the world-

famous Albert Schweitzer. Like Bouquet, Schweitzer's opposition to Neill and Kraemer does not lie in their conclusions but in the methods with which they arrive at these conclusions. Kraemer condemns the non-Christian religions and upholds Christianity purely by 'decision' the *fiat* of the human person confronting God. Schweitzer, on the other hand, does so by 'judgement', in the consciousness that Christianity is the only true religion that fulfils what religion itself ought to be and condemns the religions of the world as falling short of this universal religious norm and truth. He opened his lectures at Seely Oak Colleges, Birmingham, published under the title, *Christianity and the Religions of the World*,⁷³ with the question "Why [is] this Gospel... for us the highest wisdom?"⁷⁴ Schweitzer is a pronounced opponent of irrationalism. He is against any apologetic based on the assertion that "Christianity contains truths which are above all reasoning [intractable, to use Kraemer's word] and which therefore, do not have to enter into contest with philosophy."⁷⁵

Behind this assertion stands the assumption of metareligion. Indeed, for Schweitzer, religious truth is rational, necessary, critical truth. "All religious truth," he writes, "must in the end be capable of being grasped as something that stands to reason;"⁷⁶ and Christianity, far from withdrawing to the dark but secure realm of personal decision, ought to confront all the religions on the platform of objective truth and public reason. This 'platform' consists not of what the adherents of a religion did in history but of the ideals the religions themselves stand for.⁷⁷ Being strictly an evaluative affair, the ideals of religions need to be tested against three principles constituting Schweitzer's metareligion; to wit, optimism-pessimism, monism-dualism, and ethical character.⁷⁸ He then defines optimism-pessimism as the acceptance or rejection of the principle that "the forces at work in the natural world have their origin in a perfect primal force which leads all things towards perfection through a natural development."⁷⁹ Upon this depends whether man is to look to perfection and fulfilment in this world of space time or in another world beyond space-time, in a realm of pure, spiritual being. Whether Christianity satisfies this prerequisite of optimism or not, we shall soon see.⁸⁰ But there is no doubt that, assuming that it does satisfy, Schweitzer gives this test in order to furnish a base for rejecting the Indian religions. His principle must be further clarified. As given, the optimism-pessimism criterion commits Schweitzer to finalistic determinism, the necessary consummation of the causal processes of nature, by agency of their primal origin, of all the perfection of which they are capable and for the sake of which they have been set in motion in the first place. This is of course false, for the natural process is by nature committed to no purpose and can serve any purpose whether it be God's or the devil's. More serious yet,

is the fact that the taking of man, inasmuch as he is a part of the processes of nature, as standing under and within the necessary march of these processes to their predestined goals, makes short play of his moral freedom, striving, and responsibility.

Schweitzer's second metareligious principle, namely, monism-dualism, is defined as whether or not a religion "considers God to be the sum total of all the forces at work in the universe" and that a perfect knowledge of the latter is *ipso facto* a perfect knowledge of the former.⁸¹ This view Schweitzer does not contrast with dualism proper, or the acceptance of a transcendent wholly-other realm of being, the ideal, constraining all nature to necessary obedience by merely commanding man to obey, but with optimism as Christianity understands it; that is, with the view of a Transcendent Being militating against, and is militated against by, the forces of nature.⁸² Obviously, Schweitzer must go to this length if he is to justify Christianity's doctrine of the fall of man.⁸³ With bad conscience, he declares that God's struggle with nature, with His creation must be maintained "however great may be the difficulties which this involves for human reasoning,"⁸⁴ thus sacrificing the original rationalism and critical attitude. That there is militance between God and nature apart from man, belongs not to metareligion, but to animism. On the other hand, it is far from evident either that man's militance against God is anything like a primordial and necessary 'Fall', or that God's militance against man is anything other than a 'command' an ideal 'ought to be'.⁸⁵

The third and final principle of metareligion according to Schweitzer is the extent of a religion's production of "permanent and profound incentives to the inward perfecting of personality and to ethical activity."⁸⁶ The full legitimacy and rationality of this principle to which all men ought to subscribe is self-evident. A religion which does not mean to produce ethical incentives, whose God does not command the actualization of values that ought to be, is cynicism; *ex hypothesi*, it can have no case. This, therefore, is the only genuinely given and accurately stated metareligious principle that Schweitzer gives. But his account of it is disappointing. He does not elaborate it; nor does he give concrete meanings to the ethical ideal which is to serve as measuring rod for all the religions. There is neither an axiology nor morality; and the reader is thrown upon his own conception of ethical content and incentive.

Notes

1. The Acts 1:3.
2. *Ibid.*, 2:1.
3. "This scripture must needs have been fulfilled." (*Ibid.*, 1:16).
4. *Ibid.*, 2:1.

5. *Ibid.*, 2:36.
6. "For the promise is unto you, and to your children, and to all that are afar off, even as many as the Lord our God shall call" (*Ibid.*, 2:39).
7. But certainly not as easy as Friedrich Heiler seems to think ("The History of Religions as a Preparation for the Co-operation of Religions," in *The History of Religions, Essays in Methodology*, ed. by Mircea Eliade and Joseph M. Kitagawa, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1959, p. 156). "Most Christian theologians," he wrote, "fear nothing so much as 'relativism'. I have a way of answering such theologians that the greatest of all relativists is God himself, the Absolute, for he is fulness in itself and his fulness is revealed in the immeasurable diversity of nature and the spiritual life." The factuality of religious diversity cannot be denied. But to ascribe this diversity to God is no justification of diversity but a begging of the question at issue. The orthodox theologian may well answer Heiler, "How do we know that God is the author of all the religions? Is it not possible that some of them be creations of the devil, that through them men realize values inconsonant with divine will?" On the other hand, Heiler's God, which seems here to be a warehouse of all sorts of odd and contradictory items is not what the greater number of theologians of the Semitic religions take the 'Absolute' to mean.
8. Joseph Kitagawa, "The History of Religions in America," in *The History of Religions*, p. 27.
9. *Ibid.*
10. "It must be kept in mind," writes Kitagawa, "that the historian of religions is engaged in the religio-scientific enquiry of religions for the sake of 'understanding', and not for the service of propagation of any particular faith... The object of a University is intellectual and not moral, and... the significance of the teaching of the history of religions must be intellectual and not 'religious' in the traditional sense of the term" (Kitagawa, pp. 28-29).
11. See for a case in point, "Christliches Verstandnis des Islam" by Fazlu-r-Rahman and Isma'il Ragi al Faruqi, being their reviews of Kenneth Cragg's *Call of the Minaret and Sandals at the Mosque*, in *Kairos: Zeitschrift für Religionswissenschaft und Theologie*, Heft 3-4, 1961, 225-33.
12. On this point no comparativist has been as clear and vehement or as clearly committed as Wilfred Cantwell Smith. In his "Comparative Religion: Whither—and Why?" (Kitagawa, p. 42) he wrote: "No statement about a religion is valid unless it can be acknowledged by that religion's believers." His reason for this assertion however, is not self-evident. He claims that this is so because "faith is a quality of men's lives. All religions are new religions, every morning. For religions do not exist up in the sky somewhere, elaborated, finished, and static; they exist in men's hearts" (p. 34). That some, many, or all present day adherents believe something to be their religion proves no more than it asserts, viz. that those adherents believe that their religion consists of thus and so. This is a long way from asserting that that religion is itself thus and so. For it is not impossible that those adherents might have fallen under other determinants than their coreligionists whether past or present, and have betrayed, or at least changed, the trust of the fathers. Indeed, if faith were really a mere quality of men's lives, it would be absurd to speak of development in religion, of the history of a religion. For what we have would not be the history of religions, or of a religion, but a substrate-less succession of faith-states devoid of sequence or order. To order these states into any kind of sequence is to presuppose a 'nature of that religion' other than the faith-states of its adherents, which is the substrate of the changing faith-states. For a further critical analysis of Professor Smith's stand, see, Isma'il Ragi al Faruqi, "Urubah and Religion: An

- Analysis of the Fundamental Ideas of Arabism and of Islam as Its Highest Moment of Consciousness," *On Arabism*, Amsterdam: Djambatan, 1962, I, 58-59.
13. Answers of 'Quislings' must be ruled out; as, for instance, Stephen Neill uses in his *Christian Faith and Other Faiths: The Christian Dialogue with Other Religions*, London: Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 28. So must answers given verbally devoid of written authority; for the suspicion can never be removed that, if empirically true, it was misunderstood, or given under the requirement to be polite and avoid controversy or in the atmosphere of a Shepherd's Hotel tea room. A case in point is Prof. W. C. Smith's *Islam in Modern History*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957, pp. 99-100, 120. Equally must be ruled out unauthorized, undocumented answers given by the historian of religions gratuitously on behalf of the religious authorities of another religion, such as Stephen Neill gives on, p. 46, on behalf of "the authorities of the al-Azhar University in Cairo."
 14. Alfred Guillaume, *Prophecy and Divination*, London: Hodder & Stoughton, Ltd., 1938, pp. 415-20.
 15. This method was used by the present author in his attempt to reconstruct Christian doctrine (see his *On Arabism*, I, 63-69). At this writing, the work in question has not yet appeared and it is not possible to predict the sort of reaction which his reconstruction will evoke in Christian circles.
 16. In the author's forthcoming *A Perspective of the History of Religion in the Near East*.
 17. Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Idea*, trans. by R. B. Haldane, and J. Kemp., London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1948, I, 516-20; III, 460-68.
 18. Kitagawa, "The History of Religions in America".
 19. *Ibid.*
 20. *Ibid.*, pp. 42-46.
 21. *Ibid.*, p. 23. "The answer [to the problem of teaching the History of Religion] is to be found... in the aim of education... [which] is intellectual and not moral... intellectual and not religious." (*Ibid.*, p. 29) Evidently to study, as Christians, to understand, and then to communicate with non-Christians concerning their own religions, is not even the object of the comparative discipline.
 22. Stephen Neill, *Christian Faith and Other Faiths: The Christian Dialogue with Other Religions*, London: Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 4.
 23. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
 24. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
 25. "These [principles] are not yet beliefs or doctrines; they lie behind all doctrines and make possible the formulation of doctrines" (*Ibid.*).
 26. *Ibid.*
 27. *Ibid.*
 28. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
 29. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
 30. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
 31. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
 32. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
 33. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
 34. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
 35. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
 36. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
 37. *Ibid.*, sub-title of the book.
 38. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
 39. "The church cannot compromise on its missionary task without ceasing to be the church. If it fails to see and to accept this responsibility, it is changing the Gospel

into something other than itself" (*Ibid.*).

40. *Ibid.*, p. 69.
41. *Ibid.*
42. *Ibid.*
43. Matthew 7:3; Luke 6:41.
44. Hendrik Kraemer, *Religion and the Christian Faith*, Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1957, p. 45.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 46. "This pretension of and quest for objectivity persists in many quarters," he writes, "in spite of the fact that on-going philosophical and epistemological reflection has demonstrated that complete objectivity, especially in regard to the sciences which deal with creations and life-conditions of man, is a fiction. Every philosophy, every way of thinking, every way of research, starts with a fundamental assumption and attitude about God, man and the world." (*Ibid.*)
46. *Ibid.*, p. 48.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 50.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 52.
49. Otto's comparison of Sankara and Meister Eckhard suffers the brunt of Kraemer's criticism. Kraemer suggests more reasons for contrast than Otto gives for comparison.
50. "All religions, all philosophies and world views are the various efforts on the part of man to apprehend the totality of existence, often stirring in their sublimity and as often pathetic or revolting in their ineffectiveness. Since this universal and diversified effort is man's effort, it is quite natural that there should be an amazing amount of convergence as to aspirations, ideas, institutions, symbolic, intuitions and aberrations in all the religions of mankind." (*Ibid.*, p. 44).
51. *Ibid.*, pp. 62-63.
52. *Ibid.*, p. 60.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 62.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 52. "Boasting about one's own religion" Kraemer further writes, "its excellency and superiority, coupled with delight in condemnation of other religions, is, as everybody knows, one of the most frequent sins of men everywhere." (*Ibid.*, p. 83).
55. *Ibid.*
56. *Ibid.*, pp. 83, 67.
57. A. C. Bouquet, *The Christian Faith and Non-Christian Religions*, London: James Nisbet & Co., Ltd., 1958, p. 9.
58. *Ibid.*
59. *Ibid.*, pp. 166-79; 317-23.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
61. *Ibid.*
62. The words are Lyttleton's, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 21.
63. *Ibid.*
64. *Ibid.*
65. James B. Conant, *Modern Science and Modern Man*, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1954, pp. 107ff.
66. *Ibid.*, Ch. II.
67. *Ibid.*, Ch. III.
68. *Ibid.*, Ch. IV.
69. *Ibid.*, Ch. V.
70. *Ibid.*, Ch. VI.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

72. According to Bouquet, the Qur'an contains materials borrowed from the Talmud and other extra-canonical Jewish literature, etc. To Bouquet, who knows no Arabic, this is a "very obvious" fact (Bouquet, p. 168). The Prophet Muhammad is, furthermore, alleged "to have misunderstood it, or to have had only a very scrappy and imperfect acquaintance with it, and it is most certain that at times he totally misconceived the nature of orthodox Christianity" and Bouquet blames him for having embarked upon a great movement of religious reform starting "from a whole chain of misunderstandings." (*Ibid.*) Muhammad is then said to have rallied the Arabs in the cause of widening their *Lebensraum* (*sic. Ibid.*, p. 70). Worse yet, he is compared to Luther in holding the allegiance and affection of the Arabs as the former had done with the Germanic peoples, and also with Adolph Hitler. For comparativist, strictly scientific Bouquet, both Hitler and Muhammad had the same slogan of "One people, one faith, one leader" (*Ibid.*). Furthermore, Bouquet endorses the judgement of some critics that the Qur'an is "a dreary welter," comparable to Mrs. Eddy's *Science and Health* (*Ibid.*, p. 171). After all this vituperation, Professor Bouquet bemoans the fact that "the Christian and Moslem movements drifted into opposition" (*Ibid.*, p. 172) unmindful of how little conducive his own unscholarly, unsubstantiated diatribes against Islam are to the cause of mutual understanding between the two world-religions.
73. Tr. by Johanna Powers, New York: The MacMillan Co., 1951.
74. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
76. *Ibid.*
77. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
78. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
79. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
80. *Infra*, pp. 193-223.
81. Schweitzer, *op. cit.*, p. 36.
82. *Ibid.*
83. *Ibid.*, p. 60.
84. *Ibid.*, p. 36. We shall discuss this doctrine later. See *infra*, pp. 193-223.
85. The metaphysical nature of Christian redemption is discussed *infra*, pp. 223-36.
86. Schweitzer, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

PART ONE

What is the Ethic of Jesus?

Chapter I

THE JEWISH BACKGROUND: JEWISH ETHIC

The ethic of Jesus is best understood when projected against the background of the ethic of the Jews. For Jesus was a Jew among Jews. He was born in their midst. He was brought up under the influence of their spirit, their consciousness, their ethic. He conceived of himself primarily as a person endowed with a mission whose starting point on earth was the Jewish community. Recognizing this fact, the Qur'an proclaimed: "And when Isa, Son of Mary, said, 'O people of Israel, I am God's prophet sent to you, confirming the Torah....'"¹ The Jews, for their part, did not fail to see in Jesus the beginning of a movement designed to effect a radical revolution in their spirit, their system, their ethic, and they resolved to put an end to Jesus' activity and life in order to protect, as they thought, the higher interest of that system and spirit. In order to understand the Jewish situation at the time of Jesus, one has to go back to the Exile and earlier times; one has to understand the ethic against which Jesus launched his revolution; and for this reason, one has to examine the rise of that ethic and uncover its inner ideas in the making.

The Nature of Hebrew Racialism

Across the wide canvas of ancient history, one repeatedly comes across states and empires that rise to power, hold the scene for some time, and then decay and fall into oblivion. These states and empires usually begin their rise in the dark corners of the ancient world about which the then contemporary world knew comparatively little, and often they inherit the territory and population of their dying predecessors. In the movement of one empire to another, three different modalities of being come into view. First, there is the territory which persists through all change. Towns and villages may be destroyed and put to the torch, and the countryside may be ravaged. Indeed, even the geography of the land may be changed through the destruction of plant life and the diversion of rivers. But the earth nonetheless remains as the substratum on which these changes take place. The territory of a dying state does not die with that state.

Diametrically opposed to this modality of being peculiar to the territory of a state, there is that of the state proper, the body politic. This is an intangible being which exists in the association of men as political parties, as government, as armies. Unlike that of things, its nature consists of relations; but these relations are no less real than things. The political relation which is the 'stuff' of which states and empires are made is that of a willingness on the part of all subjects to do that which some of them, as government, have the will to command to be done. The nature of the content of the relation, that of which the relation is the embodiment has, for the most part, not been ideational, like democracy, socialism, and fascism of modern times, or like the *Dar al Islam* and Christian Commonwealth ideas of the Middle Ages. Rather, it was concrete and stood embodied in the living person of a monarch, a leader, or a group of oligarchs. The political relation was brought into play when the monarch, leader, or oligarchs willed and the government, army, and people did or resisted what was commanded. The state, therefore, was literally the person or persons standing in their relation of commanding and of being obeyed. When it died, whether violently or otherwise, its being was annihilated. The political relation as vehicle for the state certainly remained, for it is as much a 'thing' as the territory is. But its content, the state, came actually to nought. This usually took place by killing or taking captive the king, his ministers and courtiers, the political leaders, the oligarchs, and the officers of the army if not the greater number of its men.

Standing between these two extremes of absolute persistence and absolute annihilation was the population of the state. This was the most fluid element of any ancient state or empire. At the death of a state or empire, its surviving population would adapt itself to the new situation and allow its political relation to carry the content of the new order. Of course this process of adaptation could take time; and it might not come about at all, in which case the 'state' would sooner or later come to be involved in another struggle for existence. In the long run, however, the population would acquiesce to the new order and thus fuse into the being of another state or empire. In most cases, this fusion of populations took place in intermarriage, in adopting a cult, a new religion, and above all, a new language. The reasons why such fusions did take place may be wide and many. Important among them was the absence of an ideational character of the state such as the later history of mankind was to witness, and, perhaps, the close pre-existent affinity, in matters of language, cult, or life-view, between the states engaged in such fusion. Human life has always managed to adapt itself to new situations. In the cataclysms of ancient history, it has managed to regroup its forces if but to cast them into the new moulds history provided, despite all losses in blood and members.

These modalities of being would be universal were it not for the case of the Hebrews and their descendants, the Jews. Many were the states and empires that rose, waxed strong, decayed, and were superseded by, and their populations fused with those of, the rising ones. These 'operations' of ancient history were as common as they were fierce, accompanied as they always were, with violence and bloodshed. No case, however, bears any resemblance to that of Israel which defied this 'logic' of being-in-history and sought to preserve its population safe and eternal despite the vicissitudes of fortune to which their state, Judah, and their ethnic community, Israel, were subject in the two millenia preceding the birth of Jesus.

The will to perpetuate a population unchanged amidst the change of history is a phenomenon that we encounter only in the history of the Jews. Most sociologists, as well as most humans involved in the change, would deem the value of the population as carrier of apolitical relation different from the value of that political relation itself. The two need not always be realized or violated together. Where a choice must be made, it is possible to realize the one and violate the other. Thus the peoples of ancient times upheld the value of human life over and against the value of the political relationship of the state. When the latter was doomed to pass away, their pursuit of human life enabled them to become carriers of a new political relationship, to become the human *matériel* of another state. Thus the population of the Fertile Crescent, with the exception of Jewry, became Akkadians, Amorites, Egyptians, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Persians, Hellenes, and Islamic as the Empires known by these names came or went. Likewise, it was possible for a nascent political being to be grafted on the body of a population other than that in which it was born, as have witnessed the greater number of ancient empires and the Islamic Empire was to witness in a later age. The Jews alone, on the other hand, regarded both values as indissoluble and made the one a mere function of the other. For them, human life was valueless unless it carried their own political idea. Nor were they at any period of their history sufficiently idealistic to value the political idea more than human life, and therefore, lay down their lives for the sake of the political idea as man—Christian or Muslim, Western or Communist—was to do in later times. They were too realistic for that. The two values were kept in absolute equilibrium and union.

This equivalence between the two values of population and political relation, the equivalence of the carrier with that of which he is the carrier, is precisely what sociologists call 'racialism'. The 'race' is never a purely chemical or biological idea.² It always contains the immaterial element of the political relation. It never stands on that relation alone, but always finds itself indissolubly wedded to a population which the 'racialist' seeks

to perpetuate as the carrier of that relation. The Hebrews were the first racialists of human history. They are so to this present day. Their whole history is the story of this racialism and is incomprehensible except under its terms.

Hebrew Scripture as Record of Hebrew Racialism

That the whole of Hebrew and Jewish history is the story of this racialism has been contended by many from a variety of motives and points of view. The Jews whom, above all, it concerns, generally accept the thesis that their scripture is *theirs*, and *only theirs*; that they have a perfect right to understand it as they please, since it was written in their language, by their ancestors, and for their benefit; that the only standpoint from which it can properly be understood is that of Jewish history, their history, pure and simple, especially as the greater part of its narratives and poems treats of their history and was written for their edification. Hence their typical aversion to proselytism of any kind, the self-centeredness with which their Scripture has been interpreted in a tradition that has remained 'rabbinic' for ages. These are only the effects of a racist view of man and the world to which the Jew, for the most part, has been addicted. However, it would be a sad state if the history, whether political or cultural, of a people, could be properly read and understood only by the members of that people or their descendants. And this would have had to be the case if the early history of a people were such that no facts could prove or disprove it, as in the case of a myth. Even then, the myth itself, its genesis, advent, and decay may be regarded as the *facta* of that people's consciousness enlightening us, if not about the early history of which the myth tells, at least about the later consciousness that is mythologized.

Fortunately, the danger of Hebrew history ever escaping us is not real. Archaeology has established beyond doubt the historicity of the greater part of Hebrew history, at least after the Exodus. It is now possible to read this history accurately with a few variations in dates pertaining to the early periods. Whether or not the records of that history uphold the racist pursuit of the race concept, whether or not they are meant to record and to inculcate the consciousness of a people for whom the value of human life was equivalent to that of the political relationship it carried, is, thanks to archaeology and the resultant reconstruction of ancient history, a question which can be answered decisively by an empirical study of given data, among which, the text of Hebrew Scripture is the foremost, most eloquent, and adequate evidence.

On the other hand, the Scripture text relative to Hebrew History before

the Exodus may be looked upon in two different ways. It may be regarded as history, as true a record of what had actually taken place as was humanly possible to produce in those days. Or it may be regarded as legend created by poetical genius, as a means whereby that consciousness of the creator would mirror and contemplate itself. In either way, there can be little doubt that either the pre-Exodus Patriarchal Hebrews or those of later times who created *Genesis*, were the world's first racialists. From the first human family in the Garden of Eden, among whose children God discriminated irrationally,³ to the Exodus from Egypt, God has shown, according to these Scriptures, a bias in favour of one man, one family, or one party. There are times when this bias is earned by virtue and good deed, as in the case of Noah, for example. But in most cases the bias is irrational and groundless. Whether it is taken as the judgement of God or of the Hebrews upon themselves, the significance of the bias is the same. The Hebrew, this prejudice means to assert, is better than the non-Hebrew because he stands in a certain relation to his race, a relation whose value, the value of his existence *per se*, is declared equivalent therewith. Because of the absolute equivalence of the two values, the Hebrew esteems himself, or God esteems him, as standing above the human kind, for whom he has coined the only word of its kind in any language, viz., *goyim*, or non-Jews.⁴ Since the relation of which the Hebrew is the carrier is valueless without the carrier to whom it is indissolubly wedded, the intangible nature of it did not fail to produce in time, a physical correlate to serve as an index of that relation and evidence of its existence. This was 'the covenant in the flesh'.⁵

There may be some Jews who, in ancient or modern times have persistently refused to identify themselves with the majority of their kind in understanding Hebrew Scripture in racist terms. Their point of view is certainly respectable and, when supported by a number of scriptural passages which definitely point in that direction, is morally of the worthiest and therefore, the most likely to have emanated from Heaven. They not only have our greatest admiration, but stand, fundamentally, in our camp, from which that which is called 'Hebrew Scripture' is regarded as a heavily edited, oft-changed version of that divine Torah which God had entrusted to Moses, and the 'Jews' are regarded as those who gave up that divinely inspired pattern for the sake of tribalist self-seeking and assertion and the preservation of their race. We, therefore, take no issue with these 'unjewish' or rather, 'truly Mosaic' Jews but, rallying ourselves to them, we join them in their defence of the genuinely Mosaic revelation and tradition against the racialists. For the purpose of the argument in this chapter, there seems therefore to be no need to regard them as contending our thesis. This part of the present writing is a con-

firmation of their position.

The other group of contenders have been the Christians. They represent by far the most important challenge to the thesis that *Hebrew Scripture* is the record of Jewish racialism, and have produced the most forceful, if oft fanciful, apologetics in their support of it as the true 'word of God'.

For twenty centuries, Christianity has been at pains to explain this racist history of the Hebrews it has adopted as Scripture. The first Christians were Jews and for them, the only Scripture that could exist was the Hebrew Scripture; namely, the Torah, the Prophetic literature, and the Writings. The Hellenes' resort to allegorical interpretation by means of which they tried to re-present the old myths and legends of Greek poetry was well known to the Alexandrian Jews.⁶ These too have resorted to it in order to re-present their Scripture to themselves as harmonizing with the culture of the times, to reconcile them with Greek philosophy to which they had been converted. Following in their footsteps, the first Christians who, for the most part, were converted Jews, availed themselves of allegorical interpretation in order to bring the Hebrew Scripture into harmony with the teachings of their new faith. Once this Jewish influence on the Christian mind passed away—and we can say that though Jewish Christians had dropped out of the history of Christianity by the end of the first century, Jewish influence lingered on for several centuries later—the Hebrew Scripture, now known as the 'Old Testament' was looked upon as a book whose value was the provision of background material for the career of Jesus. In the Reformation, the Old Testament was brought back as 'Scripture' and interest in its original Hebrew form was cultivated. Henceforward, the Protestants took Hebrew Scripture to be the word of God, on a par with the New Testament as far as holiness, authority, and revelatory status were concerned. The old practice of the church as 'Guardian of the Scripture' and as its sole interpreter persisted through many centuries, for it was not until the sixteenth century that the Bible, as we know it today, became the property of anyone who cared to purchase a copy.⁷

The popularization of the Bible brought with it the inculcation of the belief that the Old Testament is the revealed word of God, *verbatim*. But as the Christian mind broke down the chains of scholasticism and church dogmatism and began to exercise its newly won freedom of enquiry in science as well as morals and religion, it could no more accept the Hebrew Scripture as it stood. Old Testament criticism continued to deal one blow after another to *verbatim* acceptance of Hebrew Scripture until only the naive fundamentalist was left to hold the old view. In time, about a hundred years ago, German Old Testament scholars hit upon the notion

of Hebrew history as *Heilsgeschichte*, or salvation-history. This notion helped them in completely overthrowing *verbatim* revelation and replacing it with the idea of a sustained revelation in a whole series of historical events over two millenia, all designed and predetermined to lead to and to culminate in the Incarnation.

The most notable advantage of the new vision of the Old Testament as *Heilsgeschichte* was its attempt to ethicize Hebrew racialism. This does not mean that the rationalization of Hebrew racialism motivated the production of the *Heilsgeschichte* theory. Racialism has never seemed as odious to Christian eyes as it did to Islamic eyes, and popular antagonism to it has not been stirred in Christendom until our century. But it does mean, nonetheless, that the justification of the morally unworthy character of the Hebrews emerged as its greatest effect. *Heilsgeschichte* gave racialism an ethical purpose, viz., the redemption of man through the incarnation. It attributed its authorship to God and thus absolved the Hebrews from responsibility for what they did, said, or thought about it. Every item, event, or idea in the Old Testament, this view held, was God-inspired, God-incepted, and God-done, to the end that the nexus of history begun in the election of Abraham would reach the incarnation for which it was meant. But a guilt is a guilt and an evil, an evil. It does not become innocence and good by changing authors. On the contrary, since in this case the author is God Himself, from Whom only the good can proceed, the moral unworth of an evil deed increases when attributed to Him. From a misdeed, such attribution transforms the evil act into a self-contradiction. No ethically-determined conscience can deny that the racist election of the Jews was anything but wrong; that the continuation of their election despite all moral unworth—their unrighteousness and stiff-neckedness are proverbial even on the lips of their own prophets—is doubly so.

Far more ominous still, are the implications *Heilsgeschichte* holds for the nature of God. According to its advocates, salvation history begins with the election of Abraham. It must, therefore, explain human history before Abraham. But this history, *Heilsgeschichte* is unable to explain except as unsuccessful haphazard measures on the part of God in His attempt to deal with the problem of evil. The creation of woman, the banishment from paradise and man's subjection to labour and suffering, and, finally, his annihilation in the universal Deluge—all these divine measures were tried and failed before God 'hit' upon an effective method of redressing His own creature. Indeed, many of these advocates contradict the theory itself when they recognize in the racist reconstruction of Ezra and Nehemiah the turning point at which God, despairing of the Jews being His emissaries to man, took upon Himself the task of entering

the world and saving man by vicarious suffering. All this implies that God works *in staccato*, changing His strategy according to circumstance, in compromise of His omnipotence, omniscience, wisdom, and goodness. It contradicts His creation plan in which He endowed man, 'in His own image', with the faculty and will to know and to act freely rather than to suffer, to be moved like a puppet on the canvas of history.

Thus the Christian attempt at ethicizing Hebrew racialism has never worked; and the problem of making its document, the Old Testament, meaningful in and relevant for the present, the problem of its *Vergegenwärtigung*, as the Germans call it, is a problem besetting the great minds of Christendom to this day. The truth is that Hebrew racialism is unethicizable and the sooner Christianity gets rid of it altogether, the quicker will it be able to move in the footsteps of Jesus.

The Christians have traditionally dissociated the Jew-after-Christ from the Jew or Hebrew of ancient history. The former, they recognized as an ingrate rebel who has rejected Christ, separated himself from mankind and bent himself upon himself in yearning after a lost material glory—in short as a racist still pursuing a lost race. The Christians held the Jew before Christ in an ambivalent category. He was God's chosen and prophet as well as the accursed of God and the damned. With the introduction of *Heilsgeschichte*, and the resultant need to find a point at which God took the decision to assume man's guilt and atone for him, the Christian scholar found a solution to this old ambivalence. This the inauspicious governorships of Nehemiah and Ezra in the fifth century B.C. provided. It appeared to the Christian mind that 'the will to Israel' as a spiritual kingdom (which Christianity had since the Apostolic Fathers read into the later prophets by means of allegorical interpretation) was not only true but was in fact repudiated in the doings of Ezra and Nehemiah, in their re-establishment of the political Israel with all its equivalence of population and political relation, its racialism in the flesh, and its governance of life by the Torah, rather than by the so-called 'ethical' vision of an Amos or Micah. This, the Christian mind convinced itself, was a rejection by the Jews of what God had pre-ordained for them.

But the Christian was wrong. The books of Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel were not written for *his* benefit; so that, several centuries later he may, through allegorical interpretation, pull them out of their Jewish context and force upon them meanings which they clearly did not intend. In understanding them in the racist way, the post-exilic Jew was true to a tradition that went back a millenium and a half. Furthermore, allegorical interpretation is an idle attempt to find evidence where there is none. For once the natural meaning of a word intuitable by the speaker of the language immediately upon presentation in consciousness is discarded in

favour of another not so intuitable but deducible from a set of axioms arrived at esoterically through initiation, then every other meaning must be possible on the same grounds.

Moreover, the Christian is far from having established that the visions of the later prophets were not racialistic visions. They all speak of an incorruptible remnant of Jewry that justifies Jewish election; they all speak of a return to Jerusalem in Judah and of a re-establishment there of a Jewish kingdom *en chair et en os*. They all yearn for an Israel that will dominate its neighbours—nay, the whole world—and whose king would rule the *goyim* and thus avenge the sufferings his ancestors have suffered.⁸

Beyond Ezra and Nehemiah the Christian is not capable of explaining Jewish racialism. For though he may be prepared to condemn the Jews of their time as racialists, he cannot impute guilt to the earlier Jews without, as we have seen, undermining his own faith in *Heilsgeschichte*. No wonder then that only a liberal Jew, Sigmund Freud,⁹ and a Muslim disciple, M. Kamil Hussayn,¹⁰ have attempted it. For both Freud and Hussayn, Jewish racialism is as old as the Exodus from Egypt. This was the one event which forged the Hebrews into a race and endowed them with a racist consciousness that has remained in evidence throughout Jewish history to the present day.¹¹ This liberal Jewish and liberal Muslim opinion though, proved to be no less wrong than that of the Christians. Martin Buber questions¹²: "How could the Hebrew refugees from Egypt who crossed the Red Sea stand in front of Sinai as they stood, unless they already had the consciousness of being an 'Israel'? Unless, in other words, the Hebrews had already the consciousness of being an Israel, elected of God above the nations and launched on a history-making career, unless, in short, they were already racialists, it could not have been possible for them to enter into covenant with God at Sinai. To Buber's must be added the further evidence that the Hebrews could not have resisted assimilation in Egypt, and there maintained a separate identity and a live consciousness of a return to Canaan had they not already been Israel. Even before the migration to Egypt, there is the most eloquent evidence of all, that of Jacob's treatment of the Shechemites who had dared, through circumcision with the will to become Hebrews, identify themselves with Israel. In Hebrew eyes, for a *goy* to identify himself with the Hebrews was a crime worthy of death, as was to befall the universalist Shechemites. Finally, the very beginning of Hebrew election, viz., the call to Abraham, Hebrew Scripture represents as an arbitrary call, made by God for no reason at all except that the Jew is a Jew, and later interpreted by *Heilsgeschichte* as the beginning of a pre-determined nexus of events, but itself no less arbitrary than in the Jewish view. For, granted God wanted to act and to choose, and thus to incept a

Heilsgeschichte, why did He elect Abraham and the Hebrews? Here the Christian and the racist Jew agree. Both answer, "Because the Jew is a Jew", though the former puts it more humbly as "It is not given for man to inquire into God's mind."

This Christian obsession to uphold the history of Hebrew racialism, however Christianity may represent it through interpretation, this obsession which Christianity inherited from the first Christians who were converts from Judaism, has stood all these centuries as a barrier against a clear and frank appreciation of the mission of Jesus. For it was against it—with all that it implies for the spirit, ethic, and felicity of human existence—that Jesus launched his great revolution. It is most unfortunate that for twenty centuries, the followers of Christ have underrated the significance of this revolution which their divinely-inspired lord has successfully brought about and for which he paid so dearly. The revolution of Jesus is itself incomprehensible unless it is understood against this racialistic ethic of his contemporaries. To this ethic, therefore, we must now turn.

The Ethico-Political Situation at the Time of Jesus

The Jews, at the time of Jesus, were leading an unhappy and precarious existence. They had succumbed to an internal division which was not unrelated to the rampant divergence of their spiritual and ethical views. Indeed, their division was in some respects the effect of, though in turn, it may have helped to crystallize, that divergence. "For two full centuries," writes W. F. Albright, "from circa 130 B.C. to A.D.¹⁰, Jewish religious life was characterized by this party conflict in which the Pharisees gained ground steadily at the expense of their more aristocratic brethren."¹³ The former were the diehards, the ultra-conservative nationalists, or better, racist separatists who, in the interest of the re-establishment of the political kingdom of Judah and the material grandeur of Solomon's Jerusalem, lived on and for that hope alone. They conceived of the Torah, or the Law, as a body of statutes which command absolute and literal obedience and loyalty. For, by such absolute and literal obedience, they hoped to reproduce the life of the Jews under the great kings, which they interpreted as being due to such obedience on the part of their forbears. For them, the best was this idealized past and the present was an evil decay for which they thought they alone had the cure. Their very name pointed to their 'separation' from the rest of mankind—indeed, from even their Jewish brethren. They were the most steadfast followers of that arch-separatist, Ezra, who in the first half of the fourth century B.C., led

the conservative forces of the Jews and developed religious Judaism for their benefit.¹⁴ This Judaism consisted in the idea of the Torah as the full revelation of God and the duty of learning and obeying its teachings and commandments.¹⁵ Numerically, they may not have been many; but they certainly commanded the greatest influence in preserving the Torah while making its commandments effective in common life, and were looked upon with reverence by the common people.¹⁶ Their will to reproduce, and to continue, Hebrew ancient history accorded with their enforcement of the older parts of Hebrew Scripture which they associated with that history. "The religion of the Pharisees," writes an authority on them, "was an attempt to realize in practice the teaching of the prophets as part of the all-inclusive Torah."¹⁷ In this they had recourse to no small extent to the oral traditions of the Rabbis' interpretations of the Torah; but their fidelity thereto was as literal as it was to the Torah itself.

The means they acknowledged as legitimate were those of deduction from the texts of the Torah. A new provision that is desirable to promulgate would have to be presented as a deduction from some text of the law. In case no such relating of the old to the new by the strict modes of logical deduction was possible, the projected provision would have to be abandoned.¹⁸ This deduction usually moved from the general to the particular, or from the given particular to the general and then to a new particular, the purpose being always that of deducing from the letter of the law itself justification for new particular rules and customs.¹⁹ The only other means acknowledged by the Pharisees was the distension of the meaning of the expression 'Law of the Fathers' so as to include not only the law which had been written down but also that which was orally transmitted and which included the present (new) customs and practice.²⁰

The Sadducees too, were struck by the pressing needs of an ever changing world. Like the Pharisees, they had found the Torah's provisions to be getting progressively more inadequate to meet the requirements of on-going life. That segment of human activity which the provisions of the Torah covered became progressively smaller. Perhaps they were even more aware than the Pharisees that the turns which the political fate of the Jews underwent did not fail to produce changes in their public and private circumstances in which the Torah itself could not be applied. But the method they devised for meeting the new needs was different. Whereas the Pharisees sought the 'new' legislation by inference and deduction from the letter of the law, the Sadducees sought it by *ad hoc* promulgation through priestly decrees. Like the logicalism of the Pharisees, this method too had a tradition. Moreover, the Sadducees pointed to a specific authority conferred upon them by the Torah itself. Deuteronomy 17:9-11 had laid it down that the priest would have authority to give his

own judgement, presumably in both the cases where the Torah is silent and where its provision is deemed by him inadequate and in need of a further judgement.²¹ The punishment for non-compliance with these provisions was not less than death itself.²²

Apparently, the Pharisee-Sadducee conflict was sheer competition for power. The latter were the authority in control of the temple until its destruction in A.D. 70, and for a long time before that they had led Jewish life. The authority which they invoked the Torah as giving was vested in themselves since they were the priests. The Pharisees, holding no official function in the temple, were lay men, despite their detailed knowledge of the Torah and their memorization of masses of inferred provisions and arguments. The power to govern and to mould Jewish life was therefore in their hand. Apparent as this power-struggle aspect of the conflict may be, it does not explain the conflict. And the question, why could not the Pharisees agree to the Sadducees' exercise of a legitimate (Torah-ic) power remains without answer.

The answer, however, must be ideological. It may be found in their respective evaluation of the race. The matrix of this evaluation was their attitude to the Law which, after Ezra, had been constantly regarded as the cement which holds and *perpetrates the separateness of the race from the rest of mankind*. The Pharisees were all for absolute literal observance. As such, they stood fully at the center of the Ezraic tradition, holding the value of the race, of the Chosen People as a racial-political entity, supreme. What they did not like in the Sadducees' position was not their exercise of law-given authority, nor even the addition by decree of extraneous matters to the Law corpus. These were both legitimate as well as old. That which the Pharisees could not tolerate was the Sadducees' lukewarm loyalty to the Jewish race as a separate racial-political entity. As Hasmoneans, the Sadducees had too well learnt from the Maccabean tragedy the lesson that the separatist pursuit of the chosen race would soon bring them to greater disaster at the hands of their enemies, whether neighbouring or across the seas.

The Pharisees, therefore, continuously harassed the Sadducees and publicly accused them. Sadducee liberalism was branded as licence, and their progressivism as treason to Hebrew Scripture and the covenant of Ezra by which the Scripture was to be upheld in all matters until the destruction of the temple in A.D. 70, put an end to Sadducee leadership and influence. Henceforth, the Pharisees alone were to govern Jewish life in pursuit of a boundless conservatism in the literalist observance of the Torah and a racialist separatism in the conduct of their public affairs.

Between these two and the ideological forces they represented stood the

mass of the Jewish people disillusioned, despondent, and nonetheless wistfully looking forward to a Messiah, or deliverer, who would set things right and re-establish their lost glory. Meanwhile, in the pursuit of the business of life, they compromised their Law as the circumstances of their political subjugation demanded. The pettiness of their disputes with one another is amply illustrated in the anecdotes of Jesus' life recorded by the evangelists. Whether or not one may work on the Sabbath, even though such work may be ethically or physically necessary; whether or not one may eat of certain dishes; whether or not one may eat without washing his hands etc. Obviously, these and similar questions did not raise insoluble problems. The answers to them are elementary. Rather, the Pharisees lacked the breadth of spirit with which to see the Law as a body of precepts designed to bring about a state of communion with God. Stultified by their political misfortunes, their moral sense could grasp no purpose, no value, beyond that of the compliance itself. The values at which the compliance aimed and which they were supposed to realize through the means of Torah-discipline and regimentation, escaped them. Only the outside shell of compliance was visible. Its value, though of the lower order of rank which belongs to elemental values, was all their moral sense could perceive. It was this elemental value of complying with law as such which dominated their ethical life. It had elbowed all other values out of their field of vision until only the equally elemental values of material being and subsistence remained. The Jews were not certain that even these would not be denied them any moment.

Compliance with the Law thus became with them an obsession. It governed their whole outlook; its malignant forces paralyzed their moral faculties. Jesus whom they thought they could trip into incriminating himself by forcing him to choose between the two horns of their compliance-dilemmas, rebutted them with his classic 'both-and' and 'neither-nor'. "Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites" was with him a constant reproach to them²³. "Ye make clean the outside of the cup and of the platter, but within they are full of extortion and excess;"²⁴ "ye pay tithe of mint and anise and cummin, and have omitted the weightier matters of the law, judgment, mercy, and faith: these ought ye to have done, and not to leave the other undone;"²⁵ "ye are like unto whited sepulchres."²⁶ For that is all they really cared for: a strict compliance, exteriorized movements meticulously observed without attention to nuances, to meanings, and final ends.²⁷

Six centuries after the advent of Jesus, the Jews were still the same. The Prophet Muhammad's experience with them was not unlike that of Jesus. Just as Jesus condemned their exteriorized compliance and hypocrisy, the Qur'an says of them, "the likeness of those who are entrusted with the

Torah [that they may realize it] and yet realize it not [despite their carrying it] is as the likeness of the donkey carrying a load of books;"²⁸ "those who have received the Scripture turn away from it when its substance is made the judge of their differences;"²⁹ "those unto whom the Scripture hath been given would rather take misguidance than guidance;"³⁰ "[the Jews] such as say with their mouths 'We believe', but their hearts believe not...listeners to falsehood...pulling words out of their context and meaning...greedy for illicit gain.... O People of the Scripture! Stress not in your religion anything but the truth and meaning [which is there in it]."³¹

The Cult of the Law

The cult of the law arose out of the political circumstances surrounding the Exile to Babylon. During the Exile, the Jews nursed the hope for a return to Judah and for a re-establishment of their sovereign state. Deutero-Isaiah painted this ideal of the return in most vivid colours³² and dared call the pagan Cyrus God's "anointed"³³ and God's "elect"³⁴ for giving the Jews the famous edict of restoration in the year 538 B.C. Cyrus permitted the Jews to return for purely political reasons. As they were enemies of his Chaldean enemies Cyrus thought he could make the Jews his allies by undoing the exile the Chaldeans had imposed upon them. Secondly, as enemies of Egypt, they might be used as a buffer region separating Egypt from his domain.³⁵ He must have deemed it advantageous to have a strong Judah as he not only released the captives but empowered them to rebuild the temple³⁶ and contributed thereto from the treasury of the Empire.³⁷

Not all the exiled Jews³⁸ responded to this stroke of extreme good fortune for the rebuilding of the Kingdom of Judah. As in modern times so many Jews have helped the Zionist movement achieve a second '*aliyah*, or return with money but refrained from going there in person, the Jews of Babylon helped in financing the scheme but few of them volunteered to go, as witness Ezra, Chapter 2 and Nehemiah, Chapter 7. For as their ancestors in Egypt had "increased abundantly, and multiplied, and waxed exceedingly mighty"³⁹—which is hardly disputable as a description of Jewry in the modern world—the exiles in Babylon were prosperous and happy enough not to want to return to Judah. As Josephus wrote of them, they were not willing to leave their possessions.⁴⁰ Thus only the fanatic Jews went, those for whom the return itself was more important than all the happiness and security available in Babylon. It should also be noted that before the Chaldeans, the Assyrians had deported many

Israelites in 720 B.C. But these did not preserve their identity and were melted into the humanity that composed the Assyrian Empire. Evidently there was a great difference in the ideologies of these two groups: the Assyrian exiles were of the Northern Kingdom, tolerant and universalistically-inclined like their ancestors, the Shechemites of Genesis. The Chaldean exiles were of Judah, fanatically racist. The former spread throughout the Empire; the latter concentrated themselves in very few places,⁴¹ notably in Tal Aviv, "the hill of the ears of grain," by the river Chebar in lower Babylonia. Thus, the Babylonian Jews were on the whole more fanatically racist than the other Jews of the empire, yet only the most fanatic of them made the decision to pack up and go. As a matter of fact, all the exiles were the aristocracy of Judah, or those who would have been the most nationally-conscious. Otherwise the Chaldeans would not have deemed them worthy to be deported. Exilic prosperity had weeded out the doubtful, i.e., the tolerant, among them; and we might say that those who did return were the ultra-separatists, the fanatic racists. It was to them that Cyrus gave the permission to return and rebuild the temple because he must have deemed their very racism useful as a bulwark against Egypt.

Naturally, when this little group of racial fanatics returned to Jerusalem, they did not like the sight of their brethren who, disillusioned by defeat and compelled by misery, had become less racist and tolerated some mixture with the surrounding countryside. Their cousins to the North, in Samaria, were even more advanced on the road of tolerance and universalism. Therefore, the returnees found them more deserving of their hatred and contempt. The first friction came when those who returned sought to rebuild the temple under Sheshbazzar. Though their ethic had diluted if not lost its Judaic racism, the other Jews of Judah and of Palestine continued to worship Jahweh.⁴² Hence, they were naturally interested in what their brethren from exile were attempting to do. Indeed, the rebuilding of Jerusalem and, especially, its temple, had never stopped being the desideratum of the lives of all Israelites and Jews.

Thus, as soon as the work on the temple began, the Jews of Palestine rushed in to help realize the object of their dreams. "No," answered those who came back, "You have not kept your race pure, nor your worship pure, nor your customs pure, but have tolerantly and universalistically assimilated yourselves to the race, worship and customs of the *goyim*. Thus everything you do is an abomination in the eyes of Jahweh."⁴³ Such a harsh position alienated the citizens of Samaria as well as the other Jews in Palestine. But as the racists had the support of the imperial government, they managed to keep all Jews but themselves and those who readily acquiesced to their ultra-conservatism from participating in the

work of restoration. The effects of this fanatic attitude were immediate. The Samaritans tried to reverse the order of the Persian government, and succeeded in bringing the work on the temple to a halt. When the returned exiles obtained the rescinding of the halting order, the Samaritans embarked on a series of delaying tactics.⁴⁴ Finally, losing their enthusiasm, the Palestinian Jews gradually drifted further towards assimilation. Though backed by the Persian government, the 'ultras' stood alone; and this affected their own morale most adversely: Their ears were tuned to the glowing dreams of Second Isaiah;⁴⁵ the facts however, were different. Treachery,⁴⁶ weakness,⁴⁷ poverty⁴⁸ and all kinds of miseries were threatening them. Rather than Isaiah's master race dominating 'the Isles' and giving its law to the *goyim*, Jahweh's kingdom was the smallest, the most arid, dilapidated, and insignificant corner in the world-empire. Their morale itself was at low ebb.⁴⁹ At these fateful moments in Jewish history, Nehemiah and Ezra joined energies to save the race of Judah.

Nehemiah, a Jewish eunuch cup-bearer of Darius the Great, took advantage of his closeness to the person of 'the Great King' to solicit from him permission to go to Jerusalem and help rebuild it. Darius appointed him governor in 445 B.C.⁵⁰, a post he kept for twelve years.⁵¹ Moreover, he was empowered to rebuild the city's fortifications and walls⁵²—a project the Samaritans had succeeded in stopping through a special order of the King whose suspicion they had aroused by alleged reports of insurrections.⁵³ Nehemiah succeeded in rebuilding the walls of Jerusalem by apportioning the work among the various families of repatriated exiles⁵⁴ and in restoring a fair measure of security.

Having established himself securely against foreign attack, in a fortified city, he now turned to its inhabitants, the Jews, to do his racist work. The Palestinian Jews' intermarriage with the *goyim*, i.e. the Judahites' intermarriage with Samaritans was, in his view, the height of abomination and he asked them all to divorce their wives. The high priests of Jerusalem were themselves allied in marriage to Sanballat, the governor of Samaria.⁵⁵ But Nehemiah was rebuffed. He left for the court of Darius, evidently aware that for his work to become complete he needed a new power from the King and new men to help him implement it. He stayed only a few days, making whatever arrangements he needed and returned to Jerusalem,⁵⁶ accompanied, or followed, by Ezra.⁵⁷

Ezra was an archfanatic racist with religious inclinations and a knowledge of the law. With the help of Nehemiah, Ezra came to Jerusalem armed with an edict from the king empowering him to enforce the Jewish law in the king's name and under his authority on all Jews in the large satrapy of Abar-Nahara (beyond the River, i.e. geographic Syria).⁵⁸ In addition to all the free 'grants-in-aid' which the central government of

the empire as well as its provincial treasuries had granted and promised to grant in the future for the benefit of the temple of Jerusalem, Ezra was also empowered to conduct throughout Babylon a 'United Jewish Appeal' and to launch an 'Israel Government Bonds' sale.⁵⁹ Under the threat of confiscating all their property and condemning them to become outlaws,⁶⁰ the returned exiles and those Palestinian Jews who sympathized with them were coerced into divorcing their *goyim* wives,⁶¹ and pledging to mould every detail of their lives in strict compliance with the letter of the law⁶² as Ezra was to give it to them.

Undoubtedly, Ezra's law was not a legislation *ex nihilo*, but a crystallization of materials—literary texts as well as moral imperatives—with which the Jews had long been familiar.⁶³ The codification must have then been regarded as of especial worth. Its advantage lay in its unification of the ethos of all Jews and the concentration of their consciousness on one object: something which is at once the object of thought as well as of will. For in the codified law, the Jews began to see their identity, their duty, and their destiny. It was meant to satisfy their common religious, political, and social aspirations; to focus their outlook, their loyalty, and devotion upon one object. Ezra solicited and obtained—though by means of no small threat and coercion—every Jew's promise never to betray that codification. Thereby, he furnished Jewry with a new covenant, on a par with Jahweh's old covenant with the Patriarchs. For this service, Ezra won for himself the title of founder of Judaism and the gratitude and loyalty of Jews to the present day. In fact, he saved Jewry from dissolving into the body of humanity, from becoming human at all.⁶⁴

It is a strange phenomenon that men, when faced with total collapse, seek to survive by regrouping themselves around one single object of devotion. It is a wonder that their efforts succeed. By codifying the Law and making the whole religion equivalent to a literal observance of it, Ezra preserved Jewish racial identity. For, being direct, precise, clear, comprehensive and, above all, concrete, the law furnishes the faithful observant with a directive which relates his immediate, everyday act or problem to the religion. The law thus forges between him and his fellow-Jews an indissoluble bond of community. Jewish Law had definitely the purpose of making the Jews do certain things, so that by their doing them, an actual, concrete state of affairs would ensue; and this would constitute the communion between the members of their group. This real, concrete communion would then produce their survival by solidifying their consciousness around one pivot.

The Jews of Jesus' time were still living under the law of Ezra and for the most part, under his spirit. The Sadducees had sought to break this monopoly of the letter of the law—indeed of the law itself—by issuing

decrees based on what they deemed desirable in the new circumstances. But, as we have seen, their progressivist point of view did not live long. Pharisees' literalist conservatism, the strongest current in Jewish life until A.D. 70, swept everything before it after that date. Jewish ethics was a value-free, exteriorized body of rules of conduct that had lost its *raison d'être*; and, as Jesus himself saw, it was a genuine masquerade of piety.

Notes

1. Qur'an 61:6, see also 43:57-65 where God says, "The son of Mary... For he is but a servant blessed by Us and sent by Us as an example to the people of Israel."
2. Despite all allegations to the contrary, articulate nazism has always maintained that Aryan 'blood' is not what the biochemist studies in the laboratory, but is a symbol 'in the flesh' of an ideology that is inexplicable in physical terms. In "Völkische Erziehung aus Blut und Boden," *Internationale Zeitschrift für Erziehung*, III, 305-9, Ernst Krieck, foremost exponent of Nazi philosophy of education called blood "the shadowy stream of life" endowed with "symbolic significance," "leading into the realms of metaphysics," the "source of the spirit of the race," *das Dunkle, das Untergrundige*, "the representation of the current of life from which man ascends to light, spirit and knowledge."
3. Cf. the Cain and Abel myth, Genesis 4:1-6 ff.
4. It may be contended that the Hellenes too held themselves in such esteem and that they coined the term 'barbarian' to designate the non-Hellene. The fact that the Hellenes, and all other peoples did and do esteem themselves higher than the rest is universal and not in question. But the scale on which the bifurcation of Hellene-barbarian, or any other such distinction between one people and another stands, and in terms of which it is a function, is always axiological, be it ethical or aesthetic. Although, originally, the term designated the speaker of another tongue, and the Greeks, down to Plato and Aristotle, distinguished racially between Greeks and non-Greeks, Hellenic culture did develop, by the middle of the fourth century B. C., a universalism which rejected the earlier Greek racialism. In that Hellenic culture, crystallized in Isocrates' *Panegyricus* and Xenophon's *Anabasis*, the Hellene would call 'barbarian' any man of inferior, deficient standing on the moral and aesthetic scale, and his appellations were always connotative of that standing. It was unthinkable for him to join ethical goodness and/or aesthetic refinement to 'barbarism'. The Hebrew *goy* (pl. *goyim*) is utterly different because it is purely denotative in meaning and is axiologically connotative only by implication, after the appellation of the man in question had, as it were, been cast. In Hebrew terms, a *goy* may be ethically good and aesthetically refined. The acquisition of these virtues does not make him any less *goy*. The concept admits of no more-or-less. A man is *goy* purely because he is not a Jew, a son-of-the-covenant, a member of the Jewish race. *Per contra*, the Greek 'barbarian' is coterminous with ethical evil and aesthetic *grossièreté*. Whereas no Jew could under any circumstance be a *goy* though he may act like one, the Greek and the barbarian are both 'barbarian' as long as they do not act like Greeks, and stop being so when they do. It was under this Greek influence that Philo (*On the Life of Moses*, Bk. II, V) and Josephus, *The Jewish War*, Preface, Section I) applied the designation 'Upper barbarians' to the Jews who lived beyond the Euphrates. But it was not an influence strong enough

to cause them to apply the term *goy*. For an eloquent and enlightening presentation of the role Isocrates and Xenophon's thoughts played in Hellenism, see Werner Jaeger, *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture*, tr. by Gilbert Highet, New York: Oxford University Press, 1944, III, 7C ff., 156 ff., of which the following statement is exemplary: "At first sight it looks like a gigantic paradox for Isocrates to begin his proclamation of the supra-national civilizing mission of Greece by an extravagant utterance of national pride; but the apparent contradiction disappears when we connect the supra-national ideal of Greece—its universally valuable *paideia*—with the realistic political plan of conquering Asia. In fact, that ideal contains a higher justification for the new national imperialism, in that it identifies what is specifically Greek with what is universally human.... The Greeks, through the logos, over which they naturally have command, have revealed to other nations a principle which they too must recognize and adopt because its value is independent of race—the ideal of *paideia*, of culture.... Without the idea which he here expresses for the first time, the idea that Greek *paideia* was something universally valuable, there would have been no Macedonian Greek world-empire, and the universal culture which we call Hellenistic would never have existed." Jaeger, III, 80-81.

5. "He that is born in thy house, and he that is bought with thy money, must needs be circumcised; and my covenant shall be in your flesh for an everlasting covenant. And the uncircumcised man child whose flesh of his foreskin is not circumcised, that soul shall be cut off from his people; he hath broken my covenant" (Genesis, 17:13-14).
6. Philo was an archmaster of the art and he applied it ingeniously to Hebrew Scripture in order to reconcile it with the Neo-Platonic philosophy of the times.
7. Previous to that date, Christendom went through four centuries of strife and indecision regarding the publication of its Scripture. As late as the end of the eleventh century, Pope Gregory VII said "God has ordained that in some places Holy Scripture should remain unknown, because, if all could easily understand it, it might through being despised or misinterpreted, lead the people into error" (from an address on the history of the Bible by Dean S. B. Frost, McGill University Faculty of Divinity, Montreal, to the Canadian Biblical Society, 1961). In 1199, Innocent III complimented the Bishop of Metz because he had disciplined people in his diocese for reading the Scriptures in French in their own houses. The first direct prohibition against the publication of the Bible was issued by the Council of Toulouse in 1229 (obviously, prior to this, there was no possession of Holy Scripture by the laity to warrant the need for a prohibitive order), the fourteenth canon of which reads: "We also forbid the laity to possess any of the books of the Old or New Testament, except perhaps someone out of devotion wishes to have the Psalter or Breviary for the Divine offices... but we strictly forbid them having any of these books translated into the vulgar tongue" (*Ibid.*). Similarly the Synod of Oxford in 1408 enacted: "that no man hereafter by his own authority translate any text of scripture into English or any other tongue, and that, no man read any such book, pamphlet or treatise" (*Ibid.*). For over a millenium, the Church had in fact agreed with the sentiment expressed in Longfellow's poem by King Robert of Sicily, who heard in divine service the words: *Deposit potentes de sede, et exaltauit humiles* and on being told they meant "He hath put down the mighty from their seats and hath exalted them of low degree" replied:

Tis well that such seditious words are sung

Only by priests and in the Latin tongue (*Ibid.*).

This prohibition against the publication of what was claimed to be the Word of God was not merely the will of the Church to preserve 'the Latin Bible'; for that

has no more title to existence than the English or even the Greek. The Old Testament came to the Christians in Hebrew; and Jesus and his immediate disciples spoke Aramaic. The Church based its prohibition not on the verbatim sanctity of any language, but on its monopoly of understanding, interpreting, and distributing the elements and history of the faith. It is, in its case, a matter of pure will to power; for it was in order to preserve and maintain its power over the minds of Christendom that it prohibited the translation and the reading of Scripture. The fact that Latin went out of circulation was, for the Church, an effective shield against the people's acquaintance with 'the Word of God'. Even then, the Bible was not available to anyone who read Latin, but was severely kept under lock and key, and could be read only by those members of the clergy who were sufficiently indoctrinated to 'understand' it. Even Tyndale's English Bible had to be published outside of England, was confiscated like any other contraband item and burnt in public wherever it was found, and its author was banished when he first mentioned the idea of a translation. The Church's fear that the publication of the Bible would loosen its own grip over the minds of the people is best evidenced in the career of Henry VIII, who began as a protagonist and defender of the Church against the threat that the popularization of the contents of the Bible posed, but allowed the English Bible to be printed and read as soon as he broke away from the Church, and Cromwell took the office of Wolsey.

8. Thus, for example, Isaiah's good wishes on the occasion of Joiachim's having a baby, viz., "For unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given: and the government shall be upon his shoulder: and his name shall be called Wonderful, the mighty God, [a wrong translation of what means in Hebrew a God-like heir] The everlasting Father, The Prince of Peace," etc., etc. (Isaiah, 9:6) which George Händel popularized by setting to beautiful music in his famous *Messiah* and which the *ASV* calls "Christ's birth and Kingdom" is a piece of literature which, coming from the Exilic period, is certainly not an expression of the Messianic hope which is a later development. Nor is it an expression of Jewish hope for a king since at the time, the Jews had one, viz., Joiachim. Rather, it is an expression of Isaiah's hope that the future, ushered by Joiachim's new born son, may be a good one. It has, therefore, nothing to do with Christianity. Likewise, Isaiah's wishful description of the future awaiting Israel after its chastisement by Assyria (Isaiah 11:1-16) the Christians prefer to identify as "Christ's peaceable kingdom" (see *ASV*), unmindful of its dependence upon that "remnant of his people, which shall be left, from Assyria, and from Egypt... and from Hamath and from the islands of the sea" (Verse 11) and of its resentment against, and love of vengeance from, Israel's neighbours. "But they [i.e., the remnant], Isaiah exclaims wishfully shall fly upon the shoulders of the Philistines toward the west; they shall spoil them of the east together: they shall lay their hand upon Edom and Moab; and the children of Ammon shall obey them. And the Lord [on behalf and for the sake of 'His' people] shall utterly destroy the tongue of the Egyptian sea; and with his mighty wind shall he shake his hand over the river [i.e., the Euphrates]" (Isaiah 11:14-15). Likewise, Deutero-Isaiah's description of Cyrus, the Persian King, as "elected" by God to bring about the downfall of Babylon, the Jews' enemy, and restore them from the exile to which they were subjected (Isaiah, 42, 43, 44, 45) the Christians understand as a description of "the office of Christ graced with meekness and constancy" (see *ASV*) not as Giuseppe Verdi understood his Nabucco 'the hero of a dramatic fanciful representation of Italy's will to freedom from Austrian imperialism', but literally, as the exact prophecy of what was to come later in the case of Christ. Those of his statements which ring with Hebrew feelings of superiority-complex and racialism (e.g.

"But thou Israel, art my servant, Jacob whom I have chosen, the seed of Abraham my friend. Thou whom I have taken from the ends of the earth, and called thee from the chief men thereof, and said unto thee, Thou art my servant; I have chosen thee, and not cast thee away."—Isaiah 41:8-9) are called God's "mercies to the Church" of Christ (cf. *ASV*). Those which ring with Hebrew will to revenge (e.g., "Behold, all they that were incensed against thee shall be ashamed and confounded; they shall be as nothing; and they that strive with thee shall perish. Thou shalt seek them, and shalt not find them, even them that contended with thee: they that war against thee shall be as nothing, and as a thing of nought.... Thou shalt thresh the mountains, and beat them small, and shalt make the hills as chaff. Thou shalt fan them, and the wind shall carry them away, and the whirlwind shall scatter them.... I gave Egypt for thy ransom. Ethiopia and Seba for thee.... For your sake I have sent to Babylon, and have brought down all their nobles, and the Chaldeans, whose cry is in the ships."—Isaiah, 41:11-12; 15-16; 43:3, 14) are called "God's comforting of the Church" of Christ (cf. *ASV*). Isaiah's typification of Jewish resentment (e.g., "The labour of Egypt, and merchandise of Ethiopia and of the Sabeans, men of stature, shall come over unto thee, and they shall be thine: they shall come after thee; in chains they shall come over, and they shall fall down unto thee, they shall make supplication unto thee.... Come down, and sit in the dust, O virgin daughter of Babylon, sit on the ground... thou shalt no more be called tender and delicate. Take the millstones, and grind meal; uncover thy locks, make bare the leg... thy shame shall be seen: I will take vengeance, and I will not meet thee as a man.... Evil [shall] come upon thee... mischief shall fall upon thee.... [The non-Jews] shall bring thy sons in their arms, and thy daughters shall be carried upon their shoulders. And kings shall be thy nursing fathers, and their queens thy nursing mothers: they shall bow down to thee with their face toward the earth, and lick up the dust of thy feet,"—Isaiah 45:14; 47:1-3; 11, 49:22-23) is called "the ample restoration of the church" and "God's perpetual love to his church" (cf. *ASV*). Jewish *Schadenfreude*, their delight and joy at the miseries and sufferings of the gentiles (e.g., Isaiah 52) is dubbed "the exaltation of Christ's Kingdom" (cf. *ASV*).

9. Predominantly in his *Moses and Monotheism*, tr. by Katherine Jones, New York: A. A. Knopf, 1939.
10. See his *Mutanawwi'at*, Cairo, n.d., pp. 27-38. This chapter was translated and published by K. Cragg in *The Muslim World*, 1959, XLIX, No. 1 (January, 1959), 30-40.
11. Hussayn, pp. 34-35.
12. See his *Moses*, Oxford: East and West Library, 1946, p. 32; *Israel and Palestine: The History of an Idea*, Oxford: East and West Library, 1952, pp. ix-xiii.
13. W. F. Albright, *From the Stone Age to Christianity*, New York: Doubleday, 1957, p. 353.
14. "Ezra was regarded as the real founder of Judaism, after Moses; and his work is summed up in saying that he raised the Torah to the supreme place in Jewish life and thought which it has held ever since." R. Travers Herford, in *The Universal Jewish Encyclopaedia*, "Pharisees."
15. G. F. Moore, *Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era*, Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1927-30, I, 14 ff.
16. Louis Finkelstein, *The Pharisees, The Sociological Background of their Faith*, Jewish Publication Society, 1939, p. 16. Josephus described the Pharisees as the real leaders of the people: indeed, of the Sadducee priesthood as well. "Practically nothing," he wrote, "was done by them [the Sadducees]; for whenever they attain office they follow—although unwillingly and of compulsion—what the Pharisees

- say, because otherwise they would not be endured by the people," (*Antiquities*, XVIII, I, 4).
17. R. Travers Herford, *The Pharisees*, 1924, p. 91.
 18. Acknowledging the law of the fathers to be the sole authority, these lay teachers (the Pharisees) now had to find all the decisions and rules necessary for the practical life of their time contained or implied in the Law. They also had to devise methods for connecting with the Law all those new decisions and customs which were now universally observed by the people, thus making them appear as part of the laws of the fathers" (Lauterbach, *Jewish Quarterly Review*, new series, VI, 57 ff. quoted by G. H. Box in "Pharisees" in *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*).
 19. This oral law was later written down in expanded form and constitutes the *Mishnah*.
 20. Though the practice was much older, Hillel was the first to attempt a systematization of Pharasaic method. His norms include inferences *a minori ad maius* and *a fortiori*, argument from analogy, construction of the meaning of several passages from that of one of them, or from that of two passages, argument from the general to the particular and vice versa, argument from a parallel passage or from the context of a passage. A. Kaminka claimed that the application of Aristotelian methods to exegesis and hermeneutics was largely the work of Aristarchus of Samothrace, who achieved great reputation in Alexandria circa 150 B. C. (*Encyclopaedia Judaica*, IV, 623); and W. F. Albright thought that the Pharisees, on this account, were the first Hellenizers of the normative Jewish tradition. Their extension of the Law to suit new conditions and to cover all possible eventualities was thoroughly Hellenistic (*From the Stone Age to Christianity*. New York: Doubleday, 1957, pp. 354-55).
 21. "And thou shalt come unto the priests the Levites, and unto the judge that shall be in those days, and inquire; and they shall shew thee the sentence of judgment: And thou shalt do according to the sentence, which they of that place... shall shew thee; and thou shalt observe to do according to all that they inform thee: According to the sentence of the law which they shall teach thee, and according to the judgment which they shall tell thee, thou shalt do."
 22. Deuteronomy 17:12.
 23. Matthew 23:1-39.
 24. Matthew 23:25.
 25. Matthew 23:23.
 26. Matthew 23:27.
 27. "The Pharisees," writes W. F. Albright, "were vigorous legalists and their great aim was to perpetuate the Jewish Torah in the purest possible form, in order to maintain Israel's privileged place as the chosen people of God" (*The Stone Age to Christianity*, p. 391).
 28. Qur'an 62:5.
 29. Qur'an 3:23.
 30. Qur'an 4:23, 44.
 31. Qur'an 5:41-42, 77.
 32. Isaiah 35:1-10; 40:1-31; 41:1-29; 42:1-25, etc.
 33. Isaiah 45:1.
 34. Isaiah 42:1.
 35. Evidently, Cyrus had a political insight superior to that of Assyria and Chaldea. Whereas they ruled by suppression and force, running counter to the grain of the national or particular sentiments of their conquered regions, Cyrus thought he would build his empire on locally autonomous, but friendly states and provinces, paying the taxes as well as the loyalty due.

36. Ezra 1:2-4; 7-11.
37. Ezra 1:8; 1:4-6.
38. According to II Kings 24:14, the number of Jews deported to Babylon was 10,000 and according to the same source, 24:16, it was 8,000. In the year 587 another 3,023 were deported; in 586, 832 (Jeremiah 52:28-29) and in 581, 745 (Jeremiah 52:30).
39. Exodus 1:7.
40. *Antiquities of the Jews*, XI, 1, 3. To a remark by Herodotus (*Ancient History*, I, 251) that Jewish agriculture in alluvial Babylon was very rich, E. W. K. Mould adds: "Active and extensive commerce was carried on in Babylon. This was something new (*sic*) and appealing to the Jews for it offered them big opportunity. So they gradually quit farming for trade, and thereby some became rich. Thus the Exile effected a thoroughgoing transformation in the Jews. It made them into the world's traders..." (*Bible History Digest*, New York: Exposition Press, 1950, pp. 119-20).
41. Ezra 2:59; 8:15, 17, 21.
42. Jeremiah witnessed to that when he said: "There came certain from Shechem, from Shiloh, and from Samaria, even four-score men, having their beards shaven, and their clothes rent, and having cut themselves with offerings and incense in their hand, to bring them to the house of the Lord" (Jeremiah 41:5). For evidence of the Palestinian Jews' mourning over the defeat and death of 587-86 B.C. and their yearning for a restoration, see Isaiah 63:7-19; 64:12, Psalms 74, 79; the whole Book of Lamentations belongs in such a context as Jerusalem under the Chaldeans furnished.
43. This is evident in Isaiah 57:3-13; 63:1-5; Ezekiel 33:34-29; II Kings 17:29-34; etc.
44. They convinced, for instance, the Satrap of Syria to stop the restoration work in Jerusalem, which he did (Ezra 4:1-6). This order was not reversed until after the accession of Darius (519 B.C.) "in the sixth year of the reign of Darius the King" (Ezra 5:2; Zechariah 4:6-10) and aroused the Edomites, Moabites, Ammonites and all alienated Palestinian Jews to sporadic attacks against Jerusalem so that Nehemiah had to divide the workers into two shifts, one to guard while the other worked (Nehemiah 4:7-23).
45. i.e., Isaiah, 40-55.
46. Zechariah 8:10.
47. Nehemiah 7:4.
48. Haggai 1:9-11; 2:15-17.
49. Consider the general spirit of despondency prevalent in Haggai, Malachi, Zechariah, and Trito-Isaiah (Isaiah 56-66).
50. Nehemiah 5:14.
51. Nehemiah 2:1, 13:6. These dates 445-433 have been confirmed by the discoveries of the remains of another colony of tolerant universalist Jews who, running from the Chaldeans, had settled in Elephantine, an island in Upper Egypt near Aswan.
52. Nehemiah 2:1-8.
53. Ezra 4:17-22.
54. Nehemiah 3:1-32.
55. Nehemiah 13:28.
56. "In the two and thirtieth year of Artaxerxes king of Babylon came I unto the king, and after certain days obtained I leave of the king" (Nehemiah 13:6).
57. According to Ezra 7:7, Ezra arrived at Jerusalem in "the seventh year of the King" and, according to Ezra 7:1, "in the reign of Artaxerxes, King of Persia." This makes his arrival thirteen years earlier than Nehemiah which is unsound. If, on

the other hand, the seventh year was in the reign of Artaxerxes II (i.e., 398) it would be too late, because Nehemiah had by then disappeared from the scene. The evidence that these two actually co-operated in the work of restoration, Nehemiah taking care of public matters and security while Ezra was extorting from the Jews oaths to abide by the law and to divorce their wives and so forth, is too strong to put aside. Against the letter of the Old Testament it seems necessary to uphold this view to which, by the way, not a few Christian scholars agree. (See John Bright, *A History of Israel*, Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1959, pp. 363 ff).

58. Ezra 7:12 ff; especially verses 25-28.
59. If this sounds too modern, the reader is challenged to turn to Ezra 7:12-28 and then reconsider.
60. Ezra 10:8.
61. Ezra 10:44.
62. Ezra 9:83; 10:29.
63. Ezra's codification is the "Five Books of Moses" or *The Pentateuch*. K. H. Graf, the father of all Biblical criticism published in 1866 his classic *Die Geschichtlichen Bücher des Alten Testaments*, whose thesis has won the acclaim of Biblical scholars ever since. Even a Julius Wellhausen had little to add to Graf on this subject. He analyzed the Law into strata and then compared them arguing that the ritual and ceremonial Laws represent a development, in general as well as in many particulars, posterior to Deuteronomy, introduced by Hilkiah in the reign of Josiah. Apparently many authors had contributed, adding to or changing them, until Ezra compiled, redacted some, rearranged, and perhaps outrightly legislated other parts of the Law that we now have, in the year 444 B.C. Nehemiah 8-10 tells us in more than one place that the Jews of Jerusalem had neither copy nor knowledge of Ezra's book. For a revealing introduction to the scholarly analysis of this problem, see Moore, I, 3-36.
64. G. F. Moore summarizes the arguments of Abraham Kuenen, a contemporary of Graf on the effect of Ezra's work on religion, as elaborated in his *De Godsdienst van Israël*, 1870, II, 146-56: "The introduction of Ezra's law-book changed the whole character of the religion. It was, in the words of Kuenen, the origin of Judaism; [i.e., the religion of the Jews after the fall of Judah in 586 B.C. in contradistinction from that of earlier times, usually referred to as 'religion of Israel' or 'Hebrew religion'] ... There [i.e. before Ezra] the spirit ruled, here [after him] the letter; there the free word, here the scripture. The outstanding figure of the preceding centuries was the prophet; after Ezra his place was taken by the scribe. The reform was anti-prophetic and anti-universalistic; inevitably the law extinguished the remnants of prophecy, and it fastened exclusiveness on the religion for all time to come" (Moore I, 13).

Chapter II

THE ETHICAL BREAKTHROUGH OF JESUS

It was natural, nay necessary, that somebody should arise who would break this Pharisee fixation. Palestine had witnessed the rise and fall of the Greek Empire, having already experienced the succession of the Babylonian and the Persian empires. The Roman Empire was still at the apogee of its strength, though ideologically, its forces were already waning and giving rise to skepticism and stoic withdrawal. The separatist, centripetal conservatism of Pharisee legalism was utterly out of place in the cosmopolitan Palestine of Jesus. Spiritually, Palestine was perhaps as cosmopolitan a part as any of the ancient world. Phariseism brushed shoulders with the Near Eastern cults, with Persian Zoroastrianism, with Hellenism in all its shades of rationalism, mysticism and naturalism, with Roman utilitarianism and world-wide nationalism, as well as Roman empiricism and skepticism. Nor was the idealism, universalism, and ethical monotheism of the Abrahamic tradition completely forgotten. All these had their representatives, their sects, and parties, their *pourparlers* in the market place. Some were obviously stronger than others in certain sections of country and population; but nobody concerned in the moral and spiritual life of man could fail to find them all to nourish, to edify, or to arouse in indignation, his seeking spirit.

In Reaction to Jewish Ethic

In the midst of this environment, Jesus, the man, the Jew, was born. His ministry did not start until he was thirty years of age. Until then, he was a man among men, a Jew among Jews; but from the earliest times he was a keen observer and student of the systems of ideas surrounding him. As a child he astounded the learned Rabbis in the temple by his brilliance in argument with them over matters of the law, while his worried parents anxiously looked for him, and missed him, everywhere. It did not occur to them that their foster son was in the inner court of the temple, engaged in argument with priests.¹ The Qur'an pays even greater tribute to the child's precocity, by making him break into these sublime words at a yet more tender age: "Lo! I am the servant of God. It is He that gave me the Scripture; and He that sent me a Prophet. It is He that blessed me where-soever I may go. He hath enjoined upon me always to worship Him, to give in charity, and to honour her who bore me..."² Both these anec-

dotes need not necessarily be journalistic, i.e., reportative accounts of historical event. But they are not for this reason any less true. Their meaning or moral is historically true and stands beyond question; that Jesus, the man, was not only very, intelligent—he had all the symptoms of genius—but that he was extremely familiar with Jewish Scripture, the Torah, the Rabbinic traditions, and the whole ethical and spiritual situation of his people, the Jews. He surveyed and studied closely not only to familiarize himself with these systems, but to perceive their inner meanings. In fact, Jesus went beyond this to discover wherein these systems have erred and have come short of a wholesome ethic which takes adequate account of man's moral consciousness. Indeed, it was this acute awareness on his part that provides the *material cause* of his divine inspiration. Regardless of whether the reader takes Jesus to be God, as Christians do, or whether he takes him to be the prophet of God, as Muslims do, it cannot be doubted that Jesus conveyed a divine message. Divine messages, however, do not come in the vacuum; but in a context in which ideas and facts contend. Moreover, revelation can come only through a mind or soul that is fully conscious of the raging contentions. For it has a purpose; and its purpose is always to settle once and for all the contentions of which the soul has been agonizingly aware. Jewish ethic was the matrix on which operated the revelation that Jesus brought in matters ethical. His ethic is the divine settlement of the ethical contentions of the Jews, just as Muhammad's revelation had for matrix the spiritual and ethical realities of the Meccan pagans as well as the Christians and Jews of the Arab Stream or Being. This need not imply that the ethic of Jesus had nothing to do with the other ethical systems of the contemporary world. But it does mean that while that ethic was predominantly God's answer to the Jewish problem it furnished no less final answers to the other systems of antiquity with which Jesus had come into contact.

Rightly, Jesus discerned that Jewish ethic ascribed to the survival of the community the highest, and therefore false, order of rank. Rightly, he discerned that the Jews, the Pharisee majority at least, had lost sight even of that false order of rank of the survival of the community, for they observed the rigours of legalistic discipline for their own sake, forgetting "the weightier matters of the law." Later still, the Qur'an found them failing in both the observance of the 'weightier' as well as the 'lighter' matters of the law.³ Evidently, in Jesus' time, the Jews must have been too long on the road of all varieties of decay and nihilism. The road begins with a genuine intuition of a value but a false order of rank is assigned to it. This assignment enables the value to suppress all other values from the field of moral vision which it tyrannically monopolizes. Inevitably, a warping of the moral sense results, which soon turns on the value itself,

emptying it of its valuational content and leaving as subject of the stupefied human ethos the emptied real-existent shell. Thus, all touch with value is lost and the moral field is left entirely vacuitous. That is nihilism—the absence of value from ethical consciousness! And that is precisely the situation which confronted Jesus with his contemporaries.

However, Jesus was not to recapture for the Jewish vacuous ethos, the original value of the community on which it had wagered its whole life and weight. Rightly diagnosing Jewry's disease, he rejected not only their failure to comply with their ethic but the very foundation of that ethic. Piercing the walls of community survival, Jesus opened a whole new vista of genuine, properly ethical values, namely, the values of the individual person. The value of the community, no matter how 'surviving' and prosperous it may be or become, Jesus found inferior to that of the individual person. It is the latter that the community must serve. In respect to it, the value of the community can be only instrumental. The value of the individual person, the values which pertain to his inner self, are far more important than those which attach to community survival. For, what is the worth of the whole world and all mankind if the individual souls that compose it are ethically sick, if they do not realize the values of purity, of chastity, of sincerity, of charity, of forgiveness, of loving kindness and goodness? The ethical individual person is the end of moral life itself. How can community survival have anything but elemental worth? Even on this level of instruments and means, how can it have the first position? Are not the conditions of life and existence, which readily conduce to the cultivation of the moral person, of greater importance and therefore, of higher value? Would not the family with its ultimate self-sacrifice and love-cultivating atmosphere prove of higher worth than the community where everything must be impersonalized, legalized, and exteriorized? Pursuing this same insight further, would not even solitude rank higher than community, where the person can turn his eyes inward and, as it were, focus attention on what his self actually is, on what it ought to be which it is not, and on bringing that self around to become that which it ought to be?

Jesus discerned thus and rightly. The community's *raison d'être* is the service of the individual person. Instead of a law (Torah) aiming at its perpetration, its prosperity, its unity, its identity, Jesus drew attention to another law, deeper-reaching and more significant, the properly moral law. But precisely because it is moral, it is not of its nature ever to become a legislation. Its nature defies all kinds of exteriorization. For its subject matter is the self, the inner being of man which only the individual person can reach and only in his moments of ethical self-consciousness. Whereas Jewish law, as the Rabbis and Pharisees had found out, covered an ever-

widening scope of affairs to which they, systematically but hopelessly, ever sought to extend its jurisdiction, Jesus' law restricted itself to the bounds of the inner self. The self, he rightly discerned, is the main battleground of all the higher, properly ethical values. It, therefore, must be the first to count in matters ethical. Within it, within its narrow but infinitely deep area, the law of Jesus found all that it required for full realization. What is lost in scope of jurisdiction, it gained in depth. A whole new dimension to ethical life, hitherto unknown, lay open for discovery. Morality achieved a new and great height when it moved its focus from the communal will to survive to the personal will to self-surmounting and self-giving, to the personal will to love.

With the survival of the community as first and highest purpose, Jewish law was bound to be separatist in character, as we have had occasion to see in Chapter I. It was interested in the Jewish Community, in Israel. Hence, in order to achieve its purpose, it singled out Israel from all mankind. Ezra saw correctly when he extracted the oath to observe the Law from the Jews alone; for he foresaw that the observance of that Law by the Jews alone would set them off from humanity, and this separatism would preserve their other-than-*goyim* identity and thus achieve Israel's preservation. Both he and Nehemiah saw well that Israel was destined to dissolution within humanity. It was precisely in order to withstand such dissolution that they extracted the oath, and persuaded the Jews to divorce their non-Jewish wives. By means of this and other equally racialistic measures, they hoped to save Israel by saving the purity of the Jewish race. The Law was regarded by them as the *God-sent gift* by means of which that racial purity, distinction, and separateness would be maintained. The new Law of Jesus regarded all this as racist nonsense, fanaticism, and separatism worthy of the severest indictment. He condemned it in no uncertain terms. Jesus was *interested in humanity first* and last. He was interested in the Jews only inasmuch as they were part of that humanity and to the extent that he was born and lived in their midst and spoke their language.

In order to reach humanity, he rightly saw that an extension of Jewish Law to mankind would, even if it were at all within the realm of possibility, fail to realize the new values of a higher morality. Besides, the world was in no mood to desire to identify itself with Israel, an insignificant, decomposed and sullen tribe, obsessed with dreams of self-righteousness and political grandeur. On the other hand, the centering of that morality around the inner self, around the individual person, does realize both at once, the values of higher morality and the width of humankind. While not every man is or can become a Jew, concerned with the survival of the Jewish community, every man is an individual and a person, a self

endowed with all the dignity of creation. Every man is a world in which the new ethical values can and must have the ascendancy that is their due. Thus, against Jewish separatism and racial exclusivism, Jesus proclaimed the universal brotherhood of man. His universalism gained its extension through the deepening of the Law, the interiorization of morality, the making of ethical worth a function of the moral determinants of the inner self, of the individual person in his solitude with himself and God. To satisfy the imperative of this new law is, in addition to being saved and blessed, to be Jesus' 'brother' and 'sister' and 'mother'.⁴ It is all that is necessary to belong to the community and do so in good standing. But, *in hoc signo*, the community is no more Israel; it has become humanity.

The Interiorization of Ethics: The Ethic of Intent

Therefore, the interiorization of morality is itself the universalization of Israel. But this morality is different from the Jewish Law in that it is based on totally new foundations. Its purpose is universal humanity as well as higher value, and these are by nature antithetical to the ideal of Jewish Law. Besides by the very fact that Jewish Law was community-bound, it was fundamentally an ethic of consequence. The desirability of each of its provisions rested on its production of a categorical real-existent which it deemed valuable for its own sake. True, the provisions of the law also produced communion among those who observed them. But the content of that communion, namely, the common denominator produced thereby, was nothing more than that same categorical real-existent multiplied in space and time. For example, by commanding all hands to be ceremonially washed before eating, the law achieved a communion among all Jews; but that communion consisted in no more than 'washed hands', the categorical, real-existent consequence of doing what the law commanded. But real-existent, to whatever category of being they belong, are not values, and certainly not moral values. No act realizing a real-existent is on that account moral. Any ethic built upon 'consequences' or real-existent effects, is no ethic at all. At best it can constitute a code of utility, not of morality.

With his usual contempt for utility, Jesus saw that the higher place belongs not to the effect of the act, but to the intent of the moral agent. The intent of the doer is the fulcrum of ethics; the effects he actually produces may be good or bad according to the law of utility. But intention is that which gives to the act its moral character. To produce a fair effect, but with evil intention, is morally evil though good from the standpoint of utility. On the other hand, to produce a mediocre or bad effect, but with

good, wholesome intention is morally good. The unworth of such an act would be a utilitarian one, whereas its ethical quality remains unaffected. For that is not at all a function of its utilitarian *valuableness*. The ethical character of an act is a function of the will that willed it. What determined the will in its decision to do that act is properly speaking, the only ethical question. The utilitarian value of the effect does not touch the moral quality of the deed which remains purely a question of intent and will.

Jesus' ethic, then, is a genuine ethic of intent. As such, it must abstract, or at least de-emphasize, man's community though this may be mankind, and his real relations with that community. This does not mean that the community and the real relations which bind its members to it and to one another are abstracted from, or de-emphasized in, willing. On the contrary, Jesus was fully aware of the importance of the neighbour. The real relation, if it is 'real' at all, is a relation with the neighbour. Besides, it is repugnant to reason to speak of willing the higher good of the universal community without a real community which can be the object of willing. The achievement of Jesus is, rather, the removal of the neighbour—indeed of all effects and consequence of the act—from the act's properly moral character. Not the idea of the consequence contemplated by mind and will, but the actual, real consequence produced in space-time through the act shall not, according to Jesus, weigh as much as a mosquito's wing on the scale of cosmic justice by which the properly ethical worth or unworth of a human deed is weighed and determined. *Precisely here lies the whole weight and power of Jesus' breakthrough—as well as its sublime distinction and merit—that the ethical and unworth of a human deed are functions, solely and exclusively, of the determinants of the inner self in its willing the act in question.*

The interiorization of morality achieved by Jesus was not only a good antidote to the exteriorized, legalistic ethic of the Jews, but a long due revolution which placed morality in the will, the spring of all conduct, where it properly belongs. Will is the source of action. If it is good, healthy, or rightly guided, its action too, will be good. "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit."⁵ The tree, or the will, is the more important because it is the prior and the more basic. And it is precisely the deep spring of all ideas, attitudes and deeds that Jesus sought to transform. Actions, i.e., the fruits, and their effects and consequences in the real world may certainly be improved. That is what social reforms of all kinds attempt to do; namely, the betterment of real states and relations by subjecting them to certain regulative standards. For Jesus, on the other hand, such work may be praiseworthy to a measure which goes as far as utility may take it; but it certainly misses the center of the problem of evil in the world and is therefore only a half-

measure or less. Transform his inner source of all action, Jesus would say, and you have transformed the whole man: his will and soul, his existential actuality, the real-existential consequences of his deeds as well, indeed, and the whole real world around him.

That of which man stood in direct need, therefore, Jesus thought, was a radical transformation of that which is within. This radical transformation, Jesus conceived in terms of man's relationship with God. It is man's total orientation, his whole attitude to life and reality that finds expression in his relation to God. And it is right here, that the revolution envisaged by Jesus would begin. Since the transformation is to affect the deepest springs, evidently, everything else will be affected in due course. Whereas this inner self was bent, in the Jewish Law, upon 'Israel' so that man's will could see no further than the Jewish community whose service and for whose welfare the self was to perform its willing, Jesus sought to reorient the self, and its willing, towards God, and God alone. That is the only orientation worthy of the creature, man. It alone is properly speaking, religious, because only it reaches so deep and by doing so achieves totality.

The first condition of Jesus is then the radical transformation of self; and this is the only sense he had—indeed the only sense there can be—of repentance and conversion. To enter into the fellowship of Jesus means actually to undergo a new birth. "Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God."⁶ And this new birth is no more than the radical reorientation of one's soul to God, a transformation of his attitude to God. But it is also no less than that. Usually, it is hard to disentangle the inner transformation from its outward effects, whether within the person undergoing it or in his conduct in the world. Nonetheless the distinction between the two is cardinal. Perhaps nowhere else has the Christian emphasis on the 'no less' been so amply exemplified as in the orders of Christian asceticism. There, the primary concern of man is not one of bringing about effects in himself or in the world around him no matter how ethically desirable. Nor is it one of training those who take the vows to do the right no matter how loving and self-sacrificing such doings may be. But, above all, it is so to transform man's inner self as to achieve its total reorientation to God. Upon this lies the whole importance of these orders. No wonder that they deem the monk or nun a type, which a man must be in order to qualify for membership at all.

The Final Disposition of the Law

Such transformation, once accomplished, stands in need of no law; certainly of no regimentation such as the Jewish Law, with its 613 exact

precepts, has furnished. Self-transformation itself presupposes a will so purified that it is contradictory to assert that it can do evil. Hence, the first Christian converts' disregard of the Jewish Law. For the already transformed, Jewish Law—nay, any law—is superfluous moral pedantry. Thus, an Augustine could say, "Love God and do what you will," giving himself and such of his fellow-men as feel that in them radical transformation has been complete, a poise and freedom *vis-à-vis* the ethical problems confronting them. Although such poise may seem complacent to the outsider, it rests upon a premise which is incontrovertible: if the self has undergone a perfect, radical transformation, it may be trusted to do what it wills. In other words, if the self has become such that it cannot will evil, it will not do so.

The point is not entirely tautologic. For the will is dynamic and creative. It can, and in fact, always does, find new ways to meet the situations with which real life confronts it. And the synthetic aspect of the conditional is precisely that once the self is properly reoriented, it will not fail to bring its decisions and doings into proper relation with God, the goal of its total transformation. What the self wills will always be new inasmuch as life itself is always new. New situations always elicit from man new solutions, new decisions. For the case of life is one of continuous novelty regardless of whether the person is young or old, Jew or Christian. The dynamism of the transformation Jesus sought to achieve in men, therefore, consists precisely in placing the new situations of life in the new perspective and having done so, judge them under the schemata which that perspective furnishes to the innermost springs of conduct.

Evidently this is a case which gives man the widest scope of free movement. For this reason, Jesus elaborated no law; and inasmuch as his followers have done so, they have mistaken his spirit for Ezra's.⁷ Certainly, he gave many precepts for conduct; and in his own life, he furnished an example for the emulation of all men. But these precepts and type of conduct and all that may be deduced therefrom by way of laws—whether religious or ethical, individual or social—are not laws in the sense the provisions of Jewish Law are. They are only illustrations, elucidations in the concrete, of what a radically transformed will would do, of what a radically transformed life will be. The emulation of Jesus, the famous *Imitatio Christi* of the Christian tradition is good only in so far as it is made in the consciousness that it is an added ideational and temperamental prop in achieving the transformation in question. Once it is taken for its own sake, that is, 'for Christ's sake', it loses the significance that Jesus might have attached to it. For the end of ethics, the purpose of morality, is not the production of any real-existent however noble or great. That which Christ has done in space-time is a number of such real-existents.

To reproduce these real-existents, though they may be Jesus', is at the farthest possible remove from his spirit. His teaching, his acts, his whole life on earth are all illustrations of the complete orientation of self to God, which God had sent him to bring to human consciousness. Their status and worth is totally didactic. They are neither laws nor schemata for action.

To view the mission of Jesus as the provision, among other things, of a new Law reduces it to the level of a reform, with ethical and social consequences to be sure, but no more than an amelioration of a reality that remains itself. Nothing indeed could be more disastrous. Jesus' whole emphasis was through and through religious. His point is that the whole fabric of man's spiritual reality must be transformed. Man's overall orientation must be to God, the Creator. He "must love the Lord ... God with all [his] heart, and with all [his] soul, and with all [his] mind." This is the first and great commandment.⁸ Evidently this is not an ethical command, although a great number of ethical precepts may flow from it. These, however, stand to the religious command as a by-product of a process might stand to its preconceived goal or *raison d'être*. For Jesus, this reorientation was the be-all and end-all of endeavour. This is why in his admonition to his disciples and followers, he gave no law, no directives for action. Jesus resolved none of the issues presented to him. Instead, he seized every opportunity to reiterate the one theme he considered important: Transform this human self radically; once this is done, the kind of issue you raise would never occur!⁹

Self-transformation produces the character from which moral deeds necessarily flow, thus producing in man not a good deed here and another there but a wholly new 'style' of life. By nature, a 'style of life' neither obeys nor needs precepts to go by. If it is genuine, it finds its directives within; and however novel its pursuits may be, they nonetheless carry its brand and character. Thus, in making its decisions, the transformed will does not refer itself to any law, to any example, not even to Jesus himself. Man needs Jesus, his precepts and his example, as ideational instruments towards that radical self-transformation. They provide the necessary stimulant to awaken man and to shake him from his spiritual lethargy. But once Jesus has done this work in him, the convert does and must feel free to proceed on his own without Jesus. On this new road, Jesus has stopped being a master, a stimulator, a teacher, and commander and has become a fellow-partner. The need for Jesus may in a sense be external, but it is so only inasmuch as man cannot for ever sustain himself on that open freeway and needs the inspiration of Jesus to lift him out of his occasional lapse.

The interiorized, subjectivized ethic has therefore no tribunal except

personal conscience. For only conscience is the voice from within. Only *it* addresses that which is within. Only it successfully reaches the man within. Therefore, only its tribunal is competent to judge the will; for only it can penetrate into the will and uncover the decisions it hides in its folds. The law would have to wait until these hidden decisions have been translated into outward acts and have produced their real effects. Where it considers the inner motives at all relevant, it does not do so for their own sake, but only as attenuating or exacerbating the deed in question. From the standpoint of the law, intent stands plainly outside the pale and cannot be the object of judgement. Conscience, on the other hand, is precisely the organ whose very subject-matter is intent. Jesus, therefore, in making his ethic one of intent rather than consequences rightly based it upon the inward voice of conscience. It was to the inner voice of conscience alone that he appealed when, in the case of the adulteress the Pharisees sought to stone, he adjudicated, "He that is without sin among you let him first cast a stone at her."¹⁰ The Evangelist rightly understood Jesus when he commented on the event, "And they which heard it being convicted by their own conscience, went out one by one."¹¹ In the ethic of Jesus, writes T. W. Manson, moral questions, "that is, all questions concerning man's life, are taken out of the jurisdiction of all other parties, including even Jesus himself, and brought before the bar of the conscience of the responsible person."¹²

The Content of Self-Transformation

Some rather shallow comparativists of religion, anxious to find lowest 'common denominators' among the religions of the world and facile 'general characterizations' or 'essences' of them have often said that Christianity's be-all and end-all is the so-called golden rule of "as ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise."¹³ This and similar ignorant truncations of Christianity do not even give it the benefit of being an ethic. Much more serious is that they do not grant it to be a religion. An ethic exhausts itself when it has raised and answered the questions of: What ought I to do? and How may I know what ought I to do? The formalist ethic of a Kant as well as the virtue-ethic of an Aristotle or the *materielle Wertethik* of a Scheler, do not pretend to go beyond this. Neither the formal 'categorical imperative', nor the contingent 'list of virtues', nor the structuralized 'value-hierarchy' demand, in order to be discovered, known, committed to consciousness, and realized, that their metaphysical status be anything at all. It does not affect virtue, and consequently the ethic in question if, from a cosmic point of view, the

good, whether formal or material, turned out to be unreal and only an illusion. Certainly man has to believe in the reality of an ideal if he is to commit his destiny to it. But the commission of one's destiny to an ideal does not depend upon the reality or unreality of that ideal. It is as possible to dedicate oneself to truth as to illusion, to reality as to unreality, provided the subject 'believes' what he is dedicating himself to is truth and reality.

Whether the ideal is at all the truth, whether the values are at all reality, not from the standpoint of the moral subject, but absolutely, from a cosmic point of view, is properly speaking, a question of metaphysics. Only metaphysics attempts to answer them and inasmuch as it does so, it is 'the queen' of the sciences, the most comprehensive and the most basic. It confirms, as a last authority, the truth or untruth, reality or unreality, of all and every ethic. But inasmuch as it is so comprehensive and total, metaphysics does the work of religion and substitutes for it on the level of discursive discipline. Cosmically speaking, it is religion.

Jesus' command to love God is not merely an ethical command. It is religious. Indeed it is religion. It is religious because it is comprehensive and basic; it is religious because it affirms that only God, as the First and Last Reality, is worthy of being the subject of man's love and devotion. Comprehensiveness and affirmation—these are the *essentia* of religion. Both of these criteria Jesus has satisfied in his command to love God.

Jesus has affirmed that God is. This is the supreme metaphysical reality, namely, that God is Himself that reality. He also affirmed that the nature of that reality is that it is a commanding reality. Hence he did not express his first truth as a metaphysical proposition but as a command. For, when divine reality enters our consciousness at all, it does so as a commanding reality. A God that did not command would not be God, just as a good that ought not to be real would not be good at all. That which God commands is not, as we have seen, the doing of any one good, nor the doing of the good in general. Through Jesus, He did not command us 'to do' at all, but to place ourselves in a certain relation to Him. Such placement is the transformation of man from the state of servitude to other gods—be they Israel, the racialist state and people, Mammon or the *eudaemonia* of the Epicureans and stoics of all kinds—to the state in which God alone commands and determines.

The radical transformation of the self is indeed a religious event. on account of its comprehensiveness. Its affection of the self is such that the whole spiritual being of man is reoriented to divine reality. This reorientation permeates the ethos, the Will, and thus affects all conduct and all life. Though the transformation in question is a purely religious phenomenon, it is not the case that it is removed from ethics. But the ethical should not be sought on the wrong plane of the metaphysical. The con-

sequences of the reorientation in life are ethical through and through, but they are not the grounds of its desirability. It is prior; just as metaphysics is always prior to ethics, and axiology to deontology. On the other hand, the transformation is no irrational, blind 'leap of Faith'. It is undertaken under reason, the lucid light of consciousness, which judges that to which the orientation has taken place to be the First and Last Reality. It is therefore undertaken for its own sake, that is to say, for the sake of the First Reality which has brought it about by 'moving' man towards it. It is a natural fact that all men are 'moved' by God, but few are those who enable His movement to become determinative. To do so is all that the transformation means.

Furthermore, Jesus' reorientation is a perspective which cannot exist in the abstract, but in the decisions, intentions, and deeds which instantiate it. It is a new attitude, total to be sure, but nonetheless an attitude which the radically transformed self assumes. This attitude is that of opening oneself to determination issuing from one source only, God. It is not an attitude of passive acquiescence, but a dynamic invitation of God to invade and to pervade, to determine and to orient. And that is all that the religious language of worshipping God, serving God, loving God, etc. can give by way of content to worship, service, and love of God. In religious language, the worship of God moves in but one direction, from man to God, as if it were an offering given by man and taken by God. But religious language is not always precise, and worship is not something given and taken. Worship is the concentration of man's faculties upon God to the end that His moving power would determine man's consciousness to the pursuit of His will. No worship of God is worthy of the name if it does not imply some such determination by God of man's will. The so-called 'pure' contemplation of God is not different from the so-called 'pure' aesthetic contemplation of a work of art. Both are nonsense if the contemplative soul does not open itself for, and actually receive, determination from the object of contemplation.

The self-transformation Jesus has called for is therefore both religious and ethical at once. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment."¹⁴ It is religious inasmuch as it is a total reorientation to God; it is ethical inasmuch as it makes the reorientation consist in loving God, with all one's heart, soul, and mind—which is the poetico-religious way of saying that God shall be the sole determiner of one's desire, of one's will, and of one's thought. For only He is worthy of such place or function. Love is nothing else besides this invitation of God to determine the ethos and the active acquiescence in that determination of the will. The determinant of the ethos is God; that of the will, is the will of God.

The 'Firstness' of the First Command

Jesus' qualification that this is the first and great commandment is of paramount importance. The 'firstness' of the commandment that he means is neither logical, nor ordinal, but valuational. The nature of the commandment is such that it does not need a second or a third. The whole point of the ethical breakthrough of Jesus, and of his revolution of the Jewish ethic of law would be lost if this firstness is interpreted as logical or ordinal. Indeed, Jewish law has never denied or even questioned these kinds of firstness. On the contrary, it has maintained and indeed emphasized them all along. When the Pharisee lawyer asked Jesus what he should do "to inherit eternal life," and Jesus answered by reciting the ordinally first commandment of Jewish law, the Pharisee applauded, "Well, Master, thou hast said the truth."¹⁵ He was happy that Jesus did not call first any other commandment that Jewish law did not call first. Secondly, in addition to holding it as 'the first' in the ordinal sense of being, i.e., as the most important, Jewish law ascribed to the first commandment logical firstness, for the idea was not unknown to the rabbis that the whole law may be deduced from some central principle such as the first commandment. Indeed, the Rabbinical schools never tired of reducing the whole Torah to, or of deducing it from, such one or more supreme principles. The Midrashim and Mishnah are themselves, for the most part, illustrations of this principle of logical deductive analysis. Under the view, therefore, that his answer was an ascription of logical firstness to the first commandment, Jesus would have here contributed nothing new. And that is why, in all probabilities, the Pharisee lawyer applauded.¹⁶

It is otherwise if the firstness is valuational. As such it is tantamount to the assertion that the commandment is the principle of sufficient reason of all religion and ethics; that its content is all that is necessary for the radical self-transformation desired; that its satisfaction *materially* entails virtue and therefore salvation; not that every moral precept would necessarily follow from it logically, but that every good deed would necessarily follow upon it in actual human conduct.

The first consequence of this view is that the evangelist has erred wherever he has appended to this commandment a second. Matthew must have utterly misunderstood Jesus when, in addition to giving as 'second' commandment, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," he added that "on these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets."¹⁷ The second command is superfluous when the first one is given. It is implied by the first commandment; and the implication is not logical, but material. That is to say, the first commandment can in no wise be satisfied without producing a satisfaction of the second. Moreover, there

is no reason why this command should be singled out from among all its other material implications. The command to repent and to purify oneself, for example, which is equally materially implied in the first commandment is prior to the love of one's neighbour because it is one of the latter's very conditions. Could Matthew then have mentioned the second commandment as an illustration of the consequents of the first?

The answer must be in the negative; Matthew meant to give the second commandment as 'second' allowing the first only logical priority or ordinal firstness. For he further added that the whole Jewish law is deducible not from the first commandment alone, but from the first and second in conjunction. "On these two commandments," he commented on Jesus' answer, "hang all the law and the prophets."¹⁸ This bias of Matthew in favour of Jewish law was noted by T. W. Manson who judged Matthew's estimate of Jesus' revolution against Jewish law untrustworthy,¹⁹ and by Paul Ramsey who judged Matthew's interpretation as being "far from the view of Jesus" by virtue of its contrast with that of Mark and Luke as well as "by what we otherwise know concerning his [Matthew's] relation to the law."²⁰

The second consequence is that the 'firstness' meant by Jesus is uniqueness. There can be no second commandment at all, in any sense. It is of the nature of valuational firstness to obviate the need for a second, for any second. T. W. Manson and P. Ramsay have rightly seen through the legalism of Matthew; but they have not seen far enough through Matthew, Mark, and Luke so as to reach the insight that a second commandment may be given only as an illustration and comment on the first and that their giving it as a second commandment betrays an equally serious misunderstanding of the ethical breakthrough of Jesus. If God and only God is the proper object of love, if He is to occupy "all one's heart, all one's soul and all one's mind" or if He alone is to be the determiner of one's total ethos, what room is there for 'the neighbour'? Is it not blasphemous to allow the neighbour to occupy any place or corner however small in a heart, soul, and mind totally devoted to God?

Manson has argued that "the experience of God's love brings with it the knowledge that that love is for man."²¹ But this is an obvious case of logical deduction: For 'to experience', i.e. to know, that all men are mortal 'brings with it the knowledge' that death will befall all men, that Tom and Harry are mortal. And if, as Manson himself says, uncertain of what he wants, "in the light of God's love to himself a man sees other men, as it were, through God's eyes: and to see them in this way is to love them," then there is no point in calling it a second commandment. If to love God includes, in actual fact, the love of neighbour, it is as much a mixture of the orders of generality of speech to call the one first and the

other second, as to say that the mortals are, first men, second the Greeks. And it may also be argued that Jesus gave the second command as an axiological second in order to give the first command a down-to-earth pull that it may not prove to be an invitation to the mystical, Plotinian 'flight of the alone to the alone'. This fear, though, belongs more properly to the socialist-Jesus of Anglo-Saxon social-gospel-Christianity of the last hundred years, rather than to the Jesus of history. For the real Jesus, standing at the center of history's most rabid racialism and its most moribund community consciousness, regarding his divine mission on earth as beginning in and leavening from Israel, to think in these socialist terms could have been anything but possible. Genius, inspiration, prophethood—every brilliant idea and noble deed—none of these is ever afraid of being misunderstood.

Therefore, Jesus must have meant the first command to be the only one necessary. That is why, according to the Markan narrative, the questioning scribe rejoined that to obey that first commandment "is more than all whole burnt offerings and sacrifices," more than the performance of all the other provisions of the law and Jesus approved of the scribe's understanding and said, "Thou art not far from the Kingdom of God."²² Luke gives a diluted account of this since he does not mention the scribe's rejoinder regarding offerings and sacrifices; but he makes up the loss in raising anew the question of racialism versus universalism in the parable of the good Samaritan. Matthew, on the other hand, with his bias for Jewish law, does not mention any part of this dialogue after the enunciation of the two commandments—except to say that on both of them hang all the law and the prophets.

We may therefore conclude this analysis by saying that Jesus universalized the community ideal of Israel by interiorizing the Law, i.e., by making all piety, all ethics, and all virtue dependent upon an inward, radical transformation of the self, which is within the capacity, and thence the prerogative, not only of a chosen race but of all men. This transformation of which only God can be the judge and after which all contention is left for personal conscience, obviates the need for law, indeed for religion in the institutionalized sense and, in final analysis, for Jesus himself as a religious teacher. For by transforming the inner source of all action, no action can take place that is not done under the perspective of the new transformation, which is its very title to ethical goodness. Jesus, therefore, being the teacher of this radical self-transformation—and this is the only sense that can be made of his mission as a religious teacher concerned not with little or general improvements but with the total reorientation to God and Reality—could not have promulgated any other command than this first of all commandments, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with

all thy heart, all thy soul and all thy mind.” Of course, he was the first to realize this command; of course, he spent his whole life explaining what reorientation to God means; of course, he spent out that life as an illustration of that reorientation.

Notes

1. Luke 3:41-52.
2. Qur'an 19:30-32.
3. "...Your hearts were hardened and became as rocks, or worse than rocks, for hardness....Have ye (Muhammad) any hope that they will be true to you when a party of them used to listen to the Word of God (Torah), then used to change it, after they had understood it, knowingly?...Believe ye (O Jews) in part of the Torah and disbelieve ye in part thereof? And what is the reward of those who do so save ignominy in the life of the world, and on the Day of Judgment they will be consigned to the most grievous doom." (Qur'an 2:74-85).
4. Mark 3:34.
5. Matthew 7:18; 12:34-36; Luke 6:43-45.
6. John 3:3.
7. Consider in this light how unchristian is Christian ecclesiastical law with all its legalistic minutiae of deductions; how unchristian is the whole tightly-knit organization of the Church and the position that communion, or the Eucharist (mass with Catholics), the supreme act of Christian worship, may be performed only by a person initiated and 'licensed' by the Church authority to do so only after he has rigorously undergone a whole program of training in the how's of worship. The Christian who has completely fulfilled the ethical requirement of Jesus for radical self-transformation is nowadays literally an 'outcast' until he 'belongs' in the established patterns of Church authority and society.
8. Matthew 22:37-38; Mark 12:30.
9. In his *The Teaching of Jesus*, Cambridge University Press, 1959, pp. 295-308, T. W. Manson, in presenting this same point, has given the following instances: 1. Matthew 5:34-37, where Jesus attempts to get to the root-matter of truthfulness, admonishing the disciples, "Let your communication be Yea, yea, Nay, nay" rather than engage in a discussion of the provisions of Jewish Law on perjury, which he finds by nature inadequate; 2. Mark 7:1-23, where instead of furnishing further qualifications to the law of outward cleanliness in the matter of partaking food, or to that of freely-taken vows (verses 1-13), Jesus dismisses the whole issue with the notion that "There is nothing from without a man, that entering into him can defile him; but the things which come out of him, these are they that defile the man;" 3. Luke 10:25-37 with reference to which Manson concludes: "In place of a rule of conduct to obey, he [the lawyer] is given a type of character to imitate. This is typical of the method of Jesus in dealing with moral questions. He refuses to legislate, because he is concerned with the springs of conduct rather than with the outwards acts" (*Ibid.*, p. 301).
10. John 8:7.
11. John 8:9.
12. Manson, p. 302.
13. Luke 6:31; Matthew 7:12.
14. Matthew 22:37-38; Mark 12:30; Luke 10:27.
15. Mark 10:32.

16. The young Pharisee was quick to doubt this new totalist love of God as running counter to Jewish exclusivist, separatist racialism. Hence, his immediate rejoinder, "And who is my neighbour?" to which Jesus' answer that the love of God demands that ethical worth and unworth be a function of a man's commitment to the good, or the will of God (the good Samaritan is worthier than the evil priest and Levite—Luke 10:29-37) left us no room for doubt.
17. Matthew 22:39-40.
18. Matthew 22:40.
19. "It is worth noting," he wrote, "that this assertion of the absolute priority of the two great commandments has been softened down to an assertion of merely logical priority in Matthew. 'There is not another commandment greater than these' gives place to 'On these two commandments hangs the whole law, and the prophets.' By this change the whole mass of Torah and tradition which has just been shown out at the front door is quietly brought in again at the back. This is just another indication that where the Law is in question Matthew is simply not to be trusted" (Manson, p. 304. n. 2).
20. *Basic Christian Ethics*, New York: Scribner's, 1950, p. 64. Ramsay here quotes Major, Manson, and Wright (*The Mission and Message of Jesus*, Dutton, 1938, p. 519) approvingly: "Matthew thus tacitly excludes the possibility of a clash between the two great commandments and the rest, whereas Mark reckons with such a possibility and declares how it is to be decided" (*Ibid.*, p. 64).
21. Manson, p. 305.
22. Mark 12:33-4.

Chapter III

DIALECTIC OF THE NEW ETHIC

Jesus confronted Jewish consciousness with this new ethic. That the Jewish community was crumbling, that Jewish morals were low, that Jewish leadership was fanatically, though hypocritically, attached to an emptied law—all this was popularly recognized. Everybody expected something to happen that might improve the situation. Everybody looked for a saviour, or 'Messiah', who would re-establish the glory of Israel, breathe life into its spirit and better the life-conditions of its people. Nonetheless, no Jew looked forward to a revolution which would uproot the whole social edifice and start something entirely new.¹

And yet that is precisely what Jesus contemplated. The tree was corrupt. Like every other corrupt tree, this one too must needs be uprooted; for "every tree which bringeth not forth good fruit is hewn down, and cast into the fire."² The Jews, with their doctrine of the remnant with which they rationalized their racialist separatism and moral unworth, are not indispensable. "God," Jesus knew, "is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham."³ For the will of God to be done on earth cannot be dependent upon them, nor upon any other race of men, however kind He may have been to the Jews in the past. It is not a question of reform or improvement of a people, a race or a state that Jesus contemplated, but a total transformation of mankind. Even if it were a reform of a human reality whose persistence is not undesirable, as was the case with the Jewish society, "No man putteth a piece of new cloth unto an old garment, for that which is put in to fill it up taketh from the garment, and the rent is made worse."⁴ The Jewish contemporaries of Jesus have been too long set in their immorality, their ungodliness, and hypocrisy. "This people's heart is waxed gross and *their* ears are dull of hearing, and their eyes they have closed; lest at any time they should see with *their* eyes, or hear with *their* ears, and should understand with *their* heart, and should be converted, and I should heal them."⁵ "Their heart was hardened;"⁶ and "No man also having drunk old wine straightway desireth new: for he saith, The old is better."⁷

Jesus wanted to bring about a complete and new rebirth in the world. The first prerequisite of this rebirth is the discarding, by his immediate followers, the Jews, of all their ethic which had become rotten to the core. As far as that ethic is concerned, Jesus entertained no doubt as to where it belongs. "Except a man be born again," he told the Jews, "he cannot see the kingdom of God."⁸ He who wants to walk in his footsteps has to get

rid of the old ethic and come to Jesus with a *tabula rasa* ethos. "Except ye... become as little children, ye shall not enter" into this new fellowship.⁹ Indeed, that to which Jesus invited his fellowmen was so different from that to which they were used that the opposition between them is complete. "For whosoever will save his life [under the old ethic] shall lose it [under the new]: and whosoever will lose his life for my sake shall find it."¹⁰

First of all, Jesus repudiated Jewish chosenness. For him nobody was better than any other unless he has already distinguished himself ethically, i.e., by loving God and working for the good, by realizing God's will. The only relationship, he thought, which ought to bind men together is an ethical one. Even the blood ties of the family, he repudiated in favour of the ethical relationship. When his followers drew his attention to the fact that his mother and brethren were seeking him in the crowd, he answered unequivocally: "Who is my mother and my brethren?" Then, looking at his disciples, he exclaimed: "Behold, my mother and my brethren! For whosoever shall do the will of God, the same is my brother, and my sister, and mother."¹¹ *A fortiori*, Jewish racialism made no sense at all to him, and, indeed, was the very germ of rottenness gnawing at the Mosaic ethic. Unlike the Jews, God is, for Jesus, not God to the Jews alone; nor is He the God of Abraham and Jacob and Isaac and their tribe, exclusively. God is the God of all men, and all men stand to Him in exactly the same relation. "There is none good but one, that is God;"¹² "be not yet called Rabbi: for one is your Master... and all ye are brethren. And call no man your father upon the earth: for one is your Father, which is in heaven."¹³ Jesus, therefore, did away with all exclusivism. Jewish exclusivism "shut up the kingdom of heaven against men" and was hence the most odious.¹⁴ Their habit of calling themselves "the children of God" and of calling God "their Father" was even more intolerable. If any one deserved such an appellation as "their Father," Jesus told the Jews, it was certainly not God, but the devil. For that which "ye will do" is "the lusts of your father [the devil, that is]; whereas "he that is of God heareth God's words."¹⁵ Like him who "was a murderer from the beginning" they do and abide "not in the truth;" and like him who has "no truth in him," who speaks "of his own" and therefore lies, they refuse to hear the truth when they hear it.¹⁶ But Jesus was yet to say more than all this; indeed, much more. Not to abide by the word of God is certainly sufficient to alienate man from Him. But the cause of the alienation remains contingent and ethical. Jesus, on the other hand, was so certain that the Jews had no relation of parenthood whatever to God, that he regarded their ethical shortcomings as effects rather than causes of their alienation. The Jews, he held, are not "of God". Consequently, they do not hear or abide with the word of

God.¹⁷ This by no means implies that Jesus was anti-Jewish, as those who, in defence of Jewish chosenness, would imply and then refute it by observing that John's version represents Synagogue-Church strife and is therefore not to be trusted. John reports Jesus to be not against the Jews, but against the claim that they, above all people, are God's chosen, God's "children". And this is an incontrovertible truth. One cannot deny it without prejudicing Jesus' universalism with which Jewish racist exclusivism stands in diametrical opposition.

How clumsily the evangelists have narrowed down, and often repudiated, this ethical universalism of Jesus, to the point of making him a minister only unto the Jews! Overanxious to preserve Jewish Law as it was handed down through generations of the self-centered race, Matthew attributes to Jesus the saying that rather than "to destroy the law, or the prophets, I am not come... but to fulfil."¹⁸ But he gives complete vent to this essentially Jewish anxiety when he adds, again in the mouth of Jesus, "Till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled."¹⁹ Thus, turning the whole mission of Jesus upside down, he asserts that "Whosoever therefore shall break one of these least commandments, and shall teach men so, he shall be called the least in the kingdom of heaven; but whosoever shall do and teach them, the same shall be called great in the kingdom of heaven."²⁰ Moreover, he makes Jesus restrict his missionaries to the twelve tribes, and "to the lost sheep of the house of Israel." He is represented as forbidding them from going to the Gentiles among whom, in confirmation of this Judahic hatred, he does not forget to count the Samaritans.²¹ Luke betrays a keen Jewish joy when he associates Simeon's wishes that the throne of David be filled and that the house of Jacob would be reigned over with glory and to all eternity,²² with the latter's encounter with the "forty-day-old"²³ baby Jesus. He identifies Zecharias' prophecy as Christ "visited and redeemed *his* people."²⁴ Apparently, for Luke, at least in some moments, only the Gentiles are capable of "mocking," "spitefully entreating" and "spitting on" Jesus and only they occur to his mind as possible perpetrators of such crimes.²⁵ At other moments, the contradiction of Jesus is even more brazen: Luke casually links the salvation that came to Zacchaeus, the Jericho tax collector who played host to Jesus on the latter's own request and who was accused by the crowds of sin, to Jewish racialism, and has the temerity to attribute this judgement to the divinely inspired Jesus. "This day is salvation come to this house," he makes Jesus say, "forsomuch as he [Zacchaeus] also is a son of Abraham."²⁶ That is to say, Zacchaeus is saved *because* (at least partly because) he is a son of Abraham. Of all the other characteristics of Zacchaeus, his being a man whom Jesus had found fit to visit without invitation, his

justice implied in his plea against the charge that he is a sinner, namely, that "the half of my goods I give to the poor and if I have taken anything from any man by false accusation I restore him fourfold," none is causally linked to his salvation despite the fact that they are mentioned.²⁷ But the fact that Zacchaeus was "a son of Abraham" justifies, in Luke's eyes, Zacchaeus' salvation.²⁸ And we shall see in the sequel²⁹ how this obsession with Jewish racialism has remained an unfortunate characteristic of Christian thought even today. For our purpose at this stage, let us note that the universalism of Jesus cannot be overemphasized in any consideration of *his* ethic.

Having thus broken the backbone of Jewish ethic by confounding the Jews' racist exclusivism, Jesus proceeded to teach them wherein lies the wrong in their system. He told them that they ought to seek the kingdom of God, rather than the kingdom of Israel. The former is a spiritual kingdom and consists of souls whose wills fall only under the determination of God. This kingdom exists in this world inasmuch as some souls are God-determined despite the constant appeal and threat of non-divine determinants of the will; and it exists after death, in heaven, where such appeals and threats are completely absent. "Repent:" he admonished his fellow-men, "for the kingdom of heaven is at hand."³⁰ "Seek ye first the kingdom of God,"³¹ was equally the command he gave to his hearers as well as to the disciples whom he commissioned to preach in his name.³² To seek the kingdom, to be near the kingdom, to find the kingdom, indeed to have the kingdom, is to love God with all one's heart, soul, and mind. That is "the first commandment".³³

This being the nature of the new gospel, obviously it is radically different from the law; and once the transformation it calls for has taken place, the subject needs no law. He looks for the will of God in every situation he finds himself, and his will refuses to be determined by anything else. As it stands, every provision of the law treats, in some manner, of cases where God has not been the determinant. And Jesus set forth to show the Jews that this is so in almost every department of the law. "It has been said to you" that this or that is right, which is what the law says. "I say unto you" that such and such is right. Jesus is not saying that all law is wrong *in esse*, but that it is a cure—even if not always a good cure—for an already sick man. The ethically sick situation is not the normal. One should desire a quick exit therefrom in order to free oneself for the greater task of loving God and realizing His will. Thus, if man were not already sick, he would do the such and such that "I say unto you". "Except your righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no case enter into the kingdom of heaven."³⁴

The four Gospels, viz., Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John which were

canonized by the Church in the latter part of the fourth century A.D. as exclusively the Gospels of the New Testament of Jesus Christ,³⁶ have preserved for us, despite their being materials at second or third hand and the many revisions to which they have been subjected, a surprisingly revealing amount of Jesus' sayings. We may classify these sayings according to the realms of values to which the various sayings are pertinent: the political, the social, the family, the personal, and the cosmic.

The Old Values and the New

IN THE REALM OF THE POLITICAL

The three synoptic Gospels report that Jesus was asked whether or not one ought to pay his taxes.³⁶ In answer, Jesus is reported to have asked for a penny and, noting that it had the "image of superscription" of Caesar, to have said: "Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's."³⁷ Viewed superficially, his answer is evasive. This impression is furthered by the synoptic tale that the Pharisees were trying to trip him into saying something which might incriminate him in the eyes of the law, or of political authority.³⁸ Judged by this extraneous standard, Jesus' response was brilliantly evasive; and he succeeded very well in pulling himself out of the snare his enemies had laid for him. But this is all too superficial and, in this author's humble opinion, not too complimentary for a divinely inspired prophet of God who has been one of the greatest teachers of morals in human history. That the Jews were trying to destroy him is beyond question. But that the gospel may consist in the details of this hide-and-seek game is not. One would have to regard this gospel incident not from the standpoint of that game but from that of the religious revolution Jesus was teaching. It behooves him that he would transform the Jewish mischievous trick into an occasion for conveying his divine message.

From the standpoint of Jesus' prophecy, therefore, the incident acquires deeper and greater meaning. In the case of the man in whom the religious self-transformation has already taken place, there is no question but that he would be determined by God in everything he does. Such a person would render to Caesar that which is due to Caesar and to God that which is due to God, not as two divergent, alternative realities, nor as two superposed duties pertaining to the same reality, but as one duty pertaining to one and the same reality. That which is Caesar's is at once God's, for everything is God's. True, that which is Caesar's, i.e., the strictly political or civil, is a part of that whole which is God's. Furthermore, it is a part

which, in a sense, is a sub-whole unto itself, governed by an inner structure peculiar to itself and setting it apart from other sub-wholes with structures of their own such as the realms of mankind, of the human organism, the family, the worlds of animals, plants and elements, each of which constitutes a sub-whole of separate distinguishable structures. The sense, however, in which these realms constitute separate wholes is the abstract; for no man stands at the same time in the midst of all these realms at once. The recognition of tensions and structures as belonging peculiarly to each is possible. But it is a recognition demanded by the understanding and for the understanding's exclusive use. It is a grave mistake to hypostasize the categorizations of the understanding into self-autonomous realities; and it is precisely this mistake that stands at the root of the Christian misunderstanding, on which so much in Christian thought has been spent, and which has rocked Christendom for twenty centuries. The secular and the sacred are two departments of thought, not of reality; and reality, regardless of the number of standpoints from which it can be viewed is incontrovertibly subject to God's determination. Moreover, even from the several standpoints of the understanding, the secular and the sacred, as two alternative categorizations, can never enter into conflict with each other. Conflict is possible only between two axiologically independent realms, which the sacred and the secular are not. Both are subject to the same laws of goodness, the same values. There can be no plurality of axiological independence and self-autonomy in a universe that is God's. Nor can these realms conflict in a soul whose will is totally dedicated to God. For, from the standpoint of the overarching will of God, no conflict is insoluble. Obviously, if Caesar's domain were all his own and God's domain were all the priest's—and this bifurcation is the root of all misunderstanding—conflict is inevitable. In other words, axiological plurality has to be posited before it can be found. But that is far from Jesus' mind which, being magnificently obsessed with total surrender to God's will, could not envisage any problem except from the standpoint of such obsession.

The Jews were divided between resentment and subversion of the Roman authority which subjugated them to its power and, on the other hand, co-operation with that authority in order to save what could be salvaged of their national being. None accepted Rome as such and all looked to the reconstruction of the Jewish national state of the past as the cure to their present ills. Rather than appease these two factions, Jesus' answer sought to surmount their difficulties by bringing the needs which they both represented under the overall divine purpose for man. Caesar, or the *Imperium Romanum*, is a reality which cannot be ignored and which must be obeyed. So is the reality of the human will to affiliation with a

community, of which Jewish racialism was the exaggerated, *ad absurdum* corruption. But in obeying either reality, one must not forget the over-arching sovereignty of God. Both Caesar and Israel are equally under God's law. For the realities which they both seek to determine are themselves the realities which ought to be determined by God. And Jesus' solution of the tensions between them is that loyalty belongs to God above all; that in loyalty to Him alone must all and every other loyalty be measured and performed.

IN THE REALM OF THE SOCIAL

Here, all four gospels regard Jesus' dialogue with the Jews as of central importance. Social health and welfare is a universal desideratum. All humans are entitled to the divine gifts of life, of health, and joy, to the circumstances requisite for complete realization of all that with which the Creator has endowed them. In the exercise of these titles, all men are obliged to love one another, to help one another, in short the realization of God's endowments in all men is the ethical purpose of each man and their realization in each man is the ethical purpose of all men. Such is the content of the will of God which is for man the prime and sole determinant.

With this in mind, he taught: "Give to him that asketh thee, and from him that would borrow of thee turn not thou away."³⁹ "Love," not only your friends and relatives, but also "your enemies... do good to them that hate you."⁴⁰ He commanded the twelve disciples to "Heal the sick, cleanse the lepers, raise the dead, cast out devils"—all "freely;"⁴¹ "when [they] come into an house, [to] salute it;"⁴² to "do good, [we might here read, to do the good *überhaupt*, generally and absolutely, to all, in all circumstances] and lend, hoping for nothing again;"⁴³ "be ye therefore merciful ..."⁴⁴ etc.

The most important aspect of Jesus' social teaching is its universality. 'Love of neighbour' which is the generalized form of this whole realm of social teaching is an absolute command inasmuch as it is one of the contents of the love of God. We have seen that it is not a second command (Chapter 2); we shall now examine whether or not it is identical with 'the first commandment'.

Considered ethically, the command to love one's neighbour is part of the commandment to love God to which it is axiologically subservient. To lay open one's ethos and will to determination by God is to be actually determined by the will of God; or, more simply, to do His will. But His will cannot be other than love of neighbour though it may include this in itself as constitutive of all the relevance which divine will has for man's social being. Divine will includes other realms as well. But what it con-

tains can as little be said to be identical with it as it can be said to be 'second' or 'third' or 'fourth,' and hence alternative to, the love of God. Just as with the mind of a Jewish legalist, a Matthew or a Mark understood the command to love one's neighbour as a second command alternative to and different from the first commandment in respect to which it is a 'second', and together with which it makes 'two', so in the unscrupulous mind of a Luke, the first command dissolved itself into the second. Luke gives as one and the same commandment the first and second commandments of Matthew.⁴⁵ Thus, the Lukean version has avoided the error of manifold severalty in the will of God; but it has, by the same stroke, fallen into that of mixing the orders of generality. In the Authorized Version, (King James) both Matthew and Mark had kept a vestige, but only a vestige of the correct understanding of Jesus' mind by calling the second commandment "like" the first.⁴⁶ Unfortunately for the modern English reader, the Revised Standard Version has seen fit to strike out the adjective "like" in Mark and thus make any bringing together of the love of God and love of neighbour in one frame impossible. Both remain there as two, several commandments, however they may have preserved their goodness or obligatoriness.⁴⁷

For the Jews, bent upon love of Israel first and foremost, and on complying with Ezra's legalistic discipline as the best instrument for the preservation and perpetration of racist, exclusivist Israel, Jesus' equating the love of neighbour with the love of God as part of the latter's content, spelled disaster. Even misunderstood, that is to say, as holding the love of neighbour of equal or second rank of obligatoriness, the ethic of Jesus was bound to be radically revolutionary from the standpoint of Jewish Law. It was natural, therefore, that the Jews regarded Jesus' universalist love of neighbour as blasphemy. Love of God, for them, is love of the God of Israel, not of the indiscriminating and universalist God—Creator, Provider, Lover, and Merciful—of all men, but of Israel, and of Israel alone. The God of Israel's will has been laid out to them in the Law. To obey the Law therefore is to realize Israel by realizing the will of 'her' God. Evidently any humanitarian love of neighbour must then be subject to the law of Israel's God. And thus, the Jews reasoned as well as felt that the very grain of Jesus' universalist love of neighbour ran counter to the keenest instinct of Jewish being and the highest interests of Israel's future. The issue, therefore, crystallized as one between the priority of Jesus' love of neighbour and Jewish Law. Its spearpoint was the Pharisee's question recorded in Mark 3:4, "Is it lawful to do good on the sabbath days?"

The Sabbath is the most important and the most fundamental institution in Judaism. It is the quintessence of all Jewish Law, of the whole Torah.

It represented, and still does, to the Jews the special relation in which they stand to their God and to the rest of creation. It should not be surprising that the whole issue between Jesus and Judaism, should take the form of a dispute regarding the sanctity of the Sabbath. Extolling the Sabbath beyond all other institutions the rabbinic Haggadah tells us that "if all Israel observes two sabbaths [or even one sabbath, Leviticus III, 1] in all their details it will immediately be redeemed from exile;"⁴⁸ that "he who honors the sabbath with the preparation of delightful things will receive all that his heart desires; his portion will be limitless and his sins will be forgiven;" that "he who eats the three prescribed meals on the sabbath will be saved from the troubles of the Messianic age, from the judgment of Gehenna, and from the wars of Gog and Magog;"⁴⁹ that "had the Israelites observed the first sabbath in all its details, no nation or tongue could have prevailed against them."⁵⁰ Maimonides gave us a most eloquent expression of the 'Sabbath-equals-God-equals-Israel' cult which has been the peculiar legacy of Judaism since Ezra's days. "The institution of the sabbath," he wrote, "and the prohibition against idolatry are each equal in importance to all the other laws of the Torah"⁵¹... "The sabbath is also a sign between the Holy One and us for ever. Therefore while he who transgresses all the other laws of the Torah is regarded merely as one of the wicked ones of Israel, he who... desecrates the sabbath is placed on the same level with the idolater..."⁵² Maimonides then quotes Isaiah 56:2, 58:13-14 and concludes with the latter's words, that if the Jews but keep the Sabbath, "I [Jahweh] will cause thee [Israel] to ride upon the high places of the earth and feed thee with the heritage of Jacob thy father, for the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it."⁵³ Since Ezra, the Sabbath has never been regarded by Jews as a desirable, divinely inspired or instituted piece of humanitarian rest for a toiling humanity. The Sabbath is strictly a Jewish affair concerning only 'the house of Jacob'. To a *goy*, or non-Jew, the Sabbath is not binding at all; not politically or coercively to be sure, but not even morally. The non-Jew may work on the Sabbath as much as he pleases. His work is not a desecration, provided a Jew does not profit therefrom. Indeed a Jew may even order a *goy* to perform work on the Sabbath if a non-Jew stand to profit therefrom. The racialistic, relativistic, casuistic—indeed compromising—nature of Jewish law is finally evident in that it permits, "in case there was a sick person who was not in danger of death, and in whose behalf the Jew himself dared not violate the Sabbath, the non-Jew may be instructed to do the work."⁵⁴

It is therefore easy to see why Jewish law has elaborated such detailed laws regarding the keeping of the Sabbath. Upon this observance, the whole law, Jahweh himself and Israel whom he faithfully serves, all seem to revolve. The law had prescribed that no work may be performed except

in case of genuine danger of life. The Mishnah enumerates thirty-nine classes of work prohibited on the Sabbath. It relates, with obvious relish, that "if a man hears a fluttering in his dove-cote, he may climb up to see if the trapped dove is suffering more than ordinary discomfort; if not, he must climb again without loosening it. He may investigate the plight of his animal that has fallen in a ditch or well, but more work than this is justified only on account of great pain or peril of death."⁵⁵

All four gospels are unanimous in their account of this battle of loyalties: The Pharisees upholding the sanctity of the Sabbath, and Jesus upholding that of goodness, of the moral law prescribing goodness as the paramount—nay sole—end of all action. But nowhere in these gospels does one find an express statement of the significance of that battle. Conditioned as we all are, whether Muslims, Christians, or other, by centuries of unquestioning and unquestionable conviction that though the seventh day is a day of rest and prayer it is incontrovertibly subservient to the moral law, we all tend to fail to appreciate the sharp gravity of what was being contended, and therefore, to misunderstand the nature of the struggle Jesus had had to wage against his contemporaries. That which was at stake in this battle has therefore to be surmised. Sufficient evidence of the importance which the Jews attached to Jesus' 'desecration' of the Sabbath is, first, the fact that the four gospels mention Jewish scheming to destroy Jesus; secondly, that they mention it only after they have told the story of Jesus' 'desecration'; and thirdly, that they do so not only after they have told the arguments involved but *immediately* after they have told of the act itself of 'desecration'.⁵⁶

The two incidents which the gospels mention, namely; the plucking of the corn by hand while strolling in the field,⁵⁷ and the curing of the man with the withered hand⁵⁸ are insignificant little offences which the rabbinic analyses could have covered under a variety of provisions and sub-provisions. In defence of himself and of his disciples concerning their plucking of the corn on the Sabbath, Jesus cited the example of David who, in flight from King Saul, entered the temple exhausted with some of his friends. There, Jesus pleaded, even David, the prince of morality and hero of Jewry, desecrated the holiest quarter of the temple when he helped himself to the "showbread, which was not lawful for him to eat, neither for them which were with him, but only for the priests."⁵⁹ From this fact, Jesus argued *a fortiori* that he and his disciples should be allowed to do the far less offensive plucking of a few ears of corn when they became hungry while cut off from provisions. He also invoked the precedent of the priests themselves working on the Sabbath and remaining nonetheless 'blameless', though this is a far less convincing argument than the incident of David. Jewish law had provided that the priests' work in the temple in

preparation for the Sabbath ceremonies was not work in the ordinary sense and therefore stood outside the list of thirty nine prohibited activities.⁶⁰

With regard to the healing of the man with the withered hand (John simply calls it an infirmity, John 5:5) Jesus resorted once more to the *a fortiori* argument. He invoked the law permitting assistance and rescue operations to the animals. "What man shall there be among you," he told the Jews, "that shall have one sheep, and if it fall into a pit on the sabbath day, will he not lay hold on it, and lift it out? How much then is a man better than a sheep?"⁶¹ The Jews could have asked him to show that his and the disciples' violation of the Sabbath was made under the threat of life, which every work on the Sabbath must be if the law is to regard it as permissible. Had he tried to show that this was the case, they would probably have absolved him, even though his representation may not have made its point. For, they would have thought, the man was still a Jew upholding and honouring the law, though not scrupulous enough in its application. At any rate, the requirements of the law were not always fulfilled to a perfect degree, and Jewish grasp in matters ethical was too dull to perceive the very delicate nuances involved. Luke represents Jesus as if the latter were playing up to their vanity by appealing on behalf of the infirm woman that she, "being a daughter of Abraham [as if it made any difference to Jesus whether she was a daughter of Abraham or belonged to any other people] whom Satan hath bound... be loosed from this bond on the sabbath day?"⁶²

On the social level, therefore, we may conclude that the teaching of Jesus had for purpose the breaking of the subservience of goodness to the community survival. The social includes many other teachings of Jesus. But none puts the issue in such clear focus as the problem of work on the Sabbath. In the Sabbath, as the quintessence of the law, the whole community of Israel, its survival, existence and perpetuity, is pressed. This, for the Jews, is an ideal far superior to anything else, including the ethical, for it is the latter's ground and justification. It was this connection between ethical and social that Jesus sought to break because it was the opposite of everything he stood for. Goodness, the morally imperative, stands for Jesus on the highest possible level. It is absolute because it is the content of the love of God, of all ethics. By inverting the order of subservience, of axiological conditioning, the Jews have blundered the divine vocation of man and have warped his ethos.

IN THE REALM OF THE FAMILY

In the patriarchal period, Hebrew marriage was strictly an endogamous institution. Hebrew racialism regarded mixed marriages as abomination.

The most eloquent evidence of this is the Genesis account of Jacob and Shechem, prince of Shechem and son of Hamor, the Hivite.⁶³ There, the story is told that Jacob leased a piece of land from the king of Shechem and moved therein with his people. His daughter, Dinah, on a visit to Shechemite women, attracted the attention of the prince, the heir to the throne, who fell in love and lay with her without waiting for the customary nuptial ceremony. In the ensuing negotiations between Jacob and the king of Shechem, it was agreed on the basis of the love which Dinah and Shechem felt for each other and the recognized customary law allowing for the marriage of the two hitherto-unmarried offenders, that Shechem would keep Dinah as his bride. Strangely, the agreement was not sealed with silver, gold, or cattle which the young lover as well as his royal father were prepared to offer without measurement, but with the promise that Shechem would become circumcised and thus identify himself with the community of Hebrew nomads his father had permitted to live on royal land for "a hundred pieces of silver". Shechem and his father, the king, were so enthused at this suggestion that, taking Jacob at his word they circumcised themselves as well as all their citizens, thus tearing the walls that separated the Hebrews from all Shechem. But Jacob and his children were not pleased at this act of Hebraization performed by the Shechemites, and the Genesis' account expressly says that they have never willed it in the first place, having presented the suggestion of circumcision "deceitfully".⁶⁴ Their racist separatism forbade any such mixtures, even with the real and complete Hebraization of the whole Shechem kingdom. Thus, "on the third day, when they were sore"⁶⁵ Jacob's sons slew all the males and carried away their women, children, and all earthly possessions.⁶⁶

This racist separatism and exclusiveness must have been the characteristic mode of Hebrew being during the Patriarchal age as well as in Egypt, for it is not otherwise possible to understand how the Hebrews could have preserved their separate identity, and cultivated their consciousness of it to the point of carrying out an Exodus, if the Biblical version of this story is to be trusted. After the Exodus, the Hebrews first mixed with Midianites, Moses' in-laws, and then with Horeb, the tribes of Northern Arabia, who according to some scholars gave the Jews the Jahweh cult and in confederation with whom, among others, they entered Palestine. But this was little compared with what was to come. After their settlement in the land of Canaan, racial intermixture on a large scale was unavoidable. Separatist racialism suffered considerable decline at least with regard to the Canaanites and to those of their neighbours who accepted to settle in Palestine upon marriage with Hebrew wives. David, Solomon, Ahab, and untold numbers of their subjects contracted such foreign marriages.⁶⁷ But though diluted and often replaced by tolerance, racist separatism

never completely died out.⁶⁸ Mixed marriages did not go by unnoticed. They earned for those who contracted them a national stigma. Racialist criticism of them persisted and attained occasionally levels of especial intensity.

In the Babylonian exile, the purity of the race had undoubtedly suffered, much to the dismay of the staunch racialists whose protests prepared the ground for Ezra and Nehemiah's violent outburst of anti-*goyimism*. For upon their return to Judah, the Jews unleashed a harsh campaign against those of their numbers who were lax in observing the law, particularly against those who had violated the purity of the race by marrying non-Judahic wives.⁶⁹ That "the people of Israel, and the priests, and the Levites have not separated themselves from the people of the lands... the Canaanites, the Hittites, the Perizzites, the Jebusites, the Ammonites, the Moabites, the Egyptians, and the Amorites," was cause enough for Ezra to "rent [his] garment and... mantle, and plucked off the hair of... head and... beard."⁷⁰ "For they have taken of their [the *goyim*'s] daughters for themselves, and for their sons: so that the *holy* [*sic*] seed have mingled themselves with the people of those lands."⁷¹ In concurrence with the elders,⁷² Ezra asked the Jews to "put away all the wives, and such as are born to them,"⁷³ and in addition to "separate [them]selves from the people of the land."⁷⁴ Grudgingly the people of Israel accepted this demand for self-separation. "The seed of Israel separated themselves from all strangers⁷⁵... from the people of the lands... [from] their [own] wives, their sons, and their daughters, [from] every one having knowledge, and having understanding."⁷⁶ They promised never to enter, or allow their kin to enter, into marriage with non-Judahites. Thus a return to the old patriarchal position had been achieved and henceforward, the Jews had no law other than the stringently racialist code promulgated by Ezra and Nehemiah.

The Jewish law of divorce followed these developments closely. In the Patriarchal period, Jewish divorce custom was not unlike that of the surrounding Near Eastern countryside. A man could unilaterally put away his wife. Thus, Abraham dismissed Hagar by a sheer act of will and saw her off with what her shoulder could carry by way of bread and water.⁷⁷ As the Hebrews' sense of racial separatism was strong enough to withstand any attempt at mixtures, divorce was easy and free. The Hebrew family being in those days strictly patriarchal,⁷⁸ the head of the family could be counted upon to exercise sound judgement in the choice of his wives and concubines and the repudiation of those of them who might 'pollute' the purity of the race by refusing assimilation therein. For that was the upshot of the story of Abraham and Hagar, and of Jacob and Shechem.

It may be contended here that by relating the Jewish law of divorce to the ups and downs of racist consciousness, an undue limitation upon the Jewish concept of family is imposed. As divorce is not necessarily always a divorce of a non-Jewish wife, it must follow that the development of the Jewish law of divorce could not have been determined solely by racist considerations. This criticism is not warranted. First, the instances at which the Jewish law of divorce was made or promulgated, i.e., the decisive moments of history at which the development of the law made a turn were three: the Patriarchal period, Josiah's reform, and Ezra's revolution. All three moments were primarily characterized, as far as Hebrew and Jewish thinking on the family is concerned, by great awareness of racist separateness or unseparateness. In the patriarchal period, all the Biblical material dealing with the family, viz., the accounts of Abraham, Jacob, Dinah and Schechem, Joseph, etc., deal exclusively with instances in which a foreigner is involved. It is a period in which the consciousness of racial separatism ruled supreme. In Josiah's reign, the period was characterized by racial admixture and a muting of the separatist voices. Under Ezra, racism was the dominant—nay consuming—note of Jewish consciousness. It is only natural that the focus of thought at a given time will imprint itself on the productions of that period. Secondly, of all human institutions, the family is the one at which all racist considerations come to focus. Commerce and trade, public security and politics, inheritance and torts, all these are by nature removed from racist considerations except in the rare, uncommon circumstance. The family is precisely the 'field' in which racism can be implemented. What is important here is the entry or exit from wedlock of members of the Jewish race. Since entry into wedlock could not be directly regulated by authority as is requisite for the maintenance of racial purity, it was natural that Jewish Law would direct itself to exit from wedlock which it could so regulate. The offence has to become real before the law can deal with it. But if it is already real, the law that deals with it is *ipso facto* a law of divorce. Thirdly, the consideration that it is wrong to assume that the Jewish Law of divorce aimed for the most part at dealing with non-Jewish wives because Jewish wives too were meant by that law to be protected against the vagaries of their husbands, is out of place in the two millennia before Christ, where men commanded a position of dominance and superiority. Indeed, it smacks of nineteenth century Western European woman suffragetteism.

The Deuteronomic reform took place in Canaan, long after the Hebrews had settled and considerably mixed with the Canaanites. Indeed, some authorities maintain that it had not taken place until the Jews had returned from their exile in Babylon to which they were deported in 597 B.C.⁷⁹

The Deuteronomic laws were strictly anti-Canaanite. But they were so mostly on account of the Canaanites' recognition and worship of gods other than Jahweh. They commanded the Jews to "destroy all the places, wherein the nations which ye shall possess served their gods, upon the high mountains, and upon the hills, and under every green tree: And ye shall overthrow their altars, and break their pillars...and ye shall hew down the graven images of their gods, and destroy the names of them out of that place."⁸⁰ Henceforth Jerusalem was to be Jahweh's only sanctuary, and all customs having to do with the cults of Canaan were to be destroyed.⁸¹ Once this is all assured, though, the Canaanites could enjoy their rights⁸² and were taken to the feasts in Jerusalem in the Jews' company.⁸³ The country was indeed full of Canaanites and the Jews intermarried with them. It was under the influence of a conscience undetermined by claims of Hebrew racial purity that limitations began to be imposed upon divorce which, hitherto, had been the absolutely free prerogative of Hebrew men since the days of Jacob. Within the Jewish community, there were too many men and women of Canaanite origin for the diehard racialists to be allowed the advantage of a divorce law permitting repudiation of foreign wives *à la Abraham*. Thus, the Deuteronomic law demanded "a bill of divorcement" to be given by the husband.⁸⁴ Another check was imposed upon impulsive action by the provision that, under certain conditions, the separations should be final.⁸⁵ Although the law has permitted man to divorce his wife for almost any cause, since all it required was that he should have "found some uncleanness in her" or that "it come to pass that she find no favour in his eyes,"⁸⁶ still it must have made divorce less easy. In those days, it must have been quite an undertaking—certainly involving other people besides the pair involved and at least some scribes—to get the document written and executed.

In the period of the prophets, mixture with the Canaanites continued. Consequently, the trend towards limiting divorce continued too. Condemnations of divorce began to be heard, though it was not until Malachi that a pronouncement was made against the institution of divorce as such.⁸⁷ Obviously the period was one of great mixture; the exile must have seen many Jews marrying non-Jews and the travails to which a deported community must have been subjected would have created situations where men would have maltreated the 'wives of their youth' and unscrupulously put them away.

In the period following the Exile, divorce was again very common but without being the object of severe condemnation as before. It was freely administered, doubtless under the influence of Ezra and Nehemiah's racial separatism demanding the repudiation of all non-Jewish wives, their daughters, and sons. Under Ezra and Nehemiah, divorce was both

easy and desirable. The onward moving ethical development towards making divorce less and less desirable and less and less common prompted by mixture with the Canaanites was halted. The progress already made by the prophets was set back.

The Ezra-Nehemiah relapse, however, was not to undo the Deuteronomic reform, much as these two racist extremists would have liked to see it undone on the subject of divorce. There was to be no return to the easy and quick repudiation of unwanted wives of the patriarchs. A bill of divorcement continued to be necessary, though Ezra and Nehemiah, and the Jews after them, made the drawing and execution of such a document an easy matter. Divorce required that some uncleanness be found by the husband in his wife and probably, that this be given in the bill as ground for the divorce. Here, Ezra and Nehemiah found their golden opportunities to reinstitute the simple Abrahamic process of wife-and-child-repudiation. In the interpretation of the meaning of "uncleanness" they were interested in making divorce all the easier in order to achieve thereby the exclusivist ideal of society they wanted.

The wording of the Deuteronomic law was vague and this vagueness gave rise to rabbinic controversies well adapted to Ezra's racist interest. We do not have the texts of this rabbinic controversy at the time of Ezra. But we do have a fairly authentic record of the situation the problem had reached at the time of Jesus. Undoubtedly, for a long time before Jesus, there had been two trends in the rabbinic tradition: one, following the inspiration of the prophets tended to interpret uncleanness in the sense of adultery or incapacitating infirmity; the other, following the inspiration of Ezra, maintained that a Jew could divorce his wife for any reason and gave "uncleanness" as wide an interpretation as to make it include even the case when the man finds a more attractive woman.⁸⁸ The school of Beth Shammai had even sought to limit divorce further by requiring that two or three witnesses be prepared to witness to the existence of "the unseemly *thing*" in the wife.⁸⁹ Beth Hillel and Rabbi Akiba, basing their arguments on textual minutiae, argued to the contrary. The state into which the institution of divorce had fallen in the time of Jesus, through these pedantic analyses of the legists, and the degradation in the ethics of marriage and divorce, are best illustrated in the words of Rabbi Meir. The Talmud reports him as saying: "As men differ in their treatment of their food, so they differ in the treatment of their wives. Some men, if a fly falls into their cup, will put it aside and not drink it. This corresponds to the way of Papus ben Judah who used, when he went out, to lock his wife indoors. Another man, if a fly falls into his cup will throw away the fly and then drink the cup.... Another man again, if a fly falls into his soup, will squash it and eat it."⁹⁰ The school represented by Hillel and Akiba was

dominant. Josephus tells us that a Jew could divorce his wife for any reason whatever even if, on some day, she has burnt his food in the cooking of it.⁹¹ Likewise, Philo speaks of divorce "under any pretence whatever."⁹² The thought occurred to Joseph to put his wife, Mary, "away privily."⁹³ It was on this vexed question of the Shammai, Hillel, and Akiba schools that Jesus brought his insight to bear. More properly, it was on the state which this vexed question had reached that Jesus brought judgement. Divorce ought not to hang on the meanings legists attach to or deduce from an expression in the given provisions of the law. It involves the far more important values of human dignity, of the human person, and of the family, that divinely-established institution by which the most elemental value of existence and life as well as many of the highest personal values of love, fidelity, devotion, parental care and sacrifice, and a whole realm of societal values, are realized. It is therefore too important to be treated as nonchalantly as the legists have done.

Furthermore, the racialists may want to use an easy divorce in order to facilitate the separation of a mixed couple at a time when the temptation to mix is high. It is not difficult to break a marriage after its novelty has worn off. Doctrinaire racialism may well be expected to take full advantage of the situation for bringing the man back into the race's fold. But this is a perverse abuse of the marriage institution. God has so made man that when he marries, he "shall leave his father and mother, and shall cleave unto his wife: and they shall be one flesh."⁹⁴ In the divine scheme, marriage is an institution in which the husband-wife relationship transcends every other relation to tribe or race. It is precisely the only institution in which Divine Will and nature join hands to combat racist separatism.

Jesus therefore did not add further analysis to the nature of "unseemly thing" of Jewish law. He repudiated that law altogether. "It hath been said," he told the disciples in the Sermon on the Mount, "Who-soever shall put away his wife, let him give her a writing of divorcement. But I say unto you, that whosoever shall put away his wife, saving for the cause of fornication, causeth her to commit adultery: and whosoever shall marry her that is divorced committeth adultery."⁹⁵ Naturally, the Pharisees were not pleased with this proclamation. Their ensuing argument with Jesus is reported by Matthew several chapters later.⁹⁶

They came to him pleading the cause of Beth Hillel and Rabbi Akiba, saying whether it is "lawful for a man to put away his wife for any cause."⁹⁷ Jesus answered them boldly, drawing their attention to the facts of creation, to the nature of man, asserting *de novo* the truth that the family relation stands above the tribe and race, indeed above one's father and mother.⁹⁸ He concluded by repudiating divorce as contrary to God's will, as an undoing of the bond He has instituted.⁹⁹ Obviously this insight of

Jesus ran counter to both the text of the Deuteronomic law as well as the Pharisees' racialist will to easy divorce. Naturally, they were quick to observe it.¹⁰⁰ To contradict Moses to whom they attributed the authorship of their law was too great an offence, which even a Jesus would not dare do lest he lay himself open to a grave charge. Furthermore, to speak against divorce at all was a good prospect for inviting trouble at the hand of the authorities. At the time, Jesus was travelling in Herod's territory, and the latter had just divorced his wife in order to marry Herodias.

Jesus' answer, though textually ambiguous, was clear in meaning. "Moses", he said, "because of the hardness of your hearts suffered you to put away your wives: but from the beginning it was not so."¹⁰¹ Whatever interpretation may be given to this statement, it cannot evade the fact that Jesus implied Moses' disapproval of divorce. This is only too natural; for it is not possible for the prophetic mind of Jesus to conceive of another great prophet as being in error. Jesus then reiterated his position that marriage is divinely ordained and that divorce is no part of the divine scheme. Obviously the phrase "except for fornication" is itself a legalism in which Jesus could not have been interested, his purpose being to give the general principle, not to enumerate exceptions. Like every other principle this one too was not absolute and could have exceptions. These would be governed by the higher principle of love of God which alone is absolute.

The significance of Jesus' stand on divorce has been interpreted in a variety of ways. The liberal Jews for whom racialism was no concern and who had espoused the progressive ideas of the prophets, understood Jesus to have championed the school of Shammai. The racialist followers of Hillel recognized in Jesus' stand further cause to destroy him. Some scholars recognized Jesus as a champion of the Shammai school,¹⁰² others as doing so only implicitly.¹⁰³ Both have utterly missed the important point of the whole issue. Jesus was interested in championing neither Hillel nor Shammai, either implicitly or explicitly. His position rises so far above both that it is ridiculous to relate it to them in this fashion.

Just as divorce was the rubbing stone of the separatist-universalist issue which Jesus solved so decisively in favour of universalism, the question of adultery was that of the internalist-externalist family morality. Adultery was well condemned by law and custom, but it was quite widespread. There is scarcely a prophet who does not condemn the Jews for it.¹⁰⁴ The law provided the death penalty for it and the practice of stoning the adulteress must have been practised in Jesus' time as evidences the Gospel of John.¹⁰⁵ "Ye have heard," Jesus told them, "that it was said by them of old time [meaning obviously the law], Thou shalt not commit adultery. But I say unto you, That whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart." For Jesus, adultery

is not only what the law condemns and what the people punish in accordance with that law. It is, besides, to wish lustfully for another woman than one's own. This is prior to the act which has been brought to the attention of the law; prior to the act itself. For it concerns the man in his consciousness of himself as a moral agent. Suffice it for man to be guilty that he has lustfully desired another woman. From this point of view, hardly anybody, and certainly no case of adultery, escapes. For conscience sees all. This was the lesson he meant to teach when the Pharisees brought him the adulteress that he may condemn her and vindicate them, or defend her and contradict the Mosaic law. "He that is without sin among you," he told them, "let him first cast a stone at her."¹⁰⁶

Another instance where Jesus held Jewish law to have been well meaning on the subject of the family but to have been corrupted by Rabbinic analysis is the fifth commandment, "Honour thy father and thy mother."¹⁰⁷ Jewish law, however, had elaborated a theory of vows which required the son or daughter who made a vow to dedicate a certain property or service to Jahweh, to keep the vow regardless of consequences, even though he may thereby deprive his own parents of badly needed assistance.¹⁰⁸ It was natural that the two commandments would often come into conflict with each other and the rabbis upheld the vow at the cost of love of parents. The practice hardened the souls of children towards their parents; but for the rabbis, this was not an undesirable development as it bound the youth in like measure, in loyalty to rabbi, temple, and Jahweh and therefore helped to forge and maintain the racialist bond that held the nation together. An oral vow made haphazardly was something that could be done any moment. And the situation was not infrequent that upon being faced with the request to surrender something to the parents, a son could well invoke the protection of the law by merely proclaiming that he had already made a gift of the thing ("It is corban!") to Jahweh. The rabbis did not actually enforce the execution of vows. They left it to the discretion of the individual and his conscience though, it must be kept in mind, under an accusing but not prosecuting, finger of the law.

Facing this kind of situation, man, as Jesus saw him, should have no doubt where the right action is. He should honour his father and mother.¹⁰⁹ Not that he should do so more than he honours God, but he should not have made such a vow in the first place. For man ought not to vow properties or goods which are necessary to his own, his family, or parents' subsistence. If the good he vows is an unnecessary luxury, or even just plainly dispensable, the issue would not arise, for he would not by doing so be prejudicing the interest of his parent. Thus, Jesus did not suggest further qualifying details to the law, but transcended it, putting the love

and honouring of parents out of contradiction, as it were, with the duties to God. In doing so, Jesus, once more gave voice to a developing and maturing ethos which ran counter to Pharisee racialist conservatism.¹¹⁰

It is with this in mind that we should read the exceedingly harsh words Matthew puts on Jesus' lips in his admonition to the twelve apostles: "I am come to set a man at variance against his father, and the daughter against her mother. . . . He that loveth father or mother more than me is not worthy of me."¹¹¹ Obviously by these words Jesus could not have meant to annul his assignment of priority to filial duty. These words refer not to filial duty but to Jewish clannish tribalistic, racialistic duty, against which he maintained an unswerving antagonism throughout his career. It was identically the same evil he was combating here as he combated in his condemnation of the rabbinical position on *corban*.

IN THE REALM OF THE PERSONAL

The political, the social, and the family realms provide ample field for the love of God to become operative and thus determine the human ethos. This love, however, finds its most natural soil and atmosphere in the realm of the personal. Here, it finds the field in which it can best express and realize itself. For love itself is a state of the subject not as a social or cosmic organism, but purely as an acting subject. Certainly, the act is an event which takes place in the world, in a social milieu, but it is not inasmuch as the act is so that love may be predicated of it. Rather, love is a characteristic of the acting person inasmuch as he acts at all.

It may be argued that love is not a state but an activity. This is a mistake; for one cannot love in the abstract. No man can just 'love'; though he may engage himself in an activity which may or may not be described as loving. Barring the banal meaning of love as desire, and the outdated Aristotelian psychology of aesthetic and ethical judgement as consisting of an act of a second self, love is always an attribute of an act, but never the act itself. To be sure, man takes attitudes and judges; and it is his taking this or that attitude, his exercise of this or that judgement that may or may not be loving. Love is indeed used as a verb and as a transitive verb; but this is a paraphrase, consisting in naming the act by the quality or state which characterizes it.

Love then is a quality which ought to characterize all human deeds, whether personal or social. But it is not in their social aspects that love is said to be a characteristic of them, but in their aspect as acts of an acting subject. On this consideration is based the breakthrough of the new ethic, namely, its removal of love, its highest and only absolute principle, indeed its very principle of goodness and virtue, from the realm of effects or from

that of the actual world of real relations, to that of determinants of the act within the acting subject.

This transfer of the fulcrum of ethics from the outer world of space-time and history to the inner world of intent and will was a very great revolution. Jewish law, anxious to serve and preserve the community, Israel, first and last, has crystallized itself around precepts the *raison d'être* of which is the bringing about of that service and preservation. Evidently, it concerned itself with something real, namely, Israel, and regarded goodness as equivalent with the service and preservation of that reality. It therefore devised deeds which bring about or help bring about this primordial effect, and measured goodness by the extent to which this effect is brought about. As a body of principles of a general nature, like the ten commandments, the Torah had always been looked upon as the main source of God's will. If the *raison d'être* of Jewish law is what we have said it to be, the Jewish law as Torah would be not too well suited to realize its purpose. But as Torah, Jewish law did not play this role. It was as Halachah that this purpose was achieved.

When, after their return from exile, the community of Jews pledged themselves at Ezra's command to uphold the Torah, they pledged themselves to it as Halachah, or the body of do's and don't's deduced from the more general precepts of the former in order to 'streamline' Jewish observance and unite them into one body. The Torah left the Jew on many points without specific directions to meet the real life-situations as they arose. Hence, basing themselves on Exodus 18:20, "Thou shalt make clear to them the statutes and the *toroth* and make known to them the way wherein they should walk and the thing which they should do," the Pharisees had gathered a body of express commandments, of "things" the Jews should do if they are to discharge their responsibility to the Torah, and therefore to Israel. Not to do the things commanded by the Halachah was regarded since Ezra's time, as high treason to Israel, as well as to her god, Jahweh. The Halachah we have was put together by R. Akiba who died in A.D. 135, but its material, as Halachah, goes back to Ezra's time, and its origins go back to the Exile.

A Halachah, therefore, is a specific declaration, demanding the performance of a particular, given thing, i.e., the production of a given effect, in a concrete, given situation.¹¹² Its essence is its emphasis on "the doing" of "a thing" and "that before everything else."¹¹³ To the Pharisees, the whole question of morals was one of first knowing and then doing. The knowing, they thought, is complete since they had the Torah as well as the Halachah. What was missing is the doing, the production of the real-existent effects.

Evidently in this ethic of consequences, intent and will had no place at all. The locus of merit, or of demerit, of ethical goodness or sin, is the real

existent thing or state brought about by the doing. Thus if the thing done, the effect produced, is itself good, the whole deed is good and the agent, ethically worthy. If, on the other hand, the thing done, the effect, is bad, then the whole deed is bad and the agent ethically unworthy. In this spirit, the Mishnah ruled that "if a woman undertakes a Nazirite vow and then [without her knowledge] drinks wine or is defiled by a corpse, she is to receive forty stripes."¹¹⁴ In defence of this spirit, the Pharisees had recourse to Leviticus, where the principle is clearly laid out that "if a soul sin, and commit any of these things which are forbidden to be done by the commandments of the Lord, *though he wist it not*, yet is he guilty, and shall bear his iniquity."¹¹⁵ The Talmud adds in the same spirit the opinion of Resh La Kish in refutation of the judgement of Rabbah ben Bar Hana. The latter had maintained that he who eats the paschal lamb with the intention of doing so "walks in the path of the Lord" but he who eats it with that of merely having a meal is a "transgressor who has stumbled therein." The point which the former made is not, as might be expected, that without intention, the man could not be said to have even 'stumbled' into the path of the Lord. Precisely, the opposite. By having eaten, he has produced the desired effect of consuming the paschal lamb and as such, he cannot at all be a 'transgressor'.¹¹⁶

Another eloquent comment the Talmud gives is that of 'Ulla. "Both Tamah and Zimri committed adultery. Tamar committed adultery and gave birth to kings and prophets. Zimri committed adultery and on his account many tens of thousands of Israel perished." Obviously, to 'Ulla, it is the effect of adultery that is relevant in judging the final worth or unworth of Tamar and Zimri.¹¹⁷ In like spirit, Rab Judah, citing Rab, a greater and older authority than himself, said: "A man should always occupy himself with the Torah, and its precepts even though it be for some ulterior motive."¹¹⁸ 'Ultrior motives' do not vitiate the acts, as long as their effects are what they ought to be. Indeed, Rab Judah will tolerate the ulterior motive even on the mere hope, or contingency—actuality being unnecessary—of a desirable effect. He justifies the reader of the Torah with ulterior motive as one who might eventually follow the Torah and its precepts.¹¹⁹

To Jesus, all this seemed wrong to the core. The real-existent effects of an act can enjoy no moral value. They can have as much and as high a utilitarian value as they may; the properly moral will for ever escapes them. For the Jews, the identification, in matters of value, of God, of the *sum-mum bonum*, with Israel amounted to the identification of the utilitarian with the moral, of the law with conscience, of the effect of doing the law with the ethical worth of the agent. No more is required than to do the law, if producing the effect of a united, reconstructed, strong, and glorious

Israel is itself the measuring-rod of morality. To Jesus, on the other hand, the utilitarian is by nature other than the moral though they may be related in a thousand ways in the execution of the act. Being incapable of taking place in the abstract, the moral requires a matrix on which it can be exercised. But the value of that matrix does not in the least affect the moral worth of the deed which is exclusively a function of the inner determinants of the acting subject. Whether an act is morally worthy does not depend upon the goodness of its results to the agent or to the recipient. It depends, rather, on the intent and will of the subject. If in doing it, the subject has been determined by considerations of advantage to himself, whether material or social, the act is not only not worthy but morally reprehensible. Likewise, if the subject has been determined by considerations of advantage to his own kin, his tribe or people, indeed, by any consideration other than the love of God. For only this determination is moral; and only those deeds which proceed from it carry ethical value. Ethical value, the properly moral, is really none other than the imprint of that kind of determination.

Jesus gave this new insight of his several expressions, all designed to bring its truth in to focus. Consider that old, poor lady, he taught, who contributed a farthing to the temple treasury the utilitarian, goods-value of which is very small.¹²⁰ Her contribution was "all that she had, even all her living" and she gave it not in order to show off, like the rich who throw in their gold with trumpets blaring so that the world would honour them,¹²¹ but "out of her want."¹²² She gave it for the sake of giving, in order to pour herself out into her fellow-men, as it were, to help them at the cost of her own wellbeing. The love of God so moved and determined her soul that all other considerations fell away and, led by her vision of oneness with the divine image, she gave all she owned to fellow-men. In doing so, she invited the notice of none, neither did she seek any advantage to herself. Therefore, her desert is greater than that of all the other contributors combined.¹²³ By these observations, Jesus sought to teach the truth that ethicality is a quality that belongs to the will alone, and that it is in the will alone, in its intensity, its scope and range, its motives, its purpose, its determination, that the ethical is to be sought.

Another eloquent expression of this same truth is the anecdote the evangelists reported of Jesus' encounter with some Pharisees at the dinner table. Luke makes the event itself take place in the home of a Pharisee who "besought him [Jesus] to dine with him."¹²⁴ Mark speaks of an encounter Jesus had with some Pharisees on some eating occasion;¹²⁵ and Matthew, omitting all mention of the event, gives only the arguments involved.¹²⁶ It is doubtful that such a gentle nature as Jesus would answer his host with the tirade of condemnation reported by the evangelists when

the host only made an observation to his guest which sounded more like an inviting enquiry than an accusation. On the other hand, since Jesus' revelation has been situational, i.e., his pronouncements have all been occasioned by the occurrence of some event which they were meant to bear upon, it is equally doubtful that by asking their question of Jesus regarding the washing of hands, the Pharisees were enquiring hypothetically and in the abstract. It is more likely that they were commenting upon an occurrence which they saw had taken place.

What actually did take place must have been that Jesus, or his disciples, (more likely the latter), were noticed to have sat down at table without performing the ceremonial ritual of hand-washing. It is also likely that in some of the homes of those disciples, the Pharisees noticed that the rituals of washing the pots and pans a number of times as a purification from sacral defilement by milk or meat and their products, were being flouted. To the Pharisees, this was a clear case of violation of the law.¹²⁷ As Mark clearly explains, by contradicting them, Jesus was not arguing for abandoning the requisite measures of cleanliness.¹²⁸ Cleanliness was not at all his concern here. Rather, he used the situation created by the Pharisee argument to express his original insight that moral good and bad are not a function of the goods-values of real-existents.

Thus, he reproached the Pharisee critics that they "make clean the outside of the cup and the platter" while their "inward part is full of ravening and wickedness."¹²⁹ Their "lips" do plenty of "honouring" of God, but their "hearts" are "far" from Him. They pretend that in doing this, they uphold God's commandment; but in reality they do nothing of the sort. For what they teach as the commandment of God is not so at all but is their own invention. They 'use' God for their own purposes.¹³⁰

Per contra, the concern of moral man is above all to purify his will, to ethicise his ethos, so to impress his soul with the love of God that it will do His will in every situation. Not only is Jewish law concerned with bringing forth the wrong, unethical end of the will to power of a separatist race, but its concern as law is to bring about effects it deems desirable. Whereas the whole idea of the new ethic is that the will should be made wholesome (for, as "the light of the body is the eye...if...thine eye be single, thy whole body shall be full of light....If thine eye be evil, thy whole body shall be full of darkness")¹³¹ so, a good will, i.e., a will determined by the love of God will issue in a life replete with moral value. Man's highest ethical ideal is God. He strives to be "perfect, even as... [the] Father which is in heaven is perfect."¹³² But no perfection can ever be achieved through the doing of particular things expressly commanded or implicitly deduced, as long as the heart is evil. When the heart is sick, everything becomes defiled and evil: the mind, the act, the effect.¹³³ Yet,

it is otherwise if the source of all action, the will, is made perfect. Then, all actions will be perfect and the whole life will be perfect, *a fortiori*. For, out of the good tree, only good fruit can issue.¹³⁴

From this point of view, how vain—indeed ridiculous—must the Pharisee look when he meticulously fulfils the most minute requirements of the law regarding how and what to eat, how and what to sacrifice, how and what to do on so many insignificant occasions of daily living and is completely oblivious to weightier matters, to love of God, to mercy. He must needs have a completely twisted ethos to concern himself with “that which goeth into the mouth” in fear of defiling thereby his person and not with “that which cometh out of the mouth” as evidence of something defiling that must have gone into his heart and settled there.¹³⁵ The body, for all its importance, is only a vehicle for the soul. Not only does the Pharisee take undue care for its welfare but he has even dissociated the care measures from their original significance which is purely utilitarian, and transformed them into an empty ritual desired for its own sake. And yet, what value does the whole body have when compared with the soul? Even they “that kill the body” should not frighten us, but we should fear Him who judges the soul; He is worthy of all fear, and therefore of all love.

Still more unethical was the Jew's care—paralleled by the materialism of modern man—for the things of the world. Unlike the ravens that neither sow nor reap nor store in barns yet are provided for by their Creator, unlike the lilies of the field which neither toil nor spin and are yet arrayed in greater glory than was Solomon's, the Jews manifested a gross will to riches which stultified their moral sense. But if they are to redeem themselves from this path of doom, Jesus told them, they were to love God above all, to seek His Kingdom, and dedicate their whole lives to Him.¹³⁶ For man cannot have two such radically opposed masters as God and Mammon. He would either love God and hate Mammon, or love the latter and hate God. The antinomy between God and non-God is insoluble; and the only alternative for ethical man is to ‘hate’ the world, that is to say, to hold it on such level of elemental value as properly belongs to it.

Thus Jesus counselled his disciples to give up all, to give away all the things of the world that belong to them and to (or rather, in order to) follow him.¹³⁷ This was also his advice to the Pharisee whose proclamation that the first commandment is to love God with all one's heart, soul, and mind earned Jesus' compliment that he was not far from the Kingdom of God.¹³⁸ He has asked Jesus what new concrete thing he ought to do in order to inherit eternal life considering that he had observed the commandments throughout his life.¹³⁹ Prior to and better than any observance

of precepts, Jesus answered, is the love of God, one side of which is the repudiation of the things of the world. To be a disciple of Jesus, to hear his word, is precisely to do it: believing and doing are one.¹⁴⁰ That is a great, but difficult commandment. No wonder that very few people have been able to observe it. Even Peter's claim, on behalf of the apostles, to have achieved it was rejected by Jesus, *a silencio*, as pretension.¹⁴¹ "Strait is the gate, and narrow is the way, which leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it."¹⁴² To achieve that first commandment, that is to say, to transform one's inner self or will so radically as to immunize it against determination by anything other than God's will, is to build one's house on solid rock, a house impervious to flood, rain, wind, or storm.¹⁴³ To do anything less than that, that is to say, less than loving God and dedicating one's whole mind, heart, soul, and life to Him, is building on sand, a house which will soon crumble and fall.¹⁴⁴

IN THE REALM OF THE COSMIC

This extraordinary and intense interiorization of human morality, revolutionizing the whole life and destiny of the Jewish stream of being into which he was born, Jesus taught frankly, boldly, and straightforwardly. The Jews had for long cultivated a cult of secrecy and whispering, under the pressures engendered by conditions of exile and political subjugation. They expected a leader who would deliver them from their miseries and re-establish for them the glory that was Israel.¹⁴⁵ But under the influence of the later prophets,¹⁴⁶ their vision of the redeemer has changed from that of a Jahweh riding into Jerusalem, his capital, in triumph and splendour, vanquishing his (their) enemies with his spear, and driving them in chains before him, to that of an agent of Jahweh, to be born in humility and who will act in secrecy. By the time of the Apocalyptic literature, (3rd and 4th centuries B.C.), particularly in the hands of Joel¹⁴⁷ and Daniel,¹⁴⁸ the 'Day of Jahweh' has become one on which, rather than a chastisement and purification of Israel, Jahweh will do all the work of rehabilitation and reconstruction himself and avenge Israel against all her enemies. Thus, in Jewish consciousness, the power of this Messiah grew in indirect proportion to the Jews' hope of seeing their shattered kingdom reconstituted. By the time of Jesus, the conviction was pretty well universal among them, that the natural processes of politics and history could never bring about the fulfilment of their aspiration,¹⁴⁹ and that only a cataclysmic *bouleversement* of universal magnitude could provide a chance for their vindication. Although the nature of the messiah's mission had by then become composite,¹⁵⁰ the political aspects of it had remained dominant throughout. The prophetic, the spiritual, and the

political apocalyptic had fused together, making the messianic hope the innermost longing of both the separatist conservative and the spiritualist-liberal,¹⁵¹ but enabling either one to place his emphasis where he pleased. There is no doubt, however, where the Pharisees and after them, the majority of Jews, laid the emphasis.¹⁵²

This whole development was represented in the Jewish mind first as the decay and collapse and then as the restoration and vindication of Israel as the Kingdom of God.

The history of the concept 'the Kingdom of God' is for all intents and purposes, the history of the Jewish people. It is not surprising therefore that Jesus confronted it and focussed a fair part of his teachings around it, for it commanded a very central place in all Jewish thinking and feeling. But as we shall endeavour to show, Jesus merely used 'the Kingdom' as a vehicle; for, as a category of Jewish thought, it was supposed to give his new message, if couched in its terms, the advantages with which Jewish emotions and feelings had already charged that important concept.

Of the political kingdom of Israel, of its restoration and the vanquishing of Israel's traditional or present enemies Jesus would have none. "My kingdom is not of this world"¹⁵³ is clearly directed against any such confusion.¹⁵⁴ "If my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight, that I should not be delivered to the Jews: but now is my kingdom not from hence."¹⁵⁵ To Jesus, the Jews' obsession with Israel the racial, separate, political community was anathema. Against it, he taught a spiritual kingdom constituted purely of men loving God and doing His will.¹⁵⁶ His is not a kingdom of a particular place, for a particular people, or in a particular time. On the contrary, it is a kingdom that exists nowhere and everywhere, in the sense that it has no relation to any given space but may exist wherever its constituents, the loving individuals, happen to be.¹⁵⁷ It is not for any given people, but for man as such, everybody being entitled to it by virtue of his humanity. Furthermore, it is not a state of affairs for which plans are laid out in secret, a kind of insurrection bringing about a new regime into the world, but something openly and clearly laid out. Nothing is hidden here, and nothing is secret. The requirement is crystal clear: if it is realized by any one, the Kingdom has, by that much, become a reality.¹⁵⁸ It is not something that happens to the world by overt act of a power external to it. All that God will presently do has already been done in that He had already sent Jesus.¹⁵⁹ The rest, all the rest, is yet entirely to be made, and by man.¹⁶⁰ Finally, the Kingdom is not a future event but a present one. It has already come and is here "within you".¹⁶¹ For by believing him and doing his counsel the disciples and followers have already realized the Kingdom, i.e. given it concrete instantiation in themselves,¹⁶² always with the possibility of further growth in themselves and

spread to other individuals. Jesus had no use for the eschatological nonsense of his contemporaries, and much less for the eschatological 'doctrines' developed by the Christians of history.

Naturally, these teachings of Jesus were rejected by the Jews in favour of an unprepared yet historical cataclysm by which the racialist political Israel would be re-established.¹⁶³ To them, Jesus seemed to have over-hastily judged the resurrection of racially political Israel impossible and turned to a purely (the Jews would rather say, merely) spiritual kingdom.

This, the Jews argue, the Christians did "in ignorance," for "they were giving up the substance for the shadow."¹⁶⁴ The spiritual element which, born in and nursed by the Prophets throughout the centuries and raised, unprecedentedly, to the highest pitch by the effect and breakthrough of Jesus, was 'shadow' to the Jews, the substance being always Israel, Israel *en chair et en os*. Accordingly "the first duty of an Israelite is, not to waste his energies on the discernment of that spiritual element, but to study the law..."¹⁶⁵ and to do it. Similarly, without rejecting messianism, the Jew was taught not to look for an end to the world, by which, in some cataclysm, his present miseries will all become sweet blessings. From the standpoint of Biblical-Talmudic Judaism, the Jew conceives of the messiah as "a redeemer strong in physical power and in spirit who in the final days will bring complete redemption, economic and spiritual to the Jewish people."¹⁶⁶ According to Philo, such a Jewish messiah will not only rescue Israel from exile and political subjugation, but will come "leading a host and warring furiously;" he "will subdue great and populous nations."¹⁶⁷ The Kingdom of the Jewish messiah is definitely "of this world,"¹⁶⁸ and is one that will come not cataclysmically, but, though its time may not be foretold, through preparation.¹⁶⁹ Thus the Jews, by rejecting Jesus, and his spiritualized kingdom, rejected at once "the conviction that had produced the Apocalypses."¹⁷⁰ Hence, the Apocalyptic consciousness became an exclusively Christian affair and coloured the ideas of Jesus as they were handed down among the early generations of Christians whose *Weltanschauung* still belonged predominantly to the Jewish stock of ideas.¹⁷¹

This Israelitization of the message of Jesus was not the only misinterpretation that message was to undergo. As Jesus and his disciples were rejected by the Jews, the latter sought their followers among the Gentiles. There, under a totally different consciousness, the message of radical self-transformation and of the monistic ethic of love of God was to undergo further transvaluations which we shall consider below.¹⁷²

The Ethic of Jesus and Christian Legalism

Our view of the ethic of Jesus as constituting a genuine emancipation first from Jewish law and then from law in general, and, consequently, requiring a total transformation of the self so that it may be determined solely by the will of God, has been denied in favour of a view that seeks to win back for Christian ethics the legalism which Jesus' breakthrough had caused it to lose. However, this was never to be a legalism such as Ezra had instituted for the Jews, although 'canon law' has often made it hard to make out the difference between them. What the nature of the relation between Jesus' first commandment of the love of God and what these contenders mean by the law of Christ has never been clarified. Granted that explicit legal provisions demanding in any given concrete situation the bringing about of a real-existent of some sort and the governing of human life in the manner of Ezra by such provisions are excluded, the Christian legist must still find the meaning of 'the law of Christ' which will be true at once to the normal meaning of 'law' and to Jesus' 'love of God'.

An example of this confused Christian thinking is to be found in O. H. Dodd's Bampton Lectures delivered at Columbia University in 1950.¹⁷³ In Dodd's mind, the Sermon on the Mount is law. "It appears," he wrote, "that we shall not be far wrong in taking the Sermon on the Mount as Matthew had represented it, namely, as the new law which supersedes the law of the Old Testament."¹⁷⁴ In holding this, Dodd is not even true to his own position, as we shall soon see. For it is hopelessly confusing to speak of a "new law which supersedes the law of the Old Testament" when law has a different meaning in each case. Turning against his opponents, he warns that "we have to take account of the fact that in certain quarters of the Church... there has been a strong bias against any understanding of Christianity as a new law."¹⁷⁵

Professor Dodd grants that those who hold the opposite view, the "bias [that] comes out... in some forms of contemporary neo-Protestantism," have some grounds in the New Testament to which they refer it, such as "Christ is the end of the law for all who have faith,"¹⁷⁶ "you are not under law but under grace,"¹⁷⁷ and the Pauline concept of *apolytrosis* or "emancipation from the Jewish Law." But, he argues, these Christian theologians, ubiquitously present "in almost all periods of the Church" have misunderstood their Christianity as well as their St. Paul.¹⁷⁸ He tells us that Paul's ideas of being "within Christ's law,"¹⁷⁹ of "fulfilling the law of Christ,"¹⁸⁰ of "the commandment of the Lord"¹⁸¹ and the like, should have had a sobering influence upon them, since at least it is not certain "that Paul intended to repudiate the understanding of Christianity as a new

law.”¹⁸² To repudiate their view, Professor Dodd sets himself to analyze the Pauline position.¹⁸³ In fact, by his analysis the view he seeks to refute is not refuted but vindicated.

Dodd argues that an analogy exists between the situation of Israel at the Babylonian conquest when “Judaism collapsed” and the new Christian community in St. Paul’s time. In the former case, Jeremiah instituted a new covenant under which “the sins of the past would be forgiven and... [the Jews] would know God in quite a new way, because His law would be written on their hearts...instead of upon tables of stone.”¹⁸⁴ In the latter case, Judaism collapsed again and Jesus instituted a new covenant in which the new “epistle of Christ [is] inscribed not with ink but with the spirit of the living God, not upon tablets of stone, but upon hearts of flesh for tablets.”¹⁸⁵ According to Dodd, there is no better description of St. Paul’s estimate of the difference between the two covenants than Paul’s own characterization. God, he quotes Paul as writing, “who also hath made us able ministers of the New Testament [R.S.V. ‘Covenant’], not of the letter but of the spirit: for the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.”¹⁸⁶

Pedantically, though correctly, Dodd here points out that the Greek *gramma* should be translated as ‘written word’ and not ‘letter’, and refutes the common Christian position, started by St. Paul himself, held by the Apostolic Fathers and later confirmed by Bishop Ambrose of Milan in his famous lesson to the young Augustine, the teacher of Christianity, thus building it into the very fabric of Christian thought, that ‘letter’ stood for the literal meaning of the Old Testament and ‘spirit’ for an allegorical interpretation of it through which “obsolete provisions of the Law of Moses might be given artificial meanings edifying to Christians.”¹⁸⁷ The so-called “Law of Christ” is not “a law of commandments contained in ordinances”¹⁸⁸ but one “written on the heart.”¹⁸⁹ But the whole matter is one of determining the precise meaning of this characterization. That the one is “inward” and the other “external,” Dodd rightly claims to be an ambiguous way of talking. He then proceeds to define by negation. He asserts that Paul certainly did not mean to say that there is no law for the Christian except his own “inner light” and repudiates the statement “To every man his own conscience is God” as “a sentiment of the pagan poet Menander,...at variance with the fundamental Christian position that the Lord is King and the conscience of man His subject.”¹⁹⁰ He then shows that Christianity is not a “religion of the spirit” in a sense which contrasts it with the notion that it is a “religion of authority”. Undoubtedly, Christianity is not a religion of licence and libertinage. This is undoubtedly the meaning of those who maintain that Christianity is not a religion of authority. But the evidence Dodd adduces here in favour of authority is

ridiculous. The basic postulate of Christianity, he argues, is "the Kingdom of God; and a Kingdom of God implies authority." Jesus had taught "with authority and not as the scribes." This may very well be granted provided the distinction between the authority of a kind expressed in promulgated ordinances and enforced by coercion and the fear of sanctions, and the "authority of Christ" is clearly maintained. Indeed, Dodd's recourse to the figure of "the Kingdom of God" is a *petitio principii* which leaves the argument just where it was before. Though the most popular, "Kingdom" is a very inept figure of speech when indiscriminately applied to God and Jesus. It is idle to oppose the view that Christianity is not a religion of law such as Judaism with the statement that Christianity is a religion in which the Kingdom of God is a central notion. The whole matter here is one of ascertaining the difference between the political coercive authority of a king and that of Christ.

From these very cursory remarks concerning the great problem at issue, and from them alone, Dodd proceeds to the conclusion which he describes as "clear," that it would be mistaken to think that the difference between the "administration of the written word [the letter of the law] and the administration of the spirit [that which is written on the heart] is precisely that between objective and subjective ethical standards, or between authority and freedom."¹⁰¹

Thus, for Professor Dodd, unless Christianity accepts the notion of "the Law of Christ" as meaning such provisions as positive law constitutes and as enjoying such authority as a political ring enjoys, "the law of Christ" will degenerate into a "subjective ethical standard". For him, in true Anglo-Saxon empiricist fashion, only positive law is 'objective' because only it comes from the outside to govern emotions, instincts, passions, and desires. Everything else is 'subjective', because it issues from within; and all that does so is necessarily whim, desire, instinct, passion, etc. The inward character of the radical self-transformation for which Jesus called, his very revolution against Jewish legalism, the so-called "new law of Christ" which Dodd calls that which is "written on the heart," the "inner light" and "conscience" which is "God," "the religion of the spirit," is all a matter of "subjective ethical standards" until it issues in positive laws. Since "subjective ethical standards" cannot be the true intention of Jesus, and since that which contrasts with this is that "authority" which the notion of "Kingdom of God" implies, Jesus must have then meant not to destroy Jewish legalism but to change its content. Clearly then, Dodd fears that the Neo-Protestant bias against understanding Christianity as a new law is really tantamount to a bias in favour of "subjective ethical standards," a relativism which he had mobilized all his wits to combat. This apprehension obviously stems from the mistaken

identification of "inwardness" with "subjectivity." Dodd must have deemed subjectivity of ethical standards a necessary implication of apolytrosis (self-liberation) from the law, and this has determined his stand against it.

Obviously, the radically transformed self which has placed itself in a state of harmony with the Divine Being and in which it can have but one determinant for all its actions, its feelings, its thoughts ("...with all thy heart, with all thy soul and with all thy mind") does not need the law to guide its action. For in place of the law, it has *ex hypothesi* placed God Himself and has so changed itself that it cannot deviate from His determination. But, although some Christians may have acted in their worse moments as if *apolytrosis* had relieved them from all moral laws, no Christian thinker would accept that dispensing with the law is equivalent to the self becoming a law unto itself, determined by principles which it fabricates from its own subjective desires, impulses, and whims. The self that is here in question is one that has undergone Jesus' radical transformation and this can have no whims, impulses, and desires that are not ethical. Evidently then, Professor Dodd shares the old prejudices of British empiricism and has been led by them to believe that beyond the sensory, external and "from without," there is nothing in this world except the psychic and the inward which is the realm of desire and feeling on one hand, and abstract, discursive concepts on the other. To leave the realm of law is, for him inevitably to fall into that of *die Willkür*. His failure to recognize that a determinant may be 'objective' and yet 'inward' stems from the Humean prejudice, confirmed by Kantian metaphysical construction, that the will must either subject itself to something foreign to it, in which case it is ethical, or to its own whim and be the 'empirical' unethical *Willkür*.¹⁹²

Misled by this skeptic-empiricist prejudice, Dodd is now ready to define the nature of the 'law' that pertains to Christ. Starting from John 13:15, where Jesus admonishes the disciples to "do as I have done to you" and 13:34 where he gives them the commandment to "love one another...as I have loved you," he asserts that the nature of the obligation which the new covenant entails is the reproduction in human action of "the quality and the direction of the act of God by which we are saved."¹⁹³

But what does it mean to reproduce the quality and direction of divine act? Against Augustine's "Love and do as you please," Dodd cites the teachers of the early Church who dress up "a comprehensive and somewhat detailed scheme" of laws the Christian is supposed to observe.¹⁹⁴ But it is ridiculous to construe Augustine's teaching as licentious or to argue against its misconceptions in history rather than against the teaching itself. On the other hand, the appeal to the Church Fathers begs the question at issue. But Professor Dodd does not leave the matter to rest there.

He holds that "Jesus Himself has set forth a substantial number of ethical precepts...in markedly authoritative tones and [has joined them to] solemn warnings that they are intended to be obeyed."¹⁹⁵ But no sooner does he give this flagrant 'Ezraization' of Jesus that he withdraws it by denying that Jesus' law is a "law of commandments contained in ordinance." However, he does so only halfheartedly; the justification he gives is that "few of them [Jesus' laws] are capable of being made into direct regulations for behaviour."¹⁹⁶ He goes on to observe, in truly legalistic spirit, that Jesus' precepts for moral action are "highly concrete," "embarrassingly specific," and are not "broad generalities".¹⁹⁷ But he cannot make up his mind once and for all. Again, he dodges from this legalism,¹⁹⁸ asserting that we reproduce the "quality" and "direction" of the divine act by merely exerting ourselves to realize that which the precepts of Jesus (such as are contained in the Sermon on the Mount) attempt, or are designed to realize.¹⁹⁹ These contents ('meanings' or 'values') of Jesus' precepts are meant to "make abundantly clear what must be the quality of every action,... [by]...approaching the conscience through the imagination."²⁰⁰

Evidently, if this is what the nature of 'the laws of Jesus' is, they are not laws at all, but exemplifications in the concrete, of a soul which possessed by the love of God, lets no opportunity escape to give the will of God real-existence, by "approaching the conscience through the imagination," in the concrete spatio-temporal reality present in the situation. The obligation so to realize the will of God necessarily follows from the nature of that will by definition. For it is a contradiction in terms to say that the will of God is not good, and of a good that it ought not to be.

Notes

1. Joseph Klausner, a Jew, distinguishes between 'Messianic expectation' and 'belief in the Messiah' meaning by "the first the prophetic hope...in which there will be political freedom, moral perfection, and earthly bliss for the people Israel in its own land, and also (*sic*, mankind is only an also) for the entire human race;" and the second, "the prophetic hope...in which a strong redeemer, by his power and his spirit, will bring complete redemption, political and spiritual, to the people Israel..." (*The Messianic Idea in Israel*, tr. by W. F. Stinespring, New York, MacMillan, 1955, p. 9). Evidently, in either case, it is the political freedom, 'earthly' and spiritual welfare of the people Israel only, of that self-centered race and state called Israel, above all, that is in question.
2. Matthew 3:10; 7:19; Luke 3:9.
3. Matthew 3:9.
4. Matthew 9:16; Mark 2:21; Luke 5:36.
5. Matthew 13:15.
6. Mark 6:52.

7. Luke 5:39.
8. John 3:3.
9. Matthew 18:3; 19:14; Mark 10:14-15; Luke 18:16-17.
10. Matthew 10:39; 16:25; Mark 8:35; Luke 9:24; John 12:25.
11. Matthew 12:48-50; Mark 3:33-35.
12. Matthew 19:17; Mark 10:18; Luke 18:19.
13. Matthew 23:8-10; Mark 12:29, 32.
14. Matthew 23:13.
15. John 8:44, 47.
16. John 8:44.
17. "He that is of God heareth God's words: ye therefore hear them not, because ye are not of God." *Ibid*.
18. Matthew 5:17.
19. Matthew 5:18.
20. Matthew 5:19.
21. Matthew 10:5-6; 15:24. Though originally a mixed race, the Samaritans had been converted to Judaism by priests from the district of Samaria returned from exile by permission of Sargon II (722-705) for that purpose (II Kings 17:25-28). Religiously speaking they were Jews, down to every detail, until Ezra's regime. Then, refusing to give up their non-Samaritan wives (Nehemiah 13, 28-31, tells of a Samaritan priest who, refusing to give up the foreign-born woman, has been ousted from the priesthood he has supposedly 'defiled' by Ezra who thereby "cleansed...the Levites...from all strangers") they constituted for themselves a temple in Mount Gerizim but kept the scripture (Pentateuch), the law, the liturgy, and their manner of life absolutely unchanged (J. A. Montgomery, *The Samaritans, the Earliest Jewish Sect: Their History, Theology, and Literature*, Philadelphia, 1907, pp. 322-46; Warren J. Moulton, art. in *Hasting Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*; E. Kautsch, art. in *Schaff-Herzog Encyclopaedia of Religious Knowledge*).
22. Luke 2:32-33.
23. Luke 2:22; Leviticus 12:2.
24. Luke 1:68-69.
25. Luke 18:32.
26. Luke 19:9.
27. Luke 19:7-8.
28. Luke 19:9-10.
29. *Infra*. p. 277-78
30. Matthew 4:17, 10:7.
31. Matthew 6:33. Mark introduces Jesus as the man who "after that John was put in prison...came into Galilee preaching the gospel of the kingdom of God" (Mark 1:14; Luke 12:31).
32. Luke 9:60.
33. Matthew 22:37; Mark 12:30; Luke 10:27.
34. Matthew 5:20.
35. The 'New Testament' is a name applied to a collection of twenty-seven writings by eminent Christians of the first and second centuries A. D. including the following: *Matthew, Mark, Luke and John*; the *Acts of the Apostles*; the Epistle of Paul, known as *Romans, I and II Corinthians, Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians, I and II Thessalonians, I and II Timothy, Titus, Philemon, Hebrews*; the epistles of *James*, of *I and II Peter*, of *I, II, and III John*, and of *Jude*; and finally, the *Revelation* of St. John the Divine. The first four are known as the *Evangelists*, or

Gospels and give an account of the life and teaching of Jesus. Since much of the material is repeated in them, attempts at relating or harmonizing them were made at an early stage of Christian history. About A.D. 170, Tatian, started this research and gave the discipline its first fruit, *The Diatesseron* or "harmony of the gospels". His method, namely, the arrangement of the gospels account of the life and teaching of Jesus in parallel columns so as to present their rapport or variety and thus to construct a complete gospel, was followed down to 1774 when Griesbach published a critique of the relations of the Gospels to one another laying any such construction waste. *The Diatesseron* (literally, "the one by means of four") presuppositions, together with Irenaeus' fanciful reasoning, that the Gospels are four because the winds and directions are four (See his *Against Heresies*, III, 11, 8, *Ante Nicene Fathers*, New York: Scribner's, 1925, I, 428-29, were put aside in favour of a division into the synoptic Gospels and that of John. The former do, in fact, follow a pattern, however variantly they may observe it and concern themselves with the ministry of Jesus in Galilee. The latter is uniquely theoretical and where it concerns itself with anecdotes, it is limited to Jesus' work in Judah. The rest are letters written for the benefit of churches in areas more or less distant from the author in answer to definite questions, settlement of issues and/or, the edification of the faithful.

These twenty-seven writings are a selection form a much larger body of Christian literature which circulated during the formative first six centuries of the history of Christianity. The diversity of literature which must have been read in the churches and presented as holy must have dismayed the serious, conscious Christian. Accordingly, attempts were made to constitute a canon out of some writings chosen for the purpose. The first such attempt was made as early as A.D. 140 by Marcion, and his selection consisted of the gospel of *Luke* and ten of the Pauline epistles, not including the pastoral. In doing this, Marcion was undoubtedly prompted by his rejection of Hebrew Scripture and his desire to substitute for it a Scripture he may truly call 'Christian'. This created a stir, especially as Marcion had already been at odds with a number of churches over the meaning and nature of Jesus' personality and mission, and his selection and arrangement of the material was, at least partially, dictated by his theology (Alexander Souter, *The Text and Canon of the New Testament*, New York: Scribner's, 1913, p. 166). Prompted as they were by the claims of the montanist anti-ecclesiastical, anti-clerical movement for easy prophesying which Montanus, its leader, advocated as "the out-pouring of the Holy Spirit" on the Christian church, and under which he proclaimed that the Heavenly Jerusalem would soon descend near Pepuza in Phrygia (Epiphanius, *On Heresy*, 48, 1) these churches had to answer Marcion's claim. They therefore prepared another collection which they placed side by side with the Hebrew Scripture. This collection did not change Marcion's, except in its arrangement and by adding to it further epistles and other writings. It must have been the nucleus which later became the canon. For, in 1740, Muratori published a 'fragment', presumed to come from Rome towards the end of the second century, which acknowledges a collection of Scripture consisting of the four gospels, the Acts, the thirteen epistles of Paul, two epistles of John, the epistle of Jude, and the Apocalypses of John and Peter.

But it should not be assumed that any collection in this or the following century achieved any kind of unanimity. The Muratorian fragment does not acknowledge four books of the later canon; the Apocalypse of John was accepted in the West but not in the East, while the epistle to the Hebrews and that of James were not accepted in the West. Alexandria, for a long time the seat of Hellenic, as opposed

to Jewish, Palestinian, Ebionitic Christianity, recognized as scripture the epistle of Barnabas, of Clement of Rome, and the Didache, which were all struck off from the canon of orthodox Christianity. Clement of Alexandria, likewise, rejected the epistle of James, II Peter, and III John which were regarded as scripture by Rome. The Churches of Edessa and Mesopotamia, meanwhile held firmly to *The Diatesseron* (the four Gospels), the Acts, and the Epistles of Paul alone. Even as late as the middle of the third century, Origen distrusted James, II Peter, and II and III John; but he favoured a larger canon. Circa 325, Eusebius divided the books of the New Testament into three classes: First, those which are generally acknowledged, a class limited to the four Gospels, Acts, Epistles of Paul, I Peter, I John and—Eusebius is not quite so certain here—the Apocalypse of John; second those which are disputed but widely acknowledged, a class which includes James, Jude, II Peter, II and III John; third, those which are rejected, a class in which he included the Acts of Paul, the Shepherd of Hermas, the Apocalypse of Peter Barnabas, the Didache and, according to some, the Apocalypse of John.

The first mention of the canon as it appears today occurs in the thirty-ninth Festal letter of Athanasius in A.D. 367., but strife between the churches as to the exact size of the canon was to continue for over three centuries more. In the West itself, (i.e., in Rome) Athanasius' canon was not acknowledged until 382, under Pope Damasus. Even this acknowledgement needed a ratification which came only at the end of the fifth century under Pope Gelasius. In Africa, it took three synods in less than twenty-seven years for the canon to win some kind of general acceptance and it took such men as Augustine to do the work (A.D. 419). Though under growing limitations, contention as to the size and nature of the canon continued until the second Trullan Council of 692, when the formation of the canon may be said to have been closed. This does not mean that in the world at large, Christians had then stopped to contend in the matter. The Paulicians, for instance, who did not stop being an independent sect of Christianity until the twelfth century when Byzantine persecution put an end to them, relied on an entirely different canon than the orthodoxy; and it is not improbable that some Christians, particularly among the Christian Churches of the Near East, do not hold to the Christian canon even today.

In the West, Christianity did not spread as a religion revealed in a body of teachings, a system of ethical and religious ideas, conveyed by God to Jesus Christ and communicated by him to man. The first Western Christians expected an actual cataclysm to take place by which the real order would be upset and 'the Kingdom of God', according to their notion, instituted in its place. Thus, Western Christianity began not as a 'religion of the book', but as one of the impending *bouleversement*. Its advocates and faithful could not have felt the need for a 'Scripture'. Besides, they already had one in the Hebrew Scripture which they regarded as their own, though with no little twist of interpretation. Throughout the first two centuries of Christianity, the greater part of Christian teaching strove to establish that Jesus Christ was the person of whom the Hebrew Scripture prophesied. As the expected event never came, they began to look into the traditions, teachings, and writings of the ancestors with the hope of finding therein a substance of their faith other than the expectation of the Kingdom. By that time, the Eastern churches which understood Jesus as the prophet of the true religion of God, the Scripture of which the Hebrews had falsified, had argued so much with the Jews concerning it that they felt the need for a statement, or 'Book' in which the fundamental teachings of Jesus were set. It was no wonder therefore that the striving after conceptualization and the writing down of that conceptuali-

zation had crystallized in the Eastern Churches, and that Marcion was the first compiler of a Christian Scripture.

The issue of the nature and size of the content of the canon was really the issue of Christian theology and hence, of Christianity itself. Thus, the so-called 'heretical' churches had each its own Scripture and undoubtedly each underlined such passages and claimed them as authority for its own teaching. Even when a measure of unanimity as to the nature of Christianity was reached, predominantly in the West by the end of the fourth century, the roads to this unanimity were often those of 'lobbying' the Church Councils by powerful interest groups and open persecution of the dissident bishops and their followers. Unfortunately for the religion of Jesus, it never enjoyed the benefit of the scribes' art, since the scribes, in Jesus' days, were his most committed enemies and since his following did not count among them any men of culture, of reading and writing. Paul, the first learned convert of Christianity, did not make the decision to join the faithful until after the life of Jesus had run its course.

Marcion's arguments, as to the nature of Christ, of the Scripture, of salvation, of Hebrew religion, etc., were unanswerable on the level of authority, since no authority had by then set itself as empowered to speak for Christ. Moreover, since all that is known of Christ to the Christian Churches were the second-hand reports of the evangelist, apostle, bishop, or other, there was no way to answer a controversialist contending the contents of these reports. If Peter's, James's, Barnabas's, and Clement's word are authoritative why should not Marcion's, Beryllus's, Valentinus's, Basilides's, etc., be equally so? Under the pressure of this kind of argument, and in the total absence of incontrovertible words of Jesus on the subjects in dispute, the church developed a new meaning of authority. The doctrine of the Holy Spirit was there to lend itself, and it was referred to in order to establish validity or normativity where there seemed to be none. That which the Churches of the West combated as the Montanist heresy, namely, the outpouring of the Holy Spirit upon Montanus and his women, priestess-prophetesses Priscilla and Maximilla, they conferred upon themselves as 'the Church of Christianity'. This move could even claim a tradition in its favour: Ignatius had already taught that the Bishops are so by the will of Jesus Christ, as Jesus Christ himself is so by the will of the Father; that "unless a man be within the sanctuary, he lacks the bread of God" meaning that in order "to commune with God at all" the Christian must "live in harmony with the will of the bishop" and enjoined that all Christians "must regard the bishop as the Lord Himself" ("Ignatius to the Ephesians" III, IV, V, VI, Kirsopp Lake, *The Apostolic Fathers*, New York: MacMillan, 1914. I, 177 ff). The ground was thus prepared for a doctrine of revelation which invests with canonicity and holiness not only what Jesus had said, or is reported to have said, but also the pronouncements of the churchmen. By this extension of the powers of the Holy Spirit to support and to cover, as it were, its own work, the Church had set itself up as a holy authority in whatsoever it had decided or would yet decide were the nature of Christ, or of his mission. By means of this doctrine, that which was only a contender in the dispute (i.e., the Church), has become both plaintiff and judge.

36. Matthew 22:17 ff; Mark 12:14 ff; Luke 20:22.

37. Matthew 22:21; Mark 12:17; Luke 20:25.

38. Thus, Matthew introduces the story with the statement that the Pharisees "took counsel how they might entangle him in his talk" (Matthew 22:15), "to catch him in his words" (Mark 12:13). Luke exceeds both Matthew and Mark in clarity of purpose: "And they watched him, and sent forth spies, which should feign them-

selves just men, that they might take hold of his words, that so they might deliver him unto the power and authority of the governor" (Luke 20:20).

39. Matthew 5:42; Luke 6:30.
40. Matthew 5:44; Luke 6:27.
41. Matthew 10:8.
42. Matthew 10:12.
43. Luke 6:35.
44. Luke 6:36; Matthew 5:7.
45. Indeed, Luke gives this not only as the First Commandment but as the essence of the whole law. He reports: "And, behold, a certain lawyer stood up, and tempted him, saying, Master, what shall I do to inherit eternal life? He said unto him, What is written in the law? how readest thou? And he answering said, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind; and thy neighbour as thyself. And he said unto him, Thou hast answered right: this do, and thou shalt live" (Luke 10:25-28).
46. "And the second [commandment] is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself" (Matthew 22:39-40). "And the second is like, namely this, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself" (Mark 12:31).
47. "...You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your mind, and with all your strength.' The second in this, 'You shall love your neighbor as yourself.' There is no other commandment greater than these" (Authorized Standard Version, Mark 12:30-31).
48. Shabbath, 118b.
49. Shabbath, 118a, b.
50. *Ibid.*; compare *ibid.* 87b, Tosafoth to Shabbath, s.v. "Kasher," *Universal Jewish Encyclopaedia*, New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1905, art. on Sabbath by Julius H. Greenstone.
51. Hullin, 5a.
52. Moses ben Maimon, Moreh, ii, 31.
53. *Ibid.*
54. Moses ben Maimon, *Yad Ha-hazakah*, Shabbath ii, 10. Quoted in the *Universal Jewish Encyclopaedia*, 1905, art. *cit.*
55. Paul Ramsey, *Basic Christian Ethics*, New York: Scribner's, 1950, p. 56.
56. Matthew writes: "Then [i.e., after the desecration had taken place in public defiance of the law] the Pharisees went out, and held a council against him, how they might destroy him" (12:14). Mark is even more to the point: After the "withered hand" was cured in public "the Pharisees went forth, and *straightway* [italics this author's] took counsel with the Herodians [evidently, this is a matter in which all Jewry concurred, including the romanized Herodians, Judah's supposed 'enemies'] against him, how they might destroy him" (Mark 3:6). Luke is clearer still. He introduces the act, not the argument, of 'desecration' itself with the remark that "The scribes and Pharisees watched him... that they might find an accusation against him" and reports, once the act had taken place: "And they were filled with madness; and communed one with another what they might do to Jesus" (Luke 6:7, 11). Finally, John drops a significant remark. He tells that having cured the man and hence committed the act of violation, "Jesus had conveyed himself away, a multitude being in the place [or from the multitude that was in that place]" (John 5:13, Authorized—King James—Version, n. 1). Evidently Jesus correctly assessed the gravity of what he had just done and wisely took shelter. Like the other evangelists, John adds: "And therefore did the Jews persecute Jesus, and sought to slay him, because he had done these things on the

sabbath day" (John 5:16).

57. Matthew 12:1; Mark 2:23; Luke 6:1.
58. Matthew 12:13; Mark 3:1; Luke 6:6; John 5:5.
59. Matthew 12:4; Mark 2:25; Luke 6:4. This anecdote from David's life is given in I Samuel 21:1-6. Exodus 25:30, 35:13, 39:36 prescribe "And thou shalt set upon the table shewbread before me always" and Josephus relates that this bread was placed on the table on the morning of the Sabbath, in two opposite rows of six each; that it stayed there all week long under "two golden platters laden with frankincense" and that it could be eaten by the priests only after its week was over and the new bread is put in its place. This was done "at the public expense". *Jewish Antiquities*, III, x, 7; *Works*, tr. by H. Thackeray, London: W. Heinemann, 1930, IV, 441.
60. *The Mishnah*, Shabbath, VII, 2.
61. Matthew 12:1-12. In another chapter, Luke resumes the argument; and in another he cites the example of the Jew loosening "his ox or his ass from the stall and lead him away to watering" (13:15), adding the example of "an ass or an ox fallen into a pit" (14:1-5).
62. Luke 13:16, Christians still argue that "I am not sent but unto the lost sheep of the house of Israel" (Matthew 15:24) and "Go not into the way of the Gentiles, and into any city of the Samaritans enter ye not: But go rather to the lost sheep of the house of Israel" (Matthew 10:5-6) represent genuine sayings of Jesus, unaware that such statements commit Jesus to a separatist nationalist relativism of which he was utterly innocent. As they see their own Christianity deeply enmeshed with the racial history of the Jews which centuries of acceptance of the Old Testament as *verbatim* revelations has imposed upon their minds, they are spiritually unable to break free from the deadening grasp of Jewish sectarianism to appreciate the universalism of Jesus in its complete power, majesty, and significance. (See this author's review of S. B. Frost, "The Beginning of the Promise," *Christian Outlook* XVI, No. 1, Montreal, November 1960, 16-18).
63. Genesis 34:1-31.
64. "And the sons of Jacob answered Shechem and Hamor his father deceitfully . . ." (Genesis 34:13).
65. Genesis 34:25.
66. Genesis 34:31.
67. That Israeli women were in Hebrew eyes permitted to marry non-Israelis is evidenced by David's marriage of Bath-Sheba, a Hittite (II Samuel 11-3, 27), Abigail's marriage to "Jether the Ishmaelite" (I Chronicles 2:17); etc. II Samuel, 3 gives, as wives of David "Ahinoam, the Jezreelitess," "Abigail, the wife of Nabal, the Carmelite," "Maacab, the daughter of Talmai, King of Geshur;" etc. I Kings 16:31 cites as foreign wife of Ahab, the Baal-worshipping Zidonian, Jezebel who lured him to idolatry.
68. The fact that Deuteronomy expressly forbade marriage with the original inhabitants of Canaan may not be explained away as belonging to a much later period than that of the Kings. For it is unlikely that either the Deuteronomic reform or the revolution of Ezra would have codified a family law that was utterly unknown hitherto. It should be remembered that Josiah's introduction of the Deuteronomic law was not a state promulgation of positive law, but a proclamation of commitment to the sacral law that already was there.
69. "Nation and cult having vanished," writes J. Bright, "they had little else to mark them Jews. This undoubtedly helps to explain that growing stress on Sabbath, circumcision, and ritual cleanness observable in the exile and immediately after.

Indeed, all Israel's leaders from Ezekiel through the restoration prophets to Nehemiah show great concern for Sabbath, tithing, the Temple and its cult, ceremonial purity, and the like. These things were not, to them, external trivia, but distinguishing marks of the purified Israel for which they laboured" (*History of Israel*, Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1959, pp. 415-16).

70. Ezra 9:1, 3.
71. Ezra 9:2.
72. Ezra 10:2.
73. Ezra 10:3.
74. Ezra 10:11.
75. Nehemiah 9:2.
76. Nehemiah 10:28.
77. Genesis 22:14.
78. David R. Mace, *Hebrew Marriage; A Sociological Story*, London: Epworth Press, 1935, p. 66. "The solidarity of the Hebrew tribal group is therefore essentially the solidarity of the patriarchal family, centered in the father as its head" (*Ibid.*).
79. Johannes Pedersen, *Israel*, Oxford University Press, 1947, IV, 586. Pedersen departs from the view, currently held since the nineteenth century, that Deuteronomy was found under Josiah and compiled in the seventh century. He admits that the author of 'D' document may have shaped his work in the seventh century but he denies the probability of such a view on the grounds that "the struggles of the 7th century [may have]...prepared the ground for such a self-contained Israelite community as D takes for granted, but it did not come into existence before the exile. [Because, Pedersen argues, it is only]...from that time [that] the difference between the Israelite and the foreign element acquired its absolute character" (*Ibid.*, p. 585).
80. Deuteronomy 12:2-3.
81. *Ibid.*, 14:1; 18:9-22.
82. *Ibid.*, 24:17ff; 24:19-22.
83. *Ibid.*, 16:11 ff, Leviticus 19:34.
84. Deuteronomy 24:1.
85. Deuteronomy 24:4; 22:13-19; 22:28-9.
86. Deuteronomy 24:1.
87. Malachi 2:16; 5:15.
88. Mishnah, Gittin, IX, 10: "Beth Shammai says: A man should not divorce his wife unless he has found her guilty of some unseemly conduct, as it says, because he has found some unseemly thing in her. Beth Hillel, however, says [that he may divorce her] even if she has merely spoilt his food, since it says because he hath found some unseemly thing in her. R. Akiba says, [he may divorce her] even if he finds another woman more beautiful than she is, as it says, it cometh to pass, if she find no favour in his eyes" (*The Babylonian Talmud*, Seder Nashin, ed. by I. Epstein, London: Soncino Press, 1936), VII, 436-37).
89. "And what do Bath Shammai make of this word 'thing'? It says here 'thing' and it says in another place 'thing' viz., in the text, 'By the mouth of two witnesses or by the mouth of three witnesses thing shall be established' (Deuteronomy 19:15). Just as there two witnesses are required, so here two witnesses are required" (*The Babylonian Talmud*, Gittin, IX, 90a, VII, 437).
90. *Ibid.* Gittin, IX, 90b, VII, 438.
91. Flavius Josephus, *Jewish Antiquities*, Works, IV. 597.
92. Works, Jonge's edition, III, 312.
93. Matthew 1:19.

94. Genesis 2:24.
95. Matthew 5:31-23.
96. *Ibid.*, 19:3-12.
97. *Ibid.*, 19:3.
98. *Ibid.*, 19:4-5.
99. *Ibid.*, 19:6.
100. "Why did Moses then command to give a writing of divorcement and to put her away?" (*Ibid.*, 19:7).
101. *Ibid.*, 19:8. It is hard to construe this passage, as Christians are inclined to do, with complete Jewish concurrence, to mean simply that Moses suffered such a command to be issued by God on account of men's hardness of heart. The *Interpreter's Bible* mentions that "it is a standard Jewish teaching that God frequently adjusts a high principle of law to human weakness," and quotes E. P. Gould's definition of 'hardness of heart' as "the rude nature which belongs to a primitive civilization." (*Interpreter's Bible*, New York: Abingdon Cokesbury Press, 1951; Matthew 19:5). But what does it mean for Moses to be corrected by God and for Moses to accept the divine correction 'on sufferance'? If God wants to promulgate a precept, does the Prophet resent it? and accepts it only on sufferance? It is far more probable that Jesus meant to say that Moses never said such a thing and never promulgated such a law; that since in the beginning the law did not read such and such, it must have been their hardness of heart that changed the law of Moses to suit the Jews' own racist tendencies.
102. Notably, Amram, *Jewish Law of Divorce According to Bible and Talmud*, London, 1897, given in Mace, *Hebrew Marriage*, p. 257 and J. Hastings, "Marriage: Semitic," *The Dictionary of the Bible*, New York: Scribner's, 1901.
103. e.g., R. H. Charles, *The Teaching of the New Testament on Divorce*, London: Williams and Norgate, 1921, p. 33.
104. Genesis 12:18-19; 20:2-7, and 26:10-11 tell of the punishment Pharaoh earned by his advances to Sarah. Genesis 39:7-9 condemns Potiphar's wife for enticing Joseph. Exodus 20:14 and Deuteronomy 5:18 expressly condemn adultery as an offence against Jahweh. From there through the whole Old Testament, the same theme runs unchanged: II Samuel, 12:13; Proverbs 2:17-18; 6:26, 32; 7:18-20; Ecclesiasticus 23:18-26; Jeremiah 7:9, 23:10; Ezekiel 16:32, 18:6, 11, 15, 22:11, 33:26; Hosea 4:2, Malachi 3:5.
105. John 8:3 ff.
106. *Ibid.*, 8:7.
107. Exodus 20:12.
108. "When thou shalt vow a vow unto the Lord thy God, thou shalt not slack to pay it: For the Lord thy God will surely require it of thee; and it would be sin in thee... That which is gone out of thy lips thou shalt keep and perform; even a freewill offering, according as thou hast vowed unto the Lord thy God, which thou hast promised with thy mouth" (Deuteronomy 23:21-23).
109. "But yet say, Whosoever shall say to his father or his mother, It is a gift, by whatsoever thou mightest be profited by me; And honour not his father or his mother, he shall be free. Thus have ye made the commandment of God of none effect by your tradition. Ye hypocrites..." (Matthew 15:5-7). "Full well ye reject the commandment of God, that ye may keep your own tradition" (Mark 7:9).
110. *The Babylonian Talmud*, Nedarim 9:1, already expressed the view that a man need not keep a vow if it interfered with his duty to his parents, but this insight was hardly observed in the Pharisee-dominated atmosphere of the Jewish Law. See S. Belkin, "Dissolution of Vows and the Problem of Antisocial Oaths in the

- Gospels," *Journal of Biblical Literature*, LV (1936), 227-34.
111. Matthew 10:35-37.
 112. R. Travers Herford, *The Pharisees*, London: MacMillan, 1924, p. 73.
 113. *Ibid.*, p. 143,
 114. *The Babylonian Talmud*, Nazir, 23a, VI, 79.
 115. Leviticus 5:17.
 116. *The Babylonian Talmud*, Nazir, 23a, VI, 82.
 117. *Ibid.*, Nazir, 23b; VI, 84.
 118. *Ibid.*
 119. *Ibid.* See also *ibid.*, Horayoth, 10a-b, Horayoth 67-76.
 120. Mark 12:41-44; Luke 21:1-4.
 121. Matthew 6:1-4.
 122. Mark 12:44.
 123. Mark 12:43.
 124. Luke 11:37 ff.
 125. Mark 7:1 ff.
 126. Matthew 15:1 ff.
 127. "Then the Pharisees...asked him, Why walk not thy disciples according to the tradition of the elders?" (Mark 7:5; Matthew 15:2).
 128. "For the Pharisees, and all the Jews, except they wash their hands oft, eat not, holding the traditions of the elders. And when they come from the market, except they wash, they eat not. And many other things there be, which they have received to hold, as the washing of cups, and pots, brasen vessels, and of tables" (Mark 7:3-4).
 129. Luke 11:39.
 130. "In vain do they worship me, teaching for doctrines the commandments of men... Laying aside the commandment of God, ye hold the tradition of men" (Mark 7:7-8).
 131. Matthew 6:22-23; Luke 11:34.
 132. Matthew 5:48.
 133. "From within, out of the heart of men, proceed evil thoughts, adulteries, fornications, murders, thefts, covetousness, wickedness, deceit, lasciviousness, an evil eye, [i.e., jealousy] blasphemy, pride, foolishness" (Mark 7:21-22).
 134. Luke 6:43.
 135. Matthew 15:11; Mark 7:15-23.
 136. Luke 11:29-31.
 137. Mark 10:21; Matthew 6:25 ff, 33.
 138. Mark 12:34.
 139. "All these [Do not commit adultery, do not kill, do not steal, do not bear false witness, etc.] have I kept from my youth up" (Luke 18:21).
 140. John 7:17, 9:31-33.
 141. "Then Peter said, Lo, we have left all, and followed thee. And he said unto them. Verily... There is no man that hath left house, or parents, or brethren, or wife, or children, for the kingdom of God's sake, Who shall not receive manifold more in this present time, and in the world to come life everlasting" (Luke 18:29-30; Mark 10:28-29).
 142. Matthew 7:14.
 143. Matthew 7:24-27.
 144. *Ibid.*, Luke 6:47-49.
 145. With Amos, in the eighth century B.C., the idea was born of 'a day of Jahweh' when, through the Assyrians as instruments of his will, Jahweh would chastise and

purify Israel (Amos ch. 3-8, are full of reprobation and condemnation) but would consolidate her on a healthier and surer foundation. It is doubtful whether any other Old Testament Book contains a more intense and straightforward rejection of Israel on account of her sins. So much so, that in what for a moment seems to be a transport of ethical universalism Amos ascribed to Jahweh a universalist, providential attitude to the Gentile Philistines and Syrians who, by definition, are neither entitled to nor have they ever stood in, a relation to Jahweh describable as one of loving care. This is so extraordinary throughout the Old Testament that many Jewish and Christian apologists cite it as evidence for the case that Judaism is not totally racist separatism. But how shortlived is their optimism! As soon as Jahweh is through with his accusation and condemnation, Joel, for instance, makes him say: "I will not utterly destroy the house of Jacob... [indeed] I will command, and I will sift the house of Israel among all nations, like as corn is sifted in a sieve, yet shall not the least grain [!!!] fall upon the earth... In that day will I raise up the tabernacle of David that is fallen and close up the breaches thereof; and I will raise up his ruins, and I will build it as in the days of old." Not yet satisfied with this reversal, Jewish genius demands revenge. The whole rebuilding of Israel and the Tabernacle of David, continues Amos, is designed "that they may possess the remnant of Edom, and of all the heathen" (Amos 9:7-12). Next, with Isaiah, the idea the Jews had of themselves was still virile enough to conceive an 'anointed' saviour of Israel in front of whom "the crooked places will become straight" and "the gates of brass will be broken to pieces, the bars of iron cut asunder" (Isaiah 45:2).

146. Predominantly Jeremiah, chaps. 4, 7, and 11. See also Isaiah, chaps. 52, 53, 57 and 66.
147. Joel 3:2 ff.
148. Daniel 12:1-12.
149. This idea, generalized into the form that God is the master-operator of the processes of history, is, according to H. H. Rowley, the "enduring message of apocalyptic." See his *The Relevance of Apocalyptic*. London: Butterworth Press, 1944, pp. 141 ff.
150. Klausner. p. 163.
151. S. Mōwinckel, *He That Cometh*, tr. by G. W. Anderson, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1956, pp. 153-54.
152. John Bright, *The Kingdom of God*, New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1953, pp. 167-69.
153. John 18:36.
154. Typical of the method in which Jesus dealt with the question of whether the Kingdom of God is material or spiritual is his solution to the problem of the wife who had had seven brothers as husbands, presented to him as a trap by the Pharisees. "Whose wife will it be," they asked him, "in the resurrection when, presumably, she and all her husbands will be raised?" Jesus answered that in the resurrection, in the Kingdom of God where Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob now sit, people do not marry at all, neither are they regarded under these material categories of married, unmarried, etc. For, the Kingdom is a purely spiritual one, and in it, all are equally the angels of God (Matthew 22:24-32; Mark 12:18-26; Luke 20:27-37).
155. John 18:36.
156. "...Ye shall see Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, and all the prophets, in the kingdom of God, and you yourselves [ye workers of iniquity! Luke 13:27] thrust out. And they shall come from the east, and from the west, and from the north, and from the south, and shall sit down in the kingdom of God" (Luke 13:28-29).

- To the Pharisees, Jesus said: "Ye are they which justify yourselves before men, ... that which is highly esteemed among men [i.e., among you, Pharisees] is abomination in the sight of God. The law and the prophets were until John: since that time the kingdom of God is preached, and every man presseth into it" (Luke 16:15-16).
157. "Into whatsoever city ye enter, and they receive you... say unto them, The kingdom of God is come nigh unto you" (Luke 10:8-9).
 158. At his trial at the Sanhedrin, Jesus defended himself in these words: "I ever taught openly to the world; I ever taught in the synagogue, and in the temple, whither the Jews always resort; and in secret have I said nothing. Why asketh thou me? ask them which heard me, what I have said unto them: behold they know what I said" (John 18:20-21).
 159. "If I cast devils by the Spirit of God, then the kingdom of God is come unto you" (Matthew 12:28).
 160. "The kingdom of heaven," Jesus affirmed, "is like to a grain of mustard seed which a man took, and sowed in his field: which indeed is the least of all seeds: but when it is grown, it is the greatest among herbs..." (Matthew 13:31-2; Mark 4:31-2; Luke 13:19-20).
 161. Luke 17:21.
 162. "... That ye should do as I have done to you" (John 13:15). "My doctrine is not mine, but his that sent me. If any man will do his will... he that followeth me shall not walk in darkness, but shall have the light of life" (John 7:16, 8:12).
 163. F. Crawford Burkitt, *Jewish and Christian Apocalypses*, The Schweich Lectures 1913, London: British Academy, 1914, p. 13.
 164. Burkitt, p. 14.
 165. Burkitt, p. 15.
 166. Klausner, p. 520. The description is obviously Philo's: "An intrepid hardihood of soul and an irresistible strength of body either of which things is formidable to the enemy and if both qualities are united they are completely invincible." Philo, "On Rewards and Punishments, XVI", *Works*, ed. by C. D. Yonge, London: Henry Bohn, 1855, III, 477-78.
 167. Klausner, pp. 163-64, 520-23.; Philo, pp. 477-78.
 168. Klausner, p. 524.
 169. *Ibid.*, p. 525.
 170. Burkitt, p. 15.
 171. Burkitt, part II, chs, 5, 6, 7.
 172. Part II of this study, pp.
 173. Published under the title, *Gospel and Law*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1951, p. 83 ff.
 174. *Gospel and Law*, p. 64.
 175. *Ibid.*, pp. 65.
 176. Romans 10:4.
 177. Romans 6:14.
 178. Dodd, pp. 65-66.
 179. I Corinthians 9:21.
 180. Galatians 6:2.
 181. I Corinthians 14:37.
 182. Dodd, p. 66.
 183. We give Dodd's analysis of St. Paul's position not so much for the sake of presenting St. Paul (for this, see chapters V, VI, VIII following) but, for that of presenting C. H. Dodd. Actually, we do hold that St. Paul has transvalued the values of

Christ in several important respects, but that it was his peculiar merit to have understood Christ correctly on this subject of apolytrosis from the law. All the more strange, therefore, that by arguing as he does, Dodd seems to nullify what appears to be St. Paul's paramount, if not only, merit.

184. Jeremiah 31:31-34; Dodd, p. 68.
185. II Corinthians 3:3; Dodd, p. 68.
186. II Corinthians 3:6; Dodd, pp. 68-69.
187. Dodd, p. 69.
188. Ephesians 2:15.
189. Dodd, p. 70.
190. Dodd, p. 70. To deprecate, though only as a half argument, as Dodd has done, an idea on account of its foreign origin is a dangerous precedent for any religion or culture. For Christianity this strategy of Dodd spells nothing short of disaster.
191. *Ibid.*, pp. 70-71.
192. On the contrast of 'Will' and 'Willkur' see Kant, *The Critique of Practical Reason*, I, Beck's translation.
193. Dodd, p. 71.
194. *Ibid.*, p. 72.
195. *Ibid.*
195. *Ibid.*
196. *Ibid.*, p. 73.
197. *Ibid.*
198. "It is hardly possible to treat it [the injunction to turn the other cheek] as a ruling to be directly applied in all appropriate circumstances" (*Ibid.*, p. 74).
199. *Ibid.*
200. *Ibid.*, p. 76.

Chapter IV

THE SUFI PARALLEL

The Parallelism

The opinion that in Sufism, Islam and Christianity came rather close to each other is quite widespread. On this point, western Islamists seem to differ little, if at all.¹ It is understood that when the *engagé* Christian—and there is hardly a western Islamist who has not been one—approaches the subject of Islam, he tends to see, more prominently than any other, those aspects which appear to have the greatest correspondence with his own faith. It is also natural that the secular Muslim, who for the most part thinks in terms borrowed from Western culture and history, would feel particularly attracted to Sufism because, by its emphasis upon the personal and upon withdrawal from society, it is well adapted to the secularist concern of denying Islam jurisdiction in public life and relegating it exclusively to the realm of the personal. The opinion, therefore, that in Sufism, Islam and Christianity come closest together, is by no means merely a 'Western' bias. Muslim thinkers have shared it². Such consensus must have a basis in fact; and it is this basis that we shall now seek to uncover.

All Sufi thinking begins and ends with God. The origin of Islam as a combat against the polytheism of Mecca has underlined the importance of abolishing from one's consciousness the gods of the tribes, and the whole of Islam has hence oft been compressed in the notion of *tawhid*, or 'unization', which, besides expressing the oneness of truth and the oneness of God, has stood for the oneness of value. Hence, *tawhid* has necessarily and always implied the oneness of the object of loyalty, devotion, worship, desire, and love. What Jesus had to struggle for and win for human consciousness, wrestling it out of Pharisee association of the tribe with the Godhead, the Sufis found ready-made and 'built-in', as it were, in Islam, in the faith of the Prophet Muhammad, conveyed in the Holy Qur'an. For Islam is hardly more aware than this *tawhid* of its implications in the various fields of human endeavour and life. The battle against the tribal gods of Arabia and all the particularisms they represented had already been won by Muhammad, the Prophet, in the first quarter of the seventh century. Although this is only one aspect of *tawhid*, the Sufis singled it out and built around it a unique system of devotion and theosophy. In a sense, therefore, Sufism is an outgrowth of the breakthrough of Islam, whereas it is a consummation of the breakthrough of Jesus.

Since God is One and, as such, is alone worthy of worship and desire, the Sufis were ready to fill man's ethos and consciousness with *Him* alone. To see and to hold Him as One was, according to them, the end and purpose of religion and ethics; but it was also its beginning and condition. For unless, by an act of will and consciousness, one eliminates the other gods dwelling therein—these being not necessarily tribal, but personal—it would be impossible to offer the worship and service which might conduce to a real communion with the One God. Thus, the Sufis insisted from the beginning, man ought to turn his eyes inward. Like a radar antenna forever revolving, man's eye ought to keep scanning the horizons of the soul in order to detect the presence of a foreign god. When such is discovered, its duty is to alert the will to rise to its destruction and elimination. This process is the prerequisite of all Sufism. Its object, namely, a consciousness and an ethos clear of foreign elements for the ready flight of the soul towards its God and source, is the whole purpose of Sufism.

This process of repeating within oneself what the Prophet Muhammad had done in Arabia has become the Sufi discipline *par excellence*. Essentially, therefore it is a process of self-purification, the end being always the determination of the soul by God alone. It meets and satisfies the requirements laid down by Jesus for radical self-transformation. For Jesus meant no more than to achieve these very results. Both he and Sufism aimed at a regenerated state of the soul in which God would play the role of sole determinant. Whereas Jesus demanded of the Jews the rejection of the tribalist Jahweh whom they identified with Israel, the race, the community, the political state, as object of worship and desire, the Sufis, born in an atmosphere of pure monotheism, demanded the cleansing of the soul from whatever lesser or greater deities it may cherish in its most personal moments. Thus, the Sufis demanded what Jesus of the first century A.D. would demand if he were to relive his earthly life again in present-day monotheistic Christendom. This does not mean that Jesus did no demand, like the Sufis, the cleansing of the soul from the personal deities it may worship besides God, but it does mean that the main weight of his teaching centered around the Jewish preoccupation with the tribe as God. The Sufis, on the other hand, were predominantly occupied with the Muslims' personal gods of self-seeking; for the old Arab tribalism had been completely wiped out.

In fact, Jesus, having to fight off Jewish associationism all his life, had little time to indulge in the mechanics of self-purification and its inner byways, as did the Sufis centuries later. Having outlined its boundaries, he poured out his genius into the immediate and live issue of Jewish racialism. No wonder that he left it to his followers centuries later, to fill in the details of radical self-transformation. Though starting from another point

and using somewhat different categories, the Sufis were, as far as their ethical breakthrough is concerned, the disciples of Jesus, in every respect. And it was under their stimulation and influence that the Christian mystics of the Middle Ages developed their 'Christian' version of the process of inner self-purification which, by any other name, remains one and the same.³ This is the well known 'Sufi path' which consists of a number of stages (*maqâmât*) progressively more and more demanding in the realization of the personalist values of poverty, charity, purity, devotion, discipline, and obedience to the leader of the brotherhood, the *Shaykh*, and implying the achievement of progressively more intense and higher states (*ahwâl*) of consciousness. The final object, or ideal, of the Sufi path is identical with that of Jesus as well as Paul. It consists in a state of consciousness in which God and only God is present and determines. Such state is really one of unity with God, though it is a special kind of unity. Real life has furnished thought with the ideas of the lover becoming one with his beloved, of the pupil becoming one with his master. The unity in question is commonly grasped without the suspicion of a 'fusion' of bodies, or of substances, or of souls, or of consciousnesses. The two continue in actual fact to be two. But the consciousness of the beloved has made such an imprint upon that of the lover, that their wills and ideas appear as one, as if they issued from one and the same source. It is not the case that one is annihilated by the other, but simply that the lover's consciousness anticipates the ideas and desires of the beloved by reacting, intuiting, feeling, or emoting in the situations of life exactly as his beloved would think, react, intuit, feel, or emote. Hence this harmony and rapport which poetry calls 'unity' when it should be satisfied with 'union'.

Thus, Jesus spoke of his 'unity' with God; or rather, he was interpreted by John and the Christians of history as if 'unity' were what he meant. In fact, John reports him as only saying, "I and the Father are one," and this, as a conclusion to a discussion in which the main point of Jesus was that his works are the evidence that God had sent him.⁴ Jesus' argument is simple enough: he and God have the same will inasmuch as all the works he does are such as God would do. And if a person achieves such correspondence between his will and God's, he might well be entitled to the description 'he and God are one', though such description must not be given lightly and must therefore be reserved alone for occasions of truly great and very intense awareness.

Paul, too, has used the notion of 'unity with Christ', to describe union between the most conscious Christians, including himself, and Jesus Christ. His famous phrase 'in Christ', and 'to be one in Christ', despite all speculation by later generations on the so-called 'mystical union with Christ', etc.,⁵ means no more, in final analysis, than this complete cor-

respondence of mind and will between Jesus Christ and the most virtuous of his followers. "He that is joined unto the Lord is one spirit with him,"⁶ and all the Christians are 'one in Christ' because they "have been all made to drink into one spirit"⁷ and many other statements of like wording, mean no more than this correspondence when all poetry and sentimentality are left behind. Even if the groundless theological speculations of later Christians concerning a mystical-or-otherwise body of Christ in which all Christians are united as members, are warranted, it cannot be denied that they all rest, in final analysis, upon such correspondence between the consciousness of Jesus and that of the Christians.

On several occasions, Paul spoke of the unity of Jesus with God, and that of the Christians with Jesus, as being the same.⁸ In this he was following the example of Jesus, as reported by John.⁹ Obviously, the so called mystical unity of either cannot be one of substances; but a correspondence of will, feeling, and thought. Furthermore, the correspondence in question is one-directional; the will of the lover corresponds to that of the beloved; but the latter remains undetermined *vis-à-vis* the lover. It is blasphemy to speak of God, the beloved in this case, of necessarily willing what the lover wills. He may do so, but he also may not. The unity in question is therefore even less than a union; since it is a one-directional correspondence in which one pole, namely, God, remains in the union, its object, its standard and judge, the principle of the union as well as its very end—but utterly free in Himself and regarding the other pole. Hence, to say that the resultant state is of the nature of material or logical equivalence, or that it implies any kind of substantial fusion or diffusion of being is to speak lightly of this union. Despite their union, God and the human soul remain utterly and forever different, other, and two.

The object and ideal of Sufism is, therefore, identically the same as that of the radical self-transformation of Jesus. Both aimed at the state of consciousness in which God is the sole subject, the sole determiner and the sole object of love and devotion. The traditions of both later influenced each other and succeeded in developing the same kind of preparatory disciplines leading towards the end. Finally, both referred to the final end of these processes as 'oneness' and their reference was in each case exposed to the same dangers of misunderstanding, indeed to the same misunderstanding. The oneness of Jesus was misunderstood as unity and fusion of being, and thus gave rise to the greatest materialization of an essentially spiritual union history has ever seen. The oneness of the highest Sufi state was likewise misunderstood and gave rise to the worst crime perpetrated on account of a supremely conscious misunderstanding. It will be recalled that the claim to the Sufi oneness with God had exposed its author, Al Hallaj, to the gravity of a misunderstanding that perempto-

rily led to his martyrdom in Baghdad in A.D. 922. The destinies of the two misunderstandings, however, were far apart. The Christian misunderstanding came to dominate Christendom; the Muslim misunderstanding performed its bloody deed and sank away in front of the Sufi tide which overwhelmed the Muslim world. The success of Sufism in Islam was therefore the success of the Jesus' ethic, but devoid of the theological superstructures which this Christian misunderstanding had constructed concerning the oneness of Christ with God, or of men with Christ. In the Middle Ages, the intellectual disciples of Jesus were the Sufis of Islam, rather than the theologians of the Council or Pope-monarchs of Christendom. It was in sufism that the ethical breakthrough of Jesus bloomed into a complete *Weltanschauung* true to that original breakthrough in every one of its details.

Once the path of self-purification is entered upon, only one feeling is proper to God: Love. As Jesus had found this to be the 'first' command, talking as he was, in a context dominated by the law of Moses, the Sufis had found it to be the only 'act', 'attitude', and 'feeling' possible to man that is worthy of God. The Qur'an requires man to fill his consciousness with Him. This requirement, reasoned the Sufis, makes no other act, attitude, or feeling possible. For to worship God or to serve Him out of any other motive than love is to associate some other god with Him. Thus Rabi'ah al-'Adawiyyah sang in ecstatic Arabic poetry:

I have not served God from fear of Hell, for I should be like a wretched hireling, if I did it from fear: nor from love of paradise, for I should be a bad servant if I served for the sake of what was given, but I have served Him only for the love of Him and out of desire for Him. O my Lord, if I worship Thee from fear of Hell, burn me in Hell; and if I worship Thee from hope of Paradise, exclude me thence; but if I worship Thee for Thine own sake, then withhold not from me Thine Eternal Beauty.¹⁰

And again:

*Two ways I love Thee: Selfishly,
And next, as worthy is of Thee.
'Tis selfish love that I do naught
Save think on Thee with every thought.
'Tis purest love when Thou dost raise
The veil to my adoring gaze.
Not mine the praise in that or this
Thine is the praise in both, I wis.¹¹*

An insight identical to Rabi'ah's must have inspired Francis Xavier when he recited,

*My God I love thee: not because
I hope for heaven thereby
Not with the hope of gaining aught
Not seeking a reward:
But as Thyself hast loved me
O ever-loving Lord!*

The praise of the Love of God, the illumination this love brings to the understanding and its singing for the moving of the heart to greater and higher levels of 'unization', have made many an Arab and Persian poet immortal. The love of God has fired their imagination, and, making their soul incandescent in the process, has opened for these poets infinite horizons and depths.¹² The ethical content of this Love of God is, as much as the forms this love has taken, identical with that of Jesus. Both consist in a state of the soul in which only God decides and moves and determines.¹³ The man that is so determined is blessed; the act so determined, ethical.¹⁴ The life that is lived under such determination is felicitous not only ethically but aesthetically; for, it *has* a style and its style is the most beautiful there can be.¹⁵ As in the ethic of Jesus, the life of love is conceived by the Sufis as a genuine apolytrois, or emancipation, but the tyrants from which emancipation had taken place are different. Whereas in the case of Jesus, the tyrant was Israel, in the case of the Sufis, the tyrant was multifaced and far more personal. The Jews' loyalty to Israel found itself embodied in the observance of an exteriorized, objectified, and fixed law, in a power- and state-hungry priesthood. On the other hand, the gods of the Sufis were desires, doubts, and longings anchored in the depths of the soul in its solitude.

*To become a saint of God, you must covet nothing in this world or the next and you must give yourself entirely to God and turn your face to Him, having no desire for this world or for the world to come. To covet this world means to turn away from God, for the sake of what is transitory, and to covet the next world means turning away from God, for the sake of what is everlasting.*¹⁶

Although Jesus' *apolytrois* was mainly one from Jewish law as quintessence of Israeli racialism, he did teach an *apolytrois* from the gods of the heart. And it is precisely these 'gods' that became the *bête noire* of Christian mysticism once the tyranny of Jewish law was broken. 'Sin', 'de-

secration', 'pollution', 'evil', etc. were for the Jews of Jesus' time (and still are) departure from the law; while Jesus spent all his life and energy trying to teach them that this was not so. Those who listened and believed abandoned their shibboleth, Israel, and opened their consciousness and ethos to the One True God. Nonetheless, the breakthrough insight of Jesus did not come into its own except later, after the Israel-Law-context in which he taught was gone and forgotten. Only then, in this free atmosphere of Christian life, did 'sin' and 'evil' come to be identified with the internal gods. Only then did Christianity discover the new tyrant against which the Christian ethos was now to struggle. Literally as well as metaphorically, this tyrant was christened 'Original Sin'. The association with Adam was the metaphorical element; the real, genuine 'sin' was the association of self with God to whom alone worship, devotion, and service belong. It was this Christian sin, rather than the sin of violating the law, which Sufism christened 'the Self'. To emancipate oneself from the Self became the first and last condition of the Sufi life of grace.

It is imprecise, therefore, to equate the Christian understanding of sin and sinfulness with the Islamic understanding of *khati'ah* or *kabirah*, the prohibited (*muharram*) wrong act already committed. 'Sin' is much more serious than a wrong, unjust deed, however unethical. It is a state. Purified from the sectarian accretions of Christian history, sin for Jesus and as might have been applied by him to his generation, is the state of the person in whom no radical self-transformation has taken place. Such would be the Pharisee and his peers who believed in, and generally acted on the terms of Jewish racialism. For the Christians and indeed for contemporary man, the Christian sense of sin cannot be this. It must be what the Sufis mean by *shirk*, or associationism of other gods with the One God who is the sole object of love, worship, and devotion. This is why the more serious Christian defines sin not as a misdeed, however grave, but as a state of rebellion or defiance against God. Though Jesus may not have articulated his thought precisely in this manner, such definition hits his mark more closely. To rebel against God is precisely to reject Him as the sole *titulaire* of human worship and devotion. From the respect of action, sin is *shirk*, or associationism; from that of the state of the sinful, it is *kufir*.

The religion of Jesus, therefore, may be said to seek to save man from the state of *kufir* in which man 'associates' other gods with God. According to the Sufis, Islam is primarily a religion of *tawhid* or 'unization'; and the unization in question is that of God as object of worship, love, devotion and, indeed, all desire. It is as undeniable that Jesus' Sufi thrust was against the racist tribalism of the Jews, as it is that the Christian thrust of the Sufis was against the personal gods of self, against flesh, power, pleasure, and all the other lower values which in the sinful, *kufir*-bound

self-elevate themselves to a position of rivalry with God.¹⁷

For the worldly description of that 'state of the heart' the Sufis used the same concepts as Jesus. The Islamic tradition of ascetic self-denial in the service of God and the *ummah* (i.e., the universal brotherhood under God, or better, under His Will, which is the absolute moral law) had furnished them with the tools and style of presentation. The Prophet had extolled the life of poverty and many of his companions had set it up as an ideal to be deliberately pursued. One such companion was Abu Dharr al Ghifari. Echoing a famous admonition of Jesus, Rabi'ah, one of the earliest figures of Sufism, counselled her fellowmen that "The best thing for the servant who desires to be near his Lord, is to possess nothing in this world or the next save Him."¹⁸ F. D. al'Attar expressed the moral value of poverty by picturing it as a commodity the purchase of which would be made at great cost if the moral motive is sufficiently intense.¹⁹

For Jesus, the life of poverty was the life in which God's determination could take effect without resistance. Riches put up very stiff resistance to divine, ethical determinants and often carry the fight to victory. On the other hand, the life of poverty is a means, the end being the easy entry of the will under governance of divine determinants. Appropriating both Jesus' and the Islamic notions, the Sufis joined them to the gnostic notions of emanation and return. Poverty, or the non-possession of worldly things, gave rise to the view that this world is not our true home. Whereas ethically poverty was meant to achieve no more than a reduced resistance to the morally imperative, it here produced a world-view. The poor man is not only readier to do the good, he is also readier to leave this world and its shackles and go to his Lord. But 'go to his Lord' he must, for that is whence he came. Poverty, then, is the beginning of the 'return'. Thus, in this life led under Islamic-Christian poverty, the soul was supposed actually to engage itself in the ascent, or return to God, its primordial source. It was through this door that the gnostic theosophy had been grafted on an ethos disciplined by Islamic asceticism and Jesus' poverty, and informed by the *tawhid* (unization) of Islam. Here, the Sufi sought 'union' with God where Jesus, as well as Muhammad, would have been satisfied with acquiescence to His will. The two trends, however, are present in sufism. The one keeps strictly close to Islam in the ethical sense of surrender to divine determinants, even though it regards such surrender as effect, rather than cause, of communion with God. The other pretends to enter the soul into ecstatic union with the Godhead and fuse its being with the Divine Being.

First, Abu Sa'id ibn Abi al Khayr suggested the new ideal in what seems to be a purely ethical statement: "Those who in this world live in joy and agreement with one another must have been akin to one another in

yonder place. Here they love one another and are called the friends of God, and they are brethren who love one another for God's sake.'"²⁰ Then, 'Umar Khayyam projected the ideal and made it concrete for the understanding, ready to be used by the Sufi zealous enough to assume it as an objective.²¹ Finally, Husayn ibn Mansur al Hallaj achieved it and sang its raptures,²² and Muhyi-d-Din ibn al 'Arabi fastened to it the capstone of philosophy, an abstract system of thought.²³ The effects of this pantheistic philosophy upon ethics were not long in coming. Ibn al 'Arabi himself wrote in verse, as befits the thought,

*Within my heart, all forms may find a place.
The cloisters of the monk, the idol's fane
A pasture for gazelles, the Sacred House
Of God, to which all Muslims turn their face:
The tables of the Jewish Law, the Word
Of God, revealed unto His Prophet true.
Love is the faith I hold, and whereso'er
His camels turn, the one true faith is there.*²⁴

With this Sufism has obviously defeated its own original purpose which, like Jesus' has been ethical through and through. Nonetheless it is still the logical consequence, as the history of Sufism has shown, of any monistic ethic, such as Jesus', built exclusively upon the one single category of the 'state of the soul'.

Its Explanation

Sufism and the ethic of Jesus have therefore run on parallel lines. Their developments, histories, and destinies were of the same natures. Even their misunderstandings, as we have seen, were of the same kind. Hence, the lists of individual events, thoughts, attitudes, achievements, or strains and travails at the hands of the non-adherents or the misunderstanding adherents, that run parallel or may be superposed with one another with geometrical precision, are as limitless as they are enlightening. But no description or analysis of a parallelism in ideas is complete unless it has revealed that parallelism in the genesis of the movements in question. The 'explanation' of a movement cannot be satisfied with a description of its state of full development, nor with that of its maturation and decay. Only its genesis can betray its inner motives, its secret, or logic. Even its later history and development cannot be said to be firmly grasped unless it can be related to its genesis as consequence to antecedent and effect to cause.

Attempts to explain the parallelism between the ethic of Jesus and Sufism have been many and varied. Those who have attempted it fall generally into three classes: First, there is the *engagé*, or committed, Christian or secular, western Islamist. He has drawn the parallel between Christianity and Sufism as originating historically in a reaction. In the case of Christianity, the reaction was against Jewish legalism personified in and expressed by the Pharisees. In the case of Sufism, the reaction was against Islamic legalism personified and expressed by the *fuqaha* (legists, jurists) of Sunni (orthodox) Islam.²⁵ Jewish law and the Shari'ah, according to this view, are one in that they both envisage a 'kingdom' that is really a 'king's peace', concerned merely with external conditions and circumstances.²⁶ Further, they are one in that they require "no inward conditions of an exacting kind—regeneration or radical transformation."²⁷ Hence, the historic need for an inward-looking ethic of spiritual regeneration and spirituality such as Jesus taught and Sufism had achieved. Secondly, there is the balanced western Islamist, like Louis Massignon,²⁸ who sought the origin of Sufism in the purely Arab asceticism of the early community, particularly the companions of the Prophet. This opinion is shared by the majority of Muslim scholars, and the point they wish to make is that unless Sufism is presented as an internal development within Islam, it cannot be adequately understood. That Sufism has incorporated non-Islamic elements is then accepted as a matter of course, but with the principle clearly borne in mind, that these have been integrated within a framework of ideas that are purely Islamic. Lastly, standing by himself in a third category, the Sufi *engagé* has maintained that the first Sufi was none other than the Prophet himself; the Sufi book none other than the Holy Qur'an; and the history of Sufism none other than the history of Islam.²⁹

These opinions are all erroneous.³⁰ When Islam travelled outside Arabia and the arabization process of the Muslims did not run abreast with their Islamization, as was the case in Persia and beyond, the intuitive understanding of the Qur'anic poetry was absent. What the companions of the Prophet, the Arabs of the Peninsula and the Arabicized peoples of the Fertile Crescent grasped immediately constituted immense stumbling blocks to the unarabicized Persians whose consciousness was not capable of intuiting meanings and values in their Qur'anic poetical notions. Naturally, all these unarabicized, or inadequately arabicized peoples had to recourse to interpretation, or *ta'wil*, that is to say, to master in consciousness an Arabic material by the devious means of translating it into categories of a non-Arab consciousness. Having thus broken the authority and hold of the Arabic Word of God and of the categories of consciousness in which it has been couched, this recourse to interpretation did not

safeguard the original meanings, and different ones were substituted for them. The poetical phrases and figures of speech of the Qur'an, like any other poetry that is forced into concepts and categories other than those of the language in which they were first created, could be understood by them only literally. But a literal understanding of the Qur'anic verses would inevitably find them in direct contradiction with the message of Islam. The sublime descriptions of God's transcendence, for example, appeared to the non-Arab mind, as gross anthropomorphism. The conflict could not be solved except by completing the Arabization processes already begun, or, by means of allegorical interpretation if the understanding consciousness is to preserve its non-Arabness. In Persia, the latter course was the course of destiny.

Therefore, a 'knowledge' began to develop in Persia, which was designed to fill the needs of a Muslim unarabized consciousness. In time, this knowledge grew and became a discipline. Allegorical interpretation was pressed into the service of politics, especially as the Shi'ah division became more and more established in Persia, and the diversion between knowledge (*'ilm*) and gnosis (*ma'rifah*) became greater, the one was predominantly interested in deducing oughts for the doing and willing of a soul that, having grasped the original meanings intuitively, was more concerned with the ethical task of realizing the content of those meanings; the other in sifting and contemplating meanings for the satisfaction of an understanding that could not understand. It is not accidental that *'ilm* or rational science, remained both exclusively Arab and exclusively of the Shari'ah, of the how of realization of the revealed divine pattern, whereas *ma'rifah*, or knowledge, remained exclusively a concern with meanings and grew more and more personal, allegorical, and esoteric. Sufi *ma'rifah* was certainly no reaction at all, but a positive satisfaction of the need to intellectual harmony of an unarabized, yet Islamic consciousness.

Notes

1. "Mysticism was the common ground where medieval Christianity and Islam touched each other most nearly. The fact is founded on history.... It explains why the ideas, methods, and systems produced by mystics—Roman Catholic and Muslim—of that period seem to bear the stamp of one and the same spiritual genius.... It would be indeed strange if no influence from this source [Sufism] reached men like Aquinas, Eckhard and Dante" (R. A. Nicholson, "Mysticism," in *The Legacy of Islam*, ed. by T. Arnold and A. Guillaume, Oxford University Press, 1952, pp. 210-11). Arguing against the opinion that early Islamic mysticism may have its origin purely in the asceticism of the Qur'an, a view presented by L. Massignon in his *Essai sur les origines du lexique technique de la mystique musulmane* (Paris, 1922), H. A. R. Gibb wrote, "...The groundwork of the asceticism of the Qur'an is

identical with that of Eastern Christianity, and, in consequence, in the development of Islam outside Arabia the two systems cannot always be disentangled.... Here, [i.e., in Sufi-inspired prose and poetry] and not in the abstractions or the theologians, is the true [sic] spirit of popular Islam.... Apart altogether from doctrines and beliefs it is interesting to note how tenacious Christian usages were, in spite of the change of faith" (*Mohammedanism*, Oxford: Home University Library, 1954, pp. 128-29, 131). "This orthodox mysticism, among the Arabs, received its first definite consideration at the hands of Harith ibn Asad al Muhasibi and it owes much to the ideal of asceticism founded in Christianity, which taught the doctrine of complete renunciation" (Margaret Smith, *Readings from the Mystics of Islam*, London: Luzac, 1950, Introduction, p. 3). In his *Sufism: An Account of the Mystics of Islam*, A. J. Arberry took the question for granted and decided "for the sake of brevity to accept... [it] ...as proven." (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1956, p. 11) etc., etc.

2. "We must acknowledge," writes Zaki Mubarak in one of the classic treatises on the subject in any language, "that the personality of Jesus did in fact affect the Sufi outlooks. The Sufi books seem never to tire of quoting Jesus' words; the Christian monk commanded great respect, and these words were often quoted by the Sufis" Zaki Mubarak, *Al Tasawwuf al Islami*, 2nd. ed., Cairo: al Maktabah al Tijariyyah al Kubra, II, 26'.
3. "Not long ago," wrote R. A. Nicholson, expressing an experience which every student of Sufism acquainted with Christian mystic writings must have had, "as I was turning over the first few pages of Miss Underhill's *Mysticism*, my eye fell on two quotations, one from a medieval German mystic, the other from an English author whose death had just been announced; and it struck me that I could recall exact Muslim parallels to both. Eckhard's famous saying, 'the word *sum* can be spoken by no creature, but by God only; for it becomes the creature to testify of itself *non sum*' reminded me that three and a half centuries earlier, at Baghdad, Abu Nasr al Sarraj, commenting on a definition of mystical unity (*tawhid*), had written, 'none saith "I" except God, since real personality belongs to God alone.' The remark of Edward Carpenter, 'this perception seems to be one in which all the senses unite into one sense,' caused me to look up some verses in the Ta'iyya of the Egyptian poet and saint, Ibn al Farid (632/1235)... How much it [the West] learned of these matters during the Middle Ages, when Muslim philosophy and science, radiating from their center in Spain, spread light through Christian Europe, we have yet to discover, in detail, but the amount was certainly considerable" ("Mysticism," p. 210.).
4. John 10:25-30.
5. For a good treatment of the history, and systematic discussion of the subject, see Albert Schweitzer, *The Mysticism of Paul, the Apostle*. New York: MacMillan, 1956.
6. I Corinthians, 6:17.
7. I Corinthians 12:13.
8. Romans 12:4-5; I Corinthians 10:17; 12:12; Galatians 3:28, Colossians 3:15, etc.
9. John 17:21-22.
10. Rabi'ah al-'Adawiyyah (185/801) as reported by Jami in *Nafahat al Uns*, Calcutta, 1859, p. 716, and by Farid al Din 'Attar, *Tadhkirat al Awliya'*, I, 69, 73; Smith, *Readings*, p. 11.
11. Rabi'ah al-'Adawiyyah, tr. by R. A. Nicholson, "Mysticism", pp. 213-14.
12. Muhammad Iqbal, himself touched by that divine fire, has conceptualized it in verse. He wrote:

*I will tell thee what is the secret of Life—
To sink into thyself like the pearl,
Then to emerge from thine inward solitude,
To collect sparks beneath the ashes,
And become a flame and dazzle men's eyes.*

13. Despite the inevitable losses of translation, the words of Ibn al Farid glow with warmth: "Let my passionate love for Thee overwhelm me and have pity on the blazing flames of my heart's love for Thee. If I ask Thee unveiled, bestow on me that which I ask and answer me not, 'Thou shalt not see Me'. O heart, thou hast promised me to have patience in thy love. Beware, then of being straitened and wearied. Love is life itself, and to die of love will give the right to be forgiven. Say to those who went before me and those who will come after me and to those who are with me now, who have seen my grief, 'Learn from me and follow in my steps: listen to me and tell of my passion among mankind.'
I have been alone with the Beloved and we shared secrets which meant more than the Breeze when night comes. The sight of His beauty and His Majesty bewildered me and in my ecstasy, my tongue could no more speak. Look upon the fairness of His Face and you will find all beauty pictured in it and if all beauty were found in a face and it seemed perfect, beholding Him, it would say: 'There is no God but He is Most Great'" (Trans. by Smith, in *Readings*, p. 96).
14. Baba Kuhi of Shiraz, tr. by R. A. Nicholson in Margaret Smith, *The Sufi Path of Love*, London: Luzac, 1954, pp. 23-24.
15. Abu al Qasim ibn Muhammad al Junayd, 298/910 in Sarraj, *Kitab al Luma'*, pp. 29 ff, tr. by Smith, in *Readings*, p. 35.
16. F. D. al 'Attar, *Mantiq al Tayr*, Paris, 1859, p. 143, tr. by Smith, in *Readings*, pp. 9-10.
17. The Sufis depicted the evils of the self as the seat of all false gods, in terms no less strong or moving than those with which the Christians described the state of sin:

*The "Truth" will not be shown to lofty thought
Nor yet with lavished gold may it be bought;
Till self be mortified for fifty years,
From words to "states of heart" no soul is brought.*

*The more I die to self, I live the more,
The more abuse myself, the higher soar;
And, Strange! the more I drink of Being's wine
More sane I grow, and sober than before.*

*From self-reliance, Lord, deliver me
Sever from self, and occupy with Thee!
When sober I am bondman to the world,
Make me beside myself, and set me free.*

*Open the door! O Warder best and purest,
And guide the way, O Thou of guides the Surest!
Directors born of men shall not direct me,
Their counsel comes to naught, but Thou endurest!*

('Umar Khayyam, *The Ruba'iyyat*, tr. by E. H. Winfield, quoted in Smith, *The Sufi Path of Love*, p. 87).

18. Rabi'ah al 'Adawiyyah, as reported by Jami, in *Nafahat al Uns*, p. 716; Farid al Din al 'Attar, *Tadhkirat al Awliya'*, I, p. 68. See Smith, *Readings*, p. 11.
19. "A certain man was constantly bewailing his condition and complaining of his poverty. Ibrahim ibn al Adham said to him: "My son, perhaps you paid but little for your poverty!" "You are talking nonsense," said the man, "you should be ashamed of yourself. Does any one buy poverty?" Ibrahim replied, "For my part, I chose it of my own free will, nay, more, I bought it at the price of this world's sovereignty, and I would buy one instant of this poverty again with a hundred worlds, for every moment it becomes worth yet more to me.... Those who aspire to spiritual things are willing to stake both body and soul in the search for them, and they spend their years consumed by their love to God. The bird of their ambition has attained to fellowship with Him: It has soared beyond temporal and spiritual things alike. If you are not man enough for such an ambition, get you gone, for you are unworthy to be a partaker of the Divine Grace" (F. D. al 'Attar, *Mantiq al Tayr*, p. 143, tr. Smith, in *Readings*, pp. 9-10).
20. Abu Sa'id ibn Abi al Khayr, tr. by R. A. Nicholson in Smith, *Readings*, p. 61.
21. *O soul! from earthly taint when purified,
As spirit free, thou shalt toward heaven ride,
Thy home the empyrean! Shame on thee
Who dost in this clay tenement reside!*

*In love eternal He created me
And first He taught the lore of charity
Then from my heart He filed a key that might
Unlock the treasures of Reality.*

*In some low inn I'd rather seek Thy face,
Than pray without Thee toward the Niche's place.
O First and Last of all! As Thou dost will
Burn me in Hell—or save me by Thy grace.*
(Umar Khayyam, tr. E. H. Rodwell in Smith, *The Sufi Path of Love*, p. 63).
22. *I am He whom I love and He whom I love is I
We are two spirits indwelling one body.
When thou seest me, thou seest Him,
And when thou seest Him, then thou dost see us both.*
(Husayn ibn Mansur al Hallaj, 309/922, in Smith, *Readings*, p. 37).
23. "The essences of things," he wrote, "are in themselves non-existent, deriving what existence they possess from God, who is the real substance of all that exists. Plurality consists of relations, which are non-existent things. There is really nothing except the Essence, and this is transcendent for itself, not in relation to anything, but we predicate of the One Substance transcendence in respect of the modes of being attributed to it: hence we say that God is He (*hua*) and is not not-He (*la hua*) The inward says 'no' when the outward says 'I', and the outward says 'no' when the inward says 'I', and so on in the case of every contrary, but the speaker is One, and He is substantially identical with the hearer" (Ibn al 'Arabi, tr. by R. A. Nicholson in Smith, *The Sufi Path of Love*, p. 34).
24. Ibn al 'Arabi, *Tarjuman al Ashwaq* (London, 1911, p. 19, tr. by Smith, in *Readings*, p. 97).

25. Kenneth Cragg, *Sandals At The Mosque: Christian Presence Amid Islam*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1959. "Ardent discussions," writes A. L. Tibawi in *al Tasawwuf al Islami al 'Arabi*, Cairo, 1928, pp. 36-37, "took place between the Sufis and the Christians and verses from the gospels began to appear in Sufi sayings The important effect that Christianity left upon Sufism is the theory of divine love." Tibawi then quotes a Sufi story that Jesus passed by three groups of ascetics who gave him different accounts of their lives. To the last group, who said 'The reason for our asceticism is only the love of God', Jesus answered, 'You are the nearest to God.' (*Ibid.*, pp. 37-38).
 26. Cragg, pp. 106-7, 121.
 27. *Ibid.*, pp. 130-31, 123.
 28. Cf. *Essai, supra*, n. 1.
 29. This is commonly the view of most later Sufi writers, thinkers, poets, theologians, etc. For a modern statement of this view by a contemporary Sufi thinker, see Abu Bakr Siraj Ed-Din, *The Book of Certainty*, London: Rider, 1952. Mr. Siraj Ed Din announces in the preface: "It will be clear to anyone who understands this book that without Sufism, the Islamic religion would be like a circumference without a center, that the first Sufi is the Prophet himself and that Sufism is therefore as old as Islam. In fact, far from being a later development, as some people maintain, Sufism was never so generally widespread, in proportion to the total number of the faithful, as it was during the life of the Prophet" (p. 10).
 30. The position of the committed Sufi does not deserve much notice. It rests on the attribution of ideas and concepts to the Prophet which he could not have had, and elicits from the Qur'an meanings by means of allegorical interpretation which no analysis can support. In final analysis, the Sufi *engagé* rests his case on this subject on mere assertion, distending the concepts of the Qur'an, the Prophet, and the companions beyond recognition. It is not possible to argue the case with him as long as he holds the criterion of truth to be his own esoteric, occult illumination alone.
- Hovering between the first two positions is Professor H. A. R. Gibb, who likes the scholarship of the second but prefers the conclusion of the first. (Gibb, p. 128) According to him, Massignon's evidence that Islamic mysticism was the descendent of early Islamic asceticism does not prove much. For, "even if this [i.e., the closest relations between the asceticism of the Prophet's companions and Sufism] may be granted, it will be remembered that the groundwork of the asceticism of the Koran is identical with that of Eastern Christianity" (*Ibid.*). This, Professor Gibb holds, does not extricate Sufism from Christian influence. This may be true only from the standpoint that Islam, the third sublime moment of Arab consciousness after Moses and Jesus, and natural heir of its whole tradition before Moses, has not repudiated either the person of Jesus or his teaching. No moment in Arab consciousness may reject a previous moment; for this inevitably implies that God has changed His mind and strategy—which is blasphemy. Jesus stands in the middle of the Arab Stream of Being as one of its three sublime moments; and no movement, Christian or Islamic, can remove him from that position. The Prophetic tradition is incomplete without him and the historical advent of Islam itself cannot be explained without his historical mission. We may then say, in answer to Professor Gibb, that inasmuch as Eastern Christianity is Christian and Islam has incorporated within itself the true teachings of Jesus, Islam may be said to have something in common with Eastern Christianity, and Sufism would do likewise *a fortiori*. But Gibb's statement is certainly false when it is regarded from the standpoint of the position that the Qur'an, the Prophet, or early Sufism have historically been fed by ideas

borrowed, as it were, from Eastern Christianity.

The difference between what I have called the committed and the 'balanced' western Islamist is really narrow. The former holds that Islam is, by nature, the sort of thing that Pharisee legalism is; that it has remained as such until Sufism arose and swept the 'Pharisee' 'Ulama and their legalist wisdom before it. This has supposedly happened, the *engagé* asserts, because, first, every human heart tends towards the love of a self-sacrificing-for-him God and the Muslims, being no exception, continued to thirst for the God of Christianity; secondly, because of the stimulus to the Muslims presented by Eastern Christianity and the resurrection, within them, of Christian ideas which they entertained as Christians before their conversion to Islam and which they had never quite forgotten. The 'balanced' western Islamist whose view is shared by a number of Muslims, is that in the course of the third century of the Hijrah, in the hands of the 'Ulama, Islam did degenerate into a 'Pharisee' kind of empty legalism and thus failed to answer the needs, spiritual and social, of the masses. The growth of Sufism was directly due to the presence of this need which 'Ulama-Islam did not and could not satisfy, and to its own satisfaction of it. (Thus, Zaki Mubarak unscrupulously quotes from *al Siyasa* Newspaper of June 3, 1932, "a passage from page 124 of an English book on Philosophy of Religion by Edward Ross: 'The word Islam means acquiescence to the will of God, the purpose of which is the inculcation of the idea that God is the incomprehensible potentate-judge against whom rebellion is futile. Neither holiness, nor love are attributes of that God. Nonetheless Muslims did appear who were not satisfied with this 'dry' religion; for the appearance of Sufi sects in Islam is itself the evidence of the existence among the Muslims of a longing for a closer relationship with a living God overflowing with love.'" (*Al Tasawuf al Islami*, p. 25). Worse yet is Mubarak's comment on this passage. He writes: "These [Ross's words] are true words indeed, except for their attribution of dryness to Islam for it is not necessary that we regard God as merciful or compassionate all the time; and it would be ignorance to forget God's wrath against the evil and the unjust.... Sufism did, however, fill the empty flanks of Muslim hearts. Sufism is that which neutralized, in the Muslims, the materialistic coarseness cultivated by legalist culture..." (*Ibid*). Thus, both parties are ready to impute to Islam (granted it is to the 'Ulama-Islam of the third century that the Muslim scholars, though not the western Islamists, do so) a failure to provide the religious emotional craving of the people, their will to a life of inward purity and personal rapprochement to God, with energizing inspiration and leadership. The Shari'ah, which this Islam offered alone, was, according to this view, a body of laws which by nature could not and did not go beyond the external circumstances of human existence. This is not the place to raise the question, whether or not the Shari'ah was what under this view it is claimed to be; or whether or not Sufism does in fact satisfy what is being claimed for it as *raison d'être*. Much less is it the place to answer them. Our purpose here must be limited to the delineation of the common grounds between the ethic of Jesus and Sufism. For this reason a few observations regarding the issue but showing the parallelism between Jesus and Sufism will have to suffice. Evidently, the case rests with the truth or otherwise of the statement, "the groundwork of the asceticism of the Koran is identical with that of Eastern Christianity." (Gibb, p. 128). Here, three observations are relevant. In the first place, the qualification 'Eastern' is superfluous because, except in modern times, 'western' Christianity did not come into any affecting contact with the East in which the latter was the recipient of ideas. Even as regards the so-called 'western spiritual invasion of the East' the time is still premature to judge either the extent of its reach, or of its truth. In the second place,

Professor Gibb gave us neither in *Mohammedanism* nor, to the knowledge of this author, in any other work, the evidence necessary to support this large assertion. Thirdly, he even left his reader with an assertion to the contrary. In the same work, in the chapter entitled "The Koran," he wrote, "... In reaction from the asceticism and tendency to withdraw from the world which was so marked a feature of Eastern Christianity, Mohammed [as presumed author of the Qur'an the content of which is the subject of this passage] from the first set his community squarely in the midst of the world. His often-quoted phrase 'No monkery in Islam' implies not only no professional cenobitism, but that the scene of religious activity in Islam is the life of men in the widest sense. All social activities were to be included within its purview and to be penetrated by its spirit" (*Ibid.*, p. 48). According to this statement, the truth of Professor Gibb's first statement cannot be asserted without implying that Sufism is not Islamic but 'Eastern Christian'. If it is Islamic, Gibb's second statement should be true and that would put it in contradiction with itself. For nothing Islamic can at one and the same time have "a groundwork of asceticism identical with that of Eastern Christianity" and be part of a "religious activity" whose very "scene" is set "in reaction against the asceticism of Eastern Christianity." Fourthly whereas it is true that the Christianity of Jesus was a repudiation of Jewish law in favour of the inward ethic of self-transformation, Sufism cannot be said to be a repudiation in the same manner, of Islamic Law, of the Shari'ah. For inasmuch as it is Islamic at all, Sufism must already contain the ethic of Jesus and inasmuch as Islam is Islam at all, and its Shari'ah is Islamic, they must both contain that ethic too. But we are told that Sufism reacted against Islamic Law for the sake of something both Sufism and the Law must already have had, *ex hypothesi*. Certainly, there were many Muslim thinkers, merchants, poets, and soldiers who had a more or less diluted form of either Islam or Shari'ah; but it is offensive to common sense to identify them with either Islam or the Shari'ah, its Law, and then claim that the revolt against them was really a revolt against the latter. The so-called revolt of Sufism would then not be like that of Jesus and Paul which was primarily directed against the law itself, but a revolt directed exclusively against the thought, or practice, or both, of certain Muslims.

If Sufism was a revolt against the thought or practice of certain Muslims, the Sufis' claims that their predecessors were the early ascetics, the companions of the Prophet, the Prophet himself, and their claim that Sufism lies in the Hadith and in the Holy Book itself, would have to be entirely false, because it implies that the Islam of the companions, of the early community, or of the Prophet was faulty. To be a Sufi in the sense acceptable to the first and second view the Prophet would have had to react against a 'faulty' Islam of which he was the only adherent—which is absurd. No less absurd is the implication that if Sufism is a reaction against something inadequate and the companions were Sufis, then the companions must have had an inadequate Islam. The granting of the slightest concession to their claim of being the spiritual descendants of the companions and/or of the Prophet, coupled with the definition of Sufism as a revolt against a defective Islam, would at once inculcate the companions and the Prophet as having the incomplete or deficient Islam against which the revolt could have taken place. But this would be an untenable position, in contradiction with itself. Among non-Muslims, it is usually the opinion of the unenlightened. There can be no doubt that very intimate relations bind the Sufis to the companions as well as to the Prophet and to Islam. But this relation precludes any definition of Sufism as a reaction. Throughout the first two centuries of Islamic history, hardly any of the Shaykhs claimed by the Sufis as predecessors are not at once great Shaykhs of Islam; hardly an idea of these

predecessors is not shared equally by later Sufis as by later orthodox Muslims and faqihs (legists).

The question is then one of determining the kind of relation between Sufism and Islam. It must be a relation which the accreditation of the Sufi claim for spiritual descent from the Prophet and the early community cannot harm. For there is overwhelming evidence to support the Sufi claim for such descent. But it must be borne in mind that such descent is not altogether pure. A great variety of Sufi doctrine is definitely new and was unknown to the companions and the Prophet. So that the Sufi claim of descent may not be granted without qualification. That that which had developed into the Sufi movement of history contained something utterly unislamic cannot be doubted; but neither can it be doubted that the central structure of genuinely Islamic ideas commonly held by the Prophet and the companions are all there too. The relation, therefore, cannot be one of reaction against the Shari'ah. However, though it may not be said, in so far as Sufism has diverted from the Shari'ah, that the former was a reaction against the latter, it is possible to maintain that, as regards that diversion, Sufism was a misunderstanding of the Shari'ah. Reaction, in order to be at all, demands a duality of positions, the relations of which may be the carriers of reaction. Misunderstanding, on the other hand, is possible without this two-directional relation.

The adherents of the first two views, therefore, viz., the *engagé* Christian Islamists and the Muslim scholars who agree that Sufism is, as a system of thought, fundamentally a reaction, and that Sufism is a development of and within Islam incepted by the companions of the Prophet and the early community, if not by the Prophet himself, stand on the horns of a dilemma, and must, for consistency's sake and in order to avoid the absurd, discard one of their opposing views.

The view which deserves to go first is that Sufism was the work of the early Muslims, for it lacks evidence which is vital for any historical thesis. Hardly any Sufi writings have survived from the first century and very little has come from the second. Sufism has indeed been a late phenomenon in the Muslim World. Most of the material attributed to the so-called Sufis of the first three centuries has been direct or indirect quotations by later Sufis. The suspicion that this material may have been edited to accord with later Sufi thought can therefore never be completely ruled out. The history of the development of Sufism is itself the history of its key concepts. These are three in number, *ma'rifah*, or gnosis in contradistinction from *'ilm*, or rational knowledge; *haqiqah*, or the essential truth in contradistinction from *shari'ah* or the Law, and finally *wilayah*, or sainthood, in contradistinction from *nubuwwah*, or prophethood. None of them appear in their specifically Sufi meaning in any work that is earlier than the fourth century, though as Arabic concepts they have always been well known and popular and the Qur'an had used them often. Only after A.H. 300 do they make an entry into Islamic vocabulary with a distinctly new (Sufi) meaning.

The concept of *wilayah* as meaning something especially Sufi, i.e., sainthood as a denotative class of Muslims who by their discipline and rise through the ascending scale of mystical states have achieved a station of communion with God different from the communion achieved by the prophet, is said to have been couched and first used by al Hakim al Tirmidhi (died 285/898). But since only his compilation of the Prophet's Hadiths has survived and his other works have perished, it is doubtful whether a man as pious as Tirmidhi would have thought his communion with God as being of a different sort than that of the companions of the Prophet. In L. Massignon's *Recueil de textes inédits concernant l'histoire de la mystique au pays d'Islam*, Paris: Paul Gauthner, 1929, the only mention of this problem of *wilayah*/

nubuwwah occurs in a list of questions supposedly asked by Tirmidhi, reported by Ibn al 'Arabi (died 638/1240) and, (of course) answered by the latter (Massignon, p. 33).

The other two pairs are correlates; 'ilm or science (rational knowledge) is the pursuit of *Shari'ah*, viz., the Qur'an and the Sunnah and the sciences that developed out of them. The method of 'ilm is rational, though it may be intuitive provided the intuition coheres with the findings in the Qur'an and Sunnah of a rational discipline supported by self-evidence and the consensus of the community of believers. *Ma'rifah*, on the other hand, is the purely and thoroughly intuitive, and therefore relative, personal, and esoteric, pursuit of *al-haqiqah* (the truth) which is God Himself, requisite for contemplation of and union with, Him. A. J. Arberry (*Sufism*) repudiates the claim that the introduction of *ma'rifah* into the Sufi theory was the work of al Muhasibi, because, he holds, "the conception certainly occurs in the fragments of earlier ascetics." Of these 'fragments' he gave only two, one by Ibrahim ibn al Adham (died 160/777) and the other by his pupil Shaiq of Balkh (died 194/810). Both these quotations Arberry obtained from *Hilyat al Awliya'* (The Sufi "Lives of the Saints") by Abu Nu'aim al Isfahani who died in 430/1038. But to quote al Isfahani is a far cry from asserting that *ma'rifah*—in the Sufi sense of gnosis—"certainly" occurs in the ascetics of the second century. From the same source, Arberry quotes a passage attributed to Hatim al Asamm (died 237/863) in which a fuller theory of gnosis is presented. Despite Arberry's naive confidence, this is all much too suspect to warrant building any theory upon it regarding the origins of Sufism.

Indeed, even if we took the material reported by later Sufis as belonging to Muhasibi (died 245/859), for instance, to be all genuine, we do not meet in it the opposition to the *Shari'ah* which may justify the description of early Sufism as a reaction against legalism. On the contrary, Muhasibi's reported writings understand virtue in terms couched exclusively by the *Shari'ah*.

L. Massignon gave us the original Arabic version of part of Muhasibi's *Wasaya* (*Recueil*, pp. 18-20). A. J. Arberry attempted an English translation of what seems to be the same passages and the same manuscript (*Sufism*, pp. 47-50). In this we read: "I found through the consensus of believers regarding the revealed Book of God that path of salvation consists in laying hold of the fear of God, and performing his ordinance, abstaining from what He has made lawful and unlawful alike and following all that He has prescribed, sincere obedience to God, and the imitation of His Prophet. So I sought to inform myself of God's Ordinances, and the Prophet's practices, as well as the pious conduct of the saints."

The original Arabic reads as follows:

Istirshadtu al 'ilma wa a'maltu al fikra wa ataltu al nazara fatabayyana li fi kitab Allah ta'ala wa ijma' al ummah anna ittiba' al hawa yu'mi 'an al rushd wa yudillu 'an al haqq... thumma wajadtu bi ijma' al ummah fi kitab Allah ta'ala al munazzal 'ala rasul Allah salla Allahu 'alayhi wa sallam anna sabila al najati fi al tamassuki bitaqwa Allah wa ada'i fara' idihi wa al wara'i halalihi wa haramihi wa jami'i hududihi wa al ikhlasi lilalibi bi a'malihi wa al ta'assi bi rasuli Allahi salla Allahu 'alayhi wa sallam fatalabtu ma'rifata al fara'ida wa al hududa wa al sunnana wa al wara'a 'inda al 'ulama'i wa fi al athari fara'aytu ijma'an wa ikhtilafan...

and should have been translated:

"I have sought knowledge for guidance, applied the mind and considered the matter for a long time. Thus, it became clear to me, in the book of God and in the

consensus of the ummah, that to follow one's whim blinds one to guidance and leads further astray from the truth.... I then found, in the Book of God, brought down upon God's Prophet (May God's blessing and prayer be upon him), in agreement with the consensus of the ummah, that the road to salvation lies in the preservation of the fear of God, in the performance of His obligatory commands, in piety—[observing] the permissible and [avoiding] the prohibited, in observing all His prescriptions and sanctions, in the sincere obedience to God and in observing the example of the Prophet (May God's blessing and prayer be upon him). I therefore sought the knowledge of the prescriptive duties and of the sanctions, of the Prophet's practices and of piety, from the 'Ulama and in the traditions. I have found consensus as well as divergence" etc.

Evidently, Muhasibi never "sought to inform" himself of "the pious conduct of the saints" as anything in which "path to salvation consists." On the contrary, he sought the path of salvation *chez* the 'Ulama, having understood with the consensus of believers, that it consists of many other things besides piety. Arberry's "pious conduct of the saints" is not there. The only interpretation under which it may be even by any stretch imaginable, namely, the conjunction of *wara'* and '*ulama*', makes objectionable syntax of the Arabic sentence, destroys the flow of the prose-composition and even so, can give us only "pious conduct of the '*ulama*' who were the Sufi saints' greatest antagonists.

Obviously, this is a serious misunderstanding. That Muhasibi has found himself "in agreement with the consensus of believers" proves that he thought of himself in no Sufi terms of reaction against them. That he found out piety to consist in obedience to the Shari'ah, or Law of Islam, and imitation of the Prophet, is incompatible with a Sufi *apolytrois* from the law. Finally, that he sought to learn the "prescriptions and sanction"—he could not have chosen terms that can better express, connote, and denote the Sahari'ah—at the hands of the 'Ulama, whose Islam, according to the Sufi thesis was barren, futile, and a misunderstanding, is the very opposite of what any consistent Sufi would have done if Sufism is what it is claimed to be.

It is not at all impossible that Arberry might have used another manuscript which at least in this passage runs slightly different from that of Massignon. Indeed, the misunderstanding, or 'twist' in case the translation is correct, might well have been that of the Sufi enthusiast who reported Muhasibi's *Wasaya*. But given Massignon's Arabic text, there is no escape from the charge that Arberry's translations has 'bent' the text to suit the argument. First, the Arabic text has no word which by any stretch of meaning can be translated as 'saint'. The word '*ulama*' denotes the very people against whom Sufism is supposed to be a revolt. The Arabic '*athar*', which signifies the corpus of traditions, has completely disappeared in the translation. The Arabic preposition '*inda*' qualifies the verb *talabtu*. It is 'at the hands of' the '*ulama*', as it were, that knowledge of all these things is to be sought and Muhasibi is here declaring his conviction that that is so. Obviously the *halal* or permissible and the *haram* or prohibited does not mean the ascetic "abstaining from what He has made lawful and unlawful alike" but the Islamic golden mean of doing the one and avoiding the other. The guardians of the knowledge of this *halal* and *haram* were, and still are, the '*ulama*'. That is why Muhasibi realized that he had to go to them to find that knowledge, and to the *athar* or corpus of traditions to find the knowledge of the practices of the Prophet. To seek obedience to God and imitation of His prophet in "the pious conduct of the saints" is sheer invention. In obliviousness of these and like facts, Sufi enthusiasts often quote the early Sufis as evidence for fantastic claims forgetful that what they quote are not the earlier, but the later, Sufis, and involving allegorical distensions to deduce their arguments

from the words of the so-called Sufi 'predecessors'. Thus, for yet another example, Zaki Mubarak quotes a statement as coming from the same al Muhasibi (died in 243/857), the so-called first intellectual of Sufism, to the effect that he refused to receive the inheritance his father had left him on the ground that his father was not a Sufi, that the Sufis and the non-Sufis are two *millats*, (The Arabic *millah* is stronger than a merely different religious sect; it indeed means a different religion; cf. the Qur'anic *millah* of Ibrahim, or *millet-ul awwalin*, etc.), and that the Hadith is true that no inheritance can pass in any direction between people of different religious sects. Nonchalantly, without the slightest doubt that Muhasibi could not have possibly thought of Sufism as another *millah*, and that this fantastic tale must be a later fabrication, Zaki Mubarak gives his source as *al Risalah al Qushayriyyah*, by Abu'l Qasim al Qushayri who died in 465/1074. Likewise, although the *Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam* (ed. by H. A. R. Gibb and J. Kramers, Leiden: Brill, 1953), did well to warn under Dhu'l Nun al Misri (died 245/859) that "it is... improbable that the surviving opuscles attributed to him... are really genuine; [that]... the Sufi biographers regard him as the father of mystical theory and... attribute to him the formulation of the doctrine of gnosis... after their fashion," nevertheless it has ventured on suspicious ground when it affirmed in its article on "Tasawwuf" that Dhu'l Nun al Misri has introduced the notion of *Ma'rifah* (gnosis) into Sufi vocabulary with a 'twist' of meaning all its own.

PART TWO

The Christianist Transvaluation

Chapter V

WHAT IS MAN? THE IMAGO DEI

The foregoing discussion of the Sabbath will have given us an index of Jesus' estimate of man: Man is above the law. And our Part I has established that for Jesus, man stood above the community: He is its very end and purpose. Indeed, Jesus' whole mission on earth was undertaken for man's own sake. Prophethood itself goes quickly to the ground unless man is endowed with such cosmic value as would justify God's action in sending down messages and revelation. Man's intrinsic value is the axiological ground and conditioning *prius* of prophethood. This especial worth of man derived for Jesus from man's unique station in the realm of creation. Only man is capable, by laying himself open to determination by God, by inviting divine determinants to become operative in his own willing, to give real existence to the will of God. In the cosmic economy, this unique capacity of man is of special value. Upon it depends all entry of any moral value into the realm of real-existence. For moral value, in truth, is precisely as Jesus had taught it to be; namely, a function of a free-willing man, willing the right value, its right real-existent, under the right circumstances. It cannot ever be realized unless free-willing men know of it and are determined by its moving power. Certainly God may create the real-existents which realize moral value as He has created those which realize all other types of value. But the 'finished' creation-product would not be an instance of the moral, because this, by definition, is a function of the moral subject's willing it. And a cosmos, or a man, perfected by creation or by the working of irrefragable natural law, would be less perfect than one perfected by man's ethical willing. A man-perfected man and cosmos would be more valuable than any nature-perfected ones, because of the increase in moral value which man's acts of perfecting will add to the total value of the achievement.

Man is really the crown of creation because he is the *conditio sine qua non* of the realization of that which, in this world of man, is the highest realm of God's will, namely, the moral value. Whether, as pure humanists, we regard Jesus as having been sent to realize God's will generally,¹ or as Muslims, we regard him as sent to deliver or exemplify a divine truth, or

finally, as Christians, we regard him as sent to effect a divine operation for man's redemption, there is no escape from the implication that man must be intrinsically valuable to warrant such divine action as we encounter in Jesus. The realization of the will of God demands the agency of man, if it is to be complete; and it is this capacity for being the agent of the realization of God's will that constitutes man's cosmic station and significance. Its development and orientation to God, as we have had occasion to see, was Jesus' supreme and 'first' concern. Its exercise, Jesus taught, was God's 'First', and therefore only, commandment.

In Hellenic Christianity: Humanism

This estimate of man by Jesus acquired a history after him. From his followers, it received a whole range of interpretations.

Among the evangelists Luke's treatment stands out foremost. He regarded Adam as "the son of God,"² thus granting him and all mankind after him, an even higher status than that of "image of God." This contrasts sharply with Paul's use of this notion for the characterization of Jesus. For Jesus, in Paul's eyes, is "the image of God,"³ "the image of the invisible God."⁴ But it accords with his use of the term in the characterization of man. Man, he also holds, is "the image and glory of God."⁵ The occasion for this assertion on the part of Paul was whether or not the head ought to be covered during prayer. Against Jewish law which held that the head should be covered Paul argued on the grounds that what is so covered is not "a shame" but an "image" and "glory" of God.⁶ Elsewhere he also asserted that man was "made after the similitude of God,"⁷ and that the human body is "the temple of the Holy Ghost which is in you, which ye have of God, and ye are not your own,"⁸ thus giving grounds to the view developed after him, that the divine likeness of man consists in nature, in the manner in which God had created him. This notwithstanding, Paul equally asserted that the image of God is something acquired by the Christian through his conversion to and "rise" with Christ.⁹ These two views of *imago dei*, the one innate, natural, and necessary and the other acquired and therefore, contingent, divided Christian thought after Paul. Although all these views find statement in Paul's epistles, there should be little doubt where the really Pauline view stands. There is no question but that the last-mentioned was the view Paul really held.

His recourse to the image of God as innate was a rhetorical piece designed, in the first case,¹⁰ to sway the Christians into liberating themselves from the Jewish law which prescribed the covering of the head during worship, bent as he correctly was, on making the apolytrosis as

complete as can be, even in what concerns the non-essentials, in order to cultivate a consciousness of non-Jewishness, of an 'Israel' that is genuinely 'new' and different from the law-ridden Israel of Jewish racism. In the second instance,¹¹ the term was used to exhort the Christians not to fornicate, but to respect and honour, their bodies. *Per contra*, this view is consistent with Paul's general estimate of man as essentially fallen, as sinner. He regarded humanity as "fighting a losing battle against Sin. For Sin had laid claim to the whole range of man's physical or psychical existence."¹² Obviously, he could not have seriously entertained the idea that man's nature was good—which is what the upshot of the *imago dei* notion is—if he were to give of Jesus' death, the sacrificial atonement interpretation he did give. For one thing, at least, is certain: that Hebrew Scripture, or the Old Testament, "knows nothing of the idea that henceforth the image of God in man has been lost."¹³

The first Christians were slow to appropriate this Pauline view. Their Jewish background, in the case of the converts from Judaism, and Hellenism in the case of the Gentile converts, precluded any such black-painting of human nature. The Greek poets had unanimously maintained a thoroughgoing humanism under which man descended directly from the gods.¹⁴ The Philosophers held rationality to be the divine spark in man, constituting his communion with the godhead and therefore, his peculiar distinction.¹⁵ The Stoics, finally, came close to identifying man with God by spiritualizing man's uniqueness and distinction.¹⁶ On the Jewish side, two streams, both holding man in highest honour, converged. The universalist stream held tightly to the view of man in Genesis. Genesis had laid it out unequivocally: "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion..."¹⁷ Indeed, Hebrew Scripture discerns little difference between flesh and spirit as far as imageness of God is concerned.¹⁸ The whole man is but little lower than God.¹⁹ His estimate is supreme, precisely on account of his endowment, at birth, with this divine image. The *zelem* and *demuth* of God in man is the reason for man's, as well as God's, moral treatment of man.²⁰ The racialist stream held the Israeli man in high honour throughout. When the prophets poured the vials of their wrath on the Israeli man, they never condemned him absolutely as man, but always as by nature the member of a master race who has behaved in a way unbecoming to that membership. Even so, the doctrine of the infallible, incorruptible remnant was there, ready to be resorted to in the nick of time to prevent such wholesale deprecation.²¹

Likewise, the Apostolic Fathers' estimate of human nature was very high. In some, it has reached heights which were not to be heard of again until the Renaissance and the Age of Enlightenment. In them, the Hebraic view of Genesis was happily wedded to that of Hellenic culture. Unani-

mously, they proclaimed man the *chef-d'œuvre* of the Master-Creator, endowed with all the perfections or faculties necessary to make his life-career a felicitous one.²² The likeness of God in man is, furthermore, necessary, on a par with the necessary laws of earth and heaven.²³ "From the beginning," I Clement affirms, "God gave man the goal of peace."²⁴ For if God is so good as to "ordain the universe to be in peace and concord," and does good to all creation, *a fortiori* He must have been good to man when He created him.²⁵ Repeating Genesis 2:7, I Clement wrote, "His [God's] breath is in us;"²⁶ and Barnabas, echoing Genesis 1:31, that God was pleased with "our fair creation."²⁷ The author of the Epistle to Diognetus is so moved by the consideration of man's distinction that he breaks into a psalmic song: God created creation itself for the sake of man whom He loved, "to whom He gave reason, to whom He gave mind, on whom alone He enjoined that they should look upward to Him... to whom He promised the Kingdom of heaven and earth."²⁸

Of the later Fathers of the Church, Clement, Bishop of Rome, wrote in the Homilies, usually attributed to him, "For the image of God is man" and "He who wishes to be pious towards God does good to man, because... man bears the image of God."²⁹ He commands good actions to man as good to God "whose image he is" and therefore, on that account.³⁰ Gregory of Nyssa (d. *circa* A.D. 395) followed a purely Hellenic line when he wrote that man is the image of God as the good painting of a person is the portrait of him.³¹ Throughout this age in which Plato and Aristotle ruled the Western spirit with little challenge, the Genesis *imago dei* now understood in essentially Hellenistic terms prevailed. By nature man was good and his goodness was analyzed into physical but more often spiritual (rational) qualities which, though cultivable, belonged to him through creation. The Pauline doctrine was dormant, and lay ineffective on the face of some folded manuscripts.³²

Anxious to find grounds for the Christian dogma which was being elaborated in his day, Irenaeus (*circa* A.D. 200) fabricated a distinction between *zelem* and *demuth* (image and likeness) of Genesis 1:26. He regarded them as two different qualities.³³ His purpose was obviously to allow man to lose one (*demuth* now understood as righteousness) through the Fall while he keeps the other (*zelem* interpreted as innate image). Although the basis of his reasoning was wrong, since the Hebrew terms and usage do not bear out the distinction in meaning forced upon them, the need was real. Christian dogma needed such a distinction. However, the Hellenic view was too strongly rooted to allow such a radical separation of the 'ought' from the 'is'. Although Christian dogma continued to grow and to triumph after Irenaeus, the problem of the *imago dei* and its bearing on the nature of man remained unsolved. It was not until August-

ine that the notion acquired its truly Christian character.³⁴

In Pre-Reformation Christianity: The Rejection of a Necessary Humanity of Man

Augustine was sufficiently close to the culture of Hellas to define the image of God, at least partly, in Platonic terms. Man's faculties of memory and knowledge constituted the divine image, as in the case of the Apostolic Fathers. To these Augustine joined the faculty of love which, like those of memory and knowledge, is no less innate and inalienable. The sum and activity of these faculties is what we call spirit and this is precisely that very "image and likeness of Thee on account of which he (man) was set over all irrational creatures."³⁵ Thus the naturalism of Hellenic culture appears to be absorbed in the Augustinian doctrine.

But this "image and likeness of Thee," though naturally possessed by every man must needs be exercised and realized in the right direction. For it is not sufficient for it to be had. It must realize itself by dispensing its energies. This gives the 'image' a wholly new dimension, the properly-ethical dimension; and by doing so, it neutralizes the value of that image as a natural, necessary endowment. Under its aegis, Man's excellence is no more that he has that endowment—it is now an instrument shorn of all intrinsic value—but that he make such and such use thereof. But how can the value of the divine image as natural endowment be completely lost in that of its use? To arrive at this conclusion, Augustine haphazardly found a distinction between the expressions "after Our image, or likeness," and "after his kind." There must be a reason, he thought, why Genesis uses the former and not the latter. Had the purpose of God been simply the creation of a creature completely different from or superior to the rest of creation, Genesis would have said that God created man after *his* own kind, i.e. utterly unique. Its saying that man was made "after Our image" implies that in making man, God designed him so that he may turn to God, and as it were, realize a rapport with the Deity, for which only a tendency has been built-in within his self.³⁶ The superfluity of his reasoning is evident in Augustine's obsession with the letter of Holy Writ which his non-Arab(non-Semitic)consciousness is incapable of grasping intuitively. The plural form "Us" in Genesis 7:26 has haunted Augustine as it did Tertullian, his contemporary, who spent a great deal of his energies in trying to deduce therefrom a trinitarian conception of the Godhead.³⁷ Augustine's purpose was the same as Tertullian's; and he repeated the latter's arguments.³⁸ His novel contribution was the analysis of consciousness into subject, object, and perception or act of consciousness, and the

deduction therefrom of a trinitarian nature of the self as evidence for God's making of man "in Our image"³⁹ which, he argued, is trinitarian. All this, as naive logical construction, may be, and has been in the history of Christian theology, put aside. Its conclusion, however, that is to say, the importation of the ethical element into the notion of *imago dei*, abides. Henceforth, Christianity regarded itself as having recaptured the other side of Pauline doctrine which it had lost in the Apostolic and early Fathers. And the strength of the new position lay in its acceptance and rejection of the earlier essentialist positions. In Augustine's words, "the true honour of man is the image and likeness of God, which is not preserved except it be in relation to Him by whom it is impressed."⁴⁰ The necessary, innate *essentia* of rationality, viz. memory, imagination, and love—which R. Niebuhr aptly called man's "faculty of self-transcendence"⁴¹—are, according to Augustine, themselves the likeness of God, but they are still to become like God. This becoming lies in their subjection to Him.⁴²

This doctrine of Augustine bore within it two devastating conclusions. In the first place, it stood to bring the universalism of Jesus to utter ruin. Jesus and the Fathers after him were interested in the cause of man as such, of all men. Jesus was sent into this world in order to save all men; because man, the creature that is according to Psalms 8:5 next only to the angels, was alienating himself from the honour and blessedness that are his due as crown of creation. His being the image of God was the "sufficient cause" for God's merciful act in sending Jesus and all other revelations; and every man is that image of God, entitled—if one may stretch this legalistic concept—to the benefits of the Jesus-revelation. Man's dignity and cosmic value was the necessary, inseparable correlate of his existence and actuality. In Augustine's hands, this dignity and unique distinction of man was shorn of its intrinsic value. It became a tool, another tool, endowed of merely utilitarian value, final value becoming strictly a function of its use. Only the man who uses that divine endowment in the right manner and for the right purpose, that is to say, in such wise as would bring him closer to and more like God as He has revealed Himself in Christianity, in short only the Christian is henceforth entitled to the dignity of being the image of God.⁴³ The non-Christian cannot be said to have the divine image in him; and since this image is a necessary concomitant of humanity, it follows that the non-Christian is not even human. He remains on the level of the beasts.⁴⁴ Whereas Genesis and Jesus were one in teaching the dignity of man *überhaupt*—and in so doing may well be called ethical at all and then ethically—universalistic, Augustine's teaching amounted to an advocacy of the dignity of the Christian alone. It constitutes an undoing of the Jesus revolution and a

relapse into Jewish particularism and separatism. It is not surprising that Calvin found in Augustine a predecessor and an anticipation of his predestination for election.

In the second place, the Augustinian doctrine opened the gates wide to irrationalism and relativism. Whereas in Genesis, in Hellenism, and in the Apostolic Fathers, the essentiality of the image of God in man carried the implication that it is to be honoured simply and for its own sake, the Augustinian view imposed upon it the restriction that it ought to accord with something. Thus human reason, the human soul with its tripartite faculties, is not to exercise itself freely, to discover the laws and first principles of being as and when it finds them. On the contrary, the human soul is henceforth to be subject to something extraneous to it.⁴⁵ As we have seen earlier, in Augustine's words, "the mind becomes like God to the extent vouchsafed by its subjection of itself to Him *for information*."⁴⁶ Augustine entertained no doubt that the "information" to which the mind was to subject itself for was the scripture, that is the dogma taught by the Church of Rome. For the very purpose of that subjection is the reproduction in the human soul, of the divine Trinity which is the central tenet in all church dogmatics. The mind is not supposed to discover the Christian God, the Trinity, or even God in general. There can be no natural theology. Rather, the mind becomes Godlike only in the measure it has subjected itself and acquiesced to the truth of Christian revelation as understood and taught by the Church of Rome. Certainly, it is not the acquiescence of mind to truth at all that is here advocated—that would be a tautologic assertion—but its acquiescence to a given truth, viz. the truth taught by the church. Thus, not only does the mind have truth to the measure that it has acquiesced to the Christian truth, but it is a mind—Augustine asserts—in that measure and only in that measure. The mind which reasons, remembers, imagines, and loves and which in all these activities of its essence, perceives and apprehends something other than the axioms of church dogma is here regarded as ungodlike (Augustine uses the term 'beastly') untrue, and finally, as no mind at all. Here, Augustine may well fall back upon his Genesis-Hellenistic premise that the essential (or formal) character of the image is still there even if the mind stands apart from God. He may well reassure such a mind that it is "so constituted that at no time does it not remember, and understand and love itself" and therefore in some sense continue to be the image of God.⁴⁷ Nobody will feel satisfied at merely possessing that which he had declared to be only a utilitarian tool, devoid in itself of ethical worth. Moreover, once the mind is thus chained to something given, rather than be allowed to discover that something for itself, there is no reason why its chaining to one 'truth' is any better than its chaining to another. The role of such

given guidance amounts to hardly more than that of vetoing the otherwise free findings of the mind. Such vetoing can be exercised not only by the God of church dogmatics, or even God in general. Any little prejudice or illusion could wield that sceptre just as efficiently. Irrationalism, any amount of it, is in final analysis, the whole of irrationalism and must bring relativism in its trail.

This doctrine of Augustine provided the bridge on which every Christian theory of man passed. The Augustinian adoption of a naturalistic image and its outgrowth to an image implied in the orientation of the first image, remained the characteristics of all Christian theories of man. This second, contingent, and acquired image was necessary for justifying the properly Christian virtues and exalting the person in whom they have been realized. Throughout the history of Christian thought, the second image has held a place of unquestioned axiological superiority over the first one.

Under the influence of Islamic rationalism emanating from the Muslim centers of learning in Sicily and Medieval Spain, Christian thought developed a liking for the naturalistic image of its ancestors, the Semites of Genesis and the Hellenic rationalists. Earlier, contacts with the Islamic East had stirred up the renaissance, in Italy and from there in other European centers, of secular learning and of the dignity which attaches to man as a rational being capable of learning. But the development of this appreciation of the divine image as natural rationality was never strong enough to liberate itself from tutelage to Christian virtue, or the content of the second image, to which Augustine had subjected it. In Thomas Aquinas, it reached the fairest flowering it was to reach in the history of Christian thought. But even there, despite its command of a whole realm of human activity and thought, it was yet subjugated to another order, the Christian order, which hovered above it continuously and authoritatively. The gap separating the two orders was never bridged, since neither had the power to reach out to the other. The lower, or natural-rational, order was not to constitute an independent realm, but had to be subject to directives from above. For a long way, it could proceed on its own laws since these were not in opposition to the laws of grace. But there was no doubt where the final word lies in matters where opposition arises. The values of the Christian order are not only superior to those of the natural-rational, but constitute their axiological grounds. Only they are axiologically final: the values of the rational order are merely instrumental to them.⁴⁸ This natural-rationalism had a brief spell of spring in the Age of Scholasticism. But even then, the storm was already gathering momentum. The reassertion of Augustinian sectarianism and irrationalism by means of a moralistic definition of *imago dei* as an

orientation of an activity was soon to shatter the scholastic house built on sand in an event of world-and history-wide significance: the Reformation.

In the Reformation: The Reaffirmation of Man's Inhumanity

Luther, the first leader and author of the Reformation, was predominantly interested in freeing the Christian, as Christian, from the domination of Rome. Salvation, or communion with the Godhead and the maintenance of that communion, he thought, were not necessarily dependent upon Rome, the organized church. The Christian may achieve his own salvation by himself, i.e., without the extraneous artifice of the Roman Church. For this, all that is necessary is faith, and 'salvation by faith alone' became his war cry. If faith alone is sufficient for salvation, that which faith can reconstitute for man and which he must have lost before its restitution by faith, cannot be anything which man has by nature. That which man had by nature, necessarily, does not go out of, and then come back into, existence. But the *imago dei* is precisely something which man has lost, and which he can now recapture by faith alone. It must then be wholly a matter of 'righteousness'.⁴⁹ The image is a virtue which Adam once had, and which he once lost, which every Christian after him, once did not have and which, by means of his Christian faith, he has now regained and may enjoy. The image of God thus hangs over every man as a potentiality, as God's intention for him. No man is to be respected as such; he is only to be respected for this divine intention which hovers over him but is never, unless he is already a Christian in good standing, a part of him. Obviously, this is the culmination of Tertullian's and Augustine's thought. It stands at the farthest possible remove from that Hellenistic humanism under which any man is in the image of God. To Luther, *Christianism*, or the pursuit of the Christian's glory, welfare, and freedom to assert himself as Christian, though struggling for expression during many previous centuries, has become eloquently conscious.

Luther accused the scholastics of no little confusion when they called *imago dei* both the universal, necessary image and the image by conformity of grace; when they defined both as 'love of God', whether the case was one of a sinful activity or of a charity motivated by the direct action of God. He reminded them of I Corinthians 15:48⁵⁰ and Ephesians 4:21-4;⁵¹ anxious as he was to focus all attention on the act of renewal which alone is necessary for salvation. In the natural-rational order, Luther saw nothing good. "Memory, will and mind" he wrote, commenting on Genesis 1:26, "we have indeed; but they are most depraved and most

seriously weakened, yes, to put it more clearly, they are utterly leprous and unclean. If these powers are the image of God, it will also follow that Satan was created according to the image of God, since he surely has these natural endowments...."⁵² All goodness in man begins with the act of faith. This is true for man today, as it was for Adam before the Fall, when he had the faith and lived a Godly life.⁵³ Thus, since Adam, there have been no men on earth other than the Christians; indeed, none other than those Christians who have acknowledged the Christian dogma of the nature of God and of Jesus Christ. The more such non-Christians have used their memories, wills, and minds, the more satanic they must have been. Luther was yet to surprise us even more. He went to the extreme of asserting that before the Fall, Adam's physical condition was far superior to what it became thereafter.⁵⁴ Apparently, for Luther, the moral lapse brings about a physical change of great magnitude, but moral regeneration does not bring any at all.

Ever since the Reformation, Christian thought found solid anchor in the idea that the image was purely man's standing in relation to God. A vestige of natural-rationality remained in the notion of the divine image with Calvin, but it lost even the little instrumental value Aquinas has assigned to it. Calvin actually called it a 'relic' and declared its value to be solely that of making its bearer inexcusable before God.⁵⁵ Man's reason and other faculties are now necessarily bent upon falsehood and evil. "To the great truths, what God is in Himself, and what He is in relation to us, human reason makes not the least approach."⁵⁶ The knowledge of the Christian who is "firmly persuaded that God is reconciled and is a kind Father to him" is not to be arrived at by anyone else, unless, of course, he is already a Christian and has faith in Christ.⁵⁷ But if he must already be a Christian in order to know and love God as he must, obviously the duty to know and love God cannot devolve upon man as such. Calvin pursued this challenge to the bitter end where he found himself compelled to uphold a predestination to salvation and to damnation.

In the Christianity of Modern Times: Irrationalist Confusion

Calvin's extremely eloquent diatribes on the depravity of man inspired another Christian thinker to even greater, more bitter, and more eloquent condemnation of man's state of nature, now universally branded in Protestant circles of thought as 'sin'. This was Soren Kierkegaard, whose *The Concept of Dread*,⁵⁸ *Fear and Trembling*,⁵⁹ and *The Sickness unto Death*⁶⁰ stand as the greatest monuments to that enmity to human nature which Augustine, and then the Reformation, had introduced into

Christian thought after the manner of St. Paul. In Kierkegaard, the Augustinian and Lutheran denial of divine image in the natural-rational order of man has turned aggressive. "Would it not be a sorry delusion of the lily's," Kierkegaard asked the adherents of the opposite view who in his time, were the secular rationalists, "if when it looked upon its fine raiment it thought that it was on account of the raiment that God loved it?"⁶¹ The image of God does not exist at all in man, not even a 'relic' of it. Man exists in the image of God when he agrees "to be nothing through the act of worship." Thus, the divine image is really no more than "the act of worshipping [which] is the resemblance with God, as it is the superiority over all creation."⁶² In a sense, therefore, Kierkegaard is the apogee of that tradition which began by subordinating the value of the natural to that of the religious in man and arrived with him at denying to the natural image not only value but existence altogether. Kierkegaard's equation of the divine image in man with the act of worship and then his understanding of worship as commitment to nothingness is symptomatic of the nihilism which befell the Christian Western spirit in the modern age. Though this nothingness is one in relation to an absolute God, modern Western Christian consciousness no more regards natural man as occupying any place in the cosmos. On the contrary, natural man is in Kierkegaard's view, the negative, Satanic being which must be annihilated before the road to value can even be started. Natural-non-being, as an ethical ideal to be aimed at and achieved by the worshipper, is Christian nihilism. There is hardly a modern Christian thinker whose common sense has not fallen prey to its persistent attacks since Kierkegaard gave it its classic expression.

Current Christian thought has generally remained true, on the subject of the image of God in man, to the broad outline of ideas laid out by Augustine and the Reformation. But it betrays the corroding influence of Christian nihilism in every classic statement of its problems. The question of the image of God in man has occupied a great deal of its insight and energies. Nowhere, however, has this problem come into better focus as in the controversy which Emil Brunner and Karl Barth had in the nineteen-thirties. The records of this controversy constitute the main body of literature of contemporary Christian thought on the nature of man. Paul Ramsay, Reinhold Niebuhr, Paul Tillich, and many other contemporary writers on Christian ethics have developed their thought in connection with this controversy and their writings may be regarded as footnotes to the discussions of Brunner and Barth.

Brunner opens his statement on the matter with the question whether or not knowledge is at all possible without presuppositions.⁶³ Answering in the negative, he sets out to give what he regards as the presupposition

of any Christian knowledge of man. This, he claims, is the 'Word of God'.⁶⁴ Carefully, he distinguishes between the 'Word' as Old and New Testament and as 'faith in Christ'. It is the latter that is the presupposition of all Christian knowledge. The true theory of man is to be found in Christianity's Jesus Christ because "in Him God reveals to us both His being and our being."⁶⁵ Thus, the Christian theory of man may be neither criticized from a non-Christian standpoint nor even understood. Further, this Christian standpoint is the unique stand within the faith, rather than that of scripture which, presumably, is susceptible to many interpretations. By basing the theory of man squarely on the faith in Jesus Christ Brunner meant to base it on a given interpretation of the Scripture. Such a theory is then necessarily dogmatic; it has no place for a critique which does not share its own dogmatism.

With this anti-critical nature of the Christian doctrine of man, Barth is in full agreement.⁶⁶ Brunner, however, seems to be asserting more than merely the thesis of dogmatism. With him, echoing the opening statements of the Gospel of John, the Word is equally the 'source of Being',⁶⁷ and since every man has being, he must stand to the Word in some necessary relation. This relation is twofold: He is the product of the Word since he has been begotten by it as Logos, and he confronts it in his being as hearer and recipient.⁶⁸ The Word has an ontological status endowed with the efficacy which diffuses all being appended to its ideational status as first principle of Christian truth. These two aspects Brunner fuses together when he defines man as 'product' and 'recipient' of the Word. But he gives no explanation how this is possible, and satisfies himself with analogical descriptions.⁶⁹

Granted its presuppositions, this view of Brunner is open to a number of objections. First, that man is made by the ontological Word does not imply that he knows who his creator is. His capacity as recipient of the word does not therefore necessarily follow from the fact that he is its creature. Second, that the Word as scriptural revelation (*Christus dominus et rex scripturae*—Luther) is the first principle of knowledge is anything but necessary. Man does not share it. How then can it be of his very nature to be the recipient of it? Third, the Word which generates is supposedly Jesus Christ, the Word incarnated in history. This incarnate word cannot be the creator of original man, since the said incarnation did not take place in history except in the year 1 or so, A.D. If it is the former that generates and the latter that creates, how could pre-Christ man have been the recipient of the generative Word? And yet, it is necessary that all men be generated (in the sense of being ethically transformed by the Word) in order to be said to be the recipients of it.

In reply to such criticism, Brunner asserts that the recipient to the Word

exists everywhere, even where the Word is not understood and where Christ has never been heard of. It is common to all humanity. But its ground he finds in the fact that "everything has its continued existence, not merely its origin... in the Word" as the source of creation and being.⁷⁰ However shaky the foundation on which it stands, Brunner's universalistic attempt thus to found man's humanity on something independent of his acceptance or otherwise of the Christian faith was destined for a head-on collision with Karl Barth for whom humanity is equivalent with Christianity. Barth reproaches Brunner, therefore, for allowing unchristianity, or sin, to be possible within humanity, i.e., within the rationality conferred upon man by the creative work of the Word. "Man's rationality," he argues against this view, "as Brunner sees it, does not depend on his giving God the answer which corresponds to the divine Word, so that if he failed to do so he would act irresponsibly (and hence, inhumanly). That there is also bondage, irrationality, irresponsibility and therefore apostasy not only from God but also from man's true being, in short, sin—all this seems to be for Brunner a "foreseen possibility within the rationality and responsibility given to man with his creation, and therefore in some sense to have its root in the Word of God in which man has his being."⁷¹ That Brunner has allowed man the freedom to realize himself in loyalty or disloyalty to Christ, which, in Brunner's own terms is tantamount to confirming or denying man's creatureliness and being "in the Word of God," Barth, whom we shall yet have occasion to study as the prince of paradox,⁷² jeeringly and contemptuously calls a "strange paradox in the teaching of Brunner."⁷³

In defence of himself, Brunner has fallen back on the Old Testament notion of image of God, recognizing it as the universal 'formal' image in contrast to which the New Testament notion would be the 'material' image. He notes with satisfaction that Old Testament scholars unanimously agree that "the *imago dei* describes man as he now is, and that it is never applied to a way of human existence lost through the Fall of Man."⁷⁴ This notion, however, is too universal to accommodate the Christian dogmatic teaching. Hence, Brunner defines it as formal in the Kantian sense of being free of any determining content. Thus the approbatory compliment paid to the Old Testament scholars is silently withdrawn and the *imago dei* still awaits another definition that can make it significant by giving it content. Such definition Brunner finds in the New Testament where the divine image is contentual (*matérielle*), moralistic. It consists in being like Jesus; for "to be like Him—Jesus" (I John 3:2) is "absolutely the sum total of the hope of salvation, and thus of the message of the New Testament as a whole."⁷⁵ In the former case, the divine image means "the special endowments of human nature [personal being, dominion

over the other creatures, reason, free choice in the moral sense]⁷⁶ as they can be perceived even in the sinful human being. This, in Brunner's opinion, is sufficient reason that the divine image cannot consist in such things, despite the fact that it is not limited to Genesis or to the Old Testament, but is also in I Corinthians 11:7⁷⁷ and James 3:9.⁷⁸ It is in the other passages in the New Testament (i.e., in Paul), where the "primal imago...is torn out of its Old Testament structural or morphological rigidity [and replaced by] the *imago* as being-in-the-Word-of God through faith,"⁷⁹ that the true definition of *imago* may be found. True this New Testament notion is impossible without the Old Testament *imago* which is here declared lost and restored through Jesus Christ.

Obviously this acrobatics on the part of Brunner does not convince anyone, and certainly not Barth. Brunner's formalization of the *imago* is tantamount to annihilation; for by opening it to sin, the natural endowment of man has been emptied of intrinsic value and this is nothing short of annihilation. For such is precisely what Kierkegaard meant by nihilation, not the physical—where annihilation is absurd and futile even if possible—but the valuational. Rightly then, Barth retorted that if the original image has been completely annihilated and may be restored only by faith in Christ he is correct in his claim. No, answered Brunner, for the Old Testament image is of two natures, an image and a likeness and it is only the latter that was destroyed in the Fall and restored by faith in Christ. The latter is ethical; and as such, it can be destroyed by sin and restored by Redemption. The former must then be amoral and exist universally and necessarily in all men. It consists in their capacity to hear the Word and to abide by it. In this Brunner has picked up a thread started by Irenaeus towards the close of the Second Century and he acknowledges his debt to him.⁸⁰ For Irenaeus, as we have seen earlier, the image was man's endowment of reason and God's nature itself was all reason. The *imago dei* was a *participatio dei*, in the manner of the Stoics, though Irenaeus would be careful to distinguish this from the New Testament notions of orientation which is constitutive of Redemption. Has Brunner then followed the Stoics, and Irenaeus after them?

Brunner distinguished himself from these in two novel ideas. First, the universal image is not pure rationality, mere spirituality. That was a mistake, he tells us, which the early Fathers committed because of their Hellenism.⁸¹ The Genesis view, he tells us, is that man is image in both soul and body. Indeed, the body "is the most solid and impressive manifestation of the creaturely character of man."⁸² Advancing still further, Brunner asserts that "the body is that which is intended to distinguish the being of the creature from the being of the Creator."⁸³ Pushing his advance beyond Biblical thought deep into Western naturalism, he claims that

"the physical and material element is not merely a case or a framework which contains the real human being....[It] extends right into the centre of the mind itself."⁸⁴ Finally, looking at the human body with the pagan eyes of a Greek or late Renaissance sculptor, Brunner exclaims: "In his bodily nature something of his special destiny which the Creator has given him has been expressed."⁸⁵

Secondly, Brunner holds that the word of God spoken to man in creation is not a command, but a gift, "not first of all a demand but life; not law but grace. The Word [which imparts to man his being and actuality]...is not a 'Thou shalt' but a 'Thou mayest be.'"⁸⁶ And the proper response to it is the dedicative, "Yes, I am Thine" said by man to God. Thus, it is wholly an act of divine self-communication that gave man his being and nature, summoning man to communion with Him.⁸⁷ For Brunner, this view is necessary if the Christian faith, holding the essence of the Godhead in the self-sacrificial act performed gratuitously by God for man's sake, is true. Furthermore, such a view is the presupposition of Brunner's doctrine that only the Christian faith knows the true meaning and content of man's humanity.⁸⁸ For only there, he argues, is God conceived of as a trinity of persons whose relation to one another is love, which is the necessary prerequisite for his view of man. In conceiving of a God who is so concerned with His creatures as to proffer upon them His love before He is asked—nay, before such love is even needed—Brunner lays the ground for the conclusion that only in the Christian faith is such a God recognized when the need for Him is established after the Fall.

Brunner, however, is not consistent; and his recourse to the amoral, formal, universal, and necessary image of Genesis 1:26, his sympathy for Tertullian, his approval of the results of research by Old Testament scholars, all this has been to no avail. Even the Augustinian view that the image of God had through the Fall entirely disappeared from man, as well as Luther and Calvin's view that a faint vestige of it only remains, are now utterly rejected and his taking sides with Karl Barth is unequivocal. "I teach with Barth," he categorically asserts, "that the original image of God in man is destroyed, that the *institutia originalis*, and with it the possibility of doing, or even willing, what counts before God as good, and consequently the freedom of the will is lost."⁸⁹ To recapture it, therefore, is to become a Christian; and the non-Christian is precisely a man in whom humanity has been 'destroyed' and 'lost'. But no modern Christian thinker is to be pinned down to any position, including this one. In contempt for the laws of thought, Brunner reverts once more at this point to the old position. "To lose the image of God," he now tells us, "is only a figure of speech."⁹⁰ "So far as clear ideas are possible in this realm," he apologizes, "what we can say is this: Man's relation with God, which determines his

whole being, has not been destroyed by sin, but it has been perverted. Man does not cease to be the being who is responsible to God, but his responsibility has been altered from a state of being-in-love to a state of being-under-the-law, a life under the wrath of God."⁹¹

This piece of woolly thinking convinces nobody. Barth rightly criticized him for this double-face and he has no way to avoid it. All his distinctions of two kinds of *imago* go to the ground by this one principle of Christianist metaphysics which he never doubted; namely, the material image is the creatureliness and actuality ontically imparted by the Word as the source of all being. The material, and here Brunner and Barth agree, is not merely a virtue, or disposition or formal characteristic which can be the object of acquisition and loss, but stands to the Word in an ontic relation.

Brunner, however, does not truly deserve the honour of a discussion of his thought closing, as he does, on a note of categorical assertion such as the foregoing, even if such assertion proves his argument utterly mistaken. After all, there is a certain magnanimity to a consistently held view however erroneous it may be. To Brunner belongs the inconsequence of double-talk. After saying all he had to say in the order said, he tells us that the material image could not be entirely lost if redemption is not a new beginning from nothing, but a 'renewal' of God's image in us. In an appendix to *Man in Revolt*, he declares that, "...in this perversion [of sin]...human nature still always reveals the traces of the image of God in the human structure, so that actually it is the formal 'human' element which betrays man's lost origin."⁹²

Against this confusion of Brunner, Barth gives, at least at first look, a clear-cut view. First, in the Fall, the image is completely lost; second, there is no contact with God in fallen man; third, in faith in Jesus Christ, the contact and the image are restored in what must remain a *mysterium*.⁹³ At second look, however, which also represents a later stage in the development of his doctrine, presumably after the controversy with Brunner, the unequivocal and thoroughgoing moralism of vol. I, part 1 of *Church Dogmatics* gives way to an ontic view of the image in which it is seen as "constituting man's very existence as such and as a creature of God." Man, Barth here affirms, "is God's image inasmuch as he is man."⁹⁴ In the Fall, man lost his very manhood and stood on a level with the beasts. It is not merely as moral that the image is lost in the fall, but as ontic. The fallen man is not 'man' properly speaking. His case is not that of one who is man but who has lost something that might have contingently belonged to him. Thus, it is wrong to speak of a 'loss', for there is no human substance sustaining the change brought about in the loss. After the Fall, what we have is not man but "a different being altogether."⁹⁵ "We take sin lightly if we spare sinful man this reproach, giving him the evasion that

as a sinner he has forfeited and lost his humanity, or that God has created him in a humanity in which he can choose either to be man or not, and in which inhumanity is more probable than humanity."⁹⁶ Thus for Barth, theological anthropology is pitilessly opposed "to every attempt to seek real man outside the history of his responsibility to God."⁹⁷ In a masterly paradoxical statement, Barth says, "to sin is to wander from a path which does not cease to be the definite and exclusive path of man even though he leaves it."⁹⁸ What he means is that to sin is to leave humanity and become something else. For since what man is is decided by "the humanity of Jesus," Barth is confident he does not "have to regard as human, that which measured by this criterion is non-human, i.e., not yet or no longer human."⁹⁹ He therefore proclaims in the loudest tones, that non-Christian, indeed non-Jesus-like humanity, (thus indicating even his fellow-Christians), to be not human at all.¹⁰⁰

The evidence Barth adduces in support of the claim that man is in the image of God and that the image consists in a 'similarity' between the man who is 'saved' and the humanity of Jesus, is the fact that the Bible, the sole authority for human knowledge of God's words, thoughts, and deeds, says that God said "Let *us* make man in our image." Following the crude reasoning of Tertullian, Barth tells us that the plural form "Us" is evidence that God is a trinity, that one Person, the Father, consulted with the other two, the Son and the Holy Ghost and jointly decided to make man in Their/His image.¹⁰¹ The continuation of Their/His narrative, Genesis 1:27, affirms that God did in fact create man in His image and that He created them male and female. This, for Barth, is sufficient evidence to support an equivalence of 'the image of God' and 'male and female'.¹⁰² Man's relationship with woman, which Barth conceives in no uncertain terms as consisting of the business of "begetting and bearing children" in full awareness but irrespective of "individual vagaries,"¹⁰³ is alleged by Barth to constitute "a sign of the fact that the One of whom he is the image and likeness, God Himself, has in and with his creation constituted Himself his pledge and hope."¹⁰⁴ It is, of course, exclusively this pledge and hope, and man's upholding and realizing them that constitutes, for Barth, the image of God in man and hence, his humanity. In one of his prolonged footnotes, he spells out his idea more openly. Blaming the exegetes who have not, so far, discovered his new insight into the nature of *imago dei*, he asks, "Did they perhaps find it too paltry, too banal, too simple, or even morally suspect that the divine likeness of man should consist merely in his existence as man and woman?"¹⁰⁵ Reading in Genesis 5:1-2 all the evidence he thinks he needs, he exclaims in self-assurance: "Could anything be more obvious than to conclude from this clear indication that the image and likeness of the being created by God

signifies existence in confrontation, i.e., in this confrontation, in the juxtaposition and conjunction of man and man which is that of male and female, and then to go on to ask against this background in what the original and prototype of the divine existence of the creator consists?"¹⁰⁸

This evidence, for Barth, shoots at and beyond the target. It does not only establish for him the nature of man but having done so, this established human nature itself becomes now evidence for the Christian notion of the nature of God. It must be borne in mind that Barth's theory of truth would never allow the empirical nature of man (and we hold Barth's citations regarding man's relations with woman to be for the most part empirically gathered from his experience or from his readings) to constitute evidence of the nature of God, which stands to the former only in an analogical, not ontic, relation.¹⁰⁷ Nonetheless, Barth's thought does move here from man's nature to God's.¹⁰⁸ However 'un-ontic' the analogical relationship may be, it is still a way of thinking of that which it relates. And it is crude as well as blasphemous for a Christian theologian who believes in the Trinitarian concept of the Deity, to think of the Persons of the Trinity as governed by such relationship as may be, though only analogically described, as that of man and woman in their 'begetting' and 'bearing children'.

Viewed from a wider perspective, Barth's theory of man is not at all empirical, nor, properly speaking, a theory of man. It is essentially Christocentric¹⁰⁹ and christological.¹¹⁰ It is the former inasmuch as it regards both the reality and ideality of humanity to be Jesus; but it is the latter inasmuch as the dogma of the Christian Church relative to the nature and mission of Jesus is the presupposition of all that Barth has to say on the subject of man. His doctrine of man and of the *imago dei* are really deductions from the Christian theory of Jesus' nature, embroidered by observations drawn from Scripture and, though rarely, from secular knowledge, especially selected to confirm the dogmatic christology in question. It is not by accident that his doctrine of man is an integral part of his Church Dogmatics. At best, it is a dogmatic doctrine concerned not with truth above all, but with the validation, completion, or elaboration of a given thesis which stands beyond question.

By nature, therefore, this theory cannot be universalist. By nature, it cannot transcend the narrow limits which the given so-called 'truth' imposes upon it. By nature, it is incompatible with any attitude or position open to God's revelation in any source or period other than its own. It is necessarily particularistic, separatistic. It is misunderstanding Barth to construe his naturalistic description of man in the context of his relation to woman, or his discussion of 'the real man' which opens with the bombastic proclamation that he is now ready "to give a positive

answer to the question of the being which within the cosmos constitutes human being," as a description of man irrespective of his 'godward' relation and therefore universally of all men. In this connection, his insistence that "the image does not consist in any particular thing that man is or does [but that] it is constituted by the very existence of man as such and as a creature of God,"¹¹¹ is particularly misleading. The one principle to which he is unswervingly loyal and which determines, to the extent of constituting its very "principle of sufficient reason" of every Barthian statement on the subject of *imago dei* is this, that God is known only to the man to whom He is revealed in the incarnate Christ, and that it is the man who acknowledges that God was in Christ that is man at all. Here, only the very opposite of universalism is to be found. On the other hand, his "real man" his "man as such" is only the Christian,¹¹² the man who, like himself, particularistically and separatistically sees God only in the 'Jesus Christ' whom the Christian Church had, in its orthodox tradition and as defined by councils, by means of counting heads or by roughshod overriding and persecutions, *resolved* to see as God.¹¹³

Barth's arguments against general revelation—which is the only possible ground for a truly universalist theory of man—do not stand the least analysis. David Cairns has dealt Barth the severe critique he deserves.¹¹⁴ He rightly pointed out that natural revelation ought to be the presupposition of any Christian revelation. No Christian revelation could, and none except Barth's would, hold, as they must if Barth's thesis is maintained, that "the history of mankind had continued for many thousands of years in a world belonging to God where yet God had been either unwilling or unable to reveal Himself to the many millions of men and women who had therefore to live and to die without any ray of light from Heaven."¹¹⁵ Such a God would not even be omnipotent, not to say loving. He conceded to Barth, though unnecessarily, that the peculiar revelation of Jesus was the only one which revealed to man his guilt.¹¹⁶ But granted this, "there must have been in the heathen before conversion, a certain actual knowledge, or at least a possible knowledge of God which made the heathen guilty before the coming of Christ... [without which knowledge] there can have been no guilt" and Christian guilt would be not a 'revealed' but a 'created' one.¹¹⁷ Indeed, the first two hundred and fifty pages of Barth's *Church Dogmatics*, vol. II, part I, entitled "The Knowledge of God," stand as the greatest monument to Christian irrationalism and anti-intellectualism. In them Barth sings, on every page, the perversity of the human mind, its utter incapacity, illusion, and foolishness. He does this with no mean talent; but the pity is that this great talent has been utterly perverted, by a false church doctrine, into believing, and then proclaiming *ad nauseam*, that it is, despite all its eloquence, just as human, and there-

fore, as perverse.

In Protestant theological circles, Karl Barth enjoys a great fame and following. Many recognize him as "the outstanding Protestant theologian" and a responsible source which commends itself as working "solely through the objective presentation of fact" and as always, attempting "to verify details from first hand sources." The *Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church* has gone to the extreme of exalting him as "the most notable Christian prophet of our times."¹¹⁸ No wonder that the larger variety of Christian books on, or other treatments of, the doctrine of man, unanimously end up by commenting on Barth's views with little or no original contribution of their own. Many whole works can be regarded as hardly more than extended footnotes to the Brunner-Barth controversy or the Barthian doctrine as such.¹¹⁹

Paul Tillich, another "leading contemporary exponent of Protestantism"¹²⁰ and "one of the principal architects of the new theological structure [namely: 'neo-orthodoxy', a combination of Biblical fundamentalism, Augustinianism, Lutheranism, Calvinism, the rediscovery of Pauline electionism with its justification by faith and finally, existentialist *angst*, and empiricist skepticism culminating in the surrender to irrationalism] that has been erected on the ruins of idealistic liberalism... Both in Europe and in America..." and whose doctrine "will have contributed to the reform of the modern Church and the reintegration of modern culture,"¹²¹ conceived of the nature of man in terms of 'essence' and 'existence'.¹²² Prior to the Fall, man was purely essence; after the Fall, existence; though his essential nature was not annihilated in the process. But, following Brunner, he takes all pains to emphasize that 'before the Fall' is not a historical time. All efforts to describe the state of 'original' blessedness of Adam and his paradise as a state which 'once was' and 'is no more' but may come later, were wasted. "Adam before the Fall" he writes, "and 'nature before the curse' are states of potentiality. They are not actual states. The actual state is that existence in which man finds himself along with the whole universe, and there is no time in which this was otherwise. The notion of a moment in time in which man and nature were changed from good to evil is absurd, and it has no foundation in experience or revelation."¹²³

This certainly implies, as Tillich himself writes, that "creation and the Fall coincide;" for "there is no point in time and space in which created goodness was actualized and had existence."¹²⁴ Hence, "actualized creation and estranged existence are identical."¹²⁵ It also implies that if man was ever 'innocent', a 'not-fallen', he must have been so at a stage when he was not man, but an idea in God's mind. This state of heavenly bliss, Tillich calls "the state of dreaming innocence," an appellation which has

none but poetry to commend it. Tillich apologizes for its use, claiming that "dreaming anticipates the actual...dreaming [being] a state of mind which is real and non-real at the same time—just as potentiality," and that "the word 'innocence' also points to non-actualized potentiality, the actualization of which would end the state of innocence."¹²⁶ But since by definition, the states of dreaming and of innocence are themselves states which belong exclusively to a 'created', 'fallen' man, it is nothing short of poetry to call an idea orbiting in the heavens of God's mind, a transcendental idea standing purely in the divine mode of being and about which we can know nothing *ex hypothesi*, either 'dreaming' or 'innocent'. It stands absolutely on a par with attributing virtue and beauty to the square-root of minus one.

This 'dreaming, innocent' man-idea in God's mind has passed from the ideal mode of being peculiar to it (the essential) to the actual and in so doing it has fallen. To be at all, i.e., to be actual, existent, is *ipso facto* to be fallen. But how can the man-idea in the divine mind be said to have fallen? For it to transit from the essence-mode to the existence-mode of being is clear enough. All would be well if we just substituted 'created' for 'fallen'. But it is a totally and gravely different matter to substitute 'fallen' for 'created'. Had Tillich understood the Fall purely as an epistemological or metaphysical concept, absolutely devoid of ethical significance, his usage would be tolerable, though inviting equivocation and ambiguity. But he did not. "Man himself," he writes, "makes the decision (i.e., the decision to pass to existence) and receives the divine curse for it...Only through man (i.e., as an ethical, deciding agent, contrasted with unethical nature) can transition from essence to existence occur....Man is responsible for the transition from essence to existence because he has finite freedom and because all dimensions of reality are united in him."¹²⁷ Thus, Tillich imputes guilt and responsibility to an essence, yet uncreated, existing in the ideal mode of being peculiar to it, in God's mind. But how could such an essence incur guilt? How could it be held responsible? How could an idea in God's mind decide to undertake the transition, and therefore create itself? What role did God have in such a process besides that of a spectator?

Tillich, however, is no critical thinker. Had he been, he would not speak of pre-Fall man as an individual person capable or incapable of responsible decisions contradicting or harmonizing with his nature. On his own terms, pre-Fall man is pre-creation man, *pre-existing* and therefore *non-existing* man. If he is not a mere presupposition of Tillich's Christian dogmatic, he is a transcendent being about whom nothing can be said except that he must be or have been. Yet, Tillich imputes to him the responsibility for estrangement, for the Fall, for creation or his transition

from essence to existence. And when it is asked whether the imputation of responsibility and guilt necessarily implies that the agent could not have incurred them, Tillich falls in typically pagan Greek fashion, on the notion of 'destiny'. Agreeing that "if estrangement [or the Fall, or creation] were based only on the responsible decisions of the individual person, each individual could always either contradict or not contradict his essential nature [and that] there would [then] be no reason to deny that people could avoid and have avoided sin altogether,"¹²⁸ he affirms that "Christianity must reject the idealistic separation of an innocent nature from guilty man."

In other words, 'essential' pre-Fall man could not but have fallen! And although it was a matter of destiny for him to fall—since he could not, not even theoretically, escape from it, yet he is guilty and responsible. A truly Wagnerian situation! Christian dogmatism apparently stops at nothing to establish itself; not even a Nibelung's dilemma.

Evidently, Tillich is on the horns of a terrible dilemma: On one horn of the dilemma, the consideration is that, if man could have avoided the Fall, there would be no tragic predicament, and sin would be neither universal nor necessary, thus damaging the basis for the advent of Jesus held by Christian dogma. Tillich rejects this view and proudly puts himself in the tradition of "the early church, Augustine, Luther, and Calvin, the Reformers... [and finally] the neo-orthodox and existentialist theologians."¹²⁹ He derisively brands this view as Pelagian in contradistinction from Augustine's; semi-Pelagian, in contradistinction from the Reformers; and, finally, as moralistic Protestantism in contradistinction from the neo-orthodox and existentialists.

On the other horn of the dilemma, the consideration is that if the Fall was so necessary that man could not have avoided it, then, either God has willed it and He is the responsible author of evil, or it has taken place against His will in which case the omnipotence of evil is Manicheanly asserted. Both alternatives are incongruent with Christian dogma.

At this stage Tillich's dialectical power completely breaks down. Contradicting what he said before that destiny is a category which belongs to essence before the Fall, i.e., before creation or existence, a state that is utterly different from the state of nature, of creation which is all fallen, he rationalizes destiny as the work of nature in man and argues that nature is continuous with man. Destiny is at work in man's decisions, in the "collective unconscious" or man's social dimension, in the personal unconscious "man's bodily and psychic strivings," in the inability to respond, or man's "reduced centeredness caused by tiredness, sickness, intoxication, neurotic compulsions, and psychotic splits," in man's "animal nature...at conflict with his human nature." Obviously these are

circumstances which belong *par excellence* to fallenness. How can they have caused the Fall? Could these evils be predicated of an idea in God's mind such as pre-Fall man was? Furthermore, Tillich had previously warned the reader¹³⁰ that destiny is inextricably woven with freedom in human nature and the resultant predicament of man is that his freedom is 'finite freedom'; for, unlike the 'infinite freedom of God', limited by the work of nature within which all man's doings take place and his very actuality or existence stands immersed. But, again, this will not do. For 'finite freedom' is the predicament of fallen man. Only he stands irremovably within nature; whereas the problem is one of the freedom to fall of pre-Fall man. Certainly, his freedom could not be the finite freedom of fallen man. Tillich has forgotten that this is all irrelevant to the argument which pertains not to man-in-nature, not to created and already-fallen man, but to pre-Fall man since its purpose and point is to prove man's guilt for the Fall. After saying this, as if suspecting that it was all to no avail, Tillich finally resorts to that neo-orthodox, existentialist, Christian irrationalism which has been waiting for him all the while with open arms. He asserts that "moral freedom becomes 'Pelagian' only if it is separated from tragic destiny, and tragic destiny becomes 'Manichean' only if it is separated from moral freedom."¹³¹ In other words, Pelagianism and Manicheism can be averted if, in each case, the particular thesis is inconsistently held with its diametrical opposite. Tillich is not disturbed by such contradiction. In order to remain true to Christianist dogma, he throws away the law of contradiction, asserts both thesis and antithesis without any overarching synthesis and does so *de grand cœur*. At this stage it is idle to pursue the argument with him any further, and it is hoped that the reader will agree that he has had enough.

This brief survey of the history of the Christian answer to the question, what is man? has shown that Christianity is anxious to maintain a measure of goodness in man. It postulates man in a pre-fallen state of idealized goodness and felicity, in order to recourse to it in its construction of what man ought to be. This desire was given ample satisfaction by the Apostolic Fathers. Under the influence of Greek humanism, they understood human nature in this healthy though idealized manner and conceived of the morally imperative as that which man ought to do in order not to fall. Jesus' message according to this view would be the lesson against the Fall, against falling. They did not think that the task and advent of Jesus would be in any way the lesser if he is conceived of in these terms, as being sent to teach man to preserve the divine image that is in him, to cultivate and exercise it to the full and thus to become like his Creator, to actualize that which is in him as a real potentiality. Adam's Fall is under this view only Adams' and its truth-value is metaphorical and didactic.

But right after the times of these Apostolic humanists, Christian doctrine took a sharp turn, and the forces which produced the Nicene Council and forced their way to victory in one council after another thereafter, began to make themselves effective. Essentially, these forces are those of dogma, of irrationalism, and every kind of intellectual violence. Beginning with the distinctions of Tertullian towards the close of the second century, they inched their way towards domination of the whole structure of Christian ideas. They first conjoined the state of fallenness to that of goodness; then they alternated them; then made them mutually exclusive; and finally destroyed goodness altogether in favour of fallenness. The motivation of this development was clear throughout: All efforts of all Christian mentality were devoted to the justification of an unjustifiable dogma. In the Christian department of the mind of the Christian West, the 'Dark Ages' were never outgrown. For as the Roman Catholic Church was struggling under Islamic influence, to dissipate the gloom of the Fall, the same 'Dark' forces were regrouping themselves to strike. They succeeded marvelously in the Reformation, where they even surpassed, in Calvin, their own Augustinian inspiration. The rationalism of the last two centuries occasioned another 'black' victory in Kierkegaard.

It might be said that today, in the twentieth century, Christian thought is just beginning to open its eyes, in this matter of the nature of man. It is natural that after eighteen centuries of Dark Ages, the Christian mind is dazed by the light of day and stands utterly confused, asserting and denying and asserting. Christian dogma still stands strong and heavy. But no one is fooled by the kind of nonsense which a Tillich or a Barth have said on this subject, not even themselves. The evidence furnished by their own lives, as well as the lives of the greatest number of contemporary Christians, whether personal or societal, eloquently speaks to the contrary. It all betrays an unshakable faith in man as he really and actually is, in his essential goodness and worth, regardless of whether or not he has acknowledged the Christianist dogma, and therefore in spite of his not realizing humanity, as that dogma insists. That is the dawn of a new age in the history of Christian doctrine.

But we must never lose sight of the fact that this whole history is a function of the Christianist dogma which began in the equivocal statements of Paul. And in order to understand it well, we must study, as we shall do in the sequel, its relation to the individual theses of the dogma, to peccatism and saviourism. Only then can we appreciate the need which pushed, and still pushes, the greatest minds of Christendom to commit themselves to their unworthy and inconsequential assertions.

Notes

1. "I seek not mine own will, but the will of the Father which hath sent me" (John 5:30).
2. Luke 3:38.
3. II Corinthians 4:4.
4. Col.1:15.
5. I Corinthians 11:7. Paul's hatred of woman and will to cenobitism reached such proportion as to make him deny her such privilege of being "the image and glory of God" (*Ibid.*).
6. I Corinthians 11:1-10.
7. James 3:9.
8. I Corinthians 6:19.
9. "and have put on the new man which is renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created him" (Colossians 3:10).
10. I Corinthians 11:1-10.
11. I Corinthians 6:13-20.
12. C. H. Dodd, *The Meaning of Paul for To-day*, London: Fontana Books, 1958, p. 102.
13. Von Rad, on 'image' in Kittel's *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*, Stuttgart, 1935-1957.
14. Werner Jaeger, *Paideia*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1945, I, 20-21.
15. Aristotle, *De Anima*, II, I, 2.
16. "You are a fragment of God," wrote Epictetus. "You have within you a part of Him. Why then are you ignorant of your kinship?... Will you not bear in mind, whenever you eat, who you are that eat, and whom you are nourishing?... Do you not know that you are nourishing God, exercising God?... In the presence of even an image of God you would not dare to do anything or the things you are now doing. But when God Himself is present within you, seeing and hearing everything..." etc. (Epictetus, *Discourses*, Book II, ch. 8, Loeb Classical Library, I, 263).
17. Genesis 1:26; see also Genesis 1:26; 5:1, 3; 9:6.
18. Although Genesis 6:12 affirms that "all flesh had corrupted his way upon the earth," it further adds that "My [God's] spirit shall not always strive with man, for that he also is flesh" (Genesis 6:3). And the Psalmist says, "My heart and my flesh crieth out for the living God" (Psalms 84:2). Whereas man's flesh is thus congruous with his spirit, the latter is wholly divine, 'breathed' into man directly from the divine Source (Genesis 2:7).
19. Psalms 8:5.
20. "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed, for in the image of God made he man" (Genesis 9:6).
21. That this wholesome view of man was that of the Hebrews as well as of their Scripture, has been contended by Old Testament scholars. Their arguments, however, are shallow. Through them one can easily see the post-Reformation Christian dogmatist labouring in vain to furnish Biblical grounds for his dogma. Nygren, for instance, rejects the idea that the view of man expressed in Genesis 1:26-27, 5:1-3, 9:5-6 is the Biblical view on the following grounds: First, he tells us they are too few; second, they all belong to 'P' and are hence the work of a late (5th century B.C.) period, produced under Hellenic influence. He borrows these arguments from E. Lehmann's *Skabt i Guds Billede* (Lunds Universitets arsskrift 1918, p. 11) who asserts, against the implications of the Old Testament that are

too many to count and against the express evidence of Psalms 8:5 and Amos 4:13 that "...no prophet, no psalm...has any suggestion of such a likeness of nature between God and man." (Anders Nygren, *Agape and Eros*, tr. by P. S. Watson, London: SPCK, 1953, p. 230). G. Von Rad (*Theologische Wörterbuch zum Neue Testament*, G. Kittel ed., Stuttgart: Verlag von W. Kohlhammer, II, s.v. "Die Gottesebenbildlichkeit im A.T.," 387-90) and Eichrodt (*Theologie des Alten Testaments*, II, 58) have argued against this view entertained by Lehmann and Nygren. Both held that the Biblical witness to the image of God in man rightly appears at that point where the Scripture tells of the origin of man; that although the passage does come from 'P', it does not mean that man is there regarded as wholly a part of created nature since after the creation of nature, there was a pause, a counsel-taking and then man was created, thus implying man's otherness and distinction from the rest of creation. Eichrodt adds to this an argument from the Biblical notion of divine nature: "If we remember," he writes, "the whole manner and fashion in which the Godhead is pictured in Genesis 1, how He appears from the first lines as conscious and powerful will, and continually bears witness to Himself through insistent purposive creation, we shall be forced to find man's likeness to God as indicated by the author, in his spiritual superiority, which expresses itself not only in his higher rational endowment, but above all in his capacity for self-consciousness and self-determination; in short in those capacities which we are accustomed to regard as typical of personality.... The gift to man of the *imago dei* in the formal sense indicated by us, implies nothing less than a connection with God through which man, even as a sinner, remains a rational being capable of spiritual fellowship with God" (*Theologie des Alten Testaments*, Leipzig, 1933, J. C. Heinrichs, II, 60 ff). Wheeler Robinson has pointed out that both 'P' and 'J' are one in their assignment to man of central place in their narratives, everything being made for his sake. The nature-psalms evidence the same estimate of man's nature. While Psalms 8:5 definitely lifts man above creation, Psalms 104:14 ff and 45:9 ff and Proverbs 8:22-31 make his service the very purpose of the created world (H. Wheeler Robinson, *The Christian Doctrine of Man*, Edingburgh: T. & T. Clark, 2nd edition, 1913, pp. 61-62). Summing up, Robinson concludes that "the result of our...study of the Old Testament doctrine of man has been to bring out...in the first place...the high place and dignity of man postulated by the moral and religious experience of the Hebrew. Man is the center of the created world, with little less than angelic rank; man is endowed with the power to rebel even against the will of God..." etc. (*Ibid.*, p. 68). C. Ryder Smith claims that Genesis 1:26 refers to a physical resemblance between man and his Creator and thus allowed for the retention of that image, as a necessary correlate of human nature, after the Fall (see his *The Bible Doctrine of Man*, London: Epworth Press, 1951, pp. 29-30).

22. I Clement's statement to this effect is exemplary: After quoting Genesis 1:26, he writes, "Man, the most excellent and from his intellect the greatest of His creatures, did He form in the likeness of His own image by His sacred and faultless hands." (I Clement 33:4).
23. I Clement 19:2.
24. *Ibid.*
25. I Clement 20:11.
26. *Ibid.*, 21:9.
27. Barnabas 6:12.
28. Epistle to Diognetus 10:2. From this chorus of praise, only II Clement and the Shepherd of Hermas seem to differ. When they asserted that human nature was

- 'fallen', both were trying to impress their audiences with the need for repentance. In the process, they implied an even greater honour of man. II Clement compares man to clay that is still being fashioned and urges him to correct it before it is too late. Evidently, like all Greek thinkers, II Clement took it for granted that man is not a 'finished' creation and that man is to be his own 'finisher', endowed with capacity and duty to complete God's work in time (II Clement 8:2). For Hermas, whatever ill there may be in man is too minor to disqualify him from God's blessing (Shepherd of Hermas, Mandate III, 3:4-5).
29. *The Clementine Homilies*, Homily XI, chap. IV.
 30. "As we know that man was made after the image and after the likeness of God, we tell you to be pious towards him, that the favour may be accounted as done to God." (*Ibid.*).
 31. "I would have you understand that our maker also, painting the portrait to resemble His own beauty, by the addition of virtues" instead of the colours of the painter. God gave man "purity, freedom from passion, blessedness, alienation from all evil and all those attributes of the like kind which help to form in men the likeness of God... The godhead is mind and word... and love... (which man is also). The Deity beholds and hears... and searches all things out: you too have the power of apprehension of things by means of sight and hearing, and the understanding that inquires into things and searches them out" (Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Making of Man*, V, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, 2nd series, New York: Christian Literature, 1893, V. 391).
 32. Strucker, in a study entitled *Die Gottesbenbildlichkeit des Menschen in der urchristlichen Literatur der ersten zwei Jahrhunderte*, 1913, reviewed by H. E. Brunner in *Man in Revolt*, pp. 503-4, concluded that *imago* is used exclusively in the formal sense, *imago*=the *humanum* (reason, freedom, speech, special position of man, etc.). This is represented by Melito: *Deus autem omni tempore vivens currit in mente tua: mens enim tua est ipsa eius similitudo* (essentially based upon the invisibility of the spirit), *Apol.* C. 6 in Strucker, p. 42.
 33. Laidlaw has established beyond question that there is no real distinction between these terms. See his *Bible Doctrine of Man*, p. 132, and his article on Image in *Hastings Dictionary of the Bible*. This is also the view of C. Ryder Smith, *The Bible Doctrine of Man*, London: Epworth Press, 1951, p. 37; of David Cairns, *The Image of God In Man*, London: SCM Press, 1953, p. 20; and of James Orr, *God's Image in Man*, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1905, p. 54, among others.
 34. Correctly appreciating Augustine's contribution in this regard, Calvin wrote: "Although the Greeks beyond all others... have exceeded all bounds in extolling the ability of the human will, yet such are the variations, fluctuations or obscurities of all the fathers, except Augustine, upon this subject that scarcely anything certain can be concluded from their writings (*Institutes*, Bk. II, ch. 2, parag. 4).
 35. Augustine, *Confessions*, Bk. 13, ch. 32.
 36. "Therefore Thou sayst not... 'after his kind,' but, after 'our image' and 'likeness'. Because, being renewed in his mind, and beholding and apprehending Thy truth, man needeth not man as his director that he may imitate his kind; but by Thy direction proveth what is that good, and acceptable and perfect will of Thine" (*Ibid.*).
 37. See his *Against Praxeas*, esp. ch. XII, XIII, *Ante Nicene Fathers*, III, 607 ff.
 38. *On the Trinity*, Bks. IX-XIV.
 39. The crudeness of the non-Semitic mind's interpretation of the Semitic thought-forms reaches offensive proportions in Augustine: "But in respect to that image indeed, of which it is said, 'let us make man after our image and likeness', we

believe and after the utmost search (*sic*) we have been able to make, understand—that man was made after the image of the Trinity, because it is not said, After my, or After thy image” (*Ibid.*, Book XIV, ch. 19, opening sentence).

40. *Ibid.*, Book XII, ch. 11.
41. R. Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, I, 156.
42. “For the mind becomes like God, to the extent vouchsafed by its subjection of itself to Him for information. And if it obtains the greatest nearness by that subjection which produces likeness, it must be far removed from Him by that presumption which would make the likeness greater.” (*On the Morals of the Catholic Church*, 12).
43. “... The trinity, then, of the mind, is not therefore the image of God, because the mind remembers itself, and understands and loves itself: but because it can also remember, understand and love Him by whom it was made. And in so doing it is made wise itself. But if it does not do so, even when it remembers, understands, and loves itself, then it is foolish (*On the Trinity* Book XVI, ch. 12).
44. “... The slippery motion of falling away (from what is good) takes possession of the negligent... and beginning from a perverse desire for the likeness of God, arrives at the end at the likeness of beasts... While his honour (i.e., that of using his *essentia* or image as the Christian faith demands) is the likeness of God, ... his dishonour is the likeness of the beast” (*On the Trinity*, Book XII, ch. 11).
45. R. Niebuhr understood Augustine correctly when he wrote: “It [human life] can, therefore understand the total dimension in which it stands only by making faith the presupposition of its understanding” (*The Nature and Destiny of Man*, I, 158). Augustine could not have made himself clearer on this point. “Although”, he wrote, “unless he understands somewhat, no man can believe in God, nevertheless by the very faith whereby he believes, he is helped to the understanding of greater things. For there are some things which we do not believe unless we understand them; and there are other things which we do not understand unless we believe them.” (Ps. 118, Sermon XVIII, 3) One may ask here, how can faith acquiregnoseological value when, by definition, it is the reverse of all the knowing faculties of man?
46. *On the Trinity*, Book XII, II.
47. *On the Trinity*, Book XII, ch. 14.
48. “We must say”, wrote Aquinas, “that when man is said to be in the image of God in virtue of his intellectual nature, he is chiefly in God’s image according as his intellectual nature is most able to imitate God. His intellectual nature chiefly imitates God in this, that God understands and loves Himself. Whence the image of God can be considered three ways in man. In one way according as man has a natural aptitude for understanding and loving God, and this aptitude consists in the very nature of the mind, which is common to all men. In another way, according as man by act of habit knows God and loves Him, but imperfectly, and this is the image by conformity of grace. And in a third way according as man knows and loves God in act perfectly, and this is the image according to the likeness of Glory” (*Summa*, I, 93, 4). Being the way of ‘glory’ or of a perfection akin to the divine, the ‘third way’, may be left aside. The first two concern us particularly: (1) Evidently, Aquinas follows in the footsteps of Augustine, by distinguishing a faculty, an endowment from an activity, or the exercise of that faculty. (2) Like Augustine, Aquinas is guilty of an error in reasoning. If the mind is like God and God contemplates and loves Himself by nature, the mind should contemplate and love itself by nature, not God Who is different and other than itself. (3) The mind does in fact love itself; hence the need for grace. For it is the mystery of

- grace, as *qualitas occulta*, that effects the reorientation of an otherwise self-bound loving and contemplating mind. It is on such puny ground that the Thomistic order of grace enjoys its supremacy and exercises its authority.
49. On this point, Luther is oblivious to the evidence of Genesis 9:6 which, first does not affirm, whoso sheddeth the blood of a *righteous* man... but "whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed for in the image of God made he man", (not righteous man) and which, secondly affirms what it does affirm of an already 'fallen' humanity.
 50. "As is the earthly, such are they also that are earthly: and as is the heavenly, such are they also that are heavenly."
 51. "If so be that ye have heard him, and have been taught by him, as the truth is in Jesus: That ye put off concerning the former conversation the old man, which is corrupt according to the deceitful lusts; and be renewed in the spirit of your mind; and that ye put on the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness."
 52. Martin Luther, *Luther's Works*, St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1958, I, 61.
 53. "My understanding of the image of God is this: that Adam had it in his being and that he not only knew God and believed that he was good, but that he also lived in a life that was wholly godly" (*Ibid.*, p. 62-63).
 54. "I am fully convinced that before Adam's sin his eyes were so sharp and clear that they surpassed those of the lynx and the eagle" (*Ibid.*, p. 62). Luther is obviously certain of what Adam's pre-Fall condition was. And yet, he tells us that "when we speak about that image, we are speaking about something unknown. Not only have we had no experience of it, but we continually experience the opposite" (*Ibid.*, p. 63). Is it not a pity that Luther did not abide by this (his own) principle?
 55. Commentary on Psalm 8. Calvin's obsession with the depravity and utter perversity of man is proverbial. It has led him to distrust the Psalmist and his attempt to refer Psalm 8 to the better days of old is evidence of his distrust.
 56. Calvin, *Institutes*, II, 2, 18.
 57. *Ibid.*, III, 2, 14.
 58. Tr. by Walter Lowrie, Princeton University Press, 1946.
 59. Tr. by Robert Payne, Oxford University Press, 1939.
 60. Tr. by Walter Lowrie, Princeton University Press, 1944.
 61. Soren Kierkegaard, *Philosophical Fragments*, Princeton University Press, 1944, p. 23.
 62. *The Gospel of Suffering and the Lilies of the Field*, Augsburg Publishing House, 1948, pp. 211-12. Brunner's statement of the problem is found in the work entitled, *Man in Revolt* (translation of *Mensch in Widerspruch: Die Christliche Lehre vom wahren und vom wirklichen Menschen*, 1937) rendered into English by Olive Wyon and published by the Lutterworth Press, London, 1939. Barth's views are found in his *Church Dogmatics*, III, Part 2, tr. by G. W. Bromley and T. F. Torrence, London: T. & T. Clark, 1960. Brunner also wrote a pamphlet entitled *Natur und Gnade*, to which Barth answered with an article entitled *Nein* published together under the title, *Natural Theology*, London: Bles, 1946. Finally, Brunner criticized Barth's views on the subject in an article which he contributed to *Scottish Journal of Theology*, II, (1951), 123-35, entitled "The New Barth."
 63. *Man in Revolt*, ch. IV, pp. 57 ff.
 64. "As the materialist maintains that man must be understood from the point of view of matter, and as the idealist tries to understand human existence from the

- point of view of spiritual existence or from that of the idea, so the Christian faith asserts that we can only understand him in the light of the Word of God.... All merely natural understanding of man is a misunderstanding" (*Ibid.*, pp. 64-65).
65. *Ibid.*, p. 66. "The truth of human existence is disclosed to us not by an *anamnesis* which we ourselves can accomplish, but only by the *anagennesis* which is based upon faith in the Incarnate Word of God" (*Ibid.*). "The word of Scripture, which points back to Jesus Christ and the Word in the beginning, is not given to us except through the message of the Church, which hands down to us, translates and explains the Bible as the Word of God" (*Ibid.*, p. 67).
 66. See his article entitled "Nein".
 67. *Man in Revolt*, pp. 70 ff.
 68. "Man is man by the fact that he is a creature who stands in a special relation to the Word of God, a relation of being grounded in and upheld by the Word. This is no mere phrase or figure of speech, but a simple and realistic expression of the fact that man lives 'by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God'" Matthew 4:4 (*Ibid.*, p. 71).
 69. *Ibid.*, pp. 71-72.
 70. *Ibid.*, p. 79. "The fact that man has been created by God means that he, the actual man, even in his godlessness, is upheld by the Word of God.... Man... is still a responsible being even in his irresponsibility.... He could not be a perverted human being... unless even now his continued existence is still in the Word of God" (*Ibid.*) Evidently the confusion of the Word as ontological ground of being and as ideational ground of knowledge is complete. In Christian terms this confusion is understood, and accepted, as equivalence. But it is far from clear how a man who is created and sustained by the ontological ground of being is *ipso facto* in a state of recipience to the ethical commands issuing from that source.
 71. *Church Dogmatics*, III, 2, 130-31.
 72. See *infra*, pp. 263-79.
 73. *Church Dogmatics*, III, 2, 131.
 74. *Man in Revolt*, Appendix 1, p. 500.
 75. *Ibid.*, p. 501.
 76. *Ibid.*, p. 502.
 77. "For a man indeed ought not to cover his head, forasmuch as he is the image and glory of God."
 78. "Therewith [i.e. with our tongues] bless we God, even the Father; and therewith curse we men, which are made after the similitude of God."
 79. *Man in Revolt*, p. 501.
 80. *Man in Revolt*, pp. 504 ff.
 81. "The question of dichotomy or trichotomy has only been able to play such a part in the theology of the Church because already the Biblical view of personality had been obscured by the influence of a Platonic dualism through the interest in the *anima immortalis*. Certainly the Platonic trichotomy encouraged this interest, since it set the spirit, as the higher, the immortal soul, against the psychical vital function. The idea of an *anima rationalis* is fused with that of the *natura rationalis* (Irenaeus) into a unity in that of the *anima immortalis*, which in death becomes separated from the body..." etc. (*Ibid.*, pp. 362 ff).
 82. *Ibid.*, p. 374.
 83. *Ibid.*, p. 375.
 84. *Ibid.*
 85. *Ibid.*, p. 388. Continuing in this vein, of naturalistic mysticism, Brunner writes: "Man who does not crawl on the ground like the other animals, holding his head

high, with a wide horizon and a free outlook, man whose whole physical quality points symbolically to his personal existence...has been created in the image of God....Man's body expresses the hierarchical structure of his nature, and this can be understood solely from the fact that his created nature is in the image of God..." etc. (*Ibid.*, p. 388).

86. *Ibid.*, p. 98.
87. *Ibid.*
88. "Only in this new existence [what St. Paul calls being 'in Christ'] can man truly understand himself; since only in Him [i.e. in Jesus Christ as the Church understands him] ...man himself becomes true, can perceive the truth about himself" (*Ibid.*, p. 81).
89. *Nature and Grace*, p. 9. This assertion also appears in *Man in Revolt*, p. 105.
90. *Man in Revolt*, p. 105.
91. *Ibid.*
92. *Man in Revolt*, p. 514.
93. This seems to us to be the substance of his *Church Dogmatics*, I, Part 1. It is, however, in *The Service of God and the Knowledge of God*, (pp. 40-50) that Barth elaborates the view that though man was created for the sake of the image, he is utterly unable to restore it after it has been lost and that God therefore has taken it upon Himself to do so by sending Jesus.
94. *Church Dogmatics*, III, 1, 207.
95. *Ibid.*, III, 2, 228.
96. *Ibid.*
97. *Ibid.*
98. *Ibid.*, p. 227.
99. *Ibid.*, p. 226.
100. "We are free to exercise from the proposed picture of man all those features which are incompatible with the similarity which we presuppose for all the dissimilarity between the man Jesus and us other men. That which is incompatible with this similarity is *ipso facto* non-human" (*Ibid.*, p. 226).
101. *Church Dogmatics*, III, Part 1, 191 ff. There is not the slightest evidence that the Old Testament concept of Jahweh, or 'Lord', ever involved such plurality or such male-female relationship as Barth asserts it did. Otherwise, there should have been other passages in which this must be in evidence. It is not sufficient to point, as Barth has done, (*Church Dogmatics*, III, Part 1, 191 ff, where his argument is a *petitio principii*) to such passages as Genesis 3:22 ("J"-based as it may be), 11:7, Isaiah 6:8 etc., in which a plural pronoun is used for God. The evidence required is that these plural usages mean plurality within the divine being.
102. *Ibid.*, p. 190. "When man and woman beget and bear children by the divine permission and promise; ...they continually realize in themselves the sign of this hope [the genuine hope on God which constitutes the *imago dei*]. This human activity is the sign of the genuine creaturely confrontation...which is the image and likeness of the divine form of life" (*Ibid.*, p. 190-91). Is is unwarranted Christianist construction to interpret Genesis 1:26-27 as implying such ideas. In the first place, the punctuation of this passage is that which the Rabbis of the 6-7th centuries A.D. have given us in the Masoretic text and is usually accepted by scholars as, *faute de mieux*, copy of what the older generations in pre-Christian days might have had. But this punctuation, however, makes in no wise possible such an equivalence as Barth asserts. The ASV reading, "So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them" is twisted by Barth as if to read, "So God created man in his own image;

God created him, male and female, which image is the image of God." To prove the existence within the Godhead of the male-female relationship, Barth cites Hosea 1:2 ff, 2:2 ff, 16, 3:1 ff; Isaiah 54:5 ff, 62:5; Jeremiah 3:1 ff, 6, 4:30, etc.; Ezekiel 16:1, 23:1; 2 Corinthians 11-2; Ephesians 5:23 ff; Revelations 12:1, 21:2. With the exception of Revelations 12:1 which this author neither feels himself qualified nor believes to be important enough to comment on, the citing by Barth of every one of these passages not only does not bear out what he claims for it, but furnishes, in every instance, a fresh piece of evidence for the typically Western incapacity of his mind. His case is only another instance of that Western Christian consciousness which, when it confronted the truth of Jesus couched in the poetical terms of Arab (Semitic) consciousness, was incapable of understanding that truth immediately, of grasping its meaning intuitively. Rather, it wallowed in the most crude and unintelligent literal interpretations of its paraphrases and figures of speech. It is, *en détail et en gros*, identical with that Persian Shi'i literalist analysis of the Qur'anic poetry which asked, with regard to verse VII: 54 of the Holy Qur'an, (and then God sits squarely on the throne of heaven...), How does God 'sit down' on the throne? and attempted to deduce a pantheistic theory of the world from verse XXVIII: 88 ("Everything is perishing except the face of God") and verse II: 109 ("Whosoever ye turn, there is the face of God"). The Hebrews did conceive of Zion, of Israel, as of a wife, loyal or otherwise to her husband, i.e., to Jahweh; and Paul did, in like manner, conceive of the Church of Christian community as wedded to Christ. But this proves by 'neither jot nor tittle' that within the Godhead anything analogous to the male-female relationship exists. On the typical incapacity of the Western mind to appreciate intuitively the forms of poetry peculiar to Arab (semitic) consciousness, see this author's "'Urubah and Religion", *On Arabism*, Amsterdam: Djambatan, 1962, I.

103. *Church Dogmatics*, III, Part 1, 191 ff.
104. *Ibid.*, p. 191.
105. *Ibid.*, p. 195.
106. *Ibid.*
107. "We have to do with a clear and simple correspondence, an *analogia relationis*, between this mark of the divine being, namely, that it includes an I and a thou, and the being of man, male and female. The relationship between the summoning I in God's being and the summoned divine thou is reflected both in the relationship of God to the man whom He has created, and also in the relationship between the I and the thou, between male and female, in human existence itself. There can be no question of anything more than an analogy" (*Ibid.*, p. 196).
108. "This is the book of the generations of Adam. In the day that God created man, in the likeness of God made He him; Male and female, created He them and blessed them..." etc.
109. "The basis of human life is identical with its *telos*. We are not speaking of a predicate which he might have but perhaps might not have. Man is essentially for God because he is essentially from God and in God. When we say this [i.e., when Barth speaks of God] we are speaking of the man Jesus" (*Church Dogmatics*, III, Part 2, 71). "The ontological determination of humanity is grounded in the fact that one man among all others is the man Jesus" (*Church Dogmatics*, III, Part 2, 132).
110. "Here [i.e. in anthropology] as in theology generally, the right way cannot be one which is selected at random, however illuminating. The arbitrarily selected way would be one of natural knowledge inevitably leading into an impasse.... We must continue to base our anthropology on Christology. We must ask concerning the humanity of the man Jesus, and only on this basis extend our inquiry to the form

and nature of humanity generally....As we turn to the problem of humanity, we do not need to look for any other basis of anthropology than the christological" (*Church Dogmatics*, III, Part 2, 207-8). "We are condemned to abstractions so long as our attention is riveted...on other men or rather on man in general, and in abstraction from the fact that one man among all others is the man Jesus. In this case we miss the one Archimedean point..." (*Church Dogmatics*, III, Part 2, 132).

111. *Church Dogmatics*, III, Part 1, 184.

112. "The presupposed independent existence of a man as such is an illusion." (*Church Dogmatics*, II, Part 1, 165). "The solemn seriousness in which we anxiously affirm that we are taking man seriously by confirming him in his independence is not serious at all but an empty masquerade.... Both for the sake of its object and for the sake of the true and only salvation of man, the proclamation of faith and the Church must start out in all strictness from the fact that there is no independent man as such. There is only the man for whom Jesus Christ has died and risen again, whose affairs He has taken into His own hands. And everything that it has to say to man (about himself) can only be an explanation of this his true existence.... The truth of his existence is simply this that Jesus Christ has died and risen again for him." (*Ibid.*, pp. 167-68).

113. Understandably, Barth was opposed to German national socialism and sought to fight it on the religious front. The Nazis were teaching a "positive, progressivist Christianity" designed to support them in their self-assertion and will to "the world." Instead of meeting them on their own grounds and re-establishing the Christian truths as being one with those of natural theology or general revelation, he reintroduced into Christian thought, which for centuries had nursed a fruitful positive attitude to science, culture, art, had cultivated a new sympathy for mysticism, and had painfully sought out personal experience in order to invest it with gnoseological value in matters religious, a firebrand sectarianism and irrationalism. The *Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church* sums up his philosophy in these words: "The Christian message, he held, affirmed the supremacy and transcendence of God, whose infinite superiority to all human aspirations meant the worthlessness of human reason. Since the Fall, which brought man wholly under the dominion of sin, his natural capacities including his reason, had been radically perverted..." (ed. by F. L. Cross, Oxford, 1957, art. on Karl Barth). Thus, in resentment against the falsity of a conclusion, (or more), of natural theology as advocated by one (or more) theologian, philosopher, poet, or thinker who, to be sure, could not be responsible for what the Nazi theologians did with their doctrines, Barth was prepared to put all human reason to the stake. The famous Barmen declaration for which he was chiefly responsible, decided: "Jesus Christ, as He is attested to us in Holy Scripture, is the one Word of God, whom we have to hear and whom we have to trust and obey in life and in death. We condemn the false doctrine that the Church can and must recognize as God's revelation other events and powers, forms and truths, apart from and alongside this one Word of God" (*Church Dogmatics*, II, Part 1, 172). Certainly, "the question [which] became a burning one at the moment when the Evangelical Church in Germany was...confronted by a definite and new form of natural theology, namely, by the demand to recognize in the political events of the year 1933, and especially in the form of the God-sent Adolf Hitler, a source of specific new revelation of God...the German nature-and history-myth" (*Ibid.*, p. 173), does not need in order to be refuted, such an extremist stand as that of the Barmen declaration. But German Barth is, like the Germans he was fighting or the West

in general, by nature bent upon violence, which in matters spiritual expresses itself in 'categorisms', exaggerations, and extremisms of all kinds. Besides this, two other remarks are relevant to the new sectarianism of the Barmen declaration. First, put in the form, 'the one Word of God' and 'Jesus Christ is that one Word', the thesis does not support Barth's separatism which rests, not on 'the one Word of God' or on 'Jesus Christ' but on one specific interpretation and understanding of 'that one Word' and of 'Jesus Christ'. A Muslim, not to speak of another Christian theologian, might very well accept that thesis without deducing from it the anti-human, anti-world separatism Karl Barth deduces. Even the Barthian qualification, 'Jesus Christ, as he is attested to us in Holy Scripture' might be accepted not only by a Beryllus, a Marcion, a Carpocrates, or a Hippolytus, but by many a modern Christian acquainted with the historical formation of that scripture, who would find his Jesus Christ in his own personal experience rather than in 'the Church', or the cold letter of another, though earlier, fellow-Christian. Secondly, Barth prefaces this Barmen sectarianist thesis with John 14:6 and John 10:1,9, in order to give it scriptural authority. But these verses do not support him at all. There, Jesus was cautioning Jews against seeking blessedness by means of Jewish law, and the teachings of the advocates of Jewish political reconstruction rather than through his own gospel of radical self-transformation. By 'I am the door' he meant to say, in the poetical form peculiar to the Arab (Semitic) mind, that the new way of life and being which he was teaching is 'the way, the truth and the life'. To understand this, as Barth and Western Christianity with their peculiarly un-Arab (un-Semitic) mind do understand, as meaning that Jesus was there advocating (or to use the American slang, 'selling') his own person, rather than 'the will of my Father' is crude, to say the least, and points to the 'unpoeticality' of the mould into which Western Christian consciousness had been moulded through the ages.

114. *The Image of God in Man*, London: SCM Press, 1953, ch. XIII and XIV.
115. *Ibid.*, p. 202.
116. *Ibid.*, p. 200.
117. *Ibid.*, p. 201. Actually, Cairns should have maintained that it is impossible to have a knowledge of God without a revelation of guilt which is the peculiarity of the Christian revelation as interpreted by the Church. For a discussion of guilt, sin, etc., see the next chapter.
118. *The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church*, ed. by F. L. Cross, Oxford University Press, 1957, pp. V, VI-VIII, art. on Barth, p. 135. During my visiting fellowship at the Faculty of Divinity of McGill University, 1959-61, I have been struck by the enthusiasm with which students in the Faculty received any mention of him, and their attribution of the 'new Calvinist' and 'Biblical' revivals in their own circles directly to his influence. In a survey of *The Christian Estimate of Man* (London: Duckworth & Co., 1944, 2nd printing, 1949) Sydney Cave estimates: "It is significant that the revival in our generation of neo-Calvinism, with its fresh new emphasis on the sovereignty of God and the incompetence of men, should be associated with the name of Karl Barth.... In our country, too, neo-Calvinism has now great influence. 'Modernism' has ceased to be modern" (page 211).
119. The last hundred pages of a 250-page book on *The Image of God in Man* by David Cairns, for example, deal with Karl Barth and Brunner exclusively and, though critical of many positions Barth takes, the book ends without achieving any over-all progress so far as the problem of the *Imago dei* in Christian thought is concerned. Indeed, despite his witty and sharp criticism of Barth, Cairns ends up by embracing him. Commenting on Aldous Huxley's *Ape and Essence*, Osbert Sitwell's

Noble Essences and Plato's *Republic* and condemning them all as inadequate to furnish solid bases for the dignity of man, he concludes with words which Barth himself could not have written better: "If I do not know that man is the one for whom Christ died, and with whom God wills, with all the force of His grace, to be joined in incarnation, death and eternal destiny, then is not disgust with humanity almost an inevitable result of a prolonged survey of the human scene...?" (pp. 251-52). Forgetting that he himself had criticized Barth a little earlier to the effect that discarding the bath water should never imply discarding the baby, (rejection of Nazi theology should not imply rejection of natural theology) Cairns exclaims: "What other view of man can compare with this [i.e. the Christian] for splendour, and for power to awaken compassion and resist injustice?" (p. 252) Granted Christianity does awaken compassion, etc., it does not follow that without it, man can have no dignity whatever. Nor does it follow that there remains no reason "why we could not begin to think that the cynical brutality of the totalitarians is excusable, and that even if it is not, it does not matter so very much after all" (p. 252). Reinhold Niebuhr, in his *The Nature of Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation* (2 vols., New York: Scribner, 1941) falls back on Augustine wherein he finds the fount of everything good in contemporary Christian thought about the nature of man. "Though the Protestant reformation," he writes, "must be regarded, generally, as a revival of Augustinianism both in view of the human situation and its interpretation of the plan of God to meet that situation, it could hardly be claimed that Martin Luther adds any significant insight to the Augustinian view of the image of God in man." Calvin is commended inasmuch as his thought agrees with Augustine's. Martin Heidegger and Max Scheler are also quoted for the same purpose, namely, the confirmation of the Augustinian thesis. The former's *Sein und Zeit* is "the ablest non-theological analysis of human nature in modern times... (especially as, or because, it) defines this Christian emphasis succinctly as 'the idea of transcendence.'" But whereas in Heidegger the capacity for self-transcendence which is definitive of human nature, is as universal as it is a necessary concomitant of man, and is utterly free from and unrelated to any particular realm or object towards which the transcendence may take palce—Prometheus being its highest prototype—the self-transcendence of Augustine and, presumably, of R. Niebuhr is only of extrinsic value, its axiological end and ground being the God of the New Testament. In Heidegger, the objective of transcendence is pure being, a purely neutral, a-axiological concept. ("The Evil appears together with the holy in the radiance of Being as such," *Platon's Lehre von der Wahrheit mit einem Brief über den Humanismus*, 1947, p. 112). At times, this pure being is itself conceived of by Heidegger as pure transcendency. From this standpoint, 'Pure Being' should be regarded as Christianity's very devil-concept. Finally, for Heidegger, death can never be transcended because beyond it, there is no being of any kind for anyone, be he God or man. On the other hand, Niebuhr makes illegitimate use of Max Scheler. The latter's *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos* is quoted to confirm the thesis of self-transcendence. The passages quoted, however (Scheler, pp. 46-47; Niebuhr, I, 162) prove nothing of the sort. Niebuhr writes "Max Scheler, following the Biblical tradition [*sic*] proposes to use the word 'spirit'—*Geist*—in distinction to the Greek *nous* to denote this particular quality and capacity in man, because it must be 'a word which, though including the concept of reason, must also include, beside the capacity of thinking ideas, a unique type of comprehension for primeval phenomena—*Urphänomenen*—or concepts of meaning and furthermore a specific class of emotional and volitional capacities for goodness, love, contrition and reveren-

ce." "The nature of man," he declares, "and that which could be termed his unique quality transcend that which is usually called intelligence and freedom of choice and would not be reached if his intelligence and freedom could conceivably be raised to the *n*th degree..." Scheler is obviously describing the primal consciousness of value—or the original immediate *Wesenschau* (intuition) of an ontic entity of ideal being, viz. the value—which is utterly other than the discursive consciousness of *Vorstellungen* (concepts as mental representations) whose faculty is reason. Hence, the need he sees for 'transcending' reason, to something that includes both it and the activity of the value-intuiting 'sixth' sense which is an equally genuine knowledge of being. That 'spirit', in this Schelerian sense, is the peculiar nature of man and therefore definitive of his manhood spells for the Augustinian thesis, nothing short of disaster. Niebuhr's quotation of it therefore is at once illegitimate and futile. But beyond this, Niebuhr does not go.

120. *Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church*, art. Tillich, P.
121. W. M. Horton, "Tillich's Role in Contemporary Theology", *The Theology of Paul Tillich*, ed. by C. W. Kegley and R. W. Bretall, New York: MacMillan, 1952, p. 26.
122. *Ibid.*, p. 47. Tillich's doctrine of man underlies all his writings and must be gathered from there, often even as implication. The account in *Systematic Theology*, University of Chicago Press, 1951-57, II, pp. 29-44 is not a summation, though it is indicative of the range of his thinking on the problem.
123. *Ibid.*, pp. 40-41.
124. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
125. *Ibid.*
126. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
127. *Ibid.*, pp. 39-40.
128. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
129. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
130. *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32.
131. *Ibid.*, p. 42.

Chapter VI

WHAT OUGHT MAN TO BE? SIN AND SALVATION

Man is a Fallen Creature: Peccatism

Perhaps the most absolute axiom that a conscious Christian is willing and finds utterly necessary to hold is this, that "Sin is." Every presentation of Christian doctrine known to this author has begun with this apparently simple, yet tremendously charged assertion. Every written presentation of the Christian message with which this author is familiar either begins with a similarly worded statement, or assumes it as indubitable fact. Lesslie Newbigin, for example, is the world-famous exponent of the Christian faith, who has done great work for its propagation in India. His book, first published in Tamil as a presentation of Christianity to actual and would-be converts, is appropriately entitled, *Sin and Salvation*¹. This little book is not a scholarly documented analysis, either systematic or historical, of the ideas of sin and salvation in Christianity. Rather, it is a presentation, systematic and dogmatic, of the faith itself, its message and promise for men. Yet its author has seen fit to give it that title. Although the first chapter is entitled, "What do we mean by Salvation?" the first sentence reads: "Wherever and whenever we look at man, we find that he is full of self-contradiction."² The author then proceeds to describe this "self-contradiction" of man in nature, in society, in himself, and in the cosmos where it is directed against God.

This is not an accident. On the contrary, it represents a well thought-out strategy of presentation in which the most basic premise of the whole system is laid out first. Without it, the whole edifice of Christian ideas stands on sand. It is hence of crucial importance to understand clearly and grasp firmly what is being asserted.

By asserting that sin is, the Christian is not asserting the empirical truth that some men sin, do wrongly, act unjustly, and commit evil. This truth is a platitude; and from it, nothing follows for either religion or ethics as Christianity understands them. Sin, or evil, is truly contingent here; for of any evil action by any man it is always possible to say that it could not have been done and that something else might have been done in its stead had other determinants entered the situation in which it had taken place.

What is being claimed by Christianity here is, on the contrary, that sin is a universal and necessary phenomenon; that all men have sinned and will sin; indeed, that sin is rooted into the very nature of man so that the

sinless man is, unless applied to Jesus Christ in his dual, divine-human capacity attributed to him in Christian doctrine, a contradiction in terms. To quote again our example, Bishop Newbigin: "Sin is something which is seated at the very center of the human personality.... It creates a situation which is real and terrible not only for men, but also for God.... The human race as a whole is corporately guilty of sin.... The whole human race is under the power of sin.... Even the new-born does not start with an equal freedom to do good or evil. It does not start like a balance evenly held, but with one side heavily weighed down.... Even in its own nature, there is a bias towards evil.... There is no part of the human race which is free from sin.... There is no part of man's nature which is free from sin."³

Evidently, if the above is true of Christianity, and it is unlikely that any Christian thinker will disagree with Bishop Newbigin on this point, Christianity holds a perfect absoluteness and necessity of evil. But this is an unwarranted construction. What grounds are there for such an extraordinary thesis? How can such wholesale condemnation of creation, of the human race—past, present, and future—be established or justified? Does not goodness, human goodness have any reality at all? And yet, the Christian thesis seems to sweep every possible goodness before it. It must deny that any goodness is or else, what is far less tenable, maintain that whatever little goodness there is, was, or will be in the world proceeds from evil and is not therefore genuine. For the reality of any goodness at all will contradict the universal negative that no man is good or the affirmative equivalent, that all men are by nature sinful.

Christianity is perfectly prepared to accept the empirical reality which is always contingent, of goodness. As regards evil, however, Christianity is adamantly dogmatic and assertive. Sin or evil, is necessary, universal, and inextricably involved in human nature. This aspect of Christianity, for lack of a better name, I propose to call "peccatism." It is the most fundamental premise of Christian anthropology and history, indeed, of all Christian theology. It provides the starting point of the Christian faith as a whole. For, if at that starting point it is admitted that evil is not necessary, and goodness is possible, a wholly different faith than Christianity would follow.

Indeed, peccatism even finds in sin no mean measure of desirability—nay, of necessity. For if evil were not as omnipotent as the peccatist claims, there would have been no reason for redemption, no absolute need for divine intervention. Bishop Newbigin deplores in moving words what this sin had cost God Himself: "The Word of God," he assures his reader, "is enough to create the heavens and the earth and all that is in them, to rule the stars and to check the raging of the seas." Then, en-

treating his reader to turn his gaze on the dramatic picture of Jesus before the crucifixion, he writes: "But now look at another picture. The Son of God, the Word of God made flesh, kneels in the garden of Gethsemene. He wrestles in prayer. His sweat falls like great drops of blood.... That is what it costs God to deal with man's sin. To create the heavens and the earth costs Him no labour, no anguish; to take away the sin of the world costs Him His own life-blood."⁴ Touching as this may be, it constitutes no argument. On the contrary the Christian lament over man's fallen state betrays a strand of Mephistophelean delight and joy. For after all, according to the Christian dogma, this fallenness is the cause of Jesus' advent, and hence of the whole Christian faith and being. If, according to the 'infra-lapsarian' view, God made the decision to intervene after the 'lapse' or fall of man, human lapse is that happy, fortunate event which brought about this resultant outpouring of divine love and mercy. If, according to the 'supra-lapsarian' view, God's intervention was planned from eternity, then man's fall is that equally fortunate event which brought about the fulfilment of the divine plan.⁵ Had man remained good, moral, obedient, and faithful to God, he would have upset the divine plan and compelled God either to alter His plans or to force man to sin *malgré lui*. Thus no Christian can consistently maintain a thorough-going-condemnation of sin and evil.

One is tempted to think that the most absolute and fundamental first principle which any adherent of the great monotheistic faiths would want to hold is that 'God is.' This, any Christian will most enthusiastically grant; but he will add to it a second; and this second it that sin is.

For the Christian, the axiom 'God is' as an assertion of metaphysics, epistemology and value-theory—that is to say as meaning that truth is, that being is, or that value is—implies a monistic conception of the world under which sin, or evil, is untrue, an illusion or not really evil at all. All these world-views and their implications regarding the status of evil have at one time or another been held by Christianity. The first two implying the untruth and non-being of evil were the view of Christian gnostics and pantheists throughout history, a modern descendant or revival of which is the doctrine known as 'Christian Science'.⁶ The third implying the reality of goodness and appearance of evil was acknowledged by scholastic Christianity following its acceptance of the Aristotelian thesis of the equivalence of 'goodness' and 'being'. But none of these views may be said to have achieved any real status in Christianity which must be said to have preserved a different manner of thinking of itself. Gnosticism was repudiated as heresy despite its great contribution to the propagation of the faith in the early centuries and to the systematization of Christian ideas.⁷ Christian Science is regarded, along with the Mormon Church, as

standing outside 'the Holy Church of Christ' and is recognized by the majority of Christians as a heresy. Catholicism still holds to it scholastic, Middle Ages view as taught by its greatest mind, Thomas Aquinas. But it does not hold that view alone. It limits it to the world of nature and relinquishes it altogether, when the matter in question is the act of conscious human beings. In moral phenomena, in other words, evil regains its reality, its metaphysical efficacy, and its logical and metaphysical priority to everything else. Evil, the Catholic view holds, is privation of being, an aspect of that same and one phenomenon, which, from another angle, appears as perfection and increase of being.⁸

The desperate, utterly crucial need for this priority which the Christian presentations of Christianity usually betray, is at the rock-bottom of Christian thought itself. Christianity is never satisfied, and can never be satisfied, with the axiom that God is; or with the position that God is good and all that proceeds from Him is good. It holds that besides being good, the very nature of God is trinitarian; that one of the divine persons is Jesus Christ. It regards Jesus Christ not simply as God, but as the nature of the Godhead. A God that did not give his only begotten son to die as ransom for men is, according to Christianity, not only not God, but cannot be God. Even if a pre-Christ God were possible such a God would not be God. For it is of the essence of the Godhead, it holds, that there be a Christ who is God.

But it must be remembered that Christianity also holds that Jesus Christ is the 'God son-of-God' who became incarnate, who was crucified and arose from the dead. This is an event in history. How could a historical event enter into the constitution of the Godhead? The Jesus-event, answers Christianity, did not just happen. It was predestined. Indeed, it was so from the beginning. Hence it is eternal, co-eternal with God. Christianity finds it necessary to admit that God is a God in whom Christ is. But to do so is *ipso facto* to say that God is a God in whom God would be incarnate, crucified, and resurrected. The phenomenal career and mission of Jesus Christ is in other words, of the very essence of the Godhead. Evidently, the Divine Essence is both transcendental and empirical. Such would Christian dogma have it.

However, the life and death of Jesus Christ on earth has its own pre-suppositions; and the most fundamental of them is the reality, universality, and absoluteness of sin. For, unless sin is granted, the mission of Jesus Christ as understood by Christianity loses its grounds and becomes pointless. Sin, then, is a logical presupposition of all christianist christology, and a metaphysical presupposition of that Godhead of whose essence Jesus Christ is constitutive. Sin as a presupposition of God, of the Divine Essence, is an all to blasphemous assertion; and Christianity does not let

the accusation stand without answer.

The argument commonly adduced against this far-reaching conclusion is, that Christianity does not hold that the second person of the trinity is merely Jesus Christ in his aspect as saviour on earth with the career that he had. It holds that in addition to this aspect of his being, he is also the 'Word', co-eternal with God, through which creation itself came to be. This is a valid objection; for as Word and divine means of creation the concept of Jesus entails no such presupposition as sin. But returning to a point already made, the Christian's acceptance of the two axioms, viz. that God is and that His nature is such that an aspect of it (the sole aspect which can become object of human knowledge), is the creative Word, though true without question and indubitably accepted by all those who believe in God, whether Christian, Muslim, or Jew, is insufficient for the Christian precisely because it does not satisfy what his faith demands as absolutely essential pre-requisite of all Godhead, namely, that its nature be the self-giving it has achieved in the advent on earth of the historical Jesus Christ. Hence, the argument in no way answers the accusation. Sin, simply is. This is an absolute axiom. Indeed more, it is the presupposition of the nature of God as the Christian understands Him. It is the conditioning *prius* of God being God at all. But, if this is of the essence of the Christian position, Christianity must be quite Manichean or Zoroastrian. Its long wars with Manicheanism were all wasted. Manicheanism, holds that both good and evil are divine powers that have existed from the beginning, that they are rooted in the very structure of reality and that they divide this reality somehow between them, locked as they are together in titanic struggle. This is indeed less than that which Christianity holds. In the former, the two hypostases of good and evil, Angra Mainyu (sometimes called Ahriman) and Ahurah Mazda are both gods each in his own right; in the latter, as we have just found out, not only is evil eternal but it determines at least the Christ-aspect of the God of goodness. The fact that Christianity holds, further, that evil has been conquered and vanquished by God in the Jesus-event, does not change the situation for it also holds at the same time, that evil continues nonetheless to be real, active, and powerful in the world. That is why it looks forward to a different cataclysmic order of the universe when the good God would complete his victory over evil. The good therefore has not vanquished evil, and Christianity is again at one with Manichaeism. Manichaeism too had developed an eschatological redemption following a mysterious cataclysmic—i.e. equally incomprehensible—victory of the good god over the evil god. The religion of Zarathustra has even attempted, though unsuccessfully, a rational explanation of the final collapse of evil by ascribing it to the malignant powers of nature which it

had itself brought into the world for use against the good god. It does honour to man by engaging him in the battle of the Gods which is always raging, rather than leaving him merely a passive spectator. Plutarch has spoken highly of the system of morals which the Zoroastrians had deduced from this divine struggle.⁹ As Mithraism, or the religion of precisely this refined moralism, dualistic Zoroastrianism was one of the most formidable rivals of Christianity in the early centuries of its life.¹⁰

Christianity then is more Manichean, more Zoroastrian than Manicheanism or the religion of Zoroaster. For in effect, it holds sin or evil to be co-eternal with, and at least logically prior to, God. Nor may peccatism be counteracted by the notion of the *imago dei*. For, as we have seen in the last chapter, in the hands of Christians since Tertullian, the image of God in man had lost its necessity as well as its goodness. There is therefore no appeal, for the Christian, from peccatism to the *imago dei* in man. This was a wooden bridge available only to the Hellenistic humanism of the Apostolic Fathers excluding Paul of Tarsus, which Christianity had long decided to put to the torch.

Another common Christian defence against the eternity of sin is that it has entered the world at a given time, at the fall of Adam and Eve. It consists in man's wrongdoing when he had the freedom to choose. It was man's deliberate rebellion against God that brought about his own alienation from Him. Only then did God put into operation His plan for man's salvation. This plan became necessary only through God's willing of it, which was done in time. This argument is obviously incompatible with the eternity of Jesus Christ. The Jesus Christ of history may still be held to be God; but God, according to this view, could not have been Jesus Christ in any sense or aspect from all eternity. Aware of this implication Christian theology does not hold, as this defence advocates, that evil came to be only after Adam's rebellion. It therefore postulates a devil, or pre-Adam source of evil and traces this to an event in heaven (the fall of the angels) where it loses itself in the labyrinths of Jewish apocryphal literature. This notwithstanding, the Fall, as theological idea explaining the particularly human misdeed and evil, has really dominated Christian thought throughout. The Apostolic Fathers did not omit to mention it and fit it in with their doctrine. Fundamentally, it is the solution most commonly adduced against the devastatingly dangerous alternatives we have mentioned above. While keeping in mind that the Fall idea in no way answers the foregoing criticisms, we shall nonetheless consider its genesis, its rise and significance in Christian thought.

Late Judaism, or the religious consciousness of the Exilic and post-Exilic periods down to the time of Jesus, had found it contradictory to hold that God was all benevolent and good and, at the same time, to remain true to a reality in which, sin, or evil, seemed to be the most universal characteristic. For the Exile and all its suffering, the post-exilic experience in Judah, and all its internal division and treason, its long standing misery which was punctuated with invasions, thwarted insurrections, and dispersions bringing miseries greater and more intense still—all this had filled Jewish consciousness. When racialism failed to achieve its objectives because of all these insurmountable obstacles, its logic took over the ground alone, giving full vent to its blunted will. Not only this or that Jew is a sick man it thought out, but all men. Not only this or that Jew is a traitor, an unjust member of society, an evil man; not only this or that non-Jew is an evil man because of his obstruction of the Jewish racialist dream or of his abuse and exploitation of the fallen, helpless Jews; no, not only some human beings are evil, but all men are evil.

Thus, the psalmist sang: "If thou, Lord, shouldest mark iniquities, O Lord, who shall stand?"¹¹ "And enter not into judgment with thy servant; for in thy sight shall no man living be justified."¹² He did not forget to give us the irrefutable evidence for that which determined his thought in making this unwarranted generalization. In the next verse, he says: "For the enemy hath persecuted my soul; he hath smitten my life down to the ground; he hath made me to swell in darkness, as those that have been long dead. Therefore, is my spirit overwhelmed within me; my heart within me is desolate."¹³ The condemnation of man himself as hopelessly addicted to evil was made in light of the empirical reality of evil around and within Jewish society. Jewish consciousness cultivated this condemnation to the point of obsession. Then, the inductive leap to the universal generalization was easy. Looking for an explanation of its universality, Jewish consciousness hit upon heredity. Inheritance by children of the consequences of their parents' evil deeds was not unknown; neither were the facts of nurture to evil which must have been equally given in the empirical reality. It was natural to interpret this as heredity; and it was then that the lamenting psalmist exclaimed: "Behold, I was shapen in iniquity; and in sin did my mother conceive me."¹⁴

Certainly, this is still far from the peccatist thesis of Christianity. But here lies the root of the concept of original sin, which was destined to grow to full maturity in Christian hands.

Having achieved universal, 'almost necessary' status, sin was bringing upon Jewish consciousness a new awareness of a conflict between itself

and God. And speculative minds began to look for an explanation of that conflict. It dawned upon them that the Jews themselves were not always in the sad present state of things and that at an earlier stage they were blessed in a Judahic Paradise and in perfect rapport with their god, Jahweh. This present state of misery and suffering was the direct result of the dreadful events culminating in the defeat and exile of 586 B.C. Since all Jews now suffer from the same sad fate, it is not improbable that man too, must have been blessed at some time and that he also had fallen from that state into his present predicament through some such cataclysm. Urged therefore by the pressure which the reality of evil put on a soul dominated by faith in a god that is exclusively the god of Israel, a god who has upheld and blessed his people with everything good for so long, a god, in short, who in every respect answered his people's wishes and desires at every turn, the Jewish speculative mind scanned the scriptures for such a cataclysmic event that would explain the irrational entry of evil into the world, and thus make a perfectly-contingent reality.

The first fruit of their endeavour was the story of the Fallen Angels. Not that they fabricated it *ex nihilo*, but they joined it to such interpretation as would solve, for them, the issue in question. The first six verses of Genesis VI have been used as a prelude to the deluge story: but in reality, they come from another document in which no trace of the deluge is in evidence. For in Numbers 12:33, descendants of the giants, or fallen angels, are said to have been in Palestine at the time of Joshua's invasion; whereas in the deluge story, they are said to have all been destroyed. The editor who brought together the Prophetic and priestly parts of the Hexateuch, according to Kuehnen and Wellhausen, must have found fit to prefix the deluge story with a part of *bene ha elohim* (sons of the gods) and *nephilim* (giants) story in explanation, of how evil and wickedness came into the world and gave rise to the deluge. The full details of this story are hence to be obtained not from Genesis but from the Apocryphal literature wherein they survived.¹⁵ And it is in this literature that the *locus classicus* of the beginning of evil was transferred from the story of the angel to that of Adam and Eve. The difficulty that Jewish thinkers faced was that, now that RJP, or the editor of the Prophetic and priestly documents, had already attached Genesis 6: 1-6 to the deluge story, the story of the angels could no more serve as an explanation of post-diluvian evil. For, according to that 'finished' narrative, all men were destroyed except one and his family, namely, Noah, and these were the only righteous ones. How could evil then have sprung from the good?

It was in the *Book of Jubilees*, dating from about the second century B.C. that this problem was solved. And the solution consisted in dropping the story of the angels for the sake of that of Paradise.¹⁶ Naturally, this

was not all done in an instant but was a process. Hence, hints more or less direct and to the point, may be found throughout apocalyptic literature.¹⁷ By the time of the Ezra apocalypse (the *Book of Esdras*) which scholars date as contemporaneous with Christ, the Adam-Eve story had definitely replaced the angels story as explanation of the origin of evil in the world. It was this story, or myth, that Christianity adopted largely under the influence of Paul in order to posit evil and thereby assume the requisites of divine redemption.¹⁸

THE CHRISTIANIST TRANSVALUATION OF THE JEWISH IDEA OF THE FALL

It is obvious at the first reading of the Adam story in Genesis 3: 1-24, that it contains no evidence whatever for peccatism. Adam, after Eve, committed a transgression; and both of them were punished therefor. That Adam and Eve disobeyed a divine command, and Adam became thereafter obliged to earn his living by work and Eve, to suffer pain in the performance of her motherly functions, provide poor confirmation of the peccatist thesis that sin is, that all men are necessarily sinful. First, the sin of one man, which is purely moral, has to be made communicable to all men by physiological heredity—which is a tremendous feat to achieve by any logic. By Christian logic, such an operation must be absolutely impossible. We have seen that the ethic of Jesus was a personal ethic of self-transformation and that it had, for theatre, the individual soul of man in his most personal moment. What man does or does not do on that theatre is his own ineffable decision, his own inalienable right and responsibility. How could such a personal act—only such personal acts are ethically meritorious or blameworthy—become the responsibility of another, or of all men? Secondly, the punishment of one man has to be made applicable to all men, an equally impossible extrapolation. For even if it is granted that all men do perform the same sinful acts and produce the same undesirable, disvaluable results, this by no means warrants the same condemnation or punishment. If the previous investigation, i.e. Part I of this work, has taught us anything at all, it must be the Jesus' truth that ethical worth or unworth are functions of the conscious self's willing alone, rather than of the effects and consequences of that willing. How can the willing of all mankind be declared to have had the same motives, to have been under the same determinants, so as to warrant any identical condemnation of 'guilty' in ever case?

Thirdly, the content of Adam's sinful act, namely his tasting of "the tree of knowledge of good and evil" which is the "tree of life"¹⁹ is, in the eyes of all mankind and all history, the opposite of a sinful act, and hence,

must be transmuted into something else more offensive and immoral.

The contrast of the Genesis treatment of the Adam story with that of the Qur'an is quite revealing on this point. Far from being the father of sin, the Qur'an regards Adam as the father of the Prophets. He received his learning directly from God, and in this he was superior to the angels to whom he taught the 'names' (i.e. essences, definitions) of the creatures.²⁰ God commanded him to pursue the good²¹ as well as to avoid evil, the latter being the nature of the tree whose fruit he was forbidden to eat. The identification of the tree as 'the tree of life' and of 'knowledge of good and evil' is neither God's nor Adam's, but the work of 'J', or of its priestly editors who branded knowledge of good and evil as evil in pursuit of their will to power and for the perpetration of their monopoly over man's access to God. Aware of these priestly editions (Old Testament scholarship would rather that we use this than the more *engagé* term forgeries) the Qur'an calls this wrong identification a lie told by Satan in order to lure Adam, prone as he was to know and pursue the good, to transgress God's command to do evil. Satan, the Qur'an tells, enticed Adam saying, "O Adam, shall I show you the tree of life and power eternal? Adam ate of the tree and committed a transgression and an evil deed. But God corrected him and he atoned and was rightly guided." Adam, therefore, did commit a misdeed, viz. that of thinking evil to be good, of ethical misjudgment. While Satan in the Qur'anic view, is the evil thought suggesting itself to man that he may give it real-existence,²³ Adam is the author of the first human mistake in ethical perception, committed with good intention, under enthusiasm for the good. It was not a fall but a discovery that the good is possible to confuse with the evil; that its pursuit is neither unilateral nor straightforward. This is a decisive advance in man's self-perfecting, in his realizing of God's command to do good and avoid evil. By making Adam's pursuit of knowledge of good and evil content to the gravest sin ever committed, Christianity transformed man's noblest endowments, viz. his knowledge and will to know which is undoubtedly what it agrees in another breath, constitutes his cosmic uniqueness and his being 'a little lower than the angels', into an instrument of utter doom. Fourthly, the content of Adam and Eve's punishment, namely labor and the pain that it brings with its exercise must also, be transmuted into something common sense would recognize as more terrible and undesirable. How did Christianity perform this transformation of the Adam story? Obviously, by means of interpretation. The Adam story is never taken by Christians at its face value but is bent, in one way or another, to serve the purposes of peccatism. How Christianity did that is precisely what we shall attempt to discover in the sequel.

It should be noted at the outset that as far as the synoptic gospels can prove, Jesus never entertained the peccatist thesis. That the Gospels do not furnish any evidence that he had dealt with the problem of the genesis and necessity of evil is obvious and well known²⁴. Against this Christians argue that the fact that Jesus did not expressly speak of the fall does not necessarily imply that he did not entertain the peccatist thesis. Though he did not speak of it, it is alleged, he acted, lived, and died as if peccatism were true. This argument, however, does not achieve anything. It merely pushes the problem onto another level, whether or not Jesus did act and live under the peccatist presupposition. Jesus' famous exhortation, "Repent: for the kingdom of heaven is at hand"²⁵, usually adduced as evidence implies no peccatism at all. Jesus was addressing the Jews, and even if what he told them was meant for all men, it cannot be construed to apply to any more than the conscious members of his generation. Nor can the parable of the unmerciful servant²⁶, or the petition for forgiveness of the Lord's prayer²⁷ imply peccatism. All they may point to, at the very most, is an empirical universality of sinfulness, the 'universe' being the limited world of Palestine, or of the Roman Empire, of the times. The other statements such as "For out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders...."²⁸ do not speak in necessary terms. As pointed out earlier,²⁹ this and similar statements mean to emphasize the fact that the locus of evil, of such evil as may be empirically found in the world, is the heart, i.e. the will of the subject and not the consequence of the act as Jewish law held. On the other hand, the Rabbinical doctrine that the Creator had separately implanted a *yeseh ra'*, an 'evil imagination' or *mauvais génie* in the heart of every newborn baby, which the Jews had entertained in the time of Jesus as explanation of an evil they began to regard as necessary, is totally absent in the records we have of Jesus' teaching, incompatible as it is with Jesus' idea of the nature of God as goodness.

SIN IN THE TEACHING OF PAUL

What Jesus did not furnish, Paul was ready to offer to Christianity.³⁰ For, according to Paul, Jesus Christ is God, incarnate, crucified, and resurrected that man may be saved from the predicament of sin. But if there is to be any redemption at all, there must be something from which it may take place. This 'something' he contributed to Christian dogma.

Paul wrote to the Church at Rome, and repeated what he had to say to the Church at Corinth. "Wherefore, as by one man sin entered into the

world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned....³¹ Through the offence of one many be dead.... By one man's offence death reigned by one.... By the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation.... By one man's disobedience many were made sinners."³² Evidently, Paul is here thinking of sin as a kind of hereditary disease which is transmitted to the whole of mankind by virtue of the father of all mankind being infected with it. The necessary concomitant of sin, its necessary effect, is death; physical death, since its universality and inevitability are beyond question. But Paul also says, in the same passage, that this disease did not break out with all its venom and efficiency between Adam and Moses because until the latter came, there was no Law and no Torah.³³ Only after Moses did sin become actively efficacious since the Law could have been promulgated by God only to be violated, and it is thus that sin becomes active and abundant. His statement that "The Law entered that the offence might abound"³⁴ clearly suggests the working of his blasphemously constructive mind. God sent the Law that it may be violated, that all men may sin; for if all men do sin, so Paul reasons, then will God send His son Jesus as Messiah to bring about redemption.³⁵

The nature of the disease which all men have inherited from Adam without exception, is double. In one strand, Paul fully agrees with Genesis that Adam's sin was that of obtaining knowledge of good and evil. He shares with the redactors and editors of 'J' their pessimistic view of the world, their condemnation of all civilisation as a mistake and their rejection of all culture, refinement and knowledge. In a passage replete with significance as to the attitudes the great apostle of Christianity felt towards Hellenic culture, Paul says: "For it is written, I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and will bring to nothing the understanding of the prudent. Where is the wise? Where is the scribe? Where is the disputer of this world? Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world?" This is a twisting of the words of Isaiah³⁷ which were meant to express the Jews' joy at the sudden turn of events in their favour when Cyrus rose to power, challenged and defeated, against everybody's expectation, Jewry's arch-enemy, Babylon, and stood disposed towards liberation and repatriation of the Jews from their exile. In Paul's hands, Isaiah's condemnation of the 'wise' men of his day who were predicting the invincibility of Babylon and the permanence of the Jews' exile, is construed to mean an outright condemnation of all wisdom and culture that has not yet bent its mind and reason to his Christianist dogma. "For," he writes in pursuit of the same thought, "after that in the wisdom of God the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe. For the Jews require a sign, and the Greeks

seek after wisdom: But we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumblingblock, and unto the Greeks foolishness."³⁸ Evidently, for Paul, Hellenic culture is to be opposed—and rightly so—by Christianist sectarianism and dogma. Finally, rising to one of those rare moments of a hatred of culture become genius, Paul explains: "Not many wise men after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble are called: But God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise; and God hath chosen the weak things of the world to confound the things which are mighty. And base things of the world, and things which are despised, hath God chosen, yea, and things which are not, [thus imputing deceit and duplicity to God] to bring to nought things that are."³⁹

In another strand, Paul describes the nature of the disease which found its way to man through Adam's sin as *inquinamentum*, or physical defilement and pollution. The devil, in the form of a serpent, had tempted Eve; and by so doing, he passed the dreaded disease of the flesh, the impurity of body to her who then transmitted it to Adam and by him to all mankind. In support of this view, the New Testament is said to furnish two kinds of evidence. The first, based upon II Corinthians 11:3⁴⁰ and I Timothy 2:14⁴¹ implies a concept of sin as beguilement, while the former quotation actually speaks of their being deceived in the sense of seduced. Thus, the 'iniquation' in question is here taken for granted. It is only warned against or deplored. The other kind of evidence is far more direct: It consists in an outspoken condemnation of the body, of its life, of its natural activity and even reaches to the whole realm of nature and the world of actuality. For it is against the whole order of creation and nature, that Paul has there directed his invective. "The creation," he asserts, "was subjected to futility, not of its own will, but by the will of him who subjected it [i.e., Adam].... For we know that the whole creation has been groaning in travail together until now."⁴² Thus, the Fall did not produce its sinister effects in man alone, but in the whole of nature. The conviction that nature was corrupted by the fall of Adam is an apocalyptic idea; and Paul here accepts this piece of rabbinic exaggeration willingly. In defence of Paul, some Christian scholars interpret this gloomy proclamation as meaning, in Buddhist or Schopenhauerian manner, the fact of the internecine and bloody struggle for existence that takes place on the natural level⁴³

According to others, this Pauline life-negation is taken as expressive of man's continuity with nature and the inseparability of his predicament from that of the whole of nature.⁴⁴ Whichever was the true intention of Paul, the significance of the assertion and its place in his Christianist theological system remain the same. Apparently, the greatest distending of the dimensions of sin is necessary if man is to be the utterly powerless

creature that Christianist salvation theory requires him to be. For only thus can the Christianist interpretation of God's action in the advent of Jesus Christ be justified. In either case, however, it is sheer construction, designed to serve dogma. So bent was Paul on achieving this that in his zealous onslaught upon historicity and common sense, he did not refrain from distending sin even as much as to include the heavens themselves which his zeal now presented to him as populated, buffeted, and tormented⁴⁵ with evil spirits⁴⁶ and messengers of Satan.⁴⁷

Despite all this, Paul shows no sign of awareness of the paradox that we shall meet with in later Christian thought, namely that God, holds us ethically responsible for our possession of instincts, desires, lusts, and wills He Himself has given us at our birth. He merely affirms the truth of this natural predicament of man without ever suggesting that behind it there once stood and 'original righteousness.' Indeed, though this predicament of man is condemned in no equivocal terms, it is hard to find in Paul's epistles anything in direct support of an 'original guilt' notion. His is simply the case of the Rabbinic hatred of man and nature—the very opposite of Hellenic humanism and naturalism—which is so intense and involved with its causal relation to the redemption brought about by Jesus that, though it may have reached the level of genius, has not yet reached that of the conceptually systematizing consciousness. For, according to him, it is not the instinct, desire, lust, or appetite *per se*, that is sin, but that which it produces, the transgression of the law which it engenders. For, with him, there can be no sin as long as there is no law and no transgression from the law.⁴⁸

SIN IN THE TEACHING OF THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS

For the first two centuries of the life of Christianity,⁴⁹ the atmosphere of mind and thought was dominated not by this Pauline anti-hellenism, but by the humanistic, rationalistic, and naturalistic ideas of Hellenism. Perhaps the only common ground which Paul might be said to hold with these centuries lies in the dualistic nature of man which the thinkers of this age, the Apostolic Fathers, had held. Both would agree that the body is earthly, wicked, bent upon sin and evil, the very matrix of unfaith, error, vice, and passion. But whereas Paul would be content thus to condemn the body hoping for its salvation only through the 'blood of the cross', the Apostolic Fathers would put their faith in reason, the other constituent of man, to govern the concupiscence—libido—of the body and thus to make it serve the higher interest of salvation, if not constitute by itself a harmonious well-balanced being that is worthy, beautiful, and valuable for its own sake.

This dualism, accepted by all, was given eloquent expressive imagery by Hermas. Man, as well as all "the creatures of God, are two-fold."⁵⁰ Two angels, he tells us, dwell within man: "The angel of righteousness" and that "of wickedness." The one ought to be listened to for his counsel is good; the other is to be avoided, nay combated and vanquished whenever he raises his head to tempt and to seduce. As long as the body is the servant of the soul, faithfully executing its dictates, and enabling her to use it as an instrument and a means for its own ends, it is not only to be tolerated but should be accorded a *measure of value, a just reward*. "Having served the spirit blamelessly, [the flesh] should have some place of sojourn, and not seem to have lost the reward of its service. For all flesh in which the Holy Spirit has dwelt shall receive a reward if it be found undefiled and spotless."⁵² Indeed, there is no other *raison d'être* for the flesh but to play this instrumental role. Its success in this role is its "justification," to which the soul will one day "bear witness."⁵³ Despite their strong awareness of the evil rampant in the world of the day and their enthusiastic condemnation of a world dedicated to the pursuit of lower value, reaching in II Clement almost to the level of world-denial and condemnation,⁵⁴ the Apostolic Fathers have none of the morbid flesh-, world- and self-mortification ideology of the Dark Ages. Their writings evidence a healthy, almost Hellenic, appreciation of body and earth.

Thus, against the view that the order of the body is that of a passive object, one-directionally-determined by the soul, Hermas makes a defilement of the body a defilement of the Holy Spirit and hence worthy of death and eternal damnation.⁵⁵ Sanely enough, he ends Parable V by counselling, "Keep... both pure [the soul and the body] and you shall live to God."⁵⁶ Indeed, Hermas even suggests that the body is intrinsically and finally good, for its own sake, if only it is not corrupted by evil but preserved in its God-given purity and excellence.⁵⁷

His condemnation of asceticism and monasticism is eloquently expressed in his preference of good works to fasting. Thus, for him, fasting is "useless" and "nothing," a futile self-mortification.⁵⁸ "God does not wish such a vain fast," dissociated from the actual works of righteousness in the real world outside of self.⁵⁹ Good works are for Hermas, and, in a more or less degree, for the Apostolic Fathers, the be-all and end-all of ethics, of religion, and the necessary, "sufficient reason" of salvation.

This difference between the dualism of Paul and that of the Apostolic Fathers is not accidental, but stems from a far deeper and wider gulf separating them on the nature of sin and salvation. Sin, they held unanimously, is not innate. Neither is the new born baby a fallen creature. By nature, man is created good: This we have already discovered to have

been their understanding of the *imago dei*. They therefore reasoned that if man is created good at birth, the fall, which they all take for granted, must come to him after his birth, when he is grown and consciously chooses evil. Sin, they therefore concluded, is not original, but acquired.

I Clement is the only writing which has furnished the age with the explanation of how sin is acquired and of how 'the fall' takes place anew in the case of every man. But its explanation is typical of the thinking which we find implied in all the other Apostolic Fathers' writings many of which enjoyed at some time canonical authority.⁶⁰ It is man's attainment of means, power, and *bien être* that set jealousy and envy aflame and it is through these that "death came into the world." Happiness corrupts and man's nature is such that it cannot take any great measure of happiness without becoming warped. Thus, Clement continues, was the case with Cain and Abel, Esau and Jacob, Joseph, Moses, and even the pillars of the Christian Church like Peter and the Martyrs. Without exception, in all these cases, somebody achieved eminence, 'waxed fat and kicked', producing envy and jealousy in himself and in others. Acting enviously, the jealous sinned and brought about calamity and death. There is nothing in the writings of the Apostolic Fathers which may put this position of I Clement under suspicion or even call it to question; and we may safely hold it therefore to represent their position on this issue. With this conclusion, we find the majority of Christian scholars in agreement.⁶² It may be objected that to hold, as we do, that this was in fact their position may seem to be an argument *a silencio*. The fact is that although the Fathers have not given us any direct statement to this effect, they have given many that are compatible with it, and indeed some that directly imply such a view of sin. But these belong to another chapter⁶³.

SIN BEFORE AUGUSTINE

Until the time of Augustine, the ideas of Paul regarding "the different law in my members"⁶⁴ as innate and necessary, caused by man's descent from Adam who brought about that cataclysmic catastrophe which changed human nature, human history, and heaven and earth, were to remain dormant in the mind of Christianity. Faint echoes of them were surely heard, but no clear or complete assertion. As we have seen earlier, in connection with the notion of man as the image of God, it was not before the third century that Hellenistic naturalism began to be pushed and jolted out of place until Augustine dealt it the final death blow. The same men that stood between that Hellenistic rational naturalism and Augustine, viz. Tertullian and Irenaeus regarding the

imago dei, we find occupying the same position with regard to sin. Indeed, their views on sin are only the other side of their views on the image of God in man. To them, however, we need add only Origen.

Origen, the antignostic who was deeply influenced by gnosticism, began, like his fellow-Christians and Jews, in Hellenic, gnostically minded Alexandria, to understand scripture allegorically. He went to the Genesis account of Adam's fall with a mind already determined by Plato. Plato had taught that man suffers a prenatal fall when his soul, prior to being joined to his body in birth, becomes individualized.⁶⁵ Plotinus had explained individuation as a series of concentric emanations which become less pure and worthy the further away they stand from the creative center, the divine logos. Philo, before Origen, had popularized this Plotinian explanation and applied it to Hebrew Scripture.⁶⁶ And Origen was true to this Alexandrine culture.⁶⁷ His rationalism dictated that all suffering must be deserved, or else it would be unjust of the Creator to inflict it. And since man suffers from the very start of his life, he must have merited that suffering in a prenatal state, incurred by some unethical misdeed in a previous life. By this reasoning, He gave Christianity its first idea of placing the origins of evil outside the world of creation and time. With him, original sin belongs to a state of being beyond time. When man begins his life in time, 'original sin' cannot be with him a corruption, defilement, or guilt, but only a weakness; not a *depreuatio*, but a *privatio*. This amount of rationalism was enough to incur the wrath of his bishop, Demetrius. He was discharged from his leadership of the catechetical school and condemned. Moving to Caesarea, he became acquainted with infant baptism for the first time. In this period of his life, therefore, he tended towards holding some form of 'original sin' in justification of infant baptism. Tertullian, though opposed to infant baptism,⁶⁸ on the grounds that it must be received in consciousness or else it is futile, nonetheless believed in a positive corruption of the soul, which he conceived in materialist, corporeal terms. Traducianism, which in agreement with Gregory of Nyssa he presented in his *De Anima*,⁶⁹ and which holds that the human soul is passed from the parents to the child materially through the procreative act, was the answer he advanced in explanation of the passage of sin from father to child through physical descent. His hatred of Hellenistic humanism, however, was so intense, that his rejection of infant baptism on the sound grounds of lack of consciousness is more than upset by his unrivalled hatred and rancour of everything that mind or spirit, has produced in antiquity. His regard for human responsibility, which is absent in the infant, should have taught him to honour the spirit, the mind, and its productions and the example of Jesus should have taught him a little gentleness and a sense of pardon.

The 'saintly father' of the Christian Church is, however, not only hurried to consign everything to the flames, but, indeed, is guilty of a worse rancour and bitterness than all the enemies of Christianity combined, precisely because his hatred is not merely felt but thought out and coldly poured out in cadences of the most inhuman concepts and images.

AUGUSTINE: THE EXEMPLAR OF PECCATISM

Whatever threads of condemnation and deprecation of nature and man there were in the history of Christian thought throughout the first four centuries were gathered by Augustine and raised to great pitch. Together with a number of other notions definitive of Christian doctrine, these constitute Augustine's theory of original sin. It is commonly held that Augustine crystallized his views on the subject of sin in his controversy with Pelagius. The heresy of Pelagius is thus made into the *mauvais génie* which was not altogether irresponsible for, Augustine's exaggerations.⁷¹ The truth, however, is otherwise. The whole Augustinian doctrine of man has been expressed in the treatise *De Diversis Quaestionibus Ad Simplicianum* which Augustine composed during his first year as bishop of Hippo, in 396-97. Augustine himself referred to this treatise whenever he sought to defend himself against the charge that, inconstantly, he had changed his views.⁷² In that treatise his whole philosophy is given in essential outline. Here, Augustine affirms that sin in the sense of concupiscence began with Adam and was transmitted to mankind through biological descent.⁷³ It is in this treatise that the term *Peccatum originale* first made its entry into Christian thought and vocabulary, meaning sin and involving guilt (*originalis reatus*) and therefore, punishment. Here, we also find for the first time the terrible notion that because mankind is saturated with concupiscence, it constitutes a *massa peccati* or 'a lump of sin' which, as such, is doomed to *poena mortalitatis*, or the punishment of death. It is here too, that we find that irrationalism which gives this whole doctrine its base and capstone. For Augustine there raised the question of how could God select a few to become baptized and leave the whole rest of mankind to eternal fire, when neither the saved nor the damned had deserved their fate. And it is precisely in this same treatise that Augustine has silenced such questions by appeal to the notions of 'mystery' and of man's 'innate incapacity to understand'.

It was not Augustine who reacted to Pelagius, rising, as shallow books often represent him, to the defence of the faith against the heretics. Rather it was Pelagius who reacted to Augustine. For it was not until 410 that Augustine "received news that Pelagius had been attacking a sentence of his in the Confessions," and the "fierce controversy issued...."⁷⁴ How-

ever it would put Augustine's thought in clearer focus if we consider first what Pelagius did in fact teach.⁷⁵

The real theologian of Pelagianism was Julian of Eclanum, of whom Harnack says that he was "the first, and up to the sixteenth century, the unsurpassed, unabashed representative of a self-satisfied Christianity."⁷⁶ He was a naturalist advocating and practicing clear and systematic thinking about morals and God. Augustine treated him with respect, and having answered him, sentence by sentence, gave us the possibility to reconstruct his doctrine. The methods which they advocated to settle their theological differences were wide apart. Julian claimed while Augustine denied that "we ought to weigh and not count opinions."⁷⁷ The former was therefore as much an advocate of choice, deliberation, and free will as Augustine was of authoritarianism and irresistible grace.

Harnack has admirably summarized Julian's theology in eight succinct points. First, God is absolutely just; everything he does is essentially good. Man, His creature, is good. There is no being that is evil, or sinful, as such. Second, man's greatest and inalienable endowments are his discerning reason and his freedom of choice which no wrong choice can seriously damage or alter. Sin is choosing the opposite of that which reason judges good. Third, the appetites of the body are not sinful *per se*, but good, as God, their maker, is good. Sin consists, hence, in their abuse or misuse which, when committed, is committed deliberately. Marriage is intrinsically good. Fourth, upon birth, and before becoming involved in such abuses, every man is in the state of Adam before his fall, endowed with a 'natural holiness' which consists of reason and free will. Fifth, Adam sinned through his wrong choice, as we do today. The consequence of this sinning is not natural death which is the natural order of the world, but damnation which, to be acquired at all, must be incurred by the individual person in question. Sixth, the idea of *peccatum originalis* transmitted through physical procreation is false and blasphemous. It is false because there can be no sin without free choice and will; and blasphemous because it implies that God is unjust if He regards the innocent as guilty, or malevolent, if it is He that made them sinful. Seven, the grace of God is precisely this natural endowment of man the proper exercise of which has made many Christians, as well as non-Christians, perfect. Or, it is the *augmentum beneficiorum dei*, or God's revelation of the ought, or the law, to man, so as to assist his reason in its deliberation and guide it in its choice. Or, it is the grace of Jesus, who like God's revealed law, is enlightening and teaching (*illuminatio et doctrina*) by Jesus' own example. Eight, Grace is directly proportional to man's merit. Otherwise, if it were granted to the righteous as to the others, God would not be just.

This, in brief, is Pelagianism as articulated by Julian of Eclanum. It is

essentially the belief of all sane men, Christian and others; and if this is true universally, it is particularly true of Western Christendom and modern times as a whole where the English common saying 'God helps those who help themselves', which was also the motto of Pelagian ethics, has found an equivalent in every tongue. It is in every respect in accord with the ethic of Jesus as we have discovered it to be in Part I. Indeed, it deals with material which the ethics of Jesus must have assumed from the start. Against it all, Augustine poured out his genius.

Beginning with the Genesis story of Adam, Augustine insisted that the only way it may be understood is the literal. Taken literally, it is the only basis of Christian anthropology.⁷⁸ As such, it implies in the eyes of Augustine that man's pre-fall nature was one of 'original righteousness'. Augustine therefore spared no effort to exalt that state beyond the bounds of reason. For this paradisaical state of man was one end of a see-saw whose other end is the state of sin. The higher the former is raised, the more poignantly it will contrast with the latter. Thus, Augustine argued that in Paradise there is neither physical evil, nor sickness, nor old age nor death;⁷⁹ and Adam's intellect was incomparably superior to man's.⁸⁰ Moreover, he had the ability not to sin (*posse non peccare*)⁸¹. But if this was the state of Adam, whence did he sin? He did not have the concupiscence which fallen man has and which is the source of all sins on earth. How then did he fall?

Augustine answers that Adam's sin was not the result of weakness, but the deliberate act of will against the divine command, against his otherwise habitual doing of virtuous deeds.⁸² It was, he tells us in his treatise, *On Faith*, the sin of pride, infidelity, homicide, spiritual fornication, avarice and, in what seems to be an anticlimax of theft as the fruit of the tree of knowledge which was not Adam's property.⁸³ Augustine then follows Romans 5: 12 and affirms that this sin of Adam "has passed unto all men" (*peccatum ex traduce*). To explain the nature of that which is 'passed' from man to man, Augustine distinguished *vitium* from *reatus* of sin, its physical aspect and its judicial liability. But he declared both of these communicable by physical heredity. As *vitium*, sin consists in concupiscence, expressing itself, or rather, residing and coming to focus and extreme tension, in the sexual appetite. Man is literally 'born in sin' because he is conceived through the sexual act of his parents, which is *per se* sinful;⁸⁴ and it is for this reason that Jesus had to be born from a virgin.⁸⁵ This, he claimed did not imply a condemnation of marriage as an institution, but only the excessive (he calls it 'irrational') satisfaction of the sexual appetite, thus reverting to the condemnation of the excess rather than the act.⁸⁶ Yet, in another passage he distinguishes the *actus* (actual practice) from the *reatus* (liability and responsibility) of concupiscence

and asserts, contradictorily enough, that baptism cures the *reatus*, whereas the *actus* being there, continues to make the baptized sinful.⁸⁷

Such is the power of sin, so firm is its grasp over man's flesh, so paralyzing is it to man's mind and will, that for Augustine, man is utterly helpless before it. Without God's prevenient grace, the necessity of sin binds him and drives him necessarily to his total ruin. Under sin, man is not a free agent. This is the upshot of the Augustinian position, given in no equivocal terms, by Augustine: it is one of a man subject to a *peccatum habendi dura necessitas*.⁸⁸ But this is too ridiculous and fantastic a thesis to hold. Hence, Augustine claims that mankind does in fact possess free-will. His motivation for claiming freedom is to make man responsible for the fall, and for actual sin; his motivation for claiming necessity, is to make room for irresistible grace. He is encouraged to eat his cake and have it too by another master of contradiction, Paul. So he quotes him, ⁸⁹ "When ye were the servants of sin, ye were free from righteousness;"⁹⁰ and following his example, produces some of the finest pieces of showmanship in mental jugglery. He tells us that although *libertas* (freedom) was lost in the fall, *liberum arbitrium* (free will) was preserved. The lost *libertas*, he goes on, is the liberty to do good or evil; but the *liberum arbitrium* is that of doing what we ought to do, the good only. But one jugglery can be covered only by another, and Augustine thus prepares himself to answer the question. Does God, and do the Saints, have one or the other? Again, therefore, he asserts the *beata necessitas non peccandi* and that God suffers no weakness or loss.⁹¹

The original sin of Adam passed to all mankind as *vitium* and as *reatus*. The means of transmission, we have already seen, is biological heredity. So much for sin as *vitium*. As *reatus*, the passage of sin is explained, on a model supplied by Augustine's favourite master, Paul. He takes Hebrew 7: 9-10, where Paul gives the principle of seminal identity of the descendant with the ancestor in whose loins he lies, in explanation of Levi's rights acquired by his being in the loins of Abraham when the latter paid tithe to Melchisedek, and concludes that all men are under the same liability incurred by Adam because they were in his loins. Only those escape from it whom God chooses to let escape and this is perfect divine justice. The rest, all the rest, are a "mass of perdition".

These are the premises upon which Augustine built the Christian edifice of ideas. Doubtless, his personal experience had determined his mind.⁹² J. Burnaby, who defended Augustine wherever he could, could not follow him in that total condemnation of man's natural life, of procreation, of the unbaptized little innocents. This is why he called Augustine's last work which was left unfinished, the terrible invective *Against Julian* as well as against all innocent humanity, a "melancholy reading"⁹³—a

mild term indeed when we consider that Augustine asked in it such questions as this, at the age of 73: "Why should you be surprised that they [i.e. unbaptized infants] will be with the devil in eternal fire?"⁹⁴ The horror of this doctrine is not unmatched by that of Augustine's unparelled brutality in his illicit relationships with women. Nowhere in the *Confessions* do we find the slightest hint that these relationships, including the fourteen-year-old relation with the mother of his only son, were anything but sensual lust. And in the *Soliloquies*,⁹⁵ he says flatly that he never expected anything out of the relation but the "enjoyment of voluptuousness". Knowing nothing of the refined love of a union in which body and soul participate, Augustine condemned the whole realm of human life on earth whereas he should have reserved that judgement for his own life. Even the infants of mankind did not escape his rash and morbid "postponed-to-after-life" sadism.⁹⁶

It is this fundamental disgust and horror at himself that he projects upon mankind, constructing all sorts of patchwork theories to give it the appearance of a reasoned system. What reason, common sense or empirical observation, or *a priori* deduction can lead to such a conclusion, for example, as the following:

"Banished [from paradise] after this sin, Adam bound his offspring also with the penalty of death and damnation, that offspring which by sinning he had corrupted in himself, as in a root; so that whatever progeny was born [through carnal concupiscence by which a fitting retribution for his disobedience was bestowed upon him] from himself and his spouse—who was the cause of his sin and the companion of his damnation—would drag through the ages the burden of original sin, but which it would itself be dragged, through manifold errors and sorrows, down to that final and never-ending torment with the rebel angels.... So the matter stood; the damned lump of humanity [*totius humani generis massa damnata*] was lying, prostrate, nay, was wallowing, in evil; it was everfalling headlong from one wickedness to another; and, joined to the faction of the angels who had sinned, it was paying the most righteous penalty of its impious treason."⁹⁷ Obviously, it is all the work of hatred and resentment of the human kind; a hatred which regards even genuine virtue as sin and perfidy. A virtuous non-Christian is for Augustine a contradiction in terms no matter which virtue happens to be in question.⁹⁸ The non-Christian is not chaste though he has been chaste; and he is not charitable though he has been charitable. Augustine bases this ridiculous logic on Romans 14: 23—"Whatsoever is not of faith is sin"—first, by identifying faith as the Christianist faith and, second, by tearing the statement out of its true context in which, as a saying of Jesus, the statement might have come down to Paul. Jesus might very

well have said it, but in order to mean that whatsoever proceedeth from a state other than that of the radical self-transformation in hand, the statement is twisted to serve the interests of a rabid Christianist sectarianism.

This is peccatism at its reasoned, systematized best. In order to give his doctrine the push it needed—for Pelagianism had won over practically the whole West when Pelagius, Caelestius and Julian went to Africa—Augustine applied for, and, according to some, by means which cannot at all be called honest or scrupulous, obtained the help of the Emperor to enforce it upon the churches of the Empire. Even the pope of Rome was not in favour and had to be made to agree by means of imperial pressure. The empire, or the West, was in the mood to accept Augustinianism—the extreme form of peccatism—which triumphed in the tractoria of Tosimus, at the Council of Trent and affected in its emphasis on infant damnation as introduced by Thomas Aquinas,⁹⁹ the Reformation.

SIN IN THE REFORMATION

The Reformation gave a new vitality and power to peccatism, as well as a new seriousness. As concerns the peccatist thesis Luther and Calvin differed little. Both were interested in painting humanity and human nature with the gloomiest possible colours. Thus they both rejected the schoolmen's distinction of *donum supernaturale*, the gifts which God gave to pre-fall man, from the *pura naturalia* which, though still pre-fall man's endowments, were essentia of his nature. The schoolmen had introduced this distinction in order to save the *pura naturalia* for post-fall life. But Calvin and Luther rejected the distinction precisely in order to achieve the opposite, viz. that post-fall man is wrecked, warped, and confounded in his inmost being. Not a fall from supernature to mere nature, but from supernature to sub-nature, or 'total depravity'.

According to Luther, the fall consists in man's deprivation of the faculty to know, love, and serve God. When the Synergist Lutherans under Victorinus Strigel suggested that human nature lost through the fall no faculties but had some paralyzed the Lutherans cried, "Murder to the Pelagians," and came down mercilessly upon them in the "Formulary of Concord", the official document of the Lutheran Church. "They also are likewise repudiated and rejected," this Formulary declared, "who teach that our nature has indeed been greatly weakened and corrupted because of the fall of the human race, but nevertheless has not altogether lost all goodness relating to divine and spiritual things.... For they say that from his natural birth man still has remaining somewhat of good however little, minute, scanty, and attenuated this may be."¹⁰⁰ The 'Confession

of Augsburg' affirms that "man's will hath some liberty to work a civil righteousness, and to choose such things as reason can reach unto," but this is all futile and besides the point anyway; for the same document affirms that man's will "has no power to work the righteousness of God, or a spiritual righteousness; because the natural man receiveth not the things of the spirit of God."¹⁰¹ The former document had asserted that "fallen man possesses no more power of loving God or turning towards Him than a stone, a tree-trunk or a piece of mud."¹⁰² One wonders how can the message of God through Jesus Christ ever penetrate such a "tree trunk" or "piece of mud," whether God had not worked in vain when he sent Jesus. But like his exemplar and master Augustine, Luther is here paving the road for a doctrine of grace in which the "piece of mud" passively receives what suddenly transforms it into saintliness and holiness.

"Moreover," the Lutheran Formulary asserts, "it is affirmed that original sin in human nature is not merely that total lack or defect of virtuous powers in spiritual things which pertain unto God; but also that into the place of the image of God which has been lost there has succeeded an intimate, grievous, most profound and abysslike, inscrutable, and indescribable corruption of the whole nature and of all the powers of man, most chiefly of the superior and principle faculties of the soul, corruption which infects the mind, intellect, heart, and will. Wherefore after the Fall man receives from his parents by heredity a congenitally depraved impulse, filthiness of heart, depraved concupiscences and depraved inclinations."¹⁰³

Luther agrees with Augustine and in fact, the Formulary of Concord quotes him or rather, follows him into the same blunder of misinterpreting Romans 14: 23 so as to condemn the non-Christians in whatever they do.¹⁰⁴ Calvin follows suit, agreeing with Augustine and Luther on all but the most insignificant points regarding the nature of man. His *Institutes of the Christian Religion* gives no more reason for the non-Christian being capable of some virtue than to prevent the Christian from suspecting that his nature is totally depraved.¹⁰⁵ But as soon as this is said, Calvin asserts that Camillus, the non-Christian, did good either out of hypocrisy or purely mechanically, being God's puppet. The whole of human nature, he tells us, is saturated with concupiscence which is in itself mortally sinful. Human nature is a "seed-bed of sin, odious and abominable to God". "The whole man," Calvin concludes, "from the crown of the head to the sole of the foot, is so deluged, as it were, that no part remains exempt from sin and, therefore, everything which proceeds from him is imputed as sin."¹⁰⁶ So much is this so, according to the two princes of the Reformation, that sin, (i.e. original sin) is never to be confused with actual sin. The latter is merely the former's 'epiphenomenon', its 'hideous efflorescence'.

Both Calvin and Luther carried Augustinian logic to its ultimate conclusion, landing in a purely deterministic theory of salvation. In his treatise against Erasmus, Calvin wrote that the value of his doctrine is that it teaches that "God foresees nothing contingently, but that He both foresees, determines, and actually does all things, by this unchangeable, eternal, and infallible will."¹⁰⁷ And in order to dispel any doubt about what all this means, he writes, shooting at the target point blank, "By this thunderbolt the whole idea of free will is smitten down and ground to powder.... All things which we do, even though they may seem to us to be done mutably and contingently... in reality are done under the stress of immutable necessity..."¹⁰⁸ On the other hand Calvin's predestinarianism, arises from the belief that God was the cause of the Fall. God caused Adam to fall, this reasoning holds, simply in order to bring about what God had already written since eternity. Since eternity too, men have been willy-nilly falling into the camp of the damned, except that since the days of Jesus, a small minority of them have fallen, equally willy-nilly, into the camp of the blessed.

PECCATISM AND CONTEMPORARY CHRISTIAN THOUGHT

Perhaps contemporary Christian thought is different from that of the earlier periods we have examined in at least one respect, namely, that whereas the thought of earlier centuries ran abreast of the consensus of believers and echoed it rather faithfully, there seems to be a tremendous gap separating the community of Christendom from its theologues and thinkers. This gap is particularly noticeable in the subject of sin. Aside from the fundamentalists, the number of those who, for instance, follow Augustine, Luther, and Calvin in what these fathers of Christianity say about necessity and universality of sin, guilt, depravation, and damnation of man, is amazingly small. Indeed, it is hard to imagine any Western Christian, who does so sincerely. For even the fundamentalist, who literally believes the depraved and depraving stories of Genesis, Kings, Revelation, of Augustinian, Luther, and Calvinist doctrine and who *ex professo* accepts the peccatist thesis, must do so hypocritically. For, such a man does not take this teaching seriously and never seems to act on its principles. Such a man acts and lives as if nature, whether in him or in the world outside, is essentially wholesome, beautiful, and ethically valuable in itself. He does not condemn it except in the rare moments of Christianist-fundamentalist consciousness; and even then, he condemns it in hardly more than words. On the contrary, he pursues it—whether rationally and ethically as the few nobly-disposed ones do, or furiously and unscrupulously as the ideologies of industrialism and urbanism have

conditioned him to do—with a state of mind utterly unperturbed by any of the condemning rancour characteristic of all leaders of peccatist thinking.

This fact of Christian life and history cannot be brushed aside as a platitude that all men, whatever their religion or ethic, always fall short of their ideals and lead lives which cannot, from the nature of the case, be perfect instances of those ideals. Granted this platitudinous truth, one may legitimately expect the adherent of a faith to give, at some moment in his life, clear signs not of his perfect realization of what the faith commands, but of the domination of his consciousness by the idea of the faith when it does issue its imperatives. And any faith would certainly be in a sad state if its adherents did not satisfy this prerequisite. That is precisely the case with Western Christian man. Turn the subject of conversation as you may, or follow him from factory to office, from home to picnic ground—indeed to Church—and the evidence he gives is always the same, that this life, or nature, or actuality and being, as such and in essence, is good; that it can be better, that he can, and will at least try to, make it better; that ethical worth and unworth are functions of his success or failure in this attempt. Perhaps somebody might argue that the Christian does not pursue being, as such, as evil, but as transfigured by the faith of Christ. For, this being, whether in himself or in others, is already Christian, in full enjoyment of that transfiguration which faith brings. This is a question for the empirical psychologist to settle in his clinic. The greater run of human beings, however, do not will in consciousness of the how of their own willing; and whoever does will in that fashion is bound to arrive, sooner or later, either at the psychologist's clinic or the theater of saintliness. When the greater majority of mankind wills, their consciousness is dominated by the object of will, not by its own forms. When the majority of Christians will, their consciousness is dominated by the object of their willing *simpliciter*. And it is this dominion of being of their consciousness that contradicts the peccatist central thesis, "all is sin." Because all is sin, being ought not to be the object of desire.

On the other hand, the contemporary Christian theologians assert the peccatist thesis without exception. It is simply marvellous that despite centuries of the Christian laity's distraction from that thesis, they continue to repeat it in perfect chorus. Despite the enormous literary output of Christian theology during the last two centuries, there is hardly an idea, as far as this thesis is concerned, that may be called novel. All of them to a man hold that human nature is sinful, that it is hopelessly sinful, that man can do nothing to pull himself out of his predicament and that this sinfulness of human nature is both necessary and universal

as well as dispensable, Jesus Christ being its dispenser. That the community of Christian believers do not share any more this part of the Christianist faith except in the rarest cases, does not seem to bother them at all. They even have a built-in immunity, as it were, against it. The Christian faith had insisted throughout history that it is a faith of good news. In the spirit of this tradition, the Christian theologian continues merely to proclaim the peccatist thesis, unconcerned about the currents and waves surrounding him, like the man who, in the midst of the billowing sea, sits trustfully in his little, frail, old barque.

Here and there one hears variations; but they are all variations on the same theme. This theme is, in all important respects, that of Augustine. In Catholic Christendom, the field is still under the dominion of Thomas Aquinas who, as we have seen, subscribes to all the theses of Augustine as regards peccatism with but the slight addition of the notion 'limbo' to accommodate an ethos revolted by Augustine's condemnation of innocent infants to the flames. Jacques Maritain, a foremost expositor of contemporary catholic philosophy, teaches a Thomism unaltered except by the nuances of a sharpened epistemology. Upon closer examination, however, Maritain's stand on peccatism does not show any signs of having benefited from that refined epistemology. For him, human nature remains the paradoxical one that Augustine had found it to be. Whether this or that aspect of that dual nature is emphasized is a matter of locality and periodicity. "Man," in Maritain's terms, "carries the burden of original sin and he is born dispossessed of the gifts of grace."¹⁰⁹ In a masterly statement of sheer jugglery, Maritain adds, that man is "not indeed corrupted in the substance of his being, but wounded in his nature."¹¹⁰ The other aspect of man is that "he is traversed by the calls of actual grace... and thus hears within him even here below the truly divine life of sanctifying grace and of its gifts."¹¹¹ But there should be little doubt which aspect of the paradoxical nature of man is the real determinant and the more basic. In his argument with the socialists, Maritain grants to them, for argument's sake, that the Kingdom of God is to be realized in history and on earth. Still, he asserts, man would be the sinful, subject-to-evil man he has always been; for his very nature is evil. "Grant to a socialist," he wrote (and he may have well said a Muslim or a Christian Pelagian), "every claim he makes for the regime of his future society [the regime in question is nothing short of the Kingdom of God on earth] but add that even in the most perfectly, justly, and humanely organized socialist state man will be subject to evil and misfortune because these are *in him*."¹¹² This utter pessimism and exaggerated claim of man's evil nature and depravation, is a work of the Christianist imagination, in which Maritain partakes in no mean degree. He himself has assured us

that the Christian can never "rest anywhere save where his God is nailed upon a cross;" that is to say, the Christian can never be at home in any reality which does not necessarily imply the nailing of Jesus on the cross. In plain English, for the Christian, reality is reality only when it satisfies the needs and presuppositions of dogma.

In Protestant Christendom, the field is under the dominion of Augustine whom the reformation had elevated to highest rank in all doctrinal matters of Christian ethics. Luther and Calvin's metaphysic of ethics is still shared by all, including the most liberal.¹¹³ H. Richard Niebuhr's classic plea for the integration of Christianist dogma with culture—which he calls "conversionism" on the grounds that man's nature, his natural propensities and endowments ought to be converted to the presence and will of God, not re-created on the assumption that they are absolutely evil—is nonetheless bent to make room for the peccatist dogma. Man's nature, he tells us, is not created evil, but has been corrupted. "It is not bad, as something that ought not to exist, but warped, twisted and misdirected.... It is perverted good, not evil; or it is evil as perversion, and not as badness of being."¹¹⁴ And this state of affairs has characterized man since his creation.¹¹⁵

Besides these examples of 'liberal' protestant thought, the field is completely mastered by peccatist ideas of the Augustinian variety; by Luther and Calvin, refined by the Kierkegaardian notions of 'dread'¹¹⁶ and 'existence'.¹¹⁷ Here the figures of Karl Barth and Emil Brunner, of Paul Tillich and Reinhold Niebuhr, of C. H. Dodd, D. B. Baillie, and the late Bishop Temple, stand without rival. All of them without exception hold the peccatist thesis. Barth, for instance, opens his section 60,¹¹⁸ a hundred and a half pages of macabre description of human nature, with the solemn proclamation of peccatism joined to the Christianist affirmation of which it is the logical and material presupposition: "The verdict of God pronounced in the resurrection of Jesus Christ crucified for us discloses who it was that was set aside in His death, the man who willed to be a God, himself lord, the judge of good and evil, his own helper, thus withstanding the lordship of the grace of God and making himself irreparably radically and totally guilty before Him both individually and corporately."¹¹⁹

Likewise, in an identical relating of peccatism to Christianity, Emil Brunner opens his dissertation on "Man as Sinner" with the announcement, "As the message of redemption is the center of the Biblical message so also it contains, as a *negative presupposition (sic)* the knowledge of sin.... Sin can only be rightly understood in the light of the Christian revelation.... We can only see what sin is, what man is as sinner, in the light of the Christian revelation which effects the transition from the

state of 'being-a-sinner' to that of 'being redeemed.'"¹²⁰ No more frank words are necessary, it is hoped, to convince the reader that peccatism, or the view of man as sinner is not a view of man as he is, not a description of his reality, but the view of him which Christian dogma requires and then dictates. Brunner is certainly a peccatist;¹²¹ but he has the merit of being one undaunted by the fear of proclaiming the fact that his peccatism is a subservience to an idealogical presupposition. His words are incontrovertible: "Apart from the doctrine of the Fall it is impossible to understand Sin as the presupposition of the New Testament message of Redemption. Only *fallen* humanity needs a redeemer."¹²²

Not to be surpassed by Barth and Brunner in asserting the presupposition of peccatism, is Paul Tillich. To be different, he identifies sin as "estrangement"¹²³ which consists in "unbelief,"¹²⁴ "*hubris*,"¹²⁵ and "concupiscence."¹²⁶ The only novel usage here is of the term *hubris* which Tillich regards as pride, the mother-sin. But that estrangement, or sin, is both universal and necessary he lets his readers entertain no doubt. "Creation and the Fall coincide in so far as there is no point in time and space in which created goodness was actualized and had existence.... Actualized creation and estranged existence are identical."¹²⁷ Yet, in typical Augustinian fashion, Tillich asserts the contrary thesis that "creation is good in its essential character."¹²⁸ In the first place, as essence, creation is not creation but an =X about which we know nothing at all, except that it is. To attribute goodness to essence is nonsensical. Second, granted it can be established that goodness is attributable to creation as essence, it does not do the least good for us who stand and can *ex hypothesi* stand, only in the realm of creation as existence and estrangement. Third, neither love nor dignity are attributable to man on the basis that pre-creation 'he', or rather 'it'—(for how can we ever speak of him as 'he')—was at an extemporal and ex-spatial point, good. No humanism of any kind is compatible with such a view. Tillich is of course prone to defend this discovery of his. He tells us that his critics hesitate to accept this truth because of a "justified fear that sin may become a rational necessity, as in purely essentialist systems."¹²⁹ He reassures them therefore that "the leap from essence to existence is the original fact; that it has the character of a leap and not of structural necessity. In spite of its tragic universality, existence cannot be derived from essence."¹³⁰ His argument, however, is irrelevant to the point at issue. Certainly, essence does not imply existence, and existence, with respect to essence, is always a contingent actualization. But the necessity that is dreaded in his system is not a necessity of transition from essence to existence but one of regarding all existence as estrangement. It is not the necessity of "all essence must

become existence" but of "all existence must be estrangement." The latter is not "contingent;" and if it were, redemption would not be necessary. Even if estrangement were "universal," the most that one would be compelled to deduce is that God sent Jesus to redeem men who stood in need of redemption but that it is possible that men today or in the future might not stand in such need—a thesis which, if accepted, would quickly bring down the ramparts of Christianity. If it is not impossible that men of the future may not need a God's ignominious death, then it is the duty of every one to will and to work, to think and to prepare, for the advent of such supermen. The statistical facts that so many men had been moulded who turned out to be failures is as little argument against a program for doing away with the Cross as the historical failure of Sparta is against the Platonic Republic.

Reinhold Niebuhr derives his inspiration on the subject from the gloomy 'dread' of Kierkegaard and appends to his chapter on "Sin and Man's Responsibility," the words of the latter as final conclusion. His version of peccatism, however, is immersed in paradoxes. "The Christian doctrine of original sin with its seemingly contradictory assertions about the inevitability of sin and man's responsibility of sin is a dialectical truth which does justice to the fact that man's self-love and self-centeredness is inevitable, but not in such a way as to fit the category of natural necessity. It is within and by his freedom that man sins. The final paradox is that the discovery of the inevitability of sin is man's highest assertion of freedom."¹³¹ Only a few pages earlier, Niebuhr had told his readers, "nor can the temptation which is compounded of a situation of finiteness and freedom, plus the fact sin, be regarded as leading necessarily to sin in the life of each individual, if again sin is not first presupposed in that life."¹³² But if Niebuhr's reader remembers that the opening paragraph of his long section on sin asserted, on the authority of the Bible, that "there is no absolute necessity that man should be betrayed into sin by the ambiguity of his position, as standing in and yet above nature," he would realize the futility of trying to make sense out of his teaching. The truth is that Niebuhr is an advocate of sin-necessity by commitment; an advocate of man's freedom by sheer politeness and decency. When a crucial test comes, the assumed politeness which no one has believed anyway—inevitable but not natural necessity; to be free is to know that one is not free, etc.—is torn asunder without ado. With Kierkegaard, he asserts: "The concept of sin and guilt is so basic and necessary that it presupposes the individual as individual. There is no concern for his relation to any cosmic or past totality. The only concern is that he is guilty."¹³⁴

D.M. Baillie is of course less sophisticated. There is no jugglery in his

treatment of original sin in his *God was in Christ*.¹³⁵ On the contrary, he states the peccatist case with a frankness that matches that of Brunner. Thus, he begins by telling us that God had a plan for man's destiny, but that this plan did not materialize. "Something has gone wrong," he writes,¹³⁶ "the organism somehow failed to function as one body," and was splintered into many self-centered individuals whose faces are turned away from God and "bent inwards upon themselves" individually. Twice he repeats "that is what is wrong with mankind."¹³⁷ Once committed, the evil has become necessary. Into its heritage, he asserts, "every new child is born and by it he is shaped from the start, so that as he grows into a self-conscious moral personality... he is already infected with the evil."¹³⁸ From this evil, it is impossible for man to pull himself, for the more he tries the more immersed he becomes and the more he sinks. Echoing a thought of Karl Barth, to think of oneself as capable of pulling oneself together out of sin is the highest sin there is.¹³⁹

These are examples. The theme behind them all is identical. Human nature is corrupt in its essence by original sin. Even when it stands under grace, as in the life of a baptized Christian, human nature remains corrupt. The function of grace is not to remedy this corruption now, but later, in heaven, or the after-life. Such is the Christian consciousness: moved by the greatest *angst*, shrivelled under the mortal misery of an existence that is shot through with sin, it is predetermined to receive the blessing. But as long as that nature is in nature, alive, the blessing though promised is not yet. It awaits it only in after-life. Let us then turn to Christian salvation and discover what, precisely, it consists of and how it brings about the desired transformation.

Man is Reconciled: Saviourism

CHRISTIANITY IS THE RELIGION OF REDEMPTION

Christianity has been appropriately called "the religion of redemption". This is a title well earned. For no religion has emphasized the need for redemption nor satisfied that need more than Christianity. Redemption is a notion common to almost all religions. Every religion conceives of man as standing in a predicament; and every religion claims to have means of pulling him out of a state that it has deemed undesirable, and of putting him in one that it deems desirable and blessed. Christianity is unique in that it has made redemption its be-all and end-all; in that it has woven a divine scheme of redemption into the very nature of the Godhead; and thirdly, in bringing the whole of cosmic history and destiny into sharp

focus in what it claims to be the single, unique, and final redemptive event. In order better to appreciate this aspect of Christianity, let us compare it, in this matter, with Islam.

The advent of Islam into the world and history, in the revelation of God's Holy Book, the Qur'an, to His Prophet, Muhammad, is also regarded by Muslims everywhere as a single unique and final redemptive event. But, a closer look will reveal that the two events are widely different. It was not the first time that God was revealing His Holy Book. For the 'Holy Book' is a body of ideas, a sublime but conceptual expression in ideational terms of God's will. He had revealed it to Abraham, to Moses, to Jesus, and to an unknown number of Prophets of other peoples, before revealing it to Muhammad. True, the revelation of Muhammad was the most perfect and complete; but the revelations God had sent to other Prophets were exactly of the same quality, namely, divine. All of them contained the essence and core of God's true religion, though they may have been relational to the peoples, periods, and places, in which they came. Islam, therefore, calls these other revelations "Islam, the true religion of God," and calls the men to whom it was revealed "Muslims". Every one of these revelations satisfies the prerequisites of such a title, above all, that of containing the essence and core of God's true religion. Every one of the men to whom revelation came satisfies the prerequisites of Muslimness. Hence, neither the prophets of the past nor their revelations are any less genuine than Muhammad and his revelation. It is for the sake of emphasizing and safeguarding this status that Muhammad's revelation was declared by God as one among many, though the last and most complete. That the revelation of Muhammad, and hence of Islam, was not the first, rehabilitates at once the pre-Muhammad, religious experience of mankind, grants it a unique autonomy and dignity and establishes between itself and them a relation of contentual identity. On the other hand, the uniqueness of the Christ-revelation sweeps away all the pre-Christ religious experience of mankind save that of the Jesus which it merely utilizes as an expedient, instrument, and means leading to itself. This contrasts sharply with the uniqueness of the revelation of Muhammad which consists in its degree of completeness. Certainly, Christianity holds that it is the real, living God, 'its' God, that revealed Himself to Abraham and to Moses. But it also holds that God did not communicate the Christ-revelation to either. He commanded them, and they obeyed; but they have never known the content of His mind, His message to man, which is Jesus Christ. Even the grand style Prophets of Judaism, Isaiah and Jeremiah, had according to the Christian view but the smallest glimpse of what God was about. No Prophet has ever had the essence of the Christian revelation revealed to him by God. One and all were, in the Christian view,

mere tools more or less advanced instruments, of the Christ-revelation. No revelation before Jesus' is worthy of the name 'Christian'; and however Christianity may honour Abraham and Moses, the uniqueness of its revelation never permits it to call them Christian as Islam calls them and Jesus, Muslims. Christianity's Christ-revelation is one event, the essence of which had never been revealed before it itself had taken place.

Second, the Christ-revelation is the redemptive act of God. Islam too, holds that the revelation of Muhammad is the redemptive act of God. As the Christ-revelation redeemed man from bondage to sin, so the revelation of Muhammad redeemed man from bondage to *shirk*, (associationism), or *kufr* (ungodliness or un-faith). However, the redemptive effect of the revelation of Muhammad is only an effect; it is not constitutive of Islam. Islam grants that to be redeemed is positively to be redeemed from something; that this something must be evil, undesirable, unworthy. Further, it grants that to be redeemed from that evil is good and necessary; but such redemption is not the end-all. There is yet the task of doing and achieving the good. This is why Islam does not identify itself as the religion of redemption. It claims to redeem; but having redeemed, it quickly passes over to the task of doing the Will of God, and bringing about positive results. This characterization of Islam implies that it regards redemption as the passage from a danger present, a determination by disvalue, to a neutral state. Passage from that state to one in which determination is by value, requires different powers and is always contingent upon the first transition. The first, however, does not necessarily imply the second.

Christianity, too, is not satisfied with a redemption which means only the first transition, but regards redemption as necessarily meaning both passages. It argues, rightly, that nobody can stand in the neutral, 'zero' zone, but, after his first passage must either move forward into the region of positive action or lapse back into the region of sin. To be redeemed at all, one must complete the two passages. Genuine as this argument may appear, it confuses the level of thought. For though no man may actually stand in the zero zone, and men pass as swiftly from the first zone into the second without 'loitering' in between, the zero zone is indispensable for our thought, for our analysis and conceptualization of religious experience. It amounts not to a section of real spacetime, but is a thin partition distinguishing two categories of religious experience, rather than two actual states of the soul, namely, the category of 'redemption from' and that of 'redemption for'. Granted that the Christ-revelation has achieved both, they cannot be lumped together in one concept; and Christianity itself, no sooner has it finished talking about Jesus' redemption of man than it starts exhorting him to obey a thousand and one commandments

of God whether summarized in the one-word categorical imperative 'love' or elaborated in volumes of 'divine law'.

And yet, although Christianity can never do without exhortations to virtue, it must insist that it is the religion of redemption. It does so because it feels that in the redeeming act of Jesus Christ, man's greatest battle, his war, against the greatest evil, sin, has been won once and for all. This is why for a Christian, the very fact that he is a Christian, that is to say, the very fact that he recognizes Jesus Christ as redeemer, weighs heavily in the scales. It gives him the assurance and the poise that comes from such assurance, that he is 'saved', already 'passed' deep into the second zone, and not merely lifted out of the first. This is why Christianity is stubborn in refusing to accept a redemption that is only a 'redemption from'. This is why it maintains, against ordinary logic, that passage from the first zone necessarily implies passage into the second. Despite therefore all evidence to the contrary—such evidence being as authoritative as the Pauline command,¹⁴⁰ "Work out your salvation with fear and trembling"—Christianity must hold that the Christ-revelation event did in fact achieve the complete salvation, the two kinds of redemption. Why must it do so? is a very significant question which we shall discuss shortly. Suffice it here to convince ourselves that Christianity does hold this thesis and in so doing, it differs widely from Islam. It is precisely its holding this thesis that entitles it to be preeminently the religion of redemption. This unique distinction of Christianity, though, is fraught with the greatest danger. Islam holds no sweet, immediate recompense to give its convert gratuitously upon conversion. On the contrary, it tells him point blank that his acceptance of Islam puts him squarely in the zero zone and lays out before him the arduous road of the Shari'ah, or Divine Law, which he has yet to tread in order to lift himself out of the zero zone by his own efforts. The very name of the faith, "Islam," is an active verb, *aslama*, which means to subject oneself in obedience to the divine commands, in short, to carry out the commands. Such a usage is impossible not only in the English language, but for the Christian religious consciousness. According to Christianity, one does not become a Christian by 'christ-ing', nor by the *Imitatio Christi*; but by believing that Jesus is the Christ. Therefore, whereas the Muslim comes out from his encounter with God conscious mainly of the fact that the greatest task lies ahead and that this is to be fulfilled in his ethical conduct, the Christian comes out from his encounter with God pleased, satisfied, proud, and relieved that the greatest task was done and is behind him. True, he comes out feeling that he has now become God's 'fellow' and this imposes duties upon him. Nonetheless, or precisely because he feels he has now become a fellow of the Godhead, he stands reassured, as it

were, that he can do what he wills, and that his new status will favourably affect anything he may do. At any rate, his new fellowship with God affects in some important degree, the nature of the moral imperative; and he regards his ethical burden and vocation as substantially different from those of the non-Christian. The common argument that morality is everywhere the same, that the ought is always identical, and that the difference between the ought of a Christian and that of a non-Christian is only one of outlook, robs redemption of its real power, of its claimed 'ontic' significance if all the difference between an ought apprehended by a Christian and one apprehended by a non-Christian is that in the former case it is looked upon as the proper conduct of a person who is redeemed and in the latter, that it is looked upon as the proper conduct of a person who has not yet been redeemed, then redemption itself is only a change of ways of looking at morality, a purely mental attitude. To be redeemed therefore is not a real, ontic phenomenon, as Christian doctrine claims, but to think differently; and the Christ-event was only the teacher of a new mental state, an implication obstinately rejected by all Christians. The Muslim is thus by nature moralistic, an activist, and a futurist; the Christian is by nature complacent, a passivist, and a proclaimer of an event past. The former is like the tautly-drawn bow, ready for the arrow; the latter is like the soldier whose chest and arm and feet are weighed down by the prizes of past victories.

Third, for Christianity, redemption is the nature of God. We have seen how Christian redemption affects man; it remains for us to see how it affects God. We have observed earlier that the Christ-revelation was a unique event to which every other divine act must have been a means. It is the event for which the whole of cosmic history has been the introduction and instrument. Indeed, it is the event for which creation itself was the necessary, but nonetheless subordinate, condition. For Christianity holds that Jesus Christ is God and that he is God, i.e. co-eternal with God, not as Father or Holy Ghost but as Christ. This clearly means that the Christ-revelation was not an event, even the most important event *in* history, but the event for the sake of which there has ever been any history—indeed, for the sake of which there has been any creation—at all. For God to be Christ in eternity, means that a plan has existed in eternity in which God, as Jesus, shall be baptized, anointed, crucified, and resurrected. This is why the Christian feels that what came to pass in the Christ-event was the revelation of divine nature. It was not God merely commanding something to be done; nor, as in Islam, communicating His will to man, but revealing all that divine nature itself which is relevant for man. It is natural, then, if the Christ-event was the nature of the Godhead, that any action undertaken by God would be one in which

the Christ-event necessarily takes the place of consummation and apogee. It necessarily means that the Christ-revelation event was planned in eternity. Not only that it must have been in God's mind in creation, but that creation itself was its 'occasion' and 'field'.

Islam, too, one may argue regards the revelation of Muhammad as the most important event in history. This is true. But this revelation is only one among many. Its importance must then be a function of its degree of completeness, of its perfection. However, Islam too claims that the revelation of Muhammad is eternal. Nonetheless it should be noted at once that Islam entertains no illusions about an eternity of Muhammad's person. When the Prophet lay dead in his house before burial and some Muslims—including the great 'Umar al Faruq, Second Caliph—began to murmur that Muhammad did not die, Abu Bakr al Siddiq, the first Caliph, reprimanded them in words which could not have been harder. "O Muslims," he told them, "if ye are worshippers of Muhammad, then know that Muhammad is dead. But if ye are worshippers of God, then know that God is alive and never passeth."¹⁴¹ That which Islam regards as eternal is not Muhammad but the Holy Book, the Qur'an, its meaning, its truth, for that is nothing but the will of God, or *God-in-percipi*.

The revelation of Muhammad has determined for Islam the nature of the will of God, of *God-in-percipi*, and this nature is the body of meanings, of values and of truth of which the Qur'an is the expression. The Christ-revelation, on the other hand, has determined for Christianity the nature of God Himself, of *God-in-esse*. A body of commands, of meanings, of truths can be the will of God. Their eternity is derivative from God's. They are not 'co-eternal'; not eternal 'with' God, but eternal *as* His attributes, His will, His command. Only God, God the One, is eternal *simpliciter*. Whatever else is eternal must be a derivative of Him. Christianity, on the other hand, eternalizes the revelation of Christ not as a system of ideas that may be God's will, but as the Christ-event. This is a real event in real space-time, and its subject is a human person who was born, who ate, slept, and died, like any other human. Obviously, this cannot be eternalized as a derivative of God; and Christianity consistently argues that Christ (i.e. his significance) is not the will of God, nor His command, nor His idea, but God Himself, or rather God co-eternal with God. Christianity is driven to this deifying hypostasis because what it eternalizes is a real person and a real event. A real person may be co-eternal *with* God, but not derivatively eternal without violating the law of identity. But to violate the law of identity in this instance is to lapse into polytheism. Hence, Christianity, anxious to preserve the eternality of the Christ-revelation, got itself embroiled in the insuperable difficulties of a trinitarian theology whereas, the eternalization of the Holy Qur'an as will

of God enabled Islam to preserve a thoroughgoing and pure monotheism.¹⁴² Christianity, then, holds the view that the Christ-revelation is the supreme moment in the Godhead itself, however complicated the implications of this position may be and however the various denominations of Christendom may have attempted to interpret them.

The overall meaning, therefore, of Christianity being called the religion of redemption, is that it holds as absolute truth, the following two premises: First, in the Christ-event, God has reconciled and therefore redeemed man and the world to Himself, from whom they were alienated by man's sin; and that all that is necessary for the reconciliation and redemption of man and the world has been completed. Second, now that redemption is a *fait accompli*, the morally imperative is that men live as redeemed fellows in continuous communion and fellowship with the Godhead, until God decides to put an end to this temporary interlude of man in the realm of real existence.

This is what I shall call the thesis of 'saviourism'¹⁴³ and which we shall analyse in the sequel.

THE NATURE OF SAVIOURIST SALVATION

We have seen that redemption presupposes something from which it supposedly redeems man. This something, we have discussed in the previous section of this chapter. We have observed that sin had grown in Christian minds from being the evil act of a given man to the existential predicament of man in general and of the whole of creation. This progressive growth of sin can be matched by the progressively growing notion of redemption.¹⁴⁴ For the two are correlates. It was natural for Christians to seek to elevate Christ; and the higher they elevated him, the higher they had to elevate the evil from which he had supposedly redeemed mankind. This necessary correlation, empirically demonstrable and obvious to the reader of the histories of both notions, at once casts a shadow of suspicion on the legitimacy of the saviourist exaltation of both sin and Christ. There is, in that exaltation, something of the mechanical, of the arbitrary—indeed of the *Münchhausenlich*.¹⁴⁵

At all events, the most universally held notion of the nature of that from which redemption had taken place is death. This, as old as it is Biblical, is as modern as it is existential. But 'death' too underwent in this context a similar distension of meaning. In the Old Testament, physical death was the greatest evil,¹⁴⁶ and a long life was the greatest blessing.¹⁴⁷ Redemption was then conceived of as the granting by God to man of a long life replete with fruits, children, and property.¹⁴⁸

Christians claim, however, that the Old Testament shows, in addition,

evidence of a deeper understanding of death and redemption. The evil to be delivered from is sin, or moral alienation; and redemption is restoration to a life of ethical goodness. This is true only under the Christian interpretation which purges the Old Testament of its racialist nonsense. Viewed objectively, the so-called moral element in the Old Testament is a purely racialist element, as we have seen. But if Israel means the God-determined, new community of saints, rather than the racialistic society of an Ezra, then the Christian claim is indubitably right. It is in the New Testament that, both the objective scholar and the Christian agree, this deepening of the meaning of death and restoration has taken place. The New Testament attitude to suffering, for instance, exemplified in II Corinthians 12: 9-10,¹⁴⁹ is itself evidence of the deepening in question. No Old Testament Prophet could have said words such as these.

Another aspect in which redemption radically differs in the New Testament from the Old Testament is that the former conceives of it as present, as a blessing to be immediately dispensed, not as a distant event to take place at some future time. For the racialist it was necessary to conceive of redemption as a historical event which can come only in the future. But in the interiorized ethic of Jesus, every person may be redeemed immediately who cares to satisfy the requisite of radical self-transformation. To the Christian, salvation is not something 'not-yet', but a present experience. It is, historically, a past experience; but he relives it in his daily act of worship. For him, redemption is an entry into the divine fellowship which nothing can interrupt or prevent. It is necessary, once he has committed the act of faith; and this necessity is at the root of his complacency. It is inseparable from redemption as a *fait accompli*.

Christians usually add, in addition to these observations that their notion of redemption is particularly different from that of other religions in that its reason is the sheer mercy of God. It is not a reward meted out in judgement, the consequent of a universal 'if then' order under which man obeys the command and God grants, in stern justice, the recompense, or promise due, which is the characteristic of some aspects of Hebrew religion but the peculiar distinction of Islam. Islam, too, teaches the mercy of God and proclaims His merciful acts from every lip. The most frequently called-upon name of God in Islam is *Al Rahman*, i.e. the merciful, and the second name is *Al Rahim*, i.e. the always merciful. But God's mercy does not necessarily run counter to justice. He is merciful and just. However, where mercy and justice conflict, justice is always the higher value in all matters pertaining to creation as a whole. This cannot be otherwise. For if creation is to stand, it must be an orderly one. But order cannot proceed from, or be based upon, mercy. A cosmos in which mercy is the absolute law of being would not be a cosmos, but a chaos. Neither

is the Christian claim that in God, mercy is higher than justice true. It is commonly held only by the unenlightened. True, the Christ-event does point to the very high place mercy occupies in the list of divine attributes. But it is not evidence that mercy is the highest, or as the claim goes, that it is the very nature of God. For, if the claim were true, there must be a higher principle which requires that God would do his all-merciful act in the Christ-event. The positions 'Sin *had* to be counteracted', 'man *had* to be ransomed', 'Jesus *had* to die and be resurrected if redemption is to be,' necessarily imply and are impossible without such higher principle. This principle is that of justice. Justice, therefore, is the *more conditioned*, and hence the higher, value. On the other hand, to claim that God *had* to die because God is merciful, is too shallow a self-contradiction to stand.

According to some, the death of Christ is a suffering which has been justly inflicted upon the man, Jesus Christ, as the voluntary representative and *typos* of mankind, in satisfaction of a debt, or obligation due by mankind for their sin. The act of Jesus is sacrifice; the act of God the Father who sent Jesus is mercy, and the act of God who demanded that the Father do something in expiation, is justice. All the other qualities of the Christ-revelation are subordinate to this, that God demanded it as retribution and that Jesus carried it out as expiation. But this view presents great difficulties.

The first difficulty is that this theory of redemption and of justice as a whole, implies that pain—a spectrum of pains ranging from light physical discomfort to death, or complete destruction of physical life—is an adequate retribution for moral evil. From a purely Christian point of view, pain is, and should never be returned for evil, however great the evil is. From an ethical point of view, the infliction of pain is an injustice, a disturbance of the flow of life which cannot, by nature, undo a previous disturbance. Even the educational value of the infliction of pain is questionable; on the spectator's side, it hardens man's ethos and often warps it. For, the value of infliction of pain is, to the spectator, an altogether different value from that of the sufferer. From the latter's side, the value of experiencing pain is realized in the rare cases only, since most men are broken under its weight. Where it is realized, however, it is purely a personal value, exclusively and ineffably apprehended by the sufferer alone. It can not therefore be said to constitute a retribution, much less, an undoing of the wrong it is supposed to compensate.

The second difficulty is presented by the vicariousness of Christ's suffering. If it is moral evil that is involved—and there is no doubt that it is,—then nobody can atone for anyone else. The father atoning for his child's or dog's mischief to the neighbours' yard by expressing sorrow and

offering to replace the damaged shrub, to buy another pet, to repair the ruined toy, is a ridiculous analogy. A moral evil, which is a determination of the inner self of the moral agent, can not be touched, let alone expiated, by anything external to that self, be it another man or God. Such expiation begins and ends within the soul of the evil-perpetrator. Nobody can do it for him. Christianity does indeed require repentance as redemption's first and necessary condition.¹⁵¹ Indeed, Christianity asks even more than repentance. It asks faith, a faith which it understands as surpassing belief, as one involving an act of will and issuing in obedience, which is all wonderful. But if repentance is complete in these senses, then *ipso facto*, all that is necessary for expiation and salvation of the moral subject is complete. Christ's expiation would then be superfluous.

According to other Christians, the Christ-revelation has achieved redemption in that it has furnished the whole world with the most perfect—indeed divine—example of obedience to and faith in God, of repentance and expiation of sin, such that mankind is moved by the appeal of the real example, to realize like obedience, faith, repentance, and expiation. Under this view, the value of the Redemptive act of Jesus is wholly didactic. Such is the view of liberal Christian thinkers in every generation.¹⁵²

This didactic view of the atonement is unquestionably true. Even its opponents criticize it not as altogether false but as inadequate, thus tacitly recognizing the element of truth it contains. The didactic value of the Christ-revelation may not be limited to Jesus' condemnation at the hands of the racist Pharisees, but should apply indiscriminately to all his life, his sayings, and actions. True, that life came to a crisis and a consummation in the events of Good Friday, but the nature of the moving power that issues from one realization of value is not different from that which issues from another, however they may differ in intensity. It is the same kind of being, or mode of being, to which they both belong. Moreover, this view correctly understands the ineffably personal character of repentance and of moral transformation which is what we have discovered to be the essence of the Christian ethic, the breakthrough of Jesus.

But if this view is true, then redemption is purely an ideational affair and Jesus Christ is not the saviour who has saved, but the teacher by example *par excellence*.¹⁵³ The redemption he has brought about is not a *fait accompli*, but a way of life and conduct which man ought to emulate. His position is identical with that of Socrates who taught, lived, and died the way that all men who can, ought to, live and die. In this view conversion to Christianity, would then mean the mental and emotional judgement that Jesus' way is the right way. It is not something that happens to the convert, but a change of mind which he achieves. Christianity, however,

would not call man redeemed if all he did were to approve Jesus' method of living and dying as the good way; and soon, it would willingly drop its title of 'Religion of Redemption' because it would not be any more so than Buddhism or Islam. Furthermore, there would be no need for any mystery in redemption; certainly not for Jesus to be anything more than the saint, the genius, the inspired man—in short the Prophet that he was. Saviourism asserts that Jesus is God because of the impossibility of any human being doing what he has done. And it asserts that what Jesus has done is a genuine, though mysterious, accomplished redemption because he is a God, and not a man, at work. The didactic view of redemption pulls the carpet from under both claims at once.

The didactic value of the life of Christ on earth is naturally not all one of discursive instruction, i.e. of communication of abstract concepts for the use of the understanding. Besides these, the greater part of that significance is constituted by Jesus' provision of the real-existents which are instances of the values he apprehended and sought to teach, and then letting these values shine out, as it were, of their real-instances and affect the beholder directly and immediately. This is no mean or facile strategy, but the most powerful; and its influence reaches the greatest number of people. The person of the hero does far more to affect people in favour of heroism, or the values he has realized in his heroic acts, than a whole pile of conceptual analyses of these values, however elaborate; and one work of art does more to affect people in favour of its aesthetic value than a load of conceptual dissertations on aesthetics. Jesus was the master of this strategy *par excellence*. Even his teachings, which are supposed to be conceptual, use concepts not in order to produce a direct intuition of the values in question but, poetically to construct in the imagination a picture of the real-instance of value, and then enable that imaginary real-instance to produce, like any other real-instance, an aesthetic intuition of the value realized. The significant life of Jesus Christ, his three-year ministry, consists of no more than applications of that same strategy. Whether we regard it as the work of God or of Jesus' genius, that life was systematically laid out so as to bring into the real world, a genuinely efficacious and moving power, namely, the moving appeal of values realized in the real-instance which is his life. That this power is divine, nobody can deny; for that is precisely the kind of stuff of which the power of the Will of God insofar as man is concerned, is made of. That Jesus had that power to a preeminently high degree is also indubitable; not because Jesus was God, or metaphysically superior to or different from man, but simply because his life, with all its real moments, was saturated with the high personal, moral values of which his whole career is the expression. Other prophets, heroes, saints, and geniuses exercised the

same kind of power, each according to the values which he had realized.

This power of value to jump out, as it were, from the real-instance in which it is realized and to pervade and determine the consciousness of the beholder so as to impel him to give it another real-existent instancing it, and to repeat this self-realization, *ad infinitum*, is called in Arabic, *ta'addi*, or transitivity, of virtue and of the good. It is undoubtedly what Horace Bushnell had in mind but miscalled "the vicariousness of Jesus Christ's sacrifice."¹⁵⁴ It is the substratum of his agreement with McLeod Campbell of the older generation, and A. C. Knudson and G. Harkness of the new. The penitence of Christ, Campbell tells us, avails mankind by the moral influence of his example. To behold the sacrifice of Jesus Christ is, he affirms, gradually to bring out in each of us, first the conviction that we ought to repent, then the desire to repent, and finally, our own repentance.¹⁵⁵ Bushnell used Campbell's discovery of 'transitivity' and, replaced his specific 'repentance' with the general moral transformation which, we have found, is the ideal of the Jesus' ethic. Bushnell set out to analyze the nature and possibility of substitution in religion and ethics in order to give a rational interpretation of the saviourist notion of Jesus' vicarious suffering. What he succeeded in doing was to demonstrate the transitivity of value. After an inspired description of the events of Christ-revelation, Bushnell concludes that in a spiritual religion such as Christianity, substitution cannot take place on any real-existential or ontological level, but only on the moral. The analogy with Christ's substitution ought not to be made with the law court but with the family because only here does substitution take place within the sphere of relationships that is the moral-spiritual. The atmosphere of the family is governed by love; and it is in this government, rather than in that of the law courts, that the principle which makes the analogy enlightening operates. This principle, which is an important content of love, is that of identification of the lover with the object loved and his transformation by the new influence to which, by loving, he has made himself subject. Bushnell drew on the experience of motherhood, of friendship, of patriotism in illustration of the principle of identification. Indeed, he finds this principle not only pervading the range of human experience,¹⁵⁶ but exemplified everywhere in the universe. It is then a cosmic law, he concludes, and the moral order of creation is based on the principle of 'vicarious sacrifice' whose symbol and index is the cross and which is a perfection of God, a divine attribute, from eternity.¹⁵⁷

Obviously, this is unwarranted construction. Bushnell's enthusiasm for the discovery of the transitivity of moral values has mingled with his Christianist zeal to justify the saviourist thesis. In the first place, it is the lover who undergoes transformation by the moving appeal of

values realized in the loved one and not *vice versa*. As lover, he is 'the higher potentiality'; whereas the loved one, is for him 'the higher actuality'. In this relation, the loved one, as higher actuality, moves and transforms; the lover, as higher potentiality, is moved and transformed, though the language inverts this direction of moving power by calling the lover by an active verbal noun and his act, by an active verb. The loved one does not suffer any transformation in this process unless he or she loves in turn, and thus reverses the flow of moving appeal from one pole to the other. The love relation between humans usually involves both these directions at once, but not necessarily. For the Majnun Layla which Arabic poetry had made famous is not an unusual, and certainly not unique, phenomenon.

In the case of Jesus Christ, there is no doubt that he loved men. But there are very, very few persons in his life whom he could be said to have loved in the sense of suffering, as higher potentiality, transformation at their hand as the higher actuality. Even there, the men and women of whom Jesus was fond were persons who have merely realized some of the values that ranked high in his esteem. They were not persons who have determined Jesus in the fashion (though not in the kind of determination) in which a Heathcliff is said to have determined a Catherine.¹⁵⁸ Jesus loved the values themselves in their ideality directly and immediately. He did not need to seek them in their real-existent instances in the world. He was a Prophet of God; and as Prophet, it was his peculiar power and distinction to see what God has revealed to him immediately. God revealed to him His will and that is precisely the moral value. It is then far from precise to say that Jesus loved men. What he loved was not the real-existent humans but 'humanity', or man as he ought to be.

The relation into which Jesus is more properly said to have entered is the opposite. He is the loved one, not the lover. And he is loved precisely because 'humanity' is realized in him, and he is its real-existent instance. As loved one, he is the higher actuality, the active agent, and men who see him as the real-existent instance of higher moral value and consequently love him are the higher potentialities in which the moral, radical, inner transformation of self takes place. Hence, there is no sense in which Jesus may be said to have suffered vicariously; and Bushnell's desire to deduce 'vicarious sacrifice' from the transitiveness of value, sacrifice to cosmic comprehensiveness and his attribution of it to the Godhead whose will is pure actuality, is an exaggeration prompted by his saviourist inclinations.

Redemption, as something ontic, cannot be moral or spiritual, but legal, penal, and governmental. As ontic, therefore, and as legal, it cannot leave any opportunity for ethical spiritual transformation which,

like every moral endeavour then becomes superfluous. If Jesus died for man and his sins are paid for once and for all what need is there even for repentance, indeed, for being a Christian at all? It is pointless there to speak of a 'thank you ethic', of a saintly conduct which man observes in gratitude for a favour done to him. For, if the thank you ethic is not observed, the result is ingratitude, a shortage of sensitivity, certainly not sin and damnation, a thesis which saviourism must deny if it is to remain consistent with itself. But in this scheme of things, man remains a puppet. He is saved but not by his own agency, just as he had sinned, compelled by the necessity of creation being what it is. As a puppet, it is no wonder that the Christian who is a consistent saviourist is wide open to the spiritually fatal attacks of ethical complacency. It cannot be denied, for instance, that what European Christendom had allowed itself to do *vis-à-vis* the non-Christian world during the last five centuries, not to speak of what it did in the earlier centuries after the Nicene Council in A.D., 325 is an effect of that self-righteousness which saviourism breeds and nourishes.

From this mortal enemy of morality, this phantom companion of saviourism which says 'wait a while', and 'there is no real need' and sometimes even a flat 'no' to the human sense of duty, to the healthy anxiety which the apprehension of value and the ought always brings in its wake, and to the moral enthusiasm which distinguishes the higher from the lower in humanity, saviourism has no escape except through paradox. Man is indeed saved, it tells us, but he still has to save himself, to work out his salvation. Saviourist Christians claim that such language is meaningful; but I have not yet read or heard anything substantiating this long claim.

Notes

1. English edition by SCM Press, London, 1956, 128 small size pages.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 24, 33, 37, 38, 40.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
5. "The Gospels were written at a time when Christians could look back and glory in the Cross as ordained by the purpose of God." Thus writes D. M. Baillie, in answering the question, "Why did Jesus die?" in his *God Was in Christ, An Essay on Incarnation and Atonement*, London: Faber paperback, 1961, p. 181. Apparently, Baillie is not worried by the implication of this admission, namely, that if the Gospels were written at a time when their authors had already fallen under the spell of the Christianist transvaluation of Jesus, it is only natural that they should bring their Christianity into their accounts of the life of Jesus, thus making them less trustworthy as the records of the life-events of the historical Jesus. The value

of Baillie's unwilling admission for the historical criticism of the Gospels is inestimable.

6. For authoritative presentation of the teachings of Christian Science, see Mary Baker Eddy's (the founder of the sect) *Science and Health*, which, for the adherents, is holy scripture on a level with the Bible and is read in their churches as liturgy.
7. A good case could be, and has been made for Gnosticism's direct responsibility for the Fourth Gospel and a fair portion of the corpus of Pauline and other Apostolic pronouncements. See Rudolph Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament*, tr. by K. Grobel, London: SCM Press. 1958, II, 3-92.
8. For a further analysis of the Catholic View, see *infra*, pp. 219-20; 242-43.
9. Plutarch, *De Isis et Osiris*, p. 47.
10. For the teachings of Zoroastrianism see, in addition to the *Zend Avesta* and the encyclopaedic literature, J. H. Moulton, *The Teaching of Zarathustra*, second edition, Bombay, 1917; Otto G. Wesendonk, *Das Weltbild der Iranier*, München: E. Reinhardt, 1933; and J. Duchesne-Guillemin, *Zoroastre*, Paris: G. P. Maisonneuve, 1948.
11. Psalms, 130:3.
12. Psalms, 143:2.
13. Psalms, 143:3, 4. These and the previously quoted psalm are assigned by some scholars to the Persian or early Greek period. See Charles Augustus Briggs, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Psalms*, New York: Scribner's, 1906 7, II, p. 4. Buttenwieser, a Jew, attributes this psalm to late pre-exilic times, but is careful to view it in opposition to "the blind materialism of the degenerate masses...from the rise of Amos [circa 760] down to the fall of Jerusalem in 586 B. C." (Moses Buttenwieser, *The Psalms*, University of Chicago Press, 1938. p. 186) The "degenerate masses", however, are themselves the Jews and he does not apparently care to consider the nature of their degeneracy. For our thesis, therefore, his and the like evidence remains besides the point.
14. Psalms, 51:5.
15. See the (Ethiopic) *Book of Enoch*, chapters 12-36.
16. Book of Jubilees, see particularly, 3:17-35.
17. Consider for example the *Book of the Wisdom of Solomon*, 2:23.
18. "By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned" (Romans, 5:12).
19. Genesis 3:5, 22, 27.
20. Qur'an, 2:30-32. For fuller comparison of the Qur'anic and Christian approaches to Hebrew Scripture, see this author's "A Comparison of the Islamic and Christian Approaches to Hebrew Scripture," *Journal of Bible and Religion*, XXXI, No. 3 (October 1963), 283-93.
21. Qur'an, 20:116-9.
22. Qur'an, 20:120-2.
23. Qur'an, IV: 118-20; CXIV: 3-6.
24. This is the considered judgement of Norman P. Williams, foremost Christian authority on the doctrine of the fall.
25. Matthew 4:17; Mark, 1:15.
26. Matthew 18:23-25, 16-19.
27. Luke 13:1-5.
28. Matthew 7:11; 12:16-19, 15:19; Mark 7:21-22; Luke 11:13; 6:43-45.
29. *Supra*, pp. 78ff, 80ff, 91ff, 110ff, 119ff.
30. Before his conversion, Paul, whose pre-conversion name was Saul, was an arch-

conservative Jew, a Pharisee in full alliance with that Sanhedrin which condemned Jesus to death. He was commissioned by that body to prosecute the disciples of Jesus and stamp out the danger that threatened to split Jewry. That he distinguished himself in this work is clearly shown by the New Testament account of his conversion (The Acts 9:1-27). On a trip to Damascus for which he volunteered in order to bring "slaughter against the disciples of the Lord" (The Acts 9:1), he suffered a stroke which left him blind but during which he saw an appearance of Jesus. The Acts report that Jesus had asked him, "Why persecutest thou me?" Consternated, Paul retorted, "Who art thou, Lord?" to which Jesus answered, "I am Jesus whom thou persecutest." Suggesting that Jesus had overpowered Saul, it adds that Jesus exclaimed, "It is hard for thee to kick against the pricks" (The Acts, 9:4-5). Paul's contribution to Christian doctrine on this subject is found in a number of passages in his Epistles. The most relevant are Romans 5, 6, and 7, I Corinthians 15 and Galatians 5.

31. Romans 5:12; I Corinthians 15:21.
32. Romans 5:13-19.
33. Romans 5:13-14.
34. Romans 5:20.
35. That this was the run of Paul's reasoning in this passage is also held by Williams, p. 132, where he writes: "The doctrine of man and of sin which underlies the whole passage (Romans 5:12-21) should now be sufficiently clear. Man derived from Adam... by physical heredity, the poison of suppressed sinfulness which during four millennia or thereabout... from Adam unto Moses... was unable to find its natural outlet in law-breaking, because there was no law to break. [That in pre-Mosaic days there was no law to break is, to say the least, a rather uninstructed opinion. For how could Israel have been an Israel maintaining its identity in Egypt and the patriarchal age to the extent of making an Exodus and a Mosaic adventure possible if there were no law by which its ideological identity could be safeguarded and perpetrated? Besides, Israel, was not unlike the other members of the Semitic family of nomocracies.] The Mosaic Law was then applied to mankind, as a sort of sharp, stinging fomentation, designed to bring this innate but suppressed poison up to the surface of the individual consciousness, so that it might discharge itself in the shape of actual sins. Sin, having been thus externalized and concretized, could then be dealt with on forensic lines, by means of a judicial atonement and acquittal."
36. I Corinthians 1:19-20.
37. Isaiah 29:14; 33:18; 44:25.
38. I Corinthians 1:21-23.
39. I Corinthians 1:26-28.
40. "But I fear, lest by any means, as the serpent beguiled Eve through his subtilty, so your minds should be corrupted [seduced, beguiled] from the simplicity that is in Christ."
41. "And Adam was not deceived [beguiled, seduced] but the woman being deceived [beguiled, seduced] was in the transgression."
42. RSV, Romans 8:19-22.
43. William Sanday and A. C. Headlam, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*, New York: Scribner's, 1920, p. 212, where we read, in perfect flouting of the scientific fact that nature has existed for millions of years before man and his fall and will probably continue to exist after he has passed away: "There runs through his [Paul's] words an intense sympathy with nature in and for itself. He is one of those like St. Francis of Assisi to whom it is

given to read as it were the thoughts of plants and animals. He seems to lay his ear to the earth and the confused murmur which he hears has a meaning for him: it is creation's yearning for that happier state intended for it and of which it has been defrauded"—a perfect example of a poetry that has long done away with all reason.

44. Such is the interpretation of N. P. Williams which he gives after rejecting, for the same reasons as we do, the anthropomorphic conception of nature presented by Sanday and Headlam. See their *Critical Commentary*, pp. 158-59.
45. II Corinthians 12:7; 2:110; I Thessalonians 2:18; I Corinthians 7:5. In Colossians, 1:20, Paul wrote: "And, [the Father] having made peace through the blood of his cross, by him to reconcile all things unto himself; by him, I say, whether they be things in earth, or things in heaven," thus extending the benefits of the atonement to the distant heavenly realms to which he had distended sin so as to reach and envelop.
46. Ephesians 2:2.
47. II Corinthians 12:7.
48. And yet, it is difficult to understand the need which prompted Paul to call Jesus a man "in the likeness of sinful flesh" and to assert that God, "for sin, condemned sin in the flesh" (Romans, 8:3) unless flesh is *per se* sinful and evil. This is usually explained away as meaning a condemnation of the flesh on account of its natural tendency, or impulse, to transgress the law. That this 'tendency', 'concupiscence' or 'libido' can be the source of great art, of heroism, and genius, that it can be 'cultivated' and 'oriented' is an idea altogether absent from Paul whose mind runs here in perfect accord with Manichaean dualism of mind and body.
49. There is wide diversion among scholars as to the dates of the various writings that have come down to us from the hands of the Apostolic Fathers and which are commonly regarded to be the following: I and II Clement, or the first and second letters of Clement of Rome to the Corinthians; the letters of Ignatius of Antioch to the Ephesians, Magnesians, Trallians, Romans, Philadelphians, Smyrnaeans and to Polycarp; Polycarp's letter to the Philippians, the Martyrdom of Polycarp; the Didache, an anonymous teaching of the twelve apostles; the letter of Barnabas; an anonymous letter to Diognetus; and the Fragments of Papias; For texts and critical introductions see Kirsopp Lake, *The Apostolic Fathers*, London: Loeb Classical Library, 1917, 2 vols; L. Schopp, *The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation*, New York: Christian Heritage, 1948. The classical treatment of their chronology is to be found in Adolph Harnack's *Geschichte der Altchristlichen Literatur*, Leipzig: Heinrichs, 1893-1904, 2 vols.
50. Shepherd of Hermas, Mandate 8:1.
51. "When he [the angel of righteousness] comes into your heart he at once speaks with you of righteousness, of purity, of reverence, of self-control, of every righteous deed, and of all glorious virtue... [The Angel of wickedness] is ill tempered, and bitter and foolish... When the desire of many deeds and the luxury of much eating and drinking, and many feasts, and various and unnecessary foods, and the desire of women, and covetousness, and haughtiness, and pride and whatsoever things are akin and like to these... know that the angel of wickedness is with you." (Shepherd of Hermas, Mand. vi, 2:1-5).
52. Shepherd of Hermas, Sim., V. 6:7.
53. Shepherd of Hermas, Sim, V, 7:1.
54. II Clement, 5:5; 6:3, 7. As reason for this world-denial, II Clement betrays a motivation that is more 'absolute', more consonant with a Benthamite hedonistic calculus than with asceticism which Western Christianity was to develop in the

succeeding century. "How great torment," he exclaims in justifying his condemnation of this world, "the pleasures of the present entail" (II Clement, 10:4; 20:4).

55. Shepherd of Hermas, Sim, V, 7:2-3.
56. Shepherd of Hermas, Sim, V, 7:4.
57. "If no wormwood be put into the honey (i.e., the body) the honey is found to be sweet, and becomes valuable to the master" (Shepherd of Hermas, Mand. V, 1:5). Men with small lusts are not only ranked by him among the saved (Shepherd of Hermas, Sim, VIII, 10:1-2), but are even necessary for the building of the tower of God (Sim, IX, 9:2). Both the poor as well as the rich are saved in Hermas' scheme (Shepherd of Hermas, Sim, II, 7:8-9). In an almost diametrical opposition to the ethical insight of Jesus, Hermas exclaims: "Blessed are they who are wealthy and understand that their riches are from the Lord" (Sim., II:10).
58. Shepherd of Hermas, Sim. V, 1:3.
59. Shepherd of Hermas, Sim. V, 1:4.
60. See *supra*, ch. III, fn. 35, pp. 124-27.
61. I Clement's quotation of Job 14:1 (I Clement 17:4), viz., "No man is clean from defilement, not even if his life be but a single day," constitutes no evidence to the contrary. First it is a misquotation, and neither the true intent of Clement nor whether or not he really quoted that passage can be ascertained, Job 14:1 reads as follows: "Man that is born of a woman is of few days and full of trouble." Further on in the Epistle, Clement quotes more of the Book of Job in what seems to be an attempt to depreciate man's life, being, and innocence. "For what can mortal man do," he writes, "or what is the strength of him who is a child of earth.... Shall a mortal be pure before the Lord.... Yea, [Clement adds in a fit of exaggeration] the heaven is not pure before him" (I Clement, 39:4). But no sooner has he said all this than he gives the cause of all this human unworth. "He [God] breathed on them [men] and they died because they had no wisdom.... Wrath destroyed the foolish and envy putteth to death him that is in error." (I Clement, 39:6-7) Thus, the lack of wisdom, foolishness, envy, and error are all after-birth developments and make sin acquired, rather than innate. Secondly, in its context, all Clement's quotation of Job 14:1 purports to say is that man's need for humility is universal and eternal. Even the perfect (such as Job and others were), so runs Clement's thought in this section, have recognized the need for humility. Don't you too, men of Corinth, need to be humble?
62. See Williams, p. 177, n. 3, where Williams confirms, after surveying all the so-called allusions to a fall doctrine in the Apostolic Fathers. "None of these allusions... yields any testimony to the existence of a Fall-doctrine" [such as Christianity was later to have] and finds himself compelled to conclude that "on the whole, the proportion which the various ideas of the Faith bear to each other in such sub-Apostolic literature as actually survives does roughly represent the balance of the collective mind of Christendom as it existed during this epoch." (*Ibid.*, p. 178).
63. See *infra*, pp. 169-72.
64. Romans 7:22-23.
65. Phaedrus, pp. 246 ff.
66. For a masterly presentation of this work of Philo, see Harry A. Wolfson, *Philo*, 2 vols., Harvard University Press, 1947, I, Chap. I.
67. Consider his *De Principiis*, II, 9, where refusing to admit any malevolence or change to the Creator, he asserts, in typical plotinist fashion, that the creatures constitute a *Henad* or Unity illuminated by the Divine Logos, in virtue of their

identity of nature and operation.

68. *On Baptism*, 18.

69. *De Anima*, Ch. 23-41.

70. His concluding chapters of *De Spectaculis* have been alluded to by E. Gibbon (*Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, London: Methuen and Co., 1913, Chap. XV, n. 73, II, 27) who called them an "infernal description" and begged the reader's leave not to quote them. Knowing the addiction of the ancients to the spectacles of the arena, Tertullian wrote addressing them: "If the literature of the stage delight you, we have literature in abundance of our own—plenty of verses, sentences, songs, proverbs.... Would you have also fighting and wrestlings? Well of these there is no lacking, and they are not of slight account.... Would you have something of blood too? You have Christ's.... Happy in the heavenly kingdom, they [the Christians] shall behold the tortures of the damned, in order that their own happiness may be more delightful.... Yet there remain other spectacles, that final and eternal day of judgement, that day unlooked for by the nations, that day scoffed at of men; when so great a legacy of antiquity, and so many births, shall be swallowed up in one fire. How vast will be the spectacle on that day! How I shall admire, how I shall laugh, how I shall rejoice, how I shall exult, when I behold so many proud kings and fancied gods, groaning in the lowest abyss of darkness; so many magistrates, who persecuted the name of the Lord, liquefying in fiercer fires than they ever kindled against the Christians; what wise and famous philosophers glowing in the same hot flames as their disciples... so many celebrated poets, trembling before the judgement seat... of an unexpected Christ! Then must we hear the tragedians speak more loudly, cry more piercingly, when the tragedy is their own: then must we recognize the comic actors, looser than ever when loosened by fire; then must we behold the charioteer all glowing in his chariot of fire, then must we contemplate the athletes displaying themselves not in the gymnasium but in the flames, unless even then I should rather not look at them, but feast my insatiable eyes upon those that have raged against the Lord.... What praetor or consul or pagan priest in his munificence will give thee the chance of gazing on such a sight, of exulting in such joys? And yet even now—at this hour—we have them by faith in the picturing of our imagination...." *De Spectaculis*, Ch. XXIX-XXX, ANF. III, 91.

71. Others excuse Augustine's terrible notions as exaggerations of the kind of man whom William James called 'twice born' as opposed to the sane and cool rationalism of the 'once born'. See his *Varieties of Religious Experience*, Ch. 8.

72. For such express defence of himself, see *De Dono Perseverantiae* (On the Gift of Perseverance) written in 428/29 Ch. 55, entitled "Testimony of His Previous Writings and Letters" in *Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers*, ed. by Philip Schaff, New York: Christian Literature Co., 1887, V, 548; *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum* (On the Predestination of the Saints) written in 428/29, Ch. 8, entitled "What Augustine wrote to Simplicianus, Successor of Ambrose, etc." in NPNF, V, 501.

73. *Ad Simplicianum*, I, g. 1:4 and 10. Quoted in Williams, p. 327.

74. *The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church*, art. on Augustine.

75. My authority on Pelagius has been Harnack, cf. his *History of Dogma*, tr. by Neil Buchanan, Boston: Little and Co., 1901, 7 vols., V, 191-203. Most of the material available on the Pelagian controversy has been written by the orthodox and must therefore be taken cautiously. However, we are fortunate in having some of Pelagius' own writings, which Alexander Souter edited and published under the title, *Pelagius Expositions of Thirteen Epistles of St. Paul*, Cambridge University Press, 3 vols, 1922-31.

76. Harnack, V, 171.
77. Augustine, *Contra Julianum*, II:35; *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, art. on Pelagianism.
78. *De Genesi ad Litteram* VI:30-36, 39; VIII:7, quoted by Williams, p. 360.
79. *De Genesi contra Manich.*, II:8; *De Genesi ad Litteram*, VI:36, IX:6, IX:10, quoted in Williams, pp. 362-64.
80. *Contra Julianum*, V:1, quoted by Williams, p. 361.
81. *On Rebuke and Grace*, 33, NPNF, V, 485.
82. *Contra Julianum*, I:71, quoted by Williams, p. 364.
83. *The Enchiridion*, XLV, NPNF, V, III, 252.
84. *On the Merits and Remission of Sins*, I:57, NPNF, V, 37.
85. *Contra Julianum*, V:52, quoted by Williams, p. 366.
86. Consider in this regard *On Original Sin*, 39-43, NPNF, V, 251-52.
87. *On Marriage and Concupiscence*, I:8; I:29; I:20-21, NPNF, V, 271-15; II:25, NPNF, V, 292.
88. *On Man's Perfection in Righteousness*, 9th Breviate, "Hath God given man an evil will?" NPNF, V, 161; *The Enchiridion*, XIII, 30, NPNF, III, 34. *On Man's Perfection in Righteousness*, 9th Breviate, NPNF, V, 161.
89. *Against Two Letters of the Pelagians*, I:5, NPNF, V, 378.
90. Romans 6:20.
91. *Contra Julianum*, I:100, 102, quoted by N.P. Williams, p. 369; *The City of God*, 22:30, NPNF, II, 510.
92. *Amor Dei*, London: Hodder, 1938.
93. *Ibid.*, p. 239. see Sydney Cave, *The Christian Estimate of Man*, London: G. Duckworth and Co., 1949, pp. 95-96.
94. *Contra Julianum*, III, 199. N. P. Williams tells of a woodcut prefixed to tome X of the Benedictione edition of 1700 containing Augustine's anti-Pelagian writings and meant to illustrate the passage. *Op. Imperfect, contra Julianum*, I:39, and writes: "It depicts the interior of a church.... On the right... is the baptistery where the bishop is plunging a naked infant into the font; this infant is evidently one of the elect, for the Holy Spirit is represented as a dove descending upon him in a stream of supernatural glory.... On the left... another christening party is seen, suddenly halted with expressions and gestures of horror and dismay... in their midst, a nurse holds the corpse of an infant, who was being brought to baptism but has that very moment unexpectedly died... and whose soul must be presumed to have gone straight to hell. The picture is surmounted by a scroll bearing the inscription... [tr. into English, the Latin reads: "One is accepted, the other is rejected; for great is the grace of God! But why this one rather than that? Inscrutable is the judgement of God"]. When the whole theory is so horrible, it is perhaps a small matter that it appears to assume a purely mechanical view of the efficacy of infant baptism" (p. 377).
95. *Soliloquies*, I:18-21, NPNF, VII, 543-44.
96. See n. 93 above.
97. *The Enchiridion*, 26-27; NPNF, III, 246. The English, however, is muted down to make it less odious than Augustine's language really is. "Damnation" and "damned", for instance, is translated into "punishment" and "punished".
98. *On the Proceedings of Pelagius*, 34, NPNF, V, 198.
99. Thomas Aquinas borrowed the *Limbo puerorum* concept of the Pelagians in order to make room for unbaptized infants outside of hell, which he thought was too cruel a fate for them. "Limbo" has won immediate acceptance throughout Western Christendom as witnesses the popularity of the limbo motif in Western

- poetry throughout the centuries. As regards everything else, Thomas's thought follows that of Augustine. To this witnesses the foremost advocate of Thomism in modern times, J. Maritain. "Mediaeval theological thinking," he wrote in *True Humanism* (London: G. Bles, 1939, pp. 3-4), "is dominated by St. Augustine notably in the position taken up by Augustine in opposition to Pelagius. And in this the Middle Ages were purely and simply catholic and Christian.... When the men of the Middle Ages professed this conception of the mystery of grace [i.e. its arbitrary and irresistible power] and freedom [i.e. man's moral responsibility—"original guilt"—for sin despite the necessity or inevitability of the latter], they were professing purely and simply a conception which is Christian, catholic, and orthodox. At the apogee of mediaeval thought St. Thomas theologically elaborated the solutions discerned by the great contemplative intuition of St. Augustine."
100. Formulary of Concord of the Lutheran Church, I, sect. 23. See same in *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* (Confessions-Lutheran) or Williams, p. 428.
 101. *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, loc. cit.
 102. Formulary of Concord, II, sect. 24.
 103. *Ibid.*, I:11.
 104. Apology to the Confession of Augsburg, II:38. *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, loc. cit.
 105. *Ibid.*, II, 3, 3.
 106. *Ibid.*, II, 1, 7-8-9; ed. cit. I, 216-18.
 107. *De Serve Arbitrie*, I, Sect. 10, quoted by Williams, p. 434.
 108. *Ibid.*
 109. *True Humanism*, p. 2.
 110. *Ibid.*
 111. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
 112. *Ibid.*, p. 47.
 113. G. E. Harkness is liberal to the point of being regarded as shallow in Christian theological circles, and this harsh judgement of her colleagues is, most likely, due precisely to the fact that she deviates from the peccatist commitment of standard Christian theology. She writes: "Any attitude or act in which one rebels against, or fails to be adequately responsive, to, the love commandment of Jesus is sin" (*Christian Ethics*, Nashville, Tenn: Abingdon Press, 1952, p. 95). This, apparently, is not a definition of 'sin' but of 'a sinful act'. That this is not the case, but that it is a definition of 'sin' is corroborated by the second definition, 'sin' is self-love and self-centeredness', the opposite of Jesus' love commandment, which she gives later. On the same page, we also read that 'to be a sinner... in God's eyes, requires enough maturity, knowledge, and freedom to enable one to make moral choices. This is why a little child... is not a sinner, and sin is 'original' only in the sense that the natural self-centeredness of childhood, if uncurbed, becomes sinful as the individual matures to the point of responsible decision.'" However, her peccatist colleagues may well accuse her that insistence on defining 'sinful act' rather than sin—a strategy always open to the further qualification that all men necessarily perform sinful acts—and insistence upon the requirement of responsibility and moral choice for an act to be sinful, is always open to the further qualification that Adam was responsible and the child has inherited from him not the sinful act, but the guilt arising therefrom. In asserting this, Harkness evades the issues in question; and the peccatist's criticism is therefore well deserved. Another liberal thesis suffering from essentially the same shortcoming is A. C. Knudson's *The Principles of Christian Ethics* (Nashville: Abington Press, 1943. See especially Ch. IV) which, together with his *The Doctrine of Redemption*

- (New York: Abington Press, 1933) is perhaps the sanest work on Christian ethics in the literature of Orthodox Christianity. But even there, the bias in favour of sin is evident. After denying the necessity of sin ("necessary moral evil is not moral evil. We cannot then regard sin as part of the world scheme planned by God" *Ibid.*, p. 269), he writes: "He [God] has not only made the commission of sin possible, but in the highest degree probable—indeed, almost certain.... The human world must be regarded as morally in a fallen state." It is indeed inventing a new category of Christian logic to call sin 'almost certain'.
114. H. Richard Niebuhr, *Christ and Culture*, New York: Harper, 1951, p. 194.
 115. "To redeem man in the body and in the history which began with his creation" *Ibid.*, p. 235.
 116. Søren Kierkegaard, *The Concept of Dread*, tr. by W. Lowrie, Princeton, 1946, p. 50, where dread is defined as "the reflex of freedom within itself at the thought of its possibility."
 117. In modern theological idiom, the term is synonymous with fallenness, the state of fallen man in creation characterized by dread.
 118. *Church Dogmatics*, Chap XIV, IV, Part. I, 358 ff.
 119. *Ibid.*, p. 385.
 120. Emil Brunner, *Dogmatics, The Christian Doctrine, of Creation and Redemption* tr. by Olive Wyon, London: Lutterworth Press. 1952, II, p. 89.
 121. "Before God everyone is a sinner, and all that one does, says or thinks is sinful" *Ibid.*, p. 112).
 122. *Ibid.*, p. 90.
 123. *Systematic Theology*, II, 44 ff.
 124. *Ibid.*, pp. 47 ff.
 125. *Ibid.*, pp. 49 ff.
 126. *Ibid.*, pp. 51 ff.
 127. *Ibid.*, pp. 44.
 128. *Ibid.*
 129. *Ibid.*
 130. *Ibid.*
 131. Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, p. 263.
 132. *Ibid.*, p. 254.
 133. *Ibid.*, Ch. VII to X, pp. 178 to the end of vol I.
 134. *Ibid.*, p. 263.
 135. London: Faber paperback, 1961, pp. 204 ff.
 136. *Ibid.*, p. 203.
 137. *Ibid.*, pp. 204-5.
 138. *Ibid.*, p. 205.
 139. *Ibid.*, p. 206.
 140. Philippians, 2:12.
 141. Ibn Hisham, *The Life Of Muhammad*, tr. by A. Guillaume, Oxford University Press, 1955, pp. 682-83.
 142. Some orientalists have criticized Islam for asserting the divine origin of the Qur'an alleging that such assertion precludes any literacy of higher criticism which is essential. But Islam has never prohibited literary of higher criticism of the Qur'an. On the contrary, the Qur'an openly challenged the Muslims and non-Muslims to criticize, or even imitate, any of its verses. The discipline itself of Arabic literary criticism derives its principles from the literary forms of the Qur'an. Instead of being the object of criticism, the Qur'an is the highest ideal of literary Arabic. Nonetheless, the sciences of the Qur'an have always included disciplines

which seek to analyze its language into Arabic and *dakhil* or *gharib* (borrowed non-Arabic words and phrases), the Qurayshi and non-Qurayshi Arabic, and its verses into equivocal and unequivocal, abrogating and abrogated, literally real and metaphorical, problematic and apparently-contradictory, etc. etc. The science of *tafsir* (exegesis) includes such disciplines as the analysis of the situational contexts in which the Qur'anic verses were revealed (time, place, and cause of revelation, *sha'n al nuzul*), of distinguishing the new revelations from those which were known to previous Prophets, etc. etc. Any look at the table of contents of an *al Itqan fi 'Ulum al Qur'an* by Jalal al Din al Suyuti, for example, would satisfy the most fastidious historian of criticism. When the Christian orientalist is not impressed with all this scholarship, it means that he has been looking for a different kind of criticism altogether, perhaps for the kind which the Bible underwent during the last one hundred years. But even here, all the criticism which has been built around the New Testament, for instance, is far surpassed on the Islamic side by Muslim criticism of the Hadith. The science of the Hadith stands absolutely without parallel in the whole history of criticism, and has given rise to disciplines such as *'Ilm al Rijal* (the science of biography), *'Ilm al Isnad* (the science of reportative narration) which are utterly unique in the history of thought. The Hadith of the Prophet, having been subject to edition, change, and outright forgery, is comparable from the standpoint of literary criticism to the traditions of Jesus reported in the Gospels. But whereas New Testament criticism did not come about until the nineteenth century, Hadith criticism had produced a magnificent bloom in the eighth and ninth centuries. The Old Testament has also been subject to the same criticism and this has led to startling conclusions, not the least of which are those which shattered the old view of revelation, and prophethood, the Biblical construction of early Jewish history, and forced an allegorical interpretation of morally unacceptable narratives. Now Muslims and others have for fourteen centuries looked in vain for any passages in the Qur'an, whether in its reportative news or *akhbar* or in its narratives, that suggest the slightest need for such revision. And the challenge still stands. The orientalists' persistent question of where the Qur'an got its ideas of past history and of other religions is not precluded by the divinity of its status. For the Qur'anic revelation has for the most part been situational, and the investigation of which problems of spirit and or history did revelation come down to refute, to add to, to solve, or to judge, is an old question with all exegetes. From the beginning, the divinity of the Qur'an has rested, and has been understood as resting, on the sublime, numinous quality of its religious and moral message, the divine sublimity of its language and words being merely additional accompaniments of divine speech. But this is precisely the position which Christian criticism has been and still is struggling to achieve in favour of the Bible whose *Vergegewärtigung* or re-presentation baffles every thinking Christian every morning and evening. See I. R. Faruqi, "A Comparison of the Islamic and Christian Approaches to Hebrew Scripture," n. 20.

143. For consistency's sake, I should have called it 'Redemptorism', but 'the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer' founded by Alphonso di Liguori at Scala, Italy, in 1732, have beaten us to the name.
144. For a well-documented account of the growth of this notion in Christian consciousness, see Hastings Rashdall, *The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology* (The Bampton Lectures for 1915), London: MacMillan, 1920; J. Rivièrè, *Le Dogme de la Rédemption: Essai d'Étude Historique*, 1905; J. K. Mozley, *The Doctrine of the Atonement*, 1915; R. S. Franks, *The History of the Doctrine and the Work of Christ*, 2 vols., 1918.

145. In point is Paul's elevation of salvation so as to envelop the whole cosmos and to bring therein essential change, or Origen's attribution of it to the fallen angels. According to Paul (Colossians, 1:20), "all things...whether they be things in earth, or things in heaven" have been reconciled "through the blood of his cross."
146. Psalms 6:4-5.
147. Psalms 91:16.
148. Psalms 128.
149. "And He said unto me, 'My grace is sufficient for thee: for my strength is made perfect in weakness.' Most gladly, therefore, will I rather glory in my infirmities, that the power of Christ may rest upon me. Therefore, I take pleasure in infirmities, in reproaches in necessities, in persecutions, in distresses for Christ's sake: for when I am weak, then am I strong."
150. Notably, R. W. Dale, *The Atonement*, London: Hodder, 1875; Scott, Lidgett, *The Spiritual Principle of the Atonement as a Satisfaction made to God for the Sins of the World* (Fernley lectures), London: Kelly, 1887.
151. Matthew 3:2; 4:17; Mark 1:15; 6:12; Luke 13:3, 5; 15:17-20; 17:3, 4; Acts 2:38; 3:19; 8:22; 17:30; 26:20; etc.
152. McLeod Campbell, *Nature of the Atonement in Relation to Remission of Sins and Eternal Life*, London: MacMillan 1886. Presenting Campbell's thesis, W. Adams Brown writes in the ERE, ("expiation"): "What is necessary, if mankind is to be saved, is that some man shall be found who shall estimate at its full heinousness the significance of human sin, shall accept in filial reference and submission the consequences in suffering and pain which this sin has inevitably brought in its train, and so shall set in motion those moral influences by which other men, following his example, shall be drawn to a like repentance. This is what happens in the atonement of Christ. In the spirit in which He met His suffering and death we have the supreme revelation of the true attitude which man should take toward sin. Christ on the cross identifies Himself by sympathy with suffering humanity. He utters in reverent submission His Amen to God's judgement of sin, and so, for the first time, exhibits in the most impressive way the condition upon whose fulfillment alone forgiveness depends" (Campbell, p. 117). In this generation, this is fundamentally the view of Albert C. Knudson. (*The Doctrine of Redemption*, New York: The Abingdon Press, 1933, pp. 352 ff) "The suffering love of God," Knudson writes, "awakens an answering love in the hearts of men; and thus they are redeemed in the only way that anyone can be redeemed, namely, by moral transformation" (p. 378). A still more advanced view of Redemption as a purely didactic phenomenon is Charles Allen Dinsmore's *Atonement in Literature and Life*, Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1906.
153. This has been the view of Hellenic Christianity, which a significant number of early Christians held in opposition to that branch of Paulinism which later became the dogma of the orthodox. From the earliest times, gnosticism, as the contemporary expression of this Hellenism welcomed Jesus as teacher or exemplar, as the conveyor of a revelation which can by nature not deviate from the path of reason. To be a Christian, this view held, is to participate in Jesus; and to do so is to participate in his message, which it equated with reason itself, rehabilitating the Hellenic ideal of wisdom which Paul had pulled to the ground, the career of philosophy and the ancient philosophers themselves whom it regarded as *hunafa* (the pre-Muhammad Muslims) without the advantage of a special concept therefor (F. Cayré, *Patrologie et Histoire de la Théologie*, 4th edition, Paris, 1945, I, 10 ff. Adolph Harnack, *Outlines of the History of Dogma*, tr. by E. K. Mitchell,

London: E. Benn, 1957, pp. 60-61; J. F. Bethune-Baker, *An Introduction to the Early History of Christian Doctrine*, London: Methuen, 1958, pp. 328-29). It was the view of most of the Fathers of the Church, among whom Justin Martyr, Clement of Rome, Clement of Alexandria, and Hermas deserve special mention. In the Middle Ages this same Christian rationalism complemented with mysticism, made a comeback with Peter Abélard in the eleventh century. Abélard held that those who are ignorant of the Gospel and hence do not believe in Jesus Christ commit no fault, thus implying that the salvation which Jesus brought was not something ontic, necessarily binding to all humans. For that which becomes binding only upon being known cannot be necessary. Jesus' redemption therefore was not a *fait accompli* but an invitation to accomplish a fact and this invitation becomes binding only upon being known. Evidently then, if Jesus' redemption was an invitation to man to save himself, its nature must be ideational.

When sectarian orthodoxy questioned Abélard on this matter, alleging that no matter how moral human acts may be, damned is every person who died without having known the Gospel, Abélard answered: "This unbelief in which these men die is sufficient for their damnation, even though the cause of that blindness, to which God abandoned them, is not apparent to us (*Abailard's Ethics or Scito teipsum*, tr., by J. Ramsay Mac Callum, Oxford: Blackwell, 1935, chapter VII, pp. 42-43). This lapse into irrationalist orthodoxy however, was only apparent. Reaching back to Justin Martyr, Abélard quickly denied all advantage to irrationalism by defining unbelief in novel manner. The unbelievers, he argued, are those non-Christians who violated the moral law, who did not do the bidding of their philosophers and wise men. As to those who practiced philosophy Abélard wrote: "We find that their lives, as well as their doctrine, express to the greatest degree evangelical and apostolic perfection, that they deviate but little or not at all from the Christian religion, and that they are united with us not only by their ways of life, but even in name. For we call ourselves Christians because the true wisdom, that is, the wisdom of God the Father, is Christ" (*Epitome theologiae Christianae*, in Migne, *Patrologiae*...etc., quoted in Etienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, New York: Random House, 1955, p. 162). For Abélard, the work of Jesus is not the impassable barrier which sets the saved apart from the damned once and for all. From faith to reason and from reason to faith was for him an easy passage which he, like the wise philosophers of antiquity, crossed many times (Gilson, p. 163).

156. Horace Bushnell, *The Vicarious Sacrifice Grounded in Principles Interpreted by Human Analogies*, New York: Scribner's 1866, 2 vols.
155. *Ibid.*, I, 153.
156. *Ibid.*, I, 53.
157. *Ibid.*, I, 73.
158. The two principal characters in Emily Brontë's *Wuthering Heights*.

Chapter VII

WHAT OUGHT MAN TO BE? CHURCH AND SOCIETY

Jesus Christ taught no doctrine of the church and, in his lifetime, he founded none. This is a view with which there is little disagreement. In the Gospels, the word 'church' or its equivalent occurs only twice, in Matthew 16:18, "upon this rock I will build my church," addressed to Peter and in Matthew 18:17,¹ where Jesus is alleged to have mentioned the church as the congregation of men to whom the recalcitrant Christian ought to be referred for chastisement. Both of these passages are highly suspicious. The latter is a clear case of that Matthean Jewish legalism which we have met with in Part I.² It is simply unimaginable that Jesus who is love 'incarnate' could have counselled his disciples in this manner. Besides, ethically speaking, the counsel is morbid. The unjust man whom the *tête-à-tête* counselling has not helped is not likely to be affected by the community's entrance into the dispute against him, though he may be cowered by such tactics. In that case, the ethical value of a repentance on his part would be missed. But what is the ethical worth of treating him 'like a heathen'? Presumably, for the Ezraic Matthew, to be a heathen, or a *goy*, is by itself an argument for the non-Jew to deserve the most cruel contempt and derision!³

The other passage, namely Matthew 16:18, is more likely to be the insertion of church fathers who were anxious to establish in the hearts of the faithful, a respect for their authority as the vicars of Christ on earth. Even so, the passage in question is only a declaration of intention and nowhere do the Gospels report that Jesus had actually carried out what he had there proclaimed. But the real cause of suspicion of the genuineness of the evangelist's report is the incongruity of doctrinal content therein implied and by what we are certain to have been the teaching of Jesus.

To build a church in any of the senses that this word has come to acquire in Christianity, could not have interested Jesus. As we have seen in Part I of this work, the final and most important ethical act a man ought to take is, for Christ, the re-orientation, or transformation of self, in its purely personal, individual, solitary moment. This idea is the bugbear of modern social-gospel Christians; but it need not be and it is harmless. They usually take it as implying that there is no place for any social being or life in Christianity and overhastily rise up to voice their irrelevant objections. A typical case of such overhasty critique is T. E. Jessop's *Social Ethics: Christian and Natural*.⁴ In his opening pages he

wrote that since the relevance of Christianity for societal being has been questioned, "I shall have to indicate...my reasons for rejecting...[the]... contention that the church has no direct concern with the structure and movement of earthly society."⁵ He analyzed this contention into three claims to the refutation of which he then applied himself. These claims are first, that "the Christ was not a social reformer, and the kingdom he founded is not a...state, but a spiritual fellowship;" second, that the whole order of space-time is transient, incapable of embodying any eternal values...and...consequently, the Christian must sit lightly in it...;" and third, that God "is concerned with His children individually...;" that "religion is a personal affair,...a direct link between the finite immortal soul and the greater soul that made it."⁶

Against the first claim, Jessop elaborates long and commonplace arguments. Agreeing that "social reform...was the very thing that He [Jesus] most plainly avoided," he pleads that it does not follow that Christians must do the same; unless, he reasons, "the avoidance was intended as an example for us to copy," or that the immense difference between the small, primitive Palestine community and the modern community "require no difference in our Christian range and methods."⁷ Against the second claim, Jessop argues that the world is consecrated by the entry of "the Son of God" into it, romantically adding that Jesus took notice of and appreciated "the little spring flowers in it and the short-lived sparrows making merry on the flat housetops."⁸ Finally, against the third claim, Jessop argues that it implies abandoning "an enlarging aspect of modern life as beyond the sphere of redemption," and concludes that the Christian "who in the love of God that has redeemed him, loves his fellows...can [not] look inactively on poverty and sickness, simply watch old folk shiver because their children put cars or wireless sets before even the bond of nature, or bear to see children inadequately educated and then turned out into a diseducating environment."⁹

Such arguments do not affect our contention, not because they are false, but because they are pointless. That Jesus' concern was what we have claimed it to be, in no wise implies that the man, who does what Christ has been concerned for him to do, need not honour his parents or exert himself to relieve the sufferings and miseries of his fellows. The common fear that it does so, issues from a misunderstanding of the nature of societism.

Societism and Personalism

As we have seen in Part I, the ethic of Jesus is said to be a personalist ethic inasmuch as ethical worth and unworth are functions of the quality

of the will of the individual person. This quality, which is the state of a soul radically transformed and newly born with regard to what it has been under Jewish (racialist) and Roman-Hellenic (pagan) ethic, is one of total determination by God alone. This was a definite and indeed revolutionary solution sent by God through Jesus to a world that had gone mad in its equation of ethical worth with the person's instrumentality for the socio-political welfare of the racist community, or with his achievement of consequences and pleasure, power, comfort, and contentment in the material world. Jesus' words "except a man be born again"¹⁰ were directed precisely to this predicament of mankind created by Jewish and pagan ethic, the general sin from which Christ sought to deliver man. To say, as Jesus had done, that the first and only commandment is to love God with all one's mind, soul, and heart, was and still is, a most concrete commandment. For God cannot be identified with 'Israel' nor with 'Rome', nor with power, pleasure, or *eudaemonia*.

However, to love God in this manner, or better, to invite Him to determine the mind, will and soul and then, actually to suffer such divine determination does not at all mean that man ought to have no loving relation with his fellows, or that he ought to withdraw himself from this world so that God's determination of him may be complete. The determination of God does not come in the abstract. It has to have a matrix in which it can become operative; and this matrix is the whole complexus of relations man has with himself, with his fellowmen, with nature, with the cosmos. It is in the exercise of his efficacy within this complexus, that man may be said at all to be, or not to be, determined by God. Outside this complexus of relations, it is sheer nonsense to speak of divine-human determination. To leave this complexus is, besides dying in every sense of the term, to leave the only medium in which God's determination of man can take place.

We must therefore notice that this complexus has many realms and that Jesus was not limiting the range of God's determination to any one of these realms. Anyone who maintains that he did must, not only not believe in God who had sent Jesus, but be utterly ignorant of the elementary principles of educational psychology. The child is educated not by merely hearing the command 'be good', but by being shown, in the context of his own life, what it means to be good. Without that context, the command will sound to him utterly void and empty. This is why it is so pedantic, as well as futile, to argue for or against the view that Christianity is a religion which has no concern for society. This is not at all what is meant by the claim, which this author holds, that Christianity is not a societistic religion. That Christianity is a personalist religion means in fact, no more than that it holds ethical worth and unworth to

be functions of man's determination by the will of God. A person may satisfy the Christian prerequisite whether the deed, attitude, or idea that is the matrix of determination is one which he has or does *vis-à-vis* his own body, his own soul, his personal neighbour, his neighbour at large, humanity, nature, or the universe. Its satisfaction, or violation, are not limited to any of these provinces of relations. But wherever this matrix happens to stand, the Christian prerequisite is exhaustively satisfied within the inner self as moral subject, since it consists in the determination of his will. Christian ethics makes no demand whatever that the matrices of the moral subject's acts, ideas, attitudes, etc., be any one, more than one, or all of the departments of the complexus of relations. This is not to say that Christian ethics requires no matrix—which is absurd—or that it can have a matrix of only one kind—which is false.

Societism, on the other hand, is a different ethic from the ethic of Jesus. But it is not different in that it holds a contrary or just other definition of ethical worth and unworth. It is different, by addition.

Above all, societism is the ethic of Islam. As such, it accepts, acclaims, and defends the genuineness of the ethical breakthrough of Jesus. Jesus is the prophet of God who was sent to the Jews and the world of antiquity in order to bring to them the glad tidings of the true road to blessedness. His message was in every respect a divine message, God-issued since its source was God; God-discharged since when he spoke he communicated that which God had spoken to him, and God-oriented since Jesus' whole mission on earth was ordained by and for the sake of God. It was in a sense unfortunate that Jesus' words and divine message had almost all been lost to mankind and that his followers had contended among themselves and, unsuccessfully with their enemies, as to the real substance of that message. And it was in order to settle those disputes regarding the nature of God's religion, of His will for and message to man, that God sent, in the revelation of Muhammad, a verbatim-dictated, verbatim-transmitted, verbatim-preserved word of God in an untranslatable tongue, in order that the change of the categories of human consciousness might not provide occasion for change in the understanding of the divine word or in the apprehension of the values of which it is the conceptual expression. That ethical worth and unworth are functions of the self's determination by the will of God, such self being morally transformed and radically different from a self not so determined, is a fundamental principle of Islamic ethic. It is not therefore out of dissatisfaction with Jesus' ethic that Islam brought its novel contribution. It did so, rather, because of the rise in the human situation, of circumstances which could not fall under the purview of Jesus' ethic. Hence, Islam found it necessary to add to the ethic of Jesus.

What did societism, or the ethic of Islam, add to the ethic of Jesus? Simply this, that when a certain act has satisfied the ethical criterion of Jesus, it falls under the second criterion of whether or not the content of the act has been actually realized in the world of space-time. In order to satisfy the criterion of the Jesus' ethic, it is sufficient that in willing the content of the act in question, the moral subject be determined by the will of God. This does not mean that the content of the act must needs be personal; or that, in willing it, the moral subject's consciousness is to be dominated by his own determinants, be they God's or the devil's, and by the psychic mechanics of his own inner determination. The content of the act may very well be the most social, vicarious, altruistic, philanthropic, or political that there is. For it to be ethical, it is required, and sufficient, that in willing its content, the moral subject was determined by that content of the will of God which is relevant to the situation. For example, saving a man's life or defending a woman's honour in such situation where death or dishonour pose a certain threat are definitely 'of' the will of God. For that situation, the will of God is clearly that the moral subject perform that defence. A person standing in that situation and reflecting upon the value of the life that is in danger, or of the honour that is threatened, may, for the sake of purely doing the will of God on earth, decide to take such physical or other measures as would, in his judgement, produce the effect contemplated at the least possible cost to all concerned. He may also incept the nexus of spatio-temporal events judged by him to lead to the ultimate objective. Moreover, he may, in the implementation of that nexus, expose himself to the greatest dangers; and he may even perish in the attempt.

However, in the reality of space-time, the final objective has not been achieved and, indeed, the first step in the nexus of instrumental events leading to the final objective, has not been taken. Our moral subject was under the illusion that the step was being taken, when, by a slip of consciousness, or by the agency of an unknown power, every act he did was absolutely neutralized so that no chain of effects issued from his deed. According to the ethic of Jesus, such a man would have passed all the tests and scored full ethical worth. Under the Islamic ethic, such a man's worth would be only one half of what it should. For, the ethic of Islam insists, such a man may not only will to do the act, and he may not only honestly think that he has done it, but must actually enter the world of real space and time, disturb its flow and equilibrium and bring about the real content of the act. Upon his disturbance of real space-time, his introduction therein of determinants which were not present before, and his diversion of the flow of real events, depends the second half of his moral worth.

It is not possible to argue that Jesus' ethic has or could have made such a requirement. Against such a contention stands a monumental pile of evidence from the synoptic gospels, which we have briefly surveyed in Part I, all of which points to the fact that Jesus based morality squarely upon the determination of the self by the will of God. Nowhere did Jesus extend this base to include the world of space-time. Had this been his intention, he would have had, above all, to institute besides conscience, another faculty to judge the disturbance or otherwise of space-time. Conscience is the judge, competent, a priori, and, except in the rarest case, always true, faithful, and genuine. It has complete command over the materials it judges, viz., the intentions, the attitudes, the willings, the likes, and dislikes, etc. And since to undo ethical unworth is to be reborn, or so to transform the will or self as not to will the act that is hateful to God, conscience is the most proper final tribunal of ethics. Conscience is also quite competent to judge the complex of real relations within real space-time, by subjecting whatever is furnished to it in evidence, to its own immutable and divine laws. But it is not enough to subject the world of real relations to conscience. This does not mean that it is wrong to do so, since before real relations enter any other tribunal, they must pass through the tribunal of conscience and submit to its verdict.

This second tribunal is the law. This is not a lapse into the racialist legalism of Ezra, nor into the ethic of consequences, or of real effects. For the law judges the manipulation of the causal nexus by the moral agent, not in order to guarantee the production of real effects, or real-existents, which can be the common denomination and grounds for a racialist community, political power, or eudaemonia. From the standpoint of the purely moral worth or unworth of man, Islamic law is not concerned with effects or with their bringing about into real existence. It is, rather, solely concerned with man's actual and effective transcendence of himself to the reality of space-time, with his disturbance of the ontological poise of the cosmos, his efficacious diversion of the flow of events—regardless of any and all effects. Islamic ethic contributed, or rather discovered, a new dimension in ethical life when it added to the breakthrough of Jesus, the second breakthrough of the self's transcendence, in the real world of space-time, to the non-self which is the universe. Jesus demanded that man should live purely, saintly, always dominated by the love of God, determined by His will alone. Islam confirmed all this and added that, in addition, man should live dangerously, should break forth into space-time, disturb it, and transfigure the universe into that divine pattern which is the Will of God.

It is upon this second dimension of ethical life revealed by God to Muhammad that societism is built. For societism is the ethic which holds

the ethical worth and unworth of man to be functions of his effective disturbance of space-time. It is superficial to understand by it the tendency to level incomes, to nurse the sick, to give alms to the poor, or to call for social welfare legislation in one's province or state. It is shallow to the point of offence to hold it to mean merely that the church ought to have a say in political affairs or that it should be the judge of the state or its controller. A societist ethic cannot have space-time either divided between its forces and others, or enter into partnership, or divide jurisdiction, regarding any single point of space-time, with any one. Its government of space-time is always absolute, as it is complete. Nor is this the church-state division of the Western Christian tradition. Man is not a double being each aspect of whom is subject to a different law. The personal and the societal are not two laws but one. For it is the content of the personal law that societal law seeks to see become real-existent in space-time. Both have one and the same content because that content can only be one, and this is the Will of God which is one. Societism does not demand that the Will of God be 'successfully' reproduced in space-time. That is the requirement of utility—of the nobler kind of utility befitting the company of societist ethic. For it to do so would at once make of societism an ethic of consequences, and hence, a utilitarian ethic. But societism is concerned solely with the purely moral. For this reason, its concern does not go beyond the moral subject. Whereas the ethic of Jesus is concerned with him as a willing subject, societism is concerned with him as an agent (from the latin, *agere*) subject, as a disturber of space-time.

Christianism and Society

That the majority of Christian thinkers today, all but the naively strict individualists, advocate an ethic that is indeed societist, should, and in fact does, gladden the heart of every Muslim. Societism is no less the Will of God than personalism; societist ethic is a perfection of personalist ethic. The closer mankind comes to the realization of societism the greater its felicity and the closer it stands to God. Muslim thinkers have here a special task, namely, to convey to their brethren, the Christians, their societist experience which is now thirteen centuries the senior of the Christian experience. If the Muslims fail to do this, their failure is doubly reproachable: their indictment would come from two tribunals, that of conscience and that of societist law, for it is in regard to both that they would have failed. It should be a joy to all men, and more so to Muslims, that somebody like William Temple should rise in Christendom to demand, in the name of God, and on behalf of Christian conscience that Christendom recognize

that the need of a Christian social order is real and that such order should consist "in the fullest possible development of individual personality in the widest and deepest possible fellowship."¹¹ It is equally felicitous, that somebody like Robert Owen, the founder of the co-operative movement in England, should rise about a century ago and plant in Christendom the seed of a will to a social order in which all men are members by virtue of their humanity, and man transcends himself to his fellows so as to assist them in realizing the ideal formulated by Temple a hundred years later.¹² But it is not at all edifying that an inspired man like Robert Owen could be prompted to such noble ideas not by deduction from the cardinal principles of the faith but by the pressures of the miseries of the working classes. It is the Industrial Revolution which occasioned the need for societist thought in Christendom and fed it. It is not a coincidence that that thought itself is not older than the Industrial Revolution, while the miseries of mankind are as old as humanity. Indeed, it is much more recent. For it took some time before the social problems posed by industrialization and urbanization could produce systematic societist thought.¹³ Not only have events preceded thought, but they compelled and propelled the Christian mind to think out a theological basis. This fact characterizes all social Christian thought to-day. There is something of the character of patch-work in it; there are many attempts but no permanently classic statement of substantial ideas. The thinking is dislocated and out of joint—there being little consensus as to which fundamental Christian principle is to serve as base for the societistic edifice of ideas. As a Christian colleague has put it, there are many ideas, principles, facts, and events in the Christian faith each of which may be used to provide such basis. But first, their status must be changed to that of 'symbols'; that is to say, their meaning must be distended so as to lose, in defiance of the Christianist emphasis, all their historic reference and stand merely as pure concepts of the understanding. When that is accomplished one may pick up anyone he wishes if he finds it suitable to serve as base for the establishment of societism in one or the other provinces, or *complexi*, of real relations that constitute space-time. Thus, if one wants to establish political order he can start with the symbol of the Kingdom of God; if he wants to establish social welfare he can start with the symbol of Jesus' ministry—his acts of healing, of assisting and nursing the ones in distress; if he wants to establish an optimistic world view, he can begin from the symbol of the incarnation; a tragic world-view, from the symbols of original sin and the crucifixion, etc. etc.

The attempts, therefore, at founding societism, or a societistically-determined society, on some essential principle in the Christian faith have been many and varied. But they have all failed: either the societism

so founded was not at all societism, but a weak dilution of social welfare, liberal democracy, and religious sacerdotalism; or the basing of it on the Christian principle was not a legitimate, logical deduction. To the first category belongs that school which identifies the Church with the Kingdom of God. To the second, belongs that school which keeps church and society in two separate categories but claims that the Christian faith is relevant for the latter in that it furnishes society with a Christian social ideal derived from the principles of the faith.

IN TRADITIONAL THEOLOGY: THE KINGDOM OF GOD IS THE CHURCH,
NOT SOCIETY

The advocates of this view are by no means few. The whole of the Christian tradition may generally be said to belong here, with the exception of modern movements which have rather special ideas. This is the view of Christian Orthodoxy, with which one meets frequently.¹⁴ The founding of 'the Church of Christ' on some essential principle of the Christian faith, has been universally held to be a natural derivation. The first school, or that which advocated the purely religious church of Christ, is of course the older. By far the greatest portion of literature in the tradition forms its body. Here the notions of the Old Testament are mixed up with those of the New, and all are pressed into service to provide grounds for the existence of the Church. For it is certain that the Church was a late phenomenon, Jesus having neither founded nor planned it.¹⁵ It was after it achieved existence that the Church began to scan the scripture as well as the minds of its men in search of a Christian foundation. Such foundation the church found possible in the Biblical notion of the Kingdom of God.

The 'Kingdom of God', the Church asserted, was not yet, inasmuch as not all men's lives are determined by the Christianist precepts—the Christians having always been a part but not all of mankind and even among Christians, not all aspects of their life are so determined. On the other hand, the Kingdom *is*, inasmuch as the Church of Christ is a present reality. For men to group themselves into an *ecclesia* on the basis of their acceptance and following of Jesus Christ, and for such a community to be determined by an episcopal authority issuing from the Apostles to the end that men may live in this world the true life intended for them by Jesus Christ, is nothing short of having the Kingdom. True, the life intended for them being entirely one of expecting and awaiting the sudden universalization of their order—an event utterly beyond their power and necessarily coming by divine decree—the content of that life was to be, and in actual fact was limited to, the business of personal

and public worship. There was absolutely no doubt but that to live 'in' the Church of Christ, therefore, was to live in the Kingdom of God: The coming Kingdom was not a kingdom of a different kind, of a different order, but the same Church extended so as to include the universe. The content of the Kingdom was identically the same. Man, in the Kingdom, would not be leading any different life than he actually leads as member of the Church. Indeed, the history of the Church knows neither in art nor in letters any representation of life in the Kingdom, whether the present or the future, other than that of a communion with God understood in the categories of church worship and praise.

Since there is no difference as to content the only distinction between the Kingdom and the Church is one of magnitude. Whereas the Church has a limited membership, the Kingdom, when it finally comes, will be universal. But this in no way implies that the Kingdom is not real and present. That the Church itself is real and present means that the Kingdom is so. However, the tension between its presence and futurity has never been relaxed. Moreover, Christian theologians argue that Jesus must have accepted an eschatological, future Kingdom at least in that he taught his followers to pray "The Kingdom come,"¹⁶ and that many of his teachings refer to the futurity of the Kingdom, as in the parables of the tares, the ten virgins, the sower etc. It is argued that Jesus even spoke once of the Kingdom as one that will be "coming with power" and be beheld of men of his own generation.¹⁷ This futurity has been associated with other notions which grew up in the Church in later times, such as the second coming of Christ, the day of judgement, general resurrection, etc. The sudden universalization of the church never took place. The failure of the Kingdom to come with power had begun to cause difficulties for Christian thought from the early second century whence the second Epistle of Peter comes.¹⁸ In these circumstances the tension kept the Kingdom insecure and always wavering. In modern times, the social Gospel school undermined and gave up the present Kingdom altogether for a Kingdom that is not yet in order to justify its programmatic, purposive activism. The irrationality of holding to an eschatological Kingdom at some future age compelled Christian theologians to change the content of the Kingdom (i.e., the projected magnitude of the Church) for one in which the material, socio-political, and general conditions of man would be progressively changed and a better state of affairs gradually brought into being. The Kingdom of God began to be equated with the more or less socialistic ideals of the utopians, until the advocates of the social gospel found in it the 'foundation' they had persistently looked for without avail. The history itself of the concept 'Kingdom of God' easily lent itself to this interpretation.

The Kingdom is of course a Hebrew notion. For the Jews, it meant, as we have seen earlier, something very specific, real, worldly, and concrete, something that can and would be brought about in time and soon by active work and struggle. In the time of Jesus, this notion continued to have this meaning for many. Otherwise, the Jewish War of A.D. 65-70 and the Bar Kochba revolt of A.D. 134-35 would be inexplicable. For others, the notion meant an eschatological regime embodying all the material socio-political desiderata of the present but possible only outside this world and time. For a third group, the notion was completely depoliticized. It meant a present, in-this-world, supernal regime in which spiritual goodness and felicity would be the unimpeded activity of the righteous in the eternal presence of God. It was upon this third notion that Jesus seized. He rejected the other two and touched the third notion with his fire and spirit, emphasizing the moral nature of the constituents of the Kingdom and the spiritual nature of its essence, activity and government. Although Jesus opened his mission with the proclamation that the Kingdom of God "is at hand,"¹⁹ and John the Baptist had announced its close advent before him,²⁰ Jesus brought into the notion many a radical element unknown hitherto. Most particularly, Jesus' contribution to the notion is that pure ethical and religious qualities, of the most exacting kind, are the prerequisites for entering into or receiving the Kingdom. These may be summed up in the notion of radical self-transformation which we have already analyzed. On the worldly side, the prerequisite for entrance into this spiritual kingdom found expression, but never satisfaction, in the giving up of house and family, and *a fortiori*, of tribe, clan, political state, society, or kingdom, of every other hindrance not excluding the loss of an eye or a hand where necessary;²¹ in the keeping of constant watchfulness.²² Not only are the racist Jews utterly banished from it, until, of course, they give up their racialism and legalism and undergo the self-transformation necessary, but even the non-racist rich are hardly admitted unless, of course, they undergo transformation.²³ Jesus' is a Kingdom which belongs exclusively to the humble and the childlike, the spiritually and ethically new-born.²⁴

It is certain that Jesus taught that the Kingdom is at hand and, against those who expected its coming cataclysmically at a future moment, he taught "the Kingdom of God is within you" (or in the midst of you), thus making its presence indubitable as far as any evidence of Jesus' teaching goes. In fact the presence of the Kingdom is an old idea. It was recently popularized by the discovery of another notion, namely, the 'realized eschatology' of C. H. Dodd,²⁵ which affirms that the Old Testament promises, as well as Jesus' own teaching regarding the Kingdom of God, had been once and for all fully realized in the incarnation and the

events of the Christ-revelation. The early Christian community lived and worshipped on the assumption that the Kingdom of God was present "within" them (in their midst). Revelations 1:6, 9 and 5:10 spoke of a Kingdom into which the Christians were already "made". So did Colossians 1:12-13 with its emphasis that the Kingdom was already the possession of Christians.²⁶ Romans 14:17 had taken the presence of the Kingdom for granted. Against this, socialist theologians argue that Jesus Christ merely began the realization of the Kingdom and that in his day as well as in ours, the greater part is still to come. This view, however, runs counter to their saviourist thesis that Jesus has actually redeemed all men and that this redemption is a *fait accompli*. If, as the saviourist thesis affirms, redemption is an accomplished fact, how can the work of Jesus be only a beginning? The beginning of making a bridge, namely, the preparation of the plans or erection of a scaffolding is certainly not the completion of the bridge. When held jointly with such notion of the Kingdom of God, Jesus' redemption is reduced to the work of a reformer who unfortunately passed away before he could see the fruits of his labour in full bloom. The redemption achieved by Jesus thus loses its ontic significance, for it becomes merely an opening of the gates, a paving of the way—an invitation to rather than an accomplished salvation. But an invitation is never ontic; and the effect of understanding redemption (the Jesus-event) in these terms means the undoing of the saviourist thesis. Moreover, the socialist theologians hold, in contradiction with their peccatist thesis, that the Kingdom of God, now construed as meaning total, perfect redemption, may and ought to be progressively brought about by man's own action. Peccatism has obviously no appeal for these liberal progressivists. In their view, not only is man capable of being remedied, but he is capable of doing that himself. Consequently, sin is a contingent aberration, suffered by some because of their ignorance or callousness; but it is neither universal, nor necessary. That the Kingdom can be brought about by man, and indeed, that he plays in its coming the role of an indispensable determinant, is, furthermore, contrary to the Christian estimate of the nature of God. We have seen that in Christianist theology, the fact that God took the initiative to reconcile man and creation was not an accident in the Godhead, not a contingent alteration of plans and strategy, but a necessity of divine nature. For the social gospel advocate, this necessity cannot be a necessity to do, but a necessity to instruct, to invite. But the God whose nature is the Jesus-event is not the same as the God whose nature is merely to instruct, to send the message, to reveal this will through a *Koh Amar Yahweh* or a Qur'an (i.e. a "reading"). In short, the whole of the Christianist edifice topples down upon the assertion that the Kingdom of God is the socialist utopia

the progressivists claim it to be.

We may therefore conclude, in opposition to the socialist Christian theologians, that the Kingdom of God is not the sum total of the desiderata of the present. This is a wrong identification which, begun by Augustine, has continued through history and provided the twist the socialists were over-anxious to read in the scripture in their search for dominical authority for societism. Their attempt to deduce it from the Christ-revelation by identifying it with the Kingdom of God necessitates the transvaluation of values Jesus attached to the Kingdom as he understood it. The Christian socialists lose, by their insistence on Christian societism, both their own Christianist assumptions as well as the genuine values of the ethical self transformation which were Jesus' unique discovery and breakthrough.

IN MODERN THEOLOGY: THE KINGDOM OF GOD IS BOTH THE CHURCH AND SOCIETY

The Case of William Temple: The Palliation of Original Sin Through the Subjection of Society to Christian Principles

The foremost champion of the modern theological school which identifies the Kingdom of God partly with the Church and partly with Society but subjects the latter to directives which cannot issue from it and are furnished therefore by the former, is the late William Temple, once Archbishop of Canterbury. Its classic statement is in a small book he wrote, entitled, *Christianity and the Social Order*.²⁷ There, he argued that the business of the Church is to "announce Christian principles and point out where the existing social order at any time is in conflict with them."²⁸ Just as the Church may remind a bridge-builder that he ought to build a sound, safe bridge but not tell him how this may be done, so it ought to "tell the politician what ends the social order should promote while leaving to him the devising of the precise means to those ends."²⁹ In doing this the Church may fear neither those who accuse it of meddling in affairs not its own, nor those who reproach it for talking without doing.

All the so-called social principles that this kind of Christian societist thought gives are conditioned by the principle of peccatism. Temple understands peccatism in very much the same terms as Newbigin, except that his enunciation takes a more philosophic character. But the philosophy involved is that of hedonism and egoism which had dominated English philosophic thought since the days of Mill, with the exception of the Oxford Hegelian interlude. "Our standard of value" he wrote,

"is the way things affect ourselves" and there is such perfect analogy that it amounts to identify, between the self-centeredness of a baby's physical vision and man's standard of value.³⁰ This is very poor psychology, and poorer ethics. In making value-judgements, men do not have their own psychic states present in consciousness. This can no more be said to be the work of nature than that of nurture; for the laboratory specimen that can be said to be wholly one or the other is hypothetical. The facts of the ethical life of man tell a different story from that of the Archbishop. Man is not the egotist, self-centered being he claims him to be. This is as unwarranted a generalization as one which would fancy all men to be altruistic and saintly. Temple, however, tells us that "it is not contended that men are utterly bad... [but] that they are not perfectly good and that even their goodness is infected with a quality—self-centeredness—which partly vitiates it."³¹ We should not be misled by this turn of diplomatic talk, said in order to allay the universal objection to the peccatist thesis. Temple's words "utterly" and "not perfectly" and "partly" are deliberately misleading. The vitiation in question is according to his peccatist standpoint necessary and universal.³² If sin, interpreted as self-centeredness or egotism is not universal or necessary, certainly more may, should, and could be expected from man's life on earth than Temple expects. For him, a social order has satisfied "the most fundamental requirement of any political and economic system" if it achieves a "reasonable measure of security against murder, robbery, and starvation."³³ Anything beyond this is for Temple "utopianism," against which "its assertion of original sin should make the Church" immune.³⁴

So much of this original sin pervades Temple's thought that for him there can be no such thing as 'a Christian social ideal', no ideal image—whether God made or man-made—"to which we should conform our actual society as closely as possible."³⁵ Thus, the subjection of society to church direction does not mean for the Christian socialist what it could to a Muslim or a Platonist, namely, its subjection to an ideal 'city of God', for, according to him, there is no such a thing. The impossibility of the ideal is a human impossibility because, original sin is bound to shipwreck any attainment of it. "It is the tragedy of man," asserts Temple, "that he conceives such a state of affairs as the Kingdom of God and knows it for the only satisfaction of his nature, yet so conducts his life as to frustrate all hope of attaining that satisfaction."³⁶ Then echoing Augustine and Calvin, he indicts man in these words: "It is not only that his spirit and reason have as yet established but little control over the animal part of his nature; it is his spirit which is depraved, his reason which is perverted. His self-centeredness infects his idealism because it distorts all his perspectives."³⁷ At the root of this theory of man,

Christian dogmatism and skepticism stand hand in hand. The one is anxious to establish and to defend at all costs the peccatist and saviourist dogmas of the faith; the other to confuse with its nihilism every noble idea man has or can discover, and pull down every noble scheme man has had or will have the spiritual capital power to design and to implement. This skepticism, Temple expresses in no uncertain manner. "So far as his reason acts in purely intellectual ways, it may be trustworthy: $2 + 2 = 4$; that really is true...it is an exact apprehension of absolute truth. Within what is capable of mathematical treatment man has this grasp of truth."³⁸ But in the realms of the social, the political, the moral, "we enter on the sphere of life where reason is very fallible." He should, and would, have said "essentially depraved," had he not said this a few lines earlier on the same page. "Self-interest is always [*sic*] exercising its disturbing influence" etc.³⁹ Obviously, the only truth of which man may be certain is the mathematical; because—Temple would probably add—it is analytic. But ethical and religious judgements are synthetic and can never be 'absolutely' true. Here only probabilities and guesses are in order and nobody's judgement is any better than anybody else's. But this is skepticism. If consistently held by Temple, nothing of his Christianity or of his social order would be spared. This pessimistic estimate of man is then projected into the Godhead, when the Christian socialist declares that God did not reveal such an image because He knew that it could not be realized and it was the divine plan from eternity that He do it for man Himself and in person. Mixed with this perfect peccatism and saviourism is an Anglo-Saxon democratic tendency which, from its netherworld *Froschperspektive* directs such arguments against Plato's Republic as, "No one really wants to live in the ideal state as depicted by anyone else."⁴⁰ Evidently, for Temple, everyone is his own judge, has his own standard of value; and no one may have his self-centeredness interfered with under any circumstance except perhaps to prevent murder, robbery, and starvation. What he had condemned as the root of all evil, as original sin, he now implies as a principal of ethics and society. Doubtless, because like all other democrats, Temple is, in final analysis, a relativist. But relativism is nothing more than self-centeredness; and by asserting it, Temple has put himself in the position of Epimenedes, the Cretan liar.

While therefore denying the subjection of society to an ideal, divine pattern, *in toto*, the Christian socialist demands its subjection to a few principles derived from the faith.⁴¹ According to Temple these principles are "primary" and "derivative".⁴² The latter are those of freedom, fellowship and service. The primary ones Temple calls "God and His purpose" and "the dignity, tragedy and destiny of man". Under the

first, Temple gives the saviourist thesis, affirming the paradoxes of man being essentially sinful and called by God to live a life of fellowship with Him; that of redemption being three things in one: It is at once a *fait accompli*, it still has to be earned by man by individual effort such as Temple's 'derivative principles' described, and thirdly, that it can never be realized on earth. Under the second, Temple apologizes for man's national existence, calling the national state a part of nature, like the family, and man's division into national states a "part of the divine plan for human life".⁴³ The existence of these national states should be a harmonious one, though each nation is a "spiritually independent unit" free to develop its own cultural tradition as long as it does not infringe upon the liberty of another. Just as individuals are supposed each to pursue his own standard of value—there being nothing platonically decided concerning what man ought to be—provided men do not murder, rob, or starve, so the nations are supposed to pursue each its own *geist*—there being, equally, nothing platonically decided concerning what man's universal social order ought to be, provided they do not infringe upon one another's freedom to do so.

This is a futile ideal. It is pointless to expect men and nations to behave like lambs when they are given the freedom to develop the nature of wolves. It is futile to regulate action when the springs of action are let to develop as they please. But to regulate what man ought to be, what mankind ought to be is precisely what no democrat-relativist or Christian-peccatist-saviourist would want to do. No wonder then that Temple takes refuge either in English understatement, in peccatist bemoaning, or in drawing out principles which cannot apply from the nature of the case.

The Case of Karl Barth: the Ultimate Denial of Societism (not of Society), as well as of all Ethics.

The foregoing discussion has made it progressively clear that Christianity or that view of Christianity which regards peccatism and saviourism as essential content of Christian ethics, is incompatible with societism. This incompatibility—indeed diametrical contradiction—nowhere comes so perceptibly clear as it does in the case of Karl Barth. For here, Christianity is pushed to its ultimate logical conclusion where not only societism is denied, but the very possibility of ethics itself.

Following in the footsteps of Augustine, Barth conceives of man as citizen of two entirely different worlds: The civil community or the state, and the Christian community or the Church. The civil community or the state, Barth defines as "the commonalty of all the people in one place,

region or country in so far as they belong together under a constitutional system of government that is equally valid for and binding on them all, and which is defended and maintained by force."⁴⁴ Working through its legislative, executive, and judiciary organs, Barth tells us that the civil community aims at the "safeguarding of both the external, relative and provisional freedom of the individuals and the external and relative peace of their community."⁴⁵ Although it embraces "everyone living within its area,"⁴⁶ the state never reaches outside "its area". Its essence, the purpose of its existence, is negative; for it consists in the protection of the individual against the others, the community against the individual and against other communities. The State, Barth asserts, is that ordinance "by which man is preserved and his sin and crime confined."⁴⁷ "Sin and crime" are thus the rule of nature which the state is supposed to check. Man is sinful by nature. By nature he "lapses" from the momentary righteousness "and chaos comes".⁴⁸ He therefore needs "to have kings," "to be subject to an external... order of law defended by superior authority and force."⁴⁹

Besides this safeguarding of the individual and communal peace against the encroachments of other individuals and communities, the Barthian polis has no duties and no purpose. Obviously it is a Leviathan, a very nationalistic Leviathan who looks in but one direction and is governed with but one principle, viz., the peaceful co-existence of the individual members and the peaceful persistence of the community. It is not of the nature of the civil community, Barth tells us, that its members share any "common awareness of their relationship to God,"⁵⁰ that the "spirit of God" be relevant in "the running of its affairs".⁵¹ The civil community, he asserts, is "as such... spiritually blind and ignorant. It has neither faith, nor love nor hope.... No creed and no gospel.... Its members are not brothers and sisters."⁵² Its members can only ask Pilate's question, What is truth? without ever being able to answer it. For "every answer to the question abolishes the presuppositions of the very existence of the civil community."⁵³

This hopelessly impoverished Leviathan, Barth regards, in another breath, not only as useful to the Christian Community in that it prevents all-out chaos, or the *bellum omnium contra omnes*, from breaking out⁵⁴ but as an "external, relative and provisional embodiment... [of] the eternal Kingdom of God and the eternal righteousness of His Grace."⁵⁵ He carefully adds that the state's externality, and provisionality do not affect this embodiment of divine grace which continues to be both valid and effective.⁵⁶ But we should not allow ourselves to be misled by this sudden praise of the state. Elsewhere, when Barth analyzes the purpose of the Christian community, he leaves no room for doubt that the Kingdom of

God is not "the original and final pattern" of the civil community⁵⁷ but of the Christian community.⁵⁸ The value he presently sees in the state is merely the utilitarian one of preventing the worst from happening, man's nature being the animal, beast-of-prey thing Hobbes had held it to be.⁵⁹ Not only the state, but all the institutions of culture and civilization perform in a society so understood, merely a negative role. Commenting on this view of man, which is really the peccatist view, H. Richard Niebuhr wrote: "Such Christians tend to think of the institutions of culture as having largely a negative function in a temporal and corrupt world. They are orders for corruption, preventives of anarchy, directives for the physical life, concerned wholly with temporal matters."⁶⁰

This estimate of the state at once elemental and elementary, is the common link which joins the two orders. The members of the one are at the same time members of the other.⁶¹ The church must acknowledge the civil community by "subordinating itself . . . to the cause of the civil community under all circumstances [and therefore whatever the political form and reality it has to deal with *in concreto*]."⁶² But, Barth warns, this Christian obligation imposed by Paul in Romans 13:1 does not mean that "the Christian should offer the blindest possible obedience to the civil community and its officials,"⁶³ but simply that he ought to do so inasmuch as the preservation of individual and communal peace is a necessary condition of the existence of himself as well as the Christian community itself.⁶⁴ The Christian deliberately renders unto Caesar what is Caesar's, but "with a different purpose" than the non-Christian;⁶⁵ and that difference is that whereas the non-Christian sees in the state something final, the Christian sees therein only a necessary useful instrument. Thus, the state belongs not to the order of creation, but to that of redemption.⁶⁶ It is not itself necessary; but it fulfils a necessary need, namely the need for the cessation of the war of all against all. This need must be satisfied if man and the church are to fulfil the purpose of their existence;⁶⁷ if 'the grace of God', by which Barth understands the recognition by man of the redemptive act of God through Jesus Christ, is to have a *theatrum gloriae suae*,⁶⁸ borrowing the expression of Calvin.

Moreover, this being the nature of the state, no form of the state is perfect; and there can *ex hypothesi* be no Christian theory of state.⁶⁹ Since all that is at issue "is the preservation of the common life from chaos,"⁷⁰ and since an amount of chaos is necessary inasmuch as man is by nature sinful and hence innately bent upon "chaos," "encroachment," and "aggression,"⁷¹ and since the state is by nature "relative, external and provisional,"⁷² i.e., an instrument of temporary usefulness, pending the second coming of Jesus when this world will come to an end,⁷³ "there is no such a thing as a perfect political system,"⁷⁴ not even in idea. For there

is no Christian theory of state "to advocate in face of the various forms and realities of political life;"⁷⁵ no doctrine and no form of the state to be established "as *the* Christian doctrine of the just state".⁷⁶ As Christian, the Christian is interested only in the Kingdom of God, in proclaiming and expecting it; and this Kingdom is not at all any idealized political system.⁷⁷ Nor can there be "a Christian state corresponding to the Christian Church".⁷⁸ Nonetheless, there can, of course, and indeed there must, be a Christian preference of one political system to another⁷⁹ and the criterion of choice is the realization or otherwise by the state of its utilitarian *raison d'être*. It is possible for a Christian, Barth affirms, to distinguish "between the just and the unjust state," "between the better and the worse political form," "between order and caprice," etc., and on the basis of this judgement to "choose and desire," to "support" and "to resist".⁸⁰ A good, "proper state" is one in which order, freedom, community, power and responsibility "are balanced in equal proportions;" where none of the constitutive elements dominates and all are kept in check.⁸¹ Thus it is possible to "indicate the direction in which the proper state stands," but "it goes without saying that there has never been a perfect constitutional state and that there never will be this side of Judgement Day."⁸² Utilitarian as it may be, this principle of the worth and unworth of the state, Barth strangely enough calls here the "knowledge of the Lord who is the Lord of all".⁸³ But why, one may ask, should a cold utilitarian principle such as this be given such a pompous name?

First, one might answer, in order to denigrate and impoverish the civil community still further by contrasting its lowly, human, sinful character with no less than "the Lord who is Lord of all". For in justifying itself, its forms and actions, the highest authority to which the community recurs is 'natural law'. It exonerates itself when it shows that in any issue at hand it has conformed to the dictate of natural law. But the policy to follow natural law is a pagan policy; the effect of its observance is a perpetuation of the 'state of ignorance'.⁸⁴ Even if the content of natural law were found out to be God's commandments themselves, Barth would still condemn its observance on the grounds that it has followed from a revelation of God that is 'natural', "a revelation known to man by natural means".⁸⁵ For he holds that no natural means will ever lead to a knowledge of God or of His will and what is usually alleged to be "natural law" is inevitably "a particular conception of [it]... which is passed off as *the* natural law."⁸⁶ Appropriating the current scepticism of the Anglo-Saxon empiricist tradition and the *Wiener Kraus* will to dissolve philosophy into superficiality and semantics, Barth asserts that all there can be is a "guessing" or "groping" but no "certainty" whether the whole thing "may not in the end be an illusion." "A more or less refined positivism,"

he asserts, "is all that is possible here, outside the realm of faith."⁸⁷

Per contra, the church or Christian community uses as criterion of its political decisions something not "natural" but spiritual and divine. But if there is anything spiritual or divine in the civil community, it is certainly this, that its ultimate purpose is that of being an "external, relative and provisional" instrument, for the provision of "opportunities for the preaching and hearing of the Word," a task to be done by someone else, in a totally different order of being and activity.⁸⁸ The opportunities themselves are not divine, but "natural, secular and profane," like the order in which they are to occur. They are mere worldly moments, of "the establishment of law, the safeguarding of freedom and peace".⁸⁹ The law that governs these opportunities, their existence and scope, is the law of utility, not "of the Lord". The "knowledge of the Lord who is Lord of all," is only a pompous name which has availed nothing.

Bath may answer that since all the duties of the church derive from such "knowledge of the Lord," it follows that to determine whether or not the state is furnishing the church with the opportunity to fulfil its duties in peace, this knowledge is of the essence. But the knowledge of the duties of the church which is by nature *a priori* and deductive is different from the knowledge of whether or not the state is furnishing the opportunity to fulfil duties, which must be *a posteriori*, inductive, and pertinent to the concrete, historical situation. The former cannot be the criterion of the latter.

Though the same person may be a citizen of the civil community as well as of the Christian community, or the church, the two orders are utterly distinct and separate. Both happen to be in this world, in time and space, but it is an unfortunate coincidence that both stand "in the world not yet redeemed". The church is not the ideal of the state; this is and must always remain "as such...neutral, pagan, ignorant".⁹⁰ It should not emulate the church, nor should the church require such emulation of itself by the state.⁹¹ God, Barth tells us, has not intended that "the state should itself gradually develop more or less into a church,"⁹² nor into the Kingdom of God.⁹³ Indeed, even the provision of opportunities for preaching is not a right which the church can legitimately demand of the state, but a gift for which the church can only be thankful. The state has the right to refuse to grant such gifts without incurring guilt. The church here has not only to "resist not evil,"⁹⁴ but to do penance and seek the guilt for this privation in itself, rather than in the state.

The state furthermore, is not guided by the Kingdom of God as by an ideal. "Political organization can be neither a repetition of the Church nor an anticipation of the Kingdom of God."⁹⁵ The Kingdom of God, by nature can never become a reality of political life, because it comes at a

time when, *ex hypothesi*, there can be neither state nor church nor need for either.⁹⁶ Both state and church are "annulled" by the Kingdom which brings in its wake a state of pure sinlessness, redeemedness and ethical perfection requiring neither government, nor prayer, neither peace nor preaching.⁹⁷

Despite this severely harsh dichotomy of political life from both the realm of morality and the realm of future bliss, Barth requires of the church to be the herald of the Kingdom of God and of the state to hear that warning.⁹⁸ It is certainly groundless assertion to require the state to hear of the Kingdom with which it holds no ties whatever and in relation to which it stands as that which the Kingdom is coming to supplant. The state, let us recall, is not the empirical fact whose ideal ought-to-be is the Kingdom. It is neither necessarily opposed to the Kingdom, nor necessarily its prelude or likeness. What interest can the state have in a regime that it neither accepts nor opposes, a regime that it can neither bring about nor prevent, neither hasten nor delay, but must come as a cataclysmic transformation of all men and all reality?

Barth, however, goes farther. He prescribes that the state ought to become "an allegory... a correspondence and an analogue to the Kingdom of God."⁹⁹ It should "reflect indirectly the truth and reality which constitute the Christian community"¹⁰⁰ and "reflect" that reality.¹⁰¹ Elsewhere, Barth is so impressed with the "definite service to the divine Providence and plan of salvation" which the state renders that he enthusiastically calls it "an exponent of His Kingdom".¹⁰² It is upon this service as a foundation that Barth rules out neutrality on the part of the church and all ethics regarding the state. But granted that peace and security which the state provides are necessary for the church to do its work, it does not follow that the state ought to become an analogue and correspondence to the Kingdom of God, that "its politics... should proceed... on parallel lines [to] the politics of God."¹⁰³ Against his own previous assertion, Barth here states that the state should be called "from neutrality, ignorance and paganism into co-responsibility [with the Church] before God;" that a "historical process whose aim and content is the moulding of the state into the likeness of the Kingdom of God" should be set in motion for "the fulfilment of the state's own righteous purpose".¹⁰⁴ Unless Barth also holds that the nature of the Kingdom is utilitarian—which he does not—it is illogical to hold that the state whose *raison d'être* has been assumed to be utilitarian peace and security, should parallel the Kingdom and emulate the politics of God. He cannot maintain his Hobbesian thesis of the nature of the state as well as require the state to be moulded into an analogy of the Kingdom.

Under the new goal of "moulding of the state into an allegory of the

Kingdom of God and the fulfilment of its righteousness,"¹⁰⁵ the purpose of the state is given as to "clarify" rather than "obscure" the Lordship of Jesus Christ. Among the infinite possibilities of political decision only those are worthy which "most suggest a correspondence to, an analogy and reflection of, the content of [the Christian] faith and gospel."¹⁰⁶ Thus, we should distinguish between "the just and the unjust state," between "order and caprice," "government and tyranny," "freedom and anarchy," "community and collectivism", "personal rights and individualism".¹⁰⁷ We should always stand on the side of equality before the law and constitutionalism, the "limiting and the preserving of man by the quest for and the establishment of law,"¹⁰⁸ of state welfare services for the poor, and that socio-economic system which may provide "the greatest possible measure of social justice".¹⁰⁹ In this transfigured state, there is obviously need for teachers, warners, and reminders—jobs which Barth deems becoming for the church alone to perform.¹¹⁰

Thus, the Hobbesian thesis is evidently forsaken. In its place, Barth has surreptitiously advanced a mature political theory. That Barth is here joining the ranks of Western social thinkers in their struggle to penetrate these social ideals betrays praiseworthy sensitivity. But how apart it all runs from his assertive assumptions regarding the nature of man, of the state and of the religious life. As if to prove the patchwork character of the whole thesis, Barth now moves on to deduce the ideals of modern political theory from the notion of the Kingdom using in every case exemplary *non sequitur* argument.

Barth lists eleven points of correspondence between the ideal state and the Kingdom of God.¹¹¹ It is notable that none of his comparisons, however, are comparisons of the Kingdom of God but of the church, with the state. He had asserted previously that the church is itself a temporary, intermediate fellowship, utterly unlike the Kingdom of God by which it will be superseded on the second coming of Christ. His exclusive reference to the church, however, betrays that in his mind, the Kingdom of God is not as other-worldly as he claims it to be, and has already established itself in the church as "the commonalty of the people [the Christians] in one place, region or country".

But why, it may be asked, must the state parallel the Christian Kingdom of God? or the worldly church of a certain "place, region or country"? Barth's answer, that it is to provide opportunities for the church to be, to hear, and to preach the Word, which he has given as the purpose of the state, is far from adequate.

Barth strongly asserts that the church "cannot have an inner life without having at the same time a life which expresses itself outwardly."¹¹² But it is futile to attempt to infer the state of social welfare and justice

from the proposition that "the church can, may and has to bear witness" to Jesus Christ.¹¹³ "If the church's form of life," he writes, "is the congregation as the communion of believers in an earthly body under a Heavenly Head...then a form of life corresponding to this her own form [must] be sought in the political area as well;"¹¹⁴ this is a typical Barthian 'if-then', supported by no evidence and asserted dogmatically. Further, he tells us that the correspondence in question should be the guiding principle of individual life, that whoever believes that God has intervened and saved sinful man, ought himself to do likewise and give socio-political justice to whomsoever that justice is denied.¹¹⁵ Barth has missed that the act of Jesus itself was carried out in a state which was the opposite of everything he demands the state to be. Why does the corresponding act of the Christian demand a state that is just? Indeed, if anything, Christian sacrifice demands the perpetuation of the unjust state, as the presupposition of sacrifice. There can be, *ex hypothesi*, no need for sacrifice in the just state. If, as Barth has told us,¹¹⁶ the Christian faith consists of confession, communion, mission to pass on the Word of others, love, hope, and expectation of the Kingdom, none of these necessarily requires for its exercise a state such as Barth has described. Indeed, it is not impossible that all these may be fulfilled in a situation where there is no Barthian state whatever. Confession, communion, and mission can be practised in any state which grants freedom therefor. This freedom is consonant with all kinds of states, the constitutional state as well as the absolutist, the social welfare state as well as the capitalistic laissez-faire state, the social justice state as well as the imperial. Love, hope, and expectation of the Kingdom can be practised no less in a state of social justice, welfare, and order than in one where these do not obtain.

These comparisons or "points of correspondence" between the church and the state are not, furthermore, to be regarded as "paragraphs of a political constitution" but as "examples...to illuminate the analogical...relationship".¹¹⁷ Their number could have been more or less than he made it; they are not necessary, and can "be only more or less obvious and never subject to absolute proof."¹¹⁸ Completely suppressing from consciousness the infinite variations of Christian interpretations—indeed, the whole of Christian history—Barth is confident that "the clarity of the message of the Bible will guarantee that all the explications and applications of the Christian approach will move in one answering direction and one continuous line."¹¹⁹ What is this approach? It is the sum total of ethics. But what is the ethic of Christianity?

According to Barth, Christian ethics, or dogmatics, preaches that man is a "hopeless sinner," that God desired man's "fellowship," "took up his cause and sin upon Himself" and "justified" him. This God did by

sending "His only begotten son" to die on the cross and thus "atone" for man's sinful nature. But "the Son of God" did not die for ever. He was "resurrected" on the third day, now "sits at the right hand of God" and will return to bring about "the Kingdom of God" which in another sense is already "here" and "at-hand". This is God's grace, namely, that "He himself has fulfilled His own requirement." The ethical job of man is "done with and settled once and for all."¹²⁰ "What had to happen for the reconciliation, for the redemption and the peace of man, has happened really, fundamentally, and completely."¹²¹

But if all morality has been, as it were, consummated in the divine act—which now belongs to history and, paradoxically, as Barth might wish it to be added, continues eternally to be in the present—what does it mean to be moral today? Even the work of faith itself—all of it—Barth tells us, Christian ethics preaches that God has accomplished, "that it no longer requires to be accomplished for us."¹²² Hence, all that is required of man today is to "attest what has taken place,"¹²³ "to approve it," "to endorse it with our own faith."¹²⁴ To be good, to act ethically, to be responsible, to earn moral merit, to achieve ethical felicity—all this means "necessarily and decisively" no more than "the attestation of the good of the command issued to Jesus Christ and fulfilled by him."¹²⁵ Its whole purpose is "the word or work of God in Jesus Christ, in which the right action of man has already been performed and therefore awaits only to be confirmed."¹²⁶

But what, we may ask, does this attestation mean? What does it imply? Barth answers that man does good in so far as he hears the Word of God, in so far as he acts as a hearer of this Word.¹²⁷ This means that ethicality consists in knowing that "God has accepted him [man] in Jesus Christ as the eternal Word of God and that he has been called into covenant with Him by Jesus Christ as the Word of God spoken in time."¹²⁸ It also means "to become obedient to the revelation of the grace of God: to live as a man to whom grace has come in Jesus Christ."¹²⁹ To the necessary question, how can one become obedient to this revelation? Or how does a man live if he is to do so as one to whom grace has come in Jesus Christ, Barth answers by introducing another concept: namely, 'adherence'. He quotes the famous Latin prescription, *Mihi Deo adhaerere bonum est*, saying that to attest, to glorify, to obey, to adhere, mean "to be one who stands and walks and lives and dies within the fact that God is gracious to him, that He has made him His own."¹³⁰ But that is no answer either.

If one is to elicit a clear answer to our question from the enormous mass of Barthian verbiage, he will have to turn from this long-winded section entitled "Ethics as a Task of the Doctrine of God,"¹³¹ to the

section entitled, "The Content of the Divine Claim".¹³² But even here one is disappointed, for Barth introduces more redundant concepts. After quoting Micah 6:8 without giving it any clear content, Barth introduces the concept of the "divine claim" by which he means man's need for ethics, his ethical obligation and responsibility, though this is contradictory to the notion he had previously asserted that all the ethical requirement incumbent upon man has already been fulfilled in the death of Jesus Christ. But overlooking this contradiction, let us follow Barth's thought and ask, what does it mean "to be claimed by God?"¹³¹ If man may decide and control according to his own calculation and opinion where, in what and how he is to find and identify the divine claim, then Christian ethics has availed nothing. Here in last resort, Barth falls on two ideas: the proclamation of the event of Jesus Christ, and *imitatio Christi*. Barth wavers between the two.

The proclamation thesis consists in the view that man's life ought to be governed by the principle that in it, in man's total world, Jesus "lives, reigns and governs."¹³¹ But "Jesus lives, reigns and conquers," he explains, "wherever he is recognized and attested."¹³⁵ Men become "bearers of the grace of God" in so far as among them the name of Jesus may be confessed, as "He may be believed and proclaimed and magnified as the sum of the Law."¹³⁶ Against the alternative of *imitatio Christi* which Barth condemns when he is defending the proclamation thesis as easily as he condemns the proclamation thesis when he is defending the *imitatio Christi* thesis, Barth asserts that "the content of the divine command on man...is... only that he should attest it."¹³⁷ "When man is summoned to do the right, primarily and decisively he is summoned only to adhere to the fact that the gracious God does the right."¹³⁸ Anticipating the criticism that a man may consistently acknowledge the "fact" in question and still do the wrong, Barth is prepared to assert that his attestation of the fact renders anything he may do ethically worthy. "Whatever he [man] himself does," writes Barth, "it will be the right if only he is satisfied that the gracious God does the right."¹³⁹ The whole of divine law, all that is required of us men, all the content of ethics, of the command and grace of God...all these "are contained," Barth affirms, "in what is, after all, its only requirement: that what we do, we should do as those who accept as right what God in His grace does for us...What God wants of all men is that we should believe in Jesus Christ."¹⁴⁰ Has Christendom understood? What Barth thinks is Christian ethicality is the affirmation of a name! To those inclined to say no, let us again turn to Barth. "The name of Jesus," he writes, "is itself the designation of the divine content of the divine claim, of the substance of God's law."¹⁴¹

The *imitatio Christi* thesis consists in the view that ethicality is obe-

dience to Christ, the observance of his direct commands as well as the emulation of his example. "Every thought," he writes, "must be brought into captivity to the obedience of Christ," and quotes II Corinthians 10:5 in support of it.¹⁴² He warns against that obedience of Christ's commands which is made out of reverence to the command. Such obedience, he observes, presupposes a higher law, an axiological principle that is prior to the command, and therefore something higher than Jesus. But since there is nothing higher than Jesus, obedience should not be obedience to the commands of Jesus, but a genuine emulation of his example. Then one would be obeying not an abstract principle, a "husk" containing the law as Barth calls it, but the person of Jesus himself and that is precisely what is demanded by Christian ethics.

To be ethical therefore would seem to mean to follow Christ absolutely; "to take up one's cross" as Barth quotes Matthew 10:38; "to deny oneself" in Matthew 16:24; "to leave all" in Matthew 19:27. It also means "the radicalism of the necessary turning to Him and away from everything else" in Luke 9:57; or to observe the commands of Jesus and above all, to emulate Jesus' conduct by inviting and suffering persecution, evil, self-sacrifice, and death while requiting all these with good.¹⁴³ But, Barth tells us in objection, these are "demands made in this way only by Jesus."¹⁴⁴ None can, and all do not, "lead us to the realization of what is meant by following Jesus."¹⁴⁵ But the grounds he gives for this objection are ridiculous. If man were to realize these demands, he argues, man would be a God, like Jesus, and his achievement would make him a dispenser of salvation to his fellow-men.¹⁴⁶ Rather than do what Jesus did, "what we should and can do is correspond to this good;" to regard it as "the pattern of what we have to do" while at the same time conceding that what we will do will always be something different.¹⁴⁷ Thus, the onerous responsibility of emulating Christ is surreptitiously repudiated on the grounds of hypocritical modesty, of not wanting to earn the appellation of "Godlike." "Be ye therefore perfect as your Father in heaven is perfect"¹⁴⁸ is replaced by the Barthian "Be as good as your human weakness and limitation will allow." Barth had already ruled that not only sacrifice, but Christianity itself, as an ethic is "impossible" for European man, thus throwing further light on the nature of Western ethical consciousness.¹⁴⁹

Secondly, according to Barth's own terms, to regard Jesus' acts as "patterns" with which our actions are to "correspond" as much as possible, is to separate the deed from the doer in Jesus, and the suspicion can never be removed that one has set up the principle above the person.

Even if we should purify Barth's final notions of *proclamation* and *imitatio Christi* of this inconsequence, overlook his wavering between

them and seriously take them both in conjunction, they furnish no foundation for societal morality and being, for societism. Proclamation can never give us any more than the permission to fill the air with proclamations that "Jesus has come," that "he had suffered" and that "he will come again." It is not action, but talk and hearing. Nor is it teaching and education, or even indoctrination with the tradition of historical Christianity. The teachings of the Church, Barth asserts, can provide no principle for guidance. For the Church to recourse to its own teachings as guidance is "demonism, though ecclesiastical".¹⁵⁰ That which alone may be proclaimed is the "fact" that Jesus came and completed once for all, all that needs to be done. If all the drums of the world were to beat this theme in chorus until such time as they may get bored therewith, nothing can or would follow for man's social existence.

On the other hand, the imitation of Christ certainly presupposes a state, a Sanhedrin to condemn and a Pontius Pilate to execute. But such a state can be, and had been, the devil 'statified'. If in the case of Jesus this devil fitted in the works of redemption he does not thereby lose his devilishness. The state that the emulation of Jesus presupposes can therefore be no more than a Mephisto, suffered to exist and act so that by means of his evil deeds, man may purify himself, suffer and achieve salvation. Certainly this Mephisto-state is not the just, orderly, social-welfare, judicial state that Barth says it is, but a true leviathan.

These being Karl Barth's ideas of society, what conclusion may we draw from them?

1. The Barthian theory of society, if such we may call it by stretching the meaning of theory, is irrationalistic. Instead of the laws of logic, he has accepted and observed paradox as a law of thought. He himself acknowledges that there is no defence "against the reproach that our thought is a mere play of words;" that the so-called "Logos... [is] held together in seeming unity only."¹⁵¹ He takes consolation in that Paul and Luther were no less addicted to this intellectual "football game" of "to-and-fro movement," as well as in Calvin, the paradox-prince, whose *Institutes* Barth delightfully calls "a veritable sea of paradoxes".¹⁵² He counsels the ministers whom he was addressing on the subject of "the Problem of ethics to-day" to "be ready to accept the criticism that our thought looks like a mere play of words" because it is not possible for our thought to do more than "to appeal to a tribunal to which we can no more than appeal," this tribunal being none other than faith at the gates of which all reason must be shaken off and left outside.¹⁵³

Ethical consciousness, the awareness that there is an 'ought' with which the 'is' does not but ought to agree, begets for Barth immediately and self-evidently an awareness that the ought can never by man, or in

this world ever, become actual. "For us," he asserts, "what can it [the perfect life] mean except death?"¹⁵⁴ "The problem of ethics contains the secret that man...is an impossibility."¹⁵⁵ Inspired by Kierkegaardian pessimism regarding man, Barth writes that "the problem of ethics is not only the sickness of man, but is a sickness unto death."¹⁵⁶ This negation, which ethical consciousness begets, is for Barth incontrovertible and unanswerable.¹⁵⁷ Man is not only "is never," but "can never". Thus doomed before he starts, man's only salvation must come from the outside,¹⁵⁸ from God; and all there is left for him to do is to acquiesce and accept what has been done for him; or with appeal to paradox, what there still lies to be done *for* him but never *by* him. This future event, which will do that which both has been *and* has not been done, is the millennial second coming of Christ. It is not surprising that Barth is incapable of conceiving ethics without 'millennial-ism'; for it is the only hope left after all ethical possibilities have been denied man.¹⁵⁹ The irrational here is the resignation of the supreme human duty, the surrender to necessary fate, for all that Barth requires of man is to repent, to confess, to proclaim, and to repent again, to confess again, and to proclaim again that man is relieved once for all from his ethical duty; in his paradoxical words, that the Kingdom of God has come, that it is here, and yet that it shall come some day as it has never come before.

2. This Barthian irrationalism is not new. Behind it, as behind Temple's theory, stands relativism, which is identically the same fruit and outcome of peccatism as well as of the Reformation regarding the place of reason in matters religious and spiritual.

Relativism is a measure which only intellectual violence can bring about. Bent upon intemperance, the Church had raised the orthodox interpretation of the faith to dogma. Even as dogma, the gates of further interpretation were not closed and the Church continued to make *ex cathedra* pronouncements. But since it had arrogated to itself alone the right of interpretation, it denounced as heresy every attempt at value-discovery. The Church had certainly led a long history of 'dogmatism', indeed of spiritual totalitarianism. It stood in great need for a spirit of freedom, of enquiry, and of tolerance so that the genuine discoveries of value would receive the sympathetic acclaim that is their due.

But, bent upon violence, the Western spirit that spoke through Luther could not be satisfied with tolerance. It demanded the abolition of all authority in matters spiritual and vested the individual man with the freedom to interpret religious truth as he pleased. Thus, in its objection against the closed doors of Christ-interpretation, it destroyed the gates altogether, rather than be satisfied with unlocking them.

This relativism Barth has inherited along with the violence. The fact of Jesus, like any other fact or event, will yield unquestionably to any interpretation one wishes to make of it—as long as the message of Jesus, i.e., his sayings, the principles presupposed in his deeds and decisions, are not assigned the controlling position. And that is precisely what Barth's insistence on the event to the exclusion of everything else, his fixation of the eye on Jesus and his demand of confession, of proclamation, amount to. On what one makes out of the event, on what one does or ought to do after his confession and proclamation, Barth keeps sphinx-silence but reassures that, provided one has heard, accepted, and proclaimed the event, whatever he does is morally worthy, or at any rate, not the proper subject of ethics.

This relativism is in evidence in his concept of society as 'national' at the highest. His state is always "the commonalty of the people in one place, region or country" and his Church is always "the commonalty of the people in one place, region or country."¹⁶⁰ This relativism to "place, region or country" is itself the consequence of relativism on a deeper level, on the level of the person's understanding of Jesus where, Barth evidently supposes, nobody can teach anybody but all may preach to all, because there is nothing to be taught but only an event to be recognized as an event of history.

The Christian life, Barth tells us, is that "in all acts, in all spheres, in all problems, this must be the governing point of view, the objective to which the course must be steered, the line along which one travels;" viz., the knowledge that God had sent Jesus Christ, that Christ has died and thereby saved.¹⁶¹ This knowledge gives a form, a direction, a style of living.¹⁶² But form and direction can still have any content or objective one likes to assign to them, unless they are anchored in incontrovertible first principles. As long as they are founded on an event, they provide no escape from relativism. On the contrary, the clothing of the problem with such notions as form, direction, or style is an invitation to interpret the event in relativistic manner.

But even this relativism on the deeper plane of the person's understanding of Jesus is not the last word in Barth. For if he were honestly and consistently to observe it on all levels, he would be utterly incapable of imputing offence to the national socialists whose personal understanding of Jesus was only 'different' from his own,¹⁶³ and of inciting his fellow Centro-Europeans to rise against the Third Reich. He has ridiculed the view that the Church should remain silent in the face of the National Socialist struggle to power and scoffed at the Church's recourse to Romans 13 as a guiding principle.¹⁶⁴ Obviously, behind this relativism on the level of dogmatizing there stands an absolutism that is all too

ready to accuse and condemn as heresy—nay, to put to the sword—any variation from itself.¹⁶⁵

3. Closely associated with this absolutism in political world affairs acting under the relativist cloak is a particularist separatism which does not hesitate to burst out into the open where the subject bears the slightest predisposition. The Church, which “must be the model and prototype of the real state,” which “must set an example...for the state,” Barth defines as “the commonalty of the people...who are called apart.”¹⁶⁶ Neither Church nor state ever go beyond “all cities of the realm.”¹⁶⁷ The national interest is their widest and farthest reach, beyond the strictly urban and regional. He quotes the answer to the fifty-fourth Question of the *Heidelberg Catechism* as the last word on the subject of how can or would the real Church become a spatio-temporal reality: “That the Son of God may gather, defend and preserve from the whole human race [*sic*] a chosen congregation for eternal life...from the beginning of the world even to the end, and that I may be and remain a living member of the same to eternity.”¹⁶⁸ Evidently Barth is not even honestly interested in bringing “the Word” to mankind. The Son of God has chosen a fraction of “the whole human race” and all *Herr* Barth wishes, as a man and a Christian, is that *he* may not have been excluded.

The non-Christians are all pagans, ungodly, unelected, and damned to eternal fire. Against the Muslims, his prayer “Let us pray for the destruction of the bulwarks of the false prophet Muhammad”¹⁶⁹ betrays how bitter his rancorous enmity is. In National Socialism, his *bête noire*, he finds an exemplification of Islam. “Where it [National Socialism] meets with resistance, it can only crush and kill—with the might and right which belongs to Divinity! Islam of old as we know proceeded in this way. It is impossible to understand National Socialism unless we see it in fact as a *new Islam*, its myth as a new Allah, and Hitler as this new Allah’s prophet.”¹⁷⁰

This particularist separatism of the Christian community and, by analogy, of the civil community, which Barth advocates is loosened only to let in the Jewish race. But the Jews have not been “gathered” by “the Son of God...in the unity of the true faith”¹⁷¹ but on somewhat different grounds. Their election is of a different character. “Without any doubt,” he writes, “the Jews are to this very day [*sic*] the chosen people of God in the same sense as they have been so from the beginning... They have the promise of God; and if we Christians from among the Gentiles have it too, then it is only as those chosen with them, as guests in their house.”¹⁷² That is not all. Evidencing lunatic proportions, his racist thesis continues: “He who rejects and persecutes the Jews rejects and persecutes Him who died for the sins of the Jews... He who is a radical enemy of

the Jews, were he in every other regard an angel of light, shows himself as such to be a radical enemy of Jesus Christ. Anti-Semitism is sin against the Holy Ghost."¹⁷³

And yet, none of this overflowing sympathy for the Jews filtered to anyone else. The colonized peoples suffering for centuries all sorts of miseries at the hands of their imperialist overlords; the Poles, the Slavs, the Russians who were objects of Nazi rage and who lost far more souls in their struggle against Nazism; the Latin Americans, the Asiatics and Africans struggling to shake off their foreign exploiters and oppressors—none of these receives any mention in the writings of Karl Barth.¹⁷⁴ The Jews, God's chosen people, are more than chosen. For Barth they are almost equivalent with the Godhead. Had Barth meant that to persecute the Jews is a sin against God because they are humans, then the same kind of sin should be incurred whenever any human being is abused and persecuted. But Barth has no sympathy for any other victims; at any rate, he has shown none. Barth's racist understanding of Jewishness is betrayed by his own words. There is no such thing as "a common Jewish religion," he writes. "A Jew may very well be a pantheist, an atheist, or a sceptic, indeed even a good or bad Christian, Roman Catholic or Protestant, and yet he may remain a Jew."¹⁷⁵

Irrationalism, relativism, and particularism are the essential characteristics of Barthian thought on society. These elements, however, do not exist in his thought by themselves, but joined to even more unchristian corollaries. As vehemently as he insists on paradox, he advocates myth, the myth of the millennium, of a kingdom outside of space-time and yet in time, the myth of election for the Christians and of predestination for the whole human race. In likening National Socialism to the Church, he describes the "proper church" as one "of which the real and ardent affirmation is only possible in the form of faith, of mysticism, and of fanaticism."¹⁷⁶ As strongly as he emphasizes the relativist thesis, he emphasizes a political absolutism of the Church. The Church to which he never tires of assigning the duty of hearing and proclaiming the redeeming act of Christ, of Christian witness which he defines as "speech" and nothing else,¹⁷⁷ he calls "a dumb dog" when it is "so absorbed in caring for her good reputation and clean garments that she keeps eternal silence, is eternally meditating, eternally discussing, eternally neutral...[in the political struggles that take place in the world.]"¹⁷⁸ To this he joins, against the relativist thesis, the political absolutism of the state. Running counter to his own denigration of the state as "external, relative and provisional," he asserts that "according to the scriptures the office of the state is that of the servant of God who does not carry the sword to no purpose but for rewarding the good and punishing the evil..."¹⁷⁹ But it

is all an absolutism consummating itself in the struggle against National Socialist Germany, not against tyranny as such, since he is up to this day incapable of mustering sufficient moral strength to condemn either colonialist imperialism by the West or Communist imperialism by the USSR.¹⁸⁰ The absolutism reflects Barth, and Western man, *in actuo*, whereas his relativism reflects Barth and Western man *in spirituo*.¹⁸¹ Rather than furnishing solid foundation for societism Barth's thought is, therefore, evidence of its negation.

IN THE THEOLOGY OF THE FUTURE: THE KINGDOM OF GOD IS THIS
WORLD AND ONLY THIS WORLD¹⁸²

The Lack of Societist Foundations and the Split Consciousness of Western Man

The lack of foundation in the Christianist dogma for a sound societism perturbed the Christian mind very strongly during the last one hundred years. The growth of urban centers, of industry, of the means of communication, brought about a realization of the need for a new kind of social cohesion. The social evils accompanying these developments in Western Europe and North America made that realization all the more acute. The Christian's conscience was pricked: On the one hand, he desired and sought a new pattern of societal order; on the other, he looked in vain to the Church, as guardian of the Christianist legacy and thinker of his spiritual problems, to furnish an inspiring spiritual foundation. But the Church, being the loyal guardian of that legacy, could answer him only in paradoxes which availed nothing. It was not that the Church could have helped but refrained—it really did its acrobatic best—but that there was no way to obvert the fact that Jesus' message was not a societist one, and there was no leader of Christian thought great enough to dare challenge the Church dogmatic in the one field that counts, christology. For it was the Church's christology which made the need for paradox inevitable. Hence, the Christian mind had recourse to the facile solution of asserting and denying at the same time.

As a matter of fact, the Church's recourse to paradox is not as new as we think. Though it has practically become a scandal in the matter of societism in the last hundred years, it is really woven into the very fabric of Christianist (Western) consciousness. Christianist dogma furnished paradoxes on the doctrinal level. Western man's addiction to Christianist dogma furnished paradoxes on the level of being. This is a far graver problem. Mental jugglery or acrobatics, as long as it is a phase of mental rationalization, can perhaps be borne without damage. But jugglery in

being, judging, evaluating, and feeling, leaves indelible marks upon man. It was the latter disease that overtook Western man after his christianization.

It is at once surprising and great in the history of Christianity that, throughout the metamorphoses it has undergone and the unchristlike history of Western man, the person of Jesus—the concrete example of his life, his stand in praxi regarding the tragic nature of existence—was never lost. Nothing could budge the personality of Jesus from the central position it occupied and still occupies in the consciousness of Western man, however committed he may be to the demands of an unchristlike culture and existence. This conflict between a will committed to the affirmation and pursuit of 'the World' and a moral consciousness determined by the world-denying personality of Jesus is the key to the understanding of modern Western nature. More precisely, this conflict consists in Western man's assignment of a false rank to elemental values which Jesus had relegated to lower rank and above which it was his peculiar message to place the properly moral and spiritual values.

Ever since he became a Christian, Western man has lived a split life and suffered from a split personality. Jesus and his ethical renunciation on the one hand, and nature with its self-assertion, nature-affirmation and 'worldliness' on the other, divided his loyalty and being. Although he conducted his life oblivious to Jesus' emphasis on the spiritual over and against the material, yet he invoked Jesus' blessing for every move. While vindicating the self-assertive nature within, now with brute force, now with rational argument, western man never had the courage of his conviction that the life of nature, i.e., the pursuit of 'the World,' was right. Consequently, he strove to convince himself that Jesus really approved. This self-deception, however, never worked. It took but a simple apparition of the person of Jesus to Western man's consciousness (often evoked by a recitation of the Sermon of the Mount, by the Passion, or by a genuine Jesus-like deed on the part of his neighbour) for the veil of rationalization of his affirmation to be rent. Christianity never succeeded in subjugating nature within, in conquering Western man's ethos-in-action; but it did establish itself as unquestionable master of his ethos-in-consciousness.

This process has been going on for centuries. For centuries, therefore, Western man has lived under the strain of this split loyalty. For centuries he has acted self-assertively and nature-affirmatively, and his will as well as his moral judgement *in concreto* have been irretrievably committed to self-assertion and nature-affirmation. Since history dictated his Christianization, he had to learn the technique of representing assertion and affirmation to his moral consciousness as sacrifice and altruism. Because

he could not see himself as he was, he had to misrepresent himself to himself. His faculty of moral judgement *in abstracto*, on the other hand, had been just as irretrievably mastered by the ethic of Jesus, which can in no circumstances reconcile itself with self-assertion and nature-affirmation, with 'the World'. Albert Schweitzer, a man of Jesus-like judgement in concreto,¹⁸³ could not even grasp, let alone solve, the problem of Western civilization except as one of search for a formula which would reconcile the message of Jesus with Western world-affirmation. It escaped him that the central message of Jesus was precisely the condemnation of that affirmation. In him, affirmation of 'the World', philosophically conceived as existence and actuality, is so well entrenched that it not only fashions the problem of civilization as one of justifying itself in consciousness, but it even dictates the conditions under which it is prepared to negotiate peace with Jesus. This it does by prescribing highhandedly and beforehand that any *Weltanschauung* which does not take the legitimacy and righteousness of world-affirmation for granted is *ipso facto* inadmissible.¹⁸⁴

It was this self-deception which did not work that left indelible stains upon the nature of Western man and affected, through his deeds, countless millions of people. In his pursuit of 'the World' Western man has exploited his neighbours, coloured and white, while all the time representing his efforts to himself as Utopia, liberation, socialism, progress, or (as in the case of the Puritans who invented a causal relationship from material success to divine election¹⁸⁵) as something not so much of his own doing as of God's. On the international level, Western man has committed aggression, invaded, colonized, and imperialized. His Christian missions carried the cross only side by side with the national flag and often raised the latter higher than the former. His case would deserve sympathy if it were that of the candid man who falls short of his ideal, better self. If this were the case, he would have acknowledged his trespasses, learned from experience, and endeavoured to become better. The fact is, however, that instead of getting progressively closer to each other, the poles of his deeds and his moral judgements continue to travel in opposite directions.¹⁸⁶

Western man's moral consciousness is, as it were, his valet. Its duty is not to justify the master's deeds, for these he recognizes as ugly without question.¹⁸⁷ Rather, the duty of this valet is to camouflage them in front of his consciousness; i.e., to transfigure into milk white the moral black of his actuality and deed, while the 'righteousness' of his will to affirm 'the World' goes unquestioned. Indeed, it is unthinkable for him that this affirmation should ever be questioned. As a child of nature, Western man has never risen out of her bosom. The advent of Christianity was significant inasmuch as, by completely converting his moral consciousness

without affecting his will, it succeeded only in giving him a bad conscience.

Except in the persons of a few saints, Western man never revolted against nature. Luther and Savonarola, among other Christians of similar moral calibre, saw the personality of Jesus being slowly overcome by the world-affirming forces of their so-called 'Christian' neighbours in Rome. The sight of the Church's hierarchy being as much infiltrated by longings after wealth, beauty, and power, as were ever Athens or Baghdad in their heyday, horrified them. Savonarola fired the whole of Italy, and Luther the whole of Germany. Their effect on Western ethical consciousness, however, was short-lived. The former's cause was soon quenched by the world-affirming forces of the Church; the latter's cause managed to succeed, predominantly because social-political-economic forces allied themselves to it. Even so, it was not long before these same forces, once victory over Rome had been achieved, gave Luther the suffocating embrace which naturalized the original ethical character of his cause. Indeed, it is no wonder that the monastic orders of Christendom have never been undermanned; monastic life is the only life in which Jesus comes into his own in Western life, determining man's representation of himself as well as his willing. Secular life, on the other hand, is so governed by instinct and so free of Jesus' ethicizing power that men of sensitive nature can only withdraw from it with horror.¹⁸⁸

Two alternative avenues out of this dilemma suggested themselves to Western man: to re-create Jesus as a world-affirming teacher, or to deny him altogether. The former avenue has a tradition. It culminated in the positive Christianity which European Fascism, as well as American Progressivism, created in order to justify Western man's affirmation of 'the World' in his own eyes. To take the place of the ethical, no-saying Jesus of history, this positive Christianity furnished an easy-approving, yes-saying Jesus, as much intoxicated with 'the World-in-perpetual-spring' as any of his Fascist and Progressivist followers. Transvaluation is always an easy way out, because it performs its work without touching the object of age-old veneration. On the other hand, the avenue of denial is radical and revolutionary. No wonder that only Communism attempted it. Jesus and his no-saying morality, it held, are an opiate preserved and distributed by the ruling class to support its will to power over the less fortunate classes.

The most eloquent and prolific mouthpiece of the new attempt to deliver the Anglo-Saxon Christian consciousness is Reinhold Niebuhr. His choice is, in fact, that of Communism, namely, the rejection of Jesus. But unlike the daring Communists, he is careful not to reject Jesus *in toto*, but simply to deny him jurisdiction at the level of societal action. His purpose is to liberate society from the ethic of the Sermon on the Mount

in order that it may, by freely meeting evil with evil, assert the self-seeking will in good conscience.

The Societist Transvaluation

Growing among western Christians there is a school of thought whose purpose is to bring about a solution of this dilemma by means of a diametrical reversal of Jesus' teaching. The ethical stand of Jesus portrayed in the famous saying "My Kingdom is not of this world"¹⁸⁹ which expresses one of the most basic truths of his message, namely, that the values usually called 'the World' are not what he had come to help the Jews realize, but the superior values which pertain to the person as an ethical subject, the properly 'spiritual' values, and hence, to all men, as men, is transvalued into the imperative, "the Christian is called to *worldliness*."¹⁹⁰ Jesus had taught his lesson against the Jews' obsession with their worldly, i.e., racial, politico-economic, material kingdom; and he said his saying in rebuttal of the Sanheddrin's indictment that he was about to restitute their worldly kingdom against the will of Rome. The new school of Christian societists would have none of that. For them, existence, involvement, success, and progress in this politico-economic material world—in short, worldliness—is a foregone conclusion and a matter of course. Being absolutely desirable and necessary, worldliness is then attributed to Jesus and the church after him, notwithstanding its incongruence with the whole tenor and substance of both the teaching of Jesus Christ, as well as that of the Church through the ages. To repeat, this does not mean that the teaching and mission of Jesus were by nature incongruent with societism, but, simply, that they were not societistic. Jesus had a far more grave and fundamental problem to deal with. The problems which societism raises and seeks to solve could not have confronted Jesus; and if they did and Jesus was aware of them, he could not have given them his attention which was needed on the far more desperate front of Jewish racialist separatism. On the other hand, Christianity or the teaching of the Church which has come to dominate Christian thought, is incongruent with societism. It is by nature paradoxical; and from paradox no ethic whatever—except cynicism—is deducible. But besides this paradoxical character of Christianist teaching; neither the thesis nor the antithesis arms of Christianist paradoxes are themselves congruent with societism. Neither in the case of the Christianist theory of man nor in that of Christianist axiology and ethics is any arm of the paradox congruent with societism.

Thus, against perhaps the most conspicuous as well as authentic teaching of Christ, namely, "My Kingdom is not of this world," Joseph

C. McLelland, one of the foremost young Christian minds combining Presbyterian traditionalism with 'the New Look'¹⁹¹ in Christian social thought, concludes his last chapter, "The Reign of Christ,"¹⁹² with a section to which he gives the title of "The World Without End". The Christian, he writes, "lives [i.e., ought to live] with his face towards the world."¹⁹³ In support of this extraordinary claim which obviously runs counter to every understanding of the mission of Christ eighteen and a half centuries of Christian history have known, McLelland quotes H. Kraemer, "The church," the latter wrote, "by being world-centered in the image of the divine example, is really the Church."¹⁹⁴ It is a platitude that the church of Christ as well as every Christian should model his life after Christ, "follow me" as Jesus himself had counselled.¹⁹⁵ It is equally a platitude that the kind of life that may be truly called a 'following' of Christ ought to be "world-centered in the image of the divine example". But wide is the difference between Kraemer's and McLelland's uses of the term, on the one hand, and between these two and the meaning of the term when applied to Jesus, on the other. To say that the life of Jesus was "world-centered" means that it had for central purpose the salvation of man. Jesus was "world-centered" inasmuch as his whole mission was *to* man. When McLelland and his socialist colleagues say the Christian ought to be "world-centered," they mean that he ought to realize for men in this world, the values constitutive of 'the World', namely, the socio-economic-political values, in which Jesus was not at all interested, and the Jewish obsessed cultivation and pursuit of which he came to condemn and to combat.¹⁹⁶ Certainly, it is as possible for a desperate pessimist who seeks to put an end to all life and existence in this world to be "world-centered" as for a Bacchus who seeks to fill that world with wine, women, and song. To extrapolate this orientation from the realm of final purpose, from meta-ethics, to that of the content of the purpose, to ethics, is an unjustifiable new twist, devoid of foundation. It is a New Look cast upon the holy life of Jesus by a *tour de force*.

The Christian, McLelland asserts, is the man whose private ownership is a "property-in-community" and not a "community of property". Undoubtedly, the crux of any altruism is that one's private property is, besides being a means for his own livelihood and that of his dependents, a privilege put at his disposal for the welfare of his fellow man. But once this altruism is translated into 'rights and duties under the law', the ethical element of Jesus' vision disappears in favour of the utilitarian. For what Jesus had enjoined man to do is not merely to fulfil the precepts of the law, of any law, but to transcend the law on one's own initiative for the sake of the neighbour. McLelland is certainly right in stressing altruism, but he has left the Jesus ethic far behind when he exhorts his

fellow Christians to legislate the Christian precepts of social justice, and then to expect fulfilment of the Christian moral imperative through the fulfilment of those precepts. There is nothing objectionable in such fulfilment *per se*. On the contrary, it is very desirable in itself. But that such fulfilment answers the ethical requirement of Jesus is utterly wrong. Law can never do what Jesus wants men to do. To legislate is ethically futile for the man whom Christian charity does not move to do for his neighbours at least as much as (Jesus would say, more than) the law might coerce him to do. By definition, law cannot enter the domain of the heart, of the will-in-its solitude with itself. When any precept is legalized, it is bound to lose its peculiarly Christian character and become utilitarian, an ethic of consequences. This does not mean that the good legislated becomes bad. It remains essentially as good as it was before. But it no longer answers the ethical requisite of Jesus. We can legislate altruism as an addition to the Jesus' requisite, which would conflict with the Christianist thesis. But we cannot have it as a substitute, or a definition of the ethic of Jesus.

It would have been wonderful if McLelland had left the law where it is and exhorted man to transcend it. To go beyond the requisites of the law, to excel the law is to realize the moral and higher values. Ethically speaking, then, to identify the morally imperative with such excelling and transcendence is to 'dispose' of the law, as Jesus had done. As we have seen, McLelland subjects charity to justice,¹⁹⁷ the higher to the lower value, thus reversing their natural order of rank. It is certainly not a mistake in ethical vision that is here in question, but a Western impatience with the Christian supreme values of love and charity. This haste is dictated by the transvaluation of the Kingdom of God that has already taken root in Western Christendom. In the anxiety to bring about and to establish the worldly kingdom, to give it the first place in man's ethical striving and hoping, the heavenly kingdom is demoted from its place and made subservient to the worldly.

That the heavenly kingdom is an order of nature rather than one of heaven; that it is in time rather than an eschatological after-time, that it is realizable by human effort, rather than coming suddenly *bon gré mal gré*, 'with power', is a hard thesis to prove. The whole of Christian history is against it. It is to be expected therefore, when the Christian societist attempts it, that he should resort to all sorts of unconvincing argument.

First, the whole position of the eschatological nature of the kingdom, whether in pre-Christ Judaism or in Christianity, with all the arguments and discussions spent on both subjects,¹⁹⁸ the whole argument started at the turn of the century by Albert Schweitzer's revolutionary *Das Messianitäts- und Leidensgeheimnis*,¹⁹⁹ Karl Barth's *Römerbrief*,²⁰⁰ and

the efforts of "Dialectical Theology" of O. Cullmann,²⁰¹ J. Marsh²⁰² and S. Möwinckel²⁰³—all these are silently passed by and forgotten. Even the 'realized eschatology' of C. H. Dodd is here contradicted by the thesis that the Kingdom is a 'not yet' which may, indeed ought to be, brought about by a programmatic societal ethic.

Secondly, the Kingdom which is a place of rest, of relaxation from striving, to which Jesus called²⁰⁴ and Paul recalled²⁰⁵ is here abandoned in favour of the apocryphal Revelation of John the Divine. But forgetting for the moment the wide difference of reliability which distinguishes *Revelations* from the direct words of Jesus as reported by the evangelist and the established words of Paul, all that *Revelations* does in fact say is simply that in the Kingdom of Heaven God's "servants shall serve him."²⁰⁶ This most simple direct statement means no more than that in life to come, the transcendental otherness of which *Revelations* proclaims in no uncertain terms,²⁰⁷ men shall 'commune' with God. The nature of the ways of this other-worldly communion are for ever beyond our knowledge on this earth and *Revelations* lays no claim to any knowledge of those ways. This simple statement, however, means for Professor McLelland that "the new age will be shaped like a kingdom, that is, like a State."²⁰⁸ By what logic or stretch of the imagination is the transcendental "service" of men to God in an other-life construed to mean a "kingdom" that is "like a State," McLelland does not show. Indeed, against the evidence of Matthew and Paul's understanding of Jesus, he outspokenly says that "in this Kingdom of God the rhythm will be changed—not replaced by the rest of an eternal Sabbath but, transformed into the final work of man, the Lord's Day service"²⁰⁹ which, he had previously told us is, for the carpenter, for example, the actual business of producing good tables.²¹⁰ It is really asserting the absurd to claim that the carpenter in this world will be a carpenter in the other and his felicity in either realm is a function of his making good tables.

Third, drawing on the paradoxical assertions of Christianist dogma that the Kingdom of God is here and not here, McLelland anxiously emphasizes the affirmative arm and then transvalues the 'hereness' in question from being one of time and space to being one of contentual worldliness. He tells us that "the Bible thinks of reality as divided into two ages or aeons"—which is true.²¹¹ He explains that the one is "old, passing away because it has become perverted by the evil powers that have invaded God's good creation... the other is new, the New Age that is coming upon us."²¹² With Christianist disregard for the law of contradiction, McLelland goes on to assert that "this New Age has already begun in a kind of secret and hidden way... when Christ arose at Easter," and with the Christianist taste for obscurantism, he explains that "this

New Age began in His own new Body.”²¹³ This “Body” which is the Kingdom, brought its power...to the Church.”²¹⁴ “Therefore,” reasons McLelland, “the lay family of God are the People of power...It is through this same People that new forms of society will be created... The Bible may speak about ‘heaven above and earth beneath’, but it speaks even more about the *old* heaven and earth and the *new* heaven and earth.”²¹⁵

One may look in vain in Christianist literature for a more woolly piece of thinking. If the “Old Aeon” has passed away, certainly it is not the old earth that did, but a regime of the earth, for evil does not destroy the earth physically, but disfigures one specie of its inhabitants spiritually. It is then claimed that the Old Age is absolutely passed and gone and the New Age is historically come. But an event—which the saving of Christ is supposed to be—is either an advent, a fact of history or it has not yet taken place. The Old Age, being a condition, a regime, has actually passed away; and an event, if it has happened, belongs to history and cannot be undone. For Professor McLelland, however, the Old Age is and is not passed and the New Age is and is not come. The latter has come in a “secret and hidden way”. Granted this much self-contradiction, the fact remains untouched that whatever it is that is and is not passed, and is and is not come, its nature is positively not physical, but spiritual. The paradox is not affirmed of the real heaven and earth but of a figurative heaven and earth, of two spiritual regimes. To assert the contrary in one’s waking hours is nothing less than pathological. And yet, with a sleight of hand, Professor McLelland asserts that it is the real heaven and the real earth populated by the Christ-professing men and women of history that constitute the New Kingdom of God. By calling the Christian to worldliness, McLelland calls him to the Kingdom of God, to the New Aeon. It is certainly a sad turn for the noble spirituality of Jesus that his professors are using his name, his ‘Body,’ to defend and to promote the real, geo-physical, historical socio-economic Zion that he has made his life mission to combat, although this new Zion is not a racist society and its place on the map is other and bigger than the Palestinian Jerusalem.

This radical departure from the “traditionally ‘religious’ questions and conventions”²¹⁶ has been rapidly gaining grounds in many quarters of Christendom. It is part of the fabric of that Western consciousness which is gradually repudiating the ethic of Jesus for an ethic which is the prerogative of Western man alone, the ethic of a Germanic joyful affirmation of himself and his world. Western man’s commitment to this ethic and, as we have seen earlier,²¹⁷ this commitment of his consciousness to the ethic of Jesus, make him ascribe his almost-pagan ethic to Jesus. Indeed, he even calls the new graft a “heresy” but acclaims it with all

heart and soul. Edward W. Warner, author of a sermon that classically represents how far Western man has gone in this direction,²¹⁸ is only a candidate for the Ph. D. degree in Divinity in the University of Chicago, but the philosophy of life he advocates, which in typical bad conscience he calls a 'heresy', finds ready acceptance in all circles.

Adopting the words of Nehemiah "Go your way, eat the fat, and drink the sweet, and send portions into them for whom nothing is prepared: for this day is holy unto your Lord: neither be ye sorry; for the joy of the Lord is your strength,"²¹⁹ said on the occasion of the promulgation of the tribalist law in which the Hebrew race was to become frozen and perpetrated for ever, Warner proclaims in unmistakably Nietzschean terms: "In the joy of men at the joy of life, 'the joy of the Lord' there shimmers and shines through. And it is strong—as only the ultimate can be strong."²²⁰ Against the eschatological kingdom of Jesus, he insists on an "essential and central fulfilment" of man that is "really possible" here and now.²²¹ And man, Christian man, he tells us, must bring about this fulfilment because it is joy and joy provides its own argument, its presence is its justification. "When we know its [joy's] fulfilling, conquering, irrepressible celebration, we can—even in great brokenness—say 'Yes' to life, to others, to ourselves, because there is nothing else to say and nothing else we want to say."²²² Here, Mr. Warner might well have joined voice with Friedrich Nietzsche who made his Zarathustra sing:

*Die Welt ist tief
Und tiefer als der tag gedacht
Tief ist ihr Weh!
Lust ist noch tiefer als Weh
Weh spricht—Vergeh!
Doch alle Lust will Ewigkeit
Will tiefe, tiefe Ewigkeit!*²²³

and made his Antichrist reason: "The Christian conception of God—God as god of the sick, God as a spider, God as spirit—is one of the most corrupt conceptions of the divine ever attained on earth. It may even represent the low-water mark in the descending development of divine types. God degenerated into the contradiction of life, instead of being its transfiguration and eternal yes! God as the declaration of war against life, against nature, against the will to live! God—the formula for every slander against this world, for every lie about the beyond! etc. etc."²²⁴

The societist transvaluation is not the only alternative to Communism facing the Christian consciousness. European Fascism was vanquished in World War II and, though it has many individual followers, it is doubtful whether the present century will see any large-scale or communal resurgence of it anywhere. American Progressivism is certainly gaining ground all the time. But its gain is the gain of mediocrity. The intelligent Christian intellectual quickly sees through its ideational jugglery; and the sincere Jesus-willed Christian is repulsed by its 'Worldliness' and withdraws lonesomely to the personalist heights of Christian self-giving, love, and charity.

But Christendom is not entirely composed of sincere Christians. There are those who are dissatisfied with the socialist transvaluation but do not accept the fact that societal ethic is not the ethic of Jesus though it may well, and indeed should, be added thereto. They do not wish to understand that the ethic of Jesus, though no societism may be deduced from it, can, must, and was meant to be completed by addition of the societal dimension to the personal. Their loyalty to the Christianist dogma prevents them from making this concession, and directs them, in consequence to seek new solutions.

The prophet of this new breakthrough is Reinhold Niebuhr. Niebuhr's estimate of human nature is fundamentally that of Hobbes. In society man stands in the midst of the *bellu omnium contra omnes* (the war of all men against all men).²²⁵ Not that this state is forced upon him; it follows from his essence, and is precisely what nature intended it to be.²²⁶ The person who lacks the "passion" necessary for self-assertion, he says, quoting Shaftesbury, "must certainly be esteemed vicious in regard to the end and design of nature."²²⁷ In another vein Niebuhr calls this predicament in which man finds himself "sin," and regards it as the consequence of man's exaggerated use of his human capacities.²²⁸ But this will to use his capacities without restriction is equally the endowment of nature.²²⁹ To call it "sin" therefore avails nothing. It may satisfy the Christian prerequisite of furnishing that from which salvation can take place, but it leaves reality, the real 'nature', just as it was before. Although redemption may change the ethical will which in turn may either sanctify and spiritualize 'nature', or prevent the fulfilment of its ends, it can never change 'nature'. Since Niebuhr bases his ethical and political theories on the empirical facts, rather than the desiderata of human nature, the introduction of the concept of sin is superfluous.

The alternative of opposing nature, i.e., of subjecting it to a higher law that is derived not from it, but, like the law of Jesus, 'from heaven', does

not appeal to Niebuhr. He distinguishes between "mutual love"—a utilitarian give-and-take arrangement by which one serves his own interest by serving another's—and "sacrificial love," that "impossible possibility,"²³⁰ which is the absolute demand of God upon human life, calling for an absolute obedience regardless of consequences to the will of God, however such obedience may run counter to 'nature'. The first is self-interest all over again, now become enlightened to seek its ends more effectively by circuitous routes. The other is "impossible". "The ethical demands made by Jesus," Niebuhr argues, "are incapable of fulfilment in the present existence of man."²³¹ This fantastic thesis Niebuhr defends on the ground that, when Jesus made this demand he was not thinking of this world, not legislating for moral conduct in this world but in the next²³²—a thesis even more fantastic. The most naive understanding of the Sermon on the Mount could not regard its ethical insights as directives for action in another world, whether inside or outside of time. In such an 'other' world, there can *ex hypothesi* be no need for morality; and certainly, there can be no need for a morality of answers to all sorts of evil. A heaven that is full of men poor in spirit, mourning, hungry, reviled, persecuted, men against whom "all manner of evil" is perpetrated, trodden under foot, killing and being killed, etc. etc. and where this state of affairs continues and thus warrants a morality, is no heaven.

Even if the Christian were to accept Niebuhr's interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount, he would still have to agree that sacrificial love is somehow relevant to this world and must somehow affect human conduct. This constitutes a division of man's loyalty. Between the two gods dwelling within his breast, both of which are commanding, the one possible and the other "impossible" duties, the Christian, as Niebuhr sees him, is torn apart. He must follow the practical dictates of utility, but under the accusing and condemning finger of the moral law. But being itself "impossible," the moral law of Jesus has, under this scheme, the sole function of preserving for Western man his age-old bad conscience.

Should a person, however, resolve to go against 'self' and 'nature' and fulfil the imperatives of sacrificial love, Niebuhr would at times call him, with Shaftesbury, 'vicious' and at other times he would remove his hat in awe at the superhuman effort involved. But he has no sympathy with any society that confuses its own welfare with the welfare of mankind, or its own duty with the general concept of duty.²³³ For social groups, it is necessary to pursue political policies which the ethic of the individual "will always find embarrassing,"²³⁴ and which "sacrificial love"—or the law of Jesus—will always be contradictory to itself. This sharp dichotomy between an ethic of the individual and an ethic of society Niebuhr explains as necessitated by four considerations:

1. "Social injustice cannot be resolved by moral and rational suasion alone.... Conflict is inevitable and in this conflict power must be challenged by power."²³⁵ "Collective power... can never be dislodged unless power is used against it."²³⁶ We must understand, he counsels, "the brutal character of the behaviour of all human collectives and the power of self-interest and collective egoism in all intergroup relations."²³⁷ One may ask here whether this is a law of science or of morals. If the former, it is irrelevant to the ethical problem of injustice in society, though it may be of some use to those in charge of the execution of social ethical judgement, namely, the governors and police commissioners, on the internal front, and the ambassadors and the military on the international. If it is a law of morals, it is nothing but presumption to prescribe evil (i.e., power, coercion, and conflict) to "dislodge" another evil (i.e., another power) when *ex hypothesi*, all society and all nature are in essence based upon conflict and power. It is an appeal *ad baculum*, the argument of the big stick.

2. "Every effort to transfer a pure morality of disinterestedness to group relations has resulted in failure."²³⁸ "It would therefore seem better," concludes Niebuhr, "to accept a frank dualism in morals than to attempt... policies which, from the political perspective, are quite impossible."²³⁹ Since no social group has shown enough imagination to make itself amenable to the influence of a disinterested pure love, and since there is no possibility "of persuading any social group to make a venture in pure love," he adds, "the selfishness of human communities must be regarded as an inevitability."²⁴⁰ Logically, this is a *non-sequitur*. Historically, that "every effort... has resulted in failure" is only one way of interpreting events and is not at all self-evident. Ethically, it is a counsel of morbid despair. Why ought a society not pursue the disinterested ethic of pure love alone? There is as little reason to think that such self-sacrifice—if that should be the outcome, though it need not necessarily be so—would be less 'successful' at the societal level than was the heroic self-sacrifice of Jesus, in the Christian view, or of Socrates in the more general view, at the individual level.

3. The ethic of pure love, argues Niebuhr, demands sacrifices. In the case of the individual, self-sacrifice is morally right since the self is at once subject and object. It is his own interest that the individual sacrifices. In the case of society—where decisions are made by proxy—unselfishness is "inappropriate to the action of a state [because] no one has a right to be unselfish with other people's interests."²⁴¹ This argument misses the fact that in a constitutional society the ruler, whether legislative or executive, is as much object of the self-sacrifice decision as the least citizen. He would not be subjecting his fellow countrymen to any unself-

ishness that he would not accept for himself. More serious, however, is the implicit conception of the ruler as onesided servant of interests rather than as definer of duties. To presuppose that the function of government is merely to serve or bring advantages to the citizens, and not to impose duties and extract prices, is not only to limit unduly the purpose of government, but it is to regard government as a monster bent upon devouring everyone and everything around it. The free bounties of nature cannot be long exploited without nature extracting some price; and even an association of robbers cannot last long without some self-imposed duties, not only *vis-à-vis* one another, but *vis-à-vis* the outside world in which they operate. In this regard, Niebuhr's political theory does not even rise to the level of recognizing the necessity of 'going to the dentist' in a hedonistic calculus. Obviously Niebuhr is here determined by the managerial ethic of American corporations where the executive has one and only one duty, namely, to enable the shareholders to realize the largest possible amounts of cash dividends.

4. The application of the norms of individual morality to society, Niebuhr further argues, results in undesirable consequences. "Such a policy easily becomes morbid [and makes] for injustice by encouraging and permitting undue self-assertion in others."²⁴² Here Niebuhr is oblivious to the power of love, to the efficacy of Christian charity, and consequently, of every noble, disinterested, unselfish deed. He has forgotten the Socratic position that to suffer injustice, not only with regard to individuals but absolutely, is better than to perpetrate it. He has completely ignored the Christian truth, central to the whole message of Jesus and therefore to the essence of Christianity, that, absolutely, it is not through evil and hostility that evil and hostility end.

It is surprising that, along with these views of human nature, Christian ethics, and political theory, Niebuhr holds that the ideal of society is justice. The surprise, however, is shortlived. Indeed, according to Niebuhr, the pursuit of this ideal is necessarily so fraught with "the assertion of interest against interest" that it compels societies "to sanction self-assertion...social conflict and violence."²⁴³ Justice itself can be maintained only through the precarious "balance of power," the setting and dividing of mankind into self-neutralizing, hostile camps.²⁴⁴ One wonders what sort of justice it is that is based on the balance of power, coercion and social conflict; in the pursuit of which society "is forced...to sacrifice a degree of moral purity for political affectiveness."²⁴⁵ Surely it must be anything but Christian justice.

For Niebuhr the fact that the conduct of the nations of the world has been immoral weighs too heavily in the scales. Indeed, it weighs so heavily that it tacitly receives a measure of approval from him. He

insists that "the sentiment of nationality and the authority of the state [are] the ultimate force of cohesion" and therefore society's highest principle.²⁴⁶ He regards universalism, or the will to extend the social sympathies of individuals to the larger social problems of mankind, as vain and futile. "What lies beyond the nation [namely] the community of mankind, is too vague to inspire devotion."²⁴⁷ The Church was once upon a time able to command such a universalist extension of human sympathy. Today, Niebuhr assures us, "the Church...no longer possesses [any such] prestige [or] universality."²⁴⁸ This being the case, he argues, society "must be self-assertive, proud, self-complacent and egotistical."²⁴⁹ Its "most significant moral characteristic...is its hypocrisy... [just as] self-deception and hypocrisy is an unvarying element in the moral life of all human beings."²⁵⁰ By concluding from all this that relations between social groups must be purely political, not ethical, Niebuhr has not only fallaciously deduced an 'ought' from an 'is', but has repudiated the ethic of Jesus inasmuch as that ethic is relevant for the conduct of society.

This empiricism, and the confirmation of the Hobbesian thesis that the nature of man is egotistic, self-assertive, hypocritical, and necessarily hostile towards other men imply, further, the rejection of the ethic of Jesus on the personal level, however much Niebuhr has proved to be lacking in the courage to pursue his thought to its logical conclusion. Inasmuch as Niebuhr is an instance of Western consciousness, the problem of Western man today is radically different from that of the first three centuries of Christianity. At that time the personality of Jesus was struggling to invade Western man's ethos. Today, after twenty centuries of 'Christian' existence, that ethos is regrouping its forces and struggling to repel, and utterly to banish, that holy personality. Thus, for him, the Kingdom of God is not this world, but the spiritual realm of the individual in his personal moment. However, he does not stop there. He tells us that the Jesus' ethic can and ought to have no relevance whatever for societal life where man is free to apply the law of the jungle which is the only true law of society.

Niebuhr's limitation of Jesus' jurisdiction to the personal level is not genuine. It is made with the ulterior motive of denying Jesus, or for that matter, any ethic at all, whatever its nature of source, of jurisdiction over the societal. But if his acrobatics prove anything, they prove that for him, the societal is really the only realm that counts, that it is *the* level at which God's Kingdom may and should be realized. But, and here lies the import of Niebuhr's whole thesis, the Kingdom of God in society is what the Anglo-Saxon thinks it is; and it is to be realized by any means whatever—including, above all, brute force—which Mr. Anglo-Saxon alone may deem necessary.

Conclusion

It may not be superfluous to remember at this juncture what we said earlier in this chapter. To repeat it with Troeltsch, "Jesus did not organise a church."²⁵¹ This is so because he was concerned with a deeper-lying problem of ethics—the radical self-transformation issuing in the determination of the self by divine will—and confronted by the rabid diseases of Jewish separatism, tribalism, and the consuming will to the political, geophysical Zion. But what he did bring about, namely, the teaching of a new road to salvation, is not necessarily contradictory to societism. It leaves the level on which societism, anti-societism and a-societism make their respective stands untouched. It would have been truly wonderful if Christian doctrine, beginning with a genuine statement of Jesus' breakthrough, had developed to the point where the Christian's consciousness, transformed by the ethic of Jesus—and confronting the situation created by the industrial and civic growth in Christendom—felt and satisfied its need for a societist enlargement of the Christian ethic. And if that consciousness had made the right start to begin with, it would have acclaimed the achievement of the Prophet Muhammad rather than regard it as a permanent stumbling block.²⁵²

Unfortunately, Christian doctrine fell under the dogmatism of Tertullian before, and of Athanasius after, the Council of Nicaea. Later on, it was wedded to the 'anti-life' irrationalism of St. Augustine at the Council of Chalcedon. Henceforth the doors were tightly closed. Peccatism, saviourism, millennialism, and paradox held complete sway. These, not the ethic of Jesus, are the enemies of societism. For how can the societist will to space-time, to the world, to life and nature, ever be reconciled with the peccatist condemnation? How could societist activism be reconciled with the saviourist contention that all that needs to be done has been done once and for all? How can the societist futurism the will to a future, that is not yet but is actualizable by man's effort alone, be reconciled with the sudden coming of the Kingdom with power, of the cosmic *bouleversement*? Finally, how can the impeccable, absolutely affirmative ethic of societism be possible under assumptions and first principles which are affirmed on one hand and denied on the other? Is it any wonder that Christian doctrine stammers and garbles in the dark when it attempts to deduce societism from this 'Christianism'? that it never gets anywhere, not to speak of succeeding in putting forth one coherent statement of its problem?

Ernest Troeltsch wrote a monumental work for which his name is duly famous.²⁵³ He spent over a thousand pages trying to present as well as to establish, the claim that the great men of Christianity have all been so-

cietists of the first calibre. But he did not succeed in any instance. All these men held Christianist views which militate successfully against societism. Thus, he wrote in conclusion: "The idea of the future Kingdom of God which is nothing less than faith in the final realization of the absolute...does not...render this world and life in this world meaningless and empty; on the contrary, it stimulates human energies, making the soul strong through its various stages of experience in the certainty of an ultimate, absolute meaning and aim for human labour. Thus it raises the soul above the world without denying the world....The life beyond this world is, in every deed, the inspiration of the life that now is."²⁵⁴ This is certainly well said. But who has ever denied it? Certainty not Jesus, nor those Christians of history who could not, and persistently refused to, swallow the bitter pills of Christianist dogma, the so-called 'heretics'. The Muslims have been proclaiming this truth for fourteen hundred years. It was the Christianists themselves, especially those whose minds were irretrievably committed to the theses of Christianist dogma but whose hearts and wills were elsewhere, that denied it. But it was precisely they who, according to Troeltsch, were the world's societists *par excellence*. Obviously, Troeltsch's work is addressed to fellow-Christianists who saw that Christianist logic ran counter to truth and therefore accused it of going against 'the World'. But Troeltsch is in yet another sense a Christianist for he thought that by convincing his fellow-Christianists that their predecessors were not against 'the World', he had established his book's sub-title, "The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches".

Notes

1. Where Jesus is reported to have commanded his disciples: "If thy brother shall trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee and him alone: if he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother. But if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may be established. And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the church: but if he neglect to hear the church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican." (Matthew 18:15-17).
2. *Supra*, Ch. III, especially, pp. 110-16, 116-18, 119-23.
3. Aware of the spuriousness of this evangelist's report, *The Interpreter's Bible* wrote: "Did Jesus speak thus of the Church, the local Christian congregation, while as yet there was no church? Would he, could he have said, *Let him be to you as a Gentile and a tax collector*? Such words certainly do not accord with his other teaching, or with his own acts: he healed Gentiles, and went to the home of Zacchaeus the tax collector. Rather than attempt impossible 'reconciliations,' it is better to assume that these verses...are not a transcript of his very words, but a reflection of the thought and practice of the early Church." (Vol. VII, 472-73; Matthew 18:15-17). It must be noted that Holzmann (*Neu Testament*

Theologie, 1897, I, 212) and Wellhausen (*Das Evangelium Matthai*, p. 93) as well as others deny the authenticity of this passage as well as of Matthew 16:18.

4. London: The Epworth Press, 1952.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
10. John 3:3.
11. William Temple, *Christianity and the Social Order*, Penguin paperback, 1956, p. 100.
12. Robert Owen is the founder of the consumers co-operative movement in England which was preceded by the founding of the agricultural credit village co-operative movement in Germany by Raiffeisen.
13. F. D. Maurice, 1805-1872, is regarded as the father of Christian socialism. It was the events of 1848 in England that brought forth in him the first socialist ideas. It was in 1850 that he began to associate with other men such as J. M. F. Ludlow, C. Kingsley, T. Hughes, and E. V. Neale, men similarly inclined to incept social reform and to seek a theological basis therefore in Christian principles. The Rockdale Pioneers co-operative society had then been six years in existence. But F. D. Maurice produced no systematic thought that may be properly called socialist. It was really in J. M. Ludlow that Christian socialist thought began to take form. See M. B. Reckitt, *Maurice to Temple, A Century of the Social Movement in the Church of England*, London: Faber and Faber, 1946.
14. A good succinct presentation of this view in modern times is Baillie, pp. 207-10; Knudson, pp. 432-72; W. R. Inge, *The Church and the Age*, London: Longman's, 1913.
15. "There is no authentic record, of such a foundation," writes John Oman in the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, ("the Christian Church"). Everything having to do with the Church as an actually existing society in the lifetime of Jesus is found in Matthew, and is conspicuously absent from all the other Gospels. The word ΕΚΚΛΗΣΙΑ appears only in Matthew 16:18 and 18:17. The final commission in Matthew 28:19 ff is much more general in Luke 24:47 ff and John 20:22 ff. The parables which speak of a mixed society (Matthew 13:25, 47 and 22:3 ff), in so far as they appear in the other gospels have a different application. The night when, in Matthew 13:25, tares are sown is, in Mark 4:27, the time when the seed springs. The good and bad in Matthew 22:10 are in Luke 14:21 the poor, halt, maimed, and blind—moral wrecks but genuine converts. When Matthew 16:18 and 18:17 are accepted as genuine, the word *ecclesia* is interpreted simply as 'community', ideally in the former, and locally in the latter, and more frequently all these sayings are regarded as having been modified under the stress of a situation in which the Church was still looked on as the society of the Kingdom of God, but in actual fact was becoming very unlike it. In neither view do we find any ground for believing that Jesus founded a society with a mixed membership and governed by officers having external authority."
16. Matthew 6:10.
17. Mark 9:1; Matthew 16:28; Luke 9:27.
18. "There shall come in the last days scoffers...saying, Where is the promise of his coming? for since the fathers fell asleep, all things continue as they were from the beginning of the creation" (II Peter, 3:3-4).
19. Matthew 4:17.

20. *Ibid.*, 3:2.
21. Mark 9:47.
22. Matthew 25:1-3.
23. Mark 10:23 Commenting on this passage, Clement of Alexandria wrote in the second century: "He [Jesus] does not, as some conceive offhand, bid him [the rich man] throw away the substance he possessed, and abandon his property; but bids him banish from his soul his notions about wealth, his excitement and morbid feeling about it, the anxieties, which are the thorns of existence, which choke the seed of life. For it is no great thing or diserable to be destitute of wealth, if without a special object—not except on account of life" (*Stromateis*, 7.2.10).
24. Matthew 5:3, 10; Mark 10:15; John 3:3 5.
25. Cf. his *History and the Gospel*, London: Nisbet, n.d.; *The Apostolic Preaching and its Development*, esp. appendix on "Eschatology and History," London: Hodder, 1936.
26. "Giving thanks unto the Father who hath made us meet to be partakers of the inheritance of the saints of light...and has translated us into the Kingdom of His dear Son."
27. Aylesbury: Penguin, 1956.
28. *Christianity and the Social Order*, p. 50.
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Ibid.*, p. 52. "Just the same thing is true of our mental and spiritual vision. Some things hurt us: we hope they will not happen again; we call them bad. Some things please us; we hope they will happen again, we call them good."
31. *Ibid.*, p. 53.
32. William Temple, *Nature Man and God*, London: MacMillan, 1934, pp. 356 ff; 514 ff. "God's creation of man," Temple writes, "involved the risk, amounting to a moral certainty, [sic] that they [men] would take the self-centered outlook upon life, and then...become hardened in selfishness till society was a welter of competing selfishness instead of being a fellowship." *Christianity and Social Order*, pp. 55-56.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 54.
34. *Ibid.*
35. *Ibid.*
36. *Ibid.*, p. 58.
37. *Ibid.*, pp. 58-59.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 59.
39. *Ibid.*
40. *Ibid.*
41. "Though Christianity supplies no ideal in this sense, it supplies something of far more value—namely; principles" (*Ibid.*, p. 55).
42. *Ibid.*, chs. 4, 5.
43. *Ibid.*, pp. 57-58.
44. Karl Barth, *Against the Stream*, London: SCM Press, 1954, p. 16.
45. *Ibid.*
46. *Ibid.*, "The polis has walls" (*Ibid.*, p. 17).
47. *Ibid.*, p. 28. "The fundamental purpose of its [the state's] existence," Barth writes, is "the limiting and the preserving of man." (*Ibid.*, p. 36) Again, "A state is an attempt undertaken by men to organize the outward life of man with the intention of preventing individual encroachments on the rights of the whole community on the rights of individuals....It is part of the nature of the state that it

- depends in the final resort on the availability of force" (*Ibid.*, p. 95).
48. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
 49. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
 50. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
 51. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
 52. *Ibid.*
 53. *Ibid.* See also pp. 22-23.
 54. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
 55. *Ibid.* See also p. 21. where Barth asserts that "however much human error and human tyranny may be involved in it, the state is not a product of sin but one of the constants of the divine Providence and government of the world in its action against human sin: It is therefore an instrument of divine grace."
 56. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
 57. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
 58. *Ibid.*
 59. *Ibid.* In an eloquent passage, Barth describes man as "a being who is always on the point of opening the sluices through which, if he were not checked in time [i.e., by the coercive authority of the Leviathan] chaos and nothingness would break in and bring human time to an end" (*Ibid.*).
 60. H. Richard Niebuhr, *Christ and Culture*, London, 1952, p. 188.
 61. Barth, *Against the Stream*, p. 23.
 62. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
 63. *Ibid.*
 64. *Ibid.*
 65. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
 66. *Ibid.*, p. 94.
 67. *Ibid.*
 68. *Ibid.*
 69. *Ibid.*, p. 25. "The various political forms and systems are human inventions... The Christian community... is aware of the limits of all the political forms and systems which man can disavow even with the cooperation of the church, and it will beware of playing off one political concept—even the 'democratic' concept—as the Christian concept against all others... In the face of all political achievements, past, present, and future, the church waits for 'the city which hath foundations whose builder and maker is God' (*Heb.*, 11:10). It trusts and obeys no political system or reality but the power of the Word, by which God upholds all things (*Hebrews*, 1:30 Barmen Thesis No. 5) including all political things" (*Ibid.*, p. 26).
 70. *Ibid.*, p. 80.
 71. *Supra*, n. 5.
 72. *Supra*, n. 12.
 73. Barth, p. 13.
 74. *Ibid.*, p. 81.
 75. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
 76. *Ibid.*
 77. *Ibid.* We may not "expect[s] the state gradually to become the Kingdom of God... The state as such, the neutral, pagan, ignorant state knows nothing of the Kingdom of God... A state in the likeness of the Kingdom of God [may neither be] projected or proposed... It belongs to the very nature of the state that it is not and cannot become the Kingdom of God" (*Ibid.*, p. 31).
 78. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

79. *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27.
80. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
81. *Ibid.*, p. 96.
82. *Ibid.*
83. *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27.
84. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
85. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
86. *Ibid.*
87. *Ibid.*
88. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
89. *Ibid.*
90. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
91. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
92. *Ibid.*
93. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
94. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
95. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
96. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
97. *Ibid.*
98. *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.
99. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
100. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
101. *Ibid.*
102. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
103. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
104. *Ibid.*
105. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
106. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
107. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
108. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
109. *Ibid.*
110. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
111. Sections 16-26 of "The Christian Community and the Civil Community," *Against the Stream*, London: SCM Press, 1954, pp. 35-42. The points of correspondence Barth lists are the following:
 1. From the notion which for Barth is a self-evident fact that God reclaimed man by sending Jesus, he deduces "man's claim against sin and death" and then identifies "sin and death" as the state of nature (of the war of all against all from which the Leviathan delivers man by subjecting him to law and limiting his freedom (Sec. 16, pp. 35-36). Against this deduction, it may be argued that the "sin and death" from which Jesus saved are not the Hobbesian war Barth claims them to be; that Jesus' claim, or salvation, may not be the replacement of this so-called state of nature by an orderly political state.
 2. From the notion that Jesus "came to seek and save the lost," Barth concludes that the state ought to regard as its primary responsibility the care for "the poor, the socially and economically weak and threatened;" that it should realize "the greatest measure of social justice" (Sec. 17, p. 36). This interpretation limits Jesus' mission to the lost of Israel, social justice to the poor and to the socially and economically weak being something specific to Jewish society. But this is an affirmation of Jewish tribalism. It is therefore sheer construction to hold that 'lost' meant for Jesus 'the poor' rather than 'the rich', 'the economically weak'

rather than the capitalists and hence the 'lost' are not only the 'lost' of Israel but the lost of all mankind. At least, Barth here goes counter to Jesus' own position expressed in the parable of the rich, of the camel and needle.

3. From the notion that "the Word of grace and the spirit" ought to be accepted freely, Barth infers the political rights of suffrage, of association, of determining education, science, art, and culture (Sec. 19, pp. 36-37). And yet, he insists, the essential nature of the state is coercion and brute force. Moreover, he is neither for "out-and-out dictatorship," nor for "out-and-out Laissez-Faire," but is prepared to back a system in which both state and citizen determine values. Here, the allegory completely breaks down: For under Barthian terms, man plays no part whatever, as creator or giver, in the dispensation of grace. See also parag. 8 below.

4. From the notion of "the one Body of the one Head," Barth deduces that in the state, neither the individual nor the collective may have the last word, but 'the being' of the individual and 'the being' of the collective, or the 'preservation' of both (Sec. 19, p. 37). This entails that neither should determine the other, but that each subsists in perfectly free dualism. But is such dualism true of the relationship of Christ, the Head, with the community, the Body?

5. From the notion of the unity of faith and baptism, Barth concludes that in the state there should be no restriction of "political freedom... of certain classes and races... of women." (Sec. 20, p. 38). However, the unity of faith is itself the unity of truth and the alternative to the true, is the probable or the false. No tolerance is ever possible here without compromise to truth. Barth had preciously told us that because the state can have no concern for truth, its topmost wisdom is tolerance (*Ibid.*, p. 24). But how can the unity of truth now achieve that which Barth had told us was the prerogative of the absence of truth?

6. From the obscure notion that there is a "variety of the gifts and tasks of the one Holy Spirit," Barth infers that in the state there is "need to separate the different functions and powers—the legislative, executive and the judicial" (Sec. 21, pp. 38-39). With typical bad conscience that this Barthian piece of illogic convinces no one, Barth furnishes other reasons, viz., "the endangering [of] the sovereignty of the law," "the disrupt [ion] rather than promot[ion of] the unity of the common enterprise" (*Ibid.*, p. 38). This should add further evidence of how utilitarian, rather than Christian, is Barth's theory of society.

7. From the beautiful rhetoric of "the disclosure of the true God and His revelation, from Him as the Light that has been lit in Jesus Christ to destroy the works of darkness," and "the dawning of the day of the Lord," Barth concludes that "all secret policies and secret diplomacy" is condemnable and ought to be abolished (Sec. 22, p. 39). Besides the need for logic, Barth here betrays need to be reminded that: "The God that sees in secret..." etc.

8. From the notion that "the human word is capable of being the free vehicle and mouthpiece of the free word of God," Barth infers that the human word must be trustworthy in the political sphere" (Sec. 23, pp. 39-40). In matters religious, the human word is not trusted absolutely but in the measure it agrees with what is canonical. With Holy Writ as base and check, the human word may travel far; but, Barth would certainly grant, never as far as to contradict it. In the case of the state, Barth has already laid down that there is no principle, no ideal state, no political theory against which the political human word may be checked. The preservation of man from war and chaos provides but nebulous possibilities for checking the worth or unworth of political controversy.

9. From the notion that "as the disciples of Christ, the members of His Church do not rule but serve," Barth deduces that the rulers ought to be not 'rulers' but

'servants', and distinguishes between *potestas*, or service under the law, and *potentia*, or rule before the law (Sec. 24, p. 40). But the so-called 'servants' do precisely no less than 'rule before the law' since it is not given for any human to approach Christ except through them. True, man may discover Christ by himself, but he may not 'live in' Christ without them. They are then, in a sense, absolutely necessary for salvation and stand on earth as the lieutenants of the Godhead. Secondly, from what Barth had so far told us about the nature of the state, the notion of 'service under the law' is a piece of political propaganda which the leviathan invents to camouflage his *potentia*; for all that is possible for the state is positive law, the human, 'provisional', 'pagan', 'ignorant' invention.

10. From the notion that the Church is 'ecumenical' Barth concludes "all abstract local, regional and national interests in the political sphere" must be resisted (Sec. 25, pp. 40-41). But the Protestant Church is always the Church of a locality, a city or a political nation. Barth has defined the Church as "the commonality of the people in one place, region or country who are called apart..." That is to say, they are called apart in contradistinction from the other people. Separateness and particularism are of the essence. Moreover, Barth always speaks of "all the cities of the realm" meaning of course not to go beyond the strictly national-political boundaries of the national churches. And granted that the Church is as Barth says in a second thought, genuinely ecumenical, it does not follow that what obtains therein should obtain in the state without mutation. For it is not a copy, but an analogy that is sought here.

11. From the notion that God does show at times His anger and will certainly bring His judgement, Barth infers that the state may, though only as a last resort, use violence and conduct war for realizing its end of preserving itself (Sec. 26, pp. 41-42). Barth's reference to God's 'anger' betrays a Hebrew Jehovic conception of the deity and stands at the farthest possible remove from Jesus who saw no reason for violence even when his very life was the object of it. Without non-violence as an absolute principle of all ethics, the Sermon on the Mount would be sheer hypocrisy. Barth is careful to add not only the permissibility of a defensive war, but of an aggressive one, as a preventive "against an external threat," or "an armed rising against a regime that is no longer worthy of...its task" (*ibid.*, p. 41), forgetfully unaware that since the state was built on such unethical grounds as he had laid down for it, it is futile to introduce distinctions of 'worth', or of 'tasks'. On Barth's utilitarian basis, nothing can be built except the order of the forest, of catch who catch can. To subvert or to undermine one's own or another's state, to launch an aggressive war against one's neighbours, can never be condemned on such basis.

112. Barth, p. 8.

113. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

114. *Ibid.*, p. 75.

115. "If the faith of the church," Barth writes, "is the faith which believes that God intervenes on behalf of sinful man, as a poor man to whom God by His own agency sees justice done, then he who so believes will as such be summoned to recognize a parable of his own need before God in every situation where he hears human crying out for human justice" (*Ibid.*). "The summons of the divine predecision, the sanctification which comes from all eternity and therefore, once and for all in the election of Jesus Christ, is that in all its human questionableness and frailty the life of the elect should become its image and repetition and attestation and acknowledgement" (Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, Vol. II, Part 2, Edinburgh, 1957, p. 512).

116. Barth, *The Church and the Political Problem of Our Day*, Hodder and Stoughton, London: 1939, p. 6.
117. Barth, *Against the Stream*, p. 42.
118. *Ibid.*
119. *Ibid.*, p. 43.
120. *Ibid.*, p. 78.
121. *Ibid.*, p. 79.
122. *Church Dogmatics*, II, Part 2, 558. In Jesus Christ, Barth writes, "the obedience demanded of us men has already been rendered. In Him the realization of the good corresponding to divine election has already taken place—and so completely that we, for our part, have actually nothing to add, but have only to endorse this event by our action. The ethical problem of church dogmatics can consist only in the question whether and to what extent human action is a glorification of the grace of Jesus Christ," (*Ibid.*, p. 540).
123. *Ibid.*, p. 518.
124. *Ibid.*, p. 559.
152. *Ibid.*, p. 518.
126. *Ibid.*, p. 543.
127. *Ibid.*, p. 546.
128. *Ibid.*, p. 547.
129. *Ibid.*, p. 539.
130. *Ibid.*, p. 559.
131. *Ibid.*, pp. 509 ff.
132. *Ibid.*, pp. 566 ff.
133. *Ibid.*, p. 566.
134. *Ibid.*, p. 568.
135. *Ibid.*, p. 570.
136. *Ibid.*, p. 571.
137. *Ibid.*, p. 578.
138. *Ibid.*
139. *Ibid.*
140. *Ibid.*
141. *Ibid.*, p. 568.
142. "Casting down imaginations, and every high thing that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God, and bringing into captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ" (II Cor. 10:5).
143. The last chapter in Barth's *The Word of God and The Word of Man* is entitled "The Christian's Place in Society". Its last sentences, answering the question of what ought we, as Christians, do? read as follows: "We can indeed do only one thing—not many. But it is just that one thing which we do not do. What can the Christian in society do but follow attentively what is done by God?"
144. *Church Dogmatics*, II, Part II, 569.
145. *Ibid.*
146. *Ibid.*, p. 578.
147. *Ibid.*
148. Matthew.
149. "...Christianity is now proved impossible as an ethic...the ways of European man are now proved impossible in relation to the ethic of Christianity" (*The Word of God and the Word of Man*, p. 147).
150. *Church Dogmatics*, II, Part II, 569-70.
151. *The Word of God and the Word of Man*, pp. 175-76.

152. *Ibid.*, p. 176.
153. *Ibid.*, p. 177.
154. *Ibid.*, p. 139.
155. *Ibid.*, p. 140.
156. *Ibid.*, p. 150.
157. "Who can transform the No of the ethical problem...into a Yes? That such a thing may ultimately be done—but not by us—is a possibility...but so far as we are concerned, it lies deeper in the No than in the Yes...To us, it [the problem of ethics] reveals more clearly the negative of life, the judgement upon humanity" (*Ibid.*, pp. 151-52).
158. Anxious to dissociate extrinsic from intrinsic values, Barth falls inadvertently into the error of mistaking finitude with finality. Thus he writes, "our question is not answered when we perceive the inner meaning...which relates our conduct to this or that proximate and finite goal. For this or that goal must look toward its own goal, and so on toward the ultimate goal of all goals (i.e. the intrinsic, final good, or value)—and so our question reaches toward a good which lies beyond all existence" (*Ibid.*, p. 141). The final good or value is not at all necessarily one which "lies beyond all existence", which is infinite, but may well be both finite and in this existence.
159. "Ethics can no more exist without millenarianism...than without the idea of a moral personality. The man who claims he is happily free from this *Judaica opinio* has either not yet learned or has forgotten what the ethical problem really is" (*Ibid.*, p. 158).
160. *Against the Stream*, pp. 15-16.
161. *The Christian Life*, p. 46.
162. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
163. See Barth's criticism of the "Reformed Church of the New Reich," *Theological Existence To-day*, tr. by R. Birch Hoyle, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1933. Significantly, Barth writes: "And above all, to set the ball arolling for Christian Reform by means of proclamations of a new and unheard-of rule of theological standard?" (*Ibid.*, p. 27).
164. *The Church and the Political Problem of Our Day*, p. 30. This little book itself is subtitled: "The church ceases to be the Church if it shirks the Political Problems of Totalitarianism".
165. Barth calls the church that does not take political action, though such a church may be completely absorbed in either proclamation and imitation or both, "a church that has become a dumb dog." (*The Church and the Political Problem of Our Day*, p. 21) Even a church that prays is, for him, utterly inadequate. "The matter cannot rest with the prayer of the church as such," he writes: for "when we earnestly pray for the suppression and casting out of National Socialism or hence for the restoration of church and state, when we are ourselves *eo ipso* summoned to do what is humanly possible towards that for which we pray" (*Ibid.*, p. 74). Thus, Barth wants the church "to work on her [the state's] own restoration [where it has been violated] and preservation." Though at one place he admits that the church cannot wield the sword, yet he demands of the members of the church to do so in no uncertain terms. To the negative statement that the church cannot wield the sword he adds a "but" and this is how it reads: "But the church in all members forms a solidarity with the state which, as a just state, as a state not yet lost to tyranny or anarchy, actively resists the radical dissolution of the just state." (*Ibid.*, p. 78) Elsewhere he writes: "The word of God may also...call to decision, to battle...to enter the fray and soil its [the Church's] hands. The

- church must then have no fear of unexpected enemies" (*Against the Stream*, p. 88) Then he tells that "the frontier between Czecho-Slovakia and the Third German Reich in September, 1938 was such a frontier," (*The Church and the Political Problem of the Day*, p. 78) a frontier where the just state was facing dissolution at the hands of an unjust state thus pointing the concrete place and time where the battle itself ought to be waged.
166. "As over against the church—what it is concerned with and those who belong to it—there stand other assemblies, places and communities from which it is distinguished" (*Credo*, p. 138). Barth discusses with relish the etymology of *Ecclesia* and asserts that "it describes therefore a place that is definite and bounded and to that extent made prominent" (*Ibid.*, p. 137).
 167. *Against the Stream*, p. 41.
 168. *Ibid.*
 169. *The Church and the Political Problem of Our day*, pp. 59, 64.
 170. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
 171. *Against the Stream*, p. 77.
 172. *Ibid.*, p. 200.
 173. *The Church and The Political Problem of Our Day*, p. 51.
 174. The ethical problem itself acquired a very special gravity for Barth because of the defeat of Germany in World War I which he represents to himself in terms not much different from those which the Nazi racialists were using to achieve power. "When the negro," he writes, "is on the Rhine and Lenin on the throne of the Czar, and when the dollar stands at over two thousand marks [we have a situation] we shudder to be living in" (*The Word of God and the Word of Man*, p. 144).
 175. *Against the Stream*, p. 19.
 176. *The Church and the Political Problem of Our Day*, p. 43.
 177. *God in Action*, tr. by E. G. Homrighausen, Edinburgh, 1936, pp. 94-95. Witness or testimony by deeds Barth declares unimportant. "God communicates with men also by deeds. The Bible calls such manifestations 'signs'. But, as a whole, when it speaks of testimony, it means a word spoken by a man to other men. Exceptions... only serve to confirm the rule" (*Ibid.*, p. 95).
 178. *The Church and the Political Problem of Our Day*, p. 21.
 179. *Ibid.*, p. 52.
 180. See his answer to E. Brunner's accusations on this matter in *Against the Stream*, pp. 113 ff.
 181. No words can express Barth's irrational, paradoxical mind better than his own; and they have remained true to this mind to the last letter. For his farewell lecture in July, 1962, at the University of Basel, Barth, then seventy four years of age, chose the topic "Thy Kingdom come". "Christians," he told his audience, breaking a higher record of paradoxical thinking of which he is the undaunted prince, "should act not according to rigid principles, but only according to what their faith tells them is God's will in Jesus Christ" (*Time*, July 14, 1962). But lest anybody mistake this as an assertion of principle, however churchly, dogmatic or Christianist it may be—indeed, as an assertion of anything at all—Barth continued in incomparably clear and precise words: "Christians should be free," he said, "to give an attenuated yes or no—according to circumstances—whenever an absolute categorical position is expected of them, and a categorical yes or no whenever no such stand is being asked for" (*Ibid.*). The *Time* reporter understood him rightly when he added, in comment, though quoting more of Barth's own words on this solemn occasion: In other words, a Christian should feel free "to say yes today when he said no yesterday" (*Ibid.*).

182. Part of the introduction of this section and the discussion of Reinhold Niebuhr's theory of Christian society have appeared as an article by the author entitled "On the Significance of Niebuhr's Ideas of Society" in *The Canadian Journal of Theology*, VII (1961), No. 3, 99-107.
183. Except when the subject in question is French colonialism in Africa. Expressing the kind of paternalism imperialists delight in, Schweitzer writes: "There can be no question with these peoples [the Africans] of real independence, but only whether it is better for them to be delivered over to the mercies, tender or otherwise, of rapacious native tyrants or to be governed by officials of European states.... Even the hitherto prevailing 'imperialism' can plead that it has qualities of ethical value" (*Out of My Life and Thought*, tr. by C. T. Campion, New York: Mentor Books, 1955, pp. 147-48). In 1957 Schweitzer appealed to President Eisenhower to interfere so as to prevent a United Nations debate on Algeria.
184. See Albert Schweitzer, *The Philosophy of Civilization*, New York: MacMillan, 1949, Chap. VII, pp. 94 ff. Presumably, Western man would vehemently contend that the dominant idea of Jesus' ethic was the renunciation of 'the World', and would, as will be noted in the sequel, advance interpretations of that ethic which would safeguard 'the World' against attack. This typically Western attitude ought to be regarded as an instance of the point that Western consciousness is often incapable of understanding Jesus except as affirming 'the World'.
185. R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, New York: Mentor Books, 1950, pp. 203-5.
186. It may be contended here that in this predicament Western man does not stand alone; that all men fall short of what they ought to be: that all men more or less recognize this ethical shortcoming; and that there is hardly a people whose record is free of aggression and hostility against one another or their neighbours—which is all true. The point, however, is not one of the veracity or otherwise of these propositions, but of the conflict Western man's deeds produce in his own consciousness which approves and does not approve of them at the same time. The uniqueness of Western man lies in his conscious commitment to both 'the World' and the ethic of Jesus. Attila and Genghis Khan made war in the consciousness that their gods did, and the monastic recluse who sins does so in the consciousness that his God does not, approve. Western man alone commits aggression in the consciousness both that his deed is ethically right and that it violates the ethic of Jesus his God.
187. Western man has poured the vials of his wrath upon Germany, his own child, because, under National Socialism, the latter dared to believe in and profess the 'righteousness' of Western man's self-assertion.
188. F. Dostoevsky, *The Brothers Karamazov*, tr. by C. Garnett, New York: Modern Library, Book VI, "The Russian Monk," pp. 295. ff.
189. John 18:36.
190. Joseph C. McLelland, *The Other Six Days: Man and the Things he Calls his Own*, Toronto: Burns and MacEachern, Ltd., 1959, p. 104.
191. This is the title McLelland gave in his book, ch. 4, p. 38, to the Reformation movement which according to him, did not fulfil what was expected of it (pp. 51 ff. 54 ff., 57 ff.).
192. *Ibid.*, Ch. 6, pp. 79-105.
193. *Ibid.*, p. 104.
194. *Ibid.*, Cf. Hendrik Kraemer, *A Theology of the Laity*, Butterworth, 1958, p. 130, 169 ff.
195. Luke 18:22; Acts 12:8-9. Instances of this following occur in Matthew 16:24;

- 19:27; Mark 8:34; 10:21, 28; Luke 5:28, etc.
196. That this is precisely what the term 'world-centered' means in the hands of McLelland is evident. In the same concluding chapter, he quotes the World Council of Churches Assembly in Amsterdam (1948) calling for "new, creative solutions" to the problems of communism and laissez-faire capitalism from the Christian "responsible society" (*The other Six Days*, pp. 79 ff). "Responsible society," McLelland goes on, quoting the Evanston, 1954 Assembly, "refers to the 'new trends' evident in the modern world, chiefly the way in which society is taking the control of economic affairs out of the sphere of 'automatic responses'" (pp. 81-82). McLelland even gives us an example of typical Christian social action. "One instance", he writes, "of such Christian social action, in our opinion is that fruitful movement... which produced the Malvern Conference in 1941.... The present system in which the great resources of society are owned by private individuals who exercise no responsibility is a 'stumbling-block' to Christian living: therefore 'Is it not the duty of any individual who has become a Christian to do what he can to bring this system of ownership to an end?'... What the Christendom Association and the Industrial Christian Fellowship propose is... Balanced Economy, in which modernized husbandry would develop agricultural resources in proportion to industrial expansion; True Trade... Monetary Reform... [and]... guild structure... [or]... the demand that every worker should have a real voice in the industry carried on by means of his labour" (*Ibid.*, pp. 84-85). That these reforms are desirable is not the point in question, but whether or not they may be said to constitute the essential meaning of 'being Christian'. McLelland quotes Dorothy Sayers approvingly as saying: "The Church's approach to an intelligent carpenter is usually confined to exhorting him not to be drunk and disorderly in his leisure hours and to come to church on Sundays. What the Church should be telling him is this: that the very first demand that his religion makes upon him is that he should make good tables" (*Ibid.* p. 87). The supreme Christian virtue of charity, Jesus' supreme law of love, are here declared impotent, as McLelland echoes a cry of the unemployed in England, "Damn your charity—we want justice." (*Ibid.*, p. 86). Jesus' great emphasis on the priority of love to justice is here diluted. "We must add," writes McLelland, "what we said above about the replacement of the modern virtue of 'charity' by that Christian love which works for social justice" (*Ibid.*). Justice is now the higher, the more conditioned, the final value for which love is made subservient. "Since the Gospel has its own law, love will operate through justice and this Christian insight will become action in terms of rights" (*Ibid.*). The fundamental ethical vision of Jesus that love, or charity, is the higher value because it calls man to self-exertion not demanded by justice, drawing him to realms of self-giving where justice by nature cannot take man, is here evidently lost.
197. *Supra*, n. 195.
198. F. Holmström, *Das Eschatologische Denken der Gegenwart*, 1936; K. H. Charles, *A Critical History of the Doctrine of A Future Life in Israel, in Judaism and in Christianity* (Jowett Lectures, 1898-99), 1913; W. O. E. Oesterley, *The Doctrine of the Last Things, Jewish and Christian*, 1908.
199. English Translation, *The Mystery of the Kingdom of God*, London, 1925.
200. English Translation by E. C. Hoskyns, *Commentary On Romans*, Oxford, 1933.
201. *Christus und die Zeit*, Zurich, 1946.
202. *The Fulness of Time*, 1952.
203. *Han Som Kommer*. Copenhagen: G. E. C. Gad, 1951, English translation by G. W. Anderson, *He That Cometh*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1959.

204. "Come unto me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me; for I am meek and lowly in heart: and ye shall find rest unto your souls. For my yoke is easy, and my burden is light" (Matthew 11:28-30).
205. "There remaineth therefore a rest to the people of God. For he that is entered into his rest, he also hath ceased from his own works, as God did from his. Let us labour therefore [RSV, strive] to enter into that rest... (Hebrews 4:9-11).
206. Revelations 22:3.
207. *Ibid.*, 21 in toto.
208. *The Other Six Days*, p. 102.
209. *Ibid.*
210. "The very first demand that his [the carpenter's] religion makes upon him is that he should make good tables [*Ibid.*, p. 87]...The proper service of the Lord's day... The Sunday Service is really the *work* by which his daily job is to be judged" (*Ibid.*, p. 101).
211. *Ibid.*, p. 102.
212. *Ibid.*
213. *Ibid.*
214. *Ibid.*
215. *Ibid.*, p. 103.
216. *Ibid.*, p. 104.
217. The previous Section (C 1) of this chapter.
218. "The Heresy of Joy," *The Divinity School News*, University of Chicago, August 1, 1959, pp. 1-6.
219. *Ibid.*, p. 2; Nehemiah 8:10.
220. Warner, p. 5.
221. "We ask, 'Is fulfilment really possible' [Paul Tillich's 'essential and central fulfilment']? And over and over again we answer: 'No, no, no...but yes' " (*Ibid.*).
222. *Ibid.*
223. F. W. Nietzsche, *Also Sprach Zarathustra*, III, Section 15, 3.
224. F. W. Nietzsche, *The Antichrist*, Section 18. The English is that of Walter Kaufmann in *The Portable Nietzsche*, New York: The Viking Press, 1954, pp. 585-86.
225. "Society is in a perpetual state of war" (R. Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, New York: Scribner's 1955, p. 19). For Niebuhr this is an axiom. He then quotes Bentham approvingly: "The clue to the interior of the labyrinth...is the principle of self-preference. Man, from the very constitution of his nature, prefers his own happiness to that of all other sentient beings put together"; and adds: "The judgement may be a little too pessimistic...but it is nearer the truth than the early hope of the utilitarians that reason could resolve the conflict between self-interest and social interest" (*Ibid.*, p. 46).
226. According to Niebuhr, "man is a child of nature, subject to its vicissitudes, compelled by its necessities, driven by its impulses," (*The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation*, New York: Scribner's, 1941, I, 3).
227. R. Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, p. 260. Incidentally, this is also identically the view of F. Nietzsche, who regards modern Western man as an animal whom Christian morality had tamed by means of making him sick; i.e., by teaching him to distrust and deny his instincts. "I call an animal, a species, an individual corrupt," he wrote, "when it loses its instincts, when it selects and prefers that which is detrimental to it....Life itself is nothing more nor less than the instinct of growth, of permanence, of accumulating forces, of power: where the will to power is lacking, degradation sets in" (*The Antichrist*, tr. by A. M.

Ludovici, Section 6).

228. "Man...is a sinner...because he is betrayed by his very ability to survey the whole to imagine himself the whole" (*The Nature and Destiny of Man; A Christian Interpretation*, I, 17). "The Freedom of his spirit causes him to break the harmonies of nature and the pride of spirit prevents him from establishing a new harmony....His failure to observe the limits of his finite existence causes him to defy the restraints of both nature and reason" (*Ibid.*). Niebuhr had previously told us that the nature of nature was conflict and self-seeking; now he is introducing the concept of a "harmony of nature" in order to ground in nature Christian salvation which would otherwise remain outside of it.
229. "It is...unthinkable that a group should be able to attain a sufficiently consistent unselfish attitude toward other groups to give it a very potent redemptive power" (*Moral Man and Immoral Society*, p. 26).
230. *An Interpretation of Christian Ethics*, New York: Harper, 1935, p. 117.
231. *Ibid.*, p. 56.
232. *Ibid.*
233. "Individual men may be moral in the sense that they are able to consider interests other than their own in determining problems of conduct, and are capable, on occasion, of preferring the advantages of others to their own...[But for societies such] achievements are...impossible" (*Moral Man and Immoral Society*, p. xi).
234. *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, p.xi.
235. *Ibid.*, p.xv.
236. *Ibid.*, p. xx.
237. *Ibid.*, pp. 270-71.
238. *Ibid.*, p. xii.
239. *Ibid.*, p. 268.
240. *Ibid.*, p. 272.
241. *Ibid.*, p. 267.
242. *Ibid.*, pp. 261-62.
243. *Ibid.*, p. 259.
244. "In the field of collective behavior the force of egoistic passion is so strong that the only harmonies possible are those which manage to neutralize this force through balance of power, through mutual defences against its inordinate expression" (*An Interpretation of Christian Ethics*, p. 140). Niebuhr condemns international co-operation as "acceptance of traditional injustices and...preference of subtler types of coercion" (*Ibid.*, p. 233). "Marxian philosophy is more true than pacifism" in that the former "has good reason to insist that the elimination of coercion is a futile ideal but that the rational use of coercion is a possible achievement which may save society" (*Ibid.*, p. 235).
245. *Ibid.*, p. 244.
246. "The unqualified character of this devotion [nationalist sentiment] is the very basis of the nation's power and of the freedom to use the power without moral restraint" (*Ibid.*, p. 91).
247. *Ibid.*
248. *Ibid.*
249. *Ibid.* The words are those of "Tyrrell, the Catholic modernist," whom Niebuhr quotes with full approbation.
250. *Ibid.*, p. 95. "The dishonesty of nations is a necessity of policy if the nation is to gain the full benefit of its double claim upon the loyalty and devotion of the individual, as his own special and unique community and as a community which

embodies universal values and ideals. The two claims...are incompatible with each other and can be resolved only through dishonesty" (*Ibid.*, pp. 95-96). Again, "society...merely cumulates the egoism of individuals, and transmutes their individual altruism into collective egoism.... For this reason, no group acts from purely unselfish or even mutual intent and politics is therefore bound to be a contest for power" ("Human Nature and Social Change," *Christian Century*, 1933, p. 363).

251. Ernst Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*, tr. by Olive Wyon, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1949, I, 58.
252. Kenneth Cragg, *Sandals at the Mosque: Christian Presence amid Islam*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1959, pp. 123-25, 131-36. P. J. Vatikiotis, "Recent Developments in Islam," in *Tensions in the Middle East*, Philip W. Thayer, ed., Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1958, pp. 170-71. A complete example of this Western impatience with the societistically oriented and community-based character of Islam is, strangely enough, *The Social Structure of Islam*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957 of Reuben Levy, a Western Jew. Its classical expression, however, is Wilfred C. Smith's *Islam in Modern History*, Princeton University Press, 1958, Chap. I, "Introduction: Islam and History," pp. 3-40.
253. See note 251.
254. Troeltsch, II, 999, 1002-03, 1005-06.

EPILOGUE

In the foregoing, we sought to present the dominant ideas of Christian ethics, to analyze them systematically and historically. These ideas were found to be peccatism and saviourism; or the principles governing the Christian understanding of sin and salvation. As held by the minds which formed and crystallized the Christian faith, peccatism and saviourism deviated widely from the faith and teaching of Jesus, the Son of Mary, inasmuch as that faith and teaching have been established. If, *per impossibile*, it is contended that there never was such an event as the historical Jesus, or that, as Albert Schweitzer argued in his famous *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*¹, the only evidence we have for such an event is merely the 'reports of faith', there must have then been several such reports which criticism is certainly capable of sifting, whose genesis and development history is capable of tracing, and whose historical relations to one another critical examination is capable of revealing. Our claim would still hold good that the 'reports of faith' characterized by peccatism and saviourism deviate widely from that 'report of faith' characterized by freedom from paradox, by its coherence with the history of prophethood, with the dominant world-view of the land and people of the figure, Jesus, unto which the faith has projected its focus and center, by its correspondence with the ethical realities within the Semitic stream of being in which Christianity arose. Indeed, this pristine Christian faith has never disappeared from history; but has survived, alongside the other traditions, within Scripture as well as within thought and history, as the cornerstone of the Christian faith as a whole.

Deviation from this pristine Christian faith that is easily identifiable with the religion of the person, Jesus, has been the source of great trouble. It was responsible for the conflicts—otherwise known as heresies and schisms—in the formative first centuries as well as after the Reformation. In the former period, deviation was justified by the verdict of an authority set up by the deviationists themselves. This authority was that of the Church of the imperial capital, Rome, which henceforward called itself the only one Catholic and Apostolic Church exclusively endowed with the whole truth of Jesus Christ. The dissidents, now themselves called deviationists and schismatics, were excommunicated, banished, persecuted, and disposed of. After this authority broke down in the Reformation, the same authority, was vested in the Scripture as understood and interpreted by the tradition, and the latter was defined as consisting of the opposite—i.e., deviating—traditions exclusively. Whereas hitherto, Christianity was defined as the religion of Jesus as interpreted by the Church magisterium exclusively, the Reformation substituted for

that magisterium the Christianist tradition which elbowed imperialistically all other traditions out of existence. For the shaking of Church authority provided the opportunity for dissension as to what constitutes the faith of Jesus to spring anew. However, the new locus of authority, namely, Scripture *plus* the Christianist tradition, was hardly capable of composing the wide differences that separated the new sects; and the national state, whether openly or behind the national Church, supplemented the authority of Scripture and tradition to hereticate and crush the dissenting voices. Even so, these voices were not all to be silenced. Though many a Christian idea was squelched in the process, the faith of Jesus proliferated into some two hundred and fifty sects.

Before and after the Reformation, the problem was the same, as well as the malaise. That which the adherents held to be of ultimate meaning and concern on the level of actual existence, had to be related to the Christianist tradition of the Church as taught by the differing sects. But since these constituted their own authorities as to the nature of the cumulative tradition, any contending theory or doctrine could take refuge in the individualistic isolation—now become legitimate—of its own stance in the historical process.

The situation became further complicated by the advent of Biblical criticism and the rise of modern scientific knowledge. To the pristine faith of Jesus, the cumulative tradition with its differing interpretations of itself, the relativities of historical determination by national culture and geography, and the ethical realities of existence and life, there was now added a fifth category with which all new statements of the faith were required to cohere, namely, ancient history and modern science. No interpretation of the faith has so far succeeded; and the reason is simply that none of them was bold enough to by-pass the tradition as final authority, and to bring its own relativities of history under judgement of the pristine faith of Jesus. For the tradition had so assertively arrogated to itself the right to define the faith as to make itself inseparable therefrom in the Christian interpreter's mind. Moreover, being what we have found it in our analysis to be, the tradition has built into itself all the elements which make any sensible relating of modern man's search for ultimate meaning in life, as well as his ethical reality, to itself impossible. As the analysis has exposed them, these elements are irrationalism and paradox, necessary fallenness of man and nature, redemption as *fait accompli*, absolute distrust of the historical process, and individualism. Certainly, modern Christian literature is full of the opposites of all these, not flowing naturally from the dogmatic expression of the faith, but arising as real and hard stumbling blocks which have to be agonistically integrated into and forcibly harmonized with that faith conceived in terms of the Christianist

tradition alone. The simple fact that these acrobatic efforts are being made establishes for us the nature of the modern Christian, rather than that of the Christian faith. And, as outsiders yet his brethren in the world-ecumene, we shudder at and bemoan his futile sport. What is needed above all is for the Christian to realize his own predicament, namely, the impossibility of reconciling his traditionalist faith with either the pristine faith of Jesus or the demands of the modern mind and heart. What is needed is not less than a 'Reformation'; a reformation which, unlike that of Luther which was directed against the authority of the Church, will be directed against the authority of the cumulative tradition.

In saying this, however, we do not mean that in order to come into the religious and ethical presence of this century, the Christian has to throw his whole tradition overboard. What we do mean is that he should achieve freedom in relation to it, from its ambiguous beginnings in the Gospels and St. Paul to Paul Tillich and Karl Barth. Tradition may still enjoy great didactic value; and the new re-presentation of the faith stands to learn and to gain from the closest affiliation therewith. But this the Christian will have to learn, namely, that no question may henceforward be declared out-of-bounds, not even those questions which the tradition has so far declared settled once and for all at Nicaea, in A.D. 325. Indeed, that is precisely where the job of reconstruction has to begin. "Back to Nicaea", and even "before Nicaea", will have to be its war cry if it is to succeed.

This 'Second Reformation' which is fortunately in the making—the acrobatic, agonistical interpreters of the faith being everywhere a small minority destined to be by-passed by history with little or no let or hindrance—will go beyond the tradition to Jesus, the Son of Mary, as mouthpiece for the Holy and exemplification of the moral law. There, it will learn anew that God did not create man and the world in sport, or as ephemeral testing ground, but as a theater for final actualization of Divine Will; that man has in this world and history a task to fulfil; that the fulfilment of that task is possible because of man's innocence as well as his endowment with the necessary and fitting faculties; that the performance of this task is the sole measure of religious and ethical felicity; and, finally, that the performance of this task, if it is really to be itself, must be, as the Son of Mary has taught, a task performed in humility, in freedom, in purity, in charity, in love of God.

To establish this thought will be the task of the new Christian theology, a theology disciplined by the great principle of Protestantism and hence capable of saying a resolute "no" to every attempt at apotheosizing any creature—including the Christian tradition itself with all its interpreters,

all its creeds, all its apologies whether, Apostolic or saintly. The new theology will be at once Protestant and Islamic precisely on account of its emphatic refusal to put man or any of his creations on the plane which belongs exclusively to the unconditioned—to God, to His will, and to the revealed expression of this very principle in the language of thought. The religious traditions of mankind—not to speak of the Christianist tradition—will instruct and educate the new theology. But its inspiration and loyalty must forever belong to the Transcendent Being alone Who, as object of human knowledge but never in Himself, and hence *in percipi* but never *in esse*, coalesces with the realm of values, of the moral law.

Here, in the rediscovery and reconstruction of the Christian faith, the Muslim intellectual who, standing in the same religious and ethical presence of this century, has rediscovered the pristine 'Protestantism' of Islam and disciplined himself thereby to brush away the cumulative scum of the centuries, can only be to the Christian seeker a brother conscripted in a cause identically the same as his own. The Muslim-Christian dialogue would then come to mean the dialectic of a mutual spiritual midwifery whose object is the vision of God and the doing of His will, value-sensing and value-actualizing in space-time. The final end to which such dialogue will lead, besides its own perpetuation and intensification, can only be the perfecting of creation, God's first and final purpose. In such a dialogue, the verse "O People of the Book! Come now to a fair principle common to both of us, that we serve none but God, that we associate not aught with Him, and that we do not take one another as lords apart from God"² will then ring in both the Muslim's and Christian's ear with new meaning and, we hope, a new moving appeal.

NOTES

1. Translated by W. Montgomery, New York: The MacMillan Company, 1957.
2. Qur'an, 3 : 64.

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